Misuse of President's Rule for partisan politics:

An empirical judgment

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Chapter 1

Introduction

An important debate in the literature of center-state relations is the misuse of President's rule by the central government. It has been subjected to several criticisms ever since its initial impositions in the 1950s. The general notion is that the state governments which do not belong to the same political alliance have been dissolved on several instances unconstitutionally. Previous literature has pointed out several anecdotal evidence which supports these accusations. However, there is a dearth of statistical evidence to support this. This study makes an attempt at addressing the question as to whether or not there has been a significant strategical misuse of article 356 for political vendetta. More specifically, this paper looks for two aspects of political vendetta. First, whether or not there is evidence that the political alignment between the center and state governments plays an important role in determining the imposition of President's rule in the states. Second, whether there are gains, for the party in power at the center when President's rule was imposed, in terms of increased vote share in the upcoming elections in the constituencies within the state. We find that the chances of imposing President's rule in non-aligned states are higher and that there are definite gains for the ruling party in the center in the upcoming assembly elections in the state where it was imposed. The study also

makes an attempt to connect the timely imposition of president's rule to parliamentary political cycles. Using this, we find that the strategic gains from that state are likely to be positive at the beginning of the cycle rather than at the end for both the upcoming assembly and the parliament elections. The timeline for this empirical analysis is 1968 to 1996[1] using political and economic data for 14 major states[2] in India.

The provisions regarding President's rule is unique to the Constitution of India. It has been provided with the view to maintain unity and integrity of the country, law and order, and proper functioning of State governments. On the report of the Governor of a state, or otherwise, if the President is satisfied that the state machinery can no longer function in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, Proclamation for Presidential rule is made under article 356 of the Constitution of India.[3] After its imposition, the President may assume any or all of the powers of the government of the state while the powers of the legislature of the state can be exercised by the parliament[4]. The state assembly can be dissolved if the central government deems it to be necessary, irrespective of whether it has a majority, and call for midterm elections[5] in the state.

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[1]There are two reasons for choosing this time period. One, the boundary of the states selected were stable during this period. The state of Haryana was formed out of Punjab in 1966 and the states of Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand were formed out of former states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar respectively. The boundaries of the constituencies have been changed only once within this period by the Delimitation Commission Act of 1972. It was suspended in 1976 so that family planning acts would not affect states' political representation in the Lok Sabha. Two, the landmark judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India in 1994 in the S. R. Bommai v. Union of India case, which discussed the controversial issues surrounding the imposition of President's rule, has made the misuse of this article more difficult. Since the judgment, courts have revoked unconstitutional dissolution of state assemblies. For examples, see instances of President's rule imposed in Arunachal Pradesh (2016) and Uttarakhand (2016). Details about the incidents and court rulings are on page 6.

[2]The states included in the analysis are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

[3]Excluding Jammu & Kashmir and Union Territories of India.

[4]See article 357 of the Constitution of India for details.

[5]Khemani (2004) observes that 45% of midterm state elections, in 14 major states of India across 1960-1992, followed the imposition of President's Rule.

Before moving on to an overview of the dissertation chapters, the next section discusses some controversial issues, notable points made by various authors in regard to the misuse of President's rule and selected court rulings which help the reader understand how gravely it has been misused and the consequences of such acts.

1.1 Literature Review

Summarizing the criticisms that the emergency provisions received, Pylee (2003) points out that misuse of this Article may lead to the destruction of the federal character of the Constitution. The power of the states might entirely be concentrated in the hands of the union executive, thus, making the union an all-powerful body. The author also mentions its similarity to emergency provisions of other countries, especially article 48 of the Constitution of Weimar Republic (1919) of Germany which reminded critics of how Hilter had used this emergency provision to rise to supreme power. The members of the Drafting Committee, on the other hand, strongly defended the article in the purview of preserving national unity. In reply to the criticisms, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, head of the Drafting Committee, had assured that this Article "will never be brought into operation" and "will remain as a dead letter" except in grave emergency situations.[6] However, after the second imposition of President's Rule in 1953, Ambedkar described it as "the most violent kind of rape on the Constitution".[7]

Critics have also pointed out that the vagueness in the Article regarding what kind of a situation may be defined as a "constitutional failure of state machinery" gives away ground for exploitation. Facts have often been misconstrued by the

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[6]See, B. R. Ambedkar in M. V. Pylee, *Constitutional Government in India* (Bombay, 1965), p. 643, as cited in Dua (1979).

[7]The second instance of President's Rule was imposed in PEPSU in March 1953 where the non-Congress ministry formed by the United Front with Akali Dal as their leading partner was removed from office by the Congress government in the center. See, Khurana (1980).

ruling party in the center and used it against the politically non-aligned state governments to dissolve the assembly and conduct fresh elections. Partisan role of the Center in other aspects of the federal structure facilitates the misuse of this article. Siwach (1985) points out that the relations between central and non-aligned state governments are not in harmony and that there are dismissals, transfers and new appointments of Governors and Chief Justices of High Courts, often explicitly against the wishes of the Chief Minister. The author also points out that the Governor plays a key role in the dismissal of state governments for partisan reasons which can be indirectly viewed as a political move by the ruling party in the Center.

This emergency provision, which is meant to be used in dire circumstances as a "rescue" operation for state governments in trouble, has been used majorly for partisan and personal interests which reduced provincial autonomy to a farce (Dua, 1979). The author points out how Indira Gandhi had used this instrument to liquidate dissent against her autocratic rule, especially from her former party members. There are also instances of President's rule where instead of dissolving, the state legislature is kept in suspended animation. Outwardly, this might seem like a non-partisan move by the central government but Siwach (1985) points out that the decision to dissolve or suspend was made in accordance with selfish interests. The assemblies were suspended whenever the ruling party at the center "felt that it would be in a position to form alternative Ministry either by [maneuvering] defections or otherwise". Assemblies were also suspended to resolve "intra-party" conflicts and this has been used mainly by the Congress party. Assemblies have also been dissolved in order to prevent the opposition from forming the government when the ministries affiliated to the ruling coalition in the center went out of office.[8][9]

The Sarkaria Commission, appointed in 1983, spent four years in researching

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[8]For instances relating to each of the cases mentioned and more, refer to Siwach (1985).

[9]Most of this study will not consider the cases where the assemblies were kept in suspended animation and not dissolved.

reforms to improve center-state relations. The recommendations made by the commission extensively defines the applicability of article 356 and its justifications in full. Unfortunately, the principles and recommendations have been disregarded and the exploitation of the article continued against the spirit of the Constitution (Joseph and Reddy, 2004).

The judiciary system, for a long period of time, withheld itself from providing justice to the dismissed state governments where and when required. An example which highlights the inefficacy of the judiciary system and the misconstruction of facts by the Governor, in favor of the Central ruling party, is the legal dispute of Rao Birendra Singh v. Union of India (1968). In Haryana (1967), the Congress party had formed the state government but, later, got ousted due to defections giving way to the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal leader, Rao Birendra Singh, to form the new state government. However, defections and counter defections still persisted in both the Congress and SVD parties but R. B. Singh still continued to enjoy a majority. The Governor then, B. N. Chakravorty, issued a proclamation stating that there was a need for a clean and efficient administration which was followed by the imposition of President's rule on November 21, 1967, along with the dissolution of the state assembly. Rao Birendra Singh challenged the Proclamation in High Court on the grounds that the Union Government was not competent to issue the Proclamation as long as the petitioner enjoyed a majority, and that it was not clear whether the report of the Governor was accepted by the President. He implied that the satisfaction of the President while issuing the Proclamation under Article 356, in fact, meant the satisfaction of the Union Home Minister. The High Court ruled that the President or Governor is out of the jurisdiction of the Court in view of Article 361[10]. Any inference drawn by the Governor or the President and the conclusions

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[10]Article 361, in short, states that neither the President nor the Governor of a State shall be answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of their office.

reached by them cannot be questioned in Court nor did it have the jurisdiction to require the disclosure of material forming the basis of the satisfaction. Thus, the court could not go into the validity of the Proclamation. Subsequently, midterm elections were held in May 1968 and Congress formed the new state government.

In 1977, the Janata Party, arising from a post-election coalition of political parties with anti-Congress sentiments, formed the very first non-Congress union government. Even though the Janata government did not last the entire term due to breakdown of coalitions, it was accused to have significantly misused the article on coming to power. In April 1977, the then Union Minister of Home Affairs, Charan Singh, wrote a letter to the Chief Ministers of nine Congress dominated states[11] requesting them to advise their respective Governors to dissolve the state assemblies. The request for dissolution, according to Charan Singh, was on the grounds that the electorate had rejected the ruling party in the recent Lok Sabha elections. President's rule was imposed on nine states simultaneously on 30th April 1977 and the assemblies were dissolved. Six out of the nine States[12] filed suits in the Supreme Court under Article 131 of the Constitution seeking justice for such an unconstitutional act by the Union Minister of Home Affairs. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the case but for the first time the apex judicial system ruled that the satisfaction of the President would be subject to judicial review.

The state governments plea to the judiciary system continued to remain ineffective until the landmark judgment of 1994. In the state of Karnataka in 1989, the Janata Dal state government headed by Chief Minister S. R. Bommai lost support from a dissentient faction of the party. K.R. Molakery, a legislator on defecting from Janata Dal, presented a letter to the then Governor of Karnataka, Pendekanti

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[11]These states were Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

[12]The States which filed the suits were Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan.

Venkatasubbaiah, in the purview of withdrawing his support from the ministry. Along with that, the Governor had received nineteen other letters of withdrawal of support, allegedly signed by legislators previously supporting the Ministry. The next day, however, seven out of those nineteen legislators, who had allegedly written the said letters to the Governor, denied sending the letters and affirmed their support to the Ministry. Chief Minister, S. R. Bommai, made the Governor and the President aware of the situation after a report was already sent to the President and requested that he should be given a chance to prove his majority. Despite his request, the Governor sent yet another report stating that the Chief Minister of the State had lost the majority support of the House. President's rule was imposed on 20th April 1989 and the assembly was dissolved. A writ petition was filed by Bommai challenging the constitutionality of the Proclamation. The previous petitions filed in the high courts of Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, etc. were transferred to the Supreme Court and the controversial issue was heard by a nine-member Constitutional bench. The court declared, by a majority of 5:4, that Presidential rule was an unconstitutional act in the case of Nagaland (1988), Karnataka (1989) and Meghalaya (1991). However, it upheld the instances of imposition in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh in 1992, right after the demolition of Babri Masjid, because the activities of the State governments were against secularism. The Court laid down principles in an attempt to clear the vagueness surrounding the article. One of the guidelines was that the majority of the state government should be tested on the floor of the House before the assembly can be dissolved. This judgment made further imposition of President's rule for partisan reasons difficult but it did not completely prevent it. However, the involvement of the court has significantly increased in a positive direction since this landmark judgment.

The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 formally studies the imposition and

withdrawal of the instances of President's rule. I have tried to establish an association of the timely imposition of President's rule to the parliamentary political cycle. It discusses the impact of its imposition on the upcoming state assembly elections and the next union elections and whether or not it favors the ruling political party at the center in these elections. Chapter 3 describes the empirical model that we use to determine political vendetta. It talks about the data that we have used in our model and the estimation strategy outlining the model specification. Chapter 4 discusses the results that we get from the regression models and chapter 5 concludes the study.

Chapter 2

Descriptive Statistics

The Constitution of India incorporates a federal structure to the Indian government declaring it to be a union of States. The division of legislative, administrative and executive powers between the Central government and the State governments are outlined in Part XI of the Constitution of India. The legislative functions are divided into a separate Union list and a State list for the Central and State governments respectively and a common list known as the Concurrent list. The lower house of the Parliament, known as the Lok Sabha, is made up of Members of Parliament elected directly by the citizens of India by the first-past-the-post voting system. Each Member of the Parliament represents a single electoral district, known as a parliamentary constituency, the geographical boundary of which is determined by the Delimitation Commission of India. The Delimitation Commission has been set up four times so far, under the Delimitation Commission Acts of 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002. It ensures that while drawing the constituencies, which are different from the administrative boundaries, the distribution of population in each constituency is uniform so as to ensure that each seat in the Lok Sabha represents equal population. The Central government is formed by the party or the coalition representing the maximum number of seats which indirectly elects the Prime Minister, head of the

Central government, and the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, State governments are elected through the state assembly elections. Each State is divided into electoral districts, known as assembly constituencies, which is a dis-aggregation of parliamentary constituencies. In a similar manner, the State government is formed by the party or coalition which holds the maximum number of seats in the Vidhan Sabha, the lower house of the state legislature[13].

From independence to 1967, Congress party monopolized the electoral landscape in both the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections. They secured more than 70% of the seats in every Lok Sabha elections and only lost two Vidhan Sabha elections. However, in the elections of 1967, the Congress party retained a majority in the Lok Sabha by only a margin of 23 seats and lost power in five state elections (Arulampalam et al., 2009). Thus, 1967 marks the significant beginning of non-alignment of union and state governments. Although the Congress party continued to retain power in the Center, internal dissension within the Congress party grew and non-Congress parties started dominating in a few states. During the Nehru era (1950-1964) and Shastri era (1964-1966), President's rule was imposed only 6 and 2 times respectively. However, during Indira Gandhi's era as Prime Minister (1966-1977), it imposition increased significantly to 39 times in total. Out of the 39 times, 23 instances have been imposed on opposition state governments and 5 instances on minority governments with outside support from Congress.

The Emergency period (1975-1977) witnessed an era Indira Gandhi's autocratic rule where most of her political opponents were imprisoned and the press was curbed. After the withdrawal of Emergency, the general elections of 1977 witnessed a massive defeat of the Congress party. The newly formed Janata Party came to power in the Center and dissolved nine Congress dominated state assemblies simultaneously

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[13]Currently, 7 out of 28 states have an upper house of the bicameral state legislature which is known as Vidhan Parishad.

on the account that the people have lost faith in the Congress government. This political tool was used in the same fashion when the Congress came back to power in the 1980 general elections and dissolved nine opposition state governments.

A brief outline of several anecdotal pieces of evidence shows that there may have been significant misuse of the article. The following section analyses whether or not the time of imposition of President's rule is dependent upon the parliamentary political cycle.

2.1 Imposition of President's Rule

Article 356 was incorporated in the Constitution of India to support the state governments in situations of emergency and dire needs. The official reasons stated in the Proclamations have been varied in nature, such as, defections by Members of Legislatures, break-up of coalitions, passing of no-confidence motions against the Council of Ministers, resignation of the Ministers for various reasons, absence of Legislatures in newly formed states, public agitations in states leading to instability in the administration etc. Since a situation of emergency can appear at any point in time, it is safe to assume that the imposition of President's rule should be uniformly distributed over the parliamentary political cycle[14] or that we should not get any specific pattern in the distribution unless imposed strategically. However, if our hypothesis is true, that is, if President's rule is misused for political vendetta, then we may find bias in the distribution of the instances of imposition over particular years in the parliamentary cycle. We make two assumptions here. First, President's rule imposed at the beginning of the cycle, if strategic, is targeted towards capturing the state machinery since the parliamentary elections are not of immediate concern.

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[14]The central and the state governments of India, generally, have a term of five years. By parliamentary political cycles, we mean the term of a central government categorized into these five years.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of President's Rule over Parliament Political Cycles

Second, President's rule imposed at the end of the cycle, if strategic, is done so to improve the central party's performance in the upcoming union elections. To test this empirically, we divide the parliamentary cycle into four bins[15] and plot the number of instances of President's rule in each bin.

There has been a total of 56 instances of imposition of President's rule in our sample.[16] Figure 2.1, which plots all instances of President's rule in the sample,

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[15]Although the term of the central government is five years, there are instances of short-lived governments in our period of analysis. For e.g., the 9th Lok Sabha lasted for less than two years (December 1989 - March 1991). To make the representation unbiased, I decided to combine the last two years (or beyond the third year) into one single bin. Thus the modified cycle consists of four bins instead of five. Note that during the emergency period, the term of the Lok Sabha was more than 5 years. There was only one instance of President's Rule being imposed (Odisha, 1976). For this, I think it is important to look at the end of the cycle as a time period beyond three years.

[16]Three instances of imposition have been excluded from the study because the term of the Lok Sabha had ended and the new term had not started when these instances were imposed. These are the instances of Odissa (1971), Kerala (1979) and Haryana (1991). This was necessary because the Proclamation needs to be approved by the Lok Sabha, in this case, it needs to be approved by the

shows that there is a bias in the distribution. Twenty seven instances of President's rule were imposed within the first year of the central government's tenure. The number drops sharply to only nine instances in the second year of the term and is at a minimum of only five instances in the third year. It shows an increasing trend towards the end of the cycle again but is even less than 50 percent of what was imposed in the first year alone. This is our first evidence that there may be a political motive behind its imposition. There is no literature that explains why the imposition is higher at the beginning of the cycle or why it shows an upward trend at the end. Hence, we use certain basic political theories to justify this phenomenon.

At the beginning of the cycle, the ruling party in center, having won the union elections recently, establishes the fact that majority of the voters have 'faith' in that political party. As pointed out by Dasgupta et al. (2008), the literature on voting theory tells us that voters, regardless of their intrinsic preferences, derive pleasure by being on the winning side (Bartels, 1985, 1988). This motivates the voters to "go with the party most likely to win" (Coleman, 2004). Voters also know that it is critical for a legislature to be part of the majority coalition while bargaining for a pork project (Krutz, 2001). Thus, inducing an assembly election in the non-aligned states can be potentially favorable for the ruling party in the center to capture the state machinery. Also, the results of the recent Lok Sabha elections may give the ruling party in the center an indication of the voters' preferences towards that party in a state[17]. At the end of the cycle, the Lok Sabha elections are nearby and that can influence the choice of policies implemented by politicians to strengthen the chances of retaining their incumbency (Chaudhuri and Dasgupta, 2005; Martinez, 2009).

newly elected Lok Sabha within 30 days of their first session provided that the Rajya Sabha has already approved it. A change in the identity of the Lok Sabha would interfere with the analysis. See Article 356(3) for more details.

[17]The implicit assumption here is that voters do not judge the performance of the political parties on the basis of national interests and state interests separately. They think that a political party who is efficient in the center can perform well in their state too.

Imposing president's rule in non-aligned states to temporarily take control over the state machinery can be strategically beneficial because the Union government would be in direct control of the union, state and concurrent lists. It also makes political campaigning and advertising easier for the ruling party in the center without the possibility of facing resistance from a non-aligned state government. However, the gains from strategic interventions might not be realized if there are repercussions from voters. This can happen if the voters have a strong bias towards their elected state government[18] or they feel that there has been foul play in imposing President's rule. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 empirically test for strategic gains using distributional tests.[19]

2.2 Withdrawal of President's Rule

If the state legislative assembly is functional when the Proclamation is issued, there are three things can happen to the assembly. One, the assembly is dissolved immediately upon issuing the Proclamation. Second, the assembly is kept in suspended animation and allowed to continue to function when the Proclamation is withdrawn. A necessary requirement for this to happen is that there should be a stable government in the state on the withdrawal of President's rule, either the existing government or a new government by some realignment. However, if the assembly fails to

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[18]It is also very improbable that President's rule will likely be used to dissolve a state government that enjoys supermajority. However, we lack sufficient data to test for this.

[19]There exists a caveat in this study. In our sample we have a few instances of coalition governments in the center. However, we assume that the minor parties do not have a bargaining power in influencing the decision of whether to impose President's rule or not, thus holding the single largest party responsible for the misuse of the article. To illustrate this assumption, let us consider the following example. Jayalalitha leader of the AIADMK claimed that the BJP leadership had promised dissolution of the DMK government while forming the alliance. However, the Vajpayee government refused to withdraw pending corruption charges against her and dismiss the DMK government in Tamil Nadu. As a result, AIADMK withdrew support and the BJP government fell after losing in a vote of no confidence by one vote (The Times of India New Delhi, June 20, 1998). It is safe to make the assumption in our sample because during this time period no single coalition member had such a bargaining power in terms of seat shares. This also rules out any seat sharing agreement between the single major party and other parties, which is difficult to capture.

elect a stable government, it leads us to the third case, where the assembly was kept in suspended animation at first but was dissolved eventually. The withdrawal of President's rule in the first and third situations needs to be preceded by a successful state assembly election whereas in the second situation the state government is allowed to complete its full term unless another Proclamation is issued.

There are also cases where the assembly was not functional when the Proclamation was issued. In Bihar (1995), President's rule was imposed because the state assembly elections could not be completed on time. There are also cases where the Governor used his power to dissolve legislative assemblies before a Proclamation was issued.[20] In the 27 instances imposed within the first year of the Central government coming to power, there were only 4 instances of suspended animation, out of which 2 were eventually dissolved. In sharp contrast to this, near the end of the term of the Central government, only in 3 out of 12 instances was the assembly dissolved immediately. In 7 instances out of 12, it was kept under suspended animation out of which 3 were ultimately dissolved.

Proclamations issued by the President, are laid down before both the Houses of the Parliament. Proclamations cease to operate at the end of two months unless it has been approved by the resolutions of both Houses. An approved Proclamation remains in operation for six months from the date of issuance but can be further extended by another six months on the approval of the Parliament. However, no Proclamation shall remain in force for more than three years. Figure 2.1 shows the pattern of duration of Proclamations issued within the sample. We checked for a correlation between the duration of President's rule and whether or not the assembly was suspended but there was no significant result.[21] The range of President's rule

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[20]Article 174(2) of the Constitution of India empowers the Governor to dissolve the legislative assembly. In Kerala (1970) the assembly was dissolved directly by the Governor of Kerala, V. Viswanathan, on the advice of the Chief Minister, C. Achutha Menon.

[21]I used a Chi-Squared test for nominal data but the results were biased due to expected counts of less than 5 in some cases.

Table 2.1: Frequency distribution of duration of President's Rule

Duration of President's Rule	Frequency
Less than equal to 30 days	5
31 to 90 days	14
91 to 180 days	12
More than 180 days	22

has varied from the shortest period being of only 8 days in Karnataka (1990) and Bihar (1995) to 4 years, 9 months and 15 days in Punjab (1987).[22]

2.3 Impact of President's Rule in the upcoming State Assembly Elections

In this section, we try to answer the question whether the imposition of President's rule benefits the party which imposes it in the upcoming state assembly election. We take a subset of the cases where President's rule was imposed in the first year of the cycle and the where assembly was dissolved. Thus, a state election must be held before president's rule can be withdrawn from that state. We compare the vote shares obtained by the party in each of the of the assembly constituencies in the state elections held after the imposition and compare it pairwise with the vote shares obtained, by the same party[23] in the same assembly constituencies[24], in the last state elections held before the imposition.

An empirical distribution of the before and after distributions are computed

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[22]This instance of Punjab is the second longest in terms of duration. The longest single spell of President's rule of Jammu and Kashmir (1990) lasting for 6 years, 2 months and 27 days. This was also preceded by Governor's rule, which is Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

[23]We need to make sure that identity of the parties remained the same in both the elections. This is difficult in the case of India's political scenario because the identities have been fluid over time due to splits and mergers of political parties. This problem is elaborated in chapter 3.

[24]The boundaries of the constituencies have changed only once in our sample. Chapter 3 elaborates on this issue as well.

Figure 2.2: Distribution of vote shares across assembly elections

and represented in figure 2.2. The distribution of vote shares won by the party candidates after imposing the article lies to the right of the distribution of vote shares won by them before imposing. This indicates that their vote shares have increased from before.[25] We test these distributions statistically using two non-parametric tests, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample distributional test and the paired-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

The null hypothesis under the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is that the distributions are essentially similar. The alternative hypothesis can be viewed in the following manner. Under the two-sided alternative, the two distributions are not identical, or, under the one-sided alternatives as, the random variables of one distribution are stochastically smaller than that of the other. Let F_X and F_Y be the true population distributions of the 'after' and 'before' vote shares respectively. Under the null hypothesis, we have, $H_0 : F_Y(x) = F_X(x)$ for all x, where x is an element from the combined sample distribution. Under the two-sided alternative, we have, H_A :

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[25]Except for a very small region at the beginning of the distributions, the distribution of vote share after imposition first order stochastically dominates the other one.

Table 2.2: K-S test for assembly elections

Alternative Hypothesis	Test Statistic	p-value
H_A	0.0762	$1.981e^{-4}$
H_A^1	0.009446	0.8679
H_A^2	0.0762	$9.906e^{-05}$

Table 2.3: Wilcoxon signed-rank test for assembly elections

Alternative Hypothesis	Test Statistic	p-value
$M_D \neq 0$	730490	$4.965e^{-8}$
$M_D > 0$	730490	$2.483e^{-8}$
$M_D < 0$	730490	1

$F_Y(x) \neq F_X(x)$ for some x. The one-sided alternatives are specified as, (i) H_A^1 : $F_Y(x) \leq F_X(x)$ for all x, and $F_Y(x) < F_X(x)$ for some x, (ii) $H_A^2 : F_Y(x) \geq F_X(x)$ for all x and $F_Y(x) > F_X(x)$ for some x. The test results are shown in table 2.2. In our analysis, we accept the alternative hypothesis (H_A^2) that the distribution function of the after vote shares lies below that of the before vote share, significant at 0.1% level of significance.

Let $X_i - Y_i$ be the pairwise difference of vote shares from the 'after' and 'before' distributions. The paired-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test assumes, in the null hypothesis, that the pairwise differences in the vote share of the two distributions are independent observations from a population of differences which is continuous and symmetric with median M_D. Thus, under the null hypothesis, we have $H_0 : M_D = 0$. Under the alternative hypothesis, H_1, we test for the following: (i) $M_D \neq 0$, (ii) $M_D > 0$, and (iii) $M_D < 0$. The results are presented in table 2.3. We accept the alternative hypothesis $(M_D > 0)$ which implies that the distribution of vote shares after the imposition is greater than the one before, significant at 0.1% level of significance.

Figure 2.3: Distribution of vote shares across parliamentary elections

2.4 Impact of President's Rule in the upcoming Lok Sabha Elections

Similar to section 2.3, in this section, we try to answer the question whether the imposition of President's rule benefits the party which imposes it in the upcoming general election. We take a subset of the cases where President's rule was imposed at the end[26] of the cycle and where the state assembly was dissolved. We compare the vote shares obtained by the party in each of the of the parliamentary constituencies in the general elections held in that state after the imposition and compare it pairwise with the vote shares obtained, by the same party[27] in the same parliamentary constituencies[28], in the last general elections held before the imposition.[29]

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[26]Instances of President's rule imposed beyond the third year of the central government's rule.

[27]Unlike the problem faced in the previous analysis, in our time period only Congress governments have lasted for more than 3 years at the center.

[28]The boundaries of the constituencies have changed only once in our sample. Chapter 3 elaborates on this issue as well.

[29]A comparison was also done with the most recent state assembly elections, an analysis commonly done by psephologists to predict the outcome of the upcoming general elections. The results did not differ significantly.

Table 2.4: K-S test for parliamentary elections

Alternative Hypothesis	Test Statistic	p-value
H_A	0.3277	$2.207e^{-11}$
H_A^1	0.3277	$1.104e^{-11}$
H_A^2	0	1

Table 2.5: Wilcoxon signed-rank test for parliamentary elections

Alternative Hypothesis	Test Statistic	p-value
$M_D \neq 0$	4905.5	$2.2e^{-16}$
$M_D > 0$	4905.5	1
$M_D < 0$	4905.5	$2.2e^{-16}$

An empirical distribution of the before and after distributions are computed and represented in figure 2.3. The distribution of vote shares won by the party candidates after imposing the article lies, in fact, to the left of the distribution of vote shares won by them before imposing. This indicates that their vote shares have decreased from before. We test these distributions statistically using same tests as before. In the K-S test, results displayed in table 2.4, we accept the alternative hypothesis (H_A^1) that the distribution function of the after vote shares lies above that of the before vote share at a p-value of $1.104e^{-11}$. In the paired-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, results displayed in table 2.5, we accept the alternative hypothesis ($M_D < 0$) which implies that the distribution of vote shares after the imposition is less than the one before, significant at 0.1% level of significance.[30]

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[30]Parametric tests such as ratio t-tests and paired differences of means were also checked for both the analysis of assembly and parliamentary elections, the results were consistent with the non-parametric tests.

Chapter 3

Data and Methodology

3.1   Data Description

Political Data

A brief summary of the Proclamations issued is presented in Lok Sabha (1996) which includes key information needed for this study. The publication is available only in print and in order to use the data, it had to be transformed into an usable spreadsheet format.[31] The Election Commission of India has the responsibility of compiling the constituency-wise data from each election held in India. This data, however, is available online in PDF reports. Jensenius and Verniers (2017) offers cleaned constituency-level datasets on the results of Indian State Elections and Indian General Elections from 1961.

The identities of political parties in India have not been constant throughout this period. There have been several splits and mergers; formation and breakdown of new parties and coalitions. This is a crucial issue in analyzing the vote shares of the political party between two consecutive elections. If there is a split of a political

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[31]The data had to be entered manually and has been checked several times to reduce data entry errors.

party into factions, the Election Commission decides which faction can retain the name and symbol of the original party[32]. To solve the problem of identification of the political parties, the faction which retains either the name or the symbol of the original party is considered to be identical. For cases which do not follow this rule of thumb and for anomalies, we follow the specifications mentioned in Butler et al. (1995). Each party is given a unique code, usually comprising of three letters, by the Election Commission of India. The election datasets use these party codes for identification of the candidates contesting in an election. The party codes are subject to change over time, when without any split or merges in the party, and the consistency of the codes needed to checked along with the identity. This is done using the reports published by the Election Commission.

On the other hand, taking the example of Janata Party and Janata Dal, these were an amalgamation of existing political parties. The identities of these newly formed parties are matched to their constituent old parties in previous periods. When vote shares are compared in chapter 2, I have taken the sum of the vote shares won by all the candidates, belonging to the constituent parties, contesting together in the constituency before the amalgamation. A caveat of this study is that it cannot capture the candidate specific preferences, rather it captures party specific preferences. We assume that if the parties join forces together, it will not disturb the preferences of the voters. Thus if the parties had merged before in the previous election, it would have gotten the combined support of all their voters. However, in section 3.2, we assume a relatively less stronger assumption where we take the maximum vote share of any candidate belonging to the constituent parties, thus checking for both situations.[33]

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[32]The Election Commission of India can also decide to freeze the original symbol as it happened in the 1969 and 1978 split of the Indian National Congress.

[33]The major parties which merged to form the Janata Party are the following identified by their party codes - BLD, BKD, SWA, SOP, PSP, UTC, BJS, NCO, CFD. Similarly for the Janata Dal - JNP, LKD, ICJ.

The geographical boundaries of the constituencies are not the same throughout the time period. The apportionment of constituencies by the Delimitation Commission in 1973 divides our sample into two halves, one prior to 1973 and the other after. We only have the possibility of a mismatch in the constituencies if two consecutive elections fall under these different halves. Jensenius (2017) solves this issue by linking up constituencies comparing the delimitation reports from 1967 and 1976. The constituencies which remained unchanged were coded as a perfect match. In most cases, however, there were new constituencies which consisted of parts of two or more former constituencies, and the old constituency with the largest overlapping population was coded as a fuzzy match to the new constituency. I used this data to compare vote shares constituency-wise between two delimitation periods. The other problem was to construct a unique identifier for each constituency to capture the constituency level time invariant effects in section 3.2. For this, unique numbers were assigned to each constituency in the previous delimitation period. The constituencies post 1973 which retained the original name were treated as the same constituency, and the other constituencies were assigned new numbers. This rule assures that the mapping from the set of constituencies before 1973 to the set of constituencies after 1973 within our time period is injective.[34]

The data on the identity of state governments would have been ideal for our analysis; unfortunately I could not find a proper data source which were accessible. We use the political alignment between center and states as a substitute which is coded from Grover and Arora (1998).[35]

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[34]The problem faced here is that the names of constituencies are subject to errors, such as typographical errors, mismatch of spellings due to translation of names, and others. For example, the constituency Kovvur in Andhra Pradesh was spelled Koyyur before 1974, but the name is unchanged in its original dialect. To deal with this issue, I have used the matching of constituencies dataset by Jensenius (2017) and generated a score based on the similarity of the two sets of names pairwise using the algorithm of Winkler (1990). After sorting the score and eyeballing the data, a score of 81% match was used as a cutoff. Instances of incorrect matches were cleaned manually; for example, the Jaro-Winkler algorithm would set a high score for 'Patna Central' which was previously a part of 'Patna West'.

[35]I am grateful to the authors of Arulampalam et al. (2009) for sharing their dataset. Some

Socioeconomic Data

This section describes the socioeconomic data, which are primarily used as control variables. The data was sourced from various sources such as Census of India, Planning Commission of India, Reserve Bank of India's Database on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Chandhok and (Organization) (1990), World Bank Database, and Indiastat. Many of the sources were available in scanned PDFs and missing data was interpolated. Some of these factors are overlooked by both the state and the union governments. A major issue in this section was the consistency in the definition of the variables.[36] The other issue was unavailability (or access to) of key factors such as unemployment and external debts of the central government. Close proxy variables were used wherever possible.

Crime Data

The situation of criminal activity in a state is overlooked by the state government solely. The data on crime is maintained by the National Crime Records Bureau and should be an important factor in determining whether there is constitutional failure of the state government. However, the major issue here is that the data on criminal activity is often not a credible representation of the actual level of crime in a state because it is often under reported.

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of the key political and socioeconomic variables used in my model have been sourced from this dataset.

[36]For example, the definition of expenditure on education, at times, included expenditure on 'Art and Culture', and 'Scientific Services and Research'; and the definition of health included, at times, 'Family Welfare' and 'Sanitation and Water Supply'. The segregated data was not available for certain years. The grants from center before 1974 was categorized as 'Grants-in-aid and other contributions'.

3.2   Estimation Strategy

This section is divided into two subsections. The first deals with the issue of political alignment between central and state governments while the second deals with gains from imposing President's rule.

Role of political alignment

As pointed out earlier, President's rule should be used in situations of emergency and its imposition should not depend on the identity of the state government. In the following regression, we will answer the following question: Is there an association between the imposition of President's rule and the political alignment of center and state governments? Since we do not have a proper theoretical structure, we estimate the following reduced form model:

$$pres_{s,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1.alignmar_{s,t} + \beta_3'F_{s,t} + \beta_4'C_{s,t} + \alpha_s + \delta_t + u_{s,t} \qquad (3.1)$$

where $F_{s,t}$ denotes the fiscal variables and consists of a combination of $nsdp_{s,t}$ and $nsdp_{s,t}^g$. While the former signifies the importance of the state in terms of the level of output, the latter captures the performance of the state. Hence, both the variables taken together will show us the effect of two different dimensions. $C_{s,t}$ denotes the set of crime variables including $murder_{s,t}$, $riot_{s,t}$ and $rcase_{s,t}$. To account for unobserved state-specific effects, we include state-specific dummies, α_s. Similarly, to account for unobserved time-specific effects, we included time specific dummies δ_t. $u_{s,t}$ is the error term in our model which follows standard assumptions. All the variables are defined in Appendix A.1. A higher value of the dependent variable, $pres_{s,t}$, indicates a higher duration of President's rule in the state with the maximum being the entire year.[37] The key independent variable, $alignmar_{s,t}$, taking

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[37]Note that this definition of President's rule takes into account the cases where the assembly

only the values 0 and 1, denote the political alignment between central and state governments at the beginning of the time period t; where 1 denotes an alignment. We estimate this using the standard Least Square Dummy Variable model. Thus, a significant result and a negative sign of β_1 would denote that the President's rule has been imposed, on an average, higher in non-aligned states than in aligned states, after controlling for other factors.

Strategic gains after imposition

In this section, we are going to see whether or not the imposition of President's rule affect election results; specifically, vote shares in favor of the majority party forming the central government under whose regime the article was invoked in a state. We check this for both the assembly and general elections.

First, we consider the case of assembly elections. Let us take the period when party p was in power in the center. We look at the state assembly elections which were held during this period and the vote shares (at the constituency level) won by p; which we then compare to the vote shares won by p in the previous assembly elections of each state. An instance of President's rule in a state, imposed during p's tenure, between the two consecutive state assembly elections is considered as a treatment. The control, on the other hand, is if there is no imposition of President's rule under p's tenure between the assembly election years of the state. Note that the control would also include an instance of President's rule imposed under the tenure of a different central government. We then estimate the effect of the treatment, which is the imposition of President's rule under p's tenure, on the change in vote share of p after controlling for other factors that may influence the change in vote share.

To check the effects of President's rule on assembly elections, we use the following

was kept in suspended animation and not dissolved.

reduced form model:

$$votes^A_{p,s,k,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1.presd^A_{p,s,t} + \alpha + \beta'_2.W_{s,t} + \beta_3.C_t + u_{s,t} \qquad (3.2)$$

where the set of controls used are α is a vector of the time invariant factors, $W_{s,t}$ is a vector of the state specific time variant factors and C_t is a vector of the country specific time variant factors; and $u_{s,t}$ is the error term. The rest of the variables, $votes^A_{p,s,k,t}$ and $presd^A_{p,s,t}$ are defined in Appendix A.2.

The vector of time invariant factors consists of constituency specific dummies and state specific dummies to capture the constituency specific and state specific effects respectively. However, only one of the effects can be checked for at a time due to collinearity issues. A three period moving average of the growth rates of the time variant control variables are taken to take into account a long term effect of these variables. The state specific time variant factors, which capture the performance of the state government, are divided into outcome variables, such as state domestic product; policy variables, such as expenditure by the state government on education and health; and crime variables, such as incidences of murder, riots and total crimes. The country specific time variant factors, which capture the performance of the central government on national issues, are categorized in a similarly.[38]

Now we consider the case of parliamentary elections. We take the period when party p was in power in the center;[39] and take the change in vote shares won by p in the general elections (at the constituency level) held at the beginning of the period in contrast to that at the end of the period.[40] The treatment is defined in a similar

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[38]There are two caveats of this empirical estimation. (i) There is a significant issue of variability within the control variables. The dependent variable is at the constituency level whereas the control variables are mostly at the state or national level. As a result of which, the control variables may turn out to be highly significant. (ii) The identification of political parties involved in the state government is important to determine the positive (negative) spill over effects of the state government's performance to the increase (decrease) of ruling party in the center's vote share.

[39]We exclude the cases of minority governments formed after the breakdown of coalition governments of Janata Party and Janata Dal.

[40]The general elections of Punjab in the years 1985 and 1992 took place a year after the elections

manner, as stated above, but for parliamentary elections instead of assembly. We estimate the following reduced form model:

$$votes^P_{p,s,k,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1.presd^P_{p,s,t} + \alpha + \beta'_2.W_{s,t} + \beta_3.C_t + u_{s,t} \qquad (3.3)$$

where the variables are similar but with the one exception. The state specific time variant factor captures the bias of the central government towards a particular state in terms of center-state fund transfer. $votes^P_{p,s,k,t}$ and $presd^P_{p,s,t}$ are defined in Appendix A.2 We estimate equations 3.2 and 3.3 using the fixed effects model, taking into account two different group variables, state and constituency dummies, in two different specifications.[41]

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of the rest of the states. This exception has to be counted for.

[41]We tested the empirical model using a time trend as well, but it had to be omitted due to problems in collinearity. This was due to the fact that in some of the years there was only a single state assembly election.

Chapter 4

Results

4.1 Imposition of President's Rule in non-aligned states

The results of estimation of equation 3.1 are presented in table B.1, in six different specifications of the model using various combinations of the control variables. The variable, $alignmar_{s,t}$, denoting political alignment between center and state governments is highly significant. The negative coefficient signifies that the imposition of President's rule is likely to be higher in states which are non-aligned. The only other variable which is significant is $murder_{s,t}$. The positive coefficient denotes that higher the incidence of murder, higher is the chance of imposing President's rule. A higher value of this variable, does indeed, denote a poor performance of the state government in maintaining law and order. However, whether it signifies a complete failure of the state machinery and whether President's rule is the solution are debatable issues.

4.2 Strategic gains from imposition President's Rule

The benefits, if any, from imposing President's rule were estimated in different phases of the parliamentary cycle. While section 4.2.1 presents an overall analysis without taking electoral cycles into consideration, section 4.2.2 and section 4.2.3 estimated equations 3.2 and 3.3 by taking a subset of the treatment variable where President's rule was imposed at the beginning of the cycle and at the end of the cycle respectively.[42] The results are discussed in the following sections.[43] There are two columns for the assembly and general elections each, the first takes state dummy as the group variable while the second column estimates using constituency dummy as the group variable.

4.2.1 Over the entire Political Cycle

The results are presented in table B.2. In an overall estimation, we do not get any conclusive results from the imposition of President's rule on vote shares of the ruling party in the center, in either the assembly or general elections. While the coefficients of $presd^A_{p,s,t}$ are insignificant, the coefficients of $presd^P_{p,s,t}$ are significant but provide contrasting results for different time invariant factors.[44]

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[42]Instances of President's rule imposed within the first two years of the parliamentary cycle were considered in the beginning of the cycle. Instances beyond the third year were considered as being imposed at the end of the cycle.

[43]This analysis will not be able to explain the coefficients of the control variables due to the problems stated before. We, indeed, get highly significant results for the control variables as we expected due to the lack of variability in the values of these controls. The coefficients might seem counter intuitive but we do not make any a priori assumption about the voting preferences of the voters. For example, the expenditure on defense might be viewed both positively, as a sign of strength, or negatively, as a trade off between spending on development and on defense. Also, many a times, higher expenditure on health or education may not translate into higher quality of these services.

[44]A possible issue of this contrasting result might be caused by the algorithm that is used to generate constituency dummies. The names of parliamentary constituencies are unlikely to change after apportionment. However, the changes in the boundaries and the composition of the integrant assembly constituencies can change the boundaries of the parliamentary constituency drastically.

4.2.2 At the beginning of the Political Cycle

The results are presented in table B.3. When we look at the instances imposed only at the beginning of the cycle, the results show that imposing President's rule has a positive significant impact in increasing the vote share of the ruling party in the center in both the upcoming state assembly election and the next general elections[45]. This is in conformation with the results of section 2.3. The effect on the parliamentary elections, which are not immediate, could very well be due to the change in state government after imposition of President's rule in the state.

4.2.3 At the end of the Political Cycle

The results are presented in table B.4. When we look at the instances imposed only at the end of the cycle, the results show that imposing President's rule has a negative significant impact in increasing the vote share of the ruling party in the center in both the upcoming general elections and the next state assembly election. This is in conformation with the results of section 2.4.

A better algorithm might require a more detailed mapping data of constituencies.

[45]Even though the coefficient of $presd^P_{p,s,t}$ is negative using constituency dummies, it is not significant.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This study was aimed at finding statistical evidence to prove (or disprove) the claims put forward by various political scientists. As a result of the empirical analysis, we find that non-aligned state governments are the likely targets for invoking this article. Moreover, not only is the imposition of President's rule is higher during the initial years of the central government being elected but the gains from it are positive in the initial years. At the end of the cycle, however, the instances of President's rule are less and it is not beneficial for the majority party of the central government. The party, during its initial years of being elected in the center, enjoys the wind that blows in their favor. Being the winners of the recent Lok Sabha elections, the party enjoys the confidence of the people at the beginning of the cycle, which over time, may fade away due to implementation of poorly planned policies, corruption, bad governance, or other negative aspects.

The other key feature which is that the results of the recent Lok Sabha election gives valuable information to the party, indicating the states where they might have a stronghold and the voters are in their favor. This informational gap increases at the end of the cycle where the political parties are uncertain about the support of the voters. As a matter of fact, the instances of President's rule imposed in 1977 and

1980 by the Janata Party government and the Congress government was targeted towards those states where the non-aligned state governments did not secure any (or only a few) seats. We believe that the instances imposed at the end of the cycle are constitutional necessities and not a political move. An example of this is the imposition of President's rule at the end of the parliamentary cycle in Tamil Nadu (1988); the reason being a political deadlock after the death of the AIADMK Chief Minister, Shri M. G. Ramachandran.

Thus, this concludes the study by finding statistical evidence that supports misuse of President's rule, however, only at the beginning of the cycle.

Appendix A

Data Variables

A.1 Role of political alignment

For all the variables, fix a state s and a year t. The time period t is in terms of the fiscal year. Thus, the year 1968 represents the time period from April 1968 to March 1969.

$pres_{s,t}$ This variable denotes the proportion of that state-year (s,t) during which President's rule was in place. Thus, this variable takes the value 0 if there was zero days of imposition and it takes the value 1 when there was 12 months of imposition.

$alignmar_{s,t}$ This 0-1 variable refers to the center-state match and takes the value of 1 if the central government and the government of state s, at the beginning of the year (that is, March 31 of the financial year $(t-1)$), share at least one political party in common. Notice that this definition does not count an instance of President's Rule as a case of center-state match.

$nsdp_{s,t}$ This variable denotes the per capita net state domestic product at factor

cost in constant prices in the state s and year t, adjusted for base year 1980-81. Changes in methodology were also adjusted by splicing the data using the common years in both series as a reference. Represented in millions of Rupees.

$nsdp_{s,t}^g$ This variable denotes the growth rate of the per capita net state domestic product (denoted by $nsdp_{s,t}$) in the state s and year t. Represented in percentage.

$murder_{s,t}$ This variable denotes the total number of murders committed in the state s and year t, registered with the police department. Represented per millions of estimated population of state s in year t.

$riot_{s,t}$ This variable denotes the total incidents of riot in the state s and year t, registered with the police department. Represented per millions of estimated population of state s in year t.

$rcase_{s,t}$ This variable denotes the total incidents of cognizable crimes in state s and year t, registered with the police department. Represented per millions of estimated population of state s in year t.

A.2   Strategic gains after imposition

Political Variables

The pairs of variables distinguish by letters A and P represent assembly and parliamentary elections respectively.

$votes_{p,s,k_A,t}^A$ Let p be the ruling party in the center during time period t when the state assembly elections in state s took place. This variable denotes the increase in vote share won by a candidate representing the political party

p in assembly constituency k_A of state s in the state assembly elections of time period t with respect to the vote share won by a candidate representing the same political party p (or p') in assembly constituency k_A (or k'_A) of state s in the state assembly elections held just before time period t, where p' and k'_A are the closest resemblance of p and k_A respectively.

$presd^A_{p,s,t}$ Let p be the ruling party in the center during time period t when the state assembly elections in state s took place. This 0-1 variable takes the value 1 if there is at least one instance of imposition of President's rule in state s while political party p was in power in the center between the state assembly election held in time period t and the previous state assembly election. Note that this definition only considers the instances of President's rule where the state assembly was dissolved eventually.

$votes^P_{p,s,k_P,t}$ Let t be the time period when a general election took place. Let p be the ruling party in the center which came to power right after the general elections were held previous to time period t. This variable denotes the increase in vote share won by a candidate representing the political party p (or p'') in parliamentary constituency k_P of state s in the general elections of time period t with respect to the vote share won by a candidate representing the same political party p (or p') parliamentary constituency k_P (or k'_P) of state s in the general elections held just before time period t, where p'' and p' are the closest resemblance of p and k'_P is that of k_P.

$presd^P_{p,s,t}$ Let t be the time period when a general election took place. Let p be the ruling party in the center which came to power right after the general elections were held previous to time period t. This 0-1 variable takes

the value 1 if there is at least one instance of imposition of President's rule in state s while political party p was in power in the center between the general election of period t and the one previous to it. Note that this definition only considers the instances of President's rule where the state assembly was dissolved eventually.

Time invariant factors

α_c This is a vector dummy of variables identifying the political constituencies.

α_s This is a vector of dummy variables identifying the states.

Time variant factors

The following variables, which have gr as a suffix, represent a three period simple moving average of the growth rates. A variable in time period t (year) will denote the moving average of the growth rate of periods $(t-1)$, $(t-2)$ and $(t-3)$. The time period t holds the same definition as described in the political variables within this section. The growth rates are expressed in percentage.

State specific

$nsdp_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita net domestic product (as defined by $nsdp_{s,t}$ in section A.1) of state s.

$grants_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the total grants received by the government of state s by the central government.

$edu_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita revenue and capital expenditure of the government of state s on education.

$health_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita revenue and capital expenditure of the government of state s on medical and public health.

$murder_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita incidents of murder registered by the police in state s.

$riot_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita incidents of riots registered by the police in state s.

$rcase_{s,t}^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita incidents of cognizable crimes registered by the police in state s.

Country specific

gdp_t^{gr} This variable denotes the per capita gross domestic product of the country at factor cost and at constant prices with base year 1980-81.

dev_t^{gr} This variable denotes the per capita revenue and capital expenditure of the central government on development.

def_t^{gr} This variable denotes the per capita revenue and capital expenditure of the central government on defense.

$fexres_t^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita total foreign exchange reserves of the country (which includes foreign currency assets, gold, reserve tranch position, and SDRs originally expressed in Rupees).

$odaoa_t^{gr}$ This variable denotes the per capita net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid received by the country (which was originally expressed in US dollars and was converted into Rupees using yearly average exchange rates).

Appendix B

Regression Tables

Table B.1: Imposition vs Alignment

	pres					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
$alignmar_{s,t}$	-.1680***	-.1677***	-.166***	-.1676***	-.1687***	-.1743***
	(.022)	(.0220)	(.0221)	(.0221)	(.0221)	(.0223)
$nsdp_{s,t}$	-.354e^{-4}	-.359e^{-4}		-.453e^{-4}*	-.396e^{-4}	-.143e^{-4}
	(.233e^{-4})	(.232e^{-4})		(.219e^{-4})	(.23e^{-4})	(.227e^{-4})
$nsdp_{s,t}^{g}$	-.0309		-.0545	-.0333	-.0348	-.0501
	(.1487)		(.1481)	(.1488)	(.1487)	(.1505)
$murder_{s,t}$	.025**	.025**	.0218**	.0252**	.0251**	
	(.0077)	(.0076)	(.0074)	(.0077)	(.0077)	
$riot_{s,t}$	.0032	.0032	.0039	.0008		.0033
	(.0029)	(.0029)	(.0029)	(.0022)		(.0029)
$rcase_{s,t}$	-.0005	-.0005	-.0007		-.0002	-.0005
	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)		(.0003)	(.0004)
$cons$	.2085**	.209**	.1784**	.1693**	.2052**	.2573***
	(.0598)	(.0597)	(.0566)	(.0509)	(.0598)	(.0587)
p <	.001(***)		.01(**)		.05(*)	

Table B.2: Strategic gains over entire cycle

		$votes_{p,s,k,t}$		
Elections→	Assembly		General	
Group Variable→	State	Constituency	State	Constituency
$presd_{p,s,t}$	0.093 (0.414)	0.380 (0.436)	2.349*** (0.686)	-2.528** (0.836)
$nsdp_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.754*** (0.039)	0.760*** (0.041)		
$grants_{s,t}^{gr}$			-0.099*** (0.012)	-0.063*** (0.013)
$edu_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)		
$health_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.151*** (0.018)	0.170*** (0.019)		
$murder_{s,t}^{gr}$	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)		
$riot_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.046*** (0.005)	0.036*** (0.005)		
$rcase_{s,t}^{gr}$	-0.050 (0.033)	-0.034 (0.035)		
gdp_t^{gr}	-2.208*** (0.100)	-2.126*** (0.106)	2.328*** (0.227)	3.586*** (0.271)
dev_t^{gr}	0.260*** (0.014)	0.251*** (0.015)	0.074** (0.027)	-0.169*** (0.039)
def_t^{gr}	-0.451*** (0.036)	-0.411*** (0.038)	2.910*** (0.139)	4.640*** (0.222)
$fexres_t^{gr}$	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.027*** (0.006)	0.061*** (0.017)	0.499*** (0.049)
$odaoa_t^{gr}$	0.128*** (0.010)	0.136*** (0.011)	-0.781*** (0.054)	-0.682*** (0.058)
$cons$	17.072*** (0.806)	16.522*** (0.852)	-33.193*** (1.500)	-44.224*** (1.992)
$p <$	.001(***)	.01(**)	.05(*)	

Table B.3: Strategic gains at the beginning of the cycle

$votes_{p,s,k,t}$

Elections→	Assembly		General	
Group Variable→	State	Constituency	State	Constituency
$presd_{p,s,t}$	5.736*** (0.493)	6.078*** (0.519)	3.984*** (0.770)	-1.022 (0.956)
$nsdp^{gr}_{s,t}$	0.576*** (0.042)	0.576*** (0.044)		
$grants^{gr}_{s,t}$			-0.128*** (0.012)	-0.093*** (0.013)
$edu^{gr}_{s,t}$	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)		
$health^{gr}_{s,t}$	0.174*** (0.019)	0.183*** (0.020)		
$murder^{gr}_{s,t}$	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.029*** (0.004)		
$riot^{gr}_{s,t}$	0.066*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.006)		
$rcase^{gr}_{s,t}$	0.026 (0.035)	0.016 (0.037)		
gdp^{gr}_t	-1.161*** (0.115)	-1.030*** (0.121)	2.092*** (0.241)	3.608*** (0.283)
dev^{gr}_t	0.348*** (0.015)	0.330*** (0.016)	0.104*** (0.029)	-0.212*** (0.041)
def^{gr}_t	-0.438*** (0.037)	-0.385*** (0.039)	2.611*** (0.146)	4.759*** (0.228)
$fexres^{gr}_t$	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.022** (0.007)	0.027 (0.018)	0.607*** (0.051)
$odaoa^{gr}_t$	0.072*** (0.011)	0.079*** (0.011)	-0.687*** (0.058)	-0.544*** (0.064)
$cons$	10.040*** (0.909)	9.137*** (0.959)	-30.823*** (1.596)	-45.202*** (2.074)
$p <$	.001(***)	.01(**)	.05(*)	

Table B.4: Strategic gains at the end of the cycle

	$votes_{p,s,k,t}$			
Elections→	Assembly		General	
Group Variable→	State	Constituency	State	Constituency
$presd_{p,s,t}$	-10.160***	-10.146***	-4.836***	-9.443***
	(0.639)	(0.692)	(1.057)	(1.221)
$nsdp_{s,t}^{gr}$	-0.273***	-0.321***		
	(0.057)	(0.065)		
$grants_{s,t}^{gr}$			-0.153***	-0.115***
			(0.018)	(0.020)
$edu_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.010***	0.009**		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
$health_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.299***	0.291***		
	(0.033)	(0.037)		
$murder_{s,t}^{gr}$	-0.559***	-0.509***		
	(0.037)	(0.040)		
$riot_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.507***	0.498***		
	(0.022)	(0.024)		
$rcase_{s,t}^{gr}$	0.035	0.010		
	(0.056)	(0.061)		
gdp_t^{gr}	-0.725**	-0.780**	0.365	1.982***
	(0.235)	(0.258)	(0.351)	(0.444)
dev_t^{gr}	0.159***	0.151***	-0.240***	-0.627***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.065)
def_t^{gr}	-0.384***	-0.353***	3.014***	5.073***
	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.165)	(0.295)
$fexres_t^{gr}$	-0.118***	-0.126***	0.087***	0.583***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.066)
$odaoa_t^{gr}$	0.390***	0.404***	-0.859***	-0.922***
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.076)
$cons$	5.299***	5.566**	-18.878***	-33.022***
	(1.608)	(1.772)	(2.269)	(3.141)
$p <$	.001(***)	.01(**)	.05(*)	

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