

**Biopolitical Technology in the Writings of the Early Church Fathers: A Genealogical Study of
Biopolitics**

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts, Jadavpur University, Kolkata

For the partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of

Master of Philosophy

By

Arka Chakraborty

(Registration No. :142373 Of 2017 - 2018)

Under the Supervision of

Dr. Doyeeta Majumder

Department of English

Jadavpur University

Kolkata 700032

India

May 2019

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation titled “**Biopolitical Technology in the Writings of the Early Church Fathers: A Genealogical Study of Biopolitics**” submitted by me towards the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy (Arts) in English** of Jadavpur University, Kolkata is based upon my own original work carried out under the supervision of **Dr. Doyeeta Majumder** and there is no plagiarism. This is also to certify that the work has not been submitted by me in part or in whole for the award of any other degree/diploma of the same Institution where the work is being carried out, or to any other Institution. A paper out of this dissertation has also been presented by me at “**Space/ Place and Modernity**” at Department of English, Jadavpur University thereby fulfilling the criteria for submission, as per the M.Phil Regulation (2017) of Jadavpur University.

Date :

Arka Chakraborty

Roll no.: 001700403001

Registration no.: 142373 of 2017 - 2018

On the basis of academic merit and satisfying all the criteria as declared above, the dissertation work of Mr **Arka Chakraborty** entitled “**Biopolitical Technology in the Writings of the Early Church Fathers: A Genealogical Study of Biopolitics**” is now ready for submission towards the partial fulfilment of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy (Arts) in English** of Jadavpur University.

Head
Department of English

Supervisor & Convener of RAC

Member of RAC

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Doyeeta Majumder for the continuous support of my M.Phil study and the necessary research, for her patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. Her guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. Besides my advisor, I would like to thank Professor Amlan Das Gupta for his insightful comments and encouragement.

Contents

<u>Content Details</u>	<u>Page Number</u>
Acknowledgements.	5
Introduction.	6 - 11
Chapter One: An Understanding towards Economy.	13 - 48
Chapter Two: The Invention of 'Soul'.	50 - 82
Chapter Three: Sculpting in Time - St Benedict and the Christian Historicity.	84 - 111
Conclusion.	113 - 114
Bibliography.	116 - 118

Introduction

My dissertation attempts to locate the Foucauldian analysis of biopolitics in those historic junctures that were not addressed by the analysis itself. In other words, this thesis aims to endow the phenomenon of the biopolitics with a broader historical operativity, to create a genealogy of biopolitics that transcends the chronological limits set by Foucault. While the Foucauldian discourse locates the eighteenth century as the temporal generator of this ‘newer’ model of governance, this thesis would attempt to locate this mode of governance even in the early Christological and theological writings of the church fathers and thereby, it hopes to facilitate a better understanding of biopolitics and also of modern political situations. So, to put it simply, my dissertation can be seen as a genealogical search for the origin of biopolitical structure, a question about which Foucault is vague at best.¹

An elemental apparatus of this discourse is to be the idea of *oikonomia*. *Oikonomia* is always characterised by an activity, by doing things. In this sense, it is more of a verb than a nonchalant noun. Xenophon’s idea of it, as shown by Giorgio Agamben in his *Kingdom and Glory*, is also marked by this form of activity.² Thus, he compares it to a dance movement and also invokes the example of a Phoenician ship in which all things are so excellently ordered and perfectly managed that there could be no confusion, or no sort of work for a searcher, nothing out of place, no troublesome untying to cause a delay when anything was wanted for immediate use. It is not the accurate knowledge of the location of the things that Xenophon refers to as *oikonomia*, but it is

¹ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978 - 1979*, trans. Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at College de France, 1977 - 1978*, trans. Graham Burchell, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1977); Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1976); Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2*, trans. Robert Hurley, (London: Penguin Books, 1976); Michel Foucault, *The Care of Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume 3*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 43.

² Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2011).

rather the ordering of the things with supreme tactfulness. This ordering of things emerges as a managerial task, an exercise in administrative potential - it is an *act* that is essentially invested in the real situations and in their quick negotiations. It is an act that is not framed in a distance from its object of control, it is rather an inherent mechanism in the cartography of power relations; it is goaded towards a practical functioning. So, contrary to all popular beliefs, this term simply does not designate the calculation of profit and loss - it involves a more problematic terrain. It is not simply a technology of calculation, it is, rather, a technology of ruling over things and beings. Marie Jose Mondzain in her seminal study *Image, Icon, Economy* recognises the *oikonomia* as not simply any form of activity, but specifically as a mediative modality - a performance to effectuate a balance.³ Thus the essence of it is in its logic of appropriation. In constricting an unique path for itself, therefore, the economy articulates a difference from the categories of the political. For an understanding of the term 'political' I have referred to the treatise *Concept of the Political* by Carl Schmitt.⁴ In this brief book, Schmitt defines the idea of the political as a rather simplistic opposition between the friend and the enemy. Therefore, the political act was understood as the absolute altercation between two warring groups and the profoundly political act was construed as deciding who was friend and who not. While the *oikonomia* facilitates a mediation, politics is only located in a relationship of opposition. The managerial faculty of *oikonomia* is, according to Foucault, a more recent phenomenon. For him the economic governance and with it the policy of security has only been present from the eighteenth century. In the first chapter of the thesis, I have tried to show that it had already been present in the early theological writings and the specific form in which it garnered much critical or rather philosophical attention is that of the divine *oikonomia*. Analysing an important text by Origen, a third century Alexandrine ascetic and theological writer, this dissertation tries to show that *oikonomia* functions also as a mechanism of administration for the

³ Marie - José Mondzain, *Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary*, trans. Rico Frances (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

⁴ Carl Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

Triune God over the entire human race. Following the previous understanding of the term from Mondzain, and intensifying it, the second volume of Origen's *On First Principles* insinuates an entirely theologico-governmental domain of the term. In this understanding, the term stands between the divine plan of the redemption and the seemingly free will of the human kind. An important function of *oikonomia* is to manipulate the truant human will to the path of righteousness. Therefore, it emerges as a cunning coercive apparatus that subtly operates with a continuous reference to the "normal" / "ethical". It appears, thus, exactly similar to that method which Foucault analyses in the three volumes of his *History of Sexuality* — a modality of government in which the coercive element is installed in the subject herself so that she herself exercises control over herself — and which he termed as the *care of self*. In this modality of control, the exercise of power is reiterated endlessly in the little acts of self-discipline that characterise 'wisdom'. This control over the subject's life and her choices form a homology between *oikonomia* and biopolitics.

For an understanding of the latter concept I have referred to Roberto Esposito's analysis of the concept in *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*.⁵ It is in the politicisation of the natural capacities of the life that Esposito redeems a fragmented yet sure sense of the term 'biopolitics'. He locates the enigma of biopolitics not in the qualified life of the *bios*, but in the fundamental nature of the life, in the ontology of its non-qualification where it signifies to nothing beyond its own nature. Thus, for Esposito, biopolitics is constituted of precisely in turning the science of life back to its original domain from which it originated - its anatomical and physiological details, to the historical experience of the body that cannot be translated into language anymore and therefore can only be governed with a specific technology. In fact, he destabilises the very distinction between the qualified life of *bios* and its formless content of the natural inheritance. For him, they are irreversibly coagulated in a structure of the power game that can only result in a government whose object is the human body itself, in its capacity of its individuality and in its capacity of forming the

⁵ Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

population. In its insistence on moderating the biological nature of life, biopolitics intersects the apparatus of *oikonomia*.

As the earlier discussion of economy would show, the flesh would turn out to be an integral element of the divine economy, but before focusing on that the thesis deals with another very important issue. In its second chapter this thesis would attempt to understand the exact nature of the soul and its precise location of importance in the governmental order of *oikonomia* — how the ‘soul’ formulates a bridging spectrum joining the body, on the one hand, with the social, historical and moral actions of it on the other hand. Closely reading the treatise *On the Soul* by Tertullian, a Christian Scholar from the Carthage of the late second century, this dissertation tries to show that, for him, the soul not only formed an inextricable substance of the economy of the body, it also provided a locale towards which the disciplinary tactics were directed. It was only by exercising control over both the body and the soul that one could hope to generate what Foucault called ‘docile body’ — the most convenient subject of governance. Therefore, the idea the soul created a sort of bridge between the physical disciplinary mechanisms and the limits set on the actions of a subject. Through the soul, and indeed for the soul, the bodily mechanisms, its desires and excesses are checked on the one hand; on the other hand, by situating the soul in an ethic-moral universe, the actions of the individual are surveyed. The soul is what through which the disciplinary technology is put into place. In the context of the emergence of a disciplinary society Foucault understood the soul, in his *Discipline and Punish*, to be a part, a tool of the governing mechanics. Taking his hint, this thesis tries to uncover an understanding of the soul alternative to the more traditional reading of the subject which is entirely located in an absolute distinction between the body and the soul, between the physicality and the metaphysicality. Contrary to this approach, here it is being argued that early Christian theologians looked at it with subtler sensibilities. Thus emerges a new complex object of government, an anatomy whose, on one side, bodily experiences are heavily monitored and fundamentally negotiated; and on the other hand, whose desires are curbed and moulded into a forced ‘normality’.

But the question remains, precisely when this controlling apparatus came into being? The Foucauldian resolution of this problem leans to an eighteenth century origination. But, as the last section of my dissertation shows, it is possible to locate this apparatus in the Galenic oeuvre even. Galen was a famous physician of Greece in second century AD. His system of human physiology continued to influence profoundly even the christological authors for a very long time. That is why, even though he isn't a Christian himself, Galen's works are included in this dissertation. A close reading of treatises *On Diseases and Symptoms*, *On Foodstuffs*, and *On the Passions and Errors of Soul* unveils the presence of the bioeconomic apparatus in these texts. He argues for a self-disciplining goaded towards an ethic of moderation as the essential pathway to lead a healthy, ethical life. Thus, again we see, the Galenic system invests a control of the biological mechanism of the body. But like a true economical system, it never postulates an unbending adherence to the rule in every circumstance, it rather encourages appropriation, renovation based on the changing realities of the context.

The third chapter of my dissertation analyses the Benedictine rulebook. As we will see from the preceding two chapters, a modality of limiting the potentials of the body and its activities was of central importance of this form of government. In the third chapter, the Benedictine rulebook will emerge as an impeccable example of this. It is, however, not to suggest that this was the first instance of something this coercive taking place in the history of 'modern' man. As Mike Ojakangas argues in his *On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics : A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower*, it is possible to locate a fragmented, disheveled presence of this motif in some writings of Aristotle and Plato. But in them it never achieved the comprehensive formulation that we can find in these theological and medical treatises of early Christianity. To prove this point, the dissertation makes a close reading of the *Rulebook of St Benedict*, a sort of guidebook written by the late fifth century monk Benedict. In his rulebook, we see, again and again, the attempt to codify the body and its diverse functions. Therefore, Benedict writes expansively on the foods, drinks taken by a Benedictine monk, of his proper way of talking and the appropriate measure of his silence. It goes

on to chart even how long would he sleep, how long would he provide manual labour and also the sleeping arrangement of the monks. So that this disciplined body is equally matched by a disciplined mind, the number of the psalms to be read on winter and summer nights, how and when to remember Christ and his actions are regimented in this rule book. They are charted but with the scope of appropriation in diverse circumstances, and not with the inflexibility of a code. We can see now how the Galenic body and its reincarnation in the theological imagination, with its precarious balance of the four humours and a tendency towards the crystallisation of moderation, provide a technological model for the bioeconomic governmentality.

Chapter One

Towards an Understanding of 'Economy' and Biopolitics

What is economy? The question seems easy enough to fall into the category of the naive - a question that, in our mind, readily settles itself comfortably into an excess of answers. But before the dust settles down, we must ask not a question involving 'what', but 'why'. Why is economy important in a discussion of the biopolitical strands in the early Christian writings? How from biopolitics is hanging this thread of economy. And why should this dissertation that purports to be mapping a genealogical study of biopolitics should involve a chapter on economy? The quickest answer could be that economy constructs the locus of any biopolitical governmentality; but that answer is unfortunately the vaguest one. It does not even begin to penetrate into the problematised intersection between the economy and the biopolitics. It rather reverts back to our initial question, 'what is economy' — is it the rather simplistic pecuniary model that charts the world of commerce, or is it something more important, vaster and more fundamental than that? It should be more profitable if we begin to illuminate the problem by regarding the second set of questions - that is, to subject the problem of biopolitics to a meticulous investigation. By investing into that with a rigour, the dissertation hopes to understand the underlying connection of it to the domain of *oikonomia*, and therefore, not only a critical understanding of the biopolitics but also an analysis of the historical form of it, in the temporal section of the Nazi regime, is inculcated in the rather long discussion of the structure that will ensue.

In Esposito's definition of biopolitics, it does not act to negate the conventional political categories like law or democracy, it does not make them dysfunctional to eventuate into a completely new sociological structure; it rather formulates a new form of traffic, a rather different negotiation with these conventional elements from which are originated previously unseen strands of governmental paradigms that cannot be explained away with those terms anymore. Even if Esposito manages to locate the luminous essence of the new form, it does not help him to grasp the

“adequate categorical exactitude” of the precise architecture.⁶ He admits, clearly enough, that the critical nature of the term oscillates between various theoretical polarities and refuses to be codified into a singular definition. To redeem the concept of biopolitics from a seemingly inevitable collapse into the land of enigma, Esposito undertakes to clarify the concept. In doing so, like Agamben, his first reference is constituted by what Aristotle called *bios politikos*. For Aristotle, the human life is qualified by being *bios* that is, having a specific form of life (like, for instance, the life of a carpenter or the life of a politician), while the animal life consists only of the mere fundamental struggle to survive — the *zōē*. But unlike Agamben, he fails to locate a natural process of emergence of biopolitics from the ancient phrase. Esposito rightly recognises that the phrase *bios politikos* involves not a distinction between *zōē* and *bios* but rather an eviction of the distinction - it destabilises the difference between them and thereby produces a conjugated form in which the natural life is not any more located independent of the qualified life. More than this, he questions the very rationality of dividing these two structures of life:

Zōē itself can only be defined problematically: what, assuming it is even conceivable, is an absolutely natural life? It’s even more the case today, when the human body appears to be increasingly challenged and also literally traversed by technology [*tecnica*]. Politics penetrates directly in life and life becomes other from itself. Thus, if a natural life doesn’t exist that isn’t at the same time technological as well; if the relation between *bios* and *zōē* needs by now (or has always needed) to include in it a third correlated term, *technē* - then how do we hypothesize an exclusive relation between politics and life?⁷

Thus, defining biopolitics in reference to the Ancient Greek phrase has become impossible for Esposito. But this does not signify that resorting to the phrase was finally proved to be an exercise in vain for Esposito’s critique. It, rather, provides an important clue to the unveiling of the mystery of biopolitics. The Ancient Greek phrase enacts a distortion of boundaries, and postulates a political

⁶ Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 14.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

ontology of interdependence. Esposito goes on to chart this migration of meaning in various texts of which the first wave is constituted by three very important texts.

The first of these texts is by the Swede Rudolph Kjellén who was not only the first one to use the term ‘biopolitics’ but who coined the term ‘geopolitics’. Esposito sees this man as prefiguring the Nazi theorisation of *Lebensraum* or ‘vital space’ while noting that Rudolph’s investment into the Nazi theory was not absolute. What he proposed was rather a version that would later transmogrified into a full blown theory of race. He had no such bold emotion. He imagined the state as a natural living organism to such an extent that he concludes, in the words of Esposito, that the state “is furnished with instincts and natural drives”.⁸ This incarnation of the state as an animal whose life is limited by innate, natural desires overturns the Hobbesian dialectic between nature and culture. Unlike Hobbes, who believed in the necessity of politics to oppose nature, here the state itself is imagined as living a natural life. And thus the natural life is brought into the terrain of politics. This process is spectacularly intensified by Baron Jakob Von Uexküll in his 1920 book *Staatsbiologie: Anatomy, Physiology, and Pathology of the State*. As the title of the book makes it clear, Uexküll formulates an inherent connection between life in its fundamental form of biology and politics. The body of the state, from his perspective, is a precarious structure that is to be maintained at its optimum capacity and for that various physiological, medicinal or even surgical operations are needed. Esposito summarises this position thus:

Threatening the public health of the German body is a series of diseases, which obviously, referring to the revolutionary traumas of the time, are located in subversive trade unionism, electoral democracy, and the right to strike: tumors that grow in the tissues of the state, causing anarchy and finally the state’s dissolution.⁹

⁸ Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 14.

⁹ Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 17 - 18.

Such insistence on a pathological understanding of the state obviously gave rise to a defensive scepticism that continued to weave policies against the seemingly threatening “parasites” - the cultural others. Thus Uexküll manages to formulate a distinctively xenophobic architecture of the state that would later be integrated into the Nazi racism. For him, the diseased state can only be dealt with a recourse to the policies, or “visions” as he said, that could bring it back to health. Therefore, his political vision guarantees a balance creating act that should always keep the structure of the state in a benign, healthy modulation and makes the politician more of a physician.

This medicinal archeology of the state garners more strength in the work Esposito next discusses, the 1938 book by the Englishman Morley Roberts *Bio-politics: An Essay in the Physiology, Pathology and Politics of the Social and Somatic Organism*. For Roberts the highest effectiveness of the ontology of the state can only be rationalised as the state’s capacity to recognise it’s diseases and to get rid of them. Thus, the state functions as a natural organism whose immunity responds to any structure that threatens its existence; thereby the rationality of the state here is imagined as essentially pathological - a mechanism that thrives on resisting diseases. Roberts terms this immunitary protocol of the state as biopolitics and creates a definition of biopolitics that is essentially exclusive. But what is more important to Esposito, as well as to our discussion, is entwining these two diverse, in the least obscurely similar, technologies - the defensive apparatus of the state and the natural immunitary capacities of the living organism. The living organism, especially the human body itself, was transformed into an ideal of state and it became educator of Roberts’ political theory:

Roberts develops a parallel between the state and the human body involving the entire immunological repertoire - from antigens to antibodies, from the function of tolerance to the reticuloendothelial system - and finds in each biological element its political equivalent.¹⁰

¹⁰ Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 19.

It is in the politicisation of the natural capacities of the life that Esposito redeems a fragmented yet sure sense of the term ‘biopolitics’. He locates the enigma of biopolitics not in the qualified life of the *bios*, but in the fundamental nature of the life, in the ontology of its non-qualification where it signifies to nothing beyond its own nature. Thus, for Esposito, biopolitics is constituted of precisely in turning the science of life back to its original domain from which it originated - its anatomical and physiological details, to the historical experience of the body that cannot be translated into language anymore and therefore can only be governed with a specific technology.¹¹ In fact, he destabilises the very distinction between the qualified life of *bios* and its formless content of the natural inheritance. For him, they are irreversibly coagulated in a structure of the power game that can only result in a government whose object is the human body itself, in its capacity of its individuality and in its capacity of forming the population.

If political behaviour is inextricably embedded in the dimension of *bios* and if *bios* is what connects human beings [*l'uomo*] to the sphere of nature, it follows that the only politics possible will be the one that is already inscribed in our natural code. Of course, we cannot miss the rhetorical short-circuit on which the entire argument rests: no longer does the theory interpret reality, but reality determines a theory that in turn is destined to corroborate it. The response is announced even before the analysis is begun: human beings cannot be other than what they have always been. Brought back to its natural, innermost part, politics remains in the grip of biology without being able to reply.¹²

In the last analysis, therefore, human history is an continuous repetition of the performance of the human nature, a reiteration of the human subject.

Esposito’s understanding of biopolitics merits a closer inspection and a possible modification. The nature of this modification involves noting a very important element missing

¹¹ In the next chapter we will see how in this anatomical-physiological system, the idea of the soul had been profitably inculcated.

¹² Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 23 - 24.

from Esposito's genealogical survey of biopolitics, something which should be interpolated in this study in an attempt to arrive at a clearer understanding of the term 'biopolitics'. This element that Esposito all but avoids from discussing is a philosophical movement in the Germany of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century - *Lebensphilosophie* - 'the philosophy of life' with which was attached philosophers like Wilhelm Dilthey and Henri Bergson.

However, here, our focus of interest would not be on these heavy names, but rather on a lesser known figure named Ludwig Klages and his cohorts. Born in 1872, the formative years of Klages was disciplined into its actual form first by his father who was a former military officer and later by Stefan George. Another important section of his life involved his childhood friendship with Theodor Lessing, a Jew whose presence was never seen with encouragement in the Klages household. Although he continued to have connections with his unwelcome friend, later in his life he would eventually subscribe to his father's anti-semitic sentiments. Anyway, to go back to our primary concern, *Lebensphilosophie* gathered much admiration in the years following the First World War, since it emerged as a potential salve to the national wounds caused by the war. Explicating on the popular acceptance of this philosophy Nitzan Lebovic, in his study of Klages' philosophy, attributed the popularity to "the interconnections among philosophy and psychology, aesthetics and an organic theory of body".¹³ Two fundamental elements functioned as the central paradigm of this philosophy : the life/blood and the theme of the *Rausch* or the ecstasy. In this philosophy, the symptoms of the life are rooted in the blood, in the genetic code material from which springs forth the ontology of life. Therefore, persons are not defined as individual beings, but their form is regarded as merely a type, an example of the category of men which he or she represents. In this stifled anatomy of human life, the exemplary being is found in what was termed as the *Kreatur*, precisely a middle ground between the animal and the human. The *Kreatur* is defined by leaning to neither nature, it is rather poised in a modicum of balance - it is defined by

¹³ Nitzan Lebovic, *The Philosophy of Life and Death: Ludwig Klages and the Rise of a Nazi Biopolitics*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 160.

acting in a balanced manner. Therefore, its equilibrium is not a result of its simple, inherent and natural essence; it is an act which is inextricably based on the natural regularities, but which is followed from a deliberate, decisive act and not essentially from natural capacities. Therefore, the decisive act of *Lebensphilosophie* mimics the “ontology of flow and circularity” that is found in natural sphere, it can be understood as dissociated from nature, although not opposed to it.¹⁴

Lebovic clarifies the position thus:

Lebensphilosophers argued fiercely in favour of a ritualistic yet self-conscious notion of life as a coherent discourse and a form of codification of signs, grounded in the circularity of blood, the repetitive heartbeat, or other bodily arithmetics (*Rechenkunde*).¹⁵

This sense of repetitiveness, of reiterating the basic formulae had also been characteristic utterance of Esposito’s critique. Thus, the concept of the *Kreatur* fundamentally relocates the essence of life from intellectual ardour to a praxis of performance. It was now the actions that evaluated life according to its proper worth, and not an engagement with the abstract ideas. The animalism, which reduced the validity of an thinking life almost to a non-existence, also forced to formulate newer, and presumably better, technologies of government in which “the whole question of critical governmental reason will turn on how not to govern too much”.¹⁶ The art of governing without ‘governing too much’ is indeed a subtle art and according to Klages, this can only be achieved through a balancing act. This act of balancing, this mechanism of appropriation had its precedence in nature too - the two poles of existence, namely, the soul and the body; but Klages’ idea of life strikes a co-ordinated balance between them and in this is located the true essence of life. But, it is to be stressed, the act of balance is not something which is preposterously incorporated into the otherwise incoherent structure of life; it is not something that is being installed in opposition to the facticity of life itself - in other words, it is not an alien substance. Rather, this process of

¹⁴ Nitzan Lebovic, *The Philosophy of Life and Death: Ludwig Klages and the Rise of a Nazi Biopolitics*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 179.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978 - 1979*, trans. Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 13.

appropriation is inherent in the structure of life. It is not being added to a state in which it was previously absent. This is induced not through a technology of injection, but rather through the apparatus of manipulation, through what is precisely meant by the Foucauldian art of government without too much governing - through a subtle elaboration and exploration of what is already there. This technology can be understood more clearly in the theories of Rudolf Bode, a close associate and disciple of Klages.

Rudolf Bode, in 1940s, would go on to become a very important ideologue of the Nazi cultural mission. In 1941 he would be appointed as NSDAP-Gymnastikpapst und Leiter der von Reichsbauernführer (that is, the gymnastics pope and the principal instructor of the Reich's farmers) and that appointment resulted in his ideas being adopted to the Nazi programme. He had been working on his ideas from many years before. He shared his plans for what he called the Bode School for the Education of the Body with Klages in a letter as early as November 1921. His grand plan for the human body was to restore it to what he recognised as the natural state of the body and to connect this with a sense of totality. Thus, by manipulating the muscular structures, the patterns of various blood vessels, the deep corners of anatomical crevices he planned to produce an optimum condition of the body which was perfectly in consonance with the ideal of a natural body and which was glorified in its astute gracefulness.

Bode grounded his whole system of gymnastics and “natural dance” on principles of rhythm and dynamic form, the physical dialectic of muscular tension and relaxation and the principle of physical automatization, all seen as immanent “poles” of *Lebensphilosophie*. Karl Toepfer describes him in *Empire of Ecstasy* as a theorist of body and movement who “introduced a ‘total’ concept of rhythm...A major influence was Klages, who asserted that excessive rationality or intellectual analysis was a source of ‘arhythm’, or unnatural, strained, discordant, stifled movement.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Nitzan Lebovic, *The Philosophy of Life and Death: Ludwig Klages and the Rise of a Nazi Biopolitics*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 192.

Thus, Bode extended the principle of *Lebensphilosophie* to produce a technology of disciplining the body and while doing so, he brings the human body back to its original “animalistic self-assurance”; he revives in the human body, which is culturally embedded, the discourse of nature. This almost Romantic longing found its corresponding movements in the supra-human phenomenons of rhythmic movement: in the blood and the soil, in the general cycle of the seasons, in the rhythmic flowing of the waves and in the trajectory of the stars across the sky. The body, as imagined by Bode, imitated these natural movements, while the rhythmic movements of its own muscles is not a natural phenomenon, but rather a conscious exercise, a deliberate choice of action which results in being ‘natural’. This ‘natural’ rhythmic body, the output of Bode’s system, is not natural at all. It imitates the natural structure but it in itself consists of a *choice* to imitate those natural motifs. On the other hand, as Esposito shows, this technology of power is characterised by an inevitability - that of the reduction of the life to its basic contours. So, the discourse of biopolitics is plagued by a duplicitous character; it is haunted by a problem of a paradoxical nature. Biopolitics is defined simultaneously by an inevitable reductionism (a logic that cancels out any form of subjective agency) and by an act of deliberate decision. The only way to achieve a sensible resolution of this paradoxical situation is by resorting to Foucault’s idea of disciplining the self, although, it is to be added, Foucault never engaged with these German philosophers and their theoretical framework critically. Still, since these philosophers, forming a pre-Foucauldian exegesis of the biopolitical domain, affiliated themselves to the theoretical significations of biopolitics, they figure quite prominently in this dissertation.

In the Foucauldian resolution of the problem it is marked by a shift from what Foucault calls *ars erotica* to that which he terms *scientia sexualis*.¹⁸ In a way of contextualising this resolving logic it should be added that Foucault, here, had been charting the evolution of the social, judicial, medical and personal engagement with sexuality. The beginning of this journey of his is marked by

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 57.

a strange story. One labourer, whose daily earning was, at best, uncertain and infrequent, was brought to the mayor by the local gendarmes in 1867 for only embracing a little girl. The mayor, in his turn, handed the labourer to a doctor and later two other experts who had a paper written about the labourer and had it published. How could this be significant in Foucault's treatise on sexuality? Answering this question, Foucault shows the mechanism that is working beneath the seemingly insignificant procedure:

the fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, these inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical intervention, a careful clinical examination, and an entire theoretical elaboration.¹⁹

Thus, the pleasure of the sexual activities is constructed into a juridico-pathological domain, a space which can only be professionally handled by the proper experts. The erotic activities are now turned into a field from which are gathered knowledge, strands of information — it becomes a science to explore and not a simple pleasure of life anymore. Thus the discourse of sexuality is multiplied into the culture, but only as an object of investigation. This discursivity of the sexuality is not to be engaged to with a complete absence of the pleasures imaginable from *ars erotica*. In this latter modality of sexual praxis, the truth of the event is grasped only through the pleasure. Here, the truth is brewed out of the absolute relationship between the subject and his or her pleasures that is gleaned from the event. Even if any knowledge, apart from the logos of pleasure, is begot from the experience it “must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though from within and amplify its effects”.²⁰

In opposition to this, in the science of sex (or *scientia sexualis*) the truth of the event is not located in the bare pleasure of the act, but in rational explanation and analysis of it from which is exiled any stigmata of the pleasure. Therefore the act of confession emerges here with an

¹⁹ Ibid., 31.

²⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 57.

unprecedented importance. Through the technology of confession the truth about sexuality is produced - it is no more a structure belonging to the domain of normal human behaviour, it is, rather, a field of knowledge. The Foucauldian critique of the negotiations with sexuality, however, is not limited. In fact, the critique involves the entire Western ethic about governing the body and it invests into the analytical model to perform an autopsy of the historical kaleidoscope of the human body. From this backdrop, the emergence of the Western man as a “confessing animal” is significant since it goes on to accurately point out various cultural structures that are generally taken as granted.²¹ This codification of the human anatomy to meaningful, coherent symbols and meanings has been facilitated by diverse cultural tactics, routinising the body off from its natural, innate significations in order to formulate cultural meanings. But how do these, any of these, manage to solve the ambiguity of the biopolitics? For that, we have to dig deeper into the nature of Foucault’s critique.

From his understanding of the shift in the cultural ideas about sexuality, Foucault meticulously charts a queue of statements about power. For him, therefore, “power is not an institution, and not a structure; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society”.²² By seeing power as a fluid system, instead of as a monolithic architecture, Foucault undoes the traditional idea of power and promotes a newer paradigm in which power is seen as continuously evolving, negotiating, and appropriating itself to different situations. In this new geometry of power, it is not situated in a central point from which it flows forth; it is, on the contrary, “exercised from innumerable points”.²³ In this new cartography of power, the exercise of power becomes a precarious act of calculation, of management. The central problematic of the power game is now circling around the preservation of balance; it is now a question of administrative prudence, of managerial circumspection and utilitarian far-sightedness:

²¹ Ibid., 59.

²² Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 93.

²³ Ibid., 94.

Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. If in fact they are intelligible, this is not because they are the effect of another instance that “explains” them, but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation.²⁴

From this fundamental rationale of calculation, of pragmatic fruitfulness is to be understood the deep-set caverns of biopolitics. The deciding factor for this form of governmentality is neither a strict adherence to the rule, nor an excessive negligence to follow them - it is rather an appropriation of the given scenario to best of interest.²⁵ Therefore, as we have already seen, biopolitics involves a modicum of subjective agency in its exercise of regulatory tactic. But this modicum of agency is limited by the technology of the self-discipline. Foucault argues that, by inventing a ‘normal’ course and by installing it into the individual with the utmost acuteness, the individual is always at pain to restrict himself or herself to these culturally constructed boundaries, since spilling beyond it would be ‘abnormal’. The Western structure of discipline had been at work to produce this ethical subject who could preclude himself or herself from yielding to those ‘abnormal’ urges and to invest only in those which were deemed ‘normal’. They *had to choose* the pathways to the ‘normal’. This had not been an easy achievement. Various forms of fears and anxieties had been employed to assert this ethical subject. Foucault, for example, talks of the affliction of the “seminal weakness” which presumably resulted in dullness, sloth, languid nature, and, more dangerously, in effeminate dispositions.²⁶ Thus it could also pose a danger to the whole nation:

This disease, which is “shameful in itself”, is “dangerous in that it leads to stagnation; harmful to society in that it goes against the propagation of species; and because it is in all respect the source of countless ills, it requires prompt treatment.”²⁷

²⁴ Ibid., 94 - 95.

²⁵ That is, in other words, neither *akribeia* nor *parabasis*, as we will see Mondzain explaining below.

²⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2*, trans. Robert Hurley, (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 15.

²⁷ Ibid., 16.

The act of overwhelming self-indulgence, therefore, is a threat to the very existence of a community, and not only to the subject. The natural attribute becomes an object of governmental control and whole systems of pathology, sociology, and psychology has been created to deal with it. But more than any external superintendence, a moderating mechanism has been installed within the very self of the subject that judges and decides. Now the minute details of the subject's movements, the slightest of facial tensions, the ticking of each muscle have become a subject of scrutiny. The morphology of human anatomy was now trapped in the intersection of power. The "codes of behaviour and forms of subjectivation" began to dictate the terms of the government.²⁸ The rich systemicity, the subtle framework, however, did not terminate the possibility of a choice, but now that choice only led to either a normalisation or to an entire category of the 'abnormal'. The act of disciplination became interiorised and it was formulated as an antidote to nothing short of death:

The principle underlying the tactics of battle - that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living - has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population.²⁹

While the sovereign had its dominion over death (whether the criminal's body would be desecralised or ritualistically humiliated; if yes, then how; would the death be a public spectacle), this new governmental modality had its dominion over life itself and "death is power's limit, the moment that escapes it".³⁰ Thus, biopolitics, by insinuating a rationale of choice, establishes a field of limited agency which continuously strives to formulate a coherent ordered regime of power. For Foucault this newer modality had been properly in its place since the eighteenth century (although, it should be noted, he collects fragments of this governmental rationality from across the vast narrative of the Western historiography, beginning with the Grecian philosophy), we will be seeing

²⁸ Ibid., 29.

²⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 137.

³⁰ Ibid., 138.

below that a cognisable pattern of this rationality had already been present in the writings of the Early Church Fathers. But before that, we have to illuminate the mystery of economy and how economy is essentially connected to the biopolitical rationality. For this, an enquiry into the historical origins of the idea of the economy is entirely necessary and here we will follow two important writers on this subject - Mondzain and Agamben.

Marie-José Mondzain has aligned the conception of economy with the ontological reality of the visible.³¹ She recommends this understanding not merely by analysing economy as an act of governing the bodies, her intended connection between these two architectures is more immediate and profoundly primal. The initiation to this mode of understanding the term 'economy' is marked by the dialectic of the image and the icon. Contextualising this discourse against the backdrop of the Byzantine iconoclastic crisis, she defines the image as the invisible, the icon as the visible surrogate to the earlier one, and the economy as the "*living linkage*".³² In other words, the economy is the mediation of the invisible into the design of the visible - it is the translation, or rather more accurately, a manifestation and thereby, the economy involves an irreversible link to the visible, to the ontology of the physical. From this perspective, economy is similar to that of the rhetoric. Since, in the structure of the rhetoric also, the efficacy of the structure can only be and is always mapped by its relation to the *manifestation* of the will. The rhetoric, simultaneously, manifests and persuades - it, in fact, persuades by manifesting. This conception of the rhetoric, emerging from a purely utilitarian reading, enables a correspondence between the economy as the *manifestation* of the invisible and the rhetoric as the *manifestation* of will, or of the predefined argument. But while the rhetoric is merely a *tekhné*, a discursive tool adapted to the pre-existing assertion, the economy involves that complex meditative system that eventually results in the very construction of the rhetoric itself.

³¹ Marie - José Mondzain, *Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary*, trans. Rico Frances (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

³² Marie - José Mondzain, *Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary*, trans. Rico Frances (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 3.

Her genealogical investigations of the term traces the first use of the idea in the writings of Paul of the biblical authority, especially where Paul refers to *oikonomia* in I Corinthians 9:16 - 17. The Pauline understanding of the term *oikonomia* enunciates a sense of wholesome structure of a plan. For him, this term refers not only to the second persona of the Trinity, it rather involves the whole trajectory beginning with the Creation and ending only with the Redemption. Therefore, *oikonomia* inaugurates into the timeless terrain of theology the historical intervention - the conversation between men and God. Economy, in its essence then, is opposed to theology. While the theological domain engages with a timeless divine presence, economy, on the other hand, deals with the temporal manifestation of the divine will. The grandiose architecture of the divine plan for the universe subsumes all forms of suffering and even chaos into a coherent, though undeniably mysterious, sense of order that plays out itself even when human beings are unaware of its activities. Nothing exists beyond this. Mondzain summarises this position quite efficiently:

Yet it is evident as well that this ineffable cohesion is not content to record only preestablished harmony; it also encompasses suffering, evil, and death because it assumes our liberty as well. There is no economy without the *spectacle of the world*, with all its complexity and contradictions. The economy is not in place to resolve apparent contradictions but to keep the route open between the visible spectacle of mystery, which, once again, will make of that creation an enigmatic mirror of its creator.³³

God is the ultimate arbiter of meaning and only from him can emanate economy. Therefore, at the heart of *oikonomia*, there is an immanent order that cannot be questioned, that cannot be mediated by any linguistic apparatus. The question of *oikonomia* therefore always leads to a reign of silence where verbal markers fail to signify anymore - a domain beyond human language.

In the various Latin texts this term *oikonomia* was translated as *dispensatio* or as *dispositio*. The Latin word *dispensatio* can faithfully be translated into English as ‘dispensation’, a word which

³³ Marie - José Mondzain, *Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary*, trans. Rico Frances (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 36.

suggests both an administration of justice and an exemption. This formulation of the idea, to say the least, is essentially paradoxical. On the one hand, the idea of administering justice entails a close abiding of the legal dictums and, on the other hand, it clearly invokes a technological resistance to those very legal dictums. How can that be possible? How can a single word be able to contain those two opposing views? Mondzain provides an easy resolution to this perplexing dichotomy. For her, the word poses a middle ground between the *akribeia* (that is, the inflexible law) and the *parabasis* (that is, the transgression of that law). The term holds both of these two poles within itself for it is a balancing act between them itself. But it is possible to argue that this convenient solution might be intensified properly to be able to define the ambiguous nature of the term completely, since any order that results from two other orders cannot contain elements from them with utter visibility - in the new order, the elements of the previous two must be negotiated to construct this third reality. It is more profitable, therefore, to see the moral problem of *dispensatio* as a logical extension of the problem of the ‘example’ (an ‘example’ can never be able to represent its class since it is an *example* of its class), a problem that disregards the rational game of locating, for once and all, a systematic, coherent response to any problem.³⁴ The *dispensatio* is simultaneously neither the rigour of law, nor the exemption of it — the ontological truth, the ‘is-ness’ of it comprises those two ‘not-ness’. This problem of the assemblage of being from nothingness is a constant source of anxiety in the Christian philosophy, and, as we will see below, this problem articulates itself in the manifestation of the divine element in the figure of Christ.

Jesus Christ has often been regarded as the manifested element of the divine plan of the redemption. Since this manifestation is positioned at a specific temporal juncture, the idea of economy is rather profoundly inscribed into a certain historicity. The temporality of the economy is reiterated in the historical appearance of Jesus Christ, of him being the ‘economy of the Father’. Therefore, the emergence of Christ is understood as the historical manifestation of the divine

³⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1995).

substance that is not limited by time. But what is entailed by this repeated use of the idea of the historicity? What is the connection that surreptitiously binds both the power of the God and the phenomenology of human experience? Giorgio Agamben leads us to an understanding of this problem.³⁵ Agamben analysis of the connection between the history (which is essentialised as a human endeavour) and economy grows out of the distinction between the politico-theological sphere and that of *oikonomia*. To underline the logical validity of his argument, Agamben invokes the Peterson-Schmitt conflict at the heart of which, as he perceivable recognises, resides the central problem of the divine economy. He suggests an understanding of economy which is constructed as an antidote to the politics as a stasisological structure. Agamben clearly formulates his position on this in his discussion of Gregory of Nyssa, the bishop of the fourth century:

In other words, in Gregory, the logos of “economy” is specifically designed to prevent the Trinity from introducing a stasiological, or political, fracture in God. Insofar as even a monarchy can give rise to a civil war, an internal stasis, it is only a displacement from a political to an “economic” rationality (in a sense that we shall explain) that can protect us against this danger.³⁶

What is to be noted here is that the stasisological architecture of the state here is equated with the state’s political reality. This drawing of the parallel is quite similar to the Foucauldian inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition to reach the dictum “politics is the continuation of war by other means”.³⁷ In order to produce this articulation, Foucault follows the lead of Boulainvilliers. Foucault elaborates on how he reaches what he calls the generalisation of war by three consecutive stages.

³⁵ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2011).

³⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2011), 13 - 14.

³⁷ Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*” *Lectures at the College de France, 1975 - 76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1992), 15.

First, Boulainvilliers makes a historical argument that finds the reality of freedom in the general sense of term as non-existent or rather existing only in prehistoric times. Though he does not deny the possibility of a natural law of equality, for him this state of nature leads always to a destabilisation of the political state since the former law is clearly weaker. He goes back to as early as the Gauls and argues that their society was divided into aristocracy and non-aristocracy, that their society functioned from a fundamental inequality. In opposition to this Gallic civilisation he posits the Greco-Roman civilisation which eventually failed to exist when their aristocratic class was not distinguished anymore from the non-aristocratic class in its actions: “Once their aristocracies became decadent, Greece and Rome lost their status and even ceased to exist as States. Inequality is everywhere, violence creates inequalities everywhere, and wars are everywhere. No society can last without this sort of warlike tension between an aristocracy and the popular masses.”³⁸ In this aggressive genealogy of the anatomy of the state, the term ‘freedom’ does not entail any sense of benign responsibility; it is, rather, marked by an “ability to deprive others of their freedom”.³⁹ This formulation of freedom, logically, gives birth to an unending sequence of violent actions, actions that inculcates inequality, that extends towards the horizon of both the past and the future. If one community’s freedom is to deprive another community of its freedom, then the second community’s freedom is to deprive a third community of its freedom in its turn; and it goes on.

From this cycle of violence only the figure of the war emerges as any substantial form of reality on which it is possible to base our understanding of the state. From this stage of the necessary war, the second point iterated by Boulainvilliers comes almost naturally. Here he analyses the nature of this war. For him, this idea of the war cannot be appropriately limited by a mere military discourse which involves the facts of the battlefields. The idea that he invests into is that this includes a technological reality as well — not everybody is technologically advanced enough to produce highly developed weapons. That community will always emerge victorious that

³⁸ Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*” *Lectures at the College de France, 1975 - 76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1992), 15.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 157.

holds a more sophisticated arsenal. This problem of being technologically advanced in building weapons is also linked with the economic reality of the community. Therefore the discourse of war is essentially located in an economico-technological paradigm which resides beyond the bare facticity of the battlefield, which rather involves the whole of society as the subject of its problematisation and its theorisation. The central problem that haunts Boulainvilliers is therefore this: “Who has the weapons?”⁴⁰ And this chief problematic augments a whole set of economic and technological critique of the state. This critique, also, is marked by a sense of inequality and he touches upon it quite clearly when endowing his theoretical argument with a historical example: “The organisation of the Germans was essentially based upon the fact that some - the *leudes* - had weapons and the others did not.”⁴¹ Boulainvilliers’ state, and following him the Foucauldian state also, is thus always characterised by the violent and violating figuration of inequality in which the societal structures are retained by a continuous struggle between two strafing communities, each of whom are engaged in the effort to deprive the other from their freedom. This functional strife is what provides the actions of the state with a specific meaning - the acute, undeniable meaning of survival to retain or ascertain the existence.

The logos of survival, however, acquires its complete blossoming in the third stage of Boulainvilliers’ analysis. This stage involves the naming of the invasion - rebellion as the elemental equation of the technology of the state. Of course, Foucault’s discussion stresses on the point of the rebellion. While invasion has historically been proven to be a deciding factor in the construction of the state as a warring machine, Foucault and Boulainvilliers both are more intrigued by the function of the rebellion in it since the rebellion, unlike the invasion, results in the dichotomisation of the community itself - here, there is no outsider that stirs the division up. To validate his point, Boulainvilliers goes back again to the history of the Gaul - Frankish conflict. He states plainly that in the outset the Franks succeeded in conquering the Gauls because they invaded

⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*” *Lectures at College de France, 1975 -76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1992), 158.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

the Gallic topography. They not only won the battle, they captured the Gallic lands, appropriated them and finally settled there. But it was also this very act of appropriation and settlement that eventually proved to be their undoing, since this led to rebellion:

And it was precisely this, or in other words, the source of their strength, that gradually became the principle of their weakness. Because the nobles lived on their separate estates, and because the tax system financed their ability to make war, they became separated from the king they had created, and were preoccupied only with war and with fighting among themselves. As a result, they neglected everything that had to do with education, instruction, learning Latin, and acquiring expertise. All these things would lead to their loss of power.⁴²

Therefore, the moral of this historical description goes, the rebellion should always be supervised, managed. But that does not entail a complete negation of presence of the rebellion in the architecture of the state. It is already there amidst the nature of the state itself. It is not possible to imagine any state that has somehow managed to discard this strand from its political body, since that would entail a disorganisation of that precise body. This conception leads to a significant rehauling of conceptualising war: “The conclusion that the simple dichotomy between victors and vanquished is no longer strictly pertinent to the description of this whole process.”⁴³ In other words, the idea of war is not any more limited or contained within the inner-national paradigm, it is not any more a battle between two opposing communities, it is more than that - it now has extended into the community itself, creating various warring factions, competing ideologies that battle each other. Thus the two points, the invasion and the rebellion, crystallise themselves into two distinct forms of wars. One among them involves the more conventional animosity of the national communities, like, for example, the Franks opposing the Gauls or the Saxons against the Normans. But the other

⁴² Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*” *Lectures at College de France, 1975 - 76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1992), 161.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 161.

form is more intrusive, more ubiquitous - that which exists within the community, within the “groups, fronts, and tactical units”.⁴⁴ It divides the community across various opposing categories. This form of generalised war falls closely to the Hobbesian imperative of animosity between man and man. His idea recognises a general, common war as the usual state of being, as the normal state of human existence in its social form. Boulainvilliers extends this relationship of individual enmity to the paradigm of the group enmity where every group is located in confrontation with the other groups. It is a perpetual state of strife and violence. It is, in other words, a state of civil war.

This idea of warring state refers to Carl Schmitt’s idea of the political.⁴⁵ For Schmitt the essence of politics can be profitably traced back to the rather simplistic dialectic of friend and enemy. This fundamental set of binary facilitates his reading of the phenomenon of politics: “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”⁴⁶ The central polemic of Schmittian politics, therefore, is not about the governance of the body politic, but about the act of deciding who is a friend and who is not. This essential motif of strife, of distinction could only lead to a society overwhelmed by war. Therefore, the war becomes the fundamental structural kernel of any given society. It becomes necessary for him to declare that recognising the enemy (or a friend, for that matter) is more political a task than fighting the enemy in the battlefield. But that does not involve, for him, sharing any contempt for the act of bravery committed on the battlefield, it emanated rather from his idea of politics itself. Since locating and dealing with an enemy was politically far more superior to him than any other political actions, it seems logical that his idea of politics is goaded towards an engagement with the enemy in which, preferably, the enemy is reduced to a state of being no threat anymore. In other words, Schmitt’s politics tends to emit a physiology of strategy, a strategy to annihilate the danger of the *other*. But this enemy / other element is markedly essential for the construction of the

⁴⁴ Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*” *Lectures at College de France, 1975 - 76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1992), 162.

⁴⁵ Carl Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 90.

relationship of the nationhood - it is only against a collective group of enemy that the community becomes able to form a coherent architecture of the group:

The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship.⁴⁷

This formulates the state as an apparatus of struggle, a machine of elongated war. The Schmittist state has an enormous capacity for politics by having constructed a modality of violence. Strife - this is the essence of politics therefore which dictates the material reality of government. The Agambenian conception, in contrast to this, deviates from this nature of the innate violence of government. Agamben's imagining of the government is based on *oikonomia*; in fact, from the outset he formulates his problems thus: "This study will inquire into the paths by which and the reasons why power in the West has assumed the form of an *oikonomia*".⁴⁸

As we have noted earlier, this economic government in Agamben is laterally oppositional to the political structures. And for that he revigorates the Schmitt - Peterson dispute to unravel subtler points. This dispute was not that much of content as much of the form. The historical causality that both Schmitt and Peterson refers back to in their separate discourses is that which eventually postpones the *eschaton*. Their disagreement grows out of this locus of agreement in the belief of the irreversible, unquestionable beginning of the divine kingdom. While both of them enunciate that the entire human civilisation is contained within a borrowed time, they disagree on the reason that leads to the genesis of the human history. For Schmitt, this rupture occurs with the advent of the human empire. But Peterson, on the other hand, stresses that the delay in the emergence of the divine

⁴⁷ Carl Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 110.

⁴⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), *xi*.

kingdom has been resulted from the Jewish obstinacy in denying Christ. Therefore, although formally the emergence is different from each other, in both Schmitt's and Peterson's understanding the telos of the human history resides in its complete obliteration and the eventual blossoming of a rectified (corrected of the ancient fault that resulted in the Fall) human race engaged in the following of the divine path of righteousness. For both of them the entire trajectory of the human history is thus inching towards this creature with the perfect mode of being - namely, the Obedient Man, that is the Man not marked by the Original Disobedience. For this reason, Agamben reads Peterson - Schmitt dispute as carrying forth the theological acumen of Eusebius. Eusebius, a polemicist and a historian of Christianity of the early times, recognised a parallel between the human and the divine state of the affairs. In this theology of history, political structure is inherently qualified by the salvific intent of the divine monarchy. And yet, in a self-defeating reversal of argument, Peterson refuses the possibility of political theology:

Peterson tries to show that, at the time of the disputes on Arianism, the theological - political paradigm of divine monarchy enters into conflict with the development of Trinitarian theology. The proclamation of dogma of the Trinity marks, from this perspective, the waning of "monotheism as a political problem". In only two pages, political theology - to whose reconstruction the book had been dedicated - is entirely demolished.⁴⁹

Here, as can be seen, emerges the problem of the Trinity or the Triune god, and with it is stressed the question of economy. Agamben effectuates an understanding of economy which attempts to result in the resolution of the problem of the Triune god. But for that, he makes an etymological study of the word 'economy'.

The first treatise that Agamben reverts back to is the pseudo-Aristotelian text, named *Economics*, on the matters of economy and he declares, following the text, "*Oikonomia* means

⁴⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 10.

“administration of the house.”⁵⁰ This economy as an administrative modality is perspicuously different from any relationship involving either amiability or enmity. The *oikonomia*, as is understood by the treatise here, consists of an ordering of the household, a disciplining of the rather complex organism that could be divided in a triadic structure of relationships - despotic (that is, between the master and the slaves), paternal (obviously between the parents and the children), and gamic (that is, between the husband and the wife). It is this principle of organisation that characterised the idea of the *oikonomia*. In this understanding of economy, politics is avidly discarded. In fact, in the second book of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, even the *polis* is governed by the principle of economy. There are described four types of the administrative faculty - *oikonomia basilikê* (economy of a king), *oikonomia satrapikê* (economy of a governor), *oikonomia politikê* (economy of the free state), and *oikonomia idiotikê* (economy of a private citizen). So, the city is organised by the faculty of an economic administration and not by investing into a warring cohabitation. In Aristotle’s *Politics* also we see that the administration of a city is engaged with the issues of happiness (*eudaimonia*) of the population, their health, the technologies of the child care, of the construction of ‘proper’ bodies or the bodies suitable to follow the emperor’s orders.

This treatise aims at qualifying and quantifying meticulously each last detail of everyday, leaving nothing to chance of the mundane life. The *polis* can only be, at least in here, governed by an *oikonomia*. Aristotle asserts the importance of both the *nomoi* and *oikonomia* for the governance of the city, opposing the famous dictum of Isocrates: “The constitution is the soul of the city.”⁵¹ Whereas the Isocrates’ epithet concludes a primacy of law over the business of the government, the Aristotelian rationality refuses to be codified into such a limited scope - it flaunts, rather, an embracing of the rationality of the normalisation. It is, as Mondzain has shown us previously,

⁵⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 17.

⁵¹ Mika Ojakanjas, *On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics: A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 55.

neither the *akribeia* nor the *parabasis*. This idea of *oikonomia* can more profitably be regarded as a positive structure than an exercise in negativity. *Oikonomia* is always characterised by an activity, by doing things. In this sense, it is more of a verb than a nonchalant noun. Xenophon's idea of it, as shown by Agamben, is also marked by this form of activity. Thus, he compares it to a dance movement and also invokes the example of a Phoenician ship in which all things are so excellently ordered and "accurately managed" that "there was no confusion, no work for a searcher, nothing out of place, no troublesome untying to cause a delay when anything was wanted for immediate use."⁵² It is not the accurate knowledge of the location of the things that Xenophon refers to as *oikonomia*, but it is rather the ordering of the things with supreme tactfulness. This ordering of things emerges as a managerial task, an exercise in administration - it is an *act* that is essentially invested in the real situations and in their quick negotiations. It is an act that is not framed in a distance from its object of control, it is rather an inherent mechanism in the cartography of power relations; it is goaded towards a practical functioning. It is in this functioning capacity of the *oikonomia* that, in Agamben, it is connected to the concept of power.

Mitchell Dean, in his study of power, manages to locate the fundamental nature of the concept of power.⁵³ For that to be achieved, Dean refers to the various forms of the word in the Romance languages. Power is *mecht* in German, *pouvoir* in French, and *potere* in Italian, and all of them, as he suggests, serve as noun and verb for the English word 'can'. Therefore, power here is constructed as residing in the very possibility of itself - it is understood as a pure potential of exercising itself. What is important here is to grasp that power as a pure potentiality is not fundamentally different from the divine economy of praxis, of practice. If God's economy is the realisation of his mystery, of the crystallisation of a specific task, then it is possible to argue that for

⁵² Xenophon, *Memorabilia and Oeconomicus*, trans. E.C.Marchant (London: Heineman, 1923), qtd in Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 18.

⁵³ Mitchell Dean, *The Signature of Power: Sovereignty, Governmentality and Biopolitics*, (London: Sage Publications, 2013).

the God of *Old Testament* economy is his power, since his potentiality to act is precisely his act. This can be clearly explicated in His language - His words are always already a reality. His utterance of “light” has already formulated the reality of light itself. While human language always presupposes a reality and therefore comes as a shadow to it, the divine logos subverts this relationship and precedes the reality - here there is no rupture between the word and its corresponding reality. The potential or the possibility of the divine plan becoming into a reality is not temporally or structurally alienated from its being real. This identification, however, leads to a rupture of a more problematic nature - the division between God’s being and action. If *oikonomia* spells His praxis, then it is not His ontological essence - it is rather the eventuation of God’s will about the government of the universe. The concept of *oikonomia*, therefore, essentialises a break between His being, His ontological structure and His praxis or His actions. This problem can only be resolved by an engagement of the divine will. “In other words”, Agamben writes, “the will is the apparatus needed to join together being and action, which were separated in God.”⁵⁴ Therefore, in the Christian imagination, the creation does not result necessarily from God’s nature, but it is a result of His choice, His act of will.

The pseudo-Justin insists that essence (*ousia*) and will (*boulē*) must be considered to be separate in God. If being and the will were the same thing in God, given that he wants many things, he would be one thing at one time, and another thing at another time, which is impossible. And if he produced by means of his being, given that his being is necessary, he would be obliged to do what he does, and his creation would not be free.⁵⁵

From the rupture between the divine ontology and his praxis emerges the primacy of the will which presided over the most areas of the Western philosophy. This dislocation of action as necessarily

⁵⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 56.

⁵⁵ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 56.

emanating from the nature meticulously corresponds to another distinction between the political and the economic man. While the Aristotelian man is political by his nature (*bios politikos*), the economic man can only be political by his or her choice. This breach or rupture had been endowed to modern economical consciousness by the theological imagination of the Gnostics. In gnostic understanding, as Agamben shows, the divine principle of creation had been separated into a god who creates and never meddles with the government and a demiurge who governs the cosmos. Agamben goes on to show that this divine principle, in the case of Platonism, was divided into three divine figures in which he recognises the early germination of the *oikonomia* of a Triune god:

Numenius's theology thus develops a paradigm that is not only Gnostic, but that circulated in early and middle Platonism and that, by presupposing two (or three) divine figures that are at the same time different and coordinated, certainly aroused the interest of the theorists of the Christian *oikonomia*.⁵⁶

Even if we, in opposition to the Agambenian logic, suppose that the pagan legacy of the triadic divinity was not endowed to the Christian world in a conscious manner, that does not ultimately alter the facticity of the incident Agamben here is referring to.

The fact that the rupture within God Himself had produced a considerable amount of anxiety in the theological community can be sufficiently gleaned, inversely, by the various treatises that deal with problem. Almost all of them attempted to resolve the ambiguity by way of referring to economy itself. The location of the rupture in God is generally, slightly, distanced and is situated as the alleged difference between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The diverse treatises, attempting to grasp the essence of God, tried to engage with the problem of the Triune God to resist the destabilising blow that could be delivered by the non-believers. So, as we suggested previously, these treatises resulted from an atmosphere of fear, of anxieties. A case in point might be the treatise on The Trinity by Hildegard of Bingen. She was born into a noble family of Bermersheim in

⁵⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 78.

1098 and was given to the care of the religious woman Jutta of Spanheim. Later in her life Hildegard would become the abbess at Disibodenberg and also would found a monastery at Eibingen in 1165. Her first work, *Scivias*, represents twenty six illustrated religious visions she had experienced and an attempt to elaborate upon their meaning. The very second vision of this queue is about the Trinity and the accompanying illustration shows “a series of three concentric coloured circles with a large figure of a man standing in the middle”.⁵⁷ Indeed, the three circles epitomise the triadic structure of God, but their shared centre stresses the importance of the fact of their being of the same essence. Even if, they appear to be veering towards a separateness, their rootedness to the one centre enunciates their shared existence. It is same with the three figures of the divinity:

This means that the Father, who is supremely just uniformity, is not without the Son or the Holy Spirit; and that the Holy Spirit, who inflames the hearts of the faithful, is not without the Father or the Son; and that the Son, who is fullness of fruitfulness, is not without the Father or the Spirit; for they are inseparable in the majesty of divinity.⁵⁸

The three figures are essentially united in their divine significance, thereby constructing a uniform presence of the Godhead. The three figures also enact a triadic colour scheme - the Father is like moist greenness that holds the entire structure, the Son is the “palpable strength” - the resistance against all sorts of evil, and the fiery red fire is the Holy Spirit, burning, inspiring and illuminating the whole of creation.⁵⁹ But just as “the three powers are contained within one stone, so the true Trinity is contained within the true Unity”.⁶⁰ But to qualify this unity with more elaboration, she incorporates another imagery that is quite intriguing. Here, the point of her reference is nothing else but the human language itself. She notes the three components of human words - sound, force and

⁵⁷ Hildegard of Bingen, *Selected Writings*, trans. Mark Atherton (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 23.

⁵⁸ Hildegard of Bingen, *Selected Writings*, trans. Mark Atherton (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 24.

⁵⁹ Hildegard of Bingen, *Selected Writings*, trans. Mark Atherton (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 26.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

breath. As any division among them would render the utterance entirely meaningless, thus “the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not to be divided, for they function as one unanimous activity”.⁶¹ For her metaphoric exercise, she creates a corresponding importance of each part - the sound makes a word heard, the force makes it understood, and the breath completes it. Likewise, the Godhead, to exist in all its glories, is preserved across the three figures:

In the sound of the word consider the Father, who expresses all things by his ineffable power; in the force of the word consider the Son, marvellously engendered of the Father; in the breath of the word consider the Holy Spirit, who burns gently within them.⁶²

In this mimetic overture she was not alone, or even new, in her times. We find such examples in other texts as well. Almost seven hundred years before her, in a treatise on the Trinity by Gregory Thaumaturgus, we see a similar comparative modality of rhetoric. This Christian bishop of the third century, who had been canonised as a saint in the Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church, began his observations on the Trinity with an allusion to the similarity between the triadic nature of the human condition and the Godhead:

I see in all three essentials—substance, genus, name. We speak of man, servant, curator (*curatorem*)—man, by reason of substance; servant, by reason of genus or condition; curator, by reason of denomination.⁶³

From this universal logic of the triadic nature of all things he goes on to understand the divine essence. The Trinity does not increase and nothing can be retracted from it - this is the essence of its completeness. Even if the Son is generated from the Father that does not reflect any reduction from the wholeness of Him. But then Gregory’s treatise brings forth an impasse and negates any form of humane inquiry into the nature of the divine, since it is ineffable and its “investigation becomes

⁶¹ Hildegard of Bingen, *Selected Writings*, trans. Mark Atherton (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 27.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Gregory Thaumaturgus, “On The Trinity” in *The Complete Works of the Church Fathers*, ed. Phil Schaf (Toronto: Amazon Asia-Pacific, 2016), Kindle, Loc. 291591.

impractical”.⁶⁴ Therefore, we shall concentrate on another text which manages to investigate into the matter and attempts to produce a coherent theory of the divine nature.

Origen of Alexandria was an early Christian scholar and an ascetic who was born around the year 184. He was a prolific writer of various textual criticisms and theological writings and produced almost two thousand pieces of writing among them all of which are not extant. The text we will be looking at was named *On First Principles*. The second section of this work was named “Economy” and it specifically engages with the problem of the divine government. Although, in the first few pages the announced desire of the treatise seems to be to prove that “God of the Law and the Gospels is proved to be one and the same”, it later broadens up its discursive horizon to investigate into the nature of relationship amidst the three divine figures and of the entire human race with them.⁶⁵ Very much like the two previous texts we have discussed, Origen accentuates the necessity of conforming faith to the fact of the three divine figures being the same. For him, however, the metaphysical nature of the divine Trinity goes a long way to explain away a lot of ambiguities. Since the nature of the Godhead remains metaphysical, it cannot be increased or decreased which are adjectives that can only characterise the items belonging to the physical world. Therefore, as Origen notes, even many saints and eventually a portion of the entire human race joins the divine substance, it does not suggest an increment in its volume.

Thus the internal problem of the Godhead is recuperated by Origen as an exterior problem of relationship. When Origen is faced with the subtle problem of the dual gods, in which the heretics argued that one of the Gods was only just but not good and the other one good but not just (and here again we see the problem of divine identity is not in itself, but rather in the manner in which the divinity deals with the human beings), he counters this charge by invoking the complex taxonomical organisation of genus and species. He argues that the fact “that goodness is the genus

⁶⁴ Gregory Thaumaturgus, “On The Trinity” in *The Complete Works of the Church Fathers*, ed. Phil Schaf (Toronto: Amazon Asia-Pacific, 2016), Kindle, Loc. 291606.

⁶⁵ Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 183.

of virtues, and that justice and holiness are species of the genus” is essentially self-evident and needs no further explanation for a sane mind and since the heretics refer to them as if they were different, their entire argument is logically invalid.⁶⁶ More than that, it is insinuated by Origen’s argument that whether the God is acting justly or goodly, in both cases He is simply acting virtuously and therefore there is no opposition between acting goodly and acting justly. Thus there is no division in divinity, only difference how He reacts to human action. The metaphor of medicine does much help for this newer orientation to humanity:

And so that what we say may be more easily understood, let us take an illustration from things very dissimilar. There are many who take part in the sciences and art of medicine: are we to suppose that all those who participate in medicine have some body, called medicine, placed before them and remove particles [of it] for themselves and thus take a share in it? Must we not rather understand that all who with a quick and trained mind grasp the art and science itself may be said to participate in medicine?⁶⁷

As the term ‘medicine’ signifies a system and not a physical marker, the divine figures are facets of a more fundamental and coherent organisation the essential definition of which can only be grasped from an analysis of its engagement with the human history. But since Origen locates the problem of *oikonomia* at the intersection between the divinity and the government of the men, it emerges as an ethic of managerial competence, of aptitude in deciding between profitable options. Thus, even a bending of the guiding logic is not seen or understood as something of a catastrophe until it serves to hold on to the more profitable option. But what does this ‘profit’ amount to? Surely not a pecuniary or a financial gain. It rather suggests to the spiritual profit of the human race, of its eventual redemption from the state of being Fallen. For this to be achieved, if it helped to the cause, it was not unthinkable to let some perish in order to save the greater number of people. Origen explains this through his reference to Tyre and Sidon:

⁶⁶ Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 199.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

Even the Saviour himself, the Son of the good God, protests in the Gospels and declares that *if signs and wonders had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes.* Yet when he had come near to those very cities and had entered their borders, why, pray, does he decline to enter those territories and to show them an abundance of *signs and wonders*, if it were certain that by such actions they would *repent in sackcloth and ashes*? As he does not indeed do this, he undoubtedly abandons to destruction those whom the very language of the Gospel shows not to be of a wicked or ruined nature, for it indicates that they were able to repent.⁶⁸

Even when the Saviour suggests that it is possible to save the cities of Tyre and Sidon and the people from there, he manages to do nothing about it. But that does not refer to, at least in Origen's analysis, the divine nonchalance of the human destiny; on the contrary, it manifests a deep concern for the human beings. Origen insinuates that by not saving those men and women of the cities, the Saviour chose to save other innocent persons. What is to be noted here in this logic is the fact that a part of humanity is surely to be not saved - it has been already decided that a certain number of people would not and cannot be saved, they would face inevitable damnation. This is how the divine metabolism of the redemption had been put into place - with a prefiguration of loss that cannot be avoided. The persons who would be inevitably damned are thus discarded from the prerogative of choice enjoyed by the other half of the human beings. This is not simply to chastise them, or out of divine vengeance sought against them; it merely is an effect of the working of the system. A very similar moral problem emerges when it is described in the *Gospel* that the God intends to harden the heart of the Pharaoh against Himself and to punish the pharaoh, then, for not listening to Him or paying any respect and heed to Him. This act is a blatant disregard of the principle of the self-will, but it is again justified by Origen by the previous logic - that it was a necessary action to save the people enslaved by the pharaoh. The fundamental ethic of this governmental tactic surely is that saving a community is far more profitable than saving a person.

⁶⁸ Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 193.

This complex government is held together by the diverse significance of the three figures of the Godhead - if the Father represents an immense adherence to the divine law (in Mondzain's terminology, *akribeia*), since He created them and dictated them in the first place and if the Holy Spirit is seen simply as enunciation of inspiration to choose the path of the righteousness, then the Son acts as the mediator between them, as an economical apparatus that acts balance out between these two extremes: "it remains that we should seek the medium between all these created things and God, that is, *the Mediator*, whom the Apostle Paul calls *the firstborn of all creation*".⁶⁹ Thus, the divine *oikonomia* emerges not simply as the grandiose plan of the redemption, but also as an acting out to realise the plan. It is a practice, a technology that helps to materialise the divine plan. It is those tasks and events that have been meticulously planned and performed in order to save humanity. It is also an act of appropriation of any variety that had not been previously charted into this grand design of things. It is not, unlike 'politics', like deciding on a motif beforehand and exempting anything that falls out of this motif - it rather moulds and includes those elements which stand out of the motif or the overall structure. Even those who are being damned, are being sacrificed, are eventually participating in this design of saving the mankind. All of humanity is bound by a love towards Him, although in some cases with a feebler or a weaker love than the others, but they are not beyond the scope of this omniscient relationship nonetheless:

For as he is himself *the invisible image of the invisible God*, he invisibly bestowed upon all rational creatures a participation in himself, in such a way that each one received from him a degree of participation to the extent of the loving affection by which they adhered to him. But whereas, because of the faculty of free will, a variety and diversity had taken hold of individual souls, so that one was attached to its Creator by a more ardent, and another by a feebler and weaker, love, that soul, of which Jesus said, *No one takes my soul from me*, adhering, from *the beginning of creation* and ever after, inseparably and indissolubly, to him, as to the Wisdom and the Word of God, and the Truth and the true Light, and receiving

⁶⁹ Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 203.

him wholly and passing itself into his light and splendour, was made with him in a pre-eminent degree one spirit, just as the Apostle promises to those who ought to imitate him, that *He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit*.⁷⁰

This technology is vast — it even occupies its oppositional forces to produce the effect that it originally desired. It manages to not discard any element, however contrary, however rogue to its own machinations. In this, *oikonomia* is absolutely different from politics. As we have seen earlier in the previous discussion about Schmitt, politics is always formulated on a policy of exclusion, its metabolistic preference being to eliminate that which fails to conform to its own structure. The *oikonomia*, on the other hand, accepts differences but produces a deep transformation at the heart of this opposition to make it an element of its very self. This manipulative modality is what defines *oikonomia*. The difference therefore is always already contained in the original act of the creation itself:

if the Creator God lacks neither the will for, nor the power to effect, a good and perfect work, what reason can there be that, in creating rational natures, that is, those of whose existence he is himself the cause, he should make some of a higher degree and others of second or of third or of many still inferior and worse degrees?⁷¹

The reason lies in the very anatomy of *oikonomia*, in its, as we called it, prefiguration of loss. It therefore is a more open and balanced system that does not naturally presume that everything would go as planned, it rather assumes deviations from the plan and therefore lets loose ends be in the plan to be appropriated in cases of emergency. Thus it produces the possibility of the free will, of acting independently (since it is certain that whatever the act be, it would manage it to its own profit). But that does not necessarily entail a free field, a space without the slightest mark of any authority. It provides, rather, a construct in which the limit is being continually produced so that no activity

⁷⁰Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 207.

⁷¹Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 245.

could manage to transgress the authorial boundary. For that it installs, as Foucault had shown, a mechanism of self-discipline:

But if anyone should say that those things which strike from without, arousing our movements, are such that it is not possible to resist them, whether they incite us to good or to evil, let the one who holds this turn his attention for a little while to himself, and carefully examine his own movements, and see if he does not find that, when the enticement of any desire strikes him, nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained and the bidding of the mind indulges the wicked suggestion; just as if an appeal were seen to be made from two parties on certain plausible grounds to a judge residing within the tribunals of our heart, in order that when the grounds have first been set forth the determination to act may be brought forth from judgement of reason.⁷²

Thus the self is divided into two and one part of it is made to stand as a guard of the actions of the other part. The human soul is *made to choose the path of righteousness*. His choice is already decided upon and even if it proves itself to be a truant will, excusing itself from choosing the divine path, the alternative choice is also made a part of the divine design. Thus, the choice is bound on all its sides. This is the true nature of *oikonomia*. Whatever the event, it would be inevitably producing profitable situation out of it.

In our discussion, then, we have come to notice a few and important similarities between biopolitics and *oikonomia*. To summarise, from our analysis, both of them have emerged as a managerial or administrative modalities. They calculate and based on these calculations they offer up possible methods of action. Neither of them are without the apprehension of loss; rather, they assume loss from the beginning and based on this observation they work meticulously to garner the most profit they could hope to achieve. Therefore, both of them are structured as a practical, day-to-day engagement with the real scenario. They both can be characterised as a model for praxis. And, lastly, both of them invests much importance in self-disciplination. These points of similarities do

⁷² Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. John Behr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 291.

not entail that they are very same, but rather they would like to suggest that the methodology of *oikonomia* is a defining factor of the biopolitical government, and biopolitics follows this methodology more than it follows the oppositional anatomy of politics. Therefore, it can be argued, biopolitics would more properly be named by the term *bioikonomia*.

Chapter Two

The Invention of 'Soul'

In the previous chapter, the governmental logic of *oikonomia* has been shown to be associated with the form of biopolitics. Thus, it has already been suggested, a new governmental architecture had been formulated in which the biological capacities and potentialities of life are categorised, organised, and sorted with an administrative principle. This technology of power orients itself towards a management of the phenomenology of the everyday, the laconic profession of survival. In the following chapter, we would see how this technology is affiliated to an ordering of the self, of the bodily expenditures, to the institution of the physical discipline. But this chapter, working as a bridge between those two critical domains, would investigate how the element of the 'soul' was invested, along the body, in this governmental technology.

The 'soul', as we will see, was not anymore something existing independently of the flesh and blood and therefore evading any form of control of the earthly state. Rather, it was very much a part of the governmental technology. The culturally stabilised form of the soul, in which is usually granted that there is an undeniable opposition between the body and the soul, leaves room for, if not downright opposition, then at least a considerable amount of scepticism. This does not mean to suggest that the idea of the oppositional domains of body and the soul is historically completely unfounded — it is not. What, alternatively, this chapter would try to show is that this view is not the only one found in various texts, it would rather show that there was a different understanding of the soul existing alongside the more known one. In this understanding, the definition of the soul was not formulated in an absolute opposition, but in an act of correspondence between the physicality and the metaphysicality, at the crossroads of these two domains. It is quite important in an understanding of the technology of biopolitics since from the mechanism of caring for the self was not abandoned the care for the soul. But to reach unto that

point, we must first understand how the seemingly non-physical ontology of the soul became a fundamental element of the apparatus of the power. For that, we would begin our discussion by looking at the historical idea of the soul. Obviously, Foucault would constitute a considerable amount of our discussion, since he makes claims about it in his oeuvre.

The problem of the soul was quite insistent in the Christological thinking and the fact has left an indelible impression in the cultural landscape of the West. An example can be taken from a popular TV series. The *Vikings*, a television series that professes to chart the adventurous journey of the mythic hero Ragnar Lothbrok, ruminates on a crossroad of some specificity, a moment that enumerates a strange dialogue between two cultures — one pagan and the other Christian. In a striking scene Ragnar converses about the Christian ways of life with Aethelstan, the Northumbrian monk he had captured and brought home. Ragnar was a curious man, a man who understood the political nature of knowledge. So he tries to have a glimpse of the European culture and their God. When the monk explains to him that their religious activities engaged with the central importance of the soul, Ragnar plainly asks, “And what is their soul?”⁷³ The monk stops short failing to formulate an answer. This apparently minor fault line surfacing unto the intricate discourse of Aethelstan rehearses the more perplexing nature of the question that had been infiltrating into the tight rhapsodies of the believers, creating pools of hesitations, silences, and of anxieties in a refined geography of faith. Aethelstan’s ensuing silence qualifies itself as an inevitable response towards this fundamental dilemma. This epistemic lacunae, however, managed to produce a certain form of theological loquaciousness, an overwhelming string of definitions and non-definitions that strived to couch the deafening silence. And it is not possible to dismiss this arduous journey of an argument as merely a thing from the past, and therefore, irrelevant to any contemporary discussion of politics, or for that matter, of society as a human

⁷³ *Vikings*, “Dispossessed”, Episode number 03, written by Michael Hirst, aired March 17, 2013, on History.

endeavour. In fact, a central concern of this present dissertation is to contest this form of rhetoric which destabilises any possible traffic between the sphere of religion and the sphere of politics. But to do that, it is important that we investigate the question, “What is soul”, more thoroughly.

It is possible to contemplate the question with a particularly Foucauldian afterglow.

Although at first this connection might seem random, might seem to be an exercise in vagueness, we could certainly profit in this regard from reengaging into Foucault’s 1975 book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. The book elucidates upon the emergence of a disciplinary society in the West, upon the intricate and subtle technologies of power through which is produced the docile body. Foucault’s lengthy and meticulous historiographic study begins with a harrowing description of pain inflicted upon Damien the regicide – tortures rediscovered with a precise and visceral account in which are detailed the various stages of punishment. From this moment of terrifying sacrilege of the human anatomy, Foucault deliberates upon a technology that attempts to shed all forms of corporeal violence, which, in fact, abstained from any physical association with the bodies of the ‘patients’ for this was the word which was used to connote the ‘prisoner’ (our word, obviously) in eighteenth century. These two distinct forms of punishing leads him to questioning the true nature of the modern disciplinary system: “If the penalty in its most severe forms no longer addresses itself to the body, on what does it lay hold? The answer of the theoreticians – those who, about 1760, opened up a new period that is not yet at an end – is simple, almost obvious...Mably formulated the principle once and for all: ‘Punishment, if I may so put it, should strike the soul rather than the body’ (Mably, 326).”⁷⁴ For Foucault, this was the specific historical juncture when the human body is invested with, and in the case of the legal arithmetic replaced by, the ‘soul’ – the non-corporeal figment around which is centred the human presence. But what is the nature of this ‘soul’, the soul which is always invoked with a sense of

⁷⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 16.

perpetration, of effectuating penalties on a criminal individual? He answers this by constructing a binary and to do this Foucault draws from a source that, according to himself, predates the newer modalities of the penal discourse. He reinvigorates the figure of 'joust' which was in frequent use in the medieval romance literature.

But the two contesting figures of this Foucauldian joust entirely deviate from the medieval sport. In this reincarnation, one of the struggling figures is the king and the other one is the condemned man. This simplistic formation is further complicated by Kantorowicz's idea about the dual nature of the king's body.⁷⁵ Against this supremely powerful body of the king which is tinged with a fraction of divinity, the tortured body of the condemned man on the rack or on the gallows is always already supplicated into a reinforced timidity, into a meekness that exhausts itself into itself. This is, as Foucault confirms following Kantorowicz, "the least body of the condemned man".⁷⁶ In contrast to this system, he concludes, can be situated that disciplinary architecture which goes for the 'soul'. For Foucault, this 'soul' refers to a non-corporeal element that is endowed with the ability to be punished. But the 'soul' is completely different, in his views, from the traditional and theological understanding of the soul which nourishes a Christian and humanistic ideal: "it is not that a real man, the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted for the soul, the illusion of the theologians."⁷⁷ The 'soul', rather, is the subjection of the human anatomy and its biological mechanisms to the technologies of power and is itself subjected to it: "A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the

⁷⁵ Ernest H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁷⁶ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 29.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

effect and instrument of a political anatomy"⁷⁸. The strictly controlling nature of the Foucauldian 'soul' is clearly distinguished from the soul of a more metaphysical order and yet, both of them fervently share the quality of being non-corporeal. The 'soul' is mapped as essentially anti-body, a formation that negates all forms of association with the fleshly structures of the human body; in its political essence, it can be meaningfully read as the juridical reality of a being – its legal self. This stricter binary of the body and 'soul' informs Foucault's history of the carceral. The most potent opposition to this reasoning emerges from a purely historicist reading.

The soul and the contours of its being are usually defined by a rather simplistic binary – that of the physical and the metaphysical. This opposition had been much invested into the Western canon and its germination has been traced back into the days of ancient philosophy and following that, the theological doctrines of the Christianity. This central binary of the western dialectic has prefigured many later inventions such as the binary of the nature and nurture, of culture and nature. While discussing about these margins of human understanding, Bryan S. Turner, in his study of the human body in *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*, espouses a very Arendtsque proposition.⁷⁹ He locates this binary not in any abstracted social equation, but at the very precise location of the Grecian city state and thereby invokes the category of the governmental. His reading is fairly based on an etymological survey of the word 'culture'. This English word has its origin in the obsolete French *culture* or in the Medieval Latin word *culturare* both of which words are based on Latin *colere* (i.e 'to tend'). This has led Turner to speculate that culture is something connected to the human action. While this formulation in its insipid generality does not differ from the populist views of the binary, it, however, makes possible to find newer dimension to the age old tradition of theorising the dual model. And Turner achieves

⁷⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 29.

⁷⁹ Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1984).

it by engaging this reduced state of the argument with the idea of life in the antiquity. According to him, “Although the nature / nurture distinction has been a favourite topic of social anthropology, we have somewhat forgotten that the original contrast was an important part of classical philosophy, where nature referred primarily to biological life outside the city and the culture was the rational life of the citizen.”⁸⁰ Thus, he produces a cartographic complex of life – within the city limits and beyond the city limits – not quite unlike the Agambenian formulation of *zōē* and *bios* that operates only within the geographically limited structure of the sovereign state⁸¹. In fact, for both of them, these distinctions construct the essential nature of the biopolitical government. And for this reason, in Turner’s imagination, being social is irreversibly a political act – an act that censures all forms of seduction from what can be defined as the more metaphysical quarters of life.⁸²

His discourse revolves around this central problematic of the construction of a docile body. In order to illustrate the nature of the coercive reality in consonance with his dialectic he gives the example of the ‘criminal type’, the type invented by the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso. This type, according to Lombroso, is distinguished by their stooping frames, their unusually large hands and low brows and, of course, by their tendencies towards criminality.⁸³ This peculiarly imagined anatomy is coupled with a form of, not anti-sociality, but of a pre-sociality, establishing this type at a different historical location than that of the ‘normal’ law-abiding

⁸⁰ Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1984), 1.

⁸¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 19.

⁸² Of course, Turner’s understanding of the ‘political’ is not similar to the subtle understanding of it as I have tried to show in the previous chapter. Turner uses the word more generally and while I discuss his ideas, the ‘political’ stops to signify the highly qualified meaning and I use it in more generalised sense.

⁸³ Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1984), 7.

citizens. They are on the lower rungs of the evolutionary ladder. This coupling of the biological structure and social control is espoused again when Turner blatantly remarks, “Governmentality ultimately refers to the ways in which bodies are produced, cultivated and disciplined.”⁸⁴ Turner recognises the element of violence inhabiting the forms of the political, for he insists that the culture consists of taking up the monopoly of violence from nature. But through his focus on the physical nature of both the subject and object of the state’s control, his critique loses the view of an important element of the technology of power — the soul, and this has led to him disastrously concluding that the Christianity “posed a sharp and decisive opposition between the world and the spirit. The cultivation of the body could have no place within a religious movement which was initially strongly oriented towards the things of the next world.”⁸⁵ The problem here is not that of the theorising the technologies effecting the docile body, but rather the conspicuous exclusion of any perception that broadens the scope of the critique beyond the scope of the physical, material body. My argument is, that the body itself is not the object of the technologies of control, it merely is a part of it like, also, the idea of soul. The body as tool contributes to the realisation of a broader and more intricately formed direction — the body in this organisation merely functions in the capacity of a complicit. And this remains true also for the idea of the soul.

Joseph R. Strayer in his book *On the Medieval Origins of Modern State* successfully and quite concisely reviewed the problem. This book was based on his 1961 Witherspoon lectures at the Princeton University. The materials were reorganised while he worked on a paper for American Political Association. In his book, he speculates on the difference of a stateless society from its more rationalised counterparts and he argues that, “Imperfect and spatially limited types of organisation meant that the society could not make the best use of its human and natural

⁸⁴ Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1984), 3.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 18 – 19.

resources, that its level of living was low, and that capable individuals were unable to realize their full potentialities.”⁸⁶ This illuminates upon the central difficulty that thrusts the organisation of the entire western politico-cultural discourse – putting resources to the best use. This invocation of the term ‘best’ reflects a necessary resignation involving an inevitable loss. The organisation or the process cannot possibly do away with all forms of loss. What it can do instead is that keeping this incurrence of loss to a manageable margin, to a limit that it defines as ‘natural’. This construction of the ‘natural’ is what Foucault terms ‘normalisation’ in his 1977 – 1978 lecture titled *Security, Territory, Population* and this technique of naturalisation forms the fundamental logic of security.⁸⁷ There will be places where we will be dealing with the issue of security in more detail later in the thesis. For now, it would be much rewarding to investigate into the nature of the soul as a tool in the production of security.

Tertullian (155 AD – 220 AD) was one of the first of the early Christian authors to produce a large body of work in Latin. His treatise, *On the Soul*, which in Latin was *De Anima* conspicuously, as its name suggested, had referred to the treatise of Aristotle of the same name. But in order to grasp the intertextuality, we have to know what he said more fully. Tertullian begins his treatise with what seems to be his intractable disregard for the ancient Grecian philosophy, although, it must be added that, later we would see him revoking some of his obstinacy regarding this issue. But in this part that begins his treatise, the Greek philosophers were those whose words were laced with the absence of truth and the Athens appears to be a mere “loquacious city”⁸⁸. He spends long passages and meticulous logical structures in order to provide the proof of the superiority of the Christian theology to that of the ancient philosophy. It is only in the fifth chapter

⁸⁶ Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origin of the Modern State*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 4.

⁸⁷ This will be more elaborately discussed below.

⁸⁸ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25364.

of his treatise that he begins to crystallise his conception of the soul. The first of these formulations come with a reversed metabolism – he was not speaking about his ideas of the soul itself, but rather musing over the generally held idea over the non-corporeality of the soul and refuting it as an erroneous miscalculation on the philosophers' part. And then, he clearly argues, now without the shadows of any euphemising organisation, that the soul has evident corporeal qualities. In support of this statement, he argues thus:

Again, there is nothing in common between things corporeal and things incorporeal as to their susceptibility. But the soul certainly sympathizes with the body, and shares in its pain, whenever it is injured by bruises, and wounds, and sores: the body, too, suffers with the soul, and is united with it (whenever it is afflicted with anxiety, distress, or love) in the loss of vigour which its companion sustains, whose shame and fear it testifies by its own blushes and paleness. The soul, therefore, is (proved to be) corporeal from this inter-communion of susceptibility. Chrysippus also joins hands in fellowship with Cleanthes when he lays it down that it is not at all possible for things which are endued with body to be separated from things which have not body; because they have no such relation as mutual contact or coherence. Accordingly, Lucretius says: "For nothing but body is capable of touching or of being touched." (Such severance, however, is quite natural between the soul and the body); for when the body is deserted by the soul, it is overcome by death. The soul, therefore, is endued with a body; for if it were not corporeal, it could not desert the body.⁸⁹

In order to establish the validity of his argument with an unquestionable force, he continues going back to philosophers like Heraclitus, Critolaus and Critias. Following Zeno, he argues that

⁸⁹ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25441.

departure of what causes the death to body must necessarily be an essential or rather indispensable and integral part of the body itself, since the disappearance of it results in the disintegration of the body, in the horrifying destabilisation of life itself. Therefore, he seeks to theorise life by an exclusion (which, indeed, is inclusive) of the death. For him, the generation of the soul is irreplaceably connected with the generation with the body – they are entwined in their very inception. That is why they share faculties, characteristics, and affections.

But there is, as he recognises, a considerable obstacle coming from the grandiose authority of Plato himself against the idea of the corporeality of the soul. To defend against that his philosophical formulation, he goes on to attack with a robust meticulousness the Platonic argument that attempts to counter (subtly, he agrees, but not truthfully) his previous conclusion regarding the corporeality of the soul. According to this recently expounded argument, he adds by way of elucidation, everything can be categorised into either of the two sections – the animate and the inanimate thing. The animate things receive motion by themselves, that is, internally, while the inanimate things receive it externally. He summarises this position, “Now the soul receives motion neither externally not internally: not externally, since it has not the inanimate nature; nor internally, because it is itself rather the giver of motion to the body. It evidently, then, is not a bodily substance, inasmuch as it receives motion neither way, according to the nature and law of corporeal substance.”⁹⁰ He constructs the defence involving the argument that it is erroneous to use such categories of the mundane things to understand the soul. The soul is what moves the body – it is the cause and not the result of any symbiotic operation.

But the soul moves the body, all whose efforts are apparent externally, and from

without. It is the soul which gives motion to the feet for working, and to the hands for

⁹⁰ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25462.

touching, and to the eyes for sight, and to the tongue for speech – a sort of internal image which moves and animates the surface. Whence could accrue such a power to the soul, if it were incorporeal? How could an unsubstantial thing propel solid objects?⁹¹

He also refuses to have any faith in the distinction between the corporeal and the intellectual classes. While the Platonic philosophy espouses that corporeal things are indicated by bodily senses (like fire by touch, for example) and the incorporeal things are realised or grasped on to by intellectual faculties (as, for example, benevolence is grasped only by intellect), he, on the contrary, argues that incorporeal things like sound or colour are regularly intercepted by bodily senses like, for instance, ear and eye. “Inasmuch, then, as it is evident that even incorporeal objects are embraced and comprehended by corporeal ones, why should not the soul, which is corporeal, be equally comprehended and understood by incorporeal faculties? It is thus certain that their arguments fail.”⁹² With rather devastating consequences for the Platonic conception of the soul, he maintains that the soul is nourished by bodily elements and in order to validate this claim, he invokes Soranus, “who is a most accomplished authority in medical science” and who “asserts that soul is even nourished by corporeal aliments, that in fact it is, when failing and weak, actually refreshed oftentimes by food. Indeed, when deprived of all food, does not the soul entirely remove from the body?”⁹³

As we will see in the next chapter, Galen’s physiological cartography was not very distant from this conception. Tertullian concludes that the corporeal nutritive elements do not affect in

⁹¹ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25485 – 25493.

⁹² *Ibid.*, Loc. 25493.

⁹³ Soranus of Ephesus was a Greek physician of the first century AD; *Ibid.*

any way the essential nature of the soul, but it helps to discipline the soul. The occurrence of the soul, as an object of the economical regime of disciplining, is even found in Galen. In his treatise on the soul, he suggests for the construction of a moderation – for him, moderation and balance could always result in an ethical living.⁹⁴ His medical metabolism espouses the “excessive vehemence” as a disease that can only be cured by moderation and this corrective measure, intended at reinstating a balance, is the very essence of the ethical living – “when he lives a disciplined life, expect that man to speak the truth”.⁹⁵ Indeed, as we shall see later, Isidore of Seville also tends towards such an understanding of the logos of medicine when he traces the origin of the word ‘medicine’ in the Latin term *modus*, that is moderation.⁹⁶ For him, the true nature of medicine consists in restoring the body to its original, and now presumably lost, balance of the four humours. In the medieval hylomorphic conception of the body, therefore, a strange event had already started to be reiterated — that of both the body and the soul as acting in compliance with some greater order, effectuating crystallisation of various and yet coherent points of a larger economy. Their meaning is not anymore self-contained, but rather is entwined with their location in this greater technology.

Not only that, Tertullian goes on to argue the quantifiable nature of the soul. In fact, a considerable portion of his treatise is characterised by the unequivocal assertion about the physically quantifiable nature of the soul. For he suggests that the soul can be gauged with those very parameters that are used to calculate a physical object. He declares, “the more usual characteristics of a body, such as invariably accrue to the corporeal condition, belong also to the soul – such as form and limitation; and that triad of dimensions – I mean length, and breadth, and

⁹⁴ Galen, *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, trans. Paul W. Harkins (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963), 61.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁹⁶ Isidore of Seville, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, trans. Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. a. Beach and Oliver Berghof (Combridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 109 – 110.

height – by which philosophers gauge all bodies”.⁹⁷ This is, indeed, a surprising statement that plainly equates the soul with the body. To prove this point, he invokes here more ‘direct’ (and for him, more plausible) example of a vision endowed divinely to a Monatanist sister. She was known for having celestially inspired visions and for conversing with the angels and with, in some rarer examples, with the God Himself. In her description of the vision, Tertullian records with a vividness characteristic of the Christian ethic, “there has been shown to me a soul in bodily shape, and a spirit has been in the habit of appearing to me; not, however, a void and empty illusion, but such as would offer itself to be even grasped by the hand, soft and transparent and of an ethereal colour, and in form resembling that of a human being in every respect”.⁹⁸ To this reflection he adds that the essence of the soul is wind and breath.⁹⁹ Since, the soul is what God breathed upon the face of man. And then he goes on to conclude that “surely that breath must have passed through the face at once into the interior structure, and have spread itself throughout all the spaces of the body; and as soon as by the divine inspiration it had become condensed, it must have impressed itself on each internal feature, which the condensation had filled in, and so have been, as it were, congealed in shape (or stereotyped). Hence, by this densifying process, there arose a fixing of the soul’s corporeality; and by the impression its figure was formed and moulded. This is the inner man, different from the outer, but yet one in the twofold condition”.¹⁰⁰ So literally, the soul is the inner man, or rather, the internal organisation of various bodily organs.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25600.

⁹⁸ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25615.

⁹⁹ Here is to be noted the natures of the terms ‘spirit’ and ‘breath’ are connected. The Greek word for ‘spirit’ was *pneuma* but this word also meant ‘to breathe’.

¹⁰⁰ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25631 – 25638.

¹⁰¹ This duality of the man presupposes the emergence of the idea of *homo duplex* which can be succinctly summarised by the famous formulation of Durkheim – ‘Man is double’.

But what purpose does this soul serve, precisely? To what end does this mechanism of the soul is geared? To answer this perplexity, Tertullian goes back to the fundamental domain of life - breathing. He argues that the function of the soul (that is, to have life) and the emission of breath, the often presumed function of spirit, are not two different functions as is sometimes expounded. What, then, he is really arguing is that the living and the emission of breath are same things.¹⁰² But then is raised the problem of those who do not breathe and yet live. He gives the examples of the gnats and ants who, for their absence of lungs and windpipes, don't breathe but who, no doubt, live. His defence against this class of argument is that, since an ant's being is irredeemably different from human anatomy, it is not possible or fair to compare these two sorts of bodies. And then his argument takes a strange turn. He first considers the possibility of whether these animals could have after all, contrary to all popular beliefs, those organs and he decides that it is entirely possible that they have those organs, but perhaps they are so small in their bulk that they evade human vision. Then he goes on to consider whether it can be true that these animals, in factuality, lack those organs. His argument runs thus: even if they don't have the organs, they surely have the function of life (since they are clearly alive) – of sight, of eating, of digestion, of moving. And if serpents are capable of movement even if they do not have legs, then, arguably, it is possible that in those animals without the organs of breathing, the act of respiration is effected “without the bellows of the lungs, and without arterial canals”.¹⁰³

In this argumentative engineering, the organs appear to be expandable in the technology of life, but not so the function of life (such as, for example, the respiration or eating or digesting). Life is equated with its functions – with the acts it performs, the fundamentally biological acts that

¹⁰² Here again, life is reduced to the bare continuation of life – the maintenance of the territory of life is itself the function of life. Therefore the function of life is nudging the death away. So the territory of life is essentially limited and localised – it is defined by the bareness of itself. So life is emptier than death.

¹⁰³ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25695.

it produces. So, life is what it achieves and thereby, he installs a purely functional discourse of life, one that is inherently utilitarian. This, therefore, historicises life, since life is what it produces as its own result, as its own effect. Life, in this argument, is that precise structure the meaning of which is always quantified by those which come after it, which are its products and life is again marked by the basic form of life. This construction of life as the subject of government that involves the tendency to revert to the biological facts of life repeatedly, as we have seen in the earlier chapter and again will see later in this thesis, is deeply imbued with essence of the biopolitical technology of power. He makes it the object of all governing modalities. It becomes especially clear in the way in which he equates breathing with living: “Pray, tell me, what is it to breathe? I suppose it means to emit breath from yourself. What is it not to live? I suppose it means not to emit breath from yourself”.¹⁰⁴

But, it is to be noted, this structure has not been invented entirely in the medieval theology. Even in Aristotle we see something quite similar in a more embryonic form. The arguments in Aristotle’s *De Anima* centre on the fundamental issue of the actuality and the potentiality. In fact, this division provides the central thematic of the Aristotelian thought itself. Here, he defines soul as “the actuality of a natural body having life in potentiality”.¹⁰⁵ For him, here he argues, the potentiality can only be turned into actuality when potentiality is imbued with form. Without this engagement, matter-in-itself (that is, pure potentiality) cannot arrive at the actuality – it cannot turn into ‘a this’. The ‘a this’ is the actualised form.¹⁰⁶ Aristotle distinguishes between two types of actuality – one is like the knowledge and the other is familiar to the theorisation. In order to theorise, he explicates, knowledge must be present in the first place. In

¹⁰⁴ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25703.

¹⁰⁵ Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1986), Kindle, Loc.1724.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

this context he qualifies his definition of the soul – it is the first actuality of a natural body having a life in potentiality.¹⁰⁷ So, in his idea, the soul is like the knowledge. The soul must be there for other activities of life to kick in. It is the fundamental element of life. The soul is the basic element that is needed for any form of life. From this elemental point, life can move up or go sideways, but can never refuse the presence of this primal point. Through this imagination of life, Aristotle hopes to grasp the ultimate nature of all living forms and to signify all the diversions of the structure called the soul within the brief limit of a singular definition. But this logical mechanism also reduces the understanding of the life or of the act of living itself. The Aristotelian cartography of the soul implicates nutrition and growth, along with the motion, as the chief functions and indicators of life. This is how, as Mika Ojakangas reminds us, the Aristotelian conception reduces life to the bare minimum that is concerned only with the sustenance of itself.¹⁰⁸ And therefore, this technology of understanding life through the bare, almost empty structure of subsistence or maintaining the biological functions of the body is coherent with modern technologies of power. While Aristotelian life involves the mere retention of it, the modern biopolitical (or thanatopolitical, in the case of the Nazi state) states function to produce human beings like tame animals (*anthopos hemeron*) and in which the life, the death and all the intermediate structures of a civilian being is governed by the sovereign state.¹⁰⁹ The Aristotelian soul, however, rejects any kind of localisation, since it is an organisation that exists between the various parts of the living animal body. The soul is, in this theorisation, the structure through which the animal engages with the functions of life – an elementary component that intermediates life unto the body. The soul can, in one sense, be understood as the realisation of the life by the body, but not quite so since

¹⁰⁷ The problematic of the actuality and potentiality in this Aristotelian treatise is more thoroughly and usefully discussed in Roland Polansky's book *Aristotle's De Anima: A Critical Commentary*.

¹⁰⁸ Mika Ojakangas, *On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics: A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower* (London: Routledge, 2016), 6 - 7.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

this reading retracts any form of agency from the structure of the soul. Therefore, the idea of the soul is much more than that of transcendental entity – it is, rather, the mechanism to formulate a dialogue with the life itself. It is then possible to call the Aristotelian soul as a ‘system’ which involves the traces of the originating Greek word *susteme* (from ‘sun’ which means ‘with’ and ‘histanin’ which means ‘set up’) or, perhaps more appropriately, as an ‘apparatus’ (from the Latin *apparare* in which ‘ad-’ denotes ‘towards’ and ‘parare’ means ‘making ready’). The soul is the preparatory step, it is the apparatus which leads to all forms of life being actualised. The soul is the indispensable element of the actualisation or realisation of the all forms of life – it is the beginning, the very moment of inception of all living forms.¹¹⁰ This marks the origin of the soul as an apparatus which constructs the base of any governmental economy of the production of the compliant body – this marks the emergence of the soul as a governing tool of the technology of the state.

To defend against Chrysippus’ argument that two bodies could not possibly be contained in one, Tertullian gives the example of the body of the pregnant woman “who, day after day, bear not one body, but even two and three at a time, within the embrace of a single womb”.¹¹¹ This

¹¹⁰ This reduction of life to a fundamental structure that pre-exists all variations of the living is symptomatic of Tertullian’s narrative. Towards the end of the book, he recognises the ‘animal’ as the essential nature of Adam. But this problematizes the concept of life being clearly divided into two spheres – the animal life, and the political life. In opposition to this Manichean reading, Tertullian engages a more complex structure. For he, although, reduces life to its bare minimum, this bare life holds the potential to turn into a political life, into a *bios politikos*. He argues here for the mutability or the changeableness of the nature. But in the twenty fifth chapter he contradicts to this very position of the mutability of nature and there he declares that nature or anything natural is quite unchangeable. They carry the form lifelong into which they are moulded by birth. If we trace this later argument of his to its logical end, we find it enacting a strange, self-defeating proposition – that is, the animality of the human beings are not subject to change or modification. This kind of obstinacy defeats the central argument of the theories of the Redemption – it negates the very chronology of the Christian history. He saves his discourse from this self-defeating argument in the forty eighth chapter where efficient disciplining of both the body and the soul is presented as a way out of the impasse of the immutable nature.

¹¹¹ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25508 – 25516.

proves for him a sense of interiority, a logic of containment. The body that is contained within another body must proceed, in his view, from its containing body and therefore they cannot be different by their nature – “The whole creation testifies how that those bodies which are naturally destined to issue from bodies, are already (included) in that from which they proceed”.¹¹² It establishes his belief in the similar nature, in fact in the very indivisibility, of the body and the soul. He, on the seventh chapter, refers to the scripture itself to second his conception of the soul. In order to achieve this, he invokes the tortured soul in the hell who is “punished in flames, suffering excruciating thirst, and imploring from the finger of a happier soul, for his tongue, the solace of a drop of water.”¹¹³ The evidently physical nature of the torment, that a soul condemned in the hell suffers, espouses the physical nature of the soul itself, since an incorporeal object cannot be tortured in physically palpable manner.

There are various other arguments that attempt to denounce the Tertullianian theorisation of the corporeality of the soul and of its not being antithetical to the flesh and bones. One important among these arguments is that the body weighs more heavily when dead, whereas it should have been lighter if the soul were a bodily substance that departed from the body. Against this, the source of the defence is again Soranus. Going back to him, Tertullian provides the example of a ship. When a ship is in the ocean, it is lighter and easier to manoeuvre it than when it sits sedentary on the land, but surely that does not discredit the ocean of its physical nature. The soul may be different from the other forms of corporeality, but that does not make it incorporeal at all — it merely is a variation that ultimately bears proof of the greatness of its author, that is God. In truth, the invisibility of soul to the mortal eyes of man contributes to this diversification of the nature of the corporeal:

¹¹² Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25516.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, Loc. 25537.

Again, even if the soul is invisible, it is only in strict accordance with the condition of its own corporeality, and suitably to the property of its own essence, as well as to the nature of even those beings to which its destiny made it to be invisible. The eyes of the owl cannot endure the sun, whilst the eagle is so well able to face his glory, that the noble character of its young is determined by the unblinking strength of their gaze; while the eaglet, which turns away its eye from the sun's ray, is expelled from the nest as a degenerate creature!¹¹⁴

Thus he subtly naturalises the variations of the qualities.

From this discussion about the ontology of the soul emerges another fundamental problem involving the soul and the mind - what is the nature of the relationship between the mind and the soul? The philosophers previous to him had argued for a separation between them based on the assumption that the mind is affected by emotions, while the soul is not. But if that is the case truly, he argues, one of these two will be the seat of "emotion and sensation, and every sort of taste, and all action and motion, will be the characteristics" of this one, "whilst of the other the natural condition will be calm, and repose, and stupor. There is therefore no alternative: either the mind must be useless and void, or the soul."¹¹⁵ Since it cannot possibly be, the soul and the mind must be connected. In the next chapter, in order to consider which is superior between the soul and the mind and to eventually decide it to be the soul, he bases his argument on the common, day-to-day phraseology. Since the pilot of the ship thinks of saving the soul and not the minds and since the soldier proposes to lay down his soul for the country and not the mind, it seems clear to

¹¹⁴ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25573 – 25581.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Kindle, Loc. 25821.

him that the soul is, manifestly, superior to the mind. This conclusion is validated by the scriptural fact that the God always addresses the soul and not the mind.¹¹⁶

Since, now, the soul had a proper physical dimension, a newer problem emerges regarding the precise location of the soul, of its position in a specific locale of the body. This gives rise to the problem that if the soul is corporeal and if it proves to be located in a specific locale in the body, then whether the parts where the soul is not located are 'soul-less'. Against this, Tertullian vehemently enunciates the organic wholeness of the body and the soul and their indivisible compatibility. To counter the argument he invokes "Archimedes – I mean his hydraulic organ, with its many limbs, parts, bands, passages for the notes, outlets for their sounds, combinations for their harmony, and the array of its pipes; but yet the whole of these details constitute only one instrument."¹¹⁷ He animates here a sense of an order, but it is not similar to the non-corporeal being of harmony, since harmony itself is an element of this order. He defends his argument thus:

In like manner the wind, which breathes throughout this organ at the impulse of hydraulic engine, is not divided into separate portions from the fact of its dispersion through the instrument to make it play: it is whole and entire in its substance, although divided in its operation. The example is not remote from (the illustration) of Strato, Aenesidemus, and

¹¹⁶ This divine validation emerges from the idea that, as Giorgio Agamben shows in his *The Sacrament of Language*, the God's word functions as the ultimate arbiter of meaning. There is no distance or loss between what God says and the reality to which His words refer to, and also create. While human language is marked by its own silences, its gaps and the rifts, the divine language is the reality itself and that is exactly why the word becomes the flesh in a divine utterance and when He says "Let there be light", the light will always be there. The very materiality of our world emerges from this divine language.

¹¹⁷ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25879.

Heraclitus: for these philosophers maintain the unity of the soul, as diffused over the entire body, and yet in every part the same.¹¹⁸

He then goes on to contemplate the question whether the soul has a central element of vitality, or what he calls *hegemonikon*. And he concludes that it indeed exists. Otherwise the structure of the soul would have collapsed. He locates this fundamental vitality of the inner instruments of life in the heart. This does not go very far from the medieval medical and cultural conception of the heart.

Heather Webb begins her study of the medieval conception of the heart with a surprising statement: “The medieval heart was a very different organ from the one we know today.”¹¹⁹ In her analysis of this organ, the word ‘circulation’ garners a prominence – circulation not in the limited meaning of the bodily fluids being pumped, but also as the body (with its heart) at the whirlwind of the cultural circulation of ideas and beliefs and pieces of information.¹²⁰ She renders present a time, now lost, in which “life was defined by extension into the world rather than effective protection from the world’s invasions.”¹²¹ The meaning of circulation, therefore, being unhinged from what she calls the notion of “cardiocentric outflow”, resonates with deeper significations about the body and the soul.¹²² The connection she makes with the reading of the medieval heart with its modern reimagining attributed to William Harvey’s 1628 text *De motu cordis*. It is interesting to note here, in this discussion about the emergence of the soul as a governmental

¹¹⁸ Ibid., Loc. 25493.

¹¹⁹ Heather Webb, *The Medieval Heart*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 1.

¹²⁰ Here I must add an explanatory note since, although the dissertation critically contemplates the early Christian times, in order to clarify one point it refers to Webb’s discussion of it in the medieval times. Even if this seems to be a case of disastrous temporal logic, it is possible to argue that the ideas that Webb explicated in her book are a direct and conspicuous descendent of the Early Christian writings, that the medieval heart was a organ which owed much to the medical conceptions of the early Fathers. Thus, it is possible to grasp from Webb’s historical analysis to understand the ideas which also formed the epistemic cosmos of the Church Fathers.

¹²¹ Heather Webb, *The Medieval Heart*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 2.

¹²² Ibid., 51.

tool, that “William Harvey begins the dedication of his *De motu cordis* of 1628 with a bit of flattery for King Charles I.¹²³ The heart, he explains, is the natural analogue of a sovereign, rendering power with the body just as the king confers grace upon his kingdom.”¹²⁴ The discourse about the nature of the heart had always been heavily invested with ideas of governmentality and body politic.¹²⁵

Webb employs the three categories of function envisioned by William James in his 1898 “Ingersole Lecture on the Immorality of Man”.¹²⁶ These three categories of the function are: the productive function (a tea kettle, for instance, produces steam); the releasing or permissive function (the trigger of a crossbow, for example, releases an arrow); and the transmissive function (coloured glass, for example, filters light). While the modern physiology taught us to think of the brain’s function as that of the first kind, that is, of the productive nature, Webb shows that the medieval theories tried to think it as that of the third kind – as the transmissive function: “Rather than producing consciousness, thought, or inner life, the brain acts, in this analysis, like the organ or the vocal apparatus. It sifts, determines, and limits something that comes from beyond itself.”¹²⁷ This place beyond the trifling activities of the brain is the heart.¹²⁸ In opposition to the brain, the heart occupies a central position in the technology of the body: “On the intracorporeal level, the heart was the organ credited with productive function in the body. It made blood, created heat, formed semen, and generated spirits, those volatile entities that carried out the

¹²³ “The animal’s heart is the basis of its life, its chief member, the sun of its microcosm; on the heart all its activity depends, from the heart all its liveliness and strength arise. Equally is the king the basis of his kingdoms, the sun of his microcosm, the heart of the state; from him all power arises and all grace stems”.

¹²⁴ Heather Webb, *The Medieval Heart*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 10.

¹²⁵ Very interestingly, later in her book, Webb suggests that Harvey actually redefines the terms to designate a power as central as sovereign, and thereby destabilises the centrality of the heart as the noblest organ.

¹²⁶ Heather Webb, *The Medieval Heart*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 16.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹²⁸ Also see Philolaus’ idea of heart as the *arche* of *psyche* discussed below.

work of the soul. The brain's function was entirely transmissive; it did not create but merely refined input received from the heart."¹²⁹ Thus the heart was given a tremendously important place in the government of the body. Even in the anatomical structure of Galen, in which the brain has a superior place to that of the heart, also the heart harbours the vital spirit or *pneuma zotikon*.¹³⁰ Even Albert the Great's thirteenth century *De animalibus* bears testimony to this:

Galen must have been mistaken...we will prove the words of the First Master [Aristotle] by setting forth the supposition that the soul is one power in and of itself, from which flow all the powers of the members. Since it is organic, there will necessarily be one member in which it is located and from which it causes all power to flow. And just as it is the principle of the powers, so will that member necessarily be the point of origin of the organs. Now it is agreed that the soul, with respect to the act and power of life is in the heart. It is therefore necessary that the heart be the point of origin of all the nerves and the veins through which the soul accomplishes its operations in the members.¹³¹

Words like 'power', 'respect', and 'operation' overwhelm this narrative of the heart. The medieval heart was characterised by this form of governmental rhetoric and by its central position as the seat of the heart in the politics of body.

This sovereignty of the medieval heart is also shared by Tertullian and therefore he concludes by quoting Empedocles, "Man has his (supreme) sensation in the blood around his heart."¹³² The next chapter deals with the economy of the soul itself. In the beginning of this

¹²⁹ Heather Webb, *The Medieval Heart*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 17.

¹³⁰ Walther Riese, introduction to *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, Galen (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963), 16.

¹³¹ Albert, *De animalibus*, trans. Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr. and Irvn Michael Rensick (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), quoted in Heather Webb, *The Medieval Heart*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 20.

¹³² Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25929.

chapter, Tertullian explores the Platonic distinction in the soul itself, namely, the rational and the irrational. He agrees with this categorisation and admits of its presence, but he diverges from Plato in one important respect. For him, the irrational element of the soul cannot originate in the God. Since the soul is derived from the God, every natural and innate part of the soul must originate in Him. But He cannot father the irrational, so it must be from the devil that this irrationality later contaminated and lay waste to the human soul. He also dismantles the Platonic claim about the subdivision of the irrationality of the soul into “two departments: the irascible, which they call *thumikon*, and the concupiscible, which they designate by the term *epithumetikon* (in such a way as to make the first common to us and lions, and the second shared between ourselves and flies, whilst the rational element is confined to us and God).”¹³³ He shows that this triadic structure of the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible is even present in Christ himself, therefore, he argues, it is not possible for this structure to be present in the capacity of irrationality, it must be a part of the overarching rationality. Thus he rationalises the element of irrationality itself in the economy of God’s plan of salvation:

In our cases, accordingly, the irascible and the concupiscible elements of our own soul must not invariably be put to the account of irrational (nature), since we are sure that in our Lord these elements operated in entire accordance with reason. God will be angry, with perfect reason, with all who deserve His wrath; and with reason too, will God desire whatever claims are worthy of Himself. For He will show indignation against the evil man, and for the good man will He desire salvation. To ourselves even does the apostle allow the concupiscible quality. “If any man,” says he, “desireth the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.” Now, by saying “a good work”, he shows us that the desire is a reasonable one. He permits us likewise to feel indignation. How should he not, when he himself

¹³³ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25929., Loc. 25976.

experiences the same? “I would,” says he, “that they were even cut off which trouble you.”

In perfect agreement with reason was that indignation which resulted from his desire to maintain discipline and order.¹³⁴

The central problematic of the institutional ethic of governance is here reiterated. It is in this politicised logistic, the soul as a technology of power is to be read. This texture almost effortlessly imbues with itself a tacit forbearance of violence, although, it is to be admitted, this violence does not exist in the common or general sphere of the civilian, it is rather centralised in the hands of the sovereign state. This indulgence into violence was not something new. It had been present, as Ojakangas confirms, even in the times of Plato.¹³⁵ In his *Republic*, Plato declares, “They [the leaders of the state] will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean – no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.”¹³⁶ Plato here, rather quite blatantly, sanctions a drastic action of violence. Tertullian carries this tradition when he suggests cutting off those who make trouble. This is the way the hegemonic power establishes and validates its superiority. He complicates this act of politicisation by adding another layer of difficulty to it. But this also make the soul more familiar, more coherent to the economical technologies analysed by Foucault.

In the later part of his book, Tertullian develops a surprising argument – that, even the trees possess knowledge. Their knowledge is of their appropriate growth and of the proper

¹³⁴ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 25983 – 25991.

¹³⁵ Mika Ojakangas, *On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics: A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower* (London: Routledge, 2016), 78.

¹³⁶ Plato, *Republic*, In *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vols 5 and 6, transl. Paul Shorey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), quoted in Mika Ojakangas, *On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics: A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower* (London: Routledge, 2016), 8.

nutrition that they are to receive. This episteme is mapped onto their bodies themselves, onto their very being. So, every form of life, implanted by God, is therefore a part of His grand design, a tool with its specific operability in the broader economy of things. Accidents and randomness are thus purged out of this carefully plotted design; but they are not obliterated or exiled, they are, rather, given a place within the fabric of the divine plan and thus are made part of the plan. And the best way, in fact the only way, to see this design being actualised is to let things take the natural course, to let things be as they are, to play them out in accordance to their inherent nature. Surely it would result in the destruction and loss of some things, but even that loss, that rupture in the taut architecture of the things is a part of the structure itself. “Now, even the seeds of plants have, one form in each kind, but their development varies: some open and expand in a healthy and perfect state, while others either improve or degenerate, owing to the conditions of weather and soil, and from the application of labour and care; also from the course of the seasons, and from the occurrence of casual circumstances.”¹³⁷ The failures, the losses are always already contained within the narrative – it is an overarching structure from which nothing deviates, since every deviation, almost paradoxically, forms a part of the structure itself. This structure, imagined by Tertullian, approximates closely to the governmental logistic about which Foucault discusses in his 1978 lecture at the College de France. In his analysis of this technique, Foucault gives the example of the cultivation of grain. He shows that in this technique the consideration begins not with the market, but several notches previous to that – namely, from sowing the seeds unto the ground or, as he calls it, “the history of grain from the moment it is put to the ground”.¹³⁸ The eventualities of scarcity and high prices, in this subtle technique, are not to be considered as an

¹³⁷ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 26287.

¹³⁸ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at College de France, 1977 - 1978*, trans. Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 36.

unprecedented deviation: “And it should not be thought of as an evil, that is to say, it should be considered as a phenomenon that, in the first place, is natural, and so consequently, secondly, neither good nor evil. It is what it is.”¹³⁹ Therefore, this technique has already calculated a margin of loss within its definition of profit. There are too many variables and there is no way in which the censure of any minimum loss can be guaranteed. So, in its calculation, for example, this technique includes variables like humidity, dryness, heat, abundance and scarcity. These fluctuations and inconsistencies construct the reality of the situation. But including these uncertain elements into the calculation, this technique organises a more rational and efficient articulation of profit. This new form is not enclosed within the limited field of the ideal, it operates in accordance with what it constructs as the ‘real’ or the ‘normal’: In other words, by working within the reality of fluctuations between abundance / scarcity, dearness / cheapness, and not by trying to prevent it in advance, an apparatus is installed, which is, I think, precisely an apparatus of security”.¹⁴⁰ Now, the obvious question that remains to be answered is ‘what is this apparatus of security?’ Foucault provides the answer in three consecutive stages.

In the first stage, there is the cause-effect modality of crime and punishment. A crime is committed and since every form of crime is usually regarded as an affliction caused against the king himself (and also against the society as a whole) , this is punished with a similar affliction against the body of the perpetrator herself. Thus, in this strategy, for instance, a murder is punished (or rather, revenged) by a complete obliteration of life of the perpetrator. The second form that Foucault discusses is entirely different from the first one. In this, punishment is not limited to a physical harm; it leads up to a disciplination, to a reformation of the perpetrator (who is more likened, as we have already seen earlier in this chapter, to a patient now, for whom is

¹³⁹ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at College de France, 1977 - 1978*, trans. Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 36.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

needed no punishment but healing). Thus, from this strategy emerges various models of surveillance technologies. The third and the finally evolved stage is inherently based on such a technology, but operates on the questions of effectiveness - on the questions like:

What is the cost of repressing these thefts? Does severe and strict repression cost more than one that is more permissive; does exemplary and discontinuous repression cost more than continuous repression? What, therefore, is the comparative cost of the theft and of its repression, and what is more worthwhile: to tolerate a bit more theft or to tolerate a bit more repression? There are further questions: When one has caught the culprit, is it worth punishing him? What will it cost to punish him? What should be done in order to punish him and, by punishing him, reeducate him? Can he really be reeducated? Independently of the act he has committed, is he a permanent danger such that he will do it again whether or not he has been reeducated? The general question basically will be how to keep a type of criminality, theft for instance, within socially and economically acceptable limits and around an average that will be considered as optimal for a given social functioning.¹⁴¹

The technology of security therefore is centred around the most possible effectiveness of any policy and its central problematic is that of whether the policy would prove to be cost-effective for the institution implementing the policy. So even the simplest of elements finds its meaning in the ulterior motive of being pragmatic (that is, cost-effective) or in the insipid fluency of 'playing safe'.

¹⁴¹ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at College de France, 1977 - 1978*, trans. Graham Burchell, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 4 -5.

To solve this problem, this technology creates an apparatus of the 'normal'. It defines a specific margin of loss as 'normal' and until and unless the loss does not exceed this 'normal' boundaries, it does not intervene. It lets things be to the boundaries of the 'normal'. It only acts when the margin transcends this imagined boundary.¹⁴² This apparatus of 'normalisation' inculcates a naturalisation of violence. When this technology is employed against the figure of the population, it already has engineered the death of some individuals as 'normal' — an inherently rational limit which cannot be avoided. Being based on this assumption of death, it contains a strange nonchalance that refuses to be perturbed until the loss transcends the limit. The performance of this apparatus is marked by those indelible death-marks. It turns the violence into a usual, essential even, part of the social structure itself and thereby limits the possibilities to critique this violence.

The thirty third chapter is quite essential in the dismantling of the Foucauldian narrative historically. The timeline, as we have seen previously, that Foucault settles for showing the emergence of the soul as a tool in the disciplinary rhetoric of power was, roughly, the eighteenth century. But here in this chapter of his treatise, Tertullian explores the emergence of the soul as a tool in the disciplinary tactic. He does this by exploring the loopholes of the Pythagorean conception of the soul. As he analyses, a group of philosophers attempted to vindicate the Pythagorean model on the basis of what they called 'a sense of justice' — a murderer's soul, for instance, would be transported into the body of a cow that would be slaughtered by the butcher, thus enacting a posthumous, superhuman judicial retribution. But, Tertullian argues, "if souls undergo a transformation, they will actually not be able to accomplish and experience the destinies which they shall deserve; and the aim and purpose of judicial recompense will be brought to nought, as there will be wanting the sense and consciousness of merit and

¹⁴² For example, we have decided that death of one among ten children is 'normal'.

retribution.”¹⁴³ The condemned man, it suggests, must experience the punishment – that is, he must go through the painful and humiliating realisation that he is being punished. Since, the soul of a cow, for example, or more appropriately the soul currently inhabiting the cow is unable to be affected by either of those painful sensibilities, the act of punishment cannot be said to be carried out. So, towards which this act of punishment is directed is not the body; had it been the materiality of the body which was the object of punishment, then it would have suffice that the cow’s body is slaughtered. But, as he argues, it is not sufficient. It implies, therefore, that the punishment is directed towards something more fundamental, more integral to life than the body is — it is the soul. But even in its punishment, the soul is not dissociated from the body. The punishment of the soul is coupled with the torture of the body or the flesh: “But even if his soul should have anticipated by its departure the sword’s last stroke, his body at all events must not escape the weapon: retribution for his own crime is yet exacted by stabbing his throat and stomach, and piercing his side.”¹⁴⁴ The pain that the condemned body beset upon the victim must be approximated on the body of the condemned in its punishment. There are, therefore, two corresponding part of Tertullian’s economy of punishment — one directed to the soul and the other directed to the body. It is through the coagulation of these two that a balanced, ‘healthy’ disciplinary tactic is born.

The soul, as we saw in the previous discussion, had always been a topic of contention. Even in Homer, the soul finds a mention. But the Homeric soul is only but a shadow at the twilight regions of the Hades. So, when Pythagoreans imagined the living being as *empsychon*, that is, ‘a *psyche* is within’, this new formulation was, as Carl Huffman argues in his study of the Pythagorean

¹⁴³ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 26957.

¹⁴⁴ Quintus Tertullian, *The Works of Tertullian*, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited), Kindle, Loc. 26957, Loc. 26980.

conception of the soul, truly revolutionary¹⁴⁵. The Homeric soul was a marginal, posthumous element in the vivid epic of life — a mere afterthought or a shadow that could only be characterised by a relation of absence or of exclusion with the living being. As Huffman says, “Homer never talks of *psyche* except either as something that leaves the body in life-threatening situations and at death or as a shade in the underworld.”¹⁴⁶ Therefore, the Homeric soul is always dissociated from the living body. While this newly imagined soul, on the contrary, was essentially a part of life. The soul, now, was present not only in death but also in life. Not only that, this new construction effected into a bridge that connected life with death. While both Empedocles and Heraclitus discussed about the materiality of *psyche*, for our investigation Philolaus would prove to be more rewarding.

Philolaus was a Greek philosopher who practised what is generally termed now as the Pythagorean philosophy. His life is recounted with uneven details by later writers and therefore no account of his history is beyond suspicion. Some of his fragments of writing, however, are extant. There are certain doubts about whether it is possible to understand the Pythagorean soul from a reading of Philolaus, since while he uses the term *psyche* Empedocles continued using the term *daimon*. The debate revolves around the question which term approximated the Pythagorean idea of the soul more accurately. However, the fragment 13 by Philolaus, as translated by Hoffman, runs thus, “The head [is the seat] of intellect, the heart of *psyche* and sensation, the navel of rooting and first growth, the genitals of sowing and generation of seed.”¹⁴⁷ And then, it thus continues, “The brain [contains] the origin of man, the heart the origin of animals, the navel the

¹⁴⁵ Carl Huffman, “The Pythagorean Conception of the Soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus”, in *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 21.

¹⁴⁶ Carl Huffman, “The Pythagorean Conception of the Soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus”, in *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 35.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

origin of plants, the genitals the origin of all [living things].”¹⁴⁸ This is indeed a strange economy. The various parts of the natural body are allocated to diverse forms of life. And in this regulated hierarchy, the head is given an unquestionable superiority, the seat of the intellectual faculties and therefore, of reason. The seat of *psyche* is, as mentioned, the heart. This is an enigmatic utterance, almost illogical, if the soul is understood as an intangible other residing in the living body only temporarily – how can such an immaterial element be unfurled within the materiality of a bounded or limited structure? The way out of this impasse involves a different anatomy of the soul – a formulation of soul in which this is, strictly speaking, not immaterial. In this idea, soul is not entirely an ‘other’ to the bodily substances, it is not clearly external to the material qualities that sustain life. The metaphysics of Philolaus categorises all things into three – the limited, the unlimited, and the harmony of the limited and the unlimited. In accordance with this discourse, he considers heart as the *arche* of *psyche*. If the soul is determined as belonging to the category of the unlimited, and the heart to that of the limited, then heart as the seat of the soul involves the harmonious nature of the third kind. In this Pre-Socratic construction, although the soul is not exactly equated with the materiality of the body itself, there exists a close, unchangeable relation between the body and the soul. When the body dies, the harmony ceases to exist and in a new body, this harmony is reinvented and reiterated. Thus *psyche* appears to be the fundamental nature of any form of life.

It is possible to argue, therefore, that conceiving soul as inextricable to the body has a long tradition indeed, a tradition that manages to include an array of illustrious names. But this impressive list is not the only aftermath that emerges in the wake of this discussion. It has been attempted, rather, to suggest that, it is possible to extend the Foucauldian chronology, structured

¹⁴⁸ Carl Huffman, “The Pythagorean Conception of the Soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus”, in *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007).

to understand the history of the disciplinary mechanism of the soul, back to the middle ages, and even to the biopolitical interventions of both Aristotle and Plato, when soul is invented as the essential tool in the government of life. The Foucauldian 'soul' therefore is not different from the traditional politico-theological figure of the soul.

Chapter Three

Sculpting in Time — St Benedict and the Christian Historicity

The previous two chapters of this present dissertation have tried to locate the biopolitical elements in the early theological writings of early Christianity. While doing that, it has performed a likening of two things that are often considered as historically differed - the *oikonomia* and the biopolitical regime. What has been consistently attempted to prove here is the clandestine homology between those two technologies. This secret passageway, in the architecture of this relationship, is termed in the Foucauldian lexicon ‘the cultivation of the self’ which, in rather simpler formulation, can be understood as a form “dominated by the principle that says one must “take care of oneself””.¹⁴⁹ This prerogative of the self of taking care of itself can and should be seen as the governmental translation of what Steinbeck refers to as *Timshel* or “thou mayest”.¹⁵⁰ In other words, the choice of taking care of oneself has been invested into the governmental strategy of the state and this act of choice, which in reality is limited to a singular, ‘normal’ code (in this particular example, to take care), originally emerged in the Christological institution. Therefore, how much strongly we enunciate our contemporary structures of the state to be secular space, it is not in fact the case - the technologies of power emerged and employed in the religious constitution still form the heart of our modern state. While Foucault recognised that the fundamental motif of the prison — the carceral anatomy - is endlessly reiterated in other forms of institutional structures like hospitals, schools, boarding houses or in the military, the contention of this dissertation is different than that in its insistence that this carceral motif is historically preceded by the controlling mechanisms used by the monastic institutions. They are inherently associated by the logic of evolution. In order to endow the first part of the argument with validity, this dissertation has analysed, the writings on the idea of *oikonomia*, especially by Origen and some other minor early Church fathers. It has shown, how in their writings, the idea of *oikonomia* is rehearsed as a specific modality of balance and

¹⁴⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Care of Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume 3*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 43.

¹⁵⁰ John Steinbeck, *East of Eden*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1952).

appropriation, of adopting to specific situation, of flexibility and coercion. It has also shown an understanding of the soul that is opposite to the generally accepted conception of the soul. Thus, it has located the government of the body is not only located at the meanderings of the body, it instructs the soul also since soul is not merely understood as distant ended from all physical bodily affairs. Thus soul and body together formulated a construction that necessitated control. Even in somewhat later treatise of medicine we can detect this complex construct of both body and soul. An example could be *The Wisdom of the Art of Medicine*, a early medieval summary of the medicinal theories in circulation. This text, or at least a considerable part of it, was written in the sixth century and its medical topography eventually boils down to ethico-theological paradigms. It insists, to go back to our example, “sinews contain bones, and bones sinews. the soul preserves the sinews. Blood governs the soul and the soul governs life”.¹⁵¹ Thus, in the medical imagination was ingrained a complex interrelated system in which both the body and the soul coordinated absolutely.

This chapter would try to locate the modern form of governance in this historical context of the structure consisting simultaneously both the body and soul, which, here, in this case is specifically originated in the early Christian doctrines that were in circulation in the European nations of that time. In this chapter, I would like to focus on how a detailed study of those doctrines could endow us with a historical understanding of our contemporary times. I would like to draw attention on the issues of body that permeated discourses about Jesus Christ and how their abundance helped to form and integrate a new vision of history which ultimately led to the modern structures of wielding power over the body politic.

We have already seen the appropriating logic of the *oikonomia* - how does it enunciate a regulatory ethic which accommodates itself to the situational arithmetic. The eventual aim is to propagate a semblance of ‘normal’ (the contours of which it itself had defined), to guarantee a sense of balance. This idea of a precarious balance as the central motif of organising system is also

¹⁵¹ *Sapientia artis medicinae. ein frühmittelalterliches Kompendium der Medizin*, trans. Faith Wallis (1928): 103–13, quoted in *Medieval Medicine: A Reader*, ed. Faith Wallis, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010),18.

present in the writings of Galen. An important problem is, why Galen? More properly, why Galen, a Greek physician who only mentions to Christianity (and Judaism with it) for merely six times in entirety of his extent oeuvre, is being invoked in a text that purports to be a study of the early Christological writings?¹⁵² The answer is two-fold. The first one is chronological : Galen belongs to the same historical cluster of the other personages discussed in this dissertation, roughly from the beginning of the first century to about 1000 AD. But Galen is more important for his influence that he wielded over the theological authors, those who formulated the monastic regulatory mechanisms. A case in point might be Isidore of Seville. As we have already noted, Isidore, the bishop of Seville and a prolific writer of theological and disciplinary treatises, argued for the understanding of the term ‘medicine’ as etymologically insinuating the sense of moderation. He also goes on to declare that, “nature grieves at excess and rejoices at restraint. Hence those who drink potions and remedies copiously and unceasingly are troubled. Anything that is immoderate brings not health but danger”.¹⁵³ Thus, an essential relationship is constructed between health and moderation. The appropriating mechanism that characterised *oikonomia* is now here being employed to the medical cartography of the human body. This is again evident in the dietary chart prepared by Anthimus, a sixth century Byzantine physician who lived most of his life as a political exile in the court of Theodoric the Great in Italy, for the Frankish King Theudoric or Thierry I of Austrasia. In his treatise, Anthimus proposes a well cooked meal for proper digestion, a meal which is not over or under cooked. Also is important the amount of the food taken. The food is always to be taken moderately. His warning on the amount of the drink taken makes things clearer:

drink should be treated in the same way, for as much should be taken as will harmonize with the food. if too much is drunk and at too low a temperature, the stomach grows chilled and

loses its efficacy, so that there ensues diarrhea and the other conditions that i

mentioned

above. let me give you an analogy: if someone is constructing a wall

¹⁵² www.tertullian.org/rpearce/galen_on_jews_and_christians.htm

¹⁵³ Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies of Isidore of Seville* , trans. Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 109.

of a house, he should mix the lime and water in the correct proportions to ensure that the mortar is thick, for then it is both useful for the building and it sets; but if too much water is added, then it is no longer useful. in a similar way proportion ought to be observed in food and drink.¹⁵⁴

It is only through maintaining a balanced structure can one hope to retain his or her healthiness. This balance, this proportioned way of being is equated with the natural state of being, with the way the divine imagination of the human existence was. From this bridging emerged another set of analogy, opposite to the earlier one, but inherently dependent upon the first — the identification of disease with the nature of sin. If being healthy was abiding by the divine idea of life, then disease was obviously the very opposite of this, that is transgressing the divine conception and that was nothing but a sin. From this metaphorical exercise between the sin and the disease emerged the idea which can be called the ‘ethical healing’.

To understand this synergy between the disease and the sin, we should refer to the idea of the absent referent proposed by Carol J. Adams.¹⁵⁵ For Adams, the concept of the absent referent is marked by, as the name precisely suggests, the absence of the reference point from which the (cultural) meaning of the present context is gathered. For example, when the rape victims talk about their nightmarish experience of being handled like “a piece of meat”, the absent referent is the slaughtered animal who is absent here and yet whose dead meat acts as an approximating metaphor to word the ghastly experience. Similarly, in the act of eating meat the absent referent is the living, breathing animal whose presence and eventual slaughter produce the meat and yet who is absent from the discourse of eating meat.¹⁵⁶ The death that provides the meat also obliterates the facticity

¹⁵⁴ Anthimus, *On the Observance of Food*, trans. Mark Grant, (Totnes: Prospect Books), 49, quoted in *Medieval Medicine: A Reader*, ed. Faith Wallis, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 78.

¹⁵⁵ Carol J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*, (London: Continuum, 1990).

¹⁵⁶ Adams shows the acute form of sexual violation leads to a complete obliteration (“eating”) of the victim. Her case in point is the story of Zeus and Metis the Titaness. Zeus, the story goes thus, lusted after Metis and ultimately had his desire fulfilled. But then he was informed that a second

of the living animal. In our set of example, both disease and sin are undercut by the absent referents sin and disease. Thus disease is always shadowed by a hint of sin or guilt, while sin is a disease. That is why in theological understanding, the beginning of the human disease and death is often contained within the Fall, the Original Sin. That is also why that Christ was imagined as a physician and the remnant of the saints could cure a man or woman of his or her ailments. Not only the saints were capable of such miraculous healing, even the Kings, as divinely chosen *christomimetes*, were supposed to have this power. Gregory of Tours recounts an example of this in his tale of the plague in Marseilles.¹⁵⁷ When the whole place was afflicted by death and decay brought in by the plague, a woman whose son was also afflicted gathered particles of the king's royal garment and mixed that in the water which her son would take. After taking that mixture, the son was healed. The saints' remaining also functioned in a similar way. In an anonymous text that celebrated the glories of Saint Martin we see the narrator being afflicted by acute dysentery and fever. His condition was worsened to such an extent that he abandoned the hope of living and no physician could help him anymore. As a last resort he oriented all his attempts at healing towards miraculous convention:

I called Armentarius, my doctor, and I said to him: "You have offered all the wisdom of your skill, and you have already tested the strength of all your salves, but the devices of this world have been of no use to me who am about to die. One option remains for me to try; let me show you a powerful antidote. Fetch dust from the most sacred tomb of lord [Martin], and then mix a drink for me. if this dust is not effective, every refuge for escaping [death] has been lost." Then a deacon was sent to the aforementioned tomb of the blessed champion. he brought back some of the sacred dust that they mixed [in water] and gave me to drink. As soon as I drank it, all the pain vanished, and I received my health

impregnation of Metis would produce a child who would dethrone Zeus himself. Being warned thus, Zeus, literally, ate Metis.

¹⁵⁷ Gregory of Tours, *The History of the Franks*, trans. O. M. Dalton, (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1927), quoted in *Medieval Medicine: A Reader*, ed. Faith Wallis, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 55.

from the tomb. The assistance available at that tomb was so effective that after this [cure] had occurred at the third hour, on the same day at the sixth hour I was healthy and went for a meal.¹⁵⁸

Thus the bodily remains of the saint was marked by a divine potency of healing. This relation between a sacred body or flesh and healing is postulated in its most vigorous form in the body of Christ who was often understood as the balm for the human race, the physician who would cure the men of their sickness of sin. Therefore, the body of Christ, as we will see below, was invested with a fertile landscape of rhetorical outpourings.

Like Isidore of Seville, Galen subscribed to the idea of proportion as a paradigm of health. For Galen, proportion was the defining faculty of disease - healthiness complex. The difference between these two states can only be formulated with reference to the idea of the propriety. The balance, for him, is always the structuring principle of the nature, the *arche* of it and therefore an imbalance, unnatural and despotic, is always the essence of disease.

If we were to find out the number of ways that bodies are hindered in functions when they are changed from an accord with nature, we would then find out the number of all the simple diseases. And here the agreed principle (*arche*) is that what accords with nature is balance, not only in an animal but also in a plant or a seed or anything living, whereas, conversely, what is contrary to nature is imbalance. Health would then be a balance and disease would be an imbalance.¹⁵⁹

Thus medicine is a restoration of the balance the problematisation of which is the disease. But indeed for Galenic anatomy and theories of health, the medicine is not that important. The naturalisation of balance resulted in the organisation of the meticulous care, in the methodology of regime. If the balance in regard to nature is to be maintained, then what is needed is not a medicinal

¹⁵⁸ “Liber de virtutibus sancti Martini episcopi” in *Saints and Their Miracles in Late Antique Gaul*, trans. Raymond Van Dam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 228 - 229, quoted in *Medieval Medicine: A Reader*, ed. Faith Wallis, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 57.

¹⁵⁹ Galen, *On Diseases and Symptoms*, trans. Ian Johnston, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 135.

allocation in the aftermath of the disease, but rather a premeditated dietary system that was located antecedent to the disease, a preventive *logos* in other words. For this act of prevention, medicine was not a viable option and therefore it was discarded from the central place of the Galenic system to be replaced by the dietary regimen. Hence properties of foods, their nutritional value and their health facilitating capitals became a fundamental topic for discussion in Galen. Not only that, the health became an ethical issue which included in itself the proper condition of the soul even and thereby effecting a regulatory mechanism of the human actions. In his treatise on the human soul, therefore, he establishes the nature of this regulatory mechanism as “guarding” that is “a watchfulness, or a diagnosis, or, in addition, a correction”.¹⁶⁰ Thus, an alert watch characterises this system, a rhetoric of vigilantism that characterised every action, every moment of the human life. This modality of continuous surveillance is exactly similar to that of the Foucauldian managerial technology that we have already discussed in the first chapter. While Foucault locates this technology of government only from the eighteenth century, it becomes clear from a reading of the Galenic treatise that it was already present in there. However, what is to be managed is the soul - it needs a constant guardianship. This guardianship certainly can come from the outside. It is possible to ask for help from persons who are wise in the matters of the human heart. Also, the person that provides counsel must be a moderate man, a man whose own errors of the soul are already cured.

However, the man who asks for counsel must neither be wealthy nor possess civil dignity:

fear will keep any one from telling the truth to one in civil office, just as fear of losing their profit will keep flatterers from telling the truth to the rich. Even if there be someone who seems to be telling the truth, these flatterers stand aloof from him. If, therefore, anyone who is either powerful or also rich wishes to become good and noble, he will first have to put aside his power and riches, especially in these

¹⁶⁰ Galen, *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, trans. Paul W. Harkins (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1963), 27.

times when he will not find a Diogenes who will tell the truth even to a rich man or a monarch.¹⁶¹

The man who provides the counsel therefore is a healthy man in respect to his ontological condition. Also, it was possible to put into being an institution that creates healthy beings. Galen gives the example of the technologies of taking care of children, of moulding them into ethical and healthy subjects. The technology of control, of “education” can only provide useful results.¹⁶²

That’s why he brings up the metaphor of horticulture to explain the system of child care; a child can only be transformed into a proper citizen if he or she is properly trained and tended, just like “even though vines may in themselves be fruitful, they will produce inferior fruit or none at all if the farmer has neglected them and left them to nature alone”.¹⁶³ So it is possible for the coercive modality to infiltrate from the outside. But more than that, the controlling mechanism must be installed in the self itself, in the perceptive sphere of the subject. In that way, it would be possible to minutely measure every act, every thought even. This is more accurate in establishing a rigorous control. But what lies at the kernel of this regulatory mechanism is not only a act of revision in itself, but to perform a modicum of moderation. Every revision of every act and thought must produce the denial of anything that is excessive, “In my opinion, excessive vehemence in loving or hating anything is also a passion; I think the saying "moderation is best" is correct, since no immoderate action is good”.¹⁶⁴ The disease of the soul consists precisely in this abundance, in this excess. In the profusion of passionate actions lies the elemental map of the disease and it must be cured by a recourse to the self-managing mechanisms: “Whenever a man becomes violently angry over little things and bites and kicks his servants, you are sure that this man is in a state of passion. The same is true in the case of those who spend their time in drinking to excess, with prostitutes, and in

¹⁶¹ Galen, *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, trans. Paul W. Harkins (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1963), 36.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Galen, *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, trans. Paul W. Harkins (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1963), 32.

carousing”.¹⁶⁵ Thus, in this epistemology of balance and imbalance is created a rapprochement between the body and the soul. Both of their health now depend upon the observatory science of balance, upon the continuous logic of appropriation. He declares this clearly:

Most men look with scorn upon all the other diseases of the soul, and so they fail to observe them when they see other men who are affected by them. But no one fails to see clearly that grief is an evil of the soul, just as pain is an evil for the body.¹⁶⁶

This relationship between the body and the soul facilitates therefore an interdependence. The uneasiness that afflict the body also create a disturbance of the soul: “The character of the soul can be altered in diseases through the kind of humour that is dominant, as in the case of delirium”.¹⁶⁷ So, to affirm the well-being of the person, all aspects are to be carefully noted.

The question of the foodstuffs, as we noted earlier, is manifested a central concern in the Galenic system since they contribute heavily to the production of the balance necessary for the healthy body. Even in his treatise on the soul, he manages to thoroughly investigate the distress caused by the indigestion:

If the food has been well digested, it will nurture the body; if taken in moderation, it will be digested. But we know that an abundance of food remains undigested. If this should once happen, the usefulness of the food is necessarily destroyed. But if the stomach should be distressed by the gnawing of undigested foods and excrete everything, the symptom is called diarrhoea, and the usefulness of the food is destroyed. For we do not take the food for the purpose of passing it through the bowels, but that it may be delivered to all parts of the body. But if food which has not been well digested should be distributed, it produces in the veins an unhealthy state of the humours.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 30.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 54.

¹⁶⁷ Galen, *On Food and Diet*, trans. Mark Grant (London: Routledge, 2000), 17.

¹⁶⁸ Galen, *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, trans. Paul W. Harkins (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1963), 61.

Thus an entire system of health emerges out of the theory of the four humours and the continuing effort of keeping them in balance. To understand this theory of the humours, we would refer to a text that its translator Mark Grant suspects of not being written by Galen himself. Even if his suspicions are valid, the text is essentially Galenic in its nature and in the ideas that it propounds. Thus, granting Grant validity of his scepticism, it is possible to see the text as a comprehensive description of the Galenic theory of the four humours. This text, titled *On the Humours*, opens with a familiarisation of the four humours with other tetra-logical movements of nature like the four seasons (the spring, the summer, the autumn, and the winter) and the four elements of creation (air, fire, water, and earth). Thus, the four humours, that is bile, blood, phlegm, and black bile, are naturalised and their presence is interpreted in the usual scheme of natural occurrences. It is suggested that the four humours are to be “suitably proportioned”, that is they are to be appropriated to the naturally ordained balance.¹⁶⁹ That is how a healthy body is maintained. But this dictum does not entail that all the humours are to be there in similar amount. It’s not like they should have an equality of presence - no, that would rather mean a catastrophic condition for all the humours are not to be present in equal measure. For them are ordained specific amounts, unique to each of them. It is in their comparative appropriation lies the success of the dietary regime. Their amount is strictly formulated by nature in response to specific contexts. Therefore, age provides itself as an important deciding factor for the humoral condition:

The blood increases at puberty; hence teenagers are cheerful and enthusiastically disposed to games. But the yellow bile in adolescents makes for anger, sexual drive and bullying early in this stage of life; whilst later there is a surge of black bile, the worst sort of humour, since wherever it rushes it is hard to resist or divert, thus making this stage of life devious, revengeful and stubborn. In old age there is phlegm, when there reigns sluggishness, loss of memory and lethargy. This is because old age is moist and

¹⁶⁹ Galen, *On Food and Diet*, trans. Mark Grant (London: Routledge, 2000), 14.

cold, just as the prime of life is dry and cold. Puberty is hot and moist, whilst adolescence belongs to an analogous and superior humour.¹⁷⁰

Beside from the age, there are others factors as well. So, the humours are in a constant state of fluidity, in perpetual motion of change and alteration. Thus, a pre-defined logic of strict measure can only fail in this system of the body. Like the Foucauldian modality of managerial activity, this Galenic system is marked by the continuous appropriation. This is where the Galenic body emerges as the proper model for the biopolitical governmental regime, a prefiguration of sorts of the latter. Also, in this capacity of constantly reorganising in response to the natural state, the Galenic body is inherently economical, that is manifesting the logos of *oikonomia*. Health is, therefore, a continuous game of rationalising and adjustments:

It seems that health is characterised by the equality and symmetry of these humours.

Diseases occur when the humours decrease or increase contrary to what is usual in terms of quantity, quality, shifting of position, irregular combination or putrefaction of whatever has rotted. Just as it can be said that diseases occur as a result of an excess of the humours, so health returns by means of the removal or of the addition of the humours, their thinness and thickness, and generally through their mildness and symmetry.¹⁷¹

In this semblance of symmetry, that is unavoidably precarious and fragile, lies the essence of health. To maintain this a strict diet, not only of the foodstuffs, but also of the actions and their ethical validity must be followed. Any form of dislocation, however minor, causes a disease both of the soul and the body. This he makes clear in his other writings as well. For example, in the treatise on disease he declares:

Someone who exercises quite excessively is made weary. This is to have excess heat in the joints and muscles more than accords with nature. For these are primarily what move. And if the heat remains there, or comes to be released prematurely before it is distributed to

¹⁷⁰ Galen, *On Food and Diet*, trans. Mark Grant (London: Routledge, 2000), 15.

¹⁷¹ Galen, *On Food and Diet*, trans. Mark Grant (London: Routledge, 2000), 16.

the whole body of the animal, what is generated in this way would be fatigue alone. Conversely, if [the heat] is spread to the whole body, the disease is called fever, which is an excessive heat of the entire animal. In the same way also passion, which is a seething of the heat around the heart, when it is distributed due to excess movement, sometimes stirs up a fever involving the whole body.¹⁷²

Thus the manipulation of the bodily structures, the anatomy of the human beings occupies an essential position in this system (or rather, in these systems - biopolitics, *oikonomia*, and the Galenic physiological system). Human body, therefore, is the fundamental object of government in all its biological capacities and potencies. This theology of the body was centre around the ideal body of Jesus Christ. Therefore, to understand this mechanism of power, we should see how the body of Christ was negotiated in the theologico-governmental domain and how it caused emergence of various problems to a rather simplistic understanding of the body.

The Gospel of St. John iterates a miraculous transformation- a transformation that emulates the central dialectic of medieval Christian philosophy. What John argues in his book is that, famously, in the beginning there was only the Word and then the Word became Flesh. It would possibly be the most logical response to wonder about the tenuous connection that binds this ancient biblical anecdote to medieval philosophy. But it is possible to trace the path with a more sophisticated understanding of the context. John's statement performs a transformation that embodies the Word which was not previously limited by the corporeality of the physical form. The immaculately balanced expressions of the ancient master economised an unprecedented confidence — "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God...And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us".¹⁷³ This process of translating the Word into a physical architecture, although it discards the possibility of a more spiritual presence, allows the Word to inhabit the world of the mortals endowing them with an opportunity to be guided by the Word of the God himself.

¹⁷² Galen, *On Diseases and Symptoms*, trans. Ian Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 161.

¹⁷³ John 1: 1 -14

The transformative potential showcased by the biblical statement is not very dissimilar to that of the Eucharist, a ritual where the God was said to be integrated into the bread and wine. The Eucharist was a strange ritual designed to embody the elusive divine mystery – a sign that credited the God with an unmistakable glory which defied any logical or natural explanation, for the God was the supreme being beyond the understanding of the trivial mortals. But it was not always that the ritual of the Eucharist spawned such aura, such fundamental significance. There were times when the rituals varied according to the differences of localities. Different communities, different villages performed the ritual with essential differences. It was only when the Church administration decided, around 1100, to regularize and discipline the multifarious, disorganized, scattered communities under the singular rubric of the official Christendom and to cast away the shadows of paganism that haunted it so far, the rituals that the masses were invested with this new language of the Eucharist. The ritual was incorporated into the main body of the ascetic ideal and teachings as an inexplicable, mysterious symbol. But was the ritual really that unproblematic as the popular opinions tend to believe? To answer this question properly it is important to consider the intricacies of the ritual with more rigour.

The two elements with which this rite is usually constructed are the bread and the wine. It originated with the scene of the Last Supper in New Testament where Jesus is shown saying, *hoc est corpus meum* which could be translated into English as ‘This is my body’. The etymological analysis of the word reveals its origination from a Greek word that is usually translated as ‘thanksgiving’. This particular word has not been used in the entire biblical narrative. The story, however, involving the night on which Jesus was betrayed, retained its place in the Christian imagination. Although there seems to be no difficulty or, for that matter, any disagreement about the two basic elements to perform the rite, they were not entirely disregarded by the scholastic tradition. As Miri Rubin suggests in her scholarly study of the Eucharist, what kind of bread or wine could be used remained debatable across the long life of the Middle ages. William of Blois in 1229, for example, meticulously noted the carefulness with which the host was to be processed —

The most diligent care must be taken over the materials used in the sacrament, so that the hosts [oblate] be made of pure wheaten grain. The ministers of the church should be dressed in surplices and sit in a proper place while they make the hosts. The instrument in which the hosts are roasted should be coated with wax, not with oil or any other fat. Those hosts of the appropriate colour and roundness are to be offered to the table of the altar.¹⁷⁴

This statement, in its brevity, defines a picture of extreme codification. It even mentions where this process of making the hosts must take place and at that time what the monks should wear.

This passage quoted here was not a rare example of this form of codification. Rubin's book copiously relate other instances, "Lanfrac's Constitutions, which record the rituals of Cluniac daily life, describe it in the section about the sacrist's duties. They stress the utmost care required, the choice of reliable and properly vested servants, of a clean table, total silence but for the recitation of psalms. The fire for baking was to be quiet and controlled" (Rubin, 42). Even the crumbs of the breads were deemed to be sacred and there was an attempt to save them from falling by attaching a net-like substance to the communicant's chest. This vigorous codification was not really very specific to the acceptable substance of the bread. It was decided by the Winchester council of 1070 that neither beer (or cervisia) nor plain water could be used for the rite. The only element valid as the host could be a mixture of wine and water. The wine, in its turn, must be fresh. John Beleth elaborates upon the nature of wine - "On that day Christ's blood will be made of new wine, if it can be found, or at least a little be squeezed into a chalice from some ripe grapes, and the wine be blessed, and thus people shall communicate".¹⁷⁵ William Russell, for example, bishop of Sodor (Isle of Man) preferred red wine over white wine and espoused that unequivocally in his treatise of 1359 — "And above all to seek and prevent that the wine which is used for celebration should be spoilt,

¹⁷⁴ Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 42.

¹⁷⁵ John Beleth, *Summa de ecclesiasticis officiis*, ed. H. Douteil (Turnholt: CCCM, 1976), 280, quoted in Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48.

or turned into wine-vinegar; and it is preferable to use red wine than white wine. The sacrament is well made in white wine, but not in wine-vinegar, because in it all the powers of the substance have been transformed, and the wine's power is lost. And a moderate quantity of water should be placed so that the wine be not absorbed into the water".¹⁷⁶

This process of rationalisation helped indeed to define the borders of the Christian reality. But the most uncertain part was the moment of transformation - that very moment when the bread and the red wine turned into Christ's body. It was the undecidable heart of the whole performance, elusive yet irreversible, that moment continued to weave discourse about the nature of Christ's presence in the Eucharist itself. An early discussion of the problem of the relation between matter and the God happened in the first half of the ninth century in the monastery of Corbie. While responding to questions posed by local churches, one monk, Paschasius Radbert of Corbie, stated in his treatise *De corporeal et sanguine domini* that it was the very body of Christ which was present in the Eucharist — "Imagine, then, whether indeed any corporeal thing could be worthier than the substance of the bread and wine for the purpose of changing internally and in fact into Christ's flesh and blood, so that following the consecration Christ's real flesh and blood is truly created".¹⁷⁷ There was, therefore for Paschasius, no distance dividing the signifier from the signified. The bread was Christ's "real flesh" (so in a very textual, and therefore perhaps limited in some ways, reading the subject was object and the object subject, thereby resulting in a sort of tautological act). This was not ambiguous or paradoxical from the stand-point of the medieval monk, since for him the body of Christ was the meaning of the Universe and all the living forms. The utterance was situated within the meaning itself, and hence, no utterance could be without meaning. There was no dichotomy between the Word and the flesh. Paschasius stressed,

¹⁷⁶ William Russell, "Concilia III" in *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae AD 446 - 1718*, ed. D. Wilkins (London: 1737), 11, quoted in Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 49.

¹⁷⁷ Paschasius Radbert, *De corpore et sanguine domini*, ed. B. Paulus (Turnhout: CCCM, 1969), 42 - 43, quoted in Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15.

But since it is not proper that Christ be eaten by teeth, He wished to make truly in this mystery bread and wine into His flesh and blood by the power of the consecration of the Holy Spirit...so that just as real flesh was created from a virgin by the Spirit, without coition, thus from the substance of bread and wine, that same body and blood of Christ is miraculously consecrated.¹⁷⁸

It was a strange proposition, albeit one that granted Christ's word immaculate authority – the real presence of Christ goaded the machinery of the ritual. It's strangeness, however, lied with its refusal to accept any distance between a mortal, natural world and the ideal, divine plane of presence. In order to dilute this anxiety of strangeness, another monk of Corbie, Ratramnus, engaged with this debate from a very different perspective. In his response to Paschasius, Ratramnus imagined the presence of Christ in the ritual of the Eucharist as merely a figurative presence, an oblique hint to a distant spiritual truth of whose reality of presence could only be grasped through the mysteries of the signs. Ratramnus' belief was that only through the distance between the signifier and the signified could Christ be revered. Evidently it was radically different from what could be defined as Paschasius' 'realist' view.

In its kernel, therefore, Paschasius' worldview contained elements of the pagan cosmos. Aristotle's *De anima*, for instance, denied any separation between body and soul. For him the soul exists in only three modes – the vegetative soul (for the plants), the sensitive soul (for the animals other than men) and the rational soul (for human beings). Therefore, it is impossible for the soul to remain outside the body or, for that matter, to remain inside a wrong body.

This pagan element of non-distinguishability continued to contaminate the Christian cosmos and its Supreme Father. An example could be William of Ockham. When discussing about the difference between essence (*entitas*) and existence (*existential*) he argues there is no difference between these two. For him, "if they were two things, then no contradiction would be involved if

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

God preserved the essence of a thing in the world without its existence, or vice versa, its existence without its essence; both of which are impossible” (Ockham 104).¹⁷⁹ Meister Eckhart, who joined the Dominican priory in Erfurt in 1276, while attempting to theorize the body of Christ, argued in *The Talks of Instruction* in a way not very dissimilar to the Aristotelian manner of imagining the body:

Thus you shall be united with him and made noble through his body. Indeed, in the body of our Lord the soul is so united with God that none of the angels, neither Cherubim nor Seraphim, can distinguish or discover a difference between them; for where they touch God, they touch the soul and where they touch the soul, they touch God. There has never been such an absolute union, for the union of the soul with God is far closer than that of the body with the soul, which makes a person. And this union is far closer than when someone pours a drop of water into a barrel of wine: the latter would be water and wine, whereas the former are so united with each other that no creature can find a difference between them.¹⁸⁰

It is to be acknowledged that the way in which Eckhart imagined the body of Christ does not simply involve the Aristotelian anatomy of the soul, Eckhart rather appropriates the pagan ideas about the body and thus creates a perfect and a unique body in which the soul and the body was not different.

This problematization of, or rather, perhaps more accurately, the erasure of coherently structured arguments recognizing the difference between the body and the soul was not entirely unprecedented. One of the earliest examples of the engagement with this form of ambiguity manifested itself, as we have seen earlier in the second chapter of the present dissertation, in Tertullian’s essay *On the Soul*. For him it was the introduction of death into human life that caused the rupture between the body and the soul:

¹⁷⁹ William of Ockham, *Philosophical Writings: A Selection*, trans. Philotheus Boehner (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), 104.

¹⁸⁰ Johannes Eckhart, *Selected Writings*, trans. Oliver Davies (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 35.

we who know the origins of man boldly affirm that death comes upon men not by nature but by a fault – and that not a natural one (although of course it is easy to use the word ‘nature’ for those features which seem to have belonged to us as accidents since birth). For if man had been directly created directed with a view to death, then indeed death would have to be ascribed to nature. But that man was not created with a view to death is proved by the law which holds death over him as a conditional threat and entrusts to the judgement of man the effect of death. Thus, if man had not sinned, he would not have died. In short, that which occurs by will from the possibility of choice and not by necessity from the authority of creation – that does not come about by nature.¹⁸¹

The fault he was referring to in his treatise was the fault of Adam and Eve of eating the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge, despite their God’s warning to not to do that. It follows from Tertullian’s discourse that since death was not natural and since it was only death that disastrously led to a difference between the body and the soul, hence this division is not natural. One of the most important turns of this Tertullianian discourse occurs, however, towards the end of the quoted passage. A close inspection of that part of the passage reveals that the Tertullianian immortality stems not from some simplistic religious indoctrination, it rather emerged out of a juridico-religious space. The juridical instance, quite surprisingly, validates the logic of the religious argument. Human figure, therefore, was simultaneously a juridical and religious construction. This juridicality of the human form corresponds with his economic intentions. His *choice* of eating the fruit helped him to thwart the natural order and to curve out a specific trajectory through time which was not already calculated by the God. The history of humankind therefore was a narrative of rupture, a break from the celestially decided path — a narrative which was inherently economic in its mechanics of choice. This form of enmeshing together of the economical, the biological and the

¹⁸¹ Jonathan Barnes, “Anima Christina”, in *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 449.

juridical domains of life resulted in the emergence of a complex being – a presence that cannot be categorized with the simplistic logic of ‘fundamental nature’. This mysterious figure eludes such easy categorization, since what the figure embraces within its own presence is not simply a specific character, but rather a form of contestation – between the divine will and the humane action – that engenders the essence of the Christian history. Thus Christianity invoked a new form, a new system of history. What does that mean? What happened previously? Were not there structures of war and antagonism always that shaped the centers of the European history? These might be the usual responses that would doubt the claim of my thesis.

To defend the argument, it might be useful to dial back to the founding work of Western historiography – Herodotus’ *Histories*. Herodotus, in the beginning of the book, describes the inspiration behind this vast work in the following manner :

What Herodotus the Halicarnassian has learnt by inquiry is here set forth: in order that so the memory of the past may not be blotted out from among men by time, and that great and marvelous deeds done by Greeks and foreigners and especially the reason why they warred against each other may not lack renown.¹⁸²

This ancient history is strictly episodic in nature. It recounts various events, not a few of them were what Herodotus called “accidents”, in their chronological order. Those incidents construct the architecture of the history – they were the elemental blocks of history. It was their chronologically ordered string that populated Herodotus’ *Histories*. It was therefore more of a catalogue of events than a narrative of history. The first volume of the book, for instance, contains the events of rapes of Io, Europa, Medea, of the subsequent Trojan war, the singer Arion’s ride on the dolphin, the description of the events that befell Croesus among other things. As this list makes it obvious, the book includes a series of incidents without inculcating a sense of temporality, of narrativity into the chronology of the events. They remain disjointed, disorganized, individual occurrences shielded within their own uniqueness. They do not converse among themselves – a zone of inscrutable

¹⁸² Herodotus, *Histories*, trans. A. D. Godley, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 1.

silence, we might add. There is no coherent structure – every act is performed as a response to some previous act or simply ‘accidentally’. This was the same with the Homeric version of incidents. Although it is troublesome to consider the epics as history, but it is still undeniable that eventually they offer up visions of history, an interpretation that requires careful consideration. The organization of the Homeric narrative results from the logic of the cause and the effect – from the interrelation between one event and its aftermath. It is this specific, meticulous fusion of the events that allows the Homeric epic to construct its trajectory. The events and their repercussions construct the movements of history. Therefore, Homeric time is an empty time, a fractured time where nothing really happens until some incident or accident starts a chain reaction of consequences. How is this empty time different from the Christian historicity? The Christian time consists of two movements that are engaged in a stark opposition. On one side there is the divine will and on the other hand is the human action. The trajectory of the Christian history is itself dialectical – it is not empty in itself. It carves out itself through an appropriation of these two extremely polar positions, it emerges as negotiation between these two. This was indeed a new system of history in which the end or telos of the narrative was always already contained in the beginning. The Christian history is prophetic in its truest sense – what it contains is not a mere anticipation of the future, but the knowledge of the future. Therefore, it was a forward-looking history – a history that had already gauged what the future held. The end of the Christian history already involved a redemption for the human beings. So, all of history, everything that happened was geared towards this ultimate moment of synthesis between thesis and antithesis. In this moment is housed the greatest hope for humanity. The Christian time was not a time marked by an emptiness, by an absence of grave happenings. Even the simplest of things was worthy of the history since it was already an element of the dialectic of the history. The trajectory of this history was predestined, predefined. A history that was both temporal and eternal. This new historical system required different forms of living and newer methods of controlling the life of its subjects. As now the history had to fulfill a definite destiny, a telos or end that was already charted, human

action could not anymore be left to decide its own course. A new method of government emerged in which everything had to be codified, where nothing could be left to the uncertainty of chances and the Aristotelian category of accidents. Everything had to be constructed in regard with the specific place it had been endowed with in the cartography of time and everything had to be appropriated to the real context in which the events were played out. The telos was fixed, but not so was the specific form of the individual occurrences. It is therefore not a simple coincidence that monastic life was defined through an extreme form of codification geared to the production of the docile body. It was from this deep, cold, and darkened corner of the monasteries that the modern form of government germinated.

In the monasteries every aspect of life was codified, as was in the case of the ritual of the Eucharist. The severest form of this systemization is present in *The Rule of St Benedict*, the most fundamental and essential reading for the Benedictine sect of the Christianity. In this little book Benedict made an attempt to regularize the life of the monks in the monastery. For him, the human body of the postlapsarian stage could only go back to the moment of the innocent bliss only through controlling the body and its desires. He begins his discourse by saying, “These are the instructions of a loving father: receive them gladly and carry them out to good effect so that by the efforts of obedience you may return to him from whom you have withdrawn through the laziness of disobedience”.¹⁸³ From this initial almost benevolent utterance, the rule book moves on to form a docile body, a body that is obedient to the master’s rule:

The first step towards humility is unhesitating obedience, which comes naturally to all who hold Christ dearer than anything else. As soon as the superior gives an order, they carry it out as promptly as if the order came from God, either because of the holy service they have promised to perform, or because they are afraid of hell, or for the sake of the glory of eternal life.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 7.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

Thus was created a thoroughly complex formation involving Christ, life, divinity and the biological facticity of the body. This complex structure is moulding subjects into obedient subjects. He continued this line of thinking in one paragraph some time later,:

But this very obedience will be acceptable to God and pleasing to men only if the order given is carried out without hesitation, without delay, without apathy, without complaint and without any answering back from the one who is unwilling.¹⁸⁵

The system of this production is not without its necessary chastisement. Every imaginable human action was categorized and was given a specific place in the hierarchy of the *regulae vitae* in which the virtue of obedience / humility had a central role to enact. In this rationalized formalization the metaphor of the body and the physical presence was reserved with a formidable consideration. In his 'Prologue' to the book, St Benedict refurbishes this whole Christian drama of sin and redemption with a very corporeal metaphoric system:

And so we must prepare our hearts and bodies to fight by means of holy obedience to his instructions. If our natural abilities do not allow us to do something, we must ask the Lord to grant us his grace to assist us...we must hasten to do now what will profit us forever, while we still have time and while we are in this body.¹⁸⁶

The presence of a physical, real body figures here quite conspicuously. It is here represented as a body that is limited in its action and thereby conditioned or rather better equipped to be graced by the divine touch (it is, in effect, closely associated with the host of the Eucharist). Generalizing very complex structures of the Benedictine rules, it might be deduced that, for St Benedict, a life guided by the rules is more desirable than a life of seclusion where there is no burden of responsibility. And this life was not devoid of manual labour. While arguing for the importance of the labour, Benedict, in a comparative study characteristic of the Galenic physiognomy, invokes the soul: "Idleness is the enemy of the soul and so the brothers ought to engage in manual labours at set

¹⁸⁵ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 20.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

times".¹⁸⁷ The errors of the soul are here being rectified by the labours of the flesh. The Benedictine preference for a disciplined life is the reason that St Benedict espoused the cenobitic living as the greatest form of the monastic life. Even the anchorites, who went out from the ranks of the brothers to the single combat of the desert, without anyone's support, relying on their own strength and with God's help, were considered by him as inferior to the cenobites.

It would be interesting to note here the Agambenian discourse regarding the cenobites. Giorgio Agamben, in his *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life* reads the cenobitic project in a very curious fashion. He regards this project "as a sanctification of life by means of time".¹⁸⁸ So, through this definition of the cenobitic form of life, the bios or life is again returned to the intricacies of government (or in the Foucauldian lexicon, to the modality of the managerial cultivation) and there is formed, at this very junction, an architecture of biopolitics. This sort of involvement of the body in the matters of belief was a recurrent motif in the discourse of the Christianity. It would be profoundly rewarding here to recount what St Benedict had to say about the divine office at night:

In winter, in other words from the first of November until Easter, it seems reasonable for the monks to rise at the eighth hour of the night so that they may rest until a little after midnight and rise with their food fully digested. In the time remaining after the night office, those brothers who need to should study the psalms and lessons. From Easter to November, the hour of rising should be set in such a way that there is only a very short interval after the night office, when the brothers can go out to deal with nature's needs; this will be followed at once by Lauds which should be said at daybreak.¹⁸⁹ This passage quoted here clearly demonstrates how the natural, physical body was taken into and appropriated in the religious system, how the biological cycle of the body was made to enact in the

¹⁸⁷ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 72.

¹⁸⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-Of-Life*, trans. Adam Kotsko, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 32.

¹⁸⁹ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 27.

discourse of governance. The will of the body itself was relegated to a marginal importance. And thus, every quotidian moment of life was invested with a governmental technology. Not only that, the number of the psalms to be said at the night office was also regulated. Benedict specifies how many times and how to chant specific words. But even then it is not a closed circuit - there are pale elements of choice. For example, he mentions that at summer night “there should never be fewer than twelve psalms said”, thus insinuating the possibility of choosing more than twelve psalms.¹⁹⁰

A formidable strictness reigned the Benedictine conception of the food. Even digestion, an essential action of the body to retain its healthy state, was codified into the Benedictine rule book as a form of proper behavior. This stratification of the physicality of the human existence reaches its zenith when St Benedict strategize the food habit of the monks. It must be quoted extensively:

We believe it is sufficient if at the daily meals, both at the sixth and ninth hour, every table has a choice of two cooked dishes to take account of different people’s weaknesses: if someone is by chance unable to eat one of them, he can be restored by the other. And so two cooked dishes should be enough for all the brothers, and if there is any fruit or young vegetables, these may be added as a third dish. One pound of bread should be enough for the day, whether there is a single meal or both dinner and supper. If the brothers are going to have supper, the cellarer should keep a third part of the pound of bread to give them at supper. But if their workload happens to have been heavier, the abbot can decide, if he thinks it right, to use his authority to increase this allowance. Over-indulgence must be avoided above all things to prevent any monk suffering from indigestion, for there is nothing so inappropriate for a Christian as over-indulgence, as our Lord says, ‘Make sure that your hearts are not weighed down by over-indulgence’ (Luke 21:34). The younger children should not be given the same sized portions: they should receive less than their elders and

¹⁹⁰ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 29.

frugality should be the rule in all circumstances. Everyone, apart from those who are very weak, should abstain completely from eating the meat of four-footed animals.¹⁹¹

Moderation is constructed as the guiding principle that the monks should abide by. The bodies of the monks are the tools through the regulation of which a specific form-of-life emerged. Not only the food, even the drinks were regulated. And again we see a codification that is open to the appropriation of the “local conditions”, a strictness in the telos and not of the form.¹⁹² The human body was constructed as such a form which had already been corrupted by the impious desire frothing under the skin. It was only through this rigorous training the body could be purified – “As to desire of the body we must believe that God is always present to us...death lies in wait at the gateway to pleasure”.¹⁹³ The body politic resulting from this systematization was a body sans any natural humane qualification, a body beyond the explanatory architectures that had traditionally organized the understanding of the human self. In his definition of the phrase ‘form-of-life’, Agamben espouses that it is a life that is linked so much, so thoroughly with its form that it proves to be inseparable from it. The monastic form-of-life acted with a specific aim and that was constructing subjects which were swiftly controllable, subjects that did not pose any kind of challenge to the authoritarian institution. The most dangerous element for any kind of institution that strives to retain its authority is the word of skepticism, the word that installed a disbelief in the system’s universalizing claims. To thwart any such issues of doubt disrupting the smooth fabric of a peaceful state, the monastic organization even had to curtail free use of words. The rules of St Benedict carefully note down the times when something can be said, what can be said and when nothing can be said. Silence is marked as the sphere to strike out the evil. “When all have gathered, let them say Compline. When they leave after Compline, no one is allowed to say anything more. If anyone is found to be breaking this rule of silence, he will be severely punished unless it was

¹⁹¹ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 62.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁹³ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 23.

necessary to speak because of the arrival of visitors or if the abbot gave someone an order. But even in this case it should be done with the utmost seriousness and restraint".¹⁹⁴ In other place he unequivocally shares his opinions about the necessity of silence on the part of the disciple:

Here the prophet shows that if it is occasionally right to refrain from saying good things because one values silence, there is all the more reason to refrain from saying bad things because sin will be punished. In fact, silence is so important that permission to speak should rarely be granted even to disciples who have made much spiritual progress, however good and holy and constructive their words might be.¹⁹⁵

The punitive course of action was not off the limits. It was involved in this difficult cartography of the formation of the cenobitic man as the latitude that helped to sustain its rigorous architecture. It was the last thing to do in order to bring him back to the path of righteousness. Every mistake had its corresponding punishment. "If anyone makes a mistake in reciting a psalm, responsory, antiphon or reading and does not make reparation humbly in front of everyone, he should be punished more severely for refusing to correct by humility the mistake he made through carelessness. But if a child makes a mistake of this kind he should be beaten".¹⁹⁶ The temporality of the monastery was not beyond this form of systemization. Time was endowed with a mythic signification. Agamben shows the manner in which the Hippolytus inscribed mythical elements to the temporality of the cenoby in his Apostolic Tradition. In that book, Agamben elucidates, the hours of prayer are intertwined with the life of Christ. Thus, for instance, the prayer of the third hour was linked to the moment when Christ was nailed to the tree, the ninth hour was matched to that ghastly moment when Christ was pierced in side and poured forth water and blood. The prayer of the midnight was endowed with a strange importance for it was the moment when the Israelites denied Christ.¹⁹⁷ St Benedict's book provides other examples of such mystification of time.

¹⁹⁴ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 65.

¹⁹⁵ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 21.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁹⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-Of-Life*, trans. Adam Kotsko, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 30.

From I October until the beginning of Lent, they should spend the time reading until the end of the second hour. At that point Terce should be said, and all the brothers should then work until None at the tasks assigned to them. When the first signal has been given for the ninth hour, they should all stop what they are doing and wait in readiness for the second signal. After the meal they should devote themselves to reading or to psalms.¹⁹⁸

It transformed the lives of the monks into a practice, an art – into a habit that must be practiced meticulously. It was indeed a violent process, but such a violence cannot be charted into a physical injury. It was a violence directed towards the ontology of their being which was modified, curtailed to the absolute necessity and made to compromise with the authoritative will. St Benedict seems to have intended to create a daily routine that charted every day of every week of the monks. So, in a way, he seems to chart or even construct the future of the monks. They had to obey the rules, however tiresome that might be, or inevitably had to face punishment for destabilizing the ‘normal’ life that had been constructed for their own sake. On Sundays, for example, they should all spend time reading, apart from those who have been assigned various other tasks. But if anyone is so lacking, the book directs, in his or her concentration and so lazy that he completely refuses or is quite unable to study or read, he should be given a task to prevent him being idle. Brothers who are weak or with a delicate constitution should be given a task or craft that prevents them being idle but which, simultaneously, does not cause them to feel oppressed or burdened by the difficulty of the task or to try to avoid it. The abbot should always be concerned about the specific nature of the monks and their weakness. It is interesting to note how the figures who sway from the normativity of the ‘masculine’ like, for example, the ‘weak’ and ‘delicate’ male, the child, are not simply discarded from this discourse of stratification, they are rather codified and marginalized within the discourse, so that their presence beyond the sphere of the controllable could not prove to be a source of anxiety. Their dangerous qualities are appropriated, codified, and they are finally contained

¹⁹⁸ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 72.

within the system. The disobedient body is not left to the chances of its own force of will – it has been made a part of the structure itself.

It is the abbot's duty to announce the hour of the work of God during the day and at night.

He should either announce it himself or assign this task to a brother who will ensure that everything is done at the right time. Those who have been ordered to do so should lead the psalms and antiphons in turn after the abbot. No one should venture to sing or read unless he can fulfil this duty in such a way as to benefit those who are listening. It should be done with humility, seriousness and reverence by the one whom the abbot has asked to do it.¹⁹⁹

There is not even a second left which is not already anticipated and already charted to be used for the practice of living the docile life.

The monastic life and its forms of codification therefore, provide a sort of backdoor entrance to the modern governance. They let us make an attempt to trace down the origins from which modern systems of governance emerged. The Christianity is not only remarkable in creating a new vision of history which involved a dialectical system but it also provided a successful model that could be and eventually was appropriated for the governing of the body politic, for discarding the difficult elements to the margins of state. The monastic life can be seen as a experimental laboratory ascribed to find a proper solution for disciplining the mass. The human body, at its core, is a dangerous element to the state power. It tends to disobey the social and the moral codes. It had to contained therefore. It was in the monastic life that one of the first conscious, structured and coherent attempt was made to alienate the subject from his or her real, physical body and to provide him with a social body – with a form-of-life.

¹⁹⁹ Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*, trans. Caroline White (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 71.

Conclusion

From this discussion of the correlation between the *oikonomia*, biopolitics and the Galenic body emerges an unusual cartography of a governmental tactic in which the act of governance is, clearly, not propelled by an external force originated in the outside domain beyond the subject, but is rather characterised by a spontaneous, internal motivation towards the eventuation of a ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ body, a docile subject that is validated by the socio-cultural consciousness. The balance of the four humours that the Galenic body promised had one elemental faculty common with the biopolitical mechanism of power — their dependence on the economic rationale. In the previous analysis, I have showed that this economic modality and its consequent dependence on technologies governing the body had been present in the writings of the early Church fathers. These coercive mechanisms formulate, therefore, a governmental dimension in which not only the biological faculties of life are scrutinised, supervised and managed, but also any form of the opposition to the power is already tactically calculated and allows its presence by negotiating it, by managing its dangers to a minimum. The opposition is made into an inherent part of the system itself. Thus, it is an endless appropriating mechanism which works for a specific aim, but which leaves room for alterations and adaptations - nothing less than a technology of compromises. It facilitates constant modifications to finally reach the goal it had started for. This sort of flexibility of the technique makes it more pragmatic and indeed more useful. But in this technique, as seen earlier, the coercion that limits individual and which guides each of his or her activities, emerges not from any outer point, from any distant centre of authority; it rather emerges from the very self of the individual subject - she negotiates her desires into a ‘sensible’ course of action, she guides her truant wills to a proper, ‘normalised’ and therefore acceptable conduct. The metabolism of negotiation, of management, of the ancient wisdom of *oikonomia* is here reiterated again at the domain of the individual. Both the socio-political government and the personal subjective ordering are structured around this technology of balancing - a subtle composition of the highest order of complexity. And human body in its Galenic proportion charts out this entire architecture.

Thus a symphony emerges in which every constituent particle is not without a certain predisposition, not without a purpose in the greater allocation of events. This enormous structure is fundamentally similar to the biblical notion of the divine *oikonomia* about which I discussed in the earlier chapters. Both of them are gargantuan mechanisms oriented towards producing a specific pre-defined telos. Seen thus, a capitalist government with its ulterior motive of maximising profit is not structurally alienated to a theological understanding of the divine ordering. We should look into the contemporary world systems of government with a different temperament therefore. While we are used to analyse the state administration as embodying a (self-righteous) sense of objective and therefore completely “scientific” architecture, it is possible to, as I have tried to show in this dissertation, understand it as carrying a striking and certainly irreducible connection to the cultural models of the early Christianity. Their debates, paradoxes, and philosophical speculations therefore animate our critical literature of our administrative procedures. Therefore, the popular discourse of any government as ‘secular’ is, at least from a strictly historical and critical point of view, quite a problematic one, if not entirely misplaced and disastrously erroneous.

Bibliography

- Adams, Carol J. *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*. London: Continuum, 1990.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1995.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of Oath*. Translated by Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theologica Genealogy of Economy and Government*. Translated by Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-Of-Life*. Translated by Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Albert. *De animalibus*. Translated by Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr. and Irvn Michael Rensick. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Aristotle. *De Anima*. Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin Books, 1986. Kindle.
- Barnes, Jonathan. "Anima Christina". In *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.
- Benedict, *The Rule of St Benedict*. Translated by Caroline White. London: Penguin Books, 2008.
- Dean, Mitchell. *The Signature of Power: Sovereignty, Governmentality and Biopolitics*. London: Sage Publications, 2013.
- Eckhart, Johannes. *Selected Writings*. Translated by Oliver Davies. London: Penguin Books, 1994.
- Esposito, Roberto. *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*. Translated by Timothy Campbell. Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press, 2004.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*. Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin Books, 1976.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2*. Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin Books, 1976.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Care of Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume 3*. Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
- Foucault, Michel. "Society Must Be Defended" *Lectures at the College de France, 1975 - 76*. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador, 1992.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin Books, 1995.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978 - 1979*. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.
- Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977 - 1978*. Translated by Graham Burchell. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

- Galen. *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*. Translated by Paul W. Harkins. Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963.
- Galen, *On Food and Diet*. Translated by Mark Grant. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Galen, *On Diseases and Symptoms*. Translated by Ian Johnston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Herodotus, *Histories*. Translated by A. D. Godley. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920.
- Hildegard, of Bingen. *Selected Writings*. Translated by Mark Atherton. London: Penguin Books 2001.
- Hirst, Michael, writer. *Vikings*. Season 1, episode 3, “Dispossessed”. Aired March 17, 2013, on History.
- Huffman, Carl. “The Pythagorean Conception of the Soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus”. In *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.
- Isidore, of Seville. *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*. Translated by Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J.A. Beach and Oliver Berghof. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Kantorowitz, Ernest H. *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Lebovic, Nitzan. *The Philosophy of Life and Death: Ludwig Klages and the Rise of a Nazi Biopolitics*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Mondzain, Marie-Jose. *Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary*. Translated by Rico Frances. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- Riese, Walter. Introduction to *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, 1 - 23. Translated by Paul W. Harkins. Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963.
- Rubin, Miri. *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Concept of the Political*. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Thaumaturgus, Gregory. “On The Trinity.” In *The Complete Works of the Church Fathers*, edited by Phil Schaf. Toronto: Amazon Asia-Pacific, 2016. Kindle.
- Turner, Bryan S. *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*. London: Sage Publications, 1984.
- Ojakanjas, Mike. *On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics: A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower*. Oxon: Routledge, 2016.
- Origen. *On First Principles*. Translated by John Behr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Steinbeck, John. *East of Eden*. New York: Penguin Books, 1952.
- Strayer, Joseph R. *On the Medieval Origin of the Modern State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Tertullian, Quintus. *The Works of Tertullian*. Translated by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Toronto: Amazon Asia-Pacific Holdings Private Limited.

Wallis, Faith. *Medieval Medicine: A Reader*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.

Webb, Heather. *The Medieval Heart*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

William, of Ockham. *Philosophical Writings: A Selection*. Translated by Philotheus Boehner. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957.

Xenophon, *Memorabilia and Oeconomicus*. Translated by E.C.Marchant. London: Heineman, 1923.