

ABSTRACT

My main line of research is whether consciousness is a unitary concept. Furthermore, I would like to claim that consciousness has a phenomenology that is inherent to conscious experience and that is "sui generis"—that is, it cannot be explained in any way, including intentional or representational. Looking at it this way, all conscious mental states are not different categories of consciousness but rather can be grouped under one roof. I have first covered the phenomenal and intentional states of mind and provided a further contrast between the qualitative and subjective in the context of the phenomenal mental state. This is where I introduced a new way of looking at content, a kind of total content theory that holds that everything that is given to someone experientially is also given to them phenomenologically. We are conscious of the experience's object and the fact that we are simultaneously experiencing it. The "transitivity principle," which states that a mental state is only conscious if one is aware of it in some way, best expresses this intuition. I have attempted to put together a few theories that support this idea. The Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the First-Order Theories of Consciousness are two generally accepted approaches that have been extensively discussed. After that, I eventually shifted to the Same-Order method, highlighting the flaws in both abovementioned theories. The debate over phenomenological particularity took center stage in my discussion of the phenomenology of perception, which I attempted to explain using both generalist and particularist perspectives. However, in the end, it was clear that to comprehend the notion of phenomenological particularity the inclusion of cognitive phenomenology is in a way necessary. Of course, I then turned to cognitive phenomenology, specifically addressing two questions: first, how the phenomenology of cognition and intentionality relate to each other, and second, how the phenomenology of cognition and sensory perception relate to each other. Where I have demonstrated the exclusivity of phenomenology in conscious thought. In closing, I talked about emotion and the idea of taking an evaluative position on it. Yet, I developed the idea of felt evaluation—which, in my opinion, comes the closest to my position—and questioned some widely accepted theories of emotion. However, this journey has me wondering if the "me" in the "for-me" ness has any bearing on the phenomenology of my experience. I think that the concept of "being" as the subject of the phenomenologically given experience illuminates the phenomenology of agency or "what it is like" to experience oneself in a convoluted manner when experiencing oneself as an agent. I hope that my framework might provide an outline to explore agentive phenomenology, or the phenomenology of the self, and it would also pave the way for further investigation.

KEYWORDS: phenomenology, "for-me" ness, awareness of awareness(order) thesis, phenomenal particularity, phenomenal intentionality, evaluative phenomenology.