Being Conscious - An Odyssey Towards the Phenomenological Unity of Consciousness

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Certificate

Certified that the Thesis entitled "Being Conscious - An Odyssey Towards the Phenomenological Unity of Consciousness" submitted by me for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts at Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the Supervision of Professor Madhucchanda Sen, Department of Philosophy and that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before for any degree of diploma anywhere / elsewhere.

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Dedicated to

To Baba, Ma, and that one person who taught me that
“We are all strong women and also broken into pieces.”

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It is December 24, 2023, and I am going to write my doctorate acknowledgment today. This is the easiest section of my thesis that I have to pen down because I know exactly whom I should acknowledge and who has been there for me during my Ph.D. journey, through both thick and thin. My doctoral studies commenced before the Covid-19 pandemic, but since then, there have been a lot of obstacles and uncertainties, some are real whereas some are mere anticipations. I did, however, reach the finishing line. It still seems unbelievable to me that I finally completed my doctoral work, since it has always been a milestone for me. I want to extend my sincere gratitude to the wonderful people who helped and mentored me during this monumental experience that enabled me to complete my doctorate despite numerous unforeseen challenges successfully. To each one of my companions who have stood by me on this unforgettable journey, I want to raise a toast to all of them.

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It is the most exquisite excursion I ever went on, and I am convinced that I am going to cherish it forever. This thesis is special because it feels like my firstborn child. It is going to remain "my precious," irrespective of whatever I do in the days to come. I would like to close this section on a lyrical tone with a lovely song by two of my absolute favorite singers, Bill Medley and Jennifer Warnes from the movie "Dirty Dancing," which was literally every teen's fantasy. That song probably better reflects how I have been feeling right now than my words can do:

“Now I've had the time of my life
No, I never felt like this before
Yes, I swear it's the truth
And I owe it all to you
Cause I've had the time of my life”

Rituparna Roy

PREFACE

Though most people like the scent of tuberose, I find it quite unpleasant as it is very intense and can even bring me grief when I smell it. Although most people I know love the smell, it always makes me feel traumatized and uneasy. I wouldn't say I like the scent and the flower because having grown up in an Indian culture where this particular flower is used in funeral rites, I can't help but feel the sadness and pain of someone dying. It never occurred to me that this tuberose is a necessary component of marriage, which is such a happy occasion. Why does this specific smell seem so strange to me? Why is it that I identify with so much negativity while most people do not? How can my cognitive faculties be activated to think differently by a smell sensation? Why is it related to death instead of a wedding in my mind? Above all, why, despite growing up in the same surroundings, does my perception of the flower seem to be so distinct from that of a different individual? As I was growing up, these questions frequently accompanied me. When I was growing up, cinema impacted me very deeply. As a young adult, I used to be drawn to sci-fi thrillers, superhero movies, and dystopian allegories. I have always been very enthusiastic about movies like "The Terminator," "A.I. Artificial Intelligence," “Edward Scissorhands”, “Blade Runner 2049” "Transcendence," and most recently, "Her” or MCU franchise movies. These dialogues and films have consistently left me with the impression that human consciousness possesses a deeper level that is not typically understood through computer programming or artificial simulation. What even the most advanced and sophisticated machines cannot match is something unique to human consciousness. Although I did not know how to articulate them philosophically or even, I was unable to identify them as philosophical inquiries.

After that, I took a high school course on philosophy, but my formal training in critical thinking and philosophizing didn't begin until I enrolled in undergrad as a philosophy major. I was exposed to the writings of David Chalmers, Thomas Nagal, and Frank Jackson during my post-graduation studies. This was probably the first time when I studied philosophy beyond its theoretical framework and began exploring philosophical questions through life and beyond it. In “Blade Runner 2049”, according to K, the act of being born confers a soul. Perhaps the most basic characteristic of a human being, "having a soul" refers to being capable of having feelings and thoughts that are unique to each individual. We seem to own all of our experiences and all of our actions. Thomas Nagel defined consciousness as "what it is like" to be a specific organism. A lot of students like myself, studying consciousness considered his 1974 paper,

"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" as one of the fundamental works in the field. Nagel describes a subjective aspect from the perspective of a bat in this article. Therefore, it does not seem unnatural to postulate that the definition of consciousness necessarily includes subjective experience. These qualitative, subjective qualities colour how we experience everything in the world. Frank Jackson's 1986 article "What Mary Didn't Know", despite being meant to refute physicalism, the theory is that everything in the universe, including the mind, is wholly physical, and it upholds the idea that feelings are distinct from brain states and attributes. Physicalism is therefore untrue. It does, however, demonstrate the existence of the subjective, qualitative aspects of experiences—which are thought of as completely independent of behavior and physical knowledge—if Mary acquires new knowledge as the consequence of seeing red. David Chalmer's 1996 book "The Conscious Mind" provides an insightful distinction between the "easy" and "hard" problems of consciousness. The "easy" problems relate to the mental and brain's functional and behavioral aspects. How people behave or how the brain interprets sensory information is comprised of the easy part. The difficulty of solving the "hard" problem of consciousness is increased by the fact that it involves the first-person viewpoint. How and why do these brain processes result in the emergence of conscious experience?

For me, conscious experience is the core idea behind consciousness. Although I am convinced there are unconscious or subconscious mental states, I have never been particularly intrigued by them. I was already perplexed by these questions and then I was exposed to the work of Uriah Kriegel, Alberto Voltolini, Michelle Montague, Elijah Chudnoff, and Bennett Helm. I got increasingly inspired by Kriegel's concept of a phenomenologically given experience submerged in the "for-me" ness while I endeavored to understand the distinctive nature of conscious experience. The notion of phenomenological particularity proposed by Montague awakened my understanding of the age-old philosophical issues surrounding perception. Chudnoff's ardent explanation of cognitive phenomenology influenced me substantially. On the one hand, Voltolini's layout of cognitive phenomenology and his criticisms of phenomenal intentionality triggered me to reconsider my preference for the phenomenological framework. On the other hand, it inspired me to develop a more compelling case for it—that is, a non-reductive approach to phenomenology. Helm's theory of felt evaluation concerning emotion led me to believe that phenomenology is a full-blown philosophy that frequently transcends beyond phenomenology itself, instead of simply being just about conscious experience.

The primary objective of this thesis is to use phenomenology in creating a unity of consciousness or conscious experiences. I am working towards developing a framework for conscious experience that will be capable of approving all the minute similarities and differences that arise in different experiences, regardless of whether they are perceptions, thoughts, or emotions. I would like to argue that every conscious mental state has a "sui generis" kind of phenomenology, regardless of whether it is typically intentional or not. This model is necessarily non-reductive in this way. I have challenged some widely accepted theories during this development, and on occasion, I have even altered certain arguments to better suit the needs of the situation. However, I never intend to be disrespectful to any of the conceptions, and in this regard, I hope that one can feel my adoration and loyalty to phenomenology and my deep veneration for the literature that has been produced in the field of philosophy of mind.

Rituparna Roy

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

> What you know, you can't explain. But you feel it You've felt it. your entire life, that there's something wrong with the world. You don't know what it is, but it's there, like a splinter in your mind, driving you mad[1].

Do you remember the dialogue from the 1999 science fiction action movie "The Matrix" when Neo and Morpheus first met? Well, perhaps not in precisely the same way or situation, but every time I tried to understand "consciousness," I have always felt this "splinter" in my mind too. As a student of philosophy of mind, if you ask me about the hardest riddle, my straightforward answer would be "Consciousness". Yet it is the most familiar phenomenon we are acquainted with. A simple overview of any theory of consciousness always shows how dense the concept of consciousness is. Sometimes it is said that some mysteries shroud the concepts of consciousness. One might wonder why consciousness, which is ever-present and directly given, is so Delphic at the same time. First, we need to understand the nature of the riddle. As Uriah Kriegel said:

> "mystery" in the definite description should be taken to denote *prima facia* mystery rather than *ultima facia* mystery. In speaking of the mystery of consciousness, I do not mean to imply that consciousness is an ultimate mystery-that us, one that will not succumb to eventual demystification. I do mean to suggest, however, that it is a *genuine* mystery- that is, that our sense of mystery upon contemplating the nature of consciousness is rational and appropriate and is not based on sheer confusion.[2]

The expression "mystery" should be interpreted as referring to a prima facia mystery instead of an ultima facia mystery. When I refer to the mystery of consciousness, I do not intend to

[1] *The Matrix*, directed by Lana Wachowski and Lilly Wachowski, (1999; United States, Warner Bros.) DVD.

[2] Kriegel, U. "The Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness". *Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. 5.

convey that consciousness is the ultimate puzzle there is, something that will never be completely comprehended. Nevertheless, I intend to imply that it is a legitimate ambiguity, but our perception of that bewilderment when considering the nature of consciousness must be appropriate and justifiable rather than merely a matter of confusion. Consciousness is more like a whodunnit. (There are many approaches to explain this mystery. People have used different kinds of metaphor) I use the "whodunnit" metaphor because I hope to find a solution to the riddle of consciousness. Similar to the murder mystery the explanation of who has done it, is not revealed until the end. In this kind of panorama, it takes the whole story to arrive at the killer because one must consider every clue and follow the right lead. Similarly, the riddle of consciousness can be decoded if one contemplates all the aspects of consciousness and attends to the right strategy. Let us elaborate on it with the help of another analogy. We all are aware of Rubik's Cube, a three-combination puzzle with six faces covered by nine stickers each one of which has six solid colors. It is undoubtedly very hard to disentangle it so that each face shows just one colour. However, the difficulty of doing this does not indicate that the task is not achievable. Anybody could unsnarl the magic cube with correct techniques and some amount of proficiency. All that is required to solve the puzzle is the knowledge of the right technique and also a way of finding out if any particular technique would be regarded as the right one. This is the particular kind of situation where philosophers engage in disputes. Many discussions are indeed going on regarding the nature of consciousness in the fields of physics, biology, cognition, and neuroscience. But on closer scrutiny, it will be revealed that the "Hard Part"[3] of consciousness remains untouched by these discussions. It is indeed important to know how our brains integrate environmental stimuli, which is what physical sciences are concerned with. This constitutes what has been considered as an attempt at solving the *Easy*[4] Problem of

[3] Chalmers, David John. "Taking Consciousness Seriously". *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. Philosophy of Mind Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

[4] Ibid.

consciousness. It concerns mostly an explanation of cognitive and behavioural functions. These explanations aim to find out the appropriate neural or computational mechanism. But it has often been said that in principle, explaining consciousness requires something more than explaining structures and functions. The way neuroscience and cognitive science acknowledge consciousness is nothing but a kind of general reduction. Sometimes people choose the *Easy* way to define consciousness. So, either they eliminate the existence of it or reduce it into something, which it is not. It is conceptually possible to allow a wholly reductive approach towards consciousness but that does not mean that the *Easy* problem can stand for the *Hard* problem and a solution to the Easy problem cannot be taken as a resolution for the *Hard* one. If one needs to the problem of consciousness in its entirety then consciousness must be taken in a non-reductive and fundamental way. Even after answering the Easy part, it remains an enigma as to how a physical system like a brain can have a subjective inner life. Unfortunately, this particular question, which indeed is the hardest question of all, is often completely ignored.

If we want to develop a comprehensive framework for consciousness then we need to understand that a theory must be developed in a way which can answer the *Hard* question about consciousness adequately. One can deny or doubt everything except his/her conscious experience. The existence of consciousness is not a matter that requires proof as we all can intuitively ascertain its presence. Remember that in taking a reductionist stance on consciousness, what we are claiming as dubitable is our consciousness, something that is a phenomenally given fact and not some metaphysical concept that our rational deliberations force us to accept. This is why such reductionism seems unacceptable. Believing that consciousness is a more profound and complex problem, that cannot be fixed by focusing solely on how our cognitive systems interpret inputs from the world, could be a starting point towards approaching consciousness with adequate consideration. We must also keep in mind that in enquiring into more serious questions we must not assume of consciousness as some

obscurantist or occult idea or rather we are going to have a spiritual journey, or at least I am not having one. Consciousness is as much part of the natural world as anything else. If it is said that because consciousness cannot be understood by physical laws it is not a natural phenomenon, and such assertions are simply wrong. Therefore, we must consider consciousness to be a natural phenomenon with uniqueness at its core. Although physicalism or materialism is a convincing theory of the world, we must go beyond it to explain consciousness. The claim that the real world is entirely physical gives rise to controversy rather than the noncontroversial thesis of physicalism, which holds that the world is mostly composed of matter. The burning sensation of itches, the suffering of pain, and so forth cannot be adequately described by even the most comprehensive physical information. The ability to manifest the mind-world relationship is a privilege endowed upon consciousness. It is consciousness that gives meaning to our encounter with the world. Every person lives within the boundaries of their reality, which is a socio-cultural-anthropological framework. It is a person's perspective of the world, and consciousness is that person's perception and awareness of how that person interacts with the outside world. One classic example that bridges the disciplines of philosophy, social science, anthropology, and even human evolution is consciousness. If it is something that matters, then it is one of a kind, therefore comprehending it calls for philosophical approaches.

To identify the most efficient approach, one must ask about certain common characteristics of consciousness, that can define consciousness as "Consciousness." Whether consciousness is a unitary concept is one of the questions we explore. First of all, let me state that when I address consciousness, I am speaking of conscious mental states. When I am trying to understand what it is to be conscious, the phenomena that I want to comprehend or explain is the everyday experience that I have, which I call conscious experience. What it is to have such a conscious experience? What makes this experience the experience it is? What makes

this experience an experience at all? It is typically not a scientific endeavor, at least in the traditional sense. Also, I am not addressing those sub-conscious and un-conscious mental states, which are usually claimed as part of consciousness. Rather, I am alluding to the reality that I am experiencing a phenomenon known as conscious experience. So how can I explain this phenomenon philosophically? I also desire to grasp its essence. Pursuing it introduces me to two competing theses within my philosophical orthodoxy, one is the idea of phenomenal and the other is the idea of intentional mental states. In a certain way, I would like to carve my position from the philosophical literature, which transcends this dichotomy. In other words, I wish to see this dichotomy not only otherwise than philosophers have interpreted it in the literature, but also with some deficiencies of its own. It is not that I am the architect of this unique way of approaching this situation. To develop an understanding of the conscious experience that prevents one from getting into the trap of this bipartism, I would like to join the other philosophers who are currently engaged in this. Conscious experience is a conscious experience by its phenomenology. However, the scope of phenomenology has evolved with time. While it was once fairly narrow, it is now more expansive and even encompasses the potentiality for cognitive phenomenology. Moreover, I can even include the so-called intentional states under the larger umbrella of phenomenology or phenomenological experiences. The consciousness that defines a phenomenal state also applies to an intentional state. they are not different kinds of consciousness. That being said, both mental states fall under the category of consciousness. We need to identify such a unitary thesis of consciousness if I am to comprehend what it means to be conscious. Ever since the groundbreaking work "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?[5]" by Nagel and Chalmers, who defines the "hard part" of consciousness, we understand that what distinguishes conscious experience from other forms

[5] Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914. 436

of experience is its subjective or phenomenal worth, but we also acknowledge that intentionality has a role to work. In considering the above, how can I make room for these two profound intuitions and create a cohesive idea that will serve as an umbrella for these two important theses? We must look into conscious mental states, or episodes, which include both phenomenal and intentional mental states, to find a unifying theory of consciousness. There are conscious perceptions that involve sensations, conscious thoughts (like belief, judgment, etc.), conscious emotions (like fear, anger, etc.), and sensations, both exteroceptive (like visual, olfactory, etc.) and interoceptive (like hunger, bodily movement, etc.). We can establish that consciousness is an integrated idea if all of the preceding mental events reflect an underlying feature that allows all of them to be conscious. You could say, at this point, that I have been looking for a unifying concept, that embraces the notion that what distinguishes intentional states, for instance, the array of thought, from other conscious mental states, such as the sensation of pain or the whiff of a smell is not that we are fundamentally encountering different kinds of states. They cannot be separated into specific categories, and this categorisation is primarily the cause of the inclination of a particular state being reduced into another.

My objective is not to put forward a phenomenological explanation of intentionality through a reductive theory of consciousness; instead, I am looking for a framework that may integrate both aspects. My paradigm does not seem to be in opposition even if some researchers are inclined to assert that all conscious mental states have a functional or representational aspect. Imagine that you have no access to a traditional oven, and you need to bake a cake. You can bake it in a Dutch oven over open flames, in a pressure cooker, toaster oven, air fryer, stovetop, instant pot, or slow cooker—it does not matter which one you use. The same thing can be done in a variety of ways, and as long as the result is cake, any method is acceptable. However, each cooking method has a slightly different taste and texture. However, an issue occurs when someone asserts that baking in an oven is the optimal method and that using a

different method is not possible. Essentially, intentionality was used by traditional philosophy of mind to diminish, and occasionally even completely eradicate, the phenomenal aspect. I prefer to be almost neutral toward the techniques used by other researchers to study consciousness, but I also desire to assert that consciousness has a phenomenology that is intrinsic to conscious experience and cannot be explained in any way (intentional/representational), which I refer to as *sui generis*. From this vantage point, all conscious mental states can be included under one roof and are not distinct categories of consciousness. The only thing separating them is how they are conscious; otherwise, they are all conscious states. And what is that? The straightforward response is phenomenology, which allows us to bring all of these things together under a single dome while also preserving the fine-grain nuances and variations across each type of consciousness. One may assume that my research belongs to the discipline of "Phenomenology" because I have been using the term "phenomenology" for quite a long time. However, it is not. Simply put, it is the philosophy of mind, more precisely the analytic philosophy of mind, and not even consciousness studies as I am using all my tools from that tradition only with little modification. I highlight the "for-me" aspect of conscious states, which I term as phenomenology. Given the context here, I have swapped the terms phenomenal and phenomenological quite often throughout my thesis.

As I am trying to construct a framework for the phenomenological unity of consciousness, it is inevitably needed to challenge the orthodox notion to implement the new one. Hence, in the first chapter, I have dealt with traditional approaches regarding the philosophy of mind and also introduced a transition. The two most important aspects of consciousness need to be covered first in this discussion, which includes the bipartism of phenomenal and intentional. The classification of phenomenal states into qualitative and subjective categories is something else I have covered here. Eventually, I addressed the orthodox notion of content and introduced a fresh notion within the theory. My second chapter

is in a way a kind of subtitle of the first chapter on one hand and the prerequisite of the whole framework on the other. There I have dealt with awareness of awareness thesis. Two popular approaches have been widely discussed, one is the First-Order Theory of consciousness and the other is the Higher-Order Theory of consciousness, and gradually moved towards the Same-Order Theory which I subscribe to in this thesis. My third chapter is about perception, phenomenology, and inclusion, where I addressed the debate on phenomenological particularity from both generalist and particularist approaches. There is a catch as I have mentioned about an inclusion: cognitive phenomenology. The fourth and most important chapter is the phenomenology of cognition since I feel the inclusion of conscious thought in the domain of phenomenology is itself an achievement, of course, because of its history of being allied with intentional mental states. I have attempted to raise a pair of significant concerns in this chapter. The first is about the intentionality of conscious thought and I have also shown that the phenomenology of cognition is not reducible to the intentionality of cognition in any way. However, in response to the second question, which concerns reducibility, I have demonstrated that conscious thought indeed exhibits a "sui generis" kind of phenomenology that is not impacted by the phenomenology of perception or any other kind of phenomenology. The topic of emotion, phenomenology, and evaluation is the subject of my fifth and final chapter. I find this topic to be the most fascinating because, while almost all philosophers agree that emotion has a phenomenological component, they dispute how to best define it. I started by looking into Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion. After demonstrating its shortcomings, I moved on to evaluative sentimentalism. Lastly, I adopted Bennett Helm's theory of felt evaluation because it seems to reflect my feelings about emotion most accurately. However, discussing all of the above phenomenologies and striving to formulate a comprehensive system brings me to a strange location that I had not planned to reach. In the final sections, I attempted to express, my best as I possibly could, my realization of this journey.

CHAPTER 1:

BIPARTISM: OVERVIEW AND A TRANSITION

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> The Terminator: Why do you cry?
>
> John Connor: You mean people?
>
> The Terminator: Yes.
>
> John Connor: I don't know. We just cry. You know, when it hurts.
>
> The Terminator: Pain causes it?
>
> John Connor: No, it's when there's nothing wrong with you, but you hurt anyway. You get it?
>
> The Terminator: No.[1]

I am sure you are wondering why I used this passage from the American science fiction action movie from 1991. Well, there is simply something so peculiar, yet exclusive about human beings that it seems stupid and hilarious but so humanly at the same time. I am confident that we have all felt like John Connor at some point in our lives, and when we think back on it, it looks so ridiculous. However, in any case, we often experience this way. We have self-perceptions that are not rational or scientific[2] in the traditional sense of the word. Humans consider themselves to be conscious beings with feelings, desires, thoughts, emotions, commitments, opinions on the world, and values. But what does it mean? Our understanding of ourselves encompasses a component that is significantly associated with the mind or more precisely conscious mental states. Some philosophers argue that our understanding of the mind is a rather disorganized array of ideas with no unifying concept that brings them all together and that it necessarily lacks any essence whatsoever.

[1] *Terminator 2: Judgment Day*, directed by James Cameron (1991; United States, Carolco Pictures), DVD.

[2] I only mean that the concept is not specialized knowledge when I say it is not scientific. Instead, it is something that we all eventually gather up as we develop as members of human society or culture, learn to understand one another and acquire language skills.

1.1. Bipartite Division of Mental States

The intentional and the qualitative or phenomenal are frequently cited as the two fundamental categories of mental states or properties. Qualitative mental states are unintentional, just as bodily sensations are qualitative in nature. The idea that not all mental states are intentional can be articulated as the non-intentionalist theory. Can we distinguish between the intentional and phenomenal contents of the mind, one might wonder? David Rosenthal says:

> There are two broad categories of mental property. Mental states such as thoughts and desires, often called propositional attitudes, have content that can be described by 'that' clauses. For example, one can have a thought, or desire, that it will rain. These states are said to have intentional properties or intentionality. Sensations, such as pains and sense impressions, lack intentional content and have instead qualitative properties of various sorts.[3]

To be more precise, intentional approaches gave rise to the tendency of separation. However, I find this motivation completely unintelligible and not very sympathetic toward it. Hence, I have tried to approach that motivation quite neutrally. For me, the most prevalent response regarding bipartism deals with a bipartite division[4] of our mental content. Because of the variations in their contents, it usually maintains that there are two distinct types of conscious mental states. In general, intentionality refers to being about something or having aboutness. Both mental and non-mental phenomena[5] share this attribute. Here, I want to focus on mental intentionality, where the actual mental state is about something. When I believe it will rain, my

[3] Rosenthal, David M. "The identity theory", In *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, edited by Samuel D. Guttenplan. Blackwell. 1994. 349.

[4] The term "bipartisam" is borrowed from George McCulloch. "Bipartism and the Phenomenology of Content." *The Philosophical Quarterly* (1950-) 49, no. 194 (1999): 18–32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660544. Although he used the term quite differently to refer to duel-componentism, in his literature. However, that is not typically my concern in this thesis.

[5] Intentionality occurs in some non-mental things, but it originates in mental states. Although they are not mental in and of themselves, signs, sentences, and equipment such as thermometers are directed on or about things because the people who invested in them had mental states.

belief state is about rain. Conscious mental intentionality includes conscious perception, conscious thought, and conscious emotion. On the other hand, a phenomenal mental state is not necessarily about something but they are felt in a certain way. There is *something it is like* experientially to be in that state. When I taste the freshly baked cookies then what it is like to be in that state is all we need to understand the phenomenology of the state, we don't need anything more than that. So, this feature has been regarded as necessarily experiential. Phenomenology refers to conscious experience, conscious sensation, and conscious feelings. The striking feature of phenomenology compared to intentionality is that the adjective "conscious" is redundant in this case. As Michelle Montague puts it:

> We can certainly register features of the environment without having any conscious experience in so doing, but to have a *sensation*, to have a *feeling*, to have an actual *experience*, is necessary- definition- to undergo a conscious mental episode.[6]

Can we make such a distinction between the phenomenal and the intentional contents of our conscious experiences? Not all philosophers have agreed on this bipartisam. Those who believe that all mental contents are intentional, basically reject the classification of mental states into two different compartments and are thus called intentionalist. On the other hand, philosophers who are somehow sympathetic towards segregation are known as anti-intentionalists. We need to remember that it's not such a simple division the way it appears. Rather, it is one of the most ambiguous and overlapping divisions that one can imagine. Various philosophers tried to explain this in various ways. I have tried to outline four[7] main alternatives regarding the context of the thesis. "Strong intentionalism" holds that all mental states are intentional and thus they

[6] Montague, M. *The Given: Experience and its Content*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. 9.

[7] These four alternatives are borrowed from Manidipa Sen. "The Qualitative and the Intentional Contents of Consciousness". in *Mind and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Sharing Essays in Honour of Amita Chatterjee*, edited by Kuntala Bhattacharya, Madhucchanda Sen & Smita Sarkar, Volume 1, 127-154. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld. 2019. 132-133.

are necessarily directed towards some object, though there are debates regarding the nature of the object itself. In contrast, "strong anti-intentionalism" defends that mental contents are exhausted by purely qualitative features of consciousness and thus are not necessarily directed towards any object in that sense. "Weak intentionalism" is the view that mental states can be both qualitative and intentional. The striking feature of this claim is that it considers that the same mental state can potentially and also conceptually exhibit both the qualitative and intentional aspects even at the same time. Lastly, "weak anti-nationalism" says that mental states are either absolutely qualitative or wholly intentional and nothing in between. So, there are two restricted categories of mental states where one excludes the other. Traditionally, philosophy of mind was the playground for strong intentionalism. With philosophers like Nagal, and Jackson people started to think otherwise. Although it was not undisputed, philosophers were mostly certain about the fact that there was a separate class of mental states that lacked intentionality. These states are realized in terms of their qualitative content. On the other hand, some philosophers seem to accept a category of mental states which is coloured by both phenomenology and intentionality.

Recent work in the domain of the theory of mind finds it really arduous to make sense of strong intentionalism, it evaluates consciousness solely in terms of intentionality without considering the remainder. But philosophers also feel that it is difficult to justify strong anti-intentionalism. According to this position, the whole mental life is subjective as it is exhausted by purely qualitative content only. But in our lived experience we can find ourselves not only as felt individuals but also as organisms who believe, desire, hope, and so on. Our mental life is not completely devoid of relational content. These two kinds of mental pictures are usually kept aside to find a convincing theory of consciousness that is all-inclusive. In contrast, weak intentionalism and weak anti-intentionalism, in some way, are rejections of both these positions. The claim that some mental states are not intentional, makes them a contradiction of

both strong intentionalism and strong anti-intentionalism. But this position can be expounded in both weak intentionalist and weak anti-intentionalist ways. Both of them accept bipartism but according to weak anti-intentionalists, a mental state is either qualitative or intentional but cannot be both. But our life shows that even so-called qualitative conscious experiences have intentional character as well though being subjective and also intentional states have qualitative traits despite being significantly intentional. So, the bipartite division advocated by weak anti-intentionalism is not a well-accepted position. Finally, weak intentionalism propounds a fusion theory of contents, that is they could possibly be both qualitative and intentional. It might be stated that weak intentionalism is the view that was largely favored in the philosophy of mind in the recent past. The stream of discussion gradually moves towards the claims that qualitative states also encompass a kind of intentionality and on the other hand some intention states might reveal a kind of qualitative aspect of their own. A history of philosophy of mind is largely dominated by the strong intentionalist position which arguably has the propensity to reduce phenomenal account through intentionality. My main aim, while addressing traditionalism in the philosophy of mind, is to demonstrate that mental states are both phenomenal and intentional, which is sufficient to uphold the traditional bipartite division of mental states. It is widely believed that there are two separate categories of conscious mental states due to the diversity of their contents.

1.1.1. All About Intentional Mental States

The tradition and development of the term "intentionality" is extensive and intricate, not all of which are pertinent to the concerns that are raised in this thesis. This expression can be traced back to the Scholastic period and it continued to be an important topic of discussion in the modern age, even today. When the jargon of intentionality was reestablished by Brentano in

his 1879 book "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint"[8], it emerged as the science of psychology and philosophy in terms of their diverse subject matters. Intentionality for Brentano was the key feature of mental states by which a mental state can be distinguished from a non-mental one. Intentionality is the property that can be defined as the mind's directedness towards its object. Although Brentano's notion of intentionality was largely celebrated, some of his characterisation of the given notion was disdained. I will revisit this topic later, but first, let me outline the fundamental traits of intentionality that are mostly regarded in the realm of philosophy of mind. While defining intentionality I have followed Tim Crane's[9] depiction of the given mental state.

The concept of "directedness" holds that intentional states have objects, and the given state is aimed at them. Philosophers have defined "intentionality" as an aspect of mental states that is comprised of their being of or about things, particularly about "What are you wondering of?" and "What are you wondering about?" The aboutness or directedness, of the mind to things, objects, or situations is commonly referred to as intentionality. What Brentano termed as "mental or intentional inexistence", is the mind's ability to refer to or be directed toward objects that could potentially exist exclusively in the mind, which must be considered essential to intentionality. Brentano wrote:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object,[10]

[8] Brentano, F. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. and ed. L. McAlister. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923.

[9] Crane, T. "Mind". *Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001. 13-33.

[10] Brentano, Franz, Oskar Kraus, and Linda L. McAlister. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. London, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Humanities Press, 1973. 88.

Hence, directedness seems the most fundamental and it is also symmetrical with Brentano's idea of intentionality as the mark of the mental. It is structured somewhat like an "I am thinking of/about" statement. We might reasonably claim that in an intentional state requirement of an object. An "intentional object" is the thing that an intentional state is aimed towards. However, what exactly is an intentional object? The question of whether an intentional object is something inside the mind, something outside the mind, something "in between," or an intermediary between the mind and the outside world, is often put forward. Here, the connotation of the expression object is a bit tricky. Although Searle has defined the notion of an object in the ordinary sense[11] it does not seem that straightforward at all. Assuming people, computers, universities, and trees are considered objects in this sense, then none of the things I am thinking about seem to be objects in the traditional sense, but rather, they seem to be a variety of entities. The first Covid outbreak might come to mind, but this is an event rather than an object. When contemplating the new features of the recently released iPhone 15, I consider physical quantities or attributes rather than actual objects. The conventional response to the quarry about what someone is thinking of, in these situations fails to define an object in the ordinary sense. Sometimes philosophers claim that object stands for merely existing entities and if so, properties and state of affairs are objects in this sense. But this gives rise to another question as there are objects that do not exist in that sense, for example, my desired object which does not potentially exist in the present. Even someone can think about a typical non-existing object as well, for example, the El Dorado. Not only that, one can think about an abstract object, for example, numbers, as generally concrete as opposed to abstract referring to things that exist in space and time. What is it, then, for something to be an intentional object? The answer is quite simple, it is to be that upon which the mind is directed when in an

[11] The phrase 'ordinary object' arises on Searle, J, R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1983. 18.

intentional state. Therefore, in the occasion of thought, the intentional object of thought is what is given in thought and similarly, the intentional object of a belief is the thing that is believed, and so on. The second attribute of intentionality is the concept of "aspectual shape". The notion of aspectual shape takes us back to Searle, as he introduced the notion in philosophical literature. The basic idea of aspectual shape is quite straightforward: in any intentional state, the objects on which the mind is directed are presented in a certain way. We always think in a particular way. the basic idea is that one cannot think of something without thinking of it at least in some way. How a state of mind portrays something gives it an aspectual shape. Thus, while expressing an intentional state we want to disclose how things are from the subject's perspective. The third characteristic feature is "intentional content". It must be noted that while the intentional object is defined in terms of directedness, the intentional content becomes clear in terms of aspectual shape. There are plenty of ways for the mind to be directed toward an intentional object, so directionality alone is insufficient. Furthermore, since an aspect is by definition the dimension under which an intentional object is presented, aspectual shape alone is also inadequate to define intentionality. The basic idea is when an object comes under the aspect it becomes the intentional content. As we have seen by far intentionality has a structure and according to many philosophers "structurality" is also a key feature of intentionality. According to Crane, although giving the content of an intentional state is a way of asserting its object, still giving the content of an intentional state does not completely individuate that state, that is, separate it from all the others. For example, I may think that I will pursue a post-doctorate after my Ph. D. and I may believe it as well. Here, the states of mind are different but their content is identical. It is preferable to address the various ways that we relate to this content, by thought, and by belief, to draw distinctions between these states. There are three ends in the structure, first is the subject, who is having an intentional mental state. The third is object/content and I have defined this notion already. But the second end is perplexing enough

as it depicts both the directedness and presentation. The variation between distinct kinds of presentation or directedness is what the discussion about belief and thought illustrates. Directedness is a reverse form of presentation in that C is presented to M when M is directed towards C. To illustrate this notion, we need to borrow another idea from Searle and that is "intentional mode". The relationships that an individual possesses with the contents of their intentional states are known as intentional modes. Hope, wish, thought, intent, perception, fear, regret, and belief are a few obvious instances of intentional modes. Hence, in a nutshell, the intentional mode and intentional content are what distinguish an individual's intentional state. Additionally, the intentional content fixes the intentional object, what the intentional state is about. Hence, Intentionality has this general structure has the form of a relation, that is subjects are related to contents through intentional modes.

1.1.2. The Character of Phenomenal Consciousness

What does it mean to be phenomenally conscious? Why is it different from the non-phenomenal or intentional approach? I said in the previous section that the intentional mode and content identify an individual's intentional state. To start with the structure of the phenomenal states, they are just not like that. the next question arises regarding the content of phenomenal states. It is not easy to define the idea of phenomenal content. Traditionally, the notion of phenomenal states is linked with conscious sensation. It is said that they are not necessarily about something, rather they are felt in a certain way. The underlying concept is that if there is a subject of a phenomenally conscious state with a distinct character, then this distinctness results from the experience being subjective, arising from the subject experiencing these properties from his/her own unique perspective. Following Thomas Nagel's coinage, it can be articulated that there is *something it is like*[12] for a subject to possess those experiences.

[12] Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914. 436.

Philosophers who are sympathetic towards the idea of phenomenal conscious states have generally attempted to understand this concept using Nagel's terminology and have claimed that no objective assessment of this concept could adequately reflect this subjective or experiential aspect of the individual. It is inherent to the experience itself in some way; comprehending calls for the experience itself.

It is reasonable to argue that to discern between the subjective aspects of one phenomenal state of consciousness and different phenomenal consciousnesses, we need to examine the differences between the two phenomenal conscious state's qualitative aspects. For instance, I might wish to differentiate between the sensations of seeing red and blue. It may also occur to me that the only way I can distinguish between the two is by using the red-blue distinction. Thus, the representational content is ultimately what is required for phenomenal consciousness. I suggest that this might not be entirely encouraging for intentionalists. Excluding the color specification reference from the point made before and providing an alternative example would be one way to try and strengthen the case. Now we can address the question of what distinguishes visually perceiving from the other senses of smelling, tasting, and hearing. It appears that the senses of sight and smell are remarkably dissimilar, and this distinction needs to be noticed on a phenomenal scale, though philosophers often interpreted it through modes. We might comprehend the discrepancy by looking at it from the outside. We might say, for instance, that the organs of sight and smell are distinct from one another. Additionally, we could provide a scientific explanation for the variances between the processes of seeing and smelling. These are not the approaches that a subject can use to determine whether they are seeing or smelling phenomenally different from one another. That they felt differently is the correct response to this query. The felt difference between different sensory modalities should not be understood in terms of the difference between objects of those senses.

On its own, sensory perception across the visual modality differs from sensory perception through the olfactory modality. All they felt had been unique in their own right.

1.2. Why Is It Special to Be Phenomenologically Conscious?

I mentioned in the introduction that thinking regarding a subject's perspective can convey the essence of the idea of mind as well as consciousness. Understanding the subject's point of view as their conscious awareness of the world through perception, thought, emotion, sensation, and other modalities seems to me to be the natural way to approach it. When I have a conscious experience of the aroma of freshly brewed coffee, there is something like for me to have that experience. It is on the one hand sensitive to the aroma of the coarse grind arabica beans itself, also there is another thing that is how the aroma feels to me. The coffee-ish way it is like for me edges the phenomenal character of my experience. This phenomenal character makes a phenomenally conscious mental state the “phenomenally conscious state it is" and at the same time the “phenomenally conscious at all”. The classification of phenomenal states into qualitative and subjective categories is something else I have covered here. Kriegel gets the credit for introducing this distinction of phenomenal consciousness. Reflecting on this account, the present scenario of the aroma of the coffee, the way it is like for me, has two ingredients subsumed into it [A] the coffee-ish part and [B] the *for-me* part. A phenomenally conscious mental state reveals two things: something that makes it a phenomenally conscious state “it is” and something that makes it the phenomenally conscious state “at all”. The subjective quality, or "for-me" aspect, is what allows a mental state to be phenomenal consciousness "at all," or the existence condition. On the other hand, the qualitative character gives phenomenality its identity conditions, or what "it is”. Thus, for a mental state to become phenomenally conscious, it should have a subjective character and it is somehow more crucial than the latter as once a mental state has become phenomenally conscious, it is the qualitative character that makes it that particular type of phenomenal conscious state it is. Representationalism and related

accounts of the philosophy of mind have mostly tried to reduce the phenomenal character with a kind of representational content and that is definitely in non-phenomenal terms. Representational states may also possess qualitative character. Consequently, it could potentially be claimed that the qualitative aspect is what unites an intentional state with a phenomenal state. I will discuss the flaws associated with this technique in the second chapter while addressing the first-order approach to consciousness. On the other hand, the subjective character is something where no amount of informative or representative reductive account seems plausible to define it in non-subjective terms. A phenomenal state is unique because of its subjective nature. As I have said earlier it is the "for-me" ness that makes the conscious experience more exclusive and the "hard part" of consciousness even harder. The subjective character of conscious mental states was recognized by Kriegel as an unstructured, unfathomable, *sui generis* aspect and he introduced the notion of "intrinsic glow"[13] while elucidating the concept. I also feel that it is the subjective character of conscious experience that makes a conscious state so unique. This "for-me" ness is not only restricted to conscious sensations (as traditionally it was taken as the mark of a phenomenal state) but it can be found in every conscious mental state, whether it is a conscious thought, perception, or emotion. Why does the same object feel different to me than yours? The "for-me" ness is an unambiguous conclusion for this quest. In a way, my work is an attempt to attain phenomenological unity of consciousness, which can preserve the "for-me" ness dimension of consciousness. The fundamental hypothesis of my work is that phenomenology makes a mental state conscious. What is a mental state composed of? What is there within experiences, that makes them essentially phenomenological? Put differently, what can be the content (following the analytic

[13] The notion of "Instant glow" is quite common in Husserlian tradition though not exactly the same way. For Husserl the "for-me" ness of consciousness of conscious mental state involves 'sui generis" form of intentional directedness.

tradition) of the experience? Perusing this necessarily leads to the discussion of content or the notion of mental content to be specific.

1.3. Orthodox Theory of Content

The question of how something can be "about" something is the crux of intentionality, that we have already discussed. In other words, intentionality can be seen in sentences, thoughts, and concepts, or across many other things, since they are considered representations of different things outside the world or within. As Brentano says:

> Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.[14]

What is desired, said, thought, believed, imagined, and so forth is referred to as content. Therefore, the content that mental processes and states hold has been identified as mental content. This might be an oversimplification of the notion of content. It is needless to say the theory of mental content has a long history[15]. What defines a sentence's meaning or the semantic content of an utterance is one of the central questions in the philosophy of language and on the other hand, what would make up an intentional mental state's content is one of the primary concerns in philosophy of mind. This is the exact location where the boundaries of the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind intersect. It is often said that the theory of content is typically dominated by the representational/intentional domain of the mind. The idea of the content, particularly the concept of intentional/representational content, has always been

[14] Brentano, Franz, Oskar Kraus, and Linda L. McAlister. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.* Paperback ed. International Library of Philosophy. London; New York: Routledge, 1995. 68.

[15] This section is developed from the book by Sen, Madhucchanda. 'Externalism and Content'. *Externalism and the Mental*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015. 1-6.

associated with intentionality discussion. That being said, it is also critical to shed light on the surrounding notion of content in particular. Is all mental content intentional or representational? What is a sentence's meaning beyond its formal and syntactic components? Why is it that a given proposition contains the content that it does? Does content solely rely on qualities found internal to the mind? Is it necessary to count on mind-external factors like the speaker's social standing or the utterance's background to ascertain the content? Content is not necessarily a single kind, such as a concrete object; instead, it may consist of a variety of things, such as states of affairs, material objects, and their attributes, or even abstract objects like numbers. However, it appears conceivable that the representational content of an experience can incorporate the phenomenological content of another subject, as occurs when I consider the pleasure or pain experienced by another person. It has been believed that the content of experience includes a representation of things, that is representational/ intentional) content. This representational content has been articulated in two ways, namely the external representational content and internal representational content.

It all commenced with the seminal work "The Meaning of 'Meaning'"[16] by Hilary Putnam. The externalism versus internalism debate is about the content of mental states and how they participate in the individuation of mental states. Internalists are those who maintain that most, but not all, of the pertinent features associated with content are found within the mind. However, externalists assert that content consists of more than just mind-internal events and their unintentional relationship to the outside world. They maintain that our language's meanings are derived from a profoundly metaphysical relationship between the mind and other external, mind-independent objects. The environment determines the mental state *constitutively*, which is more significant than its causal determination, is one of the points that

[16] Putnam, Hilary. "The Meaning of 'Meaning,'" 1975. http://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/185225.

externalists wish to highlight. For externalists, the external world constitutes the very identity aspect of mental states. On the other hand, the internalists agree that the external world influences the mental states but only causally. They believe that there is no such profound individuated connection between the subject's being in those states and the nature of her environment. According to externalists, a theory of content must explain how language expressions relate to what are sometimes referred to as things in the real world. Stated differently, the assertion is that elucidating content necessitates presenting a relationship analysis between how languages are used and the subject matter of discussion. We must understand that internalism is not precisely a rejection of the externalist position. The only thing internalism challenges is the existence of a profoundly metaphysical relationship between language and the objects of the world, that is, in an explanatory theory of content, internalists contest the externalist assertion that there are simple relationships between linguistic expressions and the real world. It is undeniable that the discussion of content goes hand in hand with the discussion of propositional attitude. Propositional attitudes, as defined by philosophers, encompass a wide range of attitudes involving propositions, such as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and expectations. "S hopes that P", like "I hope that that one day I can have a better reply for all the bullying" is a propositional attitude consisting of two parts. Information about the person in question and their state of mind can be extracted from the first, which serves as the verb of the mental-state description. In other words, the information about who adopts which propositional attitude, (like "I hope", is given in the first section. The proposition or what the attitude refers to, like "that one day I can have a better reply for all the bullying" is revealed in the subsequent section. On the other hand, a concept is usually accepted in the philosophy of mind to be a constituent of thought. Accordingly, it can be said that concepts are the components of propositions that propositional attitudes convey. People undoubtedly share concepts, and what precisely is shared can be interpreted as what kind of

content it is. If both me and my friend, hope that P, then we both share the content intrinsic in the concepts of the proposition P. According to this assertion, externalists and internalists approach things in radically different ways, particularly when it comes to the explanatory function that content is meant to accomplish. Internalists are more interested in concepts when they function as the meanings of linguistic elements, whereas externalists are primarily interested in concepts when they appear in explanations of behavior.

The most commonly cited instance in favor of externalism is Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment[17], which argues that two subjects can have the same internal mental states, but that the content of these states can vary because of specific environmental differences. So, there is the Twin-Earth, a world where water is made of XYZ instead of H_2O as it is on Earth. The term "water" refers to H_2O when someone mentions it on Earth, but it refers to XYZ when someone else for example twin me says it in a different location that is on Twin-Earth. It would seem intuitively obvious that the word "water" refers to what the word means in that specific context. Putnam wonders what would occur if transported to Twin-Earth. Would my reference to "water" on Twin-Earth now be to H_2O or XYZ? It is noteworthy that the thought experiment stipulates that the sole alteration that occurs during my transportation from Earth to Twin-Earth is the shift in environment, although states stay unaltered. In light of this, Putnam claims that if understanding a term simply requires a particular psychological state, then anyone using the term "water" on Twin-Earth should be referring to H_2O rather than XYZ as one may assume. This is because the subject's psychological state has remained constant on Earth. If the psychological state remains the same, then the reference is fixed, meaning that "water" always refers to H_2O, irrespective of the subject's surroundings. But that is not the case. In the same context, we anticipate that a word used by two individuals will mean the same thing. Hence,

[17] Putnam, Hilary. "Meaning and Reference". *Journal of Philosophy* 70, 1973. 699–711.

the argument goes, if we wish to maintain the contention that a term's meaning determines its extension or reference, we have to accept the premise that mental attributes alone are insufficient to define word's meanings or build their references. Putnam's reasoning is focused on word meanings, but Colin McGinn, Tyler Burge, and others subsequently discovered that similar logic also applied to the contents of propositional attitudes, and hence, to the contents that constitute our thoughts. Thus, the central tenet of externalism is that although thoughts are believed to exist within an individual's head, their content supervenes outside factors in their surroundings.

Following the discussion of the externalist conception of content, it is hard to embrace how could content be independent of the external world. Internalists contend that there are legitimate explanations to challenge the externalist assertion that concepts have the same relationship to the outside world as externalists do. To put it another way, internalism offers an alternative account of how our mind creates and understands the content of our concepts instead of dismissing its link to the external world. Internalism explores the inner structure and the processes of a creature and the external world gets into the equation when the theorist assigns meaning to the internal processes, elucidating how the internal workings of the organism constitute a cognitive process within a specific context. Internalists contend that although the content and its attribution are not necessary for the theory, they may differ depending on the theorist's objectives and purposes. An internalist theory would not encompass the representational content associated with the mechanism's output, but it would cover the mechanism underlying. For instance, suppose for identifying body shape in visual input, the form of the body in the representational scenario might depict a range of things, such as the edge of a peer or a fruit, or it could be an aspect of a more comprehensive depiction of the hourglass human body framework, but the fundamental mechanism is always preserved. According to internalist theory, the mind is equipped with specific mechanisms that include

building blocks for concepts. These concepts function as inputs for other systems within the mind, known as mind-internal systems, which are involved in diverse human behaviors, including communication. Hence, we can say that internalism is concerned with the mind-internal mechanisms of concept creation. In summary, the distinction between the internalist and externalist perspectives on mental content can be attributed to the various sorts of questions that each perspective aims to address. The way they interpret the function that content serves in the explanation of language and mind is different.

It is important to remember that this is merely an approximate guideline explaining the distinctions between internal and external content. It is, instead, one of the most highly debated topics in philosophy of mind history, even today. I have only restricted myself to outlining the aspects of these two hypotheses that are essential to the development of my thesis. There might be disputes regarding the nature of external and internal content but one thing is almost unanimous in the traditional discussion representational content, whether it is internal or external, is propositional content. "Propositionalism" holds that all intentional attitudes are towards propositions. There are two types of directions of fit for propositional attitudes: mind-to-world and world-to-mind. A mind-to-world direction of fit indicates that an attitude is meant to correspond to the world; on the other hand, a world-to-mind direction of fit reveals that the world is meant to adapt to the attitude. One way to describe the difference is in terms of truth conditions. A desire is fulfilled only when the world becomes what it is desired to be; otherwise, it remains unfulfilled. A belief is accurate only when the world appears as it is believed to be. Consider the following example; if Thor believes that it is a thunderstorm, then the content that is designated by "that" clause could always be understood self-sufficiently without the act of believing. Sadly enough (at least in my perspective, especially the framework I am following), fabricating content using this method makes it merely a truth condition. a requirement that the world must meet for that experience to be credible. In the first instance, Thor's beliefs would

be in line with reality if the propositional content, that is if the content matches the real situation, then it becomes veridical. Conventional explanations of content in terms of truth conditions range from propositional-attitude states to perceptual and even emotional experiences. Without a shadow of a doubt, the concept of truth condition is crucial to the accuracy of an experience. But does it shed any light on the principles underlying conscious experience? I do not think that the content of a conscious experience can be sufficiently speculated based on correspondence with reality alone. Indeed, we need something more than that.

1.4. A Fresh Perspective on Content

It is important to keep in mind that, despite its widespread acceptance, "propositionalism" is not the only theory out there. Instead, it has a historical opponent. The concept of non-propositional intentionality was advocated by Brentano, the founding father of intentionality. The assertion that there is no such thing as unconscious consciousness serves as the foundation for Brentano's theory of consciousness. this statement has a greater significance than it appears at first sight. I will discuss this point in two parts. The first part deals with the content of experience whereas the remaining with the nature of awareness as a whole. Before we begin, we should ask ourselves if Brentano[18] means to refer to the concept of "consciousness" in the same way as the idea of phenomenal consciousness, or the "what it is like" part of the experience, which has attracted a lot of attention lately in contemporary philosophy of mind. When it is evident that Brentano wasn't referring to the expression "phenomenal consciousness". Most importantly, Brentano states that consciousness can be both sensory and non-sensory. This is significant because some of the current discourse on phenomenal

[18] This section, which tries to establish a connection between the phenomenological framework that I am trying to develop in my thesis and Brentano's notion of intentionality is inspired and in turn developed from Kriegel, U. "Consciousness". *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2018. Pp 19-21

consciousness has concentrated on purely sensory phenomena. In particular, Kriegel feels it is reasonable to assume that the phenomenon Brentano had addressed is phenomenal consciousness, even though he never explicitly stated this. There is a specific explanation for optimism that Brentano is sympathetic to phenomenological principles. Brentano stated:

> In reality, physiological processes seem to differ from chemical and physical processes only in their greater complexity... [By contrast,] if one turns one's attention from the outer to the inner realm (Welt), it feels like one has switched to a new realm. The phenomena are absolutely heterogeneous.[19]

According to Brentano, the idea that biological processes are categorically different from physical and chemical phenomena because the former involves something extra was false. The previous one is actually more intricate than the latter, but only in a degree, not in kind. Nonetheless, the distinction between conscious phenomena and physical, chemical, and biological phenomena does exhibit a truly categorical difference, or "absolute heterogeneity". Similarly, the distinction "feels like" is one of a kind as opposed to a degree. That is why it is evident that Brentano is concerned with phenomenal consciousness, whether it is interpreted pre-theoretically or functionally. I am not saying that he is only fascinated by sensory consciousness when I state this. On the contrary, what I'm trying to say is that he's captivated by that very phenomenon that we know more intimately than all others, yet which always leaves a shocking conceptual disparity with other aspects of the world as it is. In this dissertation, I will be discussing an alternative concept of content that is partially, if not entirely, derived from Brentano's viewpoint.

Firstly, let me state that I find it difficult to describe this new approach to content using the term "intentional content", as doing so already reduces and makes it partial to the orthodox

[19] Brentano, F. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. and ed. L. McAlister London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923. 50–51.

theory of content. I sincerely believe that we require a content expression that is inclusive and has the capacity to undermine all conscious experiences owing to their nuanced variations, regardless of whether they are considered phenomenal or intentional. The most effective way to sum up an experience's content is to say that it consists of all of the things the person witnesses while encountering the experience. Michelle Montague said:

> The content of an experience is (absolutely) everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of the experience, everything one is aware of, experientially, in the having of the experience.[20]

What Montague is aimed to do is the "total content" theory of experience. Thus, if the question is, what comprises a conscious experience? To put it simply, experience is all that we are aware of. Put differently, the content of an individual's experience is shaped by whatever they are given. For example, when I drink a cup of black coffee, the experience is nothing more than being in that experiential state, where I am relishing that coffee. It must be noted that the idea of "given"[21] is an experimental givenness and it should not be misunderstood with any other terminology of similar kind. In my opinion, experience is essentially phenomenological and that is the most fundamental aspect of it. When someone has an experience, they are necessarily experiencing *what it is like* to be in that particular experiential state. The striking feature of experience is that there is something it is like to be in that experiential state. So, it can be said that whatever is experientially given to one, is phenomenologically given to one. It seems logically impossible to have an experience without experiencing it. Everything that is phenomenologically given in experience is the underlying foundation of the concept of mental content. The relation between phenomenological givenness and experiential givenness is of

[20] Montague, Michelle. "Intentionality, Phenomenology, Consciousness, and Content". *The Given: Experience and its Content.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. 30.

[21] It is by no means related to Sellars's notion of "the myth of the given".

identity, not even mere similarity. At first sight, this might feel circular, but on detailed scrutiny, we could grasp how significant it is.

At the beginning of the section when I addressed Brentano's fundamental notion of no unconscious consciousness, I mentioned that it has two parts. I have already discussed the first implication which is the content but there remains a second and equally important part. Brentano has no intention of ever being tautologous; however, this claim can only be non-tautological if the two expressions "consciousness" are used in an entirely distinct sense. Brentano, himself used the term conscious in two ways. The passive sense of ‘conscious’ can be illustrated as the mental state of a subject is conscious if and only if the subject is conscious of the mental state, on the other hand, the active sense is rather something like a mental state of the subject is conscious if and only if the mental state is a state of subject’s consciousness. This thesis does not carry the previous burden of tautology with this illustration. it is not logically possible for a subject to be in a state of consciousness of which she is not conscious. According to Kriegel, this can be regarded as an awareness principle. Perceiving Edgar Degas's pastel painting "Woman Bathing" consciously requires being aware of the portrait. According to the awareness principle, it also involves an awareness of the awareness of Edgar Degas's painting “Woman Bathing". Somehow it entails that an experience always involves some sort of consciousness of that very experience and this straightforwardly leads us to the awareness of awareness thesis, which I have addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2:

CONSCIOUSNESS OF *BEING CONSCIOUS*

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CONSCIOUSNESS OF *BEING CONSCIOUS*

The notion of consciousness, which I am discussing here, denotes the subjective experience, which is also termed as phenomenal consciousness that is to be contrasted with the states of merely being awake and behavioural outcomes of external inducements. Phenomenal consciousness necessarily exhibits that there is something that *it is like* to be in that state of consciousness. There are two perineal questions in this exploration, one deals with the ontology of phenomenal consciousness and the other arises out of the epistemic concern. The metaphysical question is more fundamental, as it discusses the nature of phenomenal experience, that is how it feels like something rather than nothing. This is unquestionably the most challenging inquiry in the contemporary philosophy of mind. However, the epistemological quest should also be measured as essential in the search for unity of consciousness. The epistemological inquiry can be expressed as how do we even recognise or be conscious of that it feels like something? To begin with, everyone will agree that while we are having an experience, we are also conscious of having that experience. In other words, we are not only conscious about the object of awareness but the awareness itself. Some believe that there is no difference between one's phenomenal experience and the awareness of it. They have been convinced that something it is like to be me is equivalent to my awareness of it. Self-awareness is undoubtedly an abstruse term. Fundamentally it refers to the awareness of one's mental state, but it is plausible enough to denote the awareness of a self. One way of understanding could be to appreciate that every mental occurrence has some kind of self-awareness to it. Consciousness is someone being conscious. When I reflect on my mental states, they give the impression of necessarily being mine, not as anyone else's. It has been reasonably said that there must be an essential feature of mental states that initiates self-awareness in the

first place. Rosenthal expressed this intuition most straightforwardly by articulating the 'transitivity principle', that is,

> A mental state is conscious only if one is in some way aware of it[1].

In this chapter, I have tried to assemble several theories that approve of or at least give assent to, even partially this principle. Two popular approaches have been widely discussed, one is the Higher-Order Theories of consciousness and the other is the First-Order Theories of consciousness.

2.1. First Order Approaches

The dominant idea behind the first-order approach is that any conscious state is a representation, and what *it is like to* be in a conscious state is formulated by the content of that representation. A first-order theory of consciousness attempts to explain and reduce conscious experience largely into world-directed or first-order intentional states. Automatically, a representation is about something, and the content of a representation is what the representation is about. For instance, the word 'coffee' (representation) is about the object of coffee (content). Tye and Dretske should be credited for familiarising this theory on board. It claims that the given representations, what arguably the phenomenal consciousness comprises are the representational properties in the physical world, or at least non-mental properties. Tye[2] advocates that a conscious representation must be composed to cooperate directly with one's beliefs and desires, and likewise, Dretske[3] conceives that a conscious representation must be accessible to a subject as a cause of action and design the belief.

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[1] See, Rosenthal, D.M. Consciousness and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. 4.

[2] Tye M. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1995.

[3] Dretske F. "Perception without awareness," in Perceptual Experience eds Gendler T., Hawthorne J. Oxford University Press. 2006. 147–180

They believe that all mental representations are not conscious and tend to find out what exactly separates a conscious state from the unconscious one in this context. Tye introduced the 'PANIC theory' and the abbreviation 'PANIC'[4] stands for poised, abstract, non-conceptual, intentional content. According to this view, the phenomenal aspect is identical to representational content, which might be not all but a particular kind. Tye maintained that at least some of the representational content is non-conceptual, that is the subject is devoid of the concept of the properties represented by the given experience. For example, an experience of a certain shade of colour that one has never seen before. Philosophers feel that the notion of non-conceptuality is very important in the PANIC overview. Nevertheless, conscious states undoubtedly should possess an intentional content for being the representation. Tye again added that such content can significantly be abstract in a way that is not necessarily about particular concrete objects. It is the ontological condition regarding the content. This connotation is important because it provides the aid to validate the case of hallucination cases where there are no concrete objects at all and also instances where different objects appear phenomenally alike. Possibly, the most significant for mental states to be conscious is that such content must be poised, that is the functional notion about what conscious states do. The main idea is that experiences and feelings are readily available for a direct impact on beliefs or desires and so on. In this panorama, feeling thirsty is nothing but an instantaneous cognitive effect, namely, initiated by the desire to drink water. Because they appear too early in the information processing, mental states with nonconceptual traits that are not as poised lack phenomenal nature. The PANIC theory is meant to encompass all conscious experiences, not just perception. It is PANIC, which is responsible for making any state both the consciousness *it is* and consciousness *at all*.

[4] This paragraphed is developed from, Tye, M. *Consciousness, Color, and Content*. Cambridge. MIT Press.2000. 62.

The main objection against first-order approaches is that it does not include all conscious states. Some conscious states do not exhibit such aboutness, in a way they are not essentially directed at anything as such. I have already discussed them in the first chapter and they undoubtedly occupy the central stage in my thesis as I conceive them as almost the mark of conscious mental states. For example, sensations, emotions, and so on. They are necessarily regarded as non-representational conscious states. Hence, conscious states cannot principally be expounded through representational properties once and for all. Tye answers that pains and itches are representational as they represent in the sense that the particular location of the body. He even declares that conscious emotions are also representational. It is often said that are usually restricted to specific body regions[5]. For instance, one's stomach is probably going to sink if one suddenly becomes envious. Blood pressure rises in some people. One major loophole in Tye's first-order approach is that it looks as if in the poised criterion, everything appears extremely functional and he is perhaps not talking about phenomenal consciousness from the actual representational standpoints.

2.1.1. Transition From First-Order to Higher-Order Approaches

Higher-order theories also deal with representations but they claim that the relevant representations denote mental properties. According to Higher-Order Representationalism, mental states are not conscious in virtue of representing, but in virtue of being represented. Mental properties typically include mental attitude, intentional content, and qualitative content. higher-order theories are not bulletproof and they have their shortcomings. However, the prime reason for sanctioning higher-order versions is that it can reasonably distinguish conscious states from non-conscious ones. I have already talked about the transitivity principle at the

[5] "are frequently localized in particular parts of the body. For example, if one feels sudden jealousy, one is likely to feel one's stomach sink. One's blood pressure increase" Tye, M. *Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge*. MIT Press. 2000. 51

beginning of this chapter. I am quite sympathetic towards the transitivity principle mostly because it can easily encompass what we generally mean by consciousness. Even if an amateur were questioned to define the distinguishing factor between conscious and unconscious mental states, s/he would simply respond that a mental state is conscious, when one is aware of it. It is needless to say that this reply sensibly aligned with the transitivity principle. According to Thomasson[6], this is a kind of verbal evidence, but philosophically this kind of affirmation is not always validated mostly because it is not universally accepted. So, she went a length and annexed other kinds of proof, namely the phenomenological and epistemological evidence to affirm her perspective. Phenomenological evidence refers to phenomenological givenness that is whatever is phenomenologically given that is consciously given. Some philosophers believe that it is linked with the self-awareness of consciousness. Epistemological evidence declares that consciousness is essentially first-person knowable, that is immediately available straightforward to the person and strictly only to the person to whom that consciousness belongs. Nevertheless, she suggests that both verbal and phenomenological evidence come under epistemological evidence. It has a kind of supremacy over the other two because frankly speaking, experience mostly depends on the epistemic access to it. Every piece of evidence is contested since it depends on epistemological evidence in this way. Certainly, there are conscious states that we are not or cannot be aware of. But I do not see it as problematic at all because I have already mentioned that I am only dealing with the consciousness[7] that is experientially given.

[6] This section is adopted and developed from Thomasson, A. "First-person knowledge in phenomenology", In D. W. Smith, & A. Thomasson (Eds.) *Phenomenology and philosophy of mind*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 2005. 115–138.

[7] A general theory of consciousness would cover both conscious and unconscious or even non-conscious mental episodes. However, in this short term of the thesis, I have tried to describe the conscious mental states only, that is the content of conscious experience. More precisely, what is given to us in conscious experience.

Another inspiration behind upholding higher-order approaches is the ineffectiveness of the first-order approaches to differentiate reality from its appearance. This distinction calls for cognitive functioning and the advocates of the Higher-order approaches, these cognitive dimensions are necessarily higher order. One might argue whether this distinction is needed for consciousness at all. Well, it is significant as it follows straight from the transitivity principle. Carruthers remarks that experience obtains its phenomenal attribute and the relevant subjectivity by making this distinction. Without this division, experience or to be specific, consciousness becomes non-subjective. This echoes like an oxymoron in my ears as to how there can even be consciousness without a subject to which it inevitably belongs. Since these theories embrace consciousness to be conscious of itself, that consciousness must be able to segregate between the objects it is conscious of and itself, that is the consciousness of those objects. But what precisely ensures any awareness of awareness? Although consciousness is naturally directed at things, it also needs to be conscious of itself, or at least of its intentional character, to be considered conscious of experiences. Or else, we need to conclude that only the objects are given and not the experience. This distinction, or the capacity to discern between the mind and the outside world, is somehow necessary to be conscious both of objects and of one's being aware of one's being aware of objects. According to the transitivity principle, the distinction in this context belongs to consciousness as a mark of consciousness.

Many people believe that higher-order representationalism is a subset of the latter, even though representationalism appears to be capable of existing in both first-order and higher-order forms. First of all, conventional first-order theories often do not discriminate between mental qualities and consciousness, arguing that mental qualities are merely the characteristics of conscious mental processes. Higher-order theories detached mental qualities from consciousness insofar as they believe that the former can and do befall without the latter. Thus, they tend to advance autonomous theories of mental qualities and consciousness. However, I

am not referring to representationalism here. Instead, I'm drawn to discussing higher-order techniques since they help me to understand our awareness and the wider deliberations surrounding the philosophy of mind.

2.2. Higher-Order Approaches

In the first chapter, I have already mentioned that, in higher-order theory (hereafter, HOT), a mental state is conscious because a higher-order state is directed towards it. As a result, the lower-order state is conscious in terms of having a higher-order state directed towards it.

> The appearances of consciousness reflect the contents of our HOTs; what it's like for one to be in a particular mental state is a matter of how one's HOT represents that state[8].

Primary mental states are expressed by lower-order representations. Mental states that demonstrate these lower-order states are often referred to as higher-order states. Hence, the states of higher order are meta-representations. Mental states are conscious in virtue of "being represented" rather than in virtue "of representing", according to Higher-Order Representationalism. Stated differently, they possess consciousness as they are the representational contents of higher-order representations. When someone feels a tickle behind their ear, for instance, they are aware of the tickling sensation, and this awareness is a result of a higher-order representation focusing on the tickling sensation. A lower-order mental state becomes conscious, as defined by HOTs since it ends up being the subject of a particular kind of meta-representation. It can be explained as follows[9]. In a processing hierarchy, meta-representations are representations that are aimed at other representations rather than just being

[8] Rosenthal, D. *Consciousness and Mind*. Oxford University Press. 2005. 14

[9] "Meta-representations are not merely representations that occur higher or deeper in a processing hierarchy but are, rather, representations that have as their targets other representations. For example, a representation with the content 'I have a visual experience of a moving dot' is a meta-representation, for its content concerns the agent's own representations of the world rather than the world itself". Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. ''Theories of consciousness''. Nature reviews. Neuroscience, 23(7). 2022. 439–452. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4.

representations that appear higher or deeper. A meta-representation, for instance, would consist of a representation with the content "I have the visual sensation of a floating dot", since it talks about the agent's perceptions of the world rather than the real world. In contrast to lower-order representations, which reflect the world, higher-order representations represent something about other representations. A higher-order mental state would be an awareness that one has a representation of a red tomato, whereas a lower-order mental state would be the visual representation of one. The advantage of this theory is it can easily make room for the controversy of how the same experience could be conscious and unconscious. The simple answer is when there is a higher order state fixated towards it then that experience becomes conscious, else not. Different higher-order theories interpret the meta-representations in several distinct manners. According to some assumptions, meta-representations are thoughts or thought-like states with conceptual content and some computational models define them otherwise. Higher-order theories have many variations but here, by higher-order approaches, I have restricted myself only to Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory, or HOT in short:

> A state is conscious only if one is subjectively aware of oneself being in that state...The higher-order thought theory explains that subjective awareness as due to one's having a thought that one is in that state[10].

According to Rosenthal's version, consciously seeing red is to be aware of oneself as seeing red through an appropriate HOT. A conscious mental state is a state that causes a belief that the individual is in that mental state and causes it non-inferentially. Rosenthal's theory is based on his transitivity principle. To get proper access to his theory, it is required to grasp a little overview of representationalism. First. I want to declare that I am not specifically dealing with representationalism in general and the controversies regarding that notion. There are various

[10] Rosenthal, D. *Exaggerated Reports: A Reply to Block*. 2011. 431

ways that one can formulate the notion of representation but I have followed the 'Exhaustion Thesis' mostly because it is suitable for the kind of research, I am pursuing here that is validating the phenomenological consciousness to be accurate. Sometimes, this thesis is termed as 'modern representationalism' and the basic tenet goes like that if it is said that the content of a state exhausts its phenomenal character. The exhaustion thesis precisely states that for each phenomenal character P, there exists some content C such that a state containing P can be explained as a phenomenal state containing content C[11]. I have already mentioned the phenomenal character of a conscious mental state that is essentially worn down by *what it is like* for the subject of experience, in the first chapter. Content is a layered term and it has been discussed variously by different philosophers. While citing about intentional state, I have also given a formulation for the notion of content in the framework of intentional content, to be exact. Overall, the term content stands for a condition of satisfaction. Now, if we combine these ideas with the exhaustion thesis, in the instance of visually seeing red, what we get is that the state's satisfaction criteria, which is expressing things in a particular way, is what it feels like for a subject to visually see red. One thing that should be remembered is that Rosenthal is inclined to disdain using popular terms like 'qualia' or qualitative character. Rather than this, he prefers to present his ideas as a model of consciousness. But we need to first understand why he has formulated his theory with this terminology. In the first chapter, I have already discussed Kriegel's distinction between subjective character and qualitative character of an experience. Rosenthal believes that a conscious state is one, where there is something, *it is like to* be in it, but he does not identify it with qualitative character. Consider the conscious experience of seeing a red tomato, while focusing on the attribution of redness. Rosenthal

[11] "The claim is that a state's phenomenal character is exhausted by its content. The exact meaning of the exhaustion thesis is that for every phenomenal character P, there is some content C such that a state with P is nothing more than a phenomenal state with content C". Seager, W. & Bourget, D. "Representationalism about Consciousness." In Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd Edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 2017. 274

breaks this conscious experience into two parts, namely the subjectivity or the 'for-me-ness'[12], and the qualitative character, the 'reddishness'. By contrasting the difference between conscious and subconscious or subliminal perceptions of the red apple, the significance of the distinction would be evident. Rosenthal commented that both perceptions encompass the same representation of the redness and the two perceptions have the same qualitative character. what distinguishes the conscious state from the unconscious state, is that the conscious state additionally involves the "for-me"-ness or subjective awareness aspect. To put it simply, a mental state is not conscious if it is present but the individual does not subjectively perceive being in that state. But I will use them interchangeably because, for me, qualitative consciousness and phenomenal consciousness overlap each other. The higher-order theory is possibly the best explanation of phenomenal consciousness in terms of representationalism by accommodating the transitivity thesis, which can be interpreted in terms of it. It is comparable to saying that one can only have a phenomenal experience if one is conscious of oneself as being in a qualitative condition. If one is in a mental state but not aware of it in any manner, then there is nothing that it is like to be in that state.

2.2.1. Problems with Higher-Order Approach

Higher-order theories have been confronted with massive criticism[13] and some of them articulated regarding the presentation, or to be specific, the representation. The fact that the transitivity concept is assumed rather than explained, is the most widespread and urgent issue.

> Why should a HOT confer consciousness, of any sort and at all? Without further development, we have no explanation. In virtue of what do HOTs make us conscious

[12] Rosenthal definitely did not use the term 'for-me-ness', and I have borrowed this connotation from Kriegel. However, I am using it to make my claim clearer and to link its connection with the first chapter.

[13] This whole section is adopted and thereby illustrated from Lyyra, P. *Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Appraisal and Application*. Lambert Academic Publishing. An Appraisal and Application'. *Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 387*. 2010.

> of anything? Without answering this question, then Rosenthal is either begging the question by trying to explain consciousness in terms of consciousness or is waving his hands at the problem and calling it solved[14].

It sounds highly exaggerated to maintain, as a higher-order theory would, that, under such circumstances, the rabbit's elevated consciousness is due to its being in some way aware of its mental states, thereby making them conscious. Imagine a deer with a rudimentary kind of awareness that sees an approaching tiger. For survival purposes, even a passing glance at the tiger instantly attracts the deer's attention, and the need to get away from it permeates the deer's consciousness. It has been argued that this consideration perhaps, is not restricted to animals only. It's quite possible that the argument stated regarding the deer's inherent fear of tigers also applies to adults' innate fear of something given that particular subject in question. It seems overdone to claim that one's increased consciousness is caused by one's elevated awareness of one's consciousness rather than the object and its immediate relation to one's well-being if one gets instantly afraid of anything threatening. Higher-order thoughts must be about the mental states of higher-order, not the objects the mental states are about. Why would being conscious of something make its object conscious? In my opinion, there are ample reasons to be apprehensive of the transitivity principle. One just cannot presuppose something without proper elucidation. If nothing else, it is reasonable to inquire as to how much adequate it is. If it turns out that the principle itself is not explanatory enough on which higher-order theory is founded then it is better to call for further analysis. Why the transitivity principle does not always apply, that is, why being aware of one's liver does not make one's liver conscious, has been a topic of much debate. The obvious response given by the higher-order theorist is that it

[14] Hardcastle, V. "HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray", In R. J. Gennaro (Ed.) *Higher-order theories of consciousness: An anthology*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2004. 287–288.

is special to the intentional states only. Unfortunately, this explanation seems thoroughly insufficient.

The strongest objection against Rosenthal's higher-order theory comes from Dretske. On this account, we cannot be directly conscious of our representations. It has been demonstrated that a minute distracting stimulus frequently prevents observers from noticing a substantial difference between two otherwise identical images. He has given a beautiful thought experiment. Suppose there are two familiar pictures, where one of them holds a black spot and the other does not. Now, it is completely tenable to believe that, one can have a conscious visual experience of that black spot, but as they are familiar and suppose they are presented to the subject so fast that, s/he is not conscious about the difference. When the subject becomes aware of the variation, it becomes so captivating that it is difficult to conceive that such differences could go unnoticed because they are usually such that they would be immediately noticeable without distraction. One reasonably witnesses those changes but is thoroughly unable to distinguish them. The fundamental ground is that there is a higher-order state that makes one's awareness (perception or perceptual awareness in the given context) conscious. Since. it cannot make one conscious of the change, higher-order theories are insufficient in explaining consciousness. By this, it can be concluded that one can surely have a conscious experience devoid of any higher-order state being focused on it. Therefore, consciousness is not a matter of higher-order awareness.

Francescotti[15] raised questions concerning the relationship between higher-order and lower-order states. He believed that both states could only be causally related. The Transitivity principle cannot account for any kind of causality, rather it displays merely an association between of two states. Hence, it must be rejected. But there another major objection against

[15] Francescotti, M, R. 'Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience'. *Philosophical Psychology*. 8:3, 1995. 239-254, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089508573156.

higher-order approaches was raised by Byrne[16] who deals with the existence of higher-order thoughts that are not directed to anything. Rosenthal himself confesses that there should be something *it is like to* endure a sheer higher-order state irrespective of there being any lower-order state at all. Why is it that first-order states are brought into consciousness by higher-order states? Byrne argues that consciousness, in higher-order approaches, cannot have any benefit compared to a first-order theory when there is an instance of a sufficient higher-order non-inferential state without a target because both could only tell a narrative by mentioning the process of how a particular state came about. Furthermore, according to Byrne, both explanations would be equally useless in illuminating why the state would be phenomenally conscious. Higher-order theories of Consciousness, according to neuroscientist Michael Graziano[17], aim to explain the workings of consciousness in the brain rather than trying to explain consciousness *per se*, as in subjective experience. He argues that there are no essential distinctions between first-order and higher-order approaches if we follow the neural correlates of the consciousness initiative since this is merely a strategy that we have adopted. Montague expressed her apprehension regarding higher-order theories in general. She introduces the following principle concerning conscious states:

> If a mental state S is conscious, the (representational) content of that mental state must be consciously entertained (we may say that in this sense the content of a mental state must be conscious). And conversely, if some (representational) content is consciously entertained, the mental state S of which it is the content must be conscious[18].

[16] Byrne, A. 'Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts.'

Philosophical Studies, 86. 1997. 103–129.

[17] Schurger, A., & Graziano, M. (2022). 'Consciousness explained or described?'. *Neuroscience of consciousness*. 2022(2), niac001. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niac001.

[18] Montague, M. 'Awareness of Awareness'. *The Given: Experience and its content*. Oxford University Press. 2016. 54-56

This has been coined as 'The Conscious Content Principle' (hereafter, CC), which has two parts. First, if an occurrent mental state S is a conscious mental state, the (representational) content of that mental state must in some manner be consciously occurrent. And conversely, if some (representational) content is conscious, the mental state S of which it is the (representational) content must be conscious. For Rosenthal, the challenge is that his theory fails to comply with this principle when there isn't a lower-order state. When there is a lower-order state, which is the object of a higher-order state, then the conscious mental state is the lower-order state, and the content of that lower-order state is consciously entertained. Hence, Rosenthal's theory can validate the principle. The question remains, if there is no lower-order state, the only content that can be consciously entertained is the content that consists of things subjectively seeming a certain way to a subject. However, subjectively perceiving things in a certain way is the content of a particular state, and by the second part of the CC principle, it is the presence of conscious content that qualifies a state as aware even when it is not the object of a higher-order state. Rosenthal, by principle, cannot resonate with this illustration since it goes against his theoretical commitments. Additionally, by the hypothesis, if there is no lower-order state, there would not be a higher-order state. Rosenthal's theory doesn't seem to be able to survive on its own in the end. The higher-order theory must either evolve into a same-order theory or acknowledge instances of conscious experience in which there is no identified mental state as the conscious experience.

2.3. Same-Order Approaches

The meeting point between the higher-order and same-order approaches is that all conscious experiences are ones we are conscious of being in. In this view, awareness of an object and awareness of that very awareness cluster together and constitute a single mental state. Higher-order theories and same-order theories settle upon the presence of a higher-order representation

of the mental state as a necessary condition for that given state to be conscious. The typical formulation goes something like,

1. Mental states the subject is completely unaware of are unconscious states;

so,

2. If a mental state M of a subject S is conscious, then S must be aware of M;

but,

3. Awareness of something involves a representation of it; therefore,

4. If M is conscious, then S must have a representation of M[19].

The question is what makes a given higher-order representation appropriate in the relevant sense? Nevertheless, possessing a higher-order representation does not guarantee that a mental state is conscious. According to same-order approaches, one of the provisions for an appropriate higher-order representation of mental state is that it holds some constitutive relation, or more precisely a kind of logical connection to the mental state in question, which we have already seen, was excluded by the higher-order approaches. To understand this dichotomy between these two theories, Kriegel[20] demonstrated them in the following way-

Higher Order Theory: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious iff there is a mental state M*, such that (i) S is in M*, (ii) M* is an appropriate representation of M, and (iii) there is no constitutive relation between M and M*.

Same Order Theory: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious iff there is a mental state M*, such that (i) S is in M*, (ii) M* is an appropriate representation of M, and (iii) there is a constitutive relation between M and M*.

[19] Lycan, W. G. "A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness", *Analysis,* 61. 2001. Pp 3–4.

[20] Kriegel, U. 'The Same-Order Monito ring Theory of Consciousness Second Version'. *UDC 165.12.* 2007. 363

Same-order approaches assume an internal, non-contingent relation between the subject's conscious state and the awareness of that very conscious state. On the other hand, higher-order approaches interpret these two as entirely and logically sovereign. Various kinds of same-order theories are defined through various constitutive relations.

Kriegel must be credited for employing same-order approaches in the center stage of awareness of awareness discourse. His preferred method of representing awareness of awareness is the self-constituting kind. The Self-Representational Theory, referred to as "Self-Representationalism," holds that a conscious experience always represents itself, regardless of what else it represents. It is the self-representation that makes an experience conscious. Self-representation is restricted to conscious states only, in this view. For example, when you sit alone at midnight with a glass of wine and purposefully stare at nothing. You are indeed conscious of both your loneliness and your awareness of your being alone. This can be explained in terms of self-representationalism as your awareness of how the encounter at that particular moment represents both you and your isolation. Different same-order theorists have interpreted the constitutive relation in a variety of ways. Of course, identity is the strongest constitutive relation. As a result, the mental state of the strongest version is the same as its same-order representation. This implies that a mental state essentially represents itself. I find it strange to speculate how self-representations and even a constitutive relation can be of identity, so I have no sympathy whatsoever for this idea. Some theorists see it as a "part-whole" relation and according to them for a mental state to be conscious, it is not adequate that the subject be aware of it; the subject's awareness of it must be part of that exact same mental state. Here, the term "part" does not stand for temporal or spatial connotation, rather it means logical part. I know when I am experiencing something conscious, like the smell of freshly brewed coffee. However, awareness is not an extra mental activity that takes place in conjunction with the experience. Conversely, the experience itself contains awareness. Some philosophers argue that

this "part-whole" perspective is problematic because it is questionable how a mental state could have an authentic causal connection with one of its logical components. There is another unpopular view but quite similar to the last kind, which claims that a mental state must consist of two parts, one of which must represent the other, for it to be considered conscious. Insofar as the appeal to two distinct logical parts may allow for a causal relationship to exist between them and, consequently, compatibility with naturalistic accounts of mental representation, philosophers believe it carries a certain potential. The argument that causal relationships cannot exist between logical components of the same particular or between the particular and itself might be raised. Indeed, there appears to be a problem with the notion of a causal relationship between two logical components of a single particular. Nonetheless, some philosophers postulate that there are certain situations where that is how they are naturally conveyed. They have come up with an example of a hardboiled egg, where the hardness and boiled nature of the egg are causally related in a way that the egg is hard because it is boiled and at the same time hardness and boiled nature are the logical component of the same egg. I find the whole discussion very superficial and only argumentative in a way as it is probably very good to defend the hypothesis of constitutive relation but how it is practically possible, I have my doubts over it. Hence, I would not subscribe to this alternative. Also, there is the same-order non-representational approach, which typically asserts that the concept of awareness of awareness is always present in conscious experiences, but this kind of awareness is neither relational nor representational; rather, it is an instantaneous, non-cognitive, pre-reflective phenomenon. The non-representational theory is seen as the logical development of poststructuralist thought and the successor to postmodern theory. Although non-representational theory is widely accepted and has a significant impact, it is also contentious and frequently misunderstood. Its complexity is somewhat to blame, but it is also largely due to its restricted use in actual research as well as the numerous methodological issues that remain

unsolved. The easiest way to articulate this perspective is to assert that it holds that a conscious state does not regard itself as an object. Therefore, being aware of consciousness is not a representational phenomenon if it implies acquiring something as an object. First, we need to elucidate what it means by the term "object" in this framework. An object may qualify as an object of experience if the subject perceives it to be beyond what is given to them in the domain of experience, which is typically understood to be a wholly subjective phenomenon. In this context, the concept of the object of experience is transcendent and has been provoked by non-representative approaches. But why should one grant such an unconventional notion of object in the first place that makes the whole issue even more ambiguous? To be honest, I cannot relate to this view both outside or even within the phenomenological framework, which I am currently developing. As long as I have a better version of the notion of object, I would not subscribe to this. So, the question remains the same; what could possibly be the best alternative concerning the constitutive relation for same-order approaches?

2.3.1. The Best Explanation for Same Order Approach

I feel more connected with the representational account of the same-order approach but the question of whether awareness of awareness can be interpreted in relational terms is one problem that separates same-order theories which advocate a representational overview of awareness of awareness. Kriegel discards the widely accepted claim that representation is relational. In his response, Kriegel specifically addresses the issue of whether or not the phenomena of consciousness of awareness can be adequately defined in terms of representation, though he resolves it by appealing to the self-constituting kind of representation of awareness of awareness. He contends that interpreting representation non-relationally is the best way to handle this issue. we can consciously represent the black licorice or anise note of Jagermeister not because we can stand in a relation to it, but because we can instantiate a property of representing that black licorice or anise note of Jagermeister is correctly said to be

non-relational concerning it although it is indeed a property of representing that black licorice or anise note of Jagermeister. Montague does not approve of Kriegel's account of self-represntalism that comprises a summoning kind of self-constituting type of representation or relation, she identifies awareness at its core, as fundamentally relational. According to her, Kriegel's portrayal of the same-order monitoring approach is flawed. To demonstrate the loopholes in the given approach she depicted Kriegel's claim and showed the disparity in it. I have already discussed in my first chapter the difference between the phenomenal and subjective aspects of the conscious state. Also, the subjective component is what provides any "what it's likeness" character to a conscious mental state. In turn, a mental state's ability to represent itself appropriately is what contributes it its subjective nature. There is a gap in this assertion and to mend it Kriegel introduced an idea that a representation can largely be comprised of two types of property, namely the properties represented and the properties constituted by the representation. He cites the former *schmalitative properties* and the latter *qualitative properties*. He expresses,

> being qualitatively bluish ought to be identified with being represented to be schmalitatively bluish. For a conscious state C to be qualitatively bluish is just for C to be represented to be schmalitatively bluish in the right kind of way . . . the idea is that qualitative properties are constituted by the inner awareness representation of the conscious state . . . For the state to be qualitatively bluish is for it to be represented to represent the right response-dependent property[21].

One might wonder about the uniqueness of schmalitative properties and it should be mentioned that what he earlier coined as qualitative properties, are what he wants the schmalitative properties to be—a representation of the response-dependent properties of objects. Montague

[21] Kriegel, U. 2009. 'A Self-Representational Account of Subjective Character'. *Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.* Oxford University Press. 109-110.

feels this formulation makes the notion of qualitative properties blur. Inner awareness now appears to be providing a new set of qualities, which are what is responsible for the *what it is like* quality of our conscious experiences. This is in contrast to the earlier claim that the inner awareness of some representation produces qualitative properties. More significantly, Kriegel's enlarged narrative appears to weaken the line between subjectivity or 'for me-ness' and qualitative character.

Hence Montague introduced the relational account of the same order approach. If consciousness is relational and everything that stands concerning it is a representational object, then everything that a person is aware of during an experience is a representational object related to that experience. Since, in the first chapter, I have already defined content as everything that is given to the subject in the course of that experience, we can claim that the content of an experience is identical to everything that is given to the subject in the course of that experience coincide with everything the subject is aware of in having the experience is, in turn, synonymous to all the representational objects of the experience. Enough, many philosophers do not identify as a relation at all or be a pseudo-relation at best, mostly because it does not include distinct objects. Nevertheless, there are other illustrations as well, that also do not relate distinct items, for example, the concept of self-love. The awareness of awareness relation must be understood as a special kind of representational relation. Arguably, the need for distinctness does not smear to awareness of awareness, though it is representational and consequently relational. The awareness of awareness allows it to partially determine the experience by being connected to the experience itself. Furthermore, as the phenomenological content of an experience and the comprehension of awareness relation are inherently associated the experience itself contributes to the phenomenological content. She illustrated[22] it in a way

[22] "That is, whenever a subject is aware of anything x, the subject stands in a certain very specific relation to x that we may describe—using a traditional piece of terminology—by saying that x is the or an object of the subject's awareness. We may say that it is an object in the sense of the German word Gegenstand, that is, something that

that anytime a subject is aware of anything x, the subject occupies a very particular position or a particular relation concerning x, which we can characterize—to use some conventional language—by stating that x is the subject's awareness or an object of the subject's awareness. We could define it as an object in the sense of the German word Gegenstand, which means that it is the object of the subject's awareness and that it "holds over against" the subject's awareness. Additionally, by definition, to be in a representational relation to something x is to stand in a relation to it such that x is the object of one's awareness.

2.4. Same-Order Approaches Over Higher-Order Approaches

I want to put forward an argument that attempts to establish the advantage of same-order approaches over higher-order approaches. It relates to our capacity to explain the immediateness of our awareness of our concomitant conscious experiences. From the above discussion, it could be pointed easily that in some mental states, the subject is aware of are conscious and some are unconscious. The question remains the same what makes the difference between an awareness of a mental state that ascertains that state's being conscious and an awareness that does not? One intuitively tenable hypothesis is that if the consciousness of a mental state is an immediate awareness, it succeeds in making that mental state conscious, and if it is not immediate awareness, it fails to make that mental state conscious. An appropriate portrayal of mental state must make the subject aware of it not only, but also with the necessary immediacy. Higher-order theories appear to fall short of this criterion, which is problematic. Suppose in the following situation[23], S consciously perceives a tree. S has another mental state,

'stands over against' the subject's awareness as the object of that awareness. And to stand in a relation to something x of such a kind that x is the object of one's awareness is, by definition, to stand in a representational relation to x" Montague, M. 2016. 'Awareness of Awareness'. *The Given: Experience and its content*. Oxford University Press. 57

[23] Kriegel, Uriah. "The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness." In *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, 143–70. The MIT Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6155.003.0008.

M*, which is a suitable higher-order representation of M, and as a result, the perception, M, is conscious. Of course, M typically plays a part in the causal chain that generates M*. The perception itself typically plays a key role in the causal process leading up to the higher-order representation of the tree, just as the tree typically plays a central role in the process leading up to the perception of it. This indicates that M* and M formation do not occur precisely at the same time. In contrast, there appears to be a causal process of some kind that begins with M and ends with the formation of M* over a temporal extension. In a sense, this process mediates the formation of M*. One might argue that this poses a challenge for HOMT. It seems to suggest that S's awareness of her perception of the tree is not immediate but rather is mediated by the relevant causal process.

Rosenthal addresses this problem and tries to solve it under the umbrella of higher-order approaches. I am not going deep into his line of reformation because frankly speaking, these kinds of challenges would not even appear in the case of same-order approaches. In each of the illustrations of same-order approaches, M or a logical component of M is what causes S to become aware of it; in other words, M comes with the awareness of it. There is no causal process that mediates the establishment of S's awareness of M. The challenge vanishes.

Having an experience means one is simply aware of having it. We always have the awareness of awareness. The occurrence of a phenomenal state divulges itself to the owner as s/he is having an experience. the awareness of awareness thesis has a strong common-sense base because, if we reflect on ourselves, we can easily understand this point. Historically, attempts to understand the role of consciousness in nature have been led by higher-order theories. The hypothesis, however, confronts several significant challenges, some of which are basic while others are technical. Additionally, many philosophers concur that it overlooks what makes consciousness unique. It is also based on the suitable premise that conscious states are ones that we are somehow aware of. This may be the case as recent research on consciousness

has revealed an intriguing and significant advancement in the monitoring theory of consciousness. Unexpectedly many theories that are willing to interpret consciousness in terms of monitoring make an effort to blur the distinction between the monitoring state and the monitored state, arguing that they are instead constitutively, internally, or in some other non-contingent ways connected rather than being independent existences.

In my opinion[24], the consciousness of an object or state of affairs and the awareness of that very conscious mental state cannot be an element of order. In its most basic meaning, the concept of order may contain the concepts of temporality and spatiality or both, even if it includes a fraction of it. I find this to be counterintuitive. Furthermore, since they consistently coexist in our experience, our intuition tells us that these two consciousnesses cannot be completely independent. Hence, I believe that awareness of awareness is essentially in the same order technique and his thesis is an attempt to build up a phenomenological framework, which necessarily presupposes the same-order hypothesis. But there is still one question that needs to be answered: which same-order technique, the relational or non-relational, lays the groundwork for my holistic idea? Well, I feel Montague is wrong to articulate and understand Kriegel, though her formation of a relational same-order approach makes sense independently. It is all one thing and it is just kind of something more than just phenomenologically manifest. There are purely metaphysical principles behind it. I am not sure how that constitution works but it seems like it exists like that. It is almost intuitive that whenever there is a consciousness of something, then there is a consciousness of that conscious state. Declaring it relational and ending the conversation there is probably not the best course of action. This self-representation, which encompasses the subjective character in essence, is also a reflection of reality and how it is. It longs for a deeper, more ontological quest. I hope to be able to clarify this constitutive

[24] This section is developed through conversation with Uriah Kriegel.

relation eventually. As of now, I am unsure of how to most effectively demonstrate the same-order representational approach. Let consciousness itself remain for the time being a same-order representation of knitting an overcoat that covers all conscious states with their nuanced differences and commonalities. We will investigate whether it is acceptable to articulate various conscious states within my phenomenological framework, which accepts and inherently incorporates the same order representation as one of the foundations, in the ensuing three chapters.

CHAPTER 3:

PERCEPTION, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND AN INCLUSION

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In the introduction, I argued that instead of distinguishing different kinds of consciousness to make sense of different kinds of mental states we could make distinctions between different kinds of phenomenology that those different mental states had. These differences embrace sensation (both exteroceptive and interoceptive) or sensory phenomenology, conscious thought (thinking, judgment) or cognitive phenomenology, and conscious emotion (happiness, fear) or evaluative phenomenology. In the next chapter, I asserted that phenomenology is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness since it is what consciousness is, and that "being conscious" is made up of phenomenological consciousness. However, I am beginning with conscious perception in this chapter, which involves various kinds of sensations. It is reasonable for one to speculate why perception, rather than sensation, such as pleasure and pain is brought up when addressing sensation because pain is traditionally conceived of as the trademark of sensation. The straightforward response is that pain is a very complex situation, and I am unable to put it solely in the domain of sensation. I will address it afterward in detail. Hence,

The philosophy of perception inhabits a special place among all the philosophical discourses. The nature of physical objects and how we perceive them has been a topic of debate in philosophy since ancient Greece. Traditionally philosophers have been inclined to the notion of perception from various viewpoints. Epistemological inquiry regarding perceptual knowledge and psychological exploration concerning the mechanism of perception were predominant in the domain of philosophy. My aim in this chapter is neither epistemological nor psychological in that sense. Part of my investigation is about whether perception resembles or differs from other mental states and part of it discusses the phenomenal character of

perception itself. The kind of sensory phenomenology we want to discuss can only be done within the broader understanding of perception as a distinctive mental state with its rich sensory phenomenology. There are mainly two ideas that conflict regarding the phenomenology of perception or most precisely visual perception. One is the immediacy of perception and the second is the phenomenal principle.

Immediacy technically refers to directness or a kind of intimacy. When we are aware of an object, we are aware of it as a direct immediate awareness and not by being aware of something else which is unlike the object of perception itself. The notion of the phenomenal principle was given by Howard Robinson. The principle is "If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality."[1] The idea is when someone experiences something C, then there is something C which that person is experiencing. At first sight, it might not seem to be a controversial claim. The strife arises when we include the idea of hallucination in the domain of perception. The inclusion of hallucination tends to prove that one cannot immediately perceive an object because one's experience would be the same even if there is no object perceived. Hallucination posits a problem because it seems phenomenologically indistinguishable from genuine perception. Consequently, if we follow the idea that phenomenology is all that is to consider then it is difficult to explain how the phenomenal principle could apply to both veridical and hallucinatory cases of perceptual experience. As I have mentioned above, our first line of conflict is one does not perceive an object by perceiving something else and the other one is when one grasps that something has a property then there is something that has the property. So, to find a plausible answer, we need to consider perception along with perceptually attributing properties. Because, when we

[1] Howard Robinsom, *perception*, london: Routledge,1994

perceive an object, we typically perceive it as being such, more precisely as a property unified object.

Most philosophers agree that all perceptual experiences involve sensory phenomenology; whether it is exteroceptive or interoceptive. Many philosophers argue that cognitive phenomenology is inseparable from the sensory one and others are inclined to typically reduce it to the intentionality of perception. They claim perception is an intentional state which upholds its relation to the intentional content. Two theories about the nature of perception rule the intellectual terrain in the philosophy of perception: relationalism and representationalism. Perceptual states are thought to be representational states at their core. Representationalists generally regard such contents as propositional, which includes the attribution of a property to an object and thus being equipped of functioning as either true or false. Representational states are relations to semantically evaluated contents. Relationalists claim, however, that perception is not representational. On the contrary, they maintain that the underlying framework for perception lies in the interaction between the perceiver and the concrete particular. In general, rationalists believe that perception is a relation that extends to the world because it is partially determined by the object, that is encountered. Philosophers of perception often disregard several significant historical theories because of a general preference for embracing representationalism and relationalism as the only feasible theories. There is another approach, which is not intentional in the general sense but also not phenomenal essentially, that is the adverbial theory[2]. The idea that perception is not essentially relational in structure is known as the adverbial theory. On the other hand, according to the adverbial view, perceiving an object entails being the agent of an event that has particular attributes, and those attributes account for the phenomenal and directed aspect of perception. The Adverbial Theory

[2] This section is developed from the article by D'Ambrosio, Justin and Journal of Philosophy Inc. "A New Perceptual Adverbialism:" *The Journal of Philosophy* 116, no. 8 (2019): 413–46. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116826.

typically asserts that the predicates that other theories claim the sticking properties of perceived objects are here interpreted as adverbs of the perceptual verb. Experiencing something is a matter of having one's experience modified in a certain way. But according to the most philosophers adverbialism is a dead theory. Frank Jackson[3] identified one major issue with this theory is that it has the many-property problem, that it does not have the expressive capacity to discern between perceptual scenarios where multiple attributes seem to be concurrently produced. The primary justification for disregarding the adverbial theory is its metaphysical implausibility: how can an occurrence containing specific attributes account for how our perceptions are of things in the external world? Also, many scholars feel that the weakness of this theory is that it is unable to capture one of the main features of perception itself and that is the phenomenology of visual experience.

Before discussing the phenomenology of perception, it is important to mention the content of perception. A general distinction can be made between the perception of objects or events and the perception of facts or state of affairs. The distinction can be portrayed as the difference between the verb phrase of something (I saw the rain) and when it takes the propositional form (I saw that it was raining). One can taste the wine and one can taste the sourness of the wine. Objects of perception can be things, can be events or that can be states of affairs. But perception need not necessarily be the propositional attitude. One can perceive something without necessarily perceiving that in a certain way. But for the strong intentionalism, all phenomenal aspects are part of its intentionality. Philosophers, who reject the notion of phenomenology in perception or more precisely in visual experience, are believers in a kind of transparency of experience. The term transparent is ambiguous and confusing in so many senses. Usually, this term has been used to justify mental states whose existence

[3] Jackson, Frank. "Symposium: The Adverbial Theory of Perception: On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual Experience." *Metaphilosophy* 6, no. 2 (April 1975): 127–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x.

enables us to know that we are within that state itself. Although here it stands for something different. It says that when one is having the experience of red, then one is not aware of one's experience of having certain intrinsic properties, rather one sees through to the redness itself. In this context, philosophers often talk about introspection. When one introspects, one sees through it that one attends to the colour red. But it is needless to mention that transparency of experience is a kind of generalization that takes a reductionist approach. It only talks about the represented facts that is what is represented or how things are represented. Perceptual experiences could have intentionality and that is not a matter of dispute but that intentionality cannot exclude the phenomenology of perception. Perception is exhausted with non-intentional, non-representational, intrinsic properties of the mind. Here lies the main problem of explaining phenomenal properties, that everyone knew it's obviously there but dispute over explaining it. To pinpoint the phenomenology of any perception we need to discuss the overall phenomenology perception in detail.

3.1. Why Phenomenology of Perception is Important

If I am aware of my perceptions, I know what it feels like to perceive this or that, even if the origin of these perceptions is unclear. Moreover, if I am a perceiver, I not only can but must detect *what it is like to* perceive something. The very notion of perceiver necessarily includes how to perceive this or that and the phenomenological inevitability is a unique kind of epistemic security. This phenomenological inevitability is important in a way that it is the stepping stone from the private phenomena to the discovery of its internal logic.

This epistemic value can be registered by the shift of frame from the traditional object-centric perceptual notions to the subject-oriented perception. In traditional discussions, the object of perception used to take centre stage. It was often presupposed that there is perception because there is a real, substantial, allegedly perceived object, which designs its perception to

be as it is. The perceived object has been qualified as an object existing in the material world independently of any perception, with the features it is being perceived in its appearance, and the existence of the perceived object is presumed. Hence, it simply confirms that if someone perceives a green leaf, then s/he is grasping a green leaf because this green leaf necessarily exists and because it is green, even when s/he is not perceiving it. In this framework, even the phenomenal qualities of perception are typically viewed as the ramification of the perceived object. The object or state of affairs oversees the subject and the process of perception. The theories, that somehow endorse the *myth of the given*[4], namely naive realism, the theory of causation, or even resemblance theories uphold the prevalence of the object of perception. The next perspective arises with the Copernican revolution, which takes the subject of perception into the dominant place. The perception exists because there is a subject of perception, that allows the perception of an object or state of affairs to be as it is. In this case, the perceived objects are not grasped as they are in themselves, but rather how they are raised through subjective conditions of the agent. When the subject becomes primary, all the qualities of objects are automatically converted into secondary qualities. My motivation for this thesis is neither object-centric nor subject-oriented, rather I am inclined to find the answer when one perceives some object or state of affairs how we perceive that as a particular thing or state of affairs (I have used object for both particular things or state of affairs afterward) along with

[4] the idea of the "myth of the given" originates in Wilfrid Sellars's "general critique of the entire framework of givenness" in his wide-ranging 1956 article, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-inferentially known to be the case but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact or of general truths; and (b) such that the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims -- particular and general -- about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only non-inferential but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact, whether particular or general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts must be inferential. This, however, as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the Myth. [Sellars 1997: 68-9]. However, this is not the line of argument I am dealing in my thesis so I am bracketing this discussion.

phenomenological perceptual properties. By the term "particular", I am not referring to any concrete object, but rather the amalgamation of singularity.

3.2. Generalist And Particularist Accounts of Phenomenological Content

Perception always involves experiencing something as a single, concrete object. That each of those separate objects is regarded as a distinct specific is almost universally acknowledged. Even people who otherwise tend to reject the idea of the existence of physical objects in the given context, in the final analysis, can hardly reject that we seem to perceive particular individual objects. This notion of perception is known as *phenomenology of particularity*. It is a component of the experience's entire phenomenology and content. There is theoretical disagreement among philosophers when attempting to incorporate phenomenological particularity within the realm of phenomenological content. I will be speaking about the particularist approach and the generalist approach, which are two different alternatives for addressing phenomenological particularity. We are acquainted with Putnam's Twin Earth style thought experiments, where the external object changes but the phenomenology stays the same. They necessarily invoke the idea that the phenomenal content of perceptual experience is fundamentally general. If the phenomenological content of perceptual experience is general, then we can account for the experiential-particularity of an individual's experience. But before discussing the generalist approach I would like to demonstrate Putnam's famous thought experiment.

3.2.1. Twin Earth-Style Thought Experiments

A lot of philosophers have endeavoured to elaborate on Hilary Putnam's fundamental concept ever since his ground-breaking work "Meaning and Reference"[5] was published. Putnam demonstrated how two distinct individuals who matched their intrinsic traits could nonetheless

[5] Putnam, Hilary. "Meaning and Reference". *Journal of Philosophy* 70, 1973. 699–711.

have different interpretations of the same word. I have made an effort to develop the concept here in terms of perceptual content. The study will specifically focus on hypotheses that suggest two "phenomenal twins" could perceptually represent diverse entities.

In Putnam's original description[6] of the experiment, we start by supposing that there is a planet called "Twin Earth" that is almost identical to Earth in every possible way. Every person and object on Earth has a Twin counterpart on Twin Earth. Twin Earth is devoid of water, which is the only distinction between the two planets. Instead of it, there is a liquid that resembles it on the surface but differs chemically because it is made up of a more complex formula that we refer to as "XYZ" instead of H_2O. XYZ is referred to as "water" by the Twin Earthlings, who call their language "English". Lastly, we established a time frame for our thought experiment which took place several millennia before, a time during which the inhabitants who lived on Earth and Twin Earth would not have been able to recognize that the liquids they had been referring to as "water" were H_2O and XYZ, respectively. Inhabitants on Earth would encounter water in the same way that those living on Twin Earth would encounter XYZ. This raises the question of whether the word "water" means the same thing to an Earthling and his duplicate on Twin Earth. Given that, they have the same emotions, thoughts, and other psychological states, the term "water" refers to H_2O when Earthling employs it, whereas when Twin Earth habitant applies the term, it alludes to XYZ, at least in Putnam's estimation. Putnam brilliantly wrapped up this outcome by declaring that meanings simply aren't inside our heads.

[6] Although I wrote about it in the first chapter, I am referring to the crux of it as it would be easier for me to illustrate the later argument accordingly.

3.2.2. The Twin Earth Thought Experiment and Phenomenological Particularity

"Twin Earth" and similar thought experiments encourage the premise that, regardless of how it seems that we perceive particular physical objects, the phenomenological content of perceptual experience is fundamentally and completely general rather than particular. In the context of Twin Earth-style thought experiments, I would like to define generalist account as any phenomenological content that is shared between experiences in a way that allows both sensations to be said to have the same phenomenological content even though their objects or external representational content are different from one another. The problem of particularity can be formulated as follows in light of this generalist understanding of phenomenological content, if perceptual experience's phenomenological content is general content, then how could we adequately account for the experiential, phenomenological nature of particularity? How can we extract the specific phenomenological experience from the overall phenomenological experience? But before that, we need to know what is the generalist account of phenomenological content.

3.2.2.1. Generalist Account of Phenomenological Particularity

While addressing phenomenological content, generalists usually state that two experiences can have precisely the same phenomenological content but different external objects, or different external representational content. Furthermore, they indicate that a single term referring to the experience's external object cannot be employed for defining the experience's phenomenological content. Different subjects who are phenomenal duplicates can share the same phenomenological content across separate objects. If this is a true position then any term to refer to the external object of experience cannot be applied to cite the phenomenological content of the experience in question. Once more, allow me to evaluate the twin earth experiment, which involves two experiences with identical phenomenological content.

Contrary to the claim that two experiences can have exactly the same phenomenological content but different external objects, it would be impossible for the experiences to have identical phenomenological content while having distinct objects of experience if a singular term were used to refer to the external object in specifying the phenomenological content of one of those experiences. Therefore, it follows that when defining the phenomenological content of perceptual experience, one must employ general terms only. The generalist explanation seemed to neglect a fundamental phenomenological reality, that is, the simple fact that it is obvious that we experience particular objects, despite the generalist hypothesis being driven by phenomenological concerns. However, the phenomenological particularity is unquestionably a part of perceptual experience given the entirely broad phenomenological content that generalists haven't been able to pin down.

Supporters of the generalist account frequently refer to the view, that there is a fundamental distinction between thinking about something in a particular space through a definite description and thinking about it because one is directly acquainted with him in perception. When the subject perceives the external object of perception, it separates it from other objects and establishes a distinct demonstrative relationship with it by relying solely on its general characteristics. This means that only general qualities are involved in general thought and perceptual contact with an object. Hence, in this regard, there is no phenomenological distinction between these two interactions with objects, and the uniqueness by which perception distinguishes the object of perception is overlooked in the absence of a phenomenological distinction between them. One might argue, in favour of the generalist explanation, that although both interactions with objects involve only general properties, the types of properties and relationships engaged are distinct significantly between thought and perception. It is because of these distinctions that the generalist account can define the perceptual phenomenological particularity. Imagine the difference between a subject's

thought of the Great Wall of China and their actual perception of it. The subject can directly locate the wall in space concerning herself and other things, and her perception of the wall is necessarily determined by its colour and shape. Now, thinking about it might also entail considering its colour and shape, but it seems as though there is a way in which these qualities show up in our visual experiences but not in our thinking. It must be accepted that the Great Wall of China cannot be directly located in space simply by thinking about it. According to one point of view, the phenomenology of particularity will be conveyed through the perception of shape since it could reveal a bounded object. Naturally, seeing shapes depends on the ability to perceive colour or the diffraction of colours. Following this, one might argue that shape perception is an acceptable justification for phenomenological particularity, as shape plausibly delineates the object's boundaries. Now, how can shape reveal an object's boundaries?

Not every shape I perceive denotes the boundaries of an object. Because we have already recognized shape as belonging to an object, it just defines an object's border. That is, in order to experience a shape property such as identifying an object's boundary, we must initially have a particular object's experience. Since we are concerned with object shapes, the phenomenology of particularity is phenomenologically prior to shape experience, it is unable to adequately account for the phenomenological particularity. There is a possibility that we cannot perceive an object without seeing it as shaped. This assertion is irrelevant to the discussion at hand, even if it is true. Because it is inherent in the phenomenological nature of ordinary visual perceptions that we perceive unified objects as such. Shape highlights the spatial bounds of an object; hence shape perception explains the phenomenological particularity fact. However, it can only be accomplished if we are already aware that the shape belongs to a previously identified object. Upon closer scrutiny, it has been demonstrated that the shape and boundary that were initially thought to establish the phenomenological particularity are actually components of the object's perceptual experience. That is just a form

of fallacy known as begging the question. Thus, it could be summed up that phenomenological particularity cannot be validated by sensory qualities like shape and colour alone or in conjunction with spatial attributes or borders in the given context. Hence, phenomenological particularity cannot be resolved with a generalist account of phenomenological content. In the next section, we will explore whether phenomenological particularity can be adequately captured by the particularist framework of phenomenological content.

3.2.2.2. Particularist Account of Phenomenological Particularity

Is there any way for particularists to acknowledge phenomenological particularity with greater efficiency? What does the particularist account of phenomenological content mean? The concept of representation put forward by Evans and McDowell, holds that one can only ascertain the representational content of a perception in the context of the object of the experience. They contend that physical objects are in a way part of the contents of perceptions. The representational content of a veridical perception cannot occur in a perceptual experience in the absence of the relevant object because veridical perceptions are object-involving. Thus, it is impossible for hallucinations and very identical veridical perceptions (twin earths) to possess the same content. They have used the term "content" in an absolute externalist[7] framework. The notion of the particularist account of phenomenological content refers to this concept of a representational (perhaps externalist) account of specific instances of phenomenological perceptual content. It would indisputably claim that if the objects of two

[7] Externalism concerning the content of thoughts or behaviours is known as content externalism. Generally speaking, content externalism is viewed as a claim of dependent possession that is based on a more fundamental claim of individuation dependency. The nature of a person's environment and the information regarding that environment's relationship to the content determine whether or not that person may entertain the material. An individual cannot entertain this content unless the surroundings have particular kinds of objects, properties, facts, occurrences, etc. The idea of content externalism holds that the possession of a mental state with a certain content is, at least partially, though not always, contingent on its environment.

McGinn, C. 1989, *Mental Content*, Oxford: Blackwell.

true experiences are different, then their phenomenological content cannot be the same. If identifying the phenomenological content of perceptual experiences requires the presence of external objects.

Martin[8] endorses the idea that perception is object-dependent. He made an effort to validate phenomenological particularity but that is confined to general phenomenological content. It would be better to get acquainted with Martin's vocabulary before delving into his idea of object dependency. He makes a distinction between "phenomenal nature" and "phenomenal/qualitative character". "Phenomenal/qualitative character" is supposed to capture resemblances and variances of content that can exist across diverse experiences regardless of their actual objects. The content of sensory experiences is context insensitive, that is discrete sensory occurrences that could have arisen at different times, or with the presentation of distinct objects, enjoy the same content. So, Martin's notion of phenomenal/qualitative character is fundamentally coherent with the generalist's notion of content. But Martin also acknowledges, the phenomenological particularity of perceptual experiences. When he introduces the notion of the "phenomenal nature" of a perceptual experience, he also seeks to convey the idea that particulars are usually presented by experience. He seeks to convey that experience typically represents particulars. He states that comprehension of what an experience is like requires knowledge of this phenomenological aspect. According to Martin's jargon, the fact that perceptual experiences exhibit particular objects is a phenomenological fact and this fact is captured through an account of the phenomenal nature of an experience. Martin wrote that,

> Once we reflect on the way in which an experience has a subject matter, the presentation of a particular scene, then we need a way of making room for the essentially or inherently particular aspects of this as well as the general attributes of

[8] Martin, M. G. F. "Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought". in A. O'Hear (ed.) *Logic, Thought and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 173–214. 2002.

> experience. We need to contrast the unrepeatable aspect of its phenomenology, what we might call its phenomenal nature, with (what) it has in common with qualitatively the same experiential events, what we might call its phenomenal character[9].

Thus, Martin's approach is that while experiences of quantitatively distinct entities could have similar qualitative or phenomenal character, their phenomenal natures cannot be shared. Even though two experiences have the same qualitative character, they exhibit distinct phenomenal natures when they include different objects. One approach to reflect the fact that perceptual experiences of particulars have a phenomenology of particularity is to say that they have phenomenal natures, or, to use Martin's vocabulary, that they present particular subject matters. Martin begins the discussion of phenomenal natures by introducing the premise that perceptual experiences possess a "correctness condition". He then goes on to explain these circumstances by taking into account the scenario in which a person experiences two different but qualitatively identical perceptions of ducks. Martin asserts that as correctness conditions can only be established concerning a context, the conditions for correctness for these two experiences will be different. He argues that the content of two qualitatively identical experiences can be the same while those experiences have dissimilar correctness conditions, because the objects of those experiences may be different. In Martin's account, the concept of correctness conditions enables us to distinguish between those features of perceptual experience that are repeatable and those that are not and thus helps us to comprehend the phenomenology of particularity. The repeated aspect of an experience that can be shared with subsequent experiences is its phenomenal or qualitative character. However, Martin argues that a perceptual experience's unrepeatable quality is part of its subject matter, wherein this is supposed to portray the phenomenology of particularity. And what could be a better option than the actual physical object itself for the unrepeatable feature of a perceptual experience of a physical object? Martin

[9] Ibid. Pp 193-194.

claims that correctness conditions, which depend on the context, are used for establishing physical objects. Additionally, we have the unrepeatable feature to account for the phenomenological particularity fact once we have the object presented through correctness parameters. He eventually introduces physical objects themselves to provide a justification for phenomenological particularity.

This approach, although acknowledging the undisputed reality of phenomenological particularity and registering it as a component of the "phenomenal nature" of an experience, suffers the disadvantage of not providing an adequate phenomenological explanation for it. Regarding the phenomenology of particularity itself, he offers nothing substantial or fundamentally sufficient. The phenomenal nature of an experience is the presentation of a particular physical object. Here, 'being present' is meant to be a phenomenological notion. If a physical object does not constitute part of the phenomenology of an experience it is not present in the experience. Physical objects do not, however, always form a part of the phenomenology of experience. If veridical perceptions and their equivalent hallucinations can truly be subjectively indistinguishable, then the 'qualitative content', in Martin's terms, accounts entirely for the phenomenology of these experiences. So physical objects do not play a role in determining the phenomenology of veridical perceptions. Even in cases where there isn't an actual object, the presentation of the object distinguishes an authentic perception from a hallucination. Ultimately, it appears that Martin is merely stating, without elaborating in what sense the experience's "presenting" of a specific physical object constitutes a unique phenomenological fact. In other words, it seems utterly unclear what exactly 'being present' denotes, and in what sense it is categorically a phenomenological notion, in Martin's framework. The problem with Martin's theory is that it seems, to comprise exactly the same problem as all object-dependent accounts. they confuse that a perceptual experience, when veridical, is of a particular object and the fact that it looks to a subject that s/he is perceiving a

particular object. The attempt to connect the phenomenology of particularity to real physical objects is the point where the error originates. The majority of ordinary perceptual experiences give us the impression that a particular object has been perceived. Perception of one or more things as particular objects is an aspect of the experience's phenomenology. I think the fine-grained phenomenological particularity cannot be adequately defended by a simple correctness condition. There has to be something more than that. This happens to be a phenomenon that Montague speaks of for employing the term "phenomenological particularity." Montague argues that in an attempt to decode the phenomenological particularity fact, Martin erroneously hunted for something unrepeated, non-general, or a particular physical entity. She also affirms that for this basic reason, phenomenological particularity also arises in hallucinations. She concluded that (i) When attempting to provide a sufficient explanation for phenomenological particularity, we have ample reason not to turn to physical objects. and (ii) Like all phenomenological features, phenomenological particularity is a general feature of content. Almost all perceptual experiences include something akin to the following in their general "phenomenological content": that there is some particular item being represented as there is a presentation of a ‘this thing’. The ‘this thing’ feature is a general feature since it can be shared by many different perceptual experiences[10]. Hence, phenomenological particularity is a general aspect of content, just like all other phenomenological features. The aforementioned general phenomenological content is present in almost all perceptual experiences. However, phenomenological particularity possesses an exclusivity that sets it apart from the general realm of phenomenology. Why does it vary depending on the individual person? The individual's competence in implementing concepts in the context of a particular occurrence is what fundamentally determines the cognitive-phenomenological content of that experience.

[10] Montague, M. 2016. “Perception of Physical Objects: Particularity Fact”. *The Given: Experience and its Content.* Oxford University Press. 134-135.

Putting it differently, I would like to figure out whether the cognitive phenomenology of a perceptual experience extends beyond or behind the deployment of everyday particular concepts of objects. In simple terms, the answer is that it encompasses a few core ideas that are indispensable for almost every thought and perception we encounter. These ideas play a major role in explaining the phenomenology of particularity. One prevailing view is that cognitive phenomenology must be included in the phenomenology of perception to defend the particular perception; this is the particularity's phenomenology.

3.3. Convergence of Perception and Cognition in Phenomenological Framework

You might have noticed that the chapter is titled "Perception, Phenomenology, and an Inclusion", which is precisely an indication that this chapter is going to discuss something over and above just the phenomenology of perception. It talks about inclusion. But what is it and more aptly why is there even an inclusion? I will discuss about it in this section. Perception must be studied from a historical perspective as well as on the foundation of first-person observation. At certain historical points, perception and thinking have a general inclination to converge, while apparently, they seem to diverge with an emphasis on one of them. If we alter our perspective and instead of rigidly submitting to the third-person standpoint, consider the first-person perspective, we can validate the convergence of perception and cognising.

Whether perceptions are accurate or not, thoughts are a part of perceptual experiences. It is evident that the basic framework of our thought process is "object-positing", which is the default configuration. The rudimentary object-positing feature of thought may then be accompanied by other more specific concepts and sensory properties to produce the experiences of objects we generally have. The phenomenology of particularity is explained by this aspect of cognition. "This object" of perceptual experience is delivered by object-positing. Being presented experientially with an identifiable and typically enduring unity is necessary to

experience this form of this-ness, and object-positing provides a tool for this. There are situations when affixing concepts to a thing through object-posting is misinterpreted by others. Concept-applying may be involved in object-posting, although it is not its core function. It appears likely that animals also recognize objects as continuously existing, unified entities, as do very young children. If this is the case, adult humans may also be capable of object-identification even in the absence of a conceptual understanding of objects. The explanation of how my perception may actually be considered a perception of this object at all appears to depend on the phenomenological particularity fact. It is the experience of a "this thing" that the perceptual experience involves the object-positing element of the perceptual experience that, given any perception of any object, allows that specific experience to secure external reference to that specific object at all. It is unclear how my impression of this object, or how there gets to be a perception of this at all, in the absence of object-positing. We wouldn't have anything that qualified as a perception of this particular object if we could remove the object-positing feature from the overall phenomenological character of the object-caused experience while simultaneously maintaining all other phenomenological aspects and external connections. Because the object-positing feature has been embedded in the experience, it is difficult to imagine the removal of it. But when we see objects, our perception goes beyond simple colour, shape, and other differences. Understanding the underlying cognitive phenomenological fact of object-positing is essential in order to comprehend the mechanism of our perception as the entirety of unified objects. We may explain how cognitive phenomenology describes the phenomenology of perception by employing this well-known puzzle illustration, which is also an analogy for real-world experiences.

3.3.1. Duck/Rabbit Puzzle as a Prototype of Real Perception

In this famous puzzle, there is a picture that appears as both a duck and a rabbit. It becomes undetectable what it actually exhibits. On the basis of our observational custom along with

some conscious effort and practice, we could be able to shift in one between the two possibilities. So, what is ultimately depicted in this image? There is no definitive result but most likely, we might assume that it is neither a duck nor a rabbit but simply either-or. It might not seem anything remarkable, but in commerce with this either-or phenomenon, we could understand that the appearance of the whole world in our consciousness works exactly this way as that very picture puzzle. A detailed comprehension would make the perspective clearer that there are not only two but rather infinite potentials of seeing the world, even the easiest perception may yield absolutely different aspects and that very difference is marked by the associated cognitive phenomenology along with the sensory phenomenology of the perceiving in general. Normally we do not care about this in our daily perception. We just overlook all perceptual annoyances that cannot be immediately and regularly considered. Therefore, we assume that they do not exist for us. But when we continue our awareness in such undecided situations of momentary non-existence, they lead us to an epistemic crisis. Here, crisis typically stands for cognising, we have to decide what can be seen. In the easiest case, as in the example, there are two possibilities and these possibilities of vision are nothing other than certain cognitive judgment. Deciding what to see means to previously think of a potential corresponding to that judgment. What we cannot decide we are equally unable to see and vice versa In becoming aware of our actual perception, these phenomena do not remain a quest of academic deliberation but accessible in an experiential sense. The mental exercise of artificial picture puzzles also be retrieved in our everyday perception.

How it is that we perceive and think about particular objects is an important aspect of the total phenomenological content. Talking about the inclusion of cognitive phenomenology is not the full story. However, in the next chapter, I will consider the question more substantially by considering cognitive phenomenology in detail.

This indicates a different insight that goes beyond the phenomenology of perception or the phenomenology of cognition. When they are undoubtedly staring at the same object, why would one person perceive a duck while another sees a rabbit? In other words, it refers to an individual's perspective, which is closely related to the "for-me" nature of the subject. It profoundly reveals a hint of one's propensity as an individual to how s/he interprets the world. However, this is a totally distinct topic from the comprehensive phenomenological framework I am speaking about in this thesis. I'm going to talk about this at the very end.

CHAPTER 4:

PHENOMENOLOGY OF COGNITION

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Everyone has moments when they think the most awful thing and make rash decisions, despite the reality that logic might demonstrate that there is no reason to believe that something horrible would occur. We cannot help but anticipate what could possibly go wrong. However, there are other occasions when we think positively and yearn for favourable outcomes regardless of the circumstances, even though it's easier to state it, it's not necessarily simple to do as life often challenges us by pushing our confidence to the trial. However, how does thinking in an adverse tone vary from thinking in an optimistic tone? The temptation to enumerate this disparity with individualistic propensities and socio-cultural discourses is overwhelming. I do not mind that, but my primary concern is the conscious juxtaposition between positive and negative thoughts. So, what is conscious thinking? How does thinking feel like in practice? In what ways does it feel? Does it have a raw feel about it? Or does it possess some distinctively accepted cognitive colouring that sets it apart from all other forms of accepted phenomenology? Is it similar to feeling a sensation instinctively, or is it a different experience entirely? In that case, the cognitive phenomenon would explain the discrepancy. Until this point, everyone would most likely agree, but arguments break out when they try to define the essence of that phenomenon. However, it actually opens up an entirely fresh area of discussion in phenomenology and the realm of philosophy of mind as a whole. It may appear that the inquiry might be resolved easily. Any attempt to simplify things only makes everything more convoluted. To understand the phenomenology of thinking or thought in general first we need to comprehend the terminology and the best fit for the present purpose.

4.1. Motivation Behind Cognitive Phenomenology

Why are researchers so immersed in cognitive phenomenology? Considering the broader philosophical framework is a potential way to approach this topic. The basis for this claim is that cognitive phenomenology merits more investigation. There are good grounds for believing that the state of cognitive phenomenology has implications for epistemological inquiries. There are plenty of indications for assuming that questions in the field of epistemology, value theory, and semantics, among others, are impacted by the status of cognitive phenomenology[1].

Let us suppose that you want to check your smartphone's WhatsApp app to see whether there are any new messages. Looking is the obvious course of action. Let's begin by saying that you do and a pop-up appears there. In that instance, you have reason to suppose that you have received a message on WhatsApp. Let's assert that however, that something inhibits the information from passing through your visual system to affect how things appear to you visually as you gaze at your phone application. You are unable to justify your belief that a message is being sent in this instance. If there is no phenomenal difference, then there is no epistemic difference, even if your brain somehow represents the identical visually received information about your surroundings. Now, imagine being in the flowing situation of intuiting:

> In a book you read, “If $a < 1$, then $2 - 2a > 0$,” and you wonder whether this is true. Then you “see” how a’s being less than 1 makes 2a smaller than 2 and so $2 - 2a$ greater than 0[2].

One might question whether $2 - 2a > 0$ if $a < 1$. Imagine that you do and you "see" that if $a < 1$, then $2 - 2a > 0$. In those circumstances, your belief that $2 - 2a > 0$ is justified if $a < 1$. It is natural to assert two assertions regarding this explanation. First of all, it differs in one respect from the

[1] This section is inspired and then developed by Chudnoff Elijah’s introduction part, from the book *Cognitive Phenomenology.*

[2] Chudnoff, Ellijah. ‘Introduction’. *Cognitive Phenomenology*. Routledge. 2015. 1

type of justification we have for believing that there is a message in the WhatsApp application. It is a priori in fact. This indicates that it is not fundamentally reliant on sensory experiences. However, given that there were sensory occurrences that contributed to the development of the reasoning for thinking if a <1, then 2 - 2a > 0, then this reasoning is not what we obtained via sensory manifestations. Furthermore, regardless of the distinction, there is a way in which the rationale is comparable to the kind of justification provided for believing that there is something in WhatsApp. It is phenomenal to be specific. As a result, it does fundamentally depend on a particular experience. Imagine you have thought out the scenario of whether 2 - 2a > 0 if a <1 and all the necessary conditions are in place, but just as you are about to check the truth, nothing phenomenally occurs. The checking is not complemented with any phenomenal distinction from what came before. If there is no feel difference, then there is no epistemic difference, regardless of how the brain represents all the cognitively excavated knowledge about the relevant arithmetical relations. if we take the viewpoint that all phenomenal states are sensory states. Then there is a significant challenge. Despite the fact that all experiences are sensory experiences, the reasoning for thinking that if a< 1, then 2 - 2a > 0 is not constituted by sensory experience. There must be a trade-off. Mostly, philosophers tend to reject the connection between justification and phenomenology. Other theorists will deny the a priori -ness, or the notion that any justification is independent of sensory experience. Certainly, modern epistemology is familiar with this point of view. The idea that all phenomenal states are sensory states can also be disputed. Then, an a priori reason that is partially phenomenally constructed may exist. Clarifying cognitive phenomenology is necessary to determine the viability of this. Therefore, epistemology provides some incentive to undertake this cognitive phenomenology endeavour.

Let’s consider the Value theory along with its connection with cognitive phenomenology in general. Headbutting a wall is undesirable almost universally. Being that

the wall is unclean, it could be bad because hitting it could cause further issues if safety measures aren't performed. But typically, hitting a wall hurts and that's why it's unpleasant. Consider an alternative scenario where you strike the wall but nothing hurts. In this particular situation, it appears that hammering on the wall isn't unpleasant, or at least not awful, given that, the wall is clean and that you didn't experience any discomfort. The overall well-being of an individual is not affected by the same physical and physiological occurrences, or at least not to the same degree if they have no phenomenal impact. Take a moment to reflect on the areas of life that do not revolve around keeping the head away from the wall. You contemplate the structures of arguments, work out logical conundrums, illustrate philosophical theses, and exactly the way life evolves. Two assertions are reasonable to make regarding at least some of these events. First, their contribution to your welfare differs from the kind made by hammering the wall in one important way. It is inherently independent of sensory experience, in particular. Even while your intellectual life's activities are connected to sensory experiences, these are only incidental to the values, or at least the unique values, that they achieve. The term ‘a priori’ does not exist for this. However, the concept is similar. Additionally, there is a way in which their contribution is comparable to slamming a wall. It is astounding in particular since it does fundamentally depend on a certain kind of experience. Imagine solving a logical puzzle that you do solely for leisure by applying your reasoning skills. However, nothing phenomenologically emerges. Your brain recognizes the solution, but it fails to produce anything phenomenologically remarkable. The unique contribution to your welfare is that finding such answers might be absent in this instance. Consider the idea that sensory states underlie all phenomenal states. Then there is an issue similar to the a priori justification dilemma. The following obligations would come to us: Even though events in your intellectual life don't entirely depend on sensory experience to benefit you, all experiences, including sensory experiences, are experiences. Again, something must be sacrificed. The relationship

between value and phenomenology will be rejected by a lot of philosophers. At least some values might not be fundamentally dependent on experience. Therefore, these values may be what our intellectual life experiences always appreciate. The axiological autonomy of our intellectual existence will be excluded by other philosophers. They might adhere to hedonism, a philosophy that holds that all value is derived from pleasurable experiences. The idea that all phenomenal states are sensory states can also be disputed. Clarifying cognitive phenomenology is necessary to determine the viability of this. As a result, value theory provides some incentive to pursue cognitive phenomenology.

How cognitive phenomenology is related to semantics is also an important ground of inclination in the overall quest for cognitive phenomenology. Generally, semantics stands for the study of meaning, the historical-psychological study, and the classification of changes in the signification of words or forms viewed as factors in linguistic development. Suppose you are a cinephile and you take your friend, who does not watch cinema that frequently to the cinema archive and museum for the first time. You stand in front of the portrait of Jean-Luc Godard and say "This is Godard, a Swiss film director, screenwriter, and film critic, is the pioneer of the French New Wave film movement in the 1960s. He was possibly the most significant French filmmaker of the post-war era. Godard's films include 'Vivre sa vie', 'Cléo from 5 to 7', 'Breathless', 'Pierrot le Fou', and so on." You definitely say many other things about the genius as it seems infinite. Your friend perceives the photo carefully, though s/he never heard of Godard before, now that she is acquainted with him, she can entertain various thoughts about him and his cinema. You move on to another portrait and it is of Akira Kurosawa and say "This is Kurosawa, a Japanese filmmaker and painter, directed 30 films in a career spanning over five decades. He is widely regarded as one of the most powerful filmmakers in the history of cinema. He is famous for his filmmaking techniques. He often employs the 'axial cut', in which the camera moves toward or away from the subject through a series of matched

jump cuts rather than tracking shots or dissolves. His work includes 'Seven Samuri', 'Rashomon' and many others." Your friend sees the photo as s/he never heard about him. Now that she is acquainted with him, she can entertain various thoughts about Kurosawa. Suppose, then you move on to the picture of Stanley Kubrick and say, "This is Kubrick, an American film director, screenwriter, and photographer. He is widely regarded for the adaptations of novels or short stories with detailing, innovative cinematography, extensive set design, and dark humour. Kubrick's films naturally encompass expressions of an inner struggle and observation from different perspectives. He was very careful not to present his own views of the meaning of his films and to leave them open to interpretation. His filmography includes' The Shining', 'Barry Lyndon', 'A Clockwork Orange', 'A Space Odyssey' and others." However, this time something stops your friend from experiencing it phenomenologically the way you lead her in other demonstrations. Probably she become bored by that time and was not paying enough attention. Even though she was unaware of Kubrick before, her brain somehow managed to store the image of the picture she had seen, though she could not think about him as she was not properly listening. If the phenomenology of seeing and thinking is identical, then it is supposed to be the same. Then there is no variation in what your friend is capable of thinking. But this is not the case here. Evaluate your ideas now on basic abstract concepts like addition, subtraction, and multiplication. We all eventually get the ability to think about addition, subtraction, and multiplication, just like seeing photos of those three directors. Additionally, it appears that we acquire these thinking abilities through training and practice. It is appealing to assert that those instances of learning or discovery widen the mind to basic abstract ideas. They are analogous to the contentions we discussed about epistemology and value theory. First, it is asserted that these events differ from those that facilitate rational cognition in one important way: they are fundamentally independent of sensory experience. Maybe interacting more with mathematical discourses allows one to learn addition. However,

the sensory encounters appear both unnecessary and insufficient to get acquainted with addition itself. Second, there is a correlation between episodes that ground thoughts in straightforward abstract concepts and episodes that ground thoughts in reasonable subject matter. Both, in particular, relate to phenomenology. Your friend cannot think about Kubrick, or at least s/he cannot think of certain types of related ideas, because Kubrick continues to be phenomenally invisible to her. In addition, if it continues to be phenomenally invisible to you, then you cannot think about or at least cannot think of certain kinds of thoughts about addition. It is possible to predict how the story will end. Think of phenomenal states as all being sensory states. This presents a challenge because we would then have the following obligations: Though they are constitutively dependent on some experiences and all experiences are sensory experiences. But certain events of discovery or learning that allow you to think about straightforward abstract concepts are constitutively independent of sensory experience. All of them can't be true. The relationship between thought and phenomenology may be denied by certain philosophers, at least in the context of straightforward abstract concerns. It appears that we only ever think of issues that we decide on a logical structure, but it doesn't seem that this requires experienced Logical processes. Perhaps we have similar ideas about mathematical procedures. The notion that abstracts thoughts are constitutively independent of sensory states will not be approved by all philosophers. A potential theory is that non-phenomenal elements account for the distinctions between thoughts about perceptible and abstract matters and that both types of thoughts are dependent on sensory phenomenology. Another strategy is to argue against the notion that all phenomenal states are sensory states. Understanding cognitive phenomenology is necessary to determine how feasible this is. Therefore, semantics can provide some inspiration for such a project.

Apart from the above motivations, one might find that cognitive phenomenology is an interesting area of research in itself. It has a *sui generis* kind of phenomenology associated with

it because frankly speaking, how it is like to be a thinking thing is fundamentally felt different from how it is like to sense or perceive to be specific. Unfortunately, this is not so straightforward and regarding the state of cognitive phenomenology, reasonable disagreements are there, mostly they attempt to reduce it into sensory phenomenology.

4.2. Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology

In recent years, the question regarding the phenomenal character of conscious thought, which is technically termed 'cognitive phenomenology' has emerged as a primordial issue within the domain of analytic philosophy of mind and also within recent discussions in phenomenology. The central questions that have been asked about the nature of cognitive phenomenology are the following:

(1) The Intentionality Question: What is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the intentionality of cognition? Are the phenomenal properties of cognition identical with or distinct from intentional properties of cognition?

(2) The Reduction Question: What is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the phenomenology of sensory perception? Are the phenomenal properties of cognition identical with or distinct from the phenomenal properties of sensory perception?

Does conscious thought have a proprietary phenomenal character? Does it have its own specific cognitive "phenomenology"? or the phenomenal character of occurrent, conscious, cognitive states can only be explained in terms of the popular kinds of phenomenal experiences, such as sensory, perceptual, or even emotional experiences? Does conscious thought have its specific phenomenology or can that phenomenology be reduced to the phenomenology of the accompanying sensory or emotional states? If it has its dedicated phenomenology then how can it be described? Needless to say, this area of investigation is divided between defenders

and deniers of cognitive phenomenology. There is often a rather general assumption that addressing cognitive phenomenology is somehow closely connected with classic phenomenologists. This raises an additional question, whether the tradition of phenomenology has anything particularly relevant to contribute to the ongoing debates concerning the phenomenology of cognition. The consequences of these debates concerning cognition along with its alleged phenomenology have raised many questions in the field of philosophy of mind and consciousness studies. Firstly, the claim that cognition has its own unique phenomenology questions various fundamental assumptions in recent research of consciousness, given that inquest on the phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness of experience are normally at the heart of sensations and perceptions, sometimes extending also to bodily experiences and emotions but not precisely to experiences of thinking. Mostly because phenomenology has always been assumed to have a sensory character and traditional theories of consciousness are formulated by excluding cognitive experiences. Now the interesting point is, if it turns out that there is a specific or rather proprietary phenomenal character of thought then how does it influence current theories of phenomenal consciousness? For a long time, it has been assumed that conscious thoughts are something that can be replicated by machines and computers, but if it has become the reality that it has its own individualistic phenomenology, then we need to reconsider all those debates regarding computation and artificial intelligence. Secondly, the famous question about the nature and efficacy of consciousness which is stated as the hard problem of consciousness needs to be renovated because it was primarily about the sensory and emotive experiences. It is worth asking how does cognitive phenomenology modify the portrayal of such puzzles. The question arises, does that same puzzle persist for conscious thoughts as well? Is conscious thought a part of the easy problems of consciousness, related to information processing, computation, and intentionality? If the defence for cognitive phenomenology wins, it seems that the hard part cannot be separated from the easy part. It

could be concluded that there were no easy problems of consciousness ever what was typically thought of as solely intentional also includes a kind of felt aspect of its own. Thirdly, a recent quest concerning the experience of thought might alter those already established conceptions regarding conscious thought in general and also about other traits typically exhibited by thought, such as intentionality, rationality, or even agency. In this sense, cognitive phenomenology might create room for reconsideration of those views of the mind that seek to separate intentionality and phenomenal consciousness with a kind of absolute bipartism. In general, phenomenology, which used to start from narrow premises that were previously restricted to felt aspects of sensations emotions, and perceptual experiences now includes the whole of conscious mental states.

What connection exists between the phenomenology of cognition and sensory perception? What distinguishes phenomenal properties of cognition from phenomenal properties of sensory perception, if any? In response to the first query, supporters of Cognitive Intentionalism assert that the phenomenal and intentional qualities of cognition are the same and I am tempted here to claim something unusual, though not unique. In response to the second question, proponents of Reductionism claim that the phenomenal properties of cognition are identical to the phenomenal properties of sensory perception, and my thesis aims to declare that they are not only different but also that the former is not reducible to the latter. Cognitive Phenomenology and Cognitive Intentionality are the central theories in the debate regarding their role in the individuation of cognition. This is so because cognition is traditionally accepted as an intentional state of mind which exhibits intentionality solely in its core. Suppose, you're consciously thinking that there is some Amazon delivery package at your doorstep. So, you are definitely in a phenomenal state. There is something it is like for you when you think that there is a delivery package on the doorstep. But you are in the cognitive intentional State as well. Because you cognitively represent the world in a way when you think that there is a package

at your doorstep. It is not illicit to claim that conscious thought has both phenomenal and cognitive intentional aspects at the same time. Now the question arises how are they related? One view, that I am tempted about is that the phenomenal state impels the intentional state. In this panorama, conscious thinking that there is a delivery package at your doorstep provides an instance of the Cognitive Phenomenal Intentionality thesis, which says that not all but some phenomenal states determine intentional states. This view has a direct disparity with the other two dominant perspectives. The first assertion is that the two states cannot bear determination relations to each other and the second notion is much more radical as it affirms that it is not the phenomenal state that determines the cognitive intentional state, but rather the cognitive intentional state that decides the phenomenal. In this section, I will focus on Cognitive Phenomenal Intentionality specifically and not the general Phenomenal Intentionality thesis. Also, I will try to deal with the questions that arise out of the other two contrasting views that I have mentioned above.

4.2.1. The Intentionality Question

In the first chapter, I have discussed the basic tenets of intentionality and the phenomenology of conscious mental states in separation. Lately, two significant challenges have been raised on the traditional ontological autonomy of phenomenality and intentionality. According to one theory, coined as Representationalism, the phenomenal identity is rooted in intentional content, and on the other hand, there is phenomenal intentionality, that typically embraces that the intentional content is grounded on that phenomenal aspect of that given mental state. whether is there a *sui generis* phenomenal aspect to conscious thoughts and other intentional states that are independent of the phenomenal quality of perception, and similar sensory experiences? Frankly speaking, whereas supporters of phenomenal intentionality almost invariably accepted this concept of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, representationalists have hardly ever complimented that notion. But one thing is quite evident from the discussion that since

cognitive states also have intentional content if the intentional content of perceptual states is not rudimentary but rather is rooted in something, then we should anticipate that the intentional content of cognitive states will be non-primitive as well and in fact, be grounded in the same kind of thing. Therefore, if one believes that the intentional content of perceptual states is based on their phenomenal character, one is compelled to believe that the intentional content of cognitive states is determined by phenomenal identity. The question that has been asked is whether the phenomenal properties of cognition are identical with or distinct from intentional properties of cognition. To find the answer, consider the first illustration of consciously thinking that there is a message in the WhatsApp application. It is a phenomenal state since there is *something it is like* for me when I think that there is a message on my phone. Also, there is a cognitive intentional state, because there is a way that I cognitively represent the world when I think that there is a message in my WhatsApp. Hence, conscious thought has both phenomenal and cognitive intentional parts. How could these be connected? In current research, many academicians have argued that intentionality is essentially phenomenal intentionality, as according to this hypothesis, it is determined by phenomenal character. On this view, cognitive intentionality is determined by phenomenal state and that is coined as cognitive-phenomenal intentionality. The concept of phenomenal intentionality[3] which is a form of intentional directedness wholly rooted in phenomenal character is one of Brian Loar's most significant contributions to the modern philosophy of mind. The hypothesis of cognitive phenomenology holds that cognitive states like thoughts and judgments have a unique phenomenal aspect that underlies their intentional directedness and is often reinforced by the followers' phenomenal intentionality to explain the obvious difference between phenomenology and intentionality of cognition. Kriegel has also defended six theses as part of

[3] Loar, B. "Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content". In *Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, edited by M. Hahn & B. Ramberg. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 2003. 229–258.

his Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program[4]. Within the realm of phenomenality, intentionality is defined as follows: (1) grounded in phenomenal character; (2) inseparable between the phenomenal and the intentional; (3) distinctive, indicating it is marked by unique properties; (4) narrow, which means it is not dependent on anything external to the subject; (5) subjective, that is a property of representing something for someone; and (6) basic, which means it is the foundation of all intentionality. The Cognitive Phenomenal Intentionality thesis helps to understand the dependency that is acclaimed by saying some phenomenal states bear to cognitive intentional states. Generally speaking, there could be either of two attitudes in these aspects:

Grounding: Some phenomenal states place one in a cognitive intentional state.

Necessitation: Some phenomenal states are sufficient for being in a cognitive intentional state[5].

The concept of metaphysical grounding has become even more important in metaphysics and philosophy in general over the past few years. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the topic of what grounding is and what its essential components are has been at the centre of many recent discussions. If we endorse Grounding, we are devoted to the notion that at times being in a phenomenological condition is a cognitive intentional state. If we adopt necessity, then we are not tied to the assumption that sometimes you are in a cognitive intentional state only because you are in a phenomenal condition. Both of them work as a bridge over the apparent gap in our understanding of meaning and intentionality. A concern has been brought up is: whether complete grounding necessitates what they ground. Grounding Necessitarianism[6] is the acronym given to this point of view. Grounding seems problematic as it is unable to explain

[4] Kriegel, U. "The phenomenal intentionality research program", In *Phenomenal intentionality*, ed. U. Kriegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 1–21.

[5] Chudnoff, E.2015. 'Intentionality'. Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge. 133.

[6] Hirèche, S. 'Grounding, necessity, and relevance'. *Philos Stud*. Springer. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01968-w.

the nature of the phenomenal states that are alleged to ground cognitive intentional states. Before we start delving into grounding in terms of intentionality and the phenomenology of cognition, we must grasp a few fundamental concepts related to grounding[7] itself. There are two types of grounding: complete and partial grounding. Let us say that some fact F is based on a set of one or more facts G. To give a rough idea of how partial and full grounding differ from one another, we can state that G fully grounds F if nothing more needs to be added to G to adequately and satisfactorily explain F, and that G partially grounds F if it only aids in clarifying F. All grounds are partial grounds since they all help to explain what they ground. However, the reverse is incorrect, since not all partial grounds fully explain what they ground, and neither are all grounds are full ground thesis. A mere partial ground is just that—a partial ground—and not a full one. A partial ground omits one or more supporting details that are necessary to give a complete explanation of the fact of grounding at hand. If X absolutely grounds Y, then X necessitates Y. Grounding Necessitarianism has been very prevalent among grounding theorists, but it is disputed. For instance (employing "f" for "the fact that f"), X= [If it rains] fully grounds Y= [my car which is kept outside, would get wet]. Nevertheless, X fails to necessitate Y, because X could have obtained together with Z = [my car is covered with a sheet to protect it from rain], without Y obtaining. It is not the only line of dispute, rather there are additional disbarments regarding the principle in general. The discussion essentially reduces to whether X indeed fully grounds Y, which is what is asserted by the Contingentist, or whether X only partially grounds Y and Y is instead entirely grounded in X*, explicitly X star stands for some accompanying fact A [I have forgotten to cover my car with the sheet], as the necessitarian claims. Both sides can, and typically do, agree that X at least partially grounds Y; that X does not necessitate Y, since the scenario where X obtains with Z but without Y is

[7]Trogdon, Kelly, and D. Gene Witmer. "Full and Partial Grounding." *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 7, no. 2 (2021): 252–71. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2020.26.

genuinely possible; and that X* does necessitate Y. They disagree on whether X or X* absolutely grounds Y. The Contingentist typically declares that, at best, A is a contextual or background condition or *enabler*, it enables X to completely ground Y, without being itself part of the full ground. By contrast, the necessitarian claims that, just like X, A is part of the full ground, acting as a comprehensive fact, and thus it contributes fully accomplishing X to get a full ground for Y. I have not taken the Contingentist position because I feel it depicts the whole scenario in fragments as in my thesis is an attempt to grasp the conscious experience in its totality. Also, as I have demonstrated in the first chapter by content, I mean the total content that we encounter while having a conscious experience. Hence, I will subscribe to a kind of comprehensive view. I will first address the grounding and necessitation principles in separation and the drawbacks before attempting to defend the comprehensive view. While departing greatly from the mainstream of phenomenal intentionality, I will develop my concept of grounding and necessitating intentionality into phenomenology during this discussion.

Grounding asserts that an individual or a subject of experience can be in a cognitive intentional state when experiencing certain phenomenal states, that is phenomenal state grounds the cognitive state even the background conditions. Again, consider the example of consciously thinking that there is a message in the WhatsApp application. It is a phenomenal state since there is *something it is like* for me when I think that there is a message on my phone. Also, there is a cognitive intentional state, because there is a way that I cognitively represent the world when I think that there is a message in my WhatsApp. Grounding claims that here the phenomenal state puts the subject in the intentional state as the former grounds the latter and at the same time it grounds the background facts like I often feel or think to check my WhatsApp or my knowledge of this particular pop-up sound is linked with WhatsApp and so on. Hence, intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. The problem with Grounding theory is that though it claims about a foundation of phenomenal state as the basic it hardly spreads

any light over the nature of the phenomenal states that are supposed to ground cognitive intentional state. A tempting idea is that they are just cognitive intentional states. They are states that are both phenomenal and cognitively intentional. However, according to Chudnoff, Grounding has already precluded such an option. Because grounding relation is irreflexive as nothing grounds itself. To explain this ambiguity, the notion of irreflexive relation must be introduced. So, what does it mean to say that grounding is irreflexive? Suppose some phenomenal state P grounds some cognitive intentional state C. By the irreflexivity of grounding, P is not identical to C. Therefore, we cannot just conclude that P is just C itself. Some researchers claim that there can be a plausible answer for this malaise. Irreflexively principle excludes the idea that a phenomenal state is identical to any of the cognitive intentional states it grounds. Irreflexively does not eliminate the possibility that a phenomenal state is identical to some other cognitive intentional state it does not ground. Also, one can challenge the workability of the irreflexivity of grounding.

Again, Necessitation states that to be in a cognitive intentional state, the subject needs only experience certain phenomenal states, that is a phenomenal state determines cognitive intentional states. So, the best part according to the supporters of the Necessitation principle is necessity does allow us to affirm with certainty that the phenomenal states that define cognitive intentional states are cognitive intentional states. Necessitation, as opposed to grounding necessitation, is reflexive as everything necessitates itself. Accordingly, let's say that some perceptual state P necessitates some cognitive intentional state C. could very possibly be that P is C. In fact, we would have a strong understanding of how P entails C if we knew who P and C were and their identity. As everything necessitates itself, P simply is C, hence P necessitates C. The major challenge, that arises with merging Necessitation with those phenomenal states and cognitive intentional states and claiming them identical is that it apparently discards the idea of novelty. If they are simply analogous there is nothing more to say about the assumption.

The apparent identity induces the propensity towards reduction as I have declared at the very beginning of my thesis that I am not tempted to look for another reductive theory of consciousness even via phenomenology. My odyssey is to discover a holistic approach hence the principle of Necessitation goes straight against my conviction of this research.

My idea of intentionality is that it is uniquely given and it emerges phenomenally. Because it is there for us to experience, that places it beyond any practical, even theoretical doubt. Since it is rudimentarily embedded in phenomenology, it has to be grounded and at the same time, it must suffice for the given directedness of intentionality. In the next section, I will try to show the workability of both principles and will try to demonstrate my own formulation regarding the Phenomenal Intentionality hypothesis.

4.2.1.1. Defence of Phenomenal Intentionality

Grounding and Necessitation are not inherently problematic; rather, the weakness is in how both principles are applied when phenomenal intentionality is involved. It is flawed in and of itself to make the basic assumption that some phenomenal states would be the same as intentional cognitive states. First grounding is not meant to explain the nature of either state; rather, it is meant to define the connections between phenomenal and intentional states. Secondly, the idea that necessitation encourages the notion of being alike in terms of two states is not a position that even the phenomenal intentionality thesis pursues. Discussing these grounding or necessitation principles to explain the relationship between the phenomenal and intentional states would be redundant if these states were the same. The usual claim of phenomenal intentionality is that the directedness or aboutness of intentional states is triggered by the phenomenal state. In other words, phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, experienced aspects of mental states—is the foundation of intentional states. Rather than attempting to become that intentional state directly, the intentional attitude is being shaped by

the phenomenal state, what it typically asserts. That is why it is incorrect to apply both of these principles in the above manner.

Nevertheless, there is an inherent flaw with this kind of fabrication of the necessitation[8] principle. To be considered to be in a cognitive intentional state, a subject must only experience specific phenomenal states; in other words, a phenomenal state determines cognitive intentional states. However, this claim is threatened by the existence of conscious but unintentional states (such as moods and intro/proprioceptive sensations), and in particular, by the existence of Twin-Earth scenarios for cognitive states. In both cases, necessitation is unable to explain how being in phenomenal states suffices for being in the intentional state. In the first option, the issue is confined to phenomenal consciousness that does not necessitate intentional awareness. In the second, the question of sufficiency does not even come up if the phenomenal content of various conscious thoughts is general in nature, regardless of the diversity of the thought's content. Therefore, the necessitation principle appears to be inapplicable to these states. Now, since I am attempting to create a holistic approach to consciousness, this is not how we should assess a principle's applicability if it is not fitting in every situation.

Reflecting upon the aspectual shape of intentionality, I have tried to develop my own theory of phenomenal intentionality. In the first chapter, while discussing the intentional state I mentioned aspectual shape as one of the essential characteristics of intentionality. The basic idea is that in any intentional state, the object on which the mind is directed is and Tim Crane borrowed this notion from John Searle. Searle defines what he refers to as aspectual shape as how we are acquainted with the outside world. What does this signify? Aspectual shape refers to how my viewpoint, perspective, perception, information-processing systems, and concept

[8] Following the conversation with Alberto Voltolini, this criticism of necessitation has been developed.

implementation inevitably determine how I perceive the world. Thus, Searle[9] says, it is important to keep in mind that all intentionality is aspectual since we acknowledge the perspectival aspect that defines conscious experience. When you see something through a particular lens, respectively, for instance, you can only see some of its features and not all. This means that all perception is "seeing as." Conscious and unconscious intentionality alike are subject to the same rules as seeing. Aspects are the categories under which all representations place their objects or other satisfying conditions. There is an aspectual shape to every intentional state, in my opinion. It should be highlighted that the term "shape" in this context has been used metaphorically and encompasses any cognitively discernible aspect of an object, not just its visually appealing outlines. One may counter that implementing concepts is all that is necessary to achieve aspectual shape. When I consciously apply the concept of a tomato to a particular piece of perceptual substance, it is just considered to be a tomato. However, Searle understands that taxonomy is merely the conclusive phase of the process of conscious cognition. Therefore, the notion of aspectual shape is not at all related to the conceptual content of experience. We can therefore conclude that the concept of aspectual shape illustrates the fact that the object of my perception or intention is always present in some manner, as this or that, when I think about, or desire, or believe about, or perceive something. In this case, I am currently perceiving the object that is in front of me as my laptop, which is on the table and is where I am typing at the moment. If aspectual shape is nothing more than the aspect of intentional attitude, that is one cannot think of something without thinking of it in some way then in my opinion this “some way” is coloured by the subjective experience[10]. One always

[9] “Noticing the perspectival character of conscious experience is a good way to remind ourselves that all intentionality is aspectual. Seeing an object from a point of view, for example, is seeing it under certain aspects and not others. In this sense, all seeing is “seeing as”. And what goes for seeing goes for all forms of intentionality, conscious and unconscious. All representations represent their objects, or other conditions of satisfaction, under aspects. Every intentional state has what I call an aspectual shape” Searle, J. *The rediscovery of mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1992. 131.

[10] Searle certainly believes this, but there are philosophers, such as Kriegel himself acknowledge there is unconscious aspectuality.

thinks or perceives or believes or desires in some way. It clearly indicates the fundamental concept of phenomenal intentionality, which is a form of intentional directedness wholly rooted in phenomenal character. In this framework, both the Grounding and Necessitation principles seem absolutely fine because if this is the case then there are no obstacles in claiming that certain phenomenal states ground and necessitate intentional states. This understanding of phenomenal intentionality therefore makes it seemingly appropriate to validate the hypothesis.

4.2.1.2. Unacceptability of Phenomenal Intentionality

Philosophers who disagree with the phenomenal intentionality thesis have presented evidence to refute the hypothesis as a whole. This idea has been categorically refuted by Alberto Voltolini in his groundbreaking paper "Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality"[11]. He simply criticized the whole perspective that intentionality is by any means grounded or determined by the phenomenal character of an experiential intentional mental state. It is widely accepted that our experiential states of mind have many different kinds of phenomenal traits, for example, it could be sensual, evaluative, perceptual, and cognitive, or might be something else. Again, there is an enormous range of phenomenal colouring in each phenomenal experience. There must be various intentionality attributes if phenomenal features are to typically determine intentionality. However, given that our experienced mental states can have phenomenal characters that are both incredibly various and highly heterogeneous, these attributes would not only be excessively diverse but also extremely heterogeneous. One might argue that such variability is not unlimited and hence can be addressed. The commonality among all those phenomenal characters is phenomenology, which is the category under which they belong. However, according to Voltolini being in the same genus is insufficient. The hypothesis that

[11] Voltolini, A. Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality. *Erkenn* 87, 237–256 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00193-4

various mental states share not just a common genus but also the same intentionality property is supported by some instinctively sound deductions. Voltolini outlined an inference:

> (i) Madonna has a mental image of a toyboy.
>
> (ii) Lady Gaga has a perception of a sexy guy.
>
> (iii) Hence, there is a property Madonna's imagination and Lady Gaga's perception share—namely, being of something.[12]

There is no "of ness" that the two intentional mental states mentioned above have in common if intentionality is monadic. The states "being modified toyboy wise" and "being modified sexy guy wise" each possess monadic properties, but they are merely two distinct attributes that, in theory, belong to a single genus and that is it. An additional premise that explicitly states that the two properties are species of the same genus must be incorporated into the inference to reaffirm its apparent validity. An example of this might involve a declaration that both properties share an attribute of "being of something." Since intentionality is not considered a property of intentionality but rather a genus that encompasses the various specific intentionality properties, it cannot be investigated in a naturalistic sense[13]. It is a theoretical proposition, not a characteristic that can be acquired in the real world, in Voltolini's opinion. Furthermore, acknowledging that all intentional states have a common property is not the same as disputing the metaphysics of intentionality. The aforementioned inference attempts to confirm this, considering its intuitive validity.

Moreover, if the phenomenal character is merely the "what it is like" character of an experience, then how can it determine intentionality? Given that the two variables fail to share any commonness at all. A supporter of phenomenal intentionality could indeed argue that the

[12] Ibid

[13] If intentionality were merely a common genus of all the intentional monadic attributes this would not make it eo ipso non-natural.

presentational aspect rooted in the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences encompasses an additional component that is relevant to intentionality, that is the "phenomenal objectivity[14]". "Phenomenal objectivity" is an additional component of the presentational aspect that is part of the phenomenal nature of perceptual experiences and is important for intentionality considerations. During such experiences, things are shown as existing independently of the mind. This phenomenal component not only reveals the phenomenal objectivity of such experiences but also their intentionality. This phenomenal aspect demonstrates both the intentionality of such experiences as well as their phenomenal objectivity. The notion of phenomenal objectivity is not satisfactory because intentionality is not always about perceptual states, indeed other kinds of conscious experiences exhibit intentionality as fundamental to them. At this point, proponents of phenomenal intentionality might assert the extremely radical claim that intentionality is a *sui generis* phenomenal entity. Henceforth, it gives its explicit role to the overall phenomenal appeal of that state. Numerous approaches have been put forward regarding phenomenal intentionality in this regard. However, since I have introduced the concept of phenomenal intentionality as Loar's hypothesis alone, I will only consider his version, which states that intentionality is:

> the property for that state to be felt to be directed upon something[15].

Voltolini asserts that the notion of intentionality, which Loar defined as a feeling of directedness, manifestly seems to make intentionality more phenomenal than intentional. He continues to argue that this tends to put intentionality not only hardly sufficient but also absolutely unnecessary. A sense of directness is hardly sufficient for intentionality. Consider a "Ganzfeld experience", wherein one imagines that something uniformly coloured is being

[14] Masrour, F. "Phenomenal objectivity and phenomenal intentionality", In *Phenomenal intentionality*, edited by U. Kriegel. Oxford: Oxford University. 2013. 116–134

[15] Loar, B. "Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content". In *Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge,* edited by M. Hahn & B. Ramberg. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 2003. 229–258

shown, but in reality, one is only entertained by the idea that a uniform visual field is being shown. That feeling does, after all, add to the overall phenomenal character of that experience. It is an intentional mental state, though. Secondly, intentionality does not necessarily require that feeling. There are conscious mental states; they are undoubtedly intentional, but they are not felt to be about something. A standard solution to this problem is provided by Kriegel[16]. Pure intentionality, or the intentionality of experienced mental states that are unique and not derived, is what phenomenal intentionality is all about.

Non-experiential intentional mental states, in contrast, possess the latter type of intentionality but not the former. Initially, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that intentionality is a phenomenal property for only a subset of intentional mental states—the experiential ones, which have original intentionality—while the other the nonexperiential intentional mental states, on the other hand, are simply derived intentionality. According to Kriegel[17], there are two ways to interpret the difference between original and derived intentionality: as a variation in the type of property or as a variation in how the same property is experienced. Voltolini claimed that this response was ineffective. If the difference between original and derived intentionality is understood as a difference in predication modes, the distinction lies not in how it is possessed but rather in how it is ascribed. Indeed, having intentionality does not equate to possessing something in a particular way. In other words, we need to approach the original/derived dichotomy in the same way that we interpret the disparity between genuine and "as-if" intentionality. These two distinctions are different, as Searle[18], himself originally made it explicit. The second notion refers specifically to how intentionality

[16] Kriegel, U. Two notions of mental representation. *In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind,* edited by U. Kriegel. London: Routledge. 2013. 161–179.

[17] Kriegel, U. *The sources of intentionality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011. 207.

[18] Searle, J. R. *The rediscovery of the mind*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 1992. 78-82.

is possessed: either in a literal or metaphorical sense. As a toy duck is a duck, the same applies when it does something possessing as-if intentionality, albeit in a modified sense. A similar line of reasoning can be employed here by the proponent of the theory that nonexperiential mental states are not phenomenally intentional, in contrast to experiential mental states, which are, as I have defined in my defense of the phenomenal intentionality section phenomenally intentional since the intentional object of an intentional mental state is given in aspectual terms. However, Kriegel[19] himself rejects my position that states the aspectual shape is an indication of phenomenal intentionality and that aspectual shape is in fact moulded by the phenomenal state, that grounds it. He approves that there is indeed unconscious aspectuality. As you can see, the agent may exhibit distinct non-experiential mental states that she is unable to identify as the same thing, which could explain pertinent differences in actions. Therefore, aspectuality hardly provides support for the notion that the essence of intentionality is phenomenal. It has thus been demonstrated that there is no compelling method for elucidating the "sui generis" phenomenal nature of intentionality, nor does defining intentionality with a sense of present-ness or a feeling of directedness develop the necessary conditions of phenomenal intentionality. Therefore, we must devise a different strategy to better explain the connection between the intentionality of cognition and its phenomenology.

4.2.2.3. Phenomenology of Conscious Thought

The Phenomenal Intentionality, which initially appears as the perfect explanation to the intentionality question, after discussing the inadequacy of the hypothesis, I have been left completely perplexed as to how to operate within my framework and find a solution. Honestly, I have no idea how to respond to criticism like this, and the only way, I can survive with my approach in this thesis is by detouring my route. It seems reasonable not to subscribe to Loar's

[19] Kriegel, U. "Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?". *Philosophical Studies*, 116, 2003. 271–307.

theory of phenomenological intentionality, a form of intentional directedness entirely rooted in phenomenal character, in the current context. Thus, my aim in this section is to demonstrate that, independent of its intentional component, every conscious mental state, including thoughts, exhibits a distinct phenomenology. By doing this, I hope to prove that conscious thought has a unique kind of phenomenology of its own and contributes to the search for the phenomenological unity of consciousness in general.

The main contention of proponents of cognitive phenomenology is that various intentional contents are connected to unique cognitive-phenomenological attributes. Loar defined the phenomenology of intentional states by emphasizing directedness and perceptual experiences. Still, many philosophers have argued that the prospect for cognitive-phenomenological properties to determine intentional content types more broadly is the main motivation behind the alleged existence of cognitive phenomenology. According to Pautz regarding some cognitive phenomenal properties P, at least, there is a unique content c such that it is metaphysically necessary that, if someone has P, then she has an occurrent belief (or desire) with content c[20]. Starting from the premise that phenomenological aspects of experience are inherently determinate, the general approach posits that when a subject experiences something like smelling freshly baked cookies or seeing a beautiful painting, for example, there is a certain manner through which this phenomenology appears to the subject, very simply but inevitably. The next step is to assert that phenomenology alone determines a particular kind of intentionality. The idea here is that, given a visual experience, such as that of seeing "Marta e Maddalena" by Caravaggio, for instance, there exists a type of intentional content that can be interpreted into phenomenology, meaning that any experience that shares that precise

[20] "for at least some cognitive phenomenal properties P, there is a unique content c such that it is metaphysically necessary that, if an individual has P, then he has an occurrent belief (or desire) with content c." Pautz, A. "Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?". In *Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays*, edited by U. Kriegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. 210.

phenomenology will also have that precise intentional content. By encouraging the connection between cognitive phenomenology and intentional content—since cognitive-phenomenological characteristics determine intentional content rather than being merely associated with intentional content—they have attempted to establish the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the intentionality of cognition. However, I am not at all sympathetic to this formulation as well.

I do not aim to prove the phenomenology of intentionality in any sense in this section. at the same time, I do not intend to develop a theory of phenomenology that is dependent on content. As I mentioned at the outset of my thesis, my goal is not to reduce intentionality to phenomenology by demonstrating how the former is either caused by or grounded in the latter. The models previously discussed, such as Pautz's determinist approaches, Loar's phenomenal intentionality, and Chudnoof's grounding and necessity, all seem reductionist to me. My strategy is plain and simple. I would like to show that our conscious mental states or experiences, which are traditionally viewed as intentional— belief, thought, desire-style mental states, for example—have phenomenology of their own, independent of the intentional content or intentional attitude that might be considered, by other researchers as exhibiting a particular kind of phenomenology. I feel a particular feeling when I hope to complete writing my thesis by December. This hope feels distinct from the hope of having the opportunity to work with a distinguished philosopher in the future. It feels different, too, from my belief that I will complete my thesis by the end of December. It is possible to argue that the latter difference reflects the phenomenological difference in intentional attitude, and the former belongs to the apparent phenomenological difference in content, which is basically Pautz's position. The reason for this inconsistency is that most people perceive the world from a bipartite perspective that combines the phenomenal and the intentional. Transcending this dichotomy allows us to comprehend that there are only conscious experiences that are about something while also

being simply felt in a particular way. Conscious states are felt in a particular way even though they are not consciously about something in the conventional sense. It is not about finding a hierarchy of phenomenology over intentional it is about the generic nature of conscious experience and phenomenology is naturally intrinsic to consciousness. There are a variety of explanations for conscious thought, and those theories do not conflict with my viewpoint. Instead, they are just alternative methods for clarifying a fact that I want to understand from a phenomenological perspective. As a result, conscious cognition has a distinct phenomenology that is connected to its intentionality in the sense that both demonstrate distinct methods for understanding the same concept. Because of their seemingly different methodologies, the phenomenology of conscious cognition and intentionality of conscious cognition unquestionably vary from one another. An alternative method of addressing the intentionality question would be to demonstrate that there are distinctions between the phenomenology of cognition and the phenomenology of sensation, since the majority of individuals acknowledge the existence of sensory phenomenology, they have been doubtful of cognitive phenomenology. This straightforward leads to the reduction question and I address it in the next section.

4.2.2. The Reduction Question

It will be useful to explain "cognitive phenomenology" from another dimension, even though I believe I have already familiarised the concept. It differs significantly from sensory phenomenology, to start with. The particular kind of phenomenology we usually associate with our sensory modalities is called sensory phenomenology. Sometimes people use concepts like inner speech and visual imagery in a way that indicates they are already infused with cognitive phenomenology. But if inner speech is acknowledged as having meaning already, then inner speech is given a higher significance than just sensory phenomenology. Furthermore, if one interprets a visual image as a significant object, they have also understood it to incorporate

something more than sensory phenomenology[21]. But why does one suspect that some phenomenal states have a connection to cognitive states? I have already discussed the Intentionality question explicitly to confirm that conscious cognition does possess a common phenomenological genus quite independent of whether they are intentional or not. In this section, I consider cognitive phenomenology to be a form of phenomenology that essentially goes beyond sensory phenomenology and is most commonly linked to conscious thought, but it also happens in perception and emotion.

4.2.2.1. Phenomenal Contrast Argument

In order to find the answer, I followed the phenomenal contrast strategy, depicted by Tim Bayne. Bayne[22] develops an analysis demonstrating that phenomenal intentionality embraces intentional states representing high-level qualities like the natural and artificial kinds. I have employed his concept, however somewhat modified, in order to confirm the following two assertions: first, I felt compelled to validate my claim from the previous chapter that the phenomenology of cognition naturally encompasses the phenomenology of perception; and second, there exists an exclusive kind of phenomenology that is cognition-specific and separate from perceptual, or more broadly, sensory phenomenology. He interprets an interesting asymmetry in associative agnosia. Associative agnosia patients are able to perceive colour and shape, but they are unable to distinguish between natural and artificial kinds visually. First, we need to know what agnosia is. Visual agnosia can take the form of associative visual agnosia. It is a technical term that is used to describe a problem with object recognition with otherwise normal visual field, acuteness, colour vision, brightness discrimination, language, and memory. Other sensory modalities can be used by patients to identify objects. people have trouble

[21] In perceptual experiences, one cannot entertain sensory phenomenology without entertaining extrasensory phenomenological features. Smith, A. D. *The Problem of Perception*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002.

[22] Bayne, T. "Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content," *Philosophical Quarterly* 59 (236). 2009.

deciphering the significance of what they are seeing. They can copy or sketch, but they have no idea what they have created. They can accurately detect the form and recognize the object when assessed with verbal or tactile information, but they are unable to recognize the thing. They are unable to use prior knowledge to connect the fully observed visual input to aid in stimulus recognition. Damage to the bilateral inferior occipitotemporal cortex is typically linked to associative visual agnosia. According to Bayne, the phenomenal nature of visual experience generally gets altered due to associative agnosia. But the question is what kind of content has the patient lost in terms of perception, though? The ability to process only low-level content remains intact, so he has not lost low-level perceptual content. The patient's impairment is related to category perception rather than form perception. High-level perceptual representation can therefore penetrate the contents of perceptual phenomenality[23]. This proves that our phenomenal perceptual state necessarily involves a phenomenal cognitive state. Hence, they are connected. To illustrate this notion, I have used a particular kind of phenomenological contrast that can be applied to illustrate cognitive phenomenology. In contrast arguments, a pair of situations are laid out that are claimed to vary in terms of general phenomenological character but not in terms of sensory-phenomenological aspects. The idea is that No variation in sensory phenomenology occurs, hence, the only thing that can explain their phenomenological differences is alluding to non-sensory phenomenology in a certain manner. I have outlined the very well-known Phenomenal Contrast argument by Strawson[24], as per my need in this context. Which goes as follows, in addition to visual, auditory, and other

[23] "Associative agnosia … suppose that the phenomenal character of his visual experience has changed. But what kind of perceptual content has the patient lost? He has not lost low-level perceptual content, for those abilities that require the processing of only low-level content remain intact. The patient's deficit is not one of form perception but of category perception. Hence high-level perceptual representation … can enter into the contents of perceptual phenomenality" Ibid, Pp 385–404.

[24] Not sure whether I would put the gist of phenomenal contrast arguments in this way. Their sustainers want to show that sensory phenomenology is richer than normally supposed and explain this richness in terms of perceptual content differences. I'm not sure whether Strawson would agree with it. Strawson is interested in considering the idea not only that meanings are experienced but also that they are perceived. I have used rather altered his connotation as per my requirement to support my position.

experiences, philosophers will also wonder whether understanding experiences exists at all. One may wonder if the bilingual Frenchman, Jacques, and the monolingual Englishman, Jack, are quite distinct from one another when it comes to their experiences listening to the news in French. This claim is limited to the fact that, although Jacques and Jack share some auditory experiences, Jacques's experience of listening to the news is entirely distinct from Jack's experience.[25] So, this involves two subjects who share the same auditory perception and sounds, but their overall experiences vary because one of them interprets the sounds as comprehensible words and the other cannot. In short, Jacques listens to the news with understanding on the other hand, Jack catches the news without understanding. This situation can be read in different ways[26]:

(1) Jacques and Jack are in different phenomenal states.

(2) Jacques and Jack are in the same sensory states (only).

(3) Jacques and Jack are in different cognitive states (only).

(4) The difference in the phenomenal states is either a difference in the sensory states or a difference in the cognitive states.

(5) The best explanation for the difference in the phenomenal states is the difference in the cognitive states.

(6) Therefore, there are some phenomenal states which are cognitive and not sensory states.

[25] "Philosophers will ask whether there is really such a thing as understanding experience, over and above visual experience, auditory experience, and so on … This question may be asked: does the difference between Jacques (a monoglot Frenchman) and Jack (a monoglot Englishman), as they listen to the news in French, really consist in the Frenchman's having a different experience? … The present claim is simply that Jacques's experience when listening to the news is utterly different from Jack's, and that this is so even though there is a sense in which Jacques and Jack have the same aural experience." Strawson, Galen. *Mental Reality*. MIT Press. 1994. 5-6.

[26] This inference is developed from the book by Chudnoff, E. 'Contrast'. *Cognitive Phenomenology*. Routledge. 2015. 46.

It is difficult to challenge Premise 1, which directly follows from the phenomenal contrast. Premise 4 is not a stronger claim but might be applicable in non-contradictory simplifications, though it is a matter of further discussion. Claim 5 derives straight from claims 1 and 4. Most philosophers have refuted premise 2 because for them the two situations contain separate sensory states. For instance, Jacques might perceive a torrent of noises as being structured into words and sentences, and he might also have a visual representation corresponding to the news. One might counter that even if these distinctions were genuine, they would not be sufficient to account for the phenomenal disparities between the two situations. According to Chudnoff, Strawson's claim that Jacques and Jack seem to share the same aural perception implies that there is some possibility that their auditory perceptions can differ in some way as well, along with the potential for other sensory variances. But for Strawson, even the sensory disparity is not at all problematic because what he wants to assert is that whatever sensory differences there may be, they are not sufficient to account for all of the phenomenal differences between the two cases.

Premise 3 is controversial since there are disagreements regarding linguistic understanding. According to one hypothesis, even if it is partially a cognitive mental state, then for them premise 3 is valid. There is also another hypothesis that it is essentially a sensory mental state and, in this opinion, 3 is erroneous. The view that understanding is a sensory mental state depends on the notion that sensory mental states possess high-level content[27]. We need to realise that the appropriate form of understanding is not something being partially sensory and partially cognitive, with a sensory component representing sounds or shapes and a cognitive component representing semantic properties. When the semantic properties it represents are instantiated, no part of the understanding is free from the awareness of

[27] Low-level contents refer to the properties such as shapes, colours, sounds, smells, etc, and on the other hand, High-level contents denote properties such as meanings, natural kinds, artifactual kinds, and causal relations, for example, semantic properties.

environmental participants. Even though I'm not completely sure which understanding perspective, the fully sensory or the partially cognitive view is accurate, introspective validation demonstrates that cognitive phenomenology is undoubtedly at play even if we accept that perception encompasses high-level content.

The second hypothesis is weird in the sense that it assumes that pure sensory states (in this case aural perception) have high-level content that includes semantic properties. As I have already mentioned in the last paragraph, it is not bipartisan in the case of understanding, that there is a sensory counterpart that conveys lower-level content and a cognitive component that reflects semantic characteristics in this scenario. There is not a single aspect of understanding, that isn't conscious of the *instantiation of the semantic characteristics*[28], it represents. Even if, for the sake of the argument we accept that understanding is exclusively a sensory state and consequently, the manifestation of semantic properties might just be ordinary low-level audible and visible attributes of language, it does not follow that meanings are a matter of just sensory awareness. The only conclusion is that the states of understanding embody semantic attributes in ways that require the awareness of symbols or signs which include appearance and sound. for the manifestation of understanding in general. Hence, they are in different cognitive phenomenal states. There are two distinct situations, e1 and e2. One experiences e2 in an entirely different phenomenal condition than e1. The best explanation for this is that e2 evokes an additional cognitive state than e1 does. As a result, phenomenology encompasses cognitive phenomenology.

[28] How understanding, knowledge acquisition, representation, and use of human semantic knowledge is instantiated is clearly illustrated in McClelland, J, L and Rogers T, T. 2008. 'Pre´ cis of Semantic Cognition: A Parallel Distributed Processing Approach'. *Behavioral And Brain Sciences* 31. Printed in the United States of America. 689–749. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0800589X. I am not going into detail because it is not relevant to the present discussion.

Lastly, I have focused on the conclusion that number 6, which allegedly claims there are some phenomenal states such as cognitive states and not sensory states places the subject in them. However, Irreducibility makes a different claim that certain cognitive states can put a person in phenomenal states for which no entirely sensory states are adequate. Hence, the two assertions are not entirely consistent. First, it is required to consider mental states that are partially cognitive and partially sensory, and understanding the news is such an instance that includes both. It should be noted that there is no necessary hierarchy in the sense of partiality that has been expressed here. If we assume 6 to be accurate for the sake of discussion, then also in certain scenarios, being partially cognitive but not purely sensory state might induce a phenomenal experience, but that does not imply that there are no entirely sensory states that may have placed the subject in a comparable phenomenal state. The subject could be experiencing a phenomenal state as the outcome of partially cognitive states, but it's very likely imaginable that these phenomenal states are of a similar kind to those that one experiences from pure sensory awareness. There is a discrepancy between the assertion 6 and the irreducibility principle. I feel that the phenomenal contrast argument in this context is a weaker claim as suppose you are in a phenomenal state when you are partially cognitive but not entirely sensory state. It does not follow that you could not have experienced the same phenomenon in other fully sensory states. Perhaps you experience some phenomenal state when in a partially cognitive state, but the type of phenomenal state you experience may not differ from that of a completely sensory state. That entirely sensory state can be sufficient for the relevant phenomenal state even if it does not occur on a particular occasion. Hence, a stronger foundation for cognitive phenomenology is needed to strengthen the position than what has been offered by Phenomenal Contrast arguments and that should be investigated in a way that can overcome the aforementioned confusions.

If we want to establish that cognitive phenomenology is distinct from sensory phenomenology, then we need to first provide an argument in favour of the claim that cognitive phenomenology is not only irreducible but also independent of sensory phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel introduces an argument that seems more compelling hypothesis than irreducibility, that is the Independence argument[29], which typically asserts that there are cognitive states that place the subject in phenomenal states that occur regardless of sensory phenomenology. Any justification that exhibits independence also proves Irreducibility, since independence in some sense entails[30] irreducibility.

4.2.2.2. The Zoe Argument

Imagine there is Zoe, who is a partial zombie and is devoid of any form of sensory, algedonic,[31] and emotive phenomenology. For someone to fantasize about such a zombie, one first needs to picturise three partial zombies each lacking one or more of the following phenomenology, namely the sensory, algedonic, or emotional. Then, one is able to amalgamate all these ideas into one that is devoid of each of these phenomenology. Kriegel continues that Zoe's life is not as boring as one generally assumes. On the basis of some internal yet nonconscious processes that take place in the sub-personal areas of the brain, Zoe still endures an interesting cognitive

[29] The irreducibility argument is inspired and in turn developed from the book by Kriegel, U. 2015. *The Varieties of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press. Mostly first to third chapters.

[30] According to the theory of phenomenal holism, the nature of the partial phenomenal state depends on the total phenomenal states of which it is a part. Phenomenal Holism, at least when taken to refer to genuine cognitive states, is incompatible with Independence. This interpretation of Independence holds that some genuine cognitive states can cause phenomenal states that are separate from sensory states. But any genuine

cognitive state always coexists with sensory states. As a result, if phenomenal holism is valid, sensory as well as actual cognitive phenomenal states are all dependent on total phenomenal states. if one accepts a phenomenal holism thesis then independence might not imply irreducibility. Since I am not at all sympathetic towards the notion of this phenomenal holism thesis, I presupposed the entailment relation between independence and irreducibility, though not vice versa.

[31] It is linked to interoceptive and proprioceptive sensations; in order to take into account, the fact that such a phenomenology includes not only pains but also pleasures, one may perhaps better label it alg/hedonic. pain associated with pleasure, or the pleasantness–unpleasantness dimension of experience. This explanation is given by Sacchi, E. and Voltolini, A. 2016. 'Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology'. *Rivista Internazionale Di Filosofia E Psicologia,* Vol. 7 (2016), n. 2. 256-263. DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0025.

life entirely devoted to thoughts concerning mathematical calculations. One might ask why and how is it interesting. We need to remember that phenomenology is a more rudimentary and fundamental idea than these divisions of phenomenology. Why sensory phenomenology is something that can be easily asserted as interesting while cognitive phenomenology invites so many eye-rolls? Cognitive phenomenology is an expression that sounds unfamiliar to several significant philosophers who have been working in mainstream philosophy of mind since the second half of the twentieth century. Intentional states were paradigmatically personified with cognitive states and qualitative states by sensations or raw feelings. This orthodoxy has been challenged from many angles by philosophers who defended that qualitative states are also intentional and vice versa. If phenomenology is the magical potion that makes life so-called exciting, then Zoe could definitely enjoy an interesting cognitive life without having any sensory phenomenology accompanied. In this process, she also comprehends other things along with those mathematical calculations. Kriegel calls us to imagine two fictitious scenarios where Zoe struggles to come to a sudden understanding of mathematical proof and an alternative scenario in which she is successful. Any such realization refers to a contrast in her cognitive life. He contends that this disparity is phenomenal since it covers several phenomenal mental states. Assuming that those mental states lack sensory components, it follows that they exhibit cognitive phenomenology. Thus, he concludes that Zoe possesses a cognitive phenomenology though lacks a sensory one. If Kriegel's assertion that there is a phenomenal contrast is accurate, then Zoe's overall phenomenal state is the total phenomenal state comprised of cognitive phenomenal states but excludes any sensory phenomenal states. All of them are thus purely cognitive phenomenal states, which represent Zoe's total phenomenal state. Hence, Independence and Irreducibility both are equally valid. As a result, Kriegel’s argument allegedly defends not only the claim that cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to sensory phenomenology but also the more radical claim that the former is independent of the

latter. Opponents have argued that the immediate problem with this argument is that although we can rationally imagine the story there is no certainty that this story aims at any logical possibility. In any real circumstances, we do not subscribe to Zoe's story. But Kriegel holds the opposite as he believes the story has no contradiction. Some of his critics might respond, that even though it appears that the narrative amounts to a positive form of imaginability and hence to a logical possibility, we have no reason to further validate that the narrative could also be metaphysically possible. It leads to more fundamental debates regarding the relationship between logical and metaphysical possibility. To eliminate further confusion, it would be better, in my opinion, to find additional proof encouraging Kriegel's legitimacy. It would be safer to seek out an alternative claim that can simultaneously secure the metaphysical possibilities. Sacchi and Voltolini developed a further explanation in this regard that reinforces the contention that cognitive and sensory phenomenology are not internally related. This demonstrates that the first category is not merely independent of the latter but also irreducible to it.

4.2.2.3. The Vita Argument

Let's take another argument with a genuine metaphysical possibility along with the irreducibility claim of cognitive phenomenology to sensory phenomenology. Primarily they concentrate on the most fundamental phenomenal contrast, that involves phenomenal variances, what Kriegel calls phenomenality *per se*[32] (what-it-is-ness) is manifested and on the other hand, the absence of such an instantiation, where phenomenology is not present at all. This, of course, leads to a comparison of being awake and being asleep states accordingly because the transition from staying awake to falling asleep[33] is analogous to shifting from

[32] Ibid. 10.

[33] They have also acknowledged an additional premise that no dreaming takes place while the subject is asleep, therefore we will assume this specification continues ahead.

having phenomenality *per se* to not possessing any phenomenology whatsoever. This argument is supposed to uphold a case that involves the same phenomenal contrast but with a new individual Vita[34] who is functionally like Zoe with some new buildup. Vita is an insomniac who almost tries everything to make her sleep. While going to bed, she puts a black eye mask on her eyes and switches on a radio that constantly repeats the same soothing sound like a lullaby; while lying in bed, she stretches in the most comfortable position for her body to stay; she covers herself with a soft blanket to feel cosy and so forth. In this condition, she manages to keep her sensory phenomenology stable as much as possible to fall asleep. She somehow allows her to relax so that she can feel no anxiety, tension, fear, or anger. Unfortunately, despite her best initiatives, she still has trouble falling asleep. The truth is that she is unable to stop thinking even after adopting these comfortable physical measures. She can't stop thinking, which is exactly why she fails to sleep. It has nothing to do with any movement in her body or even her brain as if she cannot just sleep because her heart is beating too fast or she is having a severe headache. Such processes might be a reason for sleeplessness in some other context but they are not the reason for the phenomenal switch from being awake to being asleep. Instead, here the explanation is that she has a mind full of thoughts and that she is conscious of them. Phenomenal life goes on with her precisely because of her cognition. Provided that it incorporates a phenomenal contrast from being awake to falling asleep this is also an example of a phenomenal contrast argument. It does possess some unique characteristics, though. The argument differs from Kriegel's Zoe argument since it does not accommodate introspection for acknowledging phenomenal differences. One's being asleep does not require introspection as being asleep is not a mental state. More importantly, unlike Joe's case, anyone will hardly deny that Vita's story describes a metaphysical possibility. There are certainly many chronic

[34] This section was developed from the article by Sacchi, Elisabetta, and Alberto Voltolini. "Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology." *Rivista Internazionale Di Filosofia e Psicologia*, no. Vol. 7, nn. 2 (2016): 256–63. https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0025

insomniacs in the real world who are a lot like Vita. Any of us may find her/himself in Vita's position or rather go through this at some given point. If we amalgamate these two arguments together, we get not only that Vita's case is a genuine metaphysical possibility, but also that the overall phenomenal difference in her case involves thoughts, not the sensory states as she tries to keep them at a minimum or none. So, we can quite legitimately confirm the claim that there is a cognitive phenomenology irreducible to a sensory one. Vita has thoughts whose phenomenal character prevents her from switching from an overall phenomenal condition of being awake to the non-phenomenal condition of sleeping. One might argue that sensory imagery is also a particular kind of sensory phenomenology that can be used to explain this case and to oppose cognitive phenomenology. Vita might use sensory imagery for all this kind of thinking, probably a visual one. She might become familiar with some auditory depiction of the rumble of the cars adjacent while she approaches the thought of going to the office. However, in my opinion, it cannot be argued that all of Vita's thoughts while lying in bed and trying to go to sleep are explained by such an imagistic phenomenology. Let's assume for the sake of this discussion that she has a peculiar disposition when it concerns thinking. She has mastered an approach to thinking monotonous, sleep-inducing thoughts, commonly the ones concerning counting things. Vita, however, refrains herself from counting sheep as most people do; rather, she counts geometrical figures, which are supposed to be less appealing. She counts a polygon first, then a circle. We all comprehend how no sensory imagery can differentiate between the notion of a polygon and the thought of a circle. We may all posit that no sensory imagery can discriminate between thinking of a circle and the thought of a polygon. Hence, Vita's thoughts are hard to comprehend in the framework of sensory imagery. Frankly speaking, living a thoughtful life keeps her away from dozing off. It can be argued that though Zoe's instance asks for an explanation of the metaphysical potential, its expansion to Vita's situation certainly meets the solution of metaphysical possibility, further proving the existence of a type

of cognitive phenomenology that is both irreducible to and distinct from sensory phenomenology.

One might also suggest that Vita engages herself in some inner speech while counting geometrical figures, which certainly has an aural equivalent. When counting polygons, Vita quietly says to herself, "This is a polygon," when counting circles, she similarly repeats, "This is a circle." Her shift in cognition is mirrored by the shift in aural imagery related to the differed phonology and maybe even the various forms of syntactical interpretation for these formulations. Let's complicate the whole situation and imagine she kept saying the same thing to herself in her head, using the exact phonology and syntax but with a different meaning. The notion of the same utterance typically refers to the repeating of precisely the same words or sentences in two different ways. Sacchi & Voltolini invited us to imagine another scenario for Vita. For example, she repeats "Dionysius is Greek" from time to time meaning differently. Sometimes she refers to Dionysius the Elder, ruler of Syracuse, Sicily, in ancient times, at other times with the connotation that Dionysius the Younger, son of the former[35]. It is conceivable that she maintains the same mental representation depicting a particular ancient adult Greek in her head and that she is unable to visually separate the two men, with whom she has never had any acquaintance. She may also be unable to audibly separate between the different but phonetically and syntactically identical tokens of the preceding sentence. Therefore, no sensory imagery can explain the flipping of thoughts. Yet, she bears with the thoughts enervated with overall, sleep-preventing, phenomenology. Now this cannot be accounted for any change in sensory imagery. So, her having a thoughtful life which is solely accompanied by cognitive phenomenology, prevents her from falling asleep and cannot be accounted for image provoking be it visual or auditory or any sort of sensory phenomenology. At this point, we need to

[35] Sacchi, E and Voltolini, A. 2016. 'Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology'. *Rivista Internazionale Di Filosofia E Psicologia*, Vol. 7 (2016), n. 2. 260. DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0025.

remember one thing irreducibility does not logically entail independence. In real-life situations, there are many instances where both the cognitive and sensory phenomenological states accompany each other. Hence, they might not be independent but that does not mean they are connected via some intrinsic relationship. Rather the link is only for association, though the former is not reducible to the latter.

So, we need to demonstrate that cognitive and sensory phenomenology are not inherently related. Therefore, we may imagine situations in which the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenal states to sensory phenomenal states does not imply that the former is independent of the latter. Instead, we will restrict our discussion to the notion of irreducibility. The phenomenology of having thoughts, what we have been addressing throughout, and the phenomenology of capturing thoughts, which means that the type of phenomenology that fundamentally occurs in experiences as of understanding is in actuality two distinct concepts. This line of thought was originally elucidated by Strawson[36]. There is undoubtedly a dependency between the cognitive phenomenology of understanding and the sensory phenomenology of hearing or reading the given word or phrase. Without having encountered the exact sentence in question, it is genuinely not possible to comprehend the idea that it conveys. Sacchi and Voltolini presented one notorious sarcasm that is on the same page with this undertone. One would not be able to fathom the quote 'To lose one parent, Mr. Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose both looks like carelessness' if one did not first hear or read that sentence and interpret the actual sense. A paradox often considered one of the funniest in any Oscar Wilde play, this statement is spoken by Lady Bracknell during her meeting with Jack Worthing after knowing that her daughter Gwendolen was interested in marrying Ernest. Lady Bracknell conducts quite an interview session where she inspects

[36] See Strawson, G. 1994. *Mental Reality*. MIT Press.

Ernest's assets, belongings, and almost everything. The society that has been portrayed in this play is a high society in the typical sense where it is not just enough to have money, rather it is also kind of obligatory to belong well-known lineage that is historically significant and well-connected family which assures a prominent position within the so-called chicness of society. Unfortunately, Ernest has no such privilege as he has lost both his parents, or actually, his parents have lost him. Since Lady Bracknell is insensible to his emotions and hardly cares about him, she completely ignores Ernest's story, which is quite disastrous, and focuses on the fact that Ernest has no connection with high-ranking family, she utters; 'to lose one parent may be regarded as a misfortune'. However, the paradox comes when she continues; 'to lose both looks like carelessness'. This is nothing but an indifferent, rather nonsensical way to compare losing two parents to losing any two objects at the same time. In the literary sense, it is an ironic and even sarcastic way to disregard Ernest's loss. Oscar Wilde adds decorative language and combines it with her lack of emotion to bring out the trivial and superficial nature of the upper classes that she represents. If someone hadn't initially heard or read that phrase as a nonsensical sentence and subsequently interpreted it as a metaphor with the connotation that deals with melancholy, then it is not possible, only upon mentally hearing or reading this given sentence, to comprehend it by extending various theoretical acceptable explanations. Therefore, regardless of whether some sentences or other imaginatively heard or read in inner speech emerge while encountering that thought, this sentence only attends the thought in an extrinsic way. Because it is an extrinsic and not an intrinsic relationship, it leads us to postulate the idea of independence for both kinds of phenomenology. As we can see, by comparing Zoe's case to that of Vita, which certainly validates the metaphysical possibility, although it may not ultimately coincide with Zoe as it does demonstrate that there is a form of cognitive phenomenology that is both independent of and irreducible to sensory phenomenology.

4.3. Best Explanation for Cognitive Phenomenology

Here, the term independence, itself seems to be tricky. Conceptually they have autonomy, that is both cognitive and sensory phenomenology are conceivable without including the other. But when they occur, in most cases they come in association, and arguably might not be for all. kinds. Irreducibility does not necessarily imply independence, but independence does entail irreducibility. In a way, Independence is a stronger claim than irreducibility. But I feel the supposition of irreducibility is a wiser and more specific explanation than independence and that is also sufficient to shed light on the purpose of the thesis, which is the individuality of cognitive phenomenology beyond the other. I do not think it is essential to interpret an autonomous thesis of any phenomenology and in this case the cognitive one, within my framework of the unitary notion of phenomenology. Instead, I aim to show that phenomenology is far more fundamental and undermines all conscious mental states, including conscious thought, emotion, and perception. Regarding the completeness of the experience, which encompasses every aspect, I am attempting to defend the total content theory. However, to effectively present them as a subset under the larger domain of phenomenology, it is better to demonstrate how each state is irreducible to the other. I think I have been able to demonstrate how the phenomenology of cognition is neither reducible to perceptual phenomenology nor comparable to the intentionality of cognition, begging both the reduction and the intentionality questions. Putting another way, the phenomenology of conscious thought is unique to it and is inherently *sui genesis* since conscious cognition is *something it is like* to have them. If it has been asked whether this is sufficient, what would you say? certainly not and that is the most plausible answer. But why not? Speaking about conscious thought, however, inevitably takes me back to my undergraduate days when I initially began my philosophical journey. Descartes's

Cogito ergo Sum[37], his first and last certainty, served as the foundation for everything. Even if I do not subscribe to Cartesian thought, how could I deny that a conscious thought could not occur without the thinker? The notion of a thinker is not a straightforward one; in fact, it is just as perplexing as the concept of consciousness. I get a cognitive phenomenological feeling when I think I might have a WhatsApp message on my phone after hearing the pop-up sound. It could also be a feeling of happiness if I think someone, I desire has pinged me, or it could be a feeling of irritation or fear if I suspect someone whom I hate, might embarrass me. The presumption could also be considered a type of cognitive state, the critics might argue. Yes, as I have mentioned previously, there may be additional phenomenological states connected as well. That, in my opinion, is what makes phenomenology so beautiful. Its entirety is blended in the Thinker or the subject. For her to think, feel, or perceive the world, there is *something it is like* in each of the three domains of thinking, feeling, and perceiving. The best way to truly comprehend the core of cognitive phenomenology is by attempting to first cognize the phenomenology of cognition within the context of this structure. Some researchers tend to assert that perceptual and evaluative phenomenology is inferior to cognitive phenomenology. As of right now, I am not prepared to manifest a thesis that makes any such promise or even to accept such hierarchical claims. I believe, however, that I must explain the other two varieties of phenomenology that are usually acknowledged as inferior to cognitive phenomenology. Since I addressed perceptual phenomenology in the third chapter, I am going to concentrate on emotion in the next chapter.

[37] Descartes, R. *Meditations on First Philosophy in Focus*, edited by Stanley Tweyman. London and New York: Routledge. 1993. 34–40.

CHAPTER 5:

EMOTION, PHENOMENOLOGY AND EVALUATION

CHAPTER 5

EMOTION, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND EVALUATION

If incorporating conscious thought expands the limits of phenomenology, then achieving unanimous agreement on the definition of emotion is perhaps the most difficult endeavour for phenomenology in general. At the outset, there is a consensus across philosophers that emotion is essentially phenomenological, reflecting both the subjective and qualitative aspects, but the particular type of phenomenology that distinguishes emotion is an area of dispute. In my opinion, emotion always has a distinctive *sui generis* kind of phenomenology, along with any other kind of phenomenology that philosophers usually claim, which is evaluative phenomenology. Most philosophers tend to reduce emotions either to sensory, cognitive phenomenology or merely to a mixture of both. I certainly experience bodily sensations typically accompanied by sadness, that is I feel the constriction of the chest, watery eyes, and raw throat. Sometimes, it seems that the body wants to curl up in itself. But the question remains, are those kinds of phenomenology sufficient to account for the phenomenology of emotion as separate and *sui generis*? The emotion, I feel in this context is enough to make me believe that it is not adequate for the exposition of emotion. A conscious evaluative judgment has experiential representation value and this is a distinctive kind of value experience. This difference can be easily marked if we try to contemplate the phenomenological difference between pure judgment (omitting feeling) of a state of affairs, for example, judging someone's death as sad, and for example, feeling the sadness of a friend's death. The phenomenological difference is manifested by the representation of value property in evaluative phenomenology and its way of depiction in conscious thought or judgments. One might argue that these simply indicate sensory phenomenology in the case of emotion. This is more so as many philosophers would like to believe that emotions are associated and hence identified in terms of bodily

sensations. I will object to this claim because I find a technical difficulty in taking something that accompanies emotion as a thing with which emotions need to be identified. Moreover, the accompanying sensory experience cannot make the emotion redundant. That is why it is not logically possible to dilute one into another based on mere co-occurrence. Let's illustrate this with an example of a fundamental spelling rule. Latin orthography dictated that a Q should be followed by a U, and the habit stuck, making QU a common digraph. It seems that we owe this "QU" rule, along with so many other things in English, to Latin. The same "QU" rule is also present in other Romance and Germanic languages, such as French and Spanish. However, this togetherness does not mean one can be altered by another because they are two different letters of the alphabet. Similarly, when you feel thrilled your face flushes or your heart races, your breathing becomes faster, your heartbeat increases, and your chest and entire body feel warmer. Some researchers say that is because of the effect on your circulatory system. Butterflies in your stomach, your facial expressions, even changes in your finger temperature, and all of these are related to your emotions. Even in physiological studies, it is claimed that we feel joy in our bodies because of the release of dopamine and serotonin, which are two kinds of neurotransmitters in the brain. Both of these chemicals are heavily associated with happiness. Despite that being the case, it can be legitimately felt that the phenomenology of emotion is not reducible to a set of bodily sensations or simply to sensory phenomenology.

It is often a slogan in the post-world war philosophy that primarily through our emotions the world is disclosed to us, that we become relevant and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate to and engage with others. Within the last few decades, emotion has emerged as a quest of great philosophical interest. Not only philosophers but psychologists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists have engaged in inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary debates concerning emotions. The spectrum is really wide and it encompasses the ontology and phenomenology of emotions, the epistemic and cognitive dimensions of emotions, the

rationality of emotions, the role that emotions play in moral judgments, the role that our bodies play in the experience and constitution of emotions, the gendered dimension of emotions, the temporality of emotions, and the cultural specificity of emotions, to name just a few. As Fehr and Russell once said,

> Everyone knows what an emotion is until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows.[1]

5.1. Evolution of Emotion in Philosophy

What is emotion? Emotions are intricate, conscious experiences. Numerous scholars have proposed various theories emotion of and explained emotions throughout the history of psychology and philosophy. Plato, one of the first philosophers, approached the question of emotions quite directly. He investigated it in light of their anthropological theories, devoting close attention to the soul. He concentrated all of the emotions and desires within the body and He was not convinced that passion and desire were beneficial qualities. Eventually, he addressed the three aspects of the human soul—reason, spirit, and appetite—as distinct subjects in "The Republic." Spirit and appetite were not considered irrational in Plato's view, despite the emphasis he placed on the distinction between the rational and non-rational parts. He envisioned emotions as a particular kind of cognitive phenomenon. Aristotle investigated a wide range of philosophical discourses, including ethics, rhetoric, and poetics, all of which placed a strong emphasis on emotions. According to Aristotle, emotions are cognitive because they are predicated on judgments and beliefs. When a subject experiences a situation, his/her emotions enlighten him/her an insight into its significance and value in life. Our values have been laid out in the framework of our emotional process. Subjective experiences that were perceived as either pleasant or painful always complemented the emotions. Pain and pleasure

[1] Fehr, B., & Russell, J. A. "Concept of emotion viewed from a prototype perspective". *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 113(3) (1984): 464. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.113.3.464.

are associated with emotions, which are the reasons why people who experience them differ in their evaluations. Fury, pity, anxiety, and so on are emotions and their contraries[2]. One may discover an in-depth investigation of emotions from the Stoics. The early school advocated the cognitive approach while arguing emotions were judgments about one's self, the greater world around us, and those around oneself. Living in harmony with nature is the pathway to happiness in life, according to Stoics. So, pursuing a life that was compatible with nature and virtue was ideal since reason ensured that a person was aware of both the good and the truth. The greatest hindrances to a rational life were desires and passions, as they both dominate and deceive individuals.

The religious doctrine of the Middle Ages affected intellectuals, but they also turned to earlier theories of emotions, particularly those of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Plato was referenced by Saint Augustine when he asserted that the soul contained a certain level of emotions. He considered that emotions were transmitted from the body to the soul. Consequently, anything devoid of a body, such as God or angels, was not capable of emotion. But Augustine was among the first to raise the question of emotional memory. The same memory carries affections, however, not in the same way that the mind holds them when it experiences them—rather, in a very different way, based on something that is completely its own. Thomas Aquinas alluded to Augustine's theory. He made a difference between the passions and cognitive domains. He separated passion into sensual and volitional categories. Sensual passion is the realm of emotions. Attention to an object seemed the cognitive aspect, while active movement was necessary for passion. Emotion is related to desire as well. The act of obtaining information from the senses and comprehending whether it was enjoyable or

[2] "Emotions are the things on account of which the ones altered differ with respect to their judgments, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain: such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries" Aristotle. "Rhetoric". In *Nicomachean Ethics. Complete Works of Aristotle. Vol. 2: The Revised Oxford Translation by Aristotle*, edited by J. Barnes (Princeton: Barnes Princeton University Press, 1984). 1378.

unpleasant, beneficial or detrimental, was known as any emotion. Thomas Aquinas explored the aspect of physiological changes because emotions were, to some extent, embedded within the body.

In contemporary times, the marriage of ethics and values, as well as ontology and epistemological theory has been the primary place for contemplating emotions. Descartes is the philosopher who explained emotion through the lens of fundamental passions. Given their close relationship to the soul, Descartes asserted that emotions are merely physical manifestations. According to the latter, they are only cognitive phenomena or thoughts. Evaluating their theories in more depth, however, does not seem to distinguish between them that much. Descartes provided an ambiguous definition of emotions and passions, defining them as perceptions, impressions, or affections that are generated and enhanced by a movement of animal spirits that reside in the brain and have the potential to flow throughout the body through the nerves. One could say that Descartes' theory anticipated contemporary neurophysiological theories because it highlighted the physiological aspect of emotions. However, the theory can be also understood as a subset of the cognitive approach because it was predicated on the premise that passion was perception. There is absolutely no doubt that emotions and passions belong to the mental substance from the perspective of Descartes' ontological dualism of substance. According to certain researchers, a passion's identity has been defined by its origins, which initially surfaced in the body, particularly in the brain. Lastly, emotions more likely arise in a place where the body and the mind intersect.

Emotional researchers remain plagued by "Cartesian anxiety," even though emotional theory has certainly progressed immensely. The parallel dualism of "mind and body" was established by Descartes, who upholds feelings and emotions to reveal an internal "spiritual quality" that is distinct from both the material body and the external, objective world. It is extremely difficult to adequately express emotions. Although it can be difficult to pinpoint

emotions precisely, people assume they can when they encounter them. Emotions appear in a cluster of emotional attitudes rather than in solitary existence, they are extremely sensitive to contextual as well as individual factors, and the vocabulary for emotion is perplexing. All of these components contribute to emotional complexity and richness at the same time. In recent times, the evolution of phenomenology was profoundly influenced by Franz Brentano. The moral and psychic lives of men were the main subjects of his academic pursuits. He identified emotions, judgments, and presentations as the three main categories of psychic phenomena. From his perspective, everything was intentional, since it had been directed at something. Morality was derived from man's emotional domain; their nature was mental, intentional, and cognitive.

Emotions are defined by thoughts, beliefs, or judgments, according to cognitive theories of emotion put forth by W. Lyons, M. Nussbaum, R. Solomon, and many other researchers. Various philosophical justifications have been offered in support of that strategy. The basic argument, according to some researchers, is that when evaluating emotions, we employ rational-cognitive language such as "rational," "justified," "legitimate," "sensible," "adequate," and so forth. Cognitive theory proponents believe that concepts and beliefs constitute a prerequisite for emotions, even though this may not be always justified.

A wide spectrum of questions regarding emotion has been addressed by philosophers from various discourses. Do emotions belong to a natural kind? What makes them distinct from thoughts, feelings, affections, and so on? Do we possess any particular feelings regarding morality or aesthetics? How do the external environment, society, culture, the body, and the mind all contribute to the formation of emotions? How do feelings affect thinking, perception, and imagination in terms of cognition? Considering consciousness, what is this connection between them? Are they intentional? Do they have a phenomenology? What sort of phenomenology, if any, does it exhibit? At this point, we may ask ourselves, how could I

identify if I'm feeling an emotion? Does it make sense that we think about mental phenomena in general and experience physical phenomena in particular? I know it's cold because I feel a chilly breeze or I know that my name is so and so because I can certainly remember it being so. But when it comes to emotion, we're not sure if it's through a conscious thought or a sensation, or something else. The simple fact that emotions appear to be composed of both cognitive and sensory components is what makes them perplexing. Simply revisiting the initial question is all that is involved in determining which of these two is perennial for the emotion. It seems that it is quite challenging to pinpoint a unified answer to this question. However, we are left with four available options:

a) Emotions are a kind of mental phenomenon.

b) Emotions are a kind of physical phenomenon.

c) Emotions are an amalgamation of both mental and physical phenomena.

d) Emotions are neither mental (in the orthodox sense) nor physical phenomena, nor an amalgamation of the two. Rather, emotional phenomena are straightforward phenomenological categories. A phenomenological study of emotions is worthy not only because it helps us to understand ourselves, but also because it enables us to see and make sense of the significance of our worldly and social existence.

5.2. What It Is Like to Have an Emotion

People usually have a great propensity to assimilate emotion with belief-desire accounts, somatic feeling theories, judgementalism, and strong perception theories. Many philosophical studies of emotion attempt to reduce it to a more familiar state. One criticism can be raised that such theories fail to grasp the distinctness of phenomenology (what-it-is-likeness) of emotional experience. The intuitive notion is that experiencing an emotion in a particular way feels natural, as exemplified by the colloquial terms for anger, joy, and disappointment.

However, these questions have been approached quite differently in more recent phenomenological and scientific analyses of emotions. In the former, the felt quality of emotion provides important perspectives about the significance of human experiences and adopts a first-person take on the emotions that are shaped by and grounded in our experiences in the world. Often, the latter approach to emotions adopts a third-personal or sub-personal standpoint, illustrating their cognitive structure and neurobiological functioning, which may be disengaged from how emotions are felt within and associated with intricate, context-dependent human experiences. Determining the emotion in its entirety demands the use of both kinds of investigation. To further illuminate and enlarge current discussions surrounding emotions, it is of the utmost importance to identify how these distinct disciplines interact with one another.

Emotions are probably the most complex among our experiences. Due to the common belief that we are emotionally invested in something, they are frequently classified as intentional events. However, there are other situations in which we experience conscious emotions, even though they may not be related to anything specific. Nevertheless, the emotion is still present on the surface. We often experience sudden melancholy, but we are unaware of the source. Though we are not very certain about the object of the emotion, it is vivid sometimes even subtle. Often, we experience emotions despite the fact we are ignorant of the nuances. Those are all perfectly acceptable human emotions. My concern in this chapter is with the phenomenology of emotions, that is *what it is like* to have an emotion. I want to be more confined to conscious emotions for my purpose in the given context. Emotions are either about things or about the state of affairs. In having different kinds of emotions, the world is portrayed to us as pleasurable, scary, amazing, threatful, pissing, depressing and so on. Although, the world is not like any of them in reality. When I feel sad about the rejection of my paper, the property of sadness is given in experience and it is attributed to the rejection incident even if it is not something sad in itself. According to Montague, those properties are 'emotion-value-

properties'. She says that these properties are ascribed to objects and states of affairs in the world exactly the way sensory properties like colour and taste are attributed to objects in the world.[3]

In a recent study of phenomenal consciousness, Uriah Kriegel resists positing *sui generis* emotional phenomenology. He characterizes emotional phenomenology in terms of a combination of proprioceptive[4], algedonic[5], conative[6], and cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive Phenomenology captures the essential features of emotional experience, making the positing of sui generis emotional phenomenology unnecessary. Relatedly, according to Kriegel, what individuates an emotion is the specific cognitive phenomenology it has identity conditions, and what makes it an emotional state at all is that it has a cognitive phenomenology at all, what he calls its existence conditions. Note the originality of this approach: in contrast to the aforementioned reductions of emotions to familiar mental states, some of which arguably have no phenomenal characters, we reduce emotional phenomenology to other phenomenologies. We can, therefore, accept the common-sense claim that emotions have a distinctive phenomenology, albeit with a qualification. A reductivist of this stripe need only say emotional phenomenology is distinctive in virtue of involving a specific combination of other phenomenologies, rather than in and of itself. There is another claim that typical emotional experiences include *sui generis* feelings towards value (FTV hereafter). I do not claim FTV exhausts the phenomenology of emotions and their overall phenomenal character may include proprioceptive, algedonic, conative, and cognitive phenomenology. However, the part of their

[3] See Montague, M. 2016. "Evaluative Phenomenology: what is given in conscious emotion". The Given: Experience and its Content. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 216.

[4] Often referred to as kinaesthesia, is the body's ability to sense movement, action, and location. It's present in every muscle movement.

[5] algedonic is a borrowing from Greek, combined with an English element. It is basically an Adjective For both pleasure and pain.

[6] The conative component reflects how one acts in response to an object. Conative is when an individual is acting a certain way toward something.

phenomenal character allowing for the representation of evaluative properties of their objects, and for personal level specification of identification and existence conditions, is irreducible to other (putative) aspects of their phenomenal character.

Although philosophers fail to find a unifying definition, most philosophers obtain that emotions are about things and states of affairs. So, one pivotal claim that philosophers almost anonymously grant are emotional states is fundamentally evaluative. The world can appear repulsive, frustrating, frightening, cruel, fantastic, loving, depressing, unbelievable, and so forth when one is experiencing different emotions. According to Kriegel, Around the end of the twentieth century, the evaluative method of assessing emotion gained a lot of traction. D'Arms, J. and D. Jacobson assert that although differing in their details, the majority of contemporary theories regarding the structure of emotion acknowledge that emotions (somehow) present the world to us as having certain *value-laden features*. Following their footsteps, we will say that emotions certainly encompass evaluative presentations.[7]

Montague also shares somewhat an analogous perspective that there are properties that are attributed to objects and states of affairs in the world just as sensory properties like colour and smell are attributed to objects in the world, which she coins as "emotion-value properties"[8]. Those properties are experienced as the objective properties of objects and state of affairs. For example, in the incident of being sad about the rejection of the paper, it seems quite natural for the experiencer to allocate the property of sadness to the state of affairs. It appears that those objects or states of affairs possess those properties quite independent of us. They are themselves objectively sad or joyful or disappointing and so on. The term 'objective' sounds misleading

[7] "Most recent accounts of the structure of emotion, despite their differences, agree that emotions (somehow) present the world to us as having certain value-laden features. Following their lead, we will say that emotions involve evaluative presentations." D'Arms, J. and D. Jacobson. 'Sentiment and Value.' *Ethics* 110: 722–48. 2000.

[8] Montague, Michelle. "Evaluative Phenomenology: What is Given in Conscious Emotion". *The Given: Experience and its Content*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. 216.

because usually, the connotation of the term is different. Here, 'objective' does not refer to the genuine property of the world. Rather, the term was used to pinpoint the fact that they are experienced as one. This is only justified while defining the subject's experience. It should not sound so odd because the attribution of properties is pivotal in sensory and cognitive experience. Emotions can be attributed to the experience only. Brentano also takes an evaluative stance on emotion. This is evident because he recognizes "emotion" (Gemüt)[9] as a suitable term for the group of mental states for which he provides the evaluative explanation. Emotional states are encompassed in the group as mentioned above along with obviously volitional states including desire, choices, and intention. Both are intended to be equally covered by the evaluative account. Similar to how every judgment considers an object as true or false, every phenomenon that falls under this domain likewise regards an object as good or bad. The contemporary evaluative narratives regarding emotions usually represent two kinds of approaches. One depicts emotions as "evaluative judgments", which is a way of being good, in an appropriately comprehensive sense of generic 'good' and the other identifies emotions as "evaluative perceptions" which is where being good is a way of being good. But according to Brentano, mental states that fall under the relevant category are not judgments or perceptions, but rather a *sui generis* category with a unique presentational mode. Therefore, in his view, emotion cannot have an evaluative dimension if it presents "value-laden features" or any other normative entities. Emotions normatively presenting "regular" entities must be the primary consideration. According to Brentano, the terms we use to describe the evaluative nature of emotion also refer to a specific way in which mental activity implies a content, as opposed to implying that the phenomena addressed in this class, goodness is attributed to what is

[9] Brentano, F.C. 1874. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* (2 vols.). Leipzig: Meiner, 1924. Trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L.L. McAlister, *Psychology from Empirical Standpoint*. London: Routledge, 1973. 35.

acceptable as positive and negative is assigned to what is disagreeable as bad. Kriegel has developed his notion in a quite similar connotation to Brentano. He stated that:

> My admiration does not present Shakespeare as good but rather presents-as-good Shakespeare. My resentment does not present the boss as bad but presents-as-bad the boss.[10]

This is known as the evaluative-attitudinal account of emotion. Where the evaluative part asserts that a positive/negative emotion about an object essentially commits to the goodness or badness of that object and the attitudinal part states that an emotion's commitment to the goodness or badness of an object is an attitudinal property of emotion. The integration of evaluative and attitudinal is a fundamental characteristic of emotions, is an attitudinal property, or the ability to present as good or bad. This is the property that makes emotions what they are. In this chapter, I have tried to present some theories that are appreciative, even partially of the evaluative-attitudinal approach to emotion. It is not wrong to claim that in the modern analytical philosophy of mind, evaluative approaches to emotion are quite prevalent, but their attitudinal counterpart is less in comparison. However, I have contrasted various perspectives and in turn, attempted to curve my position depending on which I find most similar to what I want to convey by the phenomenology of emotion.

5.3. Emotion As Experience of Value in Terms of Judgement

Since the publication of Martha Nussbaum's book "Upheavals of Thought", her theory that emotion is an "intelligent response to the perception of value"[11] has been extensively explored in almost every discipline of academia. The account of emotion that she upholds here is in a

[10] Kriegel, Uriah. 'Value". *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2018. 196.

[11] Nussbaum, M. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 1.

way wider and can be applied to moral, political, and legal issues as well. This book elegantly weaves across anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and literature while also deftly and boldly relying upon the author's lived experiences. Many researchers claim that her evaluation skilfully balances between the extremes of social constructivism and cultural relativism, and the simplistic universalism of biological and cognitivist theories of emotion. However, I can't address every aspect of her enriched theory in the short term of my thesis and consequently, I have only focused on her cognitivist approach to emotion which in a way (partially) validates the evaluative-attitudinal account of emotion which is my main concern in this framework. She maintains that since emotions are value judgments they deserve to be taken into account as a particular kind of cognitive state that enables us to discern values and reasons in the world around us. Our value judgments and the emotions that follow from them are a kind of belief that can be true or untrue. Here emotions are considered from a cognitive-evaluative perspective. It straightforwardly declares that evaluative phenomenology is sufficient for assigning value properties to objects and states of affairs. To understand this connotation with its significance, we need to discuss Nussbaum's theory of emotions and the contrast with it. Nussbaum's capabilities approach upholds that mental states are nothing but the competence of connecting with things and people outside us. By bracing these faculties, one affiliates various forms of human association that are pivotal for overall human development. According to her, emotions are a form of knowledge through which we think about things and states of affairs that we take care of but that are beyond our control. Philosophers claim that it is a version of the extreme "cognitivist" position of the ancient Stoics, which cherishes that emotions are simply judgments. Nussbaum's approach is an adaptation of the conventional cognitive theory of emotions, which holds that emotions are propositional attitudes, or more precisely, judgments of value that are intentional states. Propositions are used to define emotions. When you think someone has harmed you, you are furious with them. This

characteristic, according to cognitivism, is fundamental to emotions: to experience an emotion, a person needs to have an attitude toward a proposition—and not just any attitude, but a belief, more specifically. Emotions are evaluative beliefs. When someone harbours rage towards someone, it stems from unfavourable beliefs about what that individual did to the subject. This is not a fresh perspective, at least not since the Stoics. The argument put forth was that emotions are propositional judgments. but this notion has been criticized largely by ancient philosophers since its emergence. A cognitive account cannot explain the emotions of animals and pre-linguistic infants because they lack the linguistic abilities necessary for propositional thought, which was first put forward by Posidonius[12] against Chrysippus and has, nevertheless, been advanced opposing Nussbaum's stance. Considering they held that emotions were associated with judgments or affirmations of propositions, the ancient Stoics just refused that these creatures had any emotions at all. However, there have always been difficulties with the classical cognitivist theory since it goes against the common-sense notion that infants and animals do possess emotion. Nussbaum, herself identified this problem and in turn, formulated her modified version of cognitivism, which is free from these aligned charges. Nussbaum states her theory of emotions as neo-Stoic. She gave two justifications[13] for manifesting this new version. First, "heat and urgency" as emotions have a kind of warmth and immediacy, which seems solely phenomenological, that might influence us to postulate it as something other than mere judgments. Second, "an experience of passivity" as emotion sometimes appears as an experience of passivity, whereas in judging we are potentially active and cannot be passive. She employs an essential aspect of her interpretation of cognitivism in her first response. They are evaluative judgments of the object of the emotion. Some philosophers are keen to claim

[12] Posidonius criticized Chrysippus' intellectualism and he wanted the Stoics to go back to Plato's tripartite soul and acknowledge that emotions cannot be purely rational. Millán, Gustavo Ortiz. "Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions." *Manuscrito* 39 (2016): 119-131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N2.GOM

[13] Nussbaum, M. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 77-79.

that her view is Eudemonistic[14] because is concerned with the evolution and development of the person who experiences them. But we need to keep in mind that though she emphasizes the flourishment, the pursuit of personal accomplishment, and the realisation of own potential, that is self-interest is not part of this panorama. This explains the warmth and intimacy of emotions differently. Again, her second response asserts the idea that the objects of emotions are things and people whose actions and well-being we cannot ourselves control. She writes:

> we recognize our own passivity before the ungoverned events of life.[15]

According to Nussbaum, emotions are more complicated and ever-evolving than most people would like to believe. But emotions are by no means irrational or completely incapable of fostering a good life, overall well-being, or human growth as an extension of rational thought. The advantage of Nussbaum's neo-Stoic theory of emotions is that while acknowledging the intricate nature of emotions, it preserves an in-depth understanding of their capacity for moral reasoning and human fulfilment as well as growth and development. Evaluations of emotions are subject to either being somewhat right or wrong, and the perceptions and beliefs that encourage them, along with the judgments that they endure, remain supportive to both epistemological and, especially phronetic[16] reasoning of human growth and development comprising human flourishment. Emotions, according to Nussbaum, are eudemonistic, which means that they relate inherently to a person's sense of growth and well-being as well as to the

[14] According to Aristotelian ethics, eudaimonia is the prerequisite for human flourishing or a happy life. "Happiness" is the traditional English translation of the ancient. Aristotle and most other ancient philosophers understood it, does not consist of a state of mind or a feeling of pleasure or contentment, as “happiness” as it is commonly used implies. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the highest human good, the only human good that is desirable for its own sake as an end rather than for the sake of something else as a means toward some other end. https://www.britannica.com/topic/eudaimonia

[15] Ibid. P 78.

[16] Phronesis is an ancient Greek term, which refers to a type of wisdom or intelligence relevant to practical action. It implies both good judgment and excellence of character and habits and was a common topic of discussion in ancient Greek philosophy. Classical works on this topic are still influential today. I have borrowed this term from Plumb, D. “Emotions and human concern: Adult education and the philosophical thought of Martha Nussbaum”. *Studies in the Education of Adults*. 46:2, (2014:145-162). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02660830.2014.11661663

pursuit of sustainable development. According to Nussbaum, eudaimonia, as a form of human development, relies upon us developing a framework of objectives and principles that we adhere to. These goals and values are then components of an idea of what it means for us to lead fulfilling lives, achieve well-being, and experience human flourishing.

In Gallagher's[17] opinion, exposure to Nussbaum's profound and sophisticated investigation offers a chance to consider one's own emotionality as an inherent attribute of being human, one's priorities in life, and one's own perceptions of vulnerability and desire in the context of the fleetingness of the world. According to Deborah Brewis[18], Nussbaum proposes an alternative perspective, arguing that while pain and other negative emotions are not a component of rational thought, rather they are an integral part of human thought processes and, consequently, human rationality and the nature of mankind. She makes an effort to highlight emotion when advocating equality throughout nations, communities, and states contending that emotion is an important consideration in morality and is anchored by human flourishing and human development. Nussbaum's notions of empathy and compassion are probably the most discussed topics in the field of emotion within the philosophical discourse. She stated that empathy is an imaginative reconstruction of the other person's experience without any specific assessment of that experience.[19] She believes that evaluating someone to be worried and wishing to initiate support represents more of a compassionate than an empathic assessment. It is crucial to understand that she is not saying that compassion only consists of this; rather, she is saying that compassion requires evaluation to conquer negative feelings like

[17] Gallagher, P. "The Grounding of Forgiveness: Martha Nussbaum on Compassion and Mercy", *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2009. Pp. 231-252. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2008.00622.x

[18] Brewis, D. N. "Social Justice 'Lite'? Using Emotion for Moral Reasoning in Diversity Practice". *Gender, Work and Organization*, 24(5), 2017. Pp 519 - 532. https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12171

[19] Nussbaum, M. "Education for Citizenship in an Era of Global Connection". *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, Vol. 21 No. 4-5. 2002. P 302.

resentment, jealousy, and guilt. She contends that though sympathy lacks the intensity of compassion, it is however similar to compassion. Although it is imbued with a cognitive component, compassion is essentially an emotion that exists in the domain of experience, the immediate experience of suffering. According to Nussbaum, empathy entails both an awareness of another person's pain and an understanding that it is not mine, which she coined as "otherness", as opposed to merely feeling pain. Being able to accurately envision the other person's feelings is a prerequisite for empathy, which comes before compassion when negative emotions are involved. On the other hand, empathy may also give rise to a dearth of compassion, as is the case when opponents implement empathy to read the motives of their enemies or take unfair advantage of them. Additionally, Nussbaum argues that while empathy is an essential control of compassion, compassion itself may not exist without empathy. Instead of being, as she frames it, a reaction to significant bad things that have happened to someone else that wasn't their fault, compassion needs to involve a primary meaning that is a positive assessment of the evaluation of compassion toward the other driven by love for the other as a part of human flourishing and human development. Well, it sounds so beautiful but there is one thing that I am unable to comprehend which is how Nussbaum's explanation of compassion that focuses on the specific cognitive evaluations required in compassion would make compassion have a subjective feeling. I believe there is a significant truth about emotion here, but is it really necessary to state that this truth only consists of comprehending that the feeling is merely another cognitive process? Why this cognitive evaluation is phenomenological rather than just value judgment? I feel that, highlighting the complexity of human emotion and its unnecessary connection with human flourishment she ignored the most important component of emotion and that is why it is felt like to have the emotion and not any other conscious states.

5.3.1. Emotion as Only Judgement: An Oxymoron

I do not feel that these are very compelling responses to depend upon. I believe that her first reaction against Stoic, which is “heat and urgency” could account for the "urgency" of the emotion, but not its "heat." Emotions, even eudaimonic assessments, do not appear like simple judgments. My judgment that I have to deal with bullying because I revealed a secret to someone while intoxicated is not nearly as unpleasant as the emotions I experienced as a consequence of it or actually dealing with it. I think Nussbaum's second response, which is “an experience of passivity”, has a similar dilemma. It looks like it puts the passivity in the incorrect place. Nussbaum seems to be arguing that emotions are judgments that inherently entail that we are helpless and passive in some way. But why would this make the alleged judgment itself feel like something that just happens to us? Yet again, it does not seem to be the case that my emotions are always related to circumstances outside of my control. Most of my passions are indeed related to "external goods", and it is also true that I am not always in full command of them. However, some emotions regard the experiencer's potency as their object. For example, when I feel a subtle sense of pride in a small accomplishment, I view myself as efficacious and powerful. That feeling is about my productivity and endurance. A central tenet of Nussbaum's narrative that the notion that emotions are inherently related to or indicative of one's vulnerability. Even in her book, Nussbaum examined compassion as a set of judgments. In philosophical discourses, theories that define emotions in terms of judgments are conventionally known as cognitivism. However, it seems to me that in addition to judgment, cognitions also need to be appropriately associated with certain other aspects of the self to accomplish their intended roles in human existence. Personally, I believe that emotions play a vital role in integrating judgments into other psychological processes, something that thoughts alone lack the capacity to achieve. Since Nussbaum was aware of these kinds of criticisms, she observed that compassion cannot exist unless we also feel pain for the tragedy of another

person. But isn't this pain an effect rather than a judgment? In response, she queries the nature of the pain specifically. Is there a spasm that coincides with the thought process? The spasm needs to be directed "about" or "at" the unfortunate individual. It seems closer to a cognitive intentional state the deeper we dig into it. Nussbaum herself declared:

> value-laden intentional attitudes toward objects.[20]

This comment makes me wonder that a significant distinction between Nussbaum and noncognitivism is more about how they conceptualise judgment than how they conceptualise emotion. I find her theory of emotion more of a theory of judgment and less about emotion. If an intentional mental state is a judgment and the fact that emotions are also judgments, then emotions are exactly the same as those judgments are. The prevailing answer against cognitivism is that it cannot accommodate the subjective feelings of emotions. No matter how logical and judgemental value it might put over an object or state of affairs it still cannot answer why it feels so. For example, how can it explain the overwhelming feeling of attraction or more poetically love; the goose bumps and the warmth that is even sometimes inexpressible in words if it is nothing more than a judgment that is a matter of mere dispassionate reasoning? My emotional lived experience or rather I am definitely not ready to accept that.

I believe that Nussbaum's use of the term "cognitive" is quite unfortunate. It is an ambiguous term, and it can be used in many ways. Gustavo Millán said that her interpretation of the word swings between its four distinct manifestations of the term "cognitive" and he illustrated these four dimensions of meaning as follows:

[20] Nussbaum, M. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 79.

Cognitive1: "Cognitive" denotes to the information processing view of an individual's psychological roles (perceiving, thinking, remembering, understanding language, learning, and other mental phenomena). This is the way it is used in cognitive sciences.

Cognitive2: "Cognitive" mentions to propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, but also desires. Sometimes also termed as "intentionalism".

Cognitive3: "Cognitive" denotes also to intentional states, but "intentionality" is, at least in some cases, a two-level phenomenon: one concerning judgment, and a second level including non-conceptual content.

Cognitive4: "Cognitive" mentions to belief and knowledge.[21]

The main problem with Nussbaum's theory is that it attempts to uphold a very narrow definition of the word "cognitive," according to which emotions are propositional attitudes and evaluative beliefs. She ultimately seeks to establish that emotions are a type of evaluative belief that can provide us with knowledge, but this claim cannot be substantiated by using the first as well as the second definitions of the word "cognition." Not definitely the first, as emotions, when interpreted cognitively, are merely thought processes without inevitably possessing a truth value. A highly bizarre hypothesis where each type of state, including desires or even sensations, would possess truth values would arise if we were to understand other mental states in this fashion. Similar objections can be made against using the second cognitive definition, Conative states, for instance, do not have truth values, nor do all propositional attitudes or intentional states. Her theory is still vulnerable to the same criticisms thrown against conventional Stoic theories of emotions.

[21] These four illustrations are developed from the article by Millán, G. "Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions". *Manuscrito* 39 (2):119-131. 2016. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N2.GOM

In the end, I would like to say that I can have an emotion without having the corresponding judgment, that if an emotion were correspondent to a judgment, it would be the judgment that it is. For example, I have a mild phobia of the water, including rivers and swimming pools. Every time I go to the beach or a pool party, I remember holding my friends' phones and taking pictures of them since I am too afraid to go in the water. This implies that I would instantly shrink back in terror if someone, even my closest friend, asked me to do so or forced me to put my legs over the edge of the water. Nevertheless, I have browsed numerous articles and watched countless YouTube videos about how drowning typically occurs, and I firmly believe that this is not the way to sink even. But still, I feel terrified in this situation. However, if there were a judgment that it is dangerous, that is the exact judgment that my fear would be. The quintessential response to this kind of objection comes from subjectivity and phenomenology, more precisely evaluative phenomenology in this context. I can always feel emotional without any adjoining judgment whatsoever. I want to sum up this section by referring to Mark Twain's famous statement "I don't believe in ghosts, but they scare me anyway." I think it sums up everything nicely in a single sentence, and this is what makes emotion, or more accurately, the phenomenology of emotion so exclusive.

5.4. Emotional Awareness in Evaluative Judgment

Emotions offer an exclusive way of revealing reality. The world is presented in an evaluative way during emotional experiences, and feeling emotions makes one evaluatively aware of the world. We attribute value to our emotional awareness, which eventually leads to evaluative judgments. According to some philosophers, evaluative judgments are strictly cognitive without the inclusion of any feeling whatsoever. However, this is not an accurate vision for evaluative judgments as they incorporate emotional awareness as the core component. Evaluative judgments evaluate the object or state of affairs in various ways in addition to describing them. Words like "dangerous," "obscene," or "foul" convey disapproval. However,

each type of negative regard is distinct as being offensive and dangerous are not the same things. Differentiating between the various ways that something can be good or bad is a prerequisite to arrive at evaluative judgments. To put it another way, evaluation differentiation is necessary for evaluative judgment. In this context, there are two competing perspectives we must consider, one is Evaluative Sentimentalism and Evaluative Rationalism in the other hand. Against the Sentimentalist view, some argue that evaluative judgment is a matter of dispassionate reasoning and that is the basic connotation of Evaluative Rationalism[22], which asserts that evaluative judgments are grounded on objective features of the things we Judge. I will not consider this notion here as it is not related to my present claim. However, Sentimentalism holds that evaluative judgments are based primarily on emotions. Some Sentimentalists assert that evaluative judgment either conveys or encompasses emotions. Therefore, having an evaluative judgment is almost similar to having an emotion or sentiment towards what is being judged. On the other hand, some claim that evaluative judgments merely refer to emotional reactions that would be warranted, but we do not necessarily feel them while instantiating those judgments. Despite general disputes, it can be said that sentimentalists acknowledge that human emotional sensitivity is ultimately what determines the validity of evaluative judgments made about things and state of affairs because they necessitate either having an emotion toward the object of the judgment or being aware of which emotions are warranted by the object of the judgment. One might ask if it is also advocating a kind of judgment then how is it different from the previous perspective? The fundamental difference between these two is, that while Nussbaum's account highlights emotion as an outcome of accompanied judgment, sentimentalism states that evaluative judgment itself includes emotion,

[22] According to this notion, rather than our emotions toward something, what makes something offensive or dangerous is determined by its distinctive attributes. Rationalism holds that an object is harmful if it has the potential to harm someone and offensive if it disobeys a social norm. These definitions don't mention emotions at all. Emotional awareness is therefore not necessary for evaluation differentiation. Rather, one must deduce conclusions about the evaluative significance of non-emotional facts by reasoning from those facts.

that emotional awareness in evaluative judgment. Nussbaum's theory of emotion belongs to the domain of cognitive phenomena as it is a form of cognitive judgment, whereas sentimentalism is necessarily about evaluative phenomena since it upholds evaluative judgment. Which makes this notion exclusive from the former. According to the theory of evaluative sentimentalism, every emotion underlies a unique kind of evaluation. For instance, something is dangerous if it calls for fear, if it is offensive, it causes anger. If so, we must distinguish between anger and fear to tell the difference between aggressiveness and dangerousness. However, emotional awareness, that is, the ability to identify emotions in both oneself and others, is necessary for evaluation differentiation. Empirical research has demonstrated that distinct emotional states influence individuals' evaluation of the same thing or situation. Fear in general, panic, phobia, and fear disorder influence the subject's judgments of unsafe, and especially, the fear-induced judgments of insecurity are different than other negative emotions. Hence, it can be said that different emotions ground different types of evaluations. In search of the impression of emotional awareness over evaluation differentiation, we will consider the case of alexithymia. The term "alexithymia" etymologically means *no words for emotion*. In contemporary research of psychological investigation, alexithymia is acknowledged as a cluster of deficits in emotional awareness with difficulties in recognising, describing, and thinking about those emotions. What matters for our present purposes is to prove that emotional awareness of a thing or state of affairs subsists regardless of whether value judgment can be obtained or not. Although every sentimentalist accepts that making an evaluative judgment requires having an emotion at the moment of judging, they all share the idea that evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. High alexithymia individuals face a kind of setback in recognising emotions in themselves and others. While they can aptly distinguish between positive and negative feelings. If this is the case, then high alexithymia individuals should not only have problems distinguishing emotions but also face difficulties in

distinguishing evaluations. This motivates the main hypothesis (hereafter, H1) that Higher alexithymia is related to lower evaluation differentiation. Research suggests that high alexithymia individuals encounter greater difficulty in distinguishing anger, fear, disgust, and sadness. According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, these emotions ground awareness of offense, danger, foulness, and loss, respectively. Thus, our studies will test the impact of alexithymia on the subject's propensity to distinguish between these particular evaluations. Furthermore, we will try to find out the impact of alexithymia on evaluative differentiation based on the impression of emotional awareness over evaluative judgment. Instead of theoretical analysis I have chosen a recent experiment to validate the given claim.

I have considered two case studies[23] conducted by Rodrigo Díaz and Jesse Prinz, which were approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Montreal (CERSC-2021-008-D). In case one, they used an array of powerful passionate pictures to document participants for the evaluations, along with their alexithymia levels. They also monitored another group of participants' alexithymia levels and emotional reactions to the same pictures to corroborate the widely held belief that low emotion differentiation and high alexithymia are related. They take into account four different emotions: fear, anger, disgust, and sadness, along with the assessments that go alongside them: danger, offense, foulness, and loss. Instead of focusing on the relationship between participants' feelings and judgments concerning the same stimuli, they were primarily concerned about the connection between participants' inherent(trait) emotional awareness and their propensity for evaluative discrimination. For the investigation, 148 participants (93 men and 55 women, ages 18 to 70) were chosen via Amazon Mechanical Turk. An array of twelve photographs from the Nencki Affective Picture System were displayed to those participating. The images were of certain kinds that usually evoked

[23] Díaz, R and Prinz, J. (2013). "The role of emotional awareness in evaluative judgment: evidence from alexithymia". *Scientific Reports.* https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-32242-y.

one distinct emotion, to be specific for disgust (e.g., a dirty fridge), sadness (e.g., a car accident), anger (e.g., a violent scene), and fear (e.g., a snake). Each photo had been shown for six seconds. There was a counterbalance in the presentation chronology. Two groups, namely Emotion and Evaluation, were arbitrarily allocated to the participants. They used a scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“Extremely”), for the subjects in the Emotion group indicating how much each of the 12 pictures caused them to feel (1) “Afraid”, (2) “Angry”, (3) “Grossed out”, and (4) “Sad”. On the other hand, a scale that varied from 0 (“Not at all”) to 100 (“Extremely”), was allocated to the members of the evaluation group to assess the extent to which they thought the photographs were (1) “Dangerous”, (2) “Offensive”, (3) “Foul”, and (4) “Irrevocable loss”. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale was completed by the participants. The twenty items on this scale are categorized into three categories, that is difficulty describing feelings, difficulty identifying feelings, and externally oriented thinking. An attention test was incorporated within the scale's design. As a criterion for selecting participants, subjects were asked to express their level of attention by selecting "very much" in response to this questionnaire. They calculated Emotion differentiation and Evaluation differentiation s cores as the across-pictures average of the distance between participants’ highest-rated emotion or evaluation and the other emotions or evaluations separated by the mean intensity of their grades. The distance between grades should be divided by the intensity of the ratings because, depending on the intensity of the ratings, the same distance could point to the discrimination level. For example, a distance between ratings of 100 and 80 designates less differentiation than a distance between ratings of 40 and 20. For both Emotion Differentiation, there were noticeable variations between the High Alexithymia and Low Alexithymia categories. The first investigation's findings reveal that alexithymia is associated not only with difficulties discriminating emotions but also with difficulties differentiating evaluations. Someone might challenge that reasoning is the driving force behind both difficulties. it must be mentioned here

that the opponents of Sentimentalism also claim that the most recent discoveries about the emotional influence on evaluative judgment can be interpreted in terms of emotion's impact on reasoning and attention. If individuals high in alexithymia fail to pay attention to the relevant characteristics of what they are judging or fail to deduce what those features entail, their glitches segregating evaluations could be explicated in terms of impaired reasoning. They again added another assessment for reflective reasoning and attentional impulsivity to this investigation which they carried out to explore this alternative interpretation.

The purpose of the second research project is to confirm and expand on the results of the first investigation. Individual difference measures of attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning were crucial additions as they enabled us to assess Rationalist alternatives to sentimentalism. Therefore, in addition to the first hypothesis, they preregistered the following rationalist prediction, which constitutes the second hypothesis (hereafter, H2), and that goes as follows; Higher Attentional Impulsiveness is related to lower Evaluation differentiation, or Higher Reflective Reasoning is related to higher Evaluation differentiation. Both H1 and H2 make sense on their own and are compatible. However, if the effect of alexithymia dissolves after monitoring for individual variances in attention and reasoning, this would mean that the outcomes of investigation one could be elucidated in terms of dispassionate reasoning, which goes against the main hypothesis(H1). In the second assessment, the same pictures from the first study, the same evaluation questions, and the same alexithymia scale alongside subscales for Difficulty Identifying Feelings, and Difficulty in Describing Feelings and externally Oriented Thinking were again displayed to 296 participants (132 males, 162 females, and 2 non-binaries, aged 18 to 80). Subsequently, the participants completed the Attentional Impulsiveness questionnaire, comprising five categories that measure the participants' inattention. Furthermore, participants wrapped up the Cognitive Reflection Test, which consists of three different-level arithmetic, verbal, and logical reasoning

problems. Each participant achieved a score ranging from 0 to 3 based on how many of their responses were accurate. There was substantial difference that could be noted between the High Alexithymia and Low Alexithymia groups for Evaluation Differentiation scores using Evaluation differentiation as the result variable and showed significant effects of Difficulty Identifying Feelings, Externally Oriented Thinking, and Reflective Reasoning. Replicating the results from the first investigation, a noteworthy association between alexithymia levels and evaluation differentiation was found. More specifically, lower evaluation differentiation was correlated with participant's difficulty in identifying feelings and propensity to block out emotional thoughts. More importantly, even after monitoring for individual variations in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, these associations persisted. This provides further support for Evaluative Sentimentalism and the main hypothesis(H1). A strong correlation was discovered between evaluation differentiation and reflective reasoning, validating the second hypothesis. Reflective reasoning, however, does not have any important connection with alexithymia. Therefore, the relationship between alexithymia and evaluation differentiation cannot be attributed to reasoning skills alone. Rather, these findings imply that participants' capacity to discern between evaluations is influenced separately by reflective reasoning and emotional awareness. Conversely, there was a significant correlation found between attentional impulsiveness and alexithymia, but not with evaluation differentiation. Therefore, it appears that people with high alexithymia also pay less attention to the non-emotional aspects of their surroundings, but this does not account for their difficulties with differentiation in evaluative judgment.

According to the theory of evaluative sentimentalism, various emotions underlie different kinds of evaluation, and evaluative judgments are based on emotions. As a result, those who struggle to discern between emotions should also have trouble differentiating between evaluations. Two research investigations that used alexithymia as an indicator of

emotional awareness have found evidence backing this assumption. According to the first research study, having high alexithymia is associated with both low evaluation differentiation and low emotion differentiation. After controlling for individual variations in reflective reasoning and attentional impulsivity, the second investigation confirmed this effect and discovered that reasoning contributes independently to evaluation differentiation. As a whole, these outcomes highlight the irreducible and unalterable position that emotional awareness contributes to evaluation differentiation. We must distinguish between anger, fear, disgust, and sadness to determine whether something is offensive, dangerous, foul, or a loss. This lends credence to the sentimentalist interpretation of evaluative judgment. There are a few significant constraints to the results we have obtained. First, the evaluation judgments (dangerousness, offensiveness, foulness, and loss) that were tested in the studies were relatively restrictive. The particular deficiencies associated with alexithymia guided the selection of these assessments. but as they are hopeful, I also hope that future research endeavours explore the possibility of generalizing the findings to a broader spectrum of assessments. But one thing could be said that all emotions are grounds for a specific kind of evaluation, at least according to Evaluative Sentimentalism. Secondly, the findings of Research Two imply that evaluation differentiation is influenced by both emotion and reasoning. The concepts we have of evaluative judgment need to accommodate reasoning processes, even though the reasoning is unable to entirely elucidate the role of emotion. Various approaches are available to address this issue. There is a chance that emotion and reasoning might interact. For illustration, it could be said that reasoning might aid in enhancing our emotional sensibilities, and emotional experiences might feed into reasoning mechanisms. Another leeway might be that reasoning and emotion deliver separate routes. Under this dual-process interpretation, evaluative judgments might be sourced on emotion or reasoning reliant on the milieu. Finally, it is possible to be concerned with the predictive value of the regression model in investigation 2, and specifically the effect of

difficulty identifying feelings, which is too low to back up the theory of evaluative sentimentalism. Notably, there is no grounds to anticipate that problems with identifying feelings will have an impact on evaluative differentiation if Evaluative sentimentism is inaccurate. Therefore, it could be concluded that a small outcome already supports the Sentimentalist depiction. It is also normal to wonder why was the effect relatively low. One possible elucidation could be that individuals high in alexithymia do not entirely lack the capability to discriminate emotions. The outcomes from the first investigation invariably support this idea. One might argue that even if these findings become universal it cannot suffice for emotional awareness of value judgments. Although it accepts that individuals use their emotions as input to make value judgments, it denies that emotions are required for evaluative judgment. I do not find it problematic because this section's basic connotation is not about when emotion is required but rather the requirement of emotion in value judgment irrespective of how it has been employed in the given mechanism. Hence, it could be concluded that evaluative judgments also subsume evaluative phenomenology, which might be in association or separately but that does not change the fact of its inclusion. I am not typically against this view, but it seems that something is missing here while addressing an emotion. Somehow it does not feel emotional. Giving the judgemental account of emotion lacks one fundamental component and that is the felt aspect. Hence, it would not be wrong to look for some other approaches to validate emotion as we feel it.

5.5. Emotion As Felt Evaluations

Most of the time, the underlying similarities between will, emotion, and pleasure or pain have been overlooked in the overall framework of contemporary philosophy of mind. Bennett Helm[24] stands out as the sole exception, advocating for a cohesive explanation of these

[24] Helm, Bennett W. "Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (2002): 13–30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010055.

categories of occurrences as subjective assessments or felt evaluations. This is probably the only thesis with which I feel sympathetic in my framework of research. In Helm's view, emotions, desires, and certain sensations all reflect a unique form of intrinsically enticing evaluation, which includes both pleasure and pain. This exclusive pattern of evaluation is coined as "felt evaluations".

There are philosophers who hold that pain is a combination of a phenomenal state and an impromptu non-inferential evaluation of that state as physical harm, which is a judgment. The assertion that these judgments are spontaneous and non-inferential is intended to dodge criticism that, were pains be partially composed of judgment, we might easily manipulate our experience of pain by choosing whether or not to make the judgment. The same statement can be applied to pleasure as well. One flaw with this kind of framework is that it is not suitable to explain pain in animals as they are devoid of the propensity of judging the way typically, we do. But even if we ignore the dimension for other creatures, it is also inadequate to define which and how pain motivates behaviour. But there are many pain behaviours that are mere reflexes. For example, if I stab my feet at the edge of the table, I will naturally jerk my leg. They are aware of this and attempt to articulate this motivation by indicating desire as a common but not consistently necessary causal result of pain. The major defect with this view is that the relationship between pain and motivation seems to be much more direct; in contrast, the idea of a pleasure or pain that is unrelated to motivation is almost absurd rather than rare. The abovementioned hypothesis makes it even feasible to imagine pains not as a motivation for the behaviour, which is contrary to the common-sense notion about pain and pleasure as a whole. Thus, we need a more compatible theory for emotion.

Pain, according to Michael Tye[25], is an experience of an ill-ordered state of the body causing uneasiness about the illness of the bodily region where the disorder feels to be located as well as an immediate aversion for the body itself. It appears that what lies behind each case is that desire functions as a form of evaluation, with unpleasant or pleasant experiences being viewed either positively or negatively depending on how intimately one is inclined to understand what they are meant to be. At this point, one might ask if the distinctive "phenomenal character" of pains is an aspect of their intentional content, just which aspect is this? In response, Tye stated that phenomenal content is intentional, abstract, and nonconceptual content that is ready or "poised" for the cognitive processes to deal with. One must comprehend the claim that contents related to the phenomenal nature of pains and other sensory experiences need to be poised. This implies that these contents must be connected to the output representations of the significant sensory component and be prepared to directly influence the belief/desire mechanism. Definitely, I am not comfortable with this situation as it fails to validate the exclusivity of pain that is how it felt unpleasant and not otherwise. I have already discussed it in detail while I have addressed Tye's PANIC theory in the second chapter while referring to the First-Order approaches. To validate this inclination as valuable, desire must be differentiated from simple goal-directedness. Specifically, desire is motivated in a way that comes from an awareness that its object is worthy of seeking or shunning. Since evaluative judgment can be detached from motivation in ways that desire cannot, the type of evaluation that is implicit in desire must be separated from that which is explicit in evaluative judgment. Assessing in the manner, characteristic of desire is simply to be inspired to strive for it. Therefore, desire, motivation, as well as evaluation are intertwined. However, Helm argues that in order to fully appreciate the relationship between evaluation and motivation in desire, one

[25] Tye, Michael. "A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character." *Philosophical Perspectives* 9 (1995b): 223–39. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214219

first needs to acknowledge that desire is inherently itself to be a kind of pleasure or pain. These kinds of evaluations make us feel pleased or pain, and it is exactly because of this that they inspire us to execute proper action accordingly. To formulate a more satisfying explanation that considers both desire and bodily sensations, we must first acknowledge that emotions are an exceptional kind of evaluative response. To do this, we must regard emotions as the paradigm of pleasure and pain.

5.5.1. The Structure of Emotions as Felt Evaluation

Emotions are different than other phenomenological states they might have other phenomenologies associated with them but still, there is a *sui generis* kind of phenomenology that makes emotion, solely "emotional". According to Helm, since emotions are evaluative reactions to an individual's circumstances instead of simply phenomenal states, they have a broad spectrum of intentional objects. An emotion's "target" is, specifically, the thing or state of affairs, it is directed towards. The "formal object" of an emotion is the characteristic evaluation of the target that is implicit in that emotion type and sets it apart from other emotion types. We evaluate the emotion's legitimacy of the formal object. Suppose I am angry at you for stealing my ice cream and making faces at funny me, then the target of my emotion is of course you. It might be said that anger's formal object is offensiveness because this is how it evaluates its targets and differentiates it from annoyance, whose formal object is irritation. The notion of "target" and "formal object" (might be in some other jargon) is almost undistributed and largely accepted. What is rather not extensively discussed is that the warrant of my annoyance at your making faces or anger at you also depends on whether and how the ice cream has a bearing on me or in other words "import" it has for me. If I love ice cream, then it is definitely important to me as something to be cherished and grasped at midnight what I have planned to eat so that my annoyance would be warranted; if the ice cream may instead matter to me as I only keep it aside because it was just left over, then, in that case, my annoyance

would not be warranted or if I absolutely hate ice cream, then no emotion would be warranted at al. It follows that when I feel annoyed or angry, I'm thinking about more than just the formal object, that is irritation or you, and the target, what gets evaluated as irritating or offensive, as well as a "focus," or background object that has significance concerning which the formal object makes sense in the context of the circumstances and to which the “target” is related. Therefore, it might be concluded that the ice cream is the “focus” not only of my annoyance but also of my anger at you for stealing it, for without the ice cream having a specific “import” to me, you making funny faces is not comprehensible as irritating or you as offensive. This explanation of emotions as felt evaluations helps us to comprehend how they can be both pleasures and pains. Do they have a pleasant or unpleasant feeling? For the exact reason that they are felt evaluations, which can be either positive or negative, and that these feelings are ways of showing concern for something that should be the appropriate focus of one's attention. Just like the aforementioned illustration of anger to feel thrilled is to be delighted by some good in the sense that the good impacts itself on one in feeling. We can both comprehend how pleasures and pains intrinsically motivate and the intuition that pleasure and pain have an exclusive link to import according to this explanation of pleasure and pain as felt evaluations. Furthermore, the "emotionality of emotions" which was absolutely missed in the other theories that were discussed in the previous two sections, is well explained by the notion of how emotions are pleasures and pains concerning the conceptual framework of a felt evaluation. One could argue that while experiencing an emotion, we may also experience several corresponding bodily sensations that add to our total phenomenal experience. These ancillary sensations are, in fact, prevalent. Individuals often experience uncomfortable or even agonizing sensations when they are annoyed or angry, such as redness or dizziness. However, it is important to acknowledge that these feelings are not a necessary component of annoyance or anger, but rather something we may or may not experience alongside these emotions. Hence,

an adequate comprehension of the phenomenology of unique emotional pleasures and pains does not have to be associated with these types of bodily sensations necessarily.

5.5.2. Why Felt Evaluation Is the Best Explanation of Emotion

You may recall that I stated at the beginning of the third chapter that although pain is usually conceived of as the hallmark of sensation, I had been hesitant to place it entirely in the realm of sensation since I believe that pain is in fact an extremely intricate situation to grip. The best part of the felt evaluation approach is that it can easily accommodate the bodily pleasure and pain along with the emotional one. This is because felt evaluations encompass a type of evaluation that is fundamentally motivating and contained in bodily pleasures and pains and has both objectivity and subjectivity that can only be comprehended in terms of the kind of background import that is formed by projectable rational patterns. Emotional experiences such as bodily pains and pleasures lead us to evaluate what is happening in a specific body part as either good or bad. Furthermore, in the absence of such an evaluation, a physiological experience would normally not be defined as either painful or pleasurable[26]. These evaluations are subjective since they anticipate the subject possesses some pertinent "background cares and concerns". One might say that bodily pains are more biological than anything else and how does it make sense in the sphere of felt evaluation? Let us take the analogy of the mobile phone that probably we all are using. Suppose the phone has some defect of getting heated while

[26] It must be mentioned that This interpretation of bodily pains as felt evaluations enables us to make sense of the morphine pain. How can some patients while under the influence of morphine be, as they claim, in pain that is nearly as intense as it was before they received the morphine, though they are not bothered by it and have no particular desire to do anything to get rid of it? (A S Keats, H K Beecher; "Pain Relief with Hypnotic Doses of Barbiturates and a Hypothesis". *Anesthesiology* 1951; 12:778 doi: https://doi.org/10.1097/00000542-195111000-00025) The answer is that such sensations are intelligible as pains because of their historical connection with sensations that did hurt, and bother their subjects, though we can understand them as abnormal, defective pains insofar as they are now disconnected from the normal pattern of emotions and desires constituting their import. Hence morphine pains are intelligible only as parasitic on this normal pattern of felt evaluations. We should not, therefore, see morphine pain as a reason to eliminate any conceptual connection between pain and hurting or feeling bad, (Conee, E. "A defense of pain". *Philos Stud* 46, 239–248 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00373107) the conceptual connection remains in place even if morphine pains are defective in the way just indicated.

charging. Now, we all can understand temperature issue to be bad from the knowledge of its proper functioning, but only because of the import to us of such proper functioning has its source in our “cares and concerns”. The same illustration can be applied in the case of bodily pain (or pleasure) as well. An organism's "import" of its body's proper operation and, consequently, how bad the bodily harm is, depends on certain pertinent prior “background cares and concerns” of that organism, which is basically a prerequisite. One might argue that a caress is an inherently pleasant stimulus not dependent on any background concern and devoid of any kind of subjectivity in general. This is an absolute misconception since in reality circumstances are intelligible only in terms of such a background concern. Helm has presented an example to illustrate his perspective. He has compared the dichotomy between the sexual love of a lover and the same kind of caress by a rapist. When the loved one touches; the kiss, the cherish, it feels divine, and it feels pleasurable. On the other hand, the caress of a rapist, even if given with equal tenderness, it feels absolutely painful. There may be another instance where someone is brushed by mistake in a hurry, and it feels probably insignificant. These scenarios differ in that the first example's background concern is for one's lover and it is with consent, while the second example's is for one's own security, integrity and also it is without consent. The third sensation though with consent whatsoever, it is involuntary from both ends and hence, is neither pleasant nor painful because there is no background concern for the instance. One might reasonably argue that in the court case of the rapist's action, the pain one feels is not that of the sensation of the caress but is rather the pain of horror and panic or some other associated emotion. They believe it is illogical to state that the same sensation gets evaluated in a way that is pleasant in one situation and in an entirely distinct manner that is painful in another. It may be realistic in certain situations when one describes a victim of rape as feeling pain only from an emotional understanding of what is happening to her, rather than from the actual caress. However, assuming that this is always the case undermines a very basic, oversimplified, and

general form of phenomenology. It can feel as though the rapist is blistering the victim's skin, and the victim shrinks not only from the rapist but also from the sensation of being touched simply due to what it makes her feel. The reason the victim trembles is because the rapist's caress feels awful, and this badness cannot be separated from the feeling or "sensation" without altering its phenomenology. On the other hand, the lover's embrace is pleasant, and this too cannot be isolated from the experience without modifying its phenomenological nature. As a result, the commonalities between the two sensations lie more in the type of bodily stimulation that generates them than in the way they feel.

One might also argue that bodily pleasure and pain are not phenomenological states since it has content or more precisely intentional content. They also challenged that it reasonably includes a kind of judgement and hence bodily sensation must be subsumed under the cognitive category if we are inclined to accept the felt evaluation outlook. Interpreting physical pleasures and pains as a form of commitment to this evaluative content seems strange to me. Even if any such thing is involved then the commitment is passive because it cannot be directly controlled through altering our active judgmental evaluations; rather, it is passive in that it is sensitive to "import" impressing itself upon us. Another thing that should be noted here is that bodily pleasure and pain vary over time and circumstances. Just like your acquired taste of whiskey bodily pain gets acquired as well. I still remember the first time I did leg exercises and that 5-5 kg squats took the life out of me as the legs hurt so much. Today I do 25-25 kg squats and I am inclined to move towards heavier weight as it no longer feels as painful as it initially was. Definitely, there is an upper limit to such alteration, but it happens, and we intuitively know that. In a nutshell, I will say that physical pleasures and pains are sensations through which an evaluation impacts itself on individuals so that the sensation inspires behaviour based on that evaluation and partially contributes to that evaluation by being here within a more comprehensive rational pattern of emotions and desires. Beyond just making us

happy or hurt, the emotions we experience in response to physical pleasures or pains have other characteristics. In other words, we perceive physical pleasures as not only pleasing us but also as thrilling, affectionate, cosy, etc., and physical pains as not only hurting us but also as burning, discomforting, punching, or even tickling. These sensations are felt along the various touch dimensions, such as temperature, pressure, and texture, and as specific locations on our bodies. So, the concept of bodily pleasure and pain is broader and inseparable from phenomenologically bad and to be avoided or phenomenologically good and to be desired; this total experience is the painful/pleasurable sensation. Thus, bodily sensations are necessarily felt evaluation. I will conclude this section by stating that what makes something pleasurable or painful or emotional is that it is an occurrence of a more general, *sui generis* kind which can be coined as felt evaluation.

5.6. Emotion As I Feel It

I feel that of the three concepts I covered in this chapter, the last one is the most akin to my own because it represents the perspective that I wish to espouse. Although it seems that the felt evaluation's design and framework are fine, I nevertheless notice another clue in this panorama. While I addressed the general structure of felt evaluation, I have discussed four concepts, namely formal object, target, import, and focus. "Import" basically denotes whether and to what extent the object is important to me, while "focus" suggests the background concern and the context that surrounds it. As we can see, this framework allows for an evaluation to include not only the subject and the object but also the subject's perspective on the object and the subject's background, which is a crucial component of the evaluation. Remember that I said in the first chapter that the distinctive quality of phenomenological consciousness and the general enthusiasm in the discussion of consciousness stems from its "for-me" component. I perceived a hint of the "for-me" ness in Helm's explanation of the subject's background and his/her

perspective. We can articulate this with the following illustration[27]. For example, I might be afraid of the rabbits. The formal object here is the evaluation that is characteristic of fear, namely dangerousness, and the target is that which gets evaluated in terms of the formal object. Thus, in fearing the rabbits, I evaluate the rabbits as dangerous, so the rabbits are the target of my fear. Of course, rabbits aren't creatures we normally think of as dangerous, at least not to ourselves. What explains why I nonetheless evaluate the rabbits as dangerous is the relationship between the rabbits and the lettuce in my garden: the rabbits threaten to eat my lettuce, and I care about my lettuce — the lettuce has *import*, a kind of value, to me. Thus, I say, the lettuce is the "focus" of my fear because it is in terms of the relationship between the target (the rabbits) and the focus (my lettuce) that we can make sense of why the target is evaluated in terms of the formal object (of why the rabbits are dangerous). This means that a condition of the warrant of an emotion is that its focus is something that has import to the subject. Why do different individuals have different emotional responses to the same circumstances? Because those circumstances involve different imports to them. I am afraid that the rabbits will eat my lettuce because *my* eating my lettuce is "import" to me. But my roommate, who hates lettuce, hopes that the rabbits will eat my lettuce, and my neighbours may not respond emotionally at all because my lettuce does not have import to them.

Why do various individuals have different emotional reactions to the same incident? Why does one person feel fear whereas other feels hope in response to the rabbits eating the lettuce? Helm said this because things have different "import" and "focus" to these individuals. "Import" is the importance something has to one and the "focus" of an emotion is the object that has that import. Why are there these differences in what is "import" to different individuals? Because I feel, they have different lived experiences. What Helm has already

[27] This section is developed with prolonged mail conversations with Philosopher Bennett Helm, who introduced the notion of "felt evaluation" in the realm of philosophy.

articulated I am just saying it on a deeper level. The brief response is that they do not possess the same as the subjective aspect, even though the phenomenal aspect is analogous. This is not restricted to emotion; the same connotation extends to all conscious mental states, including conscious perception and thought. I arrived at a different station on my journey to the phenomenological unity of consciousness, which was probably not what I had planned. I am going to speak about it in my concluding remarks.

A wide range of questions have been the subject of philosophical investigations into emotions in a variety of contexts. Some issues have already been fixed, but there are still problems that remain unresolved. Their significance goes beyond conceptual development and extends to other scientific domains and theoretical fields like axiology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and epistemology. In the final analysis, they represent practical implications as well, as they impact not only human civilization and culture but also political, social, and economic aspects of life and existence.

FINAL REMARKS

FINAL REMARK

So, we have reached the end of the thesis. One might wonder throughout the journey why is it even required to look for a phenomenological unity or framework to accommodate all the conscious experiences. What could be wrong to enumerate them separately without any holistic umbrella as such? I must confess that the motivation for endeavoring to formulate such a phenomenological design transcends mere phenomenological requirements and blurs the boundaries of the pragmatic, epistemological even ontological realms. The inquiries both inspired and perplexed me as a philosophy student, I tried my best to integrate these questions into the final verses, though I am not sure of how much I can satisfy the demands of each discipline.

Certain conscious experiences might be hard to separate into the domains of cognition, sensation, perception, or emotion. Upon closer inspection, it appears that they exhibit their unique kind of phenomenology by clustering all of those phenomenological aspects. It is sometimes the sensation, often cognitive phenomenology, and at times evaluative phenomenology that occupies the forefront of those conscious experiences. How can we embrace states like these if we do not move forward with a holistic understanding of phenomenology? Consider the shame and guilt for example. They are probably the most vivid instances of concomitant experiences of anxiety, fear, judgment, and perception to a certain extent. Shame could be interpreted as a mental state that has taken up the other person's tone and/or eye on oneself. A disagreement of values and an agent's intention to replace a lower value with a higher one results in shame. The hierarchy of values and conflict between values be viewed through shame. This directly relates to one's self-image, or more specifically, the dichotomy between one's desired self-perception and one's self-image. This is because shame is an evaluation of third-person attitudes from a first-person perspective. Similar to shame, guilt is an unwelcoming feeling that involves self-reflection and self-consciousness. A person may

experience guilt for several reasons, such as actions they have committed or believe they have performed, thoughts they perceive as unethical, or a feeling of disappointment for not acting on something they should have. Although shame and guilt are primarily focused on the self, they also happen to be exceptionally socially significant. In particular, it is believed that they endorse the preservation of meaningful relationships and deter acts that could jeopardize them. However, when used disproportionately, both could unduly pressure individuals who are experiencing them. They necessarily and sufficiently reveal phenomenological exclusivity, but I am not sure how to include them in any of these three phenomenological discourses, I have discussed in my thesis, at this time. They are mostly viewed as emotions by people in general. Occasionally, I get the impression that they are not a part of the emotional experience itself, but other kinds of experiences frequently encountered simultaneously. Just like some people often tend to say that red is a hot colour[1] while blue is a cold colour. It means when you have a perceptual experience there is also a certain affective experience that comes with it but it is still separate. In guilt and shame, it is always a negative evaluation that is self-directed, and when I believe this kind of phenomenological framework, my thought is that guilt is a negative evaluation of something I did whereas shame is a negative evaluation of something I am. It is a difference between a negative evaluation of an action and a self-evaluation of the person. Shame is more about the self and guilt is about the things that the self has done. All this works nicely with the kind of purely evaluative structure that I mentioned in the last chapter. But sometimes I think that the experience of such emotion is so much cognitive, so much sensory that the tricky thing for me in the background is that when I decide that the three kinds of phenomenology come together but each has their own experience vs, they are one experience with many facets. I do not know what is the rule here as such. All I have realized is that they

[1] Uriah Kriegel provided the color analogy, and this paragraph was developed after an in-depth conversation with him.

are components of the entire phenomenological experience and the phenomenological panorama of consciousness. But this is not the only motivation to seek a unitary notion of consciousness, rather the quest is quite primitive.

This is not the first-time people are trying to find a holistic approach to consciousness. Traditional theorists adopted yet another way of integrating consciousness with a single concept. They tried to define conscious mental states exclusively in terms of intentionality, either by reducing or eliminating the phenomenal elements. Nevertheless, the question still stands: Why are researchers still trying to arrive at a single, comprehensive understanding of consciousness? Does the “me” in the “for-me” ness somehow colour the phenomenology of experience for me? This seems to be a very contentious issue. Frankly speaking, the quest is not something new, rather it takes us back to the most fundamental question of existence which is "Who am I"? The pursuit to comprehend consciousness as a unity that validates all the subtle similarities and differences of each conscious mental state while focusing on the "for-me" ness aspect, is unquestionably an attempt to grasp the "me" of "for-me" ness. This "me" is a multi-layered rather than a straightforward concept. That "me" is an amalgamation of a variety of things rather than just one distinct phenomenological dimension. When I entertain a conscious thought to something, like my thesis defense, it is already shrouded with several feelings at once that it seems impossible to focus on just one. These conscious states encompass anxiety that something might go wrong, satisfaction from wrapping up the whole work, general thoughts and the list goes on. It would perhaps be possible to validate the unitary helmet and potentially uncover the "I" at the center of all these phenomenological conscious experiences if we could construct an integrated framework for all these different kinds of conscious states. The destination was undoubtedly not what I was hoping to end up at, but as I stated in the previous chapter and throughout the thesis, the pursuit led me to an alternative location as well. In the end, I also promised to address the elephant in the room. This dissertation can provide

access to the very heart of the self, which is the consciousness of “I" or "I-consciousness". I have not talked about it in my thesis explicitly but while I have reached the end, I cannot deny the fact that phenomenology indicates something more than conscious experience. Even though I was unable to adequately address this particular issue in my thesis, I think it opens up a new avenue for research and exploration. First and foremost, it is important to carefully consider what the "me" of "for-me" ness conveys about the phenomenologicality of the phenomenology of experience. What effects will it have on the overall viewpoint that I am trying to uphold? Let me enumerate the questions that I have left unanswered and would like to reflect on in the future.

How do consciousness and self-consciousness relate to each other? It is frequently stressed that a person can be aware of a wide range of things objects and states of affairs but that person is in no way taking into consideration herself when she is, for example, aware of the aroma of the freshly brewed coffee through consciousness. That is, she does not experience self-consciousness. She is, however, obviously conscious. Something is off with this kind of understanding, in my opinion. I firmly believe that consciousness of things (not in a concrete sense) and self-consciousness are fundamentally related since the first one is not possible without the other being present. In the second chapter (Consciousness of *Being Conscious*) of my thesis, where I already discussed the awareness of awareness aspect of conscious experience, I have advocated in favour of self-consciousness in terms of self-representationalism, which holds that a conscious experience always represents itself, regardless of what else it represents. So, we are by default conscious about being conscious. At the same time, I want to link for-me-ness and phenomenal awareness, as the basis of phenomenological character, into a single feature. Whatever the quest is, without the notion of the being, who is conscious, the experience of consciousness seems unattainable. I believe that the idea of "being" as the subject of the phenomenologically given experience suggests the

phenomenology of the agency or "what it is like" to experience oneself as an agent in a very intricate way. One might argue that these features of agentive phenomenology are only accessible through introspective attention to such phenomenology and not something that can be acquired from the general understanding of consciousness. But it does not refute the fact that we get some glimpse of the phenomenology of self as an agent while having the phenomenology of conscious experience. I have covered a wide range of conscious experiences in this thesis, but what has been significant for us to consider is why different individuals experience the exact same thing in distinct manners. Considering the phenomenological framework that I espouse here, the answer also appears to be fairly straightforward: because it has subjective character or "for-me" ness and hence, it feels different among various individuals. However, what is there in the subjective character that contributes something distinctive to each person? It has a lot to do, in my opinion, with the subject's perspective, which she develops through her lived experience[2]. Yet again, there are many facets to this concept of lived experience. The experiencing subject is clearly put within the world and life by the embodied-enactive phenomenological view of the mind, which underlines the genuine active exchange between embodied agents and the environments with which they encounter and interact. I am referring to an embodied self when I discuss phenomenology because the "self" I am referring to is situated in the body and as a whole it belongs to a given contextual background. Given this perspective, I would like to put forward several questions: Is it possible for us to have this particular perspective without having this particular kind of body, with this specific constitution of blood and flesh? If there had been some silicon or hydraulic structure, for example, would the phenomenology have turned out differently? What about human embodiment? What about their interconnections to the unique conditions of human existence,

[2] I believe one's life and lived experiences are identical.

such as geographical location, time, community, culture, and philosophy? What about people's irreducible individuality, their unique phenomenology? These are the queries that continue to baffle me at the conclusion. Although I am not sure of the appropriate responses, I feel like these are the concerns that need to be resolved. The present dissertation, which strives to preserve the phenomenological unity of consciousness, may serve as a starting point toward removing the shroud of these inquiries. In conclusion, I would say that these are the primary motivations for which I developed this comprehensive phenomenological approach to consciousness.

This holistic approach has a significant social impact besides exerting a positive philosophical and pragmatic value. Any kind of phenomenology; cognitive, evaluative, or otherwise, mostly has a social dimension. Why do I feel ashamed in a given situation when someone else, from a different socio-cultural background, does not feel shameful in the same event? Or why is her experience of shame not precisely the same as mine? What is the reason behind this occurring? These phenomenological nuances indicate to us that there is a very big chunk of phenomenology that is due to my place in society and the world. My phenomenology is also due to my place in a particular society and hence the self, I am talking about is societal as well. I am speaking of this societal self, which includes the sense of "other" in its domain. How could we explain the societal self if we disagree with this idea? I feel ashamed when I feel like I should have done something and am typically unable to carry out that specific action. This is known as the "I should have done this" feeling; if I fail to carry out it, I immediately experience shame. Where is it coming from, I wonder? It has to do with how I perceive my place in society and what I owe to my significant others. Thus, this "me," which is an amalgamation of various phenomenologies, is a concept of self that integrates the others inside it. I am unsure of how to proceed with the phenomenology of others, agentive phenomenology, and phenomenologically givenness of experiences either separately or collectively because

they are so intricately woven together that trying to grasp one always reveals a glimpse of the other two. Thus, whether we are discussing sensory, cognitive, or any other type of phenomenology, they are all pointing to the "me" of the "for-me" ness in some way. Sensory implies that the "me" possesses a particular kind of body and that the sensory phenomenology is determined by the body itself. On the one hand, cognitive refers to the brain's cognitive faculty, and on the other hand, it is conceivable that social influences also shape cognitive paradigms. Likewise, if it is evaluative, it is heavily influenced by society and, in a sense, promotes the agential realm as well. These all point to the fact that the owner of this phenomenological awareness is a social being. Then, the results of all of this research may also be revealing to the nature of the self. Philosophers have discussed the nature of the self extensively and made an effort to comprehend it in a variety of ways. It is not true that no one has previously addressed this for the kind of self I am trying to put here. The only thing I want to assert is that the various phenomenologies I am attempting to discuss here reinforce that very concept of self. Thus, this could be a fresh approach for me to continue with my future research.

This is officially the last paragraph of my thesis, and as I am writing it, I am experiencing an array of nervousness and anxiety, yet satisfaction, and optimism that I am unfamiliar with and I do not know how to adequately express it in words. Perhaps this is what makes a phenomenologically given state so special, you possess complete control and are compelled to feel something, but you are sadly unable to express it entirely. As Jean Cocteau once said, "You can't explain it. You feel it."[3] The title of my thesis talks about a journey, to be specific a long and eventful journey, a voyage for the oneness of consciousness within phenomenology. The question that lingers at the end is "Have I done that successfully?" Do I now stand where I aspired to be? Has my work towards the unifying theory of consciousness been successful?

[3] *Uncle Yanco*, directed by Agnès Varda, (1967; France, Ciné-Tamaris), DVD.

well, I do not know whether my endeavor will stand firm or collapse. However, I have made an effort to understand the most commonly recognized aspect of consciousness—that is, the subjective conscious experience—while avoiding the temptation to reduce all other aspects of conscious mental states—if any exist—to phenomenology. In conclusion, I will state that this phenomenological walk was one to cherish forever. To wrap up my thesis on a lyrical note, I would like to bring up one of my most beloved singers. In the 1970s Jim Morrison said:

> Oh, keep your eyes on the road, your hands upon the wheel
> Keep your eyes on the road, your hands upon the wheel
> Yeah, we're going to the Roadhouse
> Gonna have a real
> A good time.[4]

I surrender to him and allow this amazing song to lead me to a different kingdom. For me, it is always the journey that matters, not the final destination. Hence, I will say, let the odyssey continue, uninterrupted and free.

[4] The Doors. "Roadhouse Blues". Track 1. *Morrison Hotel*. Paul A. Rothchild. 1970. CD.

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