

**JAYARĀŚI'S POLEMIC AGAINST GAUTAMA'S
DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION**

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Certified that the thesis entitled, Jayarāśi's Polemic against Gautama's definition of Perception, submitted by me towards the partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Philosophy (Arts) in Philosophy of Jadavpur University, is based upon my own original work and there is no plagiarism. This is also to certify that the work has not been submitted by me for the award of any other degree/diploma of the same Institution where the work is carried out, or to any other Institution. A paper out of this dissertation has also been presented by me at a conference at University of Rajasthan, thereby fulfilling the criteria for submission, as per the M.Phil Regulation (2017) of Jadavpur University.

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On the basis of academic merit and satisfying all the criteria as declared above, the dissertation work of DEBOPAMA BOSE entitled Jayarāśi's Polemic against Gautama's definition of Perception, is now ready for submission towards the partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Philosophy (Arts) in Philosophy of Jadavpur University.

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In Memoriam

*To my grandfather, Late Prof. Ranjit Kumar Bose and my dearest
maternal aunt, Late Smt. Dolly Mukherjee, who would have
appreciated and been glad to see this work. I always seek their
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

One of the main pillars of philosophy is Epistemology or the branch of knowledge dealing with knowledge itself, its nature, source, validity, etc. Epistemology as found in Indian philosophy is concerned with cognitions, their objects, their veridicality and their source. A valid cognition that is uncontradicted in reality is called *pramā* and the object of such a valid cognition is called *prameya*. The source that gives valid cognition or *pramā*, i.e. the valid source of knowledge is called *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* makes known the *prameya* as it really is and hence a *pramāṇa* is unerring. This *pramāṇa-prameya* dichotomy is something that has been admitted by almost all schools of Indian philosophy. But it is interesting to note that three Indian philosophers who are claimed as ‘skeptics’ of the Indian philosophical tradition completely negate this *pramāṇa-*

prameya dichotomy. These three philosophers who had flown against the main current were Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa and Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa.

Skepticism is a line of thought in philosophy that has been running parallel to the mainstream philosophy of theorizing and argument formulating by the different schools and philosophers since eras. This skeptical trend has put the theorists into challenges they could not ignore, thereby contributing to either the nourishment or the subversion of the theories. Skepticism is ‘a philosophical conception questioning the possibility of objective knowledge of reality’.¹ Following Merriam-Webster, the word ‘skeptic’ comes from the Latin word ‘*scepticus*’ coming from the Greek word ‘*skeptikos*’ meaning thoughtful, which has its root in the word ‘*skeptesthai*’ meaning to look or consider.² Talking of skepticism, the first thing that readily comes to our mind is the skepticism as

¹ *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin (eds.), Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 398.

² <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skeptic>

maintained in the West since Pyrrho and later carried forward by others like Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus. The skeptical attitude is also noticeable in Indian philosophy but there is a basic difference between the skepticism of the West and that of India. The western skeptics did not have any philosophical affiliation and upheld the idea of suspension of judgements. In Indian philosophy the skeptics do have a philosophical affiliation and not all such Indian skeptics uphold the concept of the suspension of all judgements. In this sense, there appears a difference between the skeptical outlooks of the two systems. Many people enquire whether such Indian skeptics should at all be called skeptics or not. But Bimal Krishna Matilal, Pradeep P. Gokhale and Dilip Kumar Mohanta have preferred calling them ‘cognitive skeptics’. Indian philosophy has such skeptical trends in the form of refutation of the opponent’s position through arguments without establishing the proponent’s own position. This method of skepticism as found in Indian philosophy is called *Vitaṇḍā* in Indian philosophical jargon and the person employing this method is called a *Vaitaṇḍika*. In this context it should be mentioned that *Vitaṇḍā* is

one of the three kinds of *kathā* as mentioned in the *Nyāyasūtra* and it is characterized as the *kathā* in which the aim is to attain victory over the opponent even by employing unfair means in a debate or *vicāra-sthala* by formulating arguments to refute the opponent's position without manifesting or establishing as a *sādhya* the proponent's own position which remains hidden.³

Now, among the three philosophers who are the so-called skeptics of Indian philosophy, namely, Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa and Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, it was Jayarāśi who took to refuting all the *pramāṇas* starting from *pratyakṣa* to *aitihya* and *sambhava*, thus showing the implausibility of the *pramāṇas* by definition. This dissertation is intended to focus on Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's skepticism, highlighting his refutation of Perception as defined by Maharṣi Gautama.

³ 'Sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā' [*Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.44]

It is needless to say how significant the concept of *pramāṇa* is. Maharṣi Gautama however, has only mentioned the sixteen categories beginning with *pramāṇa* but has not defined *pramāṇa*. He has only mentioned the names of the four *pramāṇas* i.e. *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *śabda* (testimony).⁴ Many philosophers have viewed this as a fault since Gautama was supposed to present a general definition of the term '*pramāṇa*'. In order to defend Gautama it can be said that a definiendum may not be always defined through a definiens, it may be defined through showing the classifications only. For instance, if a child asks, "What is a flower?" her father instead of giving her the proper definition of a flower that would be unintelligible to the child, may explain through showing the classification of flower by saying, "Rose, Lily, Lotus, Tulip are all flowers". But Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted the aphorism in a different way stating that although the aphorism upholds the classification of *pramāṇas*, the last term in the

⁴ '*Pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*' [*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.3]

Ibid, p. 83.

aphorism viz. ‘*pramāṇa*’ in the plural number indicates the general definition. Commentator Vātsyāyana too has held that the classification of *pramāṇas* indicate the special definition while the term ‘*pramāṇa*’ stands for the general definition. For him *pramāṇa* can be interpreted as “*Pramīyate’nena*”, meaning that by which an object gets established as the object of *pramā* or veridical cognition.⁵ The meaning of the term ‘*pramāṇa*’ can be understood well if the grammatical composition of the term is paid heed to. The prefix ‘*pra*’ when followed by the root ‘*mā*’ and the suffix ‘*lyut*’ in the instrumental sense (*karaṇavācyā*) is added, we get the word ‘*pramāṇa*’. In this sense *pramāṇa* is the instrument of *pramā*. The prefix ‘*pra*’ when followed by the root ‘*mā*’ in the sense of knowledge, makes the word ‘*pramā*’ and means veridical cognition. Hence *pramāṇa* is ‘*Pramākaraṇam pramāṇam*’ meaning the

⁵ ‘*Pramīyate’neneti karaṇārthābhidhano hi pramāṇaśabdah, tadviśeṣasamākhyāyā api tathaiva vyākhyānam*’ [*Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* 1.1.3]

Ibid, p. 86.

instrumental cause of *pramā* or ‘*Upalabdhi sādhanam*’ meaning the instrumental cause of *upalabdhi* or *pramā*.⁶

It is to be noted that the number of *pramāṇas* is not limited to four viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. There are other *pramāṇas* like *arthāpatti*, *anupalabdhi*, *sambhava*, *aitihya* and *ceṣṭā*. Out of these not all the schools of Indian philosophy have accepted each and every *pramāṇa*. From the *ekapramāṇavādin* school, *Cārvāka*, which accept only one *pramāṇa* viz. *pratyakṣa* to the *ṣaḍapramāṇavādin*, *Mīmāṃsā* school, which accept six *pramāṇas* viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* the number of *pramāṇas* accepted by the schools vary. A list given below states the *pramāṇas* accepted by each school of Indian philosophy.

⁶ ‘*Upalabdhi sādhanāni pramāṇānīti samākhyā-nirvvacana-sāmarthyād-boddhavyam*’ [*Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* 1.1.3]
Ibid, p. 86.

- i. *Nyāya* school accepts four— *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*.
- ii. *Vaiśeṣika* school accepts four— *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*.
- iii. *Sāṃkhya* school accepts three—*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.
- iv. *Yoga* school accepts three— *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.
- v. *Mīmāṃsā* school accepts six— *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*.
- vi. *Vedānta* school accepts six— *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*.
- vii. *Cārvāka* school accepts one— *pratyakṣa*.
- viii. *Bauddha* school accepts two— *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.
- ix. *Jaina* school accepts three— *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

The first *pramāṇa* that Jayarāśi has refuted is *pratyakṣa* or perception. We all shall admit that the commonest way of acquiring knowledge is perception. No man dares to reject it because it is the highest or *jyeṣṭha pramāṇa* for it is not dependent on other *pramāṇas*

while the rest have to depend on perception. It is probably Jayarāśi alone who has refuted perception theoretically by attacking its various definitions. The definitions of perception the author has picked for refutation are given below.

Nyāya definition of perception

*“Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam
avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam”*

Perception is the cognition arising out of the sense-object contact and which is unassociated with a name, unerring and determinate.

Bauddha definition of perception

“Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam”

Perception is a non-erroneous cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all constructions.

Mīmāṃsā definition of perception

“Sat samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṅām buddhijanma tat pratyakṣamanimittaṁ vidyamānopalambhanāt”

Perception is produced in the self by the sense organs which have the proper contact with the real objects, which apprehends a present object.

Sāṃkhya definition of perception

“Yat sambandhasiddhaṁ tadākārollekhi vijñānaṁ tat pratyakṣaṁ”

Perception is defined as that discernment which being in conjunction with an object portrays the form thereof.

Among these definitions, the first definition Jayarāśi has refuted is that given by the *Naiyāyikas* and in my dissertation I have

taken into consideration the refutation of only the definition of perception given by the *Naiyāyikas*.

It is well known to many that there are a number of definitions of perceptions that were formulated in order to deal with certain problematic issues that rose against the definitions. The very first definition of perception is the one that we find in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4 given by Maharṣi Gautama which is:

“Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannamjñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakampratyakṣam”

But for Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana, Gangeśa and others, the definition should have been: *“Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam avyabhicāri jñānam”* — since the term ‘*pratyakṣam*’ merely indicates the definiendum, the terms ‘*avyapadeśyam*’ and ‘*vyavasāyātmakam*’ indicate indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) respectively. Moreover, by the term ‘*artha*’ is meant the object of perceptual cognition. If so, then in the case of an inference of *atman*,

the internal sense organ *mana* comes in contact with the *atman* which is the object. Now, since *atman-mana samyoga* is the general or ordinary cause (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) behind all cognitions including inferential cognition, so the definition of perception is found to over-cover the case of inferential cognition as well. Again, the cases of atman-smṛti like ‘*aham sukhin*’ are also due to the contact between the *atman* and the *mana*, leading to over-coverage by the definition. Apart from these, the definition stated by Maharṣi Gautama suffers from under-coverage in the case of God’s perception since He is omniscient and His perception is not due to the sense-object contact.

To deal with these issues, Gangeśopādhyāya formulated another definition:

“*Jñānākaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*”

The *karaṇa* or extraordinary cause of perception is *indriya* or sense organs, while that of inferential cognition is *vyāptijñāna* or the knowledge of the universal concomitance, of cognition from comparison is *sādṛśyajñāna* or the knowledge of similarity and of

cognition from verbal testimony is *padajñāna* or the knowledge of words. Hence it is clear that perceptual cognition is the only one that does not have any *jñāna* or knowledge as its *karāṇa*. This definition is free from the fallacies of over-coverage and under-coverage. But those *Naiyāyikas* who consider *manas*, the internal sense organ to be the *karāṇa* of all cognitions, they hold that in that case all cognitions are *jñānākaraṇaka* since they are *manakaraṇaka* and hence the definition of perception will over-cover cognitions like *anumiti*, etc.

To deal with this issue, Raghunath Shiromani gave a definition from the perspective of the class essence or *jāti*. He held that if *anubhavatva* is not considered as a *jāti* then the definition of perception would be:

“*Tadvyakti-samaveta-smaraṇāsamavetadharmasamavāyitvaṃpratyakṣatvaṃ*”

That which is inherent in the individual perceptions and not inherent in memory is *pratyakṣatva*. *Pratyakṣatva* can be present only in

pratyakṣa. But if *anubhavatva* as a *jāti* is admitted then the definition will be:

“*Tadvyakti-samaveta-anumityasamavetadharmasamavāyitvaṃpratyakṣatvaṃ*”

That which is inherent in the individual perceptions and not inherent in *anumiti* is *pratyakṣatva* and *pratyakṣatva* being present only in *pratyakṣa* the definition does not suffer from fallacies of over-coverage and under-coverage.

In spite of all these amended definitions Jayarāṣi has chosen Gautama’s original definition for refutation. It should be mentioned in this context that Gautama’s definition is the definition of perceptual cognition or *pratyakṣa pramā* and not *pramāṇa*. The definition of the perception as a valid source or *pramāṇa* can be constructed by adding the word ‘*yataḥ*’ to the definition which will come as:

“*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannamjñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāriv
yavasāyātmakamnyataḥ tat pratyakṣam*”

However since the term *pramāṇa* stands for both *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, Jayarāśi’s selection of the definition of perception as a valid source of knowledge for refutation is not wrong.

For entering into a vivid discussion on Jayarāśi’s refutation, the need to keep certain issues discussed beforehand was felt and those have already been done separately in chapter one, Introduction. To grasp Jayarāśi and his refutation well, four chapters have been made excluding the Introduction and Conclusion. The first chapter after the Introduction is completely dedicated to an overall introduction and background of the author Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa and his treatise *Tattvopaplavasimha*. From the next chapter onwards, an attempt has been made to showcase Jayarāśi’s arguments and also to highlight any inconsistency that could be found in his formulation of the arguments following the order in which he has refuted the terms.

Hence discussion and interpretation and then the refutation of the term '*avyabhicāri*' come in the third chapter. The fourth chapter deals with the interpretation and refutation of the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' and the fifth chapter is concerned with that of the term '*indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*'. It is to be noted that since Jayarāśi himself has skipped the refutation of the term '*avyapadeśya*' by saying that the refutation of that term is already there in the book *Lakṣaṇasāra* (which may or may not be authored by him and is undiscovered), it has been completely ignored and has not been mentioned in any chapter of this dissertation. Lastly, the dissertation work has been concluded by compiling comments and observations on the issues discussed in the work in the last chapter, Conclusion.

Chapter II

THE ICONOCLAST OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY:

JAYARĀŚI BHAṬṬA AND HIS TREATISE

TATTVOPAPLAVASIMĪHA

JAYARĀŚI BHAṬṬA

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, who probably hailed from South India in the 8th century AD, was the author of *TattvopaplavasimĪha*. Jayarāśi has mentioned the name of another book, *Lakṣaṇasāra* but since the book remains undiscovered till date, it cannot be said with certainty that the book was authored by Jayarāśi himself.

The time period of Jayarāśi and his text could not be ascertained with precision but has been estimated to be 8th century

AD based on the mention of the name of the text as a refuter of *pramāṇas* in other works. There is another estimated time period based on the fact found inside the text. Jayarāṣi has refuted all the schools except the *Vedānta* system advocated by Śaṁkara. Had Śaṁkara been Jayarāṣi's contemporary or had Śaṁkara come earlier, Jayarāṣi who has bothered to refute all the systems known to him, would have not spared such a popular and influential system as Śaṁkara's. So Jayarāṣi probably did not know Śaṁkara's system since he came early. Śaṁkara's time period was late 8th century to the early part of the 9th century AD. Jayarāṣi's time period thus can be estimated to either early 7th century or 8th century AD.¹

The birthplace of the author cannot be known for certain but can only be estimated to be South India since the first reference of the book '*Tattvopaplavasimha*' was found in the works of *Digambara Jainas* Vidyānandin and Anantavirya both of whom

¹ Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa, *Tattvopaplavasimha*, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh (eds.), Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1940, p. (x) of Introduction.

came from South India. Jayarāṣi was probably a Brahmin like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and the *Lokāyata Darśana* was also a *Nāstika Brahminical Darśana* since Bṛhaspati was within the Brahminical fold.²

TATTVOPAPLAVASIMHA

This incredible work by Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa namely *Tattvopaplavasimha* was discovered in a Jaina library as a palm-leaf manuscript in 1926 by Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Pandit Bechardas Dosi and later edited and published in 1940 by Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi himself and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh in Baroda. It used to be previously held that all the texts belonging to the *Lokāyata* system were destroyed. Hence the position of the *Lokāyata* school could only be apprehended from the works of the other schools which anticipated arguments and charges from the *Lokāyata* school. Jayarāṣi's treatise has brought an ever solution to this problem. *Tattvopaplavasimha* is

² *Ibid*, p. (xi) of Introduction.

considered as the only authentic *Cārvāka* text that could be discovered and restored. The title of the text can be translated and interpreted either as ‘the lion of upsetting of all principles’ meaning the main work on the nullification of all principles or ‘the uprooting of all principles like a lion’ meaning the nullification of all principles by pouncing upon and attacking the opponents just like a lion pounces upon his prey. A third alternative can also be imagined. The term ‘*simha*’ may stand to indicate the magnitude of the work which took to refuting all the *pramāṇas* with vanity.

Jayarāśi intended to showcase in his treatise the implausibility of all the *pramāṇas* leading to the unknowability of the so called knowables. It is interesting to note how Jayarāśi has carried out the process of refutation. He has maintained a specific uniform method—he has taken each definition of the *pramāṇas*, picked each term and considered all the possible senses in which the term could be taken to mean and has shown the flaws in taking the terms in those senses, thus exhibiting the overall futility of the definition. This may be called the *reductio ad absurdum method* or *prasaṅga*, where the

possible senses are reduced to exhibit the absurdity lying therein. It is to be kept in mind that the author has refuted the *pramāṇas* only theoretically for even he has admitted that there remains a difference in theory and practice and that no matter what varying definitions philosophers belonging to various schools propose, they follow the one common way of behavior in practice.

That the treatise is concerned with the refutation of *pramāṇas* can be well understood from the contents of the book as mentioned below.

1. Examination and refutation of the definition of perception as given by the *Nyāya* school.
2. Examination and refutation of the definition of *pramāṇa* as given by the *Mīmāṃsā* school.
3. Examination and refutation of the definition of *pramāṇa* as given by Tathāgata (*Bauddha* school).
4. Examination and refutation of the definition of perception as given by Saugata (*Bauddha* school).

5. Refutation of perception as given by the *Mīmāṃsā* school.
6. Refutation of the definition of perception as given by the *Sāṃkhya* school.
7. Refutation of inference as held by the *Nyāya* school.
8. In this context refutation of the inference of *atman* as given by
 - 8.1. *Nyāya*
 - 8.2. *Jaina*
 - 8.3. *Sāṃkhya*
 - 8.4. *Vedānta* (not Śaṅkara's *Advaitavāda*)
9. Refutation of inference as held by Tathāgata.
10. Refutation of implication as held by *Mīmāṃsā* school.
11. Refutation of comparison.
12. Refutation of absence (non-apprehension).
13. Refutation of the *prāmāṇya* of 'sambhava' and 'aitihya'.
14. Refutation of testimony.

DEBATE ON JAYARĀŚI'S PHILOSOPHICAL AFFILIATION

The Indian skeptics are affiliated to some philosophical systems like Nāgārjuna was well known as a *Mādhyamika Bauddha*, Śrīharṣa was a *Vedāntin*; similarly Jayarāśi is loosely affiliated to the *Cārvāka* school although the evidences in support of this claim both from within and without the text are not conclusive. Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam* has considered the *Cārvākas* as *apramāṇavādins* and fully eligible to take part in debates. Since it is well known to us that the *Cārvākas* believed in perception as the only *pramāṇa*, Śrīharṣa too must have been aware of this fact. Yet since he has considered the *Cārvākas* as *apramāṇavādins*, it is conjectured that he has talked of Jayarāśi's trend of nullifying all the *pramāṇas*. From this we can infer that Jayarāśi has been considered as a *Cārvāka* by Śrīharṣa. Radhakrishnan and Basham accept *Tattvopaplavasīmha* as belonging to the *Lokāyata* system while the editors of the book *Tattvopaplavasīmha* and Dakshinaranjan Shastri consider Jayarāśi as representing a sub-community of the *Cārvāka*

school which denies all *pramāṇas* even perception since they hold that *prāmāṇya* of the *pramāṇas* is derived from inference and due to the unacceptance of inference, the *prāmāṇya* of perception also remains unestablished. Walter Ruben and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya were however reluctant in calling Jayarāśi a *Cārvāka*. Because the extreme idealism maintained by Jayarāśi similar to the *śūnyavādin Bauddha* and *māyāvādin Vedāntin* is totally opposed to the materialism upheld by the *Cārvākas*, Chattopadhyaya preferred calling Jayarāśi an idealist with a hidden agenda.³ He has also enumerated reasons for not calling Jayarāśi a *Cārvāka*.

Firstly, in his text Jayarāśi has nowhere stated that he belonged to the *Lokāyata* system or was a follower of Bṛhaspati or was a *Cārvāka*. He has mentioned the name of Bṛhaspati in the text indeed but for a different reason like proving his own superiority over

³ Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, *Lokāyata Darśana*, Kolkata, New Age Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1969.

Bṛhaspati. Secondly, the introductory portion of the edited version of the book *Tattvopaplavasīmha* has informative discussions on books and philosophers who mentioned Jayarāśi and his work but nowhere there is a clear statement declaring Jayarāśi to be a *Cārvāka*.

Another reason why the author should not be called a *Cārvāka* can be found from the end part of his book. Jayarāśi has clearly mentioned that his text has aimed at ‘*pākhaṇḍadarpacchidi*’ meaning the destruction of the arrogance of the *pākhaṇḍas* and ‘*pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍana*’ meaning the refutation of the *pākhaṇḍas*.⁴ Therefore, it is necessary to know the meaning of the word ‘*pākhaṇḍa*’. The word ‘*pākhaṇḍa*’ probably stands for ‘*pāṣaṇḍa*’. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya has correctly pointed out Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya’s elucidation on this. Gangopadhyaya said that

⁴ ‘*Ye yātā nahi gocaram suraguroḥ buddhervikalpā dṛḍhāḥ,
Prāpyante nanu te’pi yatra vimale pākhaṇḍadarpacchidi.*’
‘*Pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijñā jñānodadhivivaraddhitāḥ
Jayarāśerjayantīha vikalpā vādijīṣṇvaḥ.*’

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh (eds.), Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1940, p. 125.

according to lexicographers, *pā* means ‘*trayīdharma*’ i.e. the Vedas and one who refutes that dharma is a *pākhaṇḍin*.⁵ Hence it means the anti-Vedic ‘*Nāstikas*’. In Indian philosophy the *nāstika* tradition refers to the *Bauddhas*, the Jainas and definitely to the extreme *nāstika Cārvākas*. Thus it would not be justified enough to call Jayarāśi a *Cārvāka*.

Moreover the very beginning of the text also bears the mark of the author not belonging to the *Lokāyata* system. The *Cārvākas* believed in the four perceptible elements of *kṣiti* (earth), *ap* (water), *teja* (fire) and *marut* (air). But *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* begins with Jayarāśi pointing this fact out and *śarīra* (body), *indriya* (senses) and *viṣaya* (objects) being composed of their aggregates. But on reflection it will be found that these elements are not established theoretically and since these are unestablished, the question of the

⁵ Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna, ‘Tattvopaplavavāda of Jayarāśi and its Alleged Relation to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata’.

<http://www.carvaka4india.com/2015/01/tattvopaplavavada-of-jayarasi-and-its.html>

establishment of other ‘*tattvas*’ also does not arise.⁶ This also gives the allusion that Jayarāśi was not a follower of the *Cārvāka* ideology. Chattopadhyaya finds his refutation of the materialistic view as a result of his idealistic approach. Gokhale however opines that Jayarāśi has avoided the realistic and materialistic view of the world by denying the principle of the classification of the material world and reducing the objects of sensation to sense-data and at the same time he also has got rid of idealism by reducing the cognition to its content thus differing from the *Vijñānavādins*.⁷

While the treatise begins with fragmented sentences stating that actions have no otherworldly fruits like hell, heaven, etc. and both the learned and the fool follow the common way of living life when it comes to practice thus giving the allusion that Jayarāśi was

⁶ Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh (eds.), Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1940, p. 1.

⁷ Gokhale, Pradeep P., ‘The Philosophical Position Of Jayarasibhatta’, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 5, 3, 1978, p. 495.

<http://www.unipune.ac.in/ipq/english/IPQ>

a *Cārvāka*, the text ends with Jayarāṣi expressing his vanity by calling himself '*Devaguru*' and intellectually superior to Bṛhaspati himself since Jayarāṣi had addressed even those philosophical issues that remained unattended by the '*suraguru*' Bṛhaspati. Hence it is quite conspicuous that Jayarāṣi could not have been a *Cārvāka* since defying the founder of a system and placing oneself on the same seat as the founder is not the tradition of Indian philosophy.

Chapter III

INTERPRETATION AND REFUTATION OF THE TERM 'AVYABHICĀRI'

In the last chapter we have gone through an analytical discussion on the author Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa and his book *Tattvopaplavasimha*. In the book he has refuted all the valid sources of knowledge or *pramāṇa*. Out of all the *pramāṇas*, *Pratyakṣa* or Perception is held as the most reliable one. There are many definitions of perception that have been provided by the various schools of Indian philosophy but the one offered by the founder of the *Nyāya* system Maharṣi Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*, stands as the most popular that has been accepted by almost all. The definition goes as follows:

“*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannamjñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakampratyakṣam*” [Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4].

Jayarāśi has refuted all the main terms comprising this definition viz. *Indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*, *avyapadeśya*, *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. Out of these we find the refutation of only three terms in *Tattvopaplavasimha* viz. *Indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*, *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. Since the first term Jayarāśi has refuted is ‘*avyabhicāri*’ defying the order in which the terms occur in the definition, in this chapter we shall go through the refutation of the term. But before that let us have an understanding of the sense in which Gautama and his followers have taken the expression. Hence we shall have a brief discussion on the interpretation of the term first and then shall move on to the detailed discussion on the refutation of the term by Jayarāśi.

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM ‘AVYABHICĀRI’

The fourth term comprising the definition of perception offered by Maharṣi Gautama is ‘*Avyabhicāri*’. The classical interpretation of the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ and its difference from the term ‘*vyabhicāri*’ can be found in *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* 1.1.4 where he has said ‘*tasmimstaditi*’ or perception of an object as it really is, is what is meant by ‘*avyabhicāri*’ while ‘*atasmimstaditi*’ or perception of an object as it is not in reality is what is meant by ‘*vyabhicāri*’.¹

The insertion of the term is necessary in order to keep out erroneous perceptions from the scope of the definition. Perception or ascertainment of something in an object that it is not is called *vyabhicāri pratyakṣa* or erroneous perception. On the other hand perception of something in an object that it actually is, is *avyabhicāri*

¹ ‘*Yadatasmimstaditi tadvyabhicāri. Yattu tasmimstaditi tadavyabhicāri pratyakṣamiti*’ [*Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* 1.1.4]

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, *Nyāyadarśana*, on *Nyāyasūtra* by Gautama, Part I, Kolkata, West Bengal State Book Board, 2014, p. 127.

pratyakṣa or non-erroneous perception. In the case of mirage i.e. illusion of water, when the eyes come in contact with sunrays falling on hot sand in a desert, the perceiver perceives water. This is an erroneous cognition where the error occurs in the qualifier part (*viśeṣaṇāmśa*) i.e. the qualifier water-ness in this case. But the *kaṛaṇa* or instrumental cause of error that occurs in the qualifier part is not *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* or perception as a valid source. This erroneous cognition also occurs in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake or a shell for a piece of silver. Although these cognitions are not to be included into the scope of perception, yet these get covered by the definition since these too are due to sense-object contact, non-verbalized and certain cognitions. To solve this problem the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ needs to be inserted into the body of the definition. It prevents such over-coverage issues since these erroneous cognitions are *vyabhicāri* and not *avyabhicāri*.

In this connection it may be discussed that the *Naiyāyikas* uphold the theory of error named ‘*Anyathākhyātivāda*’. By this theory the erroneous object is *sat* or existent i.e. not imaginary or

alīka, and the seat where the error occurs, that too is *sat* or existent. In the case of perceiving silver in a shell, the object whatsoever is existent and it is the seat where the error occurs. Silver-ness is the qualifier or *prakāra* which is erroneous but it is also existent, existent somewhere else at some other point of time. According to this theory prior knowledge of silver is there in the memory of the perceiver and through *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* which is a kind of extra-ordinary sense-object contact, the eyes of the perceiver get connected with the silver giving rise to the erroneous perception of silver. But the person who has no knowledge of what silver is, does not have such an erroneous perception. Therefore the mental traits (*saṃskāra*) of silver induce the memory cognition of silver.

It is to be noted here that such erroneous cognitions are also non-erroneous or *avyabhicāri* in the qualificand part (*viśeṣyāmśa*). So the cognition is called erroneous with respect to the object of the cognition. Hence, the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ stands for the non-erroneousness of the object.

REFUTATION OF THE TERM BY JAYARĀŚI

Perception can be called non erroneous in several senses in which the term '*avyabhicāri*' can be taken. There are four senses in which perception can be called non erroneous:

- a) It is produced from a composite of causal factors free from defects
[in accordance with the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya* perspective]
- b) It is free from contradiction i.e. it is uncontradicted [in accordance with the *Vedānta* perspective]
- c) It leads to fruitful action [in accordance with the *Nyāya* perspective]
- d) Because of any other reason

The first alternative is not tenable. How can we know that the set of factors is not defective?

- It cannot be known by perception because whether the sense organs are defective or not, that cannot be known by the sense organs themselves.
- It cannot be known by inference due to
 - i. Lack of a proper ground or hetu which could be used for inferring.
 - ii. If the perceptual cognition itself is taken as the ground then it will involve the fallacy of mutual dependency since the veridicality of perceptual cognition is established from its non defectiveness of the causal factors and the non defectiveness of the causal factors is established from the veridicality of perceptual cognition.
- Since perception and inference fail to establish that the causal factors are non defective, other pramāṇas will by default fail to do the same.
- Moreover, the non erroneousness of perceptual cognition cannot be known from the causal factors. The sense organs are the causal factors in the case of perception. Now the sense organs are the

loci of both virtues or *guṇa* and vices or *doṣa*. Hence we cannot say that the non erroneousness of perceptual cognition results from the non defects in the sense organs. So a doubt remains on whether the resulting cognition is veridical or not. This is very similar to the case where on hearing an uttered sentence by an unknown person one cannot know for certain the intention of the speaker.

The second alternative is also not tenable.

- It cannot be said that perceptual cognition is non erroneous because no contradiction has arisen. This will lead to a doubt between the two alternatives:
 - i. Did the contradiction not arise because the perceptual cognition revealed the fact i.e. it was veridical?
 - ii. Were the causal factors responsible for producing the contradictory cognition not present?
- It is true that sometimes when all the factors are not present the contradictory cognition does not arise. For instance, a traveler traveling in a desert for the first time mistakes a mirage for water.

Without checking if that was really water he moved on. So here the contradictory cognition did not arise due to the absence of all the causal factors. But later when the same man visits that place again and cognizes the mirage as water again and moves towards it in thirst and finds only sand, then the contradictory cognition arises, thus falsifying his previous cognition of water. The contradictory cognition may take a year or more to arise. Or it may never even arise during the entire lifetime of the cognizer. But the non-arising of the contradictory cognition does not testify that the erroneous perceptual cognition was veridical.

- Again, when we say the contradictory cognition was absent, we presuppose the contradictory cognition because without the cognition of the object of absence, the cognition of absence is not possible.
- The question crops up, does the absence of contradictory cognition occur for everybody or just for the concerned cognizer?

- i. If the absence occurs for everybody, then all people will have uncontradicted cognitions and they will become omniscient. In that case the word 'non-omniscient' will lose its meaning due to no referent.
 - ii. If the absence is said to occur for the cognizer alone, then that will also not be proper since the contradictory cognition will arise once the man, in the case of the mirage, goes and sees that it is only sand.
- It may be that the nature of the erroneous perceptual cognition itself prevents the arising of the contradictory cognition, thus making the erroneous cognition seem veridical. Now, Śavarsvāmī in his *Savarbhāṣya* 1.1.5 has said that a *mithyā* or false cognition is that which arises from causal factors having defects and the cognition itself is non veridical and so misleads the cognizer. But Jayarāṣi points out here that it cannot be said that the cognition arising out of faulty causal factors will be contradicted because here in spite of arising from defective causal factors the erroneous perceptual cognition does not get contradicted.

The third alternative is not possible either.

- It is believed by the *Naiyāyikas* that non-erroneousness of a cognition depends on the efficacy of activity. But it cannot be said that the cognition is non erroneous only because it allowed fruitful interaction with the world. Now, since the efficacy of activity is related to fruit, attainment of a beloved lady or a garland or a piece of sandalwood on their respective cognitions shall render those cognitions veridical. But the lady or the garland or the sandalwood are not real fruits but mere means to the attainment of the real fruit viz. pleasure. So these means metaphorically are called fruits and here the activity becomes efficient only in the secondary sense. Hence, activity or volition is a corporal vibrancy, the efficiency of which makes known the non-erroneousness of cognition. *Pravṛtti sāphalya* is therefore the association of the body with the fruit.

- i. Does the efficiency cause the non erroneousness of cognition without being known or after being known? It means that, does the efficiency cause the non

erroneousness all by itself or is it the knowledge of the efficiency that causes the non erroneousness? If the cognition is caused without being known, i.e. if the efficiency of activity itself causes the non erroneousness, then how can we know that the efficiency of activity exists? Also what is the proof that the activity was efficient? And if it causes the cognition after being known, then how can we tell that the perceptual cognition is non erroneous? Here actually the relation between the knowledge of the efficiency of activity and the non erroneousness of cognition is inquired about. This leads to mutual dependency when we ask whether we derive the non erroneousness from the knowledge of the efficiency or we derive the knowledge of the efficiency from the non erroneousness of cognition. Hence the efficiency of activity cannot be made the ground of proving the non erroneousness of cognition.

- If it is accepted that the efficiency of activity is the association of the body with the fruit, then the non erroneousness of cognition of water will be proved by the attainment of the same water. Now, if it is accepted that the non erroneousness of the cognition of water is derived from obtaining that water, then the question arises:
 - i. Is it established by obtaining the same water that appeared in the cognition? Or
 - ii. Is it established by obtaining water belonging to the same universal or genre as the water that appeared in the cognition? Or
 - iii. Is it established by obtaining water belonging to the same series or family of water as the water that appeared in the cognition?

Alternative (i) is not tenable because the same water cannot be attained due to reasons like:

1. The water, by the time it is attained, becomes a new water due to the change in its parts. The turnings of fish, buffaloes and other marine creatures may destroy the initial configuration of water molecules and may create new waves. According to the *Nyāya* theory, a change or destruction of the parts change or destroy the whole. So the same water cannot be attained.
2. Again, the quality of water changes continuously due to chemical interactions in the water and addition of pollutants in the water. So the water does not remain unchanged.
3. Lastly, it can be said that time changes. The water in the moment 1 of perception and the water of moment 2 are not same. The water that appeared in the cognition was qualified by moment 1 and the water attained is qualified by moment 2.

Alternative (ii) is also not tenable.

1. If a false cognition of water arises on seeing the similarity or the same universal, then that cognition too will be rendered veridical on attainment of water belonging to the same universal elsewhere. It can be explained as, suppose one mistakes a colourless liquid as water. The cognition is false. But the cognition may be rendered as veridical if water bearing the property of being a colourless liquid is found somewhere else. This argument arises since there was previously no mention of the fact that the place with respect to the cognition of an object and the attainment of the object has to be the same.
2. The *Naiyāyikas* however do say that if water is obtained at the very place and time where it was cognized, then the cognition is non erroneous, otherwise not. Now, if the cognition that does not allow its object to be attained becomes erroneous, then the cognitions of things which get destroyed just after their cognition and the cognitions of celestial bodies will become by default erroneous.

3. Again, the cognition of water will be rendered erroneous if it fails to get the object attained by the cognizer due to total destruction of the place. For instance, the cognition of a lake in Hiroshima will become erroneous since the lake cannot be visited due to the total destruction of Hiroshima by bombing.

Chapter IV

INTERPRETATION AND REFUTATION OF THE TERM 'VYAVASĀYĀTMAKA'

In the previous chapter we have discussed about the term '*avyabhicāri*' and highlighted its refutation. After refuting '*avyabhicāri*' Jayarāṣi has next considered the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' for refutation. Since we are following his order of refutation, in this chapter we shall emphasize on the discussion and refutation of the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*'.

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM

‘VYAVASĀYĀTMAKA’

The fifth term used in the definition of perception given by Maharṣi Gautama is ‘*Vyavasāyātmaka*’. The word ‘*vyavasāya*’ means definite or certain and ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ means bearing certainty.

This term is inserted in the definition to keep out dubious or doubtful perception (*samśayātmaka pratyakṣa*) from the scope of the definition of perception. A dubious cognition is one in which a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is perceived as possessing two or more opposing qualifiers (*prakāra*) that do not in fact share a common locus. A perceiver perceiving an object from a distance often has a doubt whether the object is a man or the stump of a tree. So the dubious cognition occurs in the form, ‘Is it a man or the stump of a tree?’ (*‘Ayaṁ sthāṇurvā puruṣovā’*) where the two opposing qualifiers ‘*sthāṇutva*’ (stump-ness) and ‘*puruṣatva*’ (man-ness) never reside in the same locus. It should be mentioned in this context that for a doubt to occur, the two or more qualifiers regarding which

the doubt occurs, should be known to the cognizer prior to the occurrence of the dubious cognition. It is to be noted that the doubt or the error occurs in the qualifier part and not in the qualificand part. If *avyabhicāritva* or non-erroneousness is defined as '*tasmimstaditi*' meaning a non-erroneous cognition reveals an object as it really is, then *samśayātmaka pratyakṣa* or dubious perception which is of the nature of doubt also comes under the arena of being non-erroneous or *avyabhicāri*. It is because seeing an object from a distance when a doubt arises regarding whether the object is a man or the stump of a tree, the dubious cognition 'Is it a man or the stump of a tree?' becomes non-erroneous for the object concerned has to be either a man or the stump of a tree and in that case if it turns out to be a man, the cognition becomes non-erroneous for revealing the man as a man in the cognition and if the object turns out to be the stump of a tree, then also the cognition is rendered non-erroneous for revealing the stump as a stump in the cognition. Thus, since in a dubious cognition in a single qualificand two or more opposing qualifiers seem to reside, out of which one truly does, such dubious cognition will

always be found to be non-erroneous. We can easily view the case of a dubious perception giving it the form of a Disjunctive proposition in western logic. Following the rule of logic, if one of the disjuncts is true, the entire disjunction becomes true. In $(p \vee q)$ if either p or q is true, then $(p \vee q)$ becomes true. Only when both the disjuncts are false, the disjunction becomes false. When p and q are both false, $(p \vee q)$ becomes false. Similarly in the case of a man or a stump, if any one of the alternatives is true, the perception becomes true or non-erroneous. The perception can be called false or erroneous when both the alternatives are false, i.e. the object is neither a man nor a stump but something else. Now, we know that according to the *Naiyāyikas*, *saṁśaya* (dubious cognition), *viparyaya* (erroneous cognition) and *tarka* (reductio ad absurdum) are considered as *apramā* or non-veridical cognitions. A cognition is regarded as veridical when it is able to attain the object it has revealed (*prakāśitaviśayaprāpakatva*). But a dubious cognition fails to attain the object it reveals and thus becomes *vyabhicāri* or erroneous. Since dubious cognition is not the result of a *pramāṇa* or a valid source of cognition, dubious

perception cannot be kept within the scope of the definition of perception. But since the commentator Vātsyāyana has identified only *bhrama* or erroneous cognition as a cognition which definitely reveals the opposite and hence to be called *vyabhicāri* and which should be kept out of the scope of the definition of perception by the word *avyabhicāri*, the cases of dubious perceptions remain within the scope of the definition of perception thus earning the status of being *avyabhicāri* or non-erroneous. To deal with this issue the term ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ has been inserted. Dubious perception, not bearing definitiveness, remains outside the scope of the definition of perception, hence avoiding the possibility of getting over-covered.

However Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparyatīka* has considered dubious cognition to be *vyabhicāri* or erroneous and has held that the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ is sufficient to keep it away from the scope of the definition. Instead according to him the term has been added to establish that veridical determinate perception (*yathārtha savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is admitted and *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is its cause. He has equated ‘*vyavasāya*’ with ‘*vikalpa*’ and ‘*viniścaya*’.

Therefore ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ stands for *savikalpakapratyakṣa* or determinate perception. For Vācaspati Miśra ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ and ‘*avyapadeśyam*’ are not the definiens of perception, rather they stand for determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) respectively.

REFUTATION OF THE TERM BY JAYARĀŚI

Definitive cognition or cognition bearing certitude, in the form ‘I know the pot’ is what is meant by the phrase ‘*Vyavasāyātmakajñāna*’ as discussed earlier. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa gets engaged in the refutation of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* on the ground that the insertion of this term is rendered futile since by using the term nothing actually gets removed from the scope of the definition of perception. Jayarāśi explicitly says that doubt arises on perceiving the common features and not the special features. For instance, on perceiving the common features between a man and the stump of a tree which may be height, mass, etc. and not perceiving the special features of a man like arms,

legs, head, etc. or that of a tree like branches, leaves, etc. a doubt arises ‘Is it a man or the stump of a tree?’. *Vyavasāyātmaka* cognition occurring in the form ‘I am perceiving a man’ or ‘I am perceiving the stump of a tree’ removes such doubt.

Jayarāśi now raises the question, on seeing the dubious object when the doubt arises, does anything appear or not? If yes, then is it a property (*dharma*) or a locus or property-possessor (*dharmin*)?

- If it is a locus or dharmin, then is it real (*tāttvika*) or unreal (*atāttvika*)? If it is real, then it is *avyabhicāri* or non-erroneous and hence cannot be removed. According to the *Nyāya* view, something is *tāttvika* or real when its special features have been perceived. This becomes a case of determinate cognition and of dubious cognition. If it is unreal, then it is *vyabhicāri* and it gets removed by the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’. Therefore, the insertion of the term ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ stands futile.
- If it is a property or dharma, then is it stump-ness (*sthāṇutva*) or man-ness (*puruṣatva*) or both?

- i. If the property stump-ness appears, then again the question arises, is it real (*tāttvika*) or unreal (*atāttvika*)? If it is real, it cannot be a reason for doubt just like the proper cognition of water on grasping real water. And if it unreal, then the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ is sufficient for removing it; the insertion of the term ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ is unnecessary.
- ii. If the property is man-ness that appears, then the same series of arguments will arise.
- iii. If the property is both stump-ness and man-ness, then in that case is the reality (*tāttvikatā*) of both the properties to be considered or the unreality (*atāttvikatā*) of both the properties to be considered or is reality of one property and the unreality of the other is to be considered?

If the reality of both is implied, then cognition of that will also be real and non-erroneous and never dubious. For instance, doubt never arises when something is both a substance and a pot. Here both pot-ness and substance-ness are real. So this is not a case of doubt.

If both the properties are unreal, then that becomes a case of erroneous cognition or *bhramajñāna* and not dubious cognition or *samśaya*. For instance, when something is doubted to be either a man or the stump of a tree and later turns out to be a giraffe, then that becomes a case of erroneous cognition where both the properties, man-ness and stump-ness are unreal.

Now, if one property is real and the other unreal, then the very same cognition becomes both *vyabhicāri* or erroneous and *avyabhicāri* or non-erroneous since the grasping of the real property makes the cognition partly non-erroneous and the grasping of the unreal property makes the cognition partly erroneous. For instance, when both man-ness and stump-ness are imposed on the same object that later turns out to be a man, the grasping of the real property (man-ness) makes the cognition of the object non-erroneous while the grasping of the unreal property (stump-ness) makes the cognition of the same object erroneous. This issue is bound to arise since in

general out of the two conflicting properties, one is truly possessed by the object while the other is not. Jayarāṣi points out that this is very similar to the case of the cognition of two moons (*dvicandrajñāna*). It is quite understandable that there is only one moon and not two. But a person suffering from a particular disease or a person in hallucination often perceives two moons in the sky. Since one moon is real and the other unreal, hence ascription of the property moon-ness to the real moon is true while ascription of the same property to the unreal moon is false. It should be noted that in the case of *viparyaya* or erroneous cognition, error occurs in the property part (*dharmāmśa*) and not in the locus part (*dharmināmśa*). Therefore in the case of perception of two moons, the cognition is unerring from the perspective of being substance but erroneous from the perspective of the ascription of the property moon-ness. Such a case of hallucination or erroneous cognition can be easily removed by the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’.

Jayarāṣi moreover points out that a dubious cognition reveals the doubtful form of an object. If so, then the question that he raises is does the object doubted exist there or not? For instance, when an object is doubted to be a man or a stump, does the man or the stump exist there? If the man or the stump of a tree does exist, then the cognition cannot be dubious since it is uncontradicted like the cognition of water resulting from real water. Now if the doubtful object does not exist there then the cognition becomes erroneous or *vyabhicāri* and hence can be removed by the term '*avyabhicāri*' and the insertion of the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' becomes futile. And if it is said that nothing appears at all, then the cognition cannot be said to be resulting from the sense-object contact just as in the case of illusion of water where proper sense-object contact does not occur. Hence, not only the term '*avyabhicāri*', even the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' need not be inserted in the definition.

Chapter V

INTERPRETATION AND REFUTATION OF THE TERM 'INDRIYĀRTHASANNIKARṢOTPANNA'

In the last two chapters we have gone through the discussion and refutation of two terms comprising Gautama's definition of perception viz. *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. Now we shall concentrate on the analysis of the very first term in the definition i.e. '*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*' which the author has refuted at the very end.

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM

‘INDRIYĀRTHASANNIKARṢOTPANNA’

The very first term that we find in the definition of perception given by Maharṣi Gautama is ‘*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*’. It literally means being originated from the sense organ (*indriya*)-object (*artha*) contact (*sannikarṣa*). The sense organs come in contact with their respective objects capable of being grasped by those senses thus resulting in the sense-object contact. Maharṣi Gautama has meant all the five external sense organs viz. eyes (*cakṣu*), ears (*karṇa*), nose (*nāśikā*), tongue (*jihvā*) and skin (*tvak*) and also the only internal sense organ mind (*manas*) by the term ‘*indriya*’. By ‘*artha*’ is meant the objects of these sense organs like colour is the object of the eyes or a sweet fragrance is the object of the nose or pain is the object of the mind. The contact between these senses with their respective objects is what is meant by ‘*sannikarṣa*’.

The *Naiyāyikas* admit two classifications of *sannikarṣa*— the *Laukika sannikarṣa* (ordinary sense-object contact) or *Alaukika*

sannikarṣa (extraordinary sense-object contact). The traditional *Naiyāyika* Uddyotkara has admitted six kinds of ordinary contact viz. *Samyoga* (conjunction), *Samyukta samavāya* (inherence in the conjoined), *Samyukta samaveta samavāya* (inherence in the inherence-in-the-conjoined), *Samavāya* (inherence), *Samaveta samavāya* (inherence in the inherent) and *Viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva* (the relation of qualifier-qualificand). The contact between two substances like the eye and the table is called *Samyoga* or conjunction. Since the colour of the table inheres in the table, the contact that occurs between the eye and the colour of the table while perceiving the colour of the said table is called *Samyukta samavāya* or inherence in the conjoined. Just as the colour of the table inheres in the table, similarly the colourhood of the colour of the table inheres in the colour itself. So while perceiving this colourhood when the eyes come in contact with the colourhood of the colour of the table, the contact is called *Samyukta samaveta samavāya* or inherence in the inherent-in-the-conjoined. The fourth kind of contact viz. *Samavāya* or inherence occurs in the case of perceiving

sound by the ear. The hollow of the ear has ether (*ākāśa*) filled in it which carries sound. So when the ears come in contact with sound, they actually come in contact with what is inherent in it. Therefore the contact between the ear and the sound is called *Samavāya* or inherence. Just as sound inheres in the ear, similarly sound-ness inheres in sound. When the ear comes in contact with sound-ness of the sound residing in the ear, the contact is called *Samaveta samavāya* or inherence in the inherent. The last contact i.e. *Viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva* occurs in the perception of absence (*abhāva*) of an object. It is to be noted that the *Naiyāyikas* accept the direct perceptibility of absence as they believe in the perceptibility of both positive and negative categories. They hold that the absence of a pot on the ground can be perceived directly because the absence resides on the ground which is the *viśeṣya* (qualificand) here as a *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) in the relation of *Viśeṣaṇatā* (adjectivity), also called *svarūpa* (relation of identity). However based on the syntax of the Sanskrit expression of this absence, the relation may change from

Viśeṣaṇatā to *Viśeṣyatā*. For instance, the absence of a pot on the ground may be expressed in Sanskrit in two ways:

- i. ‘*Bhūtale ghaṭābhāva*’
- ii. ‘*Ghaṭābhāvavat bhūtalaṃ*’

Between the above expressions if we consider sentence (i) then the meaning of the expression can be translated as ‘There is absence of pot on the ground’. Here ‘*bhūtala*’ meaning ground stands as the *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) while ‘*ghaṭābhāva*’ meaning the absence of pot stands as the *viśeṣya* (qualificand). Since the absence is the *viśeṣya*, the relation here is *Viśeṣyatā*. Now, if we consider sentence (ii) then the meaning of the expression can be translated as ‘the ground is qualified by the absence of pot’. Here ‘*ghaṭābhāva*’ is the *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) and ‘*bhūtala*’ is the *viśeṣya* (qualificand). Since the absence is the *viśeṣaṇa*, the relation is *Viśeṣaṇatā*.

The *Naiyāyikas* admit three kinds of *Alaukika sannikarṣa* viz. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, *Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* and *Yogaja sannikarṣa*. The *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is one which enables

the perceiver to perceive all the individuals of a class through perceiving the generic attribute (*jāti*) of the particular individual. For example, by perceiving an individual man, the perceiver perceives the individual possessing inherent class universal manhood and hence has the perception of all men. The *Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is one which enables the perceiver to perceive with the help of memory a distant object previously perceived by him. For instance, having perceived the coldness of ice previously, a man can perceive the coldness of a piece of ice by the mere sight of it. The last one i.e. *Yogaja sannikarṣa* works in the case of *yogins* by which they become clairvoyant. The *Naiyāyikas* have to admit these extra-ordinary contacts because the *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is a must for establishing *Vyāpti* and the *Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* for explaining the case of Illusion. The *Yogaja sannikarṣa* is required for the explanation of the special perception of the *yogins*.

The term '*indriyārthasannikarṣa*' has been inserted into the body of the definition of perception by Maharṣi Gautama in order to keep the definition from over-covering the case of inferential

cognition. Since inferential cognition can also be non-verbalized, determinate and non-erroneous cognition, the definition of perception has the risk of over-covering it. However the insertion of the term '*indriyārthasannikarṣa*' resolves this issue since it is only perceptual cognition that results from the sense-object contact and not inferential cognition. *Indriyārthasannikarṣa* or the sense organ-object contact is the instrumental cause (*karāṇa*) of perceptual cognition for a perceptual cognition always results from such a contact.

It may be objected that along with the sense-object contact, the contact between the *atman* (self) and the *manas* (mind) is also a necessary condition for having perceptual cognition. This is because cognition (*jñāna*) emerges in the self (*atman*) due to the contact between the self and the mind (*manas*). Cognition arises only in that self which has the conjunction with the mind. Therefore perceptual cognition is an attribute (*guṇa*) of the self which is due to a conjunction (*samyoga*). Hence the definition of perception should have its mention as well and therefore the definition as given by

Maharṣi Gautama should be as considered partially expressed or incomplete. To deal with this issue commentator Vātsyāyana has admitted that for *janya pratyakṣa* or human perception to occur the sense-object contact being dependent on the sense-mind conjunction (*indriya-manas saṁyoga*) becomes the cause. Since several perceptions at the same time do not occur simultaneously, the existence of the subtle mind (*manas*) is admitted. Since mind is *anuparimāṇa* or the size of an atom, it cannot get conjoined with more than one thing at a time. Hence it is admitted that the senses get conjoined with mind which enables it to perceive only one thing at a time. Maharṣi Gautama has dealt with this problem by stating that *jñāna* or cognition being the attribute or *guṇa* of the self or *atman* is also the inferential mark (*anumāpaka linga*) of the self. In the case of human cognition the self is the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*) and the conjunction of the self with the mind is the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*) of cognition.¹ Hence it is obvious that the

¹ ‘*icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānānyātmano lingam*’ [Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10]

conjunction between the self and the mind is also a cause of perception. That is why Maharṣi Gautama has not mentioned self-mind conjunction as a cause and has only mentioned sense-object contact in the definition of perception.

REFUTATION OF THE TERM BY JAYARĀŚI

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa opines that it will not be reasonable enough to claim that perception is a product of the contact between the sense and the object (*indriyārthasannikarṣajanya*) because there is no proof in favour of the occurrence of the contact. That the contact between the sense organ and its object occurs may be established on any of the three grounds:

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, *Nyāyadarśana*, on *Nyāyasūtra* by Gautama, Part I, Kolkata, West Bengal State Book Board, 2014, p. 203.

1. Non-apprehension of the object due to its remoteness (*vyavahitārthānupalabdihilinga*), meaning that an object that is at a distance is non-apprehended due to the lack of the contact between the senses and the distant object, thus proving that such a contact occurs in the case of apprehending a nearby object.
2. Non-apprehension of the object due to cover (*āvaraṇalinga*), meaning that an object which is covered or veiled is not apprehended due to the absence of the sense-object contact, thus proving that such a contact occurs in the case of unveiled objects.
3. Inferring the occurrence of the sense-object contact from the cognition of a pot, which is produced from such a contact (*tadutpāditaghaṭādijñānāvaseya*).

It is to be noted here that in the first two alternatives the sense-object contact is established by taking into consideration the cause while in the third the contact is inferred by seeing the effect. So in the first

two alternatives the argument moves from the cause to the effect while in the third it moves from the effect to the cause.

- The first alternative is not tenable according to Jayarāṣi because there happens to be no relation of concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the sense-object contact and the non-apprehension of remote objects. It is to be noted here that by reading the original Sanskrit verse authored by Jayarāṣi in this portion and going through the interpretations given by other authors in secondary books, it is clearly visible to us that the probandum or *sādhya* and the probans or *hetu* to be used in the formulation of the *vyāpti* relation are the sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) and the non-apprehension due to remoteness (*vyavahitārthānupalabdhi*) respectively. Now the *vyāpti* that can be formulated with these will be:

All cases of non-apprehension due to remoteness are cases of the sense-object contact. [This is the *Anvayavyāpti* or concomitance in agreement.]

All cases of the absence of the sense-object contact are cases of the absence of non-apprehension due to remoteness, i.e. the cases of apprehension. [This is the *Vyatirekavyāpti* or concomitance in disagreement.]

- Now, this seems weird because broadly speaking, when there is the sense-object contact there should be apprehension and when there is no such contact there should be no such apprehension. But the above *vyāpti* speaks just the opposite and hence is not acceptable.
- Again, the *Vyatirekavyāpti* can be made meaningful if it is accepted that in the absence of the sense-object contact apprehension of the object occurs due to some other source of cognition. Such a source of cognition is not mentioned in the text.
- Moreover, the hetu non-apprehension due to remoteness is found to exist both when the *sādhyā* sense-object contact is present and absent (*sādhyābhāva*). But we know that in the

absence of the *sādhya* the *hetu* should also remain absent.

Thus, non-apprehension due to remoteness cannot be given the status of a true *hetu* (*saddhetu*).

Since such a weird and materially implausible *vyāpti* cannot be established, we do not know whether the author Jayarāśi really wished to convey some other sense or whether what he has written is only misread and misinterpreted. Hence to resolve this issue and come to a more sensible form of *vyāpti*, let us reformulate it by taking the absence of the sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣābhāva*) as the probandum (*sādhya*) and the non-apprehension due to remoteness (*vyavahitārthānupalabdhi*) as the probans (*hetu*). The *vyāpti* relation thus stands as:

All cases of non-apprehension due to remoteness are cases of the absence of the sense-object contact. [This is the *Anvayavyāpti* or concomitance in agreement.]

All cases of the absence of the absence of the sense-object contact, i.e. the cases of sense-object contact are cases of the absence of non-

apprehension due to remoteness, i.e. the cases of apprehension. [This is the *Vyatirekavyāpti* or concomitance in disagreement.]

In the above construction of the *vyāpti* relation, there arise certain problems.

- If non-apprehension or *anupalabdhi* itself is taken as the probans or the *hetu* then such a *hetu* may reside at the loci of the absence of the probandum or *sādhya* which is the absence of the sense-object contact. It means that *anupalabdhi* may reside in the loci of the absence of the absence of the contact, i.e. it may reside where the contact is present. Cases of non-apprehension may occur in cases where the contact is present due to inattentive mind or the death of the cognizer just after the occurrence of the contact or perhaps due to the non-arising of the *anuvyavasāya* due to any possible reason. We can take a concrete example from literature that illustrates this. When Śakuntala was engrossed in her thoughts about her beloved king Dusmanta, she failed to apprehend sage Durbāsā and salute him in spite of her sense-object contact with the sage. Thus, sense-object contact does not

necessarily lead to apprehension of the object. So the *hetu* is seen to reside even the locus of the absence of the *sādhya* i.e. the *sādhyaḥbhāvādhikaraṇa*. Since *vipakṣasattva* or absence of the *hetu* in the locus where the *sādhya* is absent is one of the five marks of a *saddhetu* or a non-defective *hetu*, *hetu anupalabdhi* cannot be considered as a *saddhetu* due to the violation of one of the characteristics.

- Now we need to also remember here that the non-apprehension is due to remoteness of the object. An object is called remote because it lacks the sense-object contact. So when there is sense-object contact with the particular object, it is no more distant. Therefore, in the *Vyatirekavyāpti* the *hetu* is getting distorted.

- The second alternative is not tenable either because there is no stable and fixed relation between the sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) which is the probandum (*sādhya*) and cover or veil (*āvaraṇa*) which is the probans (*hetu*). In the

presence of cover, sense-object contact does not occur as a result of which perception, too, does not occur. In the absence of such a cover, sense-object contact may or may not exist depending on other auxiliary conditions. Nevertheless, Jayarāśi has shown why there cannot be any relation between the *sādhya* and the *hetu*.

1. Cases where the *sādhya* remains absent, the *hetu* should also remain absent but instead it is found to exist. In the cases of the absence of the contact, the *hetu* cover remains present. This is the case of daily life where due to the pot being covered, the contact between the eyes and the pot does not take place.
2. Cases where the *sādhya* remains present, the *hetu* even if exists, becomes futile. Let us suppose a case where a pot is covered by a transparent cloth and the sensory contact occurs between the eyes and the pot. In that case, the cover, being transparent, becomes useless.
3. Cases where the *sādhya* remains absent i.e. cases where there is the absence of the contact, we cannot know or

guarantee if the *hetu* cover does exist because there is no sensory contact with the cover. This criticizes the first point where the *sādhya* is absent but the *hetu* is present.

- The third alternative is not tenable as well because inferring the sense-object contact from the cognition of a pot is not justified. This alternative is similar to the *Śeṣavat Anumāna* or inferring the cause from the effect, where for instance, the cause rain is inferred from the wet ground which is the effect.
- If the sense-object contact does occur with the pot, the cognition of the pot arises. But the occurrence of the sense-object contact cannot be inferred from the cognition of the pot every time because sense-object contact may occur even when there does not arise the cognition of the pot. If there is no pot but a piece of cloth, the cognition of the pot does not arise although sense-object contact is there with the cloth. The pot may remain present but

hidden behind a door as a result of which in spite of the presence of the sense-object contact with the door, the pot is not cognized.

- Moreover, since whether such a contact occurs is yet to be established, we cannot know if the cognition of the pot is the product of such sense-object contact and in that case inference of the cause from the effect is impossible.
- Jayarāśi calls this sense-object contact fictitious and a mere theoretical construct like a ghost (*piśāca*) or an atom (*paramāṇu*) or God (*maheśvara*) which are often presupposed for the sake of a theory but are unestablished and imperceptible. He criticizes the *Naiyāyikas* who hold these as real but he himself tries to call these absurd like a sky-flower (*ākāśakusuma*) which is unknown and unknowable. This argument given by Jayarāśi suggests that he was a supporter of the *Cārvāka* theory that all imperceptible things are unreal like ghost, atom, God, hell, heaven, etc.
- Jayarāśi further argues that how can the cognition of the pot itself reveal that it is a product of such a contact? He clarifies the

argument by saying how does the cognition of the pot make

known the sense-object object? There may be three ways:

- i. The cognition may make known the contact in the form of cognition itself (*viññānākāratayā*)
 - ii. The cognition may make known the contact in the form of the effect (*kāryākāratayā*)
 - iii. The cognition may make known the contact in the form of being produced from the sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāratayā*)
- Jayarāśi holds that the first way is not tenable i.e. the cognition cannot make the contact in the form of cognition itself because this over-covers the case of a cognition that results from comparison (*upamiti*), inference (*anumiti*), etc. Such cognitions from comparison, etc. are not caused by sense-object contact and sense-object contact is the necessary condition of perceptual cognition alone. Hence cognition in the very form of a cognition cannot make known the contact.

Moreover, common-sensically speaking, a particular cognition reveals or grasps its object. Thus, cognition in the form of cognition will reveal its object rather than the sense-object object.

- The second way, Jayarāśi holds, is not tenable as well. This is because there lies a problem in knowing the contact which is the cause from a cognition which is the effect since cognitions resulting from comparison (*upamiti*) and inference (*anumiti*) and erroneous cognitions (*bhramajñāna*) of water in a mirage are effects and also have this sense-object contact. In a cognition arising from comparison of say, a wild cow (*gavaya*), sense-object contact occurs in seeing the animal. In inferential cognition sense-object contact occurs in perceiving the probans (*hetu*) in the locus (*pakṣa*). In the case of an erroneous cognition, sense-object contact occurs in seeing the sand, i.e. when the eyes come in contact with the sand reflecting the sun rays that look like water. But these cognitions are not produced by sense-object contact. Now, if

one says that the sense-object contact happens to be a cause of these cognitions by the relation of sequence (*paramparāsambandha*), then the very existence of the object can also be called a cause of the cognition of that object by this logic.

This cannot be however said against the *Nyāya* position and stands as an *Iṣṭāpatti* or a charge in favour of the *Nyāya* view. Something which is the cause of an effect in the sequential relation is not considered as a cause by the *Naiyāyikas* but as *Anyathāsiddha*. For instance the effect pot is caused by the potter who in turn is caused by his father. But the father of the potter is not considered as the cause of the pot. He is the *Anyathāsiddha*.

- The third way is also not tenable holds Jayarāśi. If the cognition makes known the contact in the form of being produced by such a contact, then the question arises, is the form of being produced by the contact identical to or different from the form of cognition?

If it is said to be identical, then it is nothing but cognition itself because a cognition not having the form of cognition (*jñānākāra*) i.e. having a different form cannot be imagined in the case of cognition arising from inference, etc. for if such a form of cognition is imagined, then it will lose its status of being a cognition.

Now, if it is said to be different, then the form of being produced by the contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāra*) will be the revealer of the contact and not the form of the cognition (*jñānākāra*). The form of being produced by the contact being different from the form of cognition also fails to reveal the sense-object contact because it is not apprehended.

Jayarāśi now tries to show the process of inferring the sense-object contact and exhibits problems lying therein. The cognition that results from the sense-object contact should be apprehended in its own form, after which the remembrance of the invariable

concomitance (*vyāptismaraṇa*) will occur in the form, ‘wherever there is cognition resulting from the contact, there is the sense-object contact’, then the reflective cognition or confirmatory cognition (*parāmarśajñāna*) will occur in the form, ‘this man has that cognition which is qualified by the invariable concomitance between that cognition and sense-object contact’ and then from the hetu cognition, the inferential cognition of the sense-object contact will be apprehended. But this entire process of inference is so time-consuming that cognition which originates in the first moment, exists in the second and gets destroyed in the third will never be able to last till the end of the process. Hence cognition lasts for a very short period of time and is always contradicted by the next cognition. To cope with this issue, a mental inferential process can be sought since cognition placed in the mind is not momentary. Thus a mental process of inference as is done on the basis of the principle of the property and the property-possessor (*dharmadharmibhāva*) may be constructed where the cognition can be taken as the property (*dharma*) and the contact can be taken as the locus or the property-

possessor (*dharmin*) and from the cognition the contact can be inferred. But this entire process will become fictitious like the inference of the Buddhists.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

Hitherto we have gone through an elucidation and analysis of the three terms forming the definition of perception offered by Gautama following Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa's treatise *Tattvopaplavasimha*. Although the treatise is vast covering the refutations of all the *pramāṇas*, the flavour of the book can be easily tasted by merely going through a section of it. In this dissertation the main areas of the first chapter of the book have been explored which consequently leads us to a final take-home discussion of certain points which are explained below.

Can Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa be called a skeptic?

This is probably the first question that crops up once we go through the book Jayarāṣi has authored. Before going into answering this question directly the debate on whether the author was a *Cārvāka* or not should be recalled. It should be mentioned here that Bina Gupta while looking for skepticism in ancient Indian philosophy has talked of scholars like Tucci, Dasgupta and Garbe who had acknowledged the *Lokāyata* or *Cārvāka* school as a school of skepticism.¹ This however is challengeable I feel. Since the western skepticism emerged as moral skepticism and since the *Cārvākas* too were very similar on this point, we may consider them as skeptics, but at the same time keeping in mind the stringent sense of skepticism, the *Cārvākas* may not be called skeptics. Nevertheless, Bina Gupta herself has talked of *Tattvopaplavasīmha* which was held by the philosophers and scholars as a *Cārvāka* text. Now if Jayarāṣi was a *Cārvāka* then it is obvious that he must have been a skeptic too. But

¹ Gupta, Bina, 'Skepticism: Ancient 'East' and Modern 'West', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, IX, 1, 1981, p. 31.
<http://unipune.ac.in/ipq/english/IPQ/PDF>

the fact that Jayarāṣi was a *Cārvāka* is not confirmed. Nevertheless, scholars have acknowledged him as a skeptic. As already discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, scholars like Bimal Krishna Matilal, Pradeep P. Gokhale and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya have considered Jayarāṣi as a ‘cognitive skeptic’.² Cognitive epistemologists commonly uphold the *pramāṇa-prameya* dichotomy while the cognitive skeptics are found to refute it. Bina Gupta has shown in her paper that Jayarāṣi shares certain similarities with the skeptic of Western tradition Sextus Empiricus. Like Sextus, Jayarāṣi too takes into consideration the various concepts of the opponents, shows possible explanations and then highlights the absurdity lying therein. This method has been followed by Jayarāṣi throughout. Keeping in mind this striking similarity between Sextus Empiricus and Jayarāṣi, the latter may be called a skeptic. However since there lies a difference between the skepticism of the West and that of Indian philosophy, many do not prefer to call Jayarāṣi a skeptic at

² Mohanta, Dilip Kumar, *Jayarāṣibhaṭṭer Śamsayavāda*, Kolkata, Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, pp. 7 of Introduction.

all. In the words of Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, “‘Skepticism’ has a definite significance in western philosophy; it is improper to use it in the Indian context.”³ Instead it is safer to call him *Vaitaṇḍika* with a hidden agenda. The Indian concept of a *Vaitaṇḍika* is flexible enough to accommodate both a person without a hidden agenda and also the person who has one but is not ready to state it, thereby safely incorporating within itself philosophers like Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa.

Jayarāṣi’s method and nature of skepticism

Jayarāṣi in his treatise has followed a single method of refutation throughout. There are two methods of denial noticeable in Indian philosophy: ‘*prasajya pratiṣedha*’ or commitment-less denial and ‘*paryudāsa pratiṣedha*’ or affirming the counter positive of the

³ Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna, ‘Tattvopaplavavāda of Jayarāṣi and its Alleged Relation to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata’.

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denied. Jayarāśi has followed the former where he has only refuted his opponents without having any commitment of his own and without affirming the counter positive of the denied i.e. without accepting the truth of non-p when p is established as false. By carrying out such a commitment-less refutation Jayarāśi gets saved from the charges of inconsistencies like contradicting his own statement.⁴ Jayarāśi cannot be said to follow the latter method because he does not say that every cognition is necessarily false when he claims that no cognition can be established to be true.

Jayarāśi's nature of skepticism is very different from what we find in others. Pradeep P. Gokhale has rightly grasped the essence of Jayarāśi's skepticism and his intension. To quote his words, "...Jayarāśi is not talking of abolishing the principles as they are held by common people, but of the way in which they are treated in different schools of philosophy. The principles thought about in

⁴Since Jayarāśi has showcased the implausibility of all theses, then his thesis that 'all theses are implausible' is also implausible. This is as Mohanta says, the theoretical inconsistency charge that can be brought against Jayarāśi. However, such charges do not stand as Jayarāśi has no commitments to defend.

speculative philosophy are generally treated as if they were transcendental, definite in nature (unambiguous), never becoming out-of-date and so on...What Jayarāśi wants to oppose is such speculative principles and the speculations producing them.”⁵ Jayarāśi’s skeptical trend invalidates practical behaviour and fails to defend commonsense. His skeptical position and outlook has its own peculiarity which has been drawing the interest of scholars since the text’s discovery. Jayarāśi may be considered to be the founder of an entirely new ism viz. ‘*Tattvopaplavavāda*’ as mentioned by Vidyānandin in his books *Aṣṭasahasrī* and *Tattvārthaślokavārtika*. *Tattvopaplavavāda* means the doctrine of upsetting of all principles. M. K. Gangopadhyaya has opined that Vātsyāyana’s standpoint of establishing all principles (*pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *pramiti* and *pramātr*) which may be termed as ‘*Tattva-vyavasthāpana-vāda*’ and Jayarāśi’s standpoint of annihilating all principles are simply antipodal to each

⁵ Gokhale, Pradeep P., ‘The Philosophical Position Of Jayarasibhatta’, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 5, 3, 1978, p. 490.

<http://www.unipune.ac.in/ipq/english/IPQ>

other.⁶ Jayarāśi's radical skepticism centering around the 'suspension of all judgements' based on the absence of a proper ground for establishing knowledge is close to that of the *śūnyavādins* and the *māyāvādins* according to Chattopadhyay. It is close to *śūnyavāda* and *māyāvāda* because both tried to showcase the falsity of the world. They rejected the sources of perception and *anumāna* because if these were held as true then what they would establish had to be also taken as true and hence the world would become true. Hence these sources had to be refuted by them. However Jayarāśi's closeness with the *śūnyavādins* and *māyāvādins* cannot be admitted because both Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa had the intention of establishing through a skeptical approach something ultimate which was the concept of *Śūnya* and *Brahman* respectively. Jayarāśi however carried out his skepticism without having any such agenda

⁶ Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna, 'Tattvopaplavavāda of Jayarāśi and its Alleged Relation to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata'.

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or even if he did, since he has not stated that explicitly being a *Vaitaṇḍika*, we cannot know what agenda that could have been. Both Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa belonged to particular schools of Indian philosophy and had the responsibility of defending those school's doctrines. Jayarāśi on the other hand has no particular school from which he belongs and thus has no responsibility of defending any doctrine. He is in a privileged position it seems as he has to presupposition or position to defend. If it is at all plausible to use the term 'skeptic' in Indian philosophy then it will be applicable to Jayarāśi alone.

Inconsistency between theory and practice

Jayarāśi himself has given the hint that his criticisms of the *pramāṇas* and their refutations were only theoretical and not from the practical point of view. If theory and practice were to be consistent with each other then what Jayarāśi has done would invariably raise the question of inconsistency lying between theory and practice. And this limits

his skepticism. This apparent question of inconsistency however does not arise since Jayarāśi's aim was to merely show the theoretical implausibility of the *pramāṇas*.

Significance of refuting the Nyāya definition of perception and the term 'avyabhicāri' before others

Jayarāśi's treatise opens with the refutation of the definitions of perception. Since perception is the highest source of valid knowledge and is independent of other sources, its primacy is acknowledged by all. Jayarāśi's reason for the refutation of perception before other sources may be two: one, because he himself believed in its primacy and two, because he simply followed the layman's opinion and wanted to criticize them one by one in that order. Again if we ask why he began with refuting the *Nyāya* definition of perception then also there arises two alternatives: one, because he too believed that it was the most acceptable definition and two, because he just took the popular view which considered the *Nyāya* definition to be very

significant with the intention of refuting in the order of significance and popularity.

Among the different terms comprising the definition of perception given by Gautama, Jayarāśi selected the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ first for refutation. It is to be noted that although the term ‘*indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*’ occurs first in the definition, yet defying the order in which the terms occur in the definition, he started with the fourth term in the definition ‘*avyabhicāri*’. The question arises: ‘Why?’ When perception is taken as a *pramāṇa* its veridicality or *pramātvā* gets implied by default. No matter how the philosophical schools define perception, they all unanimously agree to this feature. Their respective definitions mainly aim at bringing out the special feature of perception from their respective philosophical standpoints. Hence one who wishes to refute perception as an epistemic tool must show the futility by striking at this basic feature of *pramātvā*. Moreover, in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* it is categorically said that the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ meaning non-erroneous should have been inserted into the definitions of other

pramāṇas as well since they too have to be non-erroneous, but the term is found only in the definition of perception because other *pramāṇas* are dependent on perception for their workings and the non-erroneousness of perception implies the non-erroneousness of all other *pramāṇas* that are dependent on it. Jayarāṣi started his refutation by refuting this ‘*avyabhicāri*’ term not only to rule out perception as a *pramāṇa* but to rule out all other *pramāṇas* that too are considered as non-erroneous. The mere refutation of the term ‘*avyabhicāri*’ is sufficient to negate all the *pramāṇas* although he has taken the pain of criticizing them separately.

Charges against the method of refutation

The most general charge that every reader of *Tattvopaplavasimha* raises against the method that Jayarāṣi has used is: Why did Jayarāṣi bring out the senses of the terms he refuted, from other schools? Was he not well acquainted with the respective theories?

Although such questions are obvious to crop up in our minds, yet the answer seems to be very simple. What Jayarāṣi intended to do is to state all the possible senses in which each of the terms could be taken. This he tried to do by taking the meaning of the term from other schools. This fact though seems to be very perplexing is actually not because all the opponents when they seek to criticize a thesis present arguments from various opposing positions. Moreover, by doing this Jayarāṣi in fact also shows how the other opponent schools could have reacted in criticism. Apart from this it is the bent of a philosopher's mind to criticize and refute something by not only understanding it from other schools' positions but to also invent his own position of understanding and posit his very own interpretation which would help him to criticize and refute better.

The other question on whether or not he was acquainted with the theories of each school he took to refute should not arise because since Jayarāṣi has not spared any school, we can easily infer that he must have been quite well acquainted with the theories. It is true as D.K. Mohanta has pointed out that Jayarāṣi has twisted the meanings

of the terms intentionally and has taken the help of sophistry like *Chhala*, etc. for his refutation and hence should be called a bad debater or ‘*kutārkika*’.⁷ This claim is not supportable in my opinion because although it is true that he has used sophistry but then we have to remember that he was a *Vaitaṇḍika*. The aim of a *Vaitaṇḍika* is to win over his opponent at any cost, even by employing unfair means as *Chhala*, *Jāti* and *Nigrahasthāna* without stating his own position. When we take Jayarāśi as a *Vaitaṇḍika* we have to allow his usage of these unfair means. Thus stands Jayarāśi as an exceptional *Vaitaṇḍika* whose intense skeptical attitude shakes the general opinions in Indian epistemology and also renders impossible the very knowledge claim. Jayarāśi has come up with a work that is very original and acts like a magnet in attracting scholars. His treatise gives the scope of initiating new channels of philosophical doctrines and triggers fresh discussions. In no way we can deny that this philosopher has truly set a new horizon in Indian philosophical

⁷ Mohanta, Dilip Kumar, ‘A Critique of Jayarāśi’s Critique of perception’, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XVII, 4, 1990, p. 505.

discussions and explorations. The skeptical outlook of the skeptics should be studied not only to understand the mainstream philosophy better but also to develop the critical and analytical mind appropriate for a philosopher.

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