INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY AND ORDER: SELECT THEORETICAL CONCERNS

BY

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Certified that the thesis entitled, <u>International Anarchy and Order: Select Theoretical Concerns</u>, submitted by me towards the partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Philosophy (Arts) in the <u>Department of International Relations</u> of Jadavpur University, is based upon my own original work and there is no plagiarism. This is also to certify that the work has not been submitted by me for the award of any other degree/diploma of the same Institution where the work is carried out, or to any other Institution. A paper out of this dissertation has also been presented by me at a seminar/conference at <u>SYLFF Progress Report Workshop, Jadavpur University</u> thereby fulfilling the criteria for submission as per the M.Phil Regulation (2017) of Jadavpur University.

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On the basis of academic merit and satisfying all the criteria as declared above, the dissertation work of <u>Moitrayee Sengupta</u> entitled <u>International Anarchy and Order: Select Theoretical Concerns</u> is now ready for submission towards the partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Philosophy (Arts) in <u>International Relations</u> of Jadavpur University.

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PREFACE

It may be mentioned right at the outset that this dissertation, entitled *International Anarchy and Order: Select Theoretical Concerns*, is a humble effort to study a very old and greatly examined question in the discipline of International Relations: what is the nature of international political life? In considering such an immense question, that ideally demands a lengthier deliberation, my effort has been to collate previous studies on the nature of international political life in a systematic classification in order to suggest a new methodological and ontological approach to the study of the subjects of international anarchy and order.

I dreamed this project as a graduate student, when I picked up Kenneth Waltz's *Man, State, and War* for the first time and could not keep myself from reading it even for a moment. Other than being exceptionally impressed to think that a doctoral dissertation may sound as fantastic, it filled me with a sense of wonder that I ended up attending to in the present research.

I extend my heartiest gratitude to Dr. Shibashis Chatterjee, Professor of International Relations, supervisor and convener of RAC, and Project Director at Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund, Jadavpur University, for his able guidance and constant encouragement. Without his keen interest in this work it would not have been possible to straddle the breadth of the topic. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Dr. Partha Pratim Basu, Professor of International Relations and member of RAC, Jadavpur University, for his immense support and guidance. I am thankful to Professor Om Prakash Mishra, Head, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University for his steady motivation. I am also thankful to Professor Joyashree Roy, Bangabandhu Chair Professor, Asian Institute of

INTRODUCTION

The oldest and conceivably most interesting question in the study of international politics has been the nature of international political life among states. The most popular books and essays on this subject have, at times to their disfavour, made use of abstruse content and mathematical formulaic representations to talk about life among states. Perhaps the scientific mind of man requires the exhibition of complex cleverness to suggest progress. Yet the highest and undeniably puissant thoughts of man shall always ask *who*, *why*, *how*. And it is only unfair and cruel to expect renunciation from a civilisation of mind, when these questions are to it the most riveting and full of intrigue.

Any self-conscious research on the nature of international politics will ask *what*. Questions of what bring answers that can be seen, tested, recorded, concluded. But only some research on the nature of international politics will ask *who*, *why*, *how*. Questions of who, why, how, cannot bring answers that can be seen or tested. These answers can at best be compared and contrasted to see which particular one can comfortably apprehend the rhythm of life in the international realm.

In contrast with the first group of questions that produces behavioural accounts of foreign policy studies and international relations, my focus in the present research is in the second group of questions, which happen to be systemic accounts of international political life. Systemic accounts of international political life ask two important questions. They ask questions about the nature of international political life. They also ask, rather maintain, international political life to be an exceptional field of study. While there may be commonness of concepts such as power with domestic society or life within states, life among states is exceptionally oriented and managed and bears no similarity with the

management and evolution of municipal affairs. A prime example of this may be found when one notes that the questions that systemic accounts ask about the nature of international politics are essentially questions of international anarchy and order. 'Anarchy' or 'order' in common parlance relate to violence and chaos, and peace and harmony, respectively. However, international anarchy and order may mean quite different and contrary things. It is for purposes of understanding what these concepts may mean, at times multipe and convergent, and often, multiple and divergent, that the present research has been undertaken. A survey of meaning does not halt at a glossary but hopes to explore why there are so many meanings to these primary concepts, what these meanings hold for the discipline, what they hold for the characterisation of contemporary international political life, and if they are sufficient to explain and understand life among states.

My research has been motivated by two interests. Chapters 1 and 2 contain my first interest and Chapter 3 takes responsibility for the second.

The first interest has been to classify, organise, and examine literature that has worked with the international lives of states. Any systemic account of international politics will contain an account of the causal powers of international anarchy and the nature of order that is produced. My first interest has been to create a continuous and integrated analysis of an otherwise piecemeal distribution of the many meanings and explanations of these two concepts in IR theory. In this sense, I try to conduct a thorough and cumulative research on systemic accounts of international anarchy and order spanning the expanses of the discipline. My focus has hoped to be thorough, as much a constraint of time may allow; in covering all broad theoretical dispositions (and not particular texts) within the field on the subject of anarchy and order. My choice in texts has been restricted to certain representative ones for which I make necessary justification when due. I separately look at three broad approaches that have been usually followed in this respect. First, international anarchy has been treated as

an independent variable that determines the international political lives of states. Second, international anarchy has been treated as a dependent variable that has been determined by the international political lives of states. Concurrent to the second is a third approach, where international anarchy is generated by intervening variables of culture and interaction that operate at a systemic level.

In my first chapter, international anarchy and order are discussed in the capacity of single independent variables that generate the international political behaviour of states. The literature consulted leads me to create a broader representation for all literature falling under this category that may induce better understanding of the same. The multiple meanings of anarchy and order found under this category are analysed with the help of this representation.

In my second chapter, international order and anarchy are discussed in the capacity of dependent variables that may be generated by the systemic intervening variables of interaction and identity. The literature consulted here leads me to create two alternative representations of systemic accounts of international anarchy that is not generative but generated. The second chapter concentrates on questions undervalued by literature in the first chapter such as the nature of membership as qualitatively various in international political life.

My second interest, attended to in my third chapter, has been to extend this exegesis into the natural result of trying a new and different approach for explaining international anarchy and order. In novelty, it has more to share with previous studies than it can claim to offer. Yet it suggests that a full representation of international political life remains in a synthetic account that may combine several useful qualities that have been developed prior to the present attempt. The attempt in this context proceeds at several levels. First, international anarchy is, in final analysis, both generated and generative, and both independent and

dependent as variable. Second, international anarchy can admit both the intervening variables of culture and interaction but with a certain modification of both. Third, any systemic study on international anarchy requires, for reasons of remaining what it claims to be, *a priori* reasoning and is therefore inadmissible of research strategies that have been employed by certain writers in their works. Fourth, a possible way to study international anarchy is through classical contractualist literature, despite differing fields and subjects. Fifth, international anarchy may be understood better when represented as the Hobbesian Leviathan, separate from all prior attempts to explain the same as pre-contractual states of nature.

The research questions that I attend to may be described as follows:

1. How can anarchy and order be conceptualised in IR theory?

2. How can systemic literature on international anarchy and order be classified?

3. Is international anarchy generated or generative? Is international anarchy an independent variable or can it be more appropriately treated as a dependent variable to an inquiry on the international political lives of states?

4. Is the depiction by authors of systemic literature on international anarchy and order such as Alexander Wendt and Hedley Bull, and sub-systemic literature as Mohammed Ayoob, in understanding international political life as a 'Lockean anarchy', an 'anarchical society' or a 'Lockean core with Hobbesian periphery' a partial analysis of international life? How can an understanding of contemporary international life be based on the conventional contractualist literature of Hobbes and Locke?

5. Can international anarchy be understood as the Leviathan?

The methodology that I have followed has been of two kinds. First, I have retained the conventional explanandum of the state in international life, as opposed to what has been an increasing inclination to diversify the explanandum in IR theory beyond the state for at least forty years now. My purpose, in absolute agreement with Alexander Wendt, for doing this is not because I think that non-state actors are not important but because I think that states are still important. This choice is best clarified if I quote the passage that puts its meaning across with a simple example (Wendt 1999: 9):

> It may be that non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately happens through states. In that sense states still are at the center of the international system, and as such it makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as "state-centric" than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being "tree-centric".

Second, since a large portion of my research is interested not in extending neat causal explanations but in deciphering meaning, I have made use of textual analysis as a prime investigative tool. I have used textual analysis in three ways. First, to enable a deep reading of all literature on anarchy and order so as to examine both variables treated as either dependent or independent, as polysemic concepts (concepts that may have multiple meanings). Second, to enable an analytical reading of all allusions and analogical reasoning undertaken by systemic writers to classical contractualist literature, especially Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, in order to examine whether their efforts hold textually. Third, for purposes of creating my own understanding of international anarchy and order through an interpretation of life under the Hobbesian Leviathan that may hold in contemporary international life.

Chapter 1: ANARCHY AS SYSTEMIC AND GENERATIVE

Studying international politics sometimes feels like sitting through a game of football. There are a bunch of players running around, shirts banded with national or club affiliations, hollering obscenities at each other, running after one ball, not to take it home of course but to hurl it at the other team's goal or, worse, an unassuming opponent's solar plexus. Not everyone who loves to play the game is out playing, and the rules of the game are mostly tacit.

The present research considers both these points: what may be taken as the rules of the game, and what exactly is the nature of participation in it? Rules in international politics began to be codified in the form of international law and customs as applies to the world of today, populated by nation states with a sovereign head acting in the name of the people, only in the modern world, during and after the Napoleonic wars in Europe. Of course, a lot of these rules and practices were not born in the nineteenth century, but derived their sum and substance from older, sometimes antiquarian bodies of law that accommodated older orders. But the fact of the matter is, even till date, there is barely any consensus on what constitutes acceptable international behaviour in the world of states. [1]

One might intervene and say, *there is a basic structure to international behaviour and states institutionalise it by practising along the lines of the former every day*. But one might similarly intervene and say, *when patterned observable practice obtains a structure slowly develops around it*. One might also intervene and say, because international politics is like, say a game of football, what the players want in running after the ball is not to cherish the

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[1] Despite international laws and customs accruing of natural law, moral codes, treaties or select constitutional histories, rules are more or less tacit and flexible. This is not to say that laws do not hold, but to say that laws do not hold alone in international life. Considerations of power and interest often form an equal or greater variable in such outcomes.

ball *per se*, but to cherish something vis-à-vis the opponent in terms of the ball, and therefore rules about relations with the opponent are largely deductive from *the more primary nature of pursuit*. In international politics this may translate into legislating on or at least drawing up common minimum principles on the international action of (the spectrum between) war and peace. This is to say that apart from approaches like the two earlier ones that say rules in international life are made either of response by practice to a basic structure or by concert and practice to create and reify a structure, there is a third way of explaining rules of international interaction between states: that of taking into account *how war and peace are addressed through a set of common minimum principles of international behaviour.*

How are these common minimum principles drawn up? Human beings function a great deal with the help of experience in life, and it is not surprising that a host of political philosophers and international lawyers have suggested the organisation of international behaviour along the lines of how conflict and the use of force is managed in domestic politics. A few things can be added here: since conflict or the private use of force has been managed in domestic societies by the institution of an overwhelming authority, by right or might, absolute or popular, secular or ecclesiastical, as the ultimate restorer of civic harmony, arranging international behaviour according to a 'domestic analogy' (Bull 1977, Suganami 1985) has produced proposals centred on various kinds of international government. Plans or blueprints for the setting up of an international government have not been majorly characteristic of peacetime, but have been usually written under duress of an impending war or the scourge of a passing one. One can think of the works of Saint-Simon, William Ladd, James Lorimer and J.C. Bluntschli, all of who began writing around after the abdication of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in nineteenth century France. In the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and Colonel House's drafts on the indivisibility of peace, followed by Roosevelt's 'A Plan to Preserve World Peace' in later

decades form the crust of the blueprints written to facilitate world peace after the two world wars (Suganami 1985).

Their works were quite different from each other in terms of how they wanted to secure the future of Europe (for even till the closing years of the Second World War, international order was largely about European order) in the hands of a common government, but their fears of war and tyranny were united. Moving to the post-war organisation of the world, the League was born not once but twice after its resuscitation as the United Nations with a half-baked promise of organised enforcement, in the oligarchic and much diluted form of collective security. Organised enforcement related to a typically governmental function, which although visualised and planned by peace-schemers, could never be implemented in solving the world's problem with aggressor states. Incapable of wielding central governing authority, both the League and its successor, the United Nations had to instead work with the leading function of a weaker kind of enforcement, collective security.

Jurists, politicians, university professors of law and international history and philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth century who wrote these blueprints talked of federations and confederations, congresses of parliamentarians and peers, and aristocrats and kings, courts of appeal and courts of arbitration, an international police and navy. Some drew them out to the last steely detail, some spoke more in veneration than of practice, but what stayed common to these attempts was a firm belief in nineteenth century liberalism and the perfectibility of human nature. These men of the nineteenth and twentieth century, sometimes with the foresight and fear of a generation that had seen the Napoleonic wars, the unforgettable memory of the Great War, or the confusion and chagrin at yet another war so lose at the heels of the first, have not surprisingly cared greatly about the need to supersede a system of the unregulated prerogative of states to fight.

What solution did they eventually come up with? It was a wide spectrum tied together by a moderate proposal of a system of states with a representative, lightly-equipped but morally strong, surrogate central authority (the League of Nations, or much evolved but on similar lines, the United Nations). While some suggested, at one end, the entire abrogation of the system of states and its replacement with a world state, others looked to tie up a loose confederation of states under a common government. These men and their systems of thought and proposals for a better world, therefore, accepted the truth of a horrific proclivity of men to fight but did not find the latter incorrigible. They were proponents of change and hope. Their bare-bone recommendation was simple: man creates the mess that he is in, and man can change it. Change it how? *Proscribe war, enable a government, and the government enables peace.* International anarchy *can* be superseded and *will* be.

But the slew of wars till the early nineteenth and in the mid twentieth century did not inspire a similar grade of hope across all writers. There were some men, philosophers and university professors, who imagined the world to be a mess created by men but not one that could be readily superseded. Their single most important source of evidence was the incorrigibility of human nature. Writers like Carr (1939), Niebuhr (1940, 1953), and Morgenthau (1973) regarded the external environment of states as a situation of anarchy and lawlessness, but not one that inspired change. States interacted like pre-political men trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature where one man's gain was the other's loss, and they seemed to face each other with competition, diffidence and glory. Life between states, as between men, was miserable business and to assume that laws or diplomatic concert could alleviate international struggles was an argument infantile. For them, it was not that the only hope to exterminate wars is not to find peace through some modicum of unity of mankind and the fraternity of states, but to instead establish that an amendment of institutions is an effort misplaced and one that does not pay attention to the real source of danger, *human nature*.

Their bare-bone conclusion, short of recommendation, can therefore be said to be: man creates the mess that he is in and that is why man cannot change it. Why not*? Mankind reels in perennial war because of his pervasive nature*. Consequently, it follows that international anarchy does not appear like it can be superseded although eventually for purposes of peace it must be. But that does not mean that it can happen through slight and fanciful institutional changes.

Both these groups of writers firmly believed that the condition of war must be alleviated through some sort of processual change, either of laws and institutions or of human nature. The second group, however, did not think it an easy task to change human nature as they identify the actual source of international dangers to be the unalterable human quest for power. Their difference, then, is one of attitude and lies simply in a degree of hope. However, this attitudinal difference reveals a lot of similarities: the first group (political idealists) and the second (political realists) *diagnose international life similarly*. Both recognise that the problem remains in how international life is arranged *contra* domestic life, in utter lawlessness and chaos, and understand that the natural, unilinear end to such a problem is *progress towards an international government or a world state, reproducing a social contract that formed civic union within states*. This suggests, international political life must be taken care of through a domestic analogy. The difference lies in their prescription: the first prescribes hope and change, the second prescribes diplomatic tact and practicality. Both these groups broadly fit into the second intervention quoted above: *when patterned observable practice obtains a structure slowly develops around it*. Both of these suggest a processual change of international life through a domestic analogy of law and central authority as the final solution.

There is, however, another group that diagnoses international life differently- they diagnose international life as *sui generis*, one of a kind, exceptional, and incomparable to the

needs and afflictions of domestic society. They view international lawlessness not as a corollary of domestic lawlessness and lack of government that must be superseded, but something that holds international life together. International anarchy is both an ordering principle (Waltz 1979) and a quality of international order (Bull 1977). For Waltz, international anarchy is the system-defining condition of international interaction which compels unit actors (states) to respond to systemic indicators. For Bull, international anarchy is not the sterile context of international life imagined as a Hobbesian state of nature but is more wholesome a concept that preserves a society of states capable of order and justice. For both these writers, processual change of human nature or of laws, regulations and institutions is second fiddle to the systemic operation of the international anarchy framework and resembles the first intervention that we recorded earlier in this chapter: *there is a basic structure to international behaviour and states institutionalise it by practising along the lines of the former every day*.

It is to these two writers that I devote the rest of this chapter to, in order to understand how international life has been understood *qua* international life, as opposed to domestic analogy, in IR theory. The questions that I seek to answer by the end of this chapter are:

(i)   How can anarchy and order be conceptualised in IR theory?

(ii)   How can anarchy and order be understood as generative?

(iii)   Are the concepts of anarchy and order related empirically to the degree of war and peace prevalent in international life?

The present chapter is divided into three sections. The first section considers the epistemological, ontological, and methodological concerns of studying polysemic concepts, or concepts that may have multiple meanings, as single independent variables in international

politics. The second section discusses anarchy and order variously. In particular, anarchy and order are looked at as independent variables that generate international behaviour of states. The third section ties up the position of international anarchy and order as systemic and generative.

I

One of the many peculiarities of the discipline of IR is taxonomical confusion. While most social sciences employ a plethora of terms to signify the various aspects of one single thing, or to describe the many forms a single thing can take on under environmental variation, a great many of our debates stem from confusion about concepts. Consider balance of power politics. Balance of power politics has been the singular reason for our academic beginnings in the early twentieth century, has supplied a great many books to the purpose of understanding what it stands for, has been severely hated by most well-meaning statesmen, and has then consequently been established as an unconscious design, and therefore inappropriate to be a subject of love or hate. It is closely linked to a second concept that we have written on for decades and yet gasp at the very thought of being asked to collate all theories into a single, identifiable, empirically sound, theoretically useful explanation: war. Fighting wars has been found to be inevitable and avoidable, just and unjust, necessary and unnecessary, rational and bestial. It has also been found to be serviceable to purposes of factional interest and then to purposes of national interest, to justify human evolution and social progress but then to also be identified as the only reason why humankind is unable to break with its brutish past.

A flurry of meanings attached to concepts as basic to our nature of inquiry as balance of power politics or war and peace may mean quite a lot of things. It may mean both horizontal and vertical cumulation of ideas, with no necessary unilinear paradigmatic advancement in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1962). This is to mean that the post-Second World War consensus[2] that had developed around political realist literature (and which continued, despite some concessional years in the middle, with increasing vigour after the publication of *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz 1979), hereafter TIP, in the waning years of the détente) has been fundamentally transposed to areas of novel theoretical attempts at explaining the fundamentals of our discipline. By a horizontal cumulation of ideas as opposed to the more scientifically accepted unilinear advancement is therefore suggested that along with a shift in consensus on the primacy of realism as an epistemological position within the discipline, academic consensus has increasingly grown around the acceptance of polysemic concepts[3] as legitimate variables of inquiry.

This suggests a related diversion from Lakatosian theory-building (Lakatos 1970) in the growth of IR theory in terms of understanding and accepting meanings of concepts. In the scientific viability of a Lakatosian research programme, scientific knowledge advances through the protection of a negative heuristic (composed of core ideas supported by absolute consensus) by a positive heuristic of related deductive ideas that are altered through novel theoretical and empirical emendations. Lakatosian evaluation of a research programme therefore depends on the strength of the auxiliary propositions or ideas related to and deductive from the constancy of the core ideas or the negative heuristic. While there has indeed been considerable attempt at understanding the growth of the social sciences through

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[2] Scientific consensus in the Kuhnian sense grows around the most promising field of academic inquiry within a discipline leading to a concentration of research fund and energies in such an area. This, according to Kuhn, is how normal science develops and progresses (Kuhn 1962) and has been applied to questions of progress in the social sciences as well (Vasquez 2004).

[3] See Little (1989) for a discussion on balancing as a polysemic concept.

texts on the philosophy of science, efforts have mostly begun from accepting realist literature

as a dominant paradigm, a series of theories intellectually related with a fixed, broad

consensus of ideas (Vasquez 2004: 37). These ideas, very broadly, relate to the primacy of

states as political units, a distinction between international and domestic politics[4] and

international relations as a struggle for power and peace (Vasquez 2004: 37). While

subsequent evaluation of the advancement of the realist research programme (Vasquez 2004:

248-285) begins analysis from after the publication of TIP in 1979, with a concentrated focus

on how deductive literature went on to theorise balance of power politics, precious little is

afforded to attest the *constancy of the meaning of the concept employed*. For instance,

Vasquez (2004: 252-3) writes:

> Waltz's (1979) book can be seen as a theoryshift that places the
> balance of power in a much more positive light than does
> Morgenthau. His theoryshift tries to resolve the question of whether
> the balance is associated with peace by saying it is not. He then,
> unlike Morgenthau, sees the balance as automatic and not the
> product of a particular leadership's diplomacy, but the product of
> system structure. The focus on system structure and the
> identification of "anarchy" as central to all explanations of
> international politics are two of the original contributions of
> Waltz… Basically, Waltz introduces two novel independent
> variables and stipulatively defines the dependent variable
> (balancing) in a non-ambiguous manner to overcome previous
> criticism of the concept.

Essentially, what Vasquez goes on to do is an evaluation of new writings on Waltzian

balancing because '…they all share certain concepts, are all concerned with balancing, share

a view of the world, and share the general purpose of trying to work within and defend a

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[4] Morgenthau (1973) finds no distinction in the quality of pursuit of power in international politics and
domestic politics, for he terms the drive for power as pathological and fundamental to humankind and states
alike.

paradigm, they can all be seen as working on the same general research program on balancing.' (Vasquez 2004: 254)

But what exactly is the Waltzian proposition on balancing? Let us quickly retract to Chapter 6 of TIP (Waltz 1979). Waltz takes down, piece by piece, three texts on balancing theory (Hume 1742, Morgenthau 1973, Organski 1968). All three texts are united in claiming two central themes, and they may be rounded up as: first, order in international politics is intended, it exists by conscious design, and therefore there is an almost transparent passage of intention into action in the world of states; and second, order in international politics is greatly premised on judgement and rationality. To this, Waltz (1979: 120) sounds nearly merciless when he says:

> Reification has obviously occurred where one reads, for example, of the balance operating successfully and of the difficulty that nations have in applying it… Reification is often merely the loose use of language or the employment of metaphor to make one's prose more pleasing. In this case, however, the theory [balance of power theory] has been drastically distorted, and not only by introducing the notion that if a balance is to be formed, somebody, must want it and must work for it. The further distortion of theory arises when rules are derived from the results of states' actions and then illogically prescribed to the actors as duties. A possible effect [maintenance of balance] is turned into a necessary cause [that of states *wanting* to maintain balance] in the form of a stipulated rule.

And further (Waltz 1979: 120):

> In a purely competitive economy, everyone's striving to make a profit drives the profit rate downward. Let the competition continue long enough under static conditions, and everyone's profit will be zero. To infer from that result that everyone, or anyone, is seeking to minimize profit, and that the competitors must adopt that goal as a rule in order for the system to work, would be absurd. And yet in

international politics one frequently finds that rules inferred from the results of the interactions of states are prescribed to the actors and are said to be a condition of a system's maintenance.

In his doctoral research, and later a book (Waltz 1959), Waltz had similarly maintained that balancing is an act that is exclusive of an individual or a state's intention and a 'quasi-automatic reaction of a state to the drive for ascendancy of another' (Waltz 1959: 208). This means the only thing that can be imputed to balancing in international politics is that the immediate interest of a state to preserve itself prevails over consideration for another's preservation (Waltz 1959: 168). In TIP, he refurbishes this to mean that balance of power politics prevails wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order is anarchic and that it is populated by units wishing to survive (Waltz 1979: 121). Therefore, to put it together: the Waltzian proposition differs from earlier realist texts on balancing to suggest that units balance each other not out of fellow-feeling or from noble intentions, but because the condition of anarchy compresses units into behaving similarly. And when units begin to behave similarly, they begin to fear and anticipate similarly. It is therefore the unintended co-action of units that maintains balance.

But what is the problem then with securing structurally effected balancing and its theorisation (neorealism or structural realism) as a valid cluster of ideas that represents the core ideas of the realist research programme? The point that I try to make is balancing is not only about its causes (the presence or absence of intentions) but also the meaning of its very nature. While the question on 'causes' asks in classical and structural realist texts, *what causes balance and how are they maintained*, the question on 'nature' asks, notwithstanding the unintended beginnings and maintenance of balancing, *does it effect order*? Let me also add, I do not mean by a question on 'nature' of balancing the question if balancing is desirable or not. That would then take us back to classical realist and idealist texts that would

forewarn its readers of the immanent deception and caprice of balancing, and that it is nothing but the greed to covet disguised as policy, strategy and incidence. The question is not at all if balancing is a 'good' thing. The question is: does balancing create systemic equilibrium, an order[5] that is predictable, and an order that is just because it tries to satisfy a limited number of reasonable claims of existence of its constituent units, i.e. states? Or, is it an unmediated institution left to its own devices that perpetuate an order that is adversarial, supported by a few good institutions of law and diplomacy, from breaking down? *Is balancing a generic untamed institution that is managerial? Or is it a generic untamed impulse that is adversarial in the least and disruptive at worst?*

My intention in trying to analyse the nature of balancing as separate from its causes is to suggest that the negative heuristic in realist literature is, by itself, inconclusive and unappreciative of attempts to understand the nature of balancing. A British cluster of literature ('The English School') closely allied with the American cluster of political realist literature, through meetings supported by the Rockefeller Foundation of the British Studies of International Politics since 1954, and through publication, collected in the form of *Diplomatic Investigations* (Butterfield and Wight 1966), has tried to understand balancing, anarchy and power politics in terms of the questions I have posed above. This has mostly been unaccounted for in American studies of political realism, save some who began to write near the end of the Cold War (Buzan 1991; Buzan, Jones and Little 1993) in their attempt to revive the old English School through new thinking.

Balancing is a polysemic term (Little 1989), a term with multiple meanings, and to relate its essence to the good/bad debate in the First Great Debate between realists and

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[5] Order, here, is used to mean not peace but a prevailing condition of predictability and certainty of international behaviour arising from an equilibrium of power and stasis of interests. This theme is examined in subsequent parts of the present chapter.

idealists or the intention/impulse debate within the realist literature is not enough. This calls for a separate and fresh enquiry, but one that is closely related to the present one.

II

Anarchy and order, like balance of power politics, has been variously understood in IR theory.

My interest in understanding these terms is however limited in two senses. First, I am interested in texts that try to understand international life *qua* international life. They do not employ what has been called a domestic analogy (Bull 1977, Suganami 1985) in trying to understand international life. They compose their work in a manner that admits distinction between how power politics is at play in the world between states and that within them. In doing so, their interest is not so much in overcoming the present system of states with an international government but in explaining why international life is unlike the unilinear progression of evolution of life within states. Quality international life is not so much about moving from chaos to civic union, which is a nearly impossible thing to achieve, but in preserving order and justice through the current system of states. Second, these texts offer structural explanation to make sense of war and peace and although they accept the drive for power as pathological and ubiquitous like the Classical Realists and the Idealists, they maintain that the search for remedial measures (strategy, reform, or the installation of government) is useless. They remain useless because all remedial measures at the level of actors and institutions draw away from the inherent structural logic of the international system.

These texts can be classified into two groups. First, Hedley Bull (Bull 1977, Bull and Watson 1984) and Martin Wight's (1977, 1979) works on the international system and international society which forms, along with the works of John Vincent (1974, 1986) and Adam Watson (1992), the 'English School'. Second, the neorealist (Waltz 1979) and neoliberal (Keohane and Nye 1977, Keohane 1984) cluster of literature that explains the behaviour of states under conditions of anarchy. However, my selection for inquiry here is two representative texts: *The Anarchical Society* (Bull 1977) and TIP (Waltz 1979). My reasons are as follows:

(i) *The Anarchical Society* (Bull 1977) is largely derivative of Martin Wight's works on power politics from the days of *Diplomatic Investigations* (Butterfield and Wight 1966) and captures largely the essence of his later works, *System of States* (Wight 1977) and *Power Politics* (Wight 1979). *The Anarchical Society* is, to be precise, the theoretical representative of Wight's and Watson's interest in international history (Bull and Watson 1984, Watson 1992) and Bull's earlier interest in understanding international life through international legal history, particularly that of the natural law tradition influenced by Hugo Grotius as against the more positivistic development of international law, courtesy Vattel and Oppenheim (Bull 1966: 35-73).

(ii) TIP is the mother body of neoliberal literature simply because the latter develops as concretely distinct from liberal IR theory due to its concessions to the anarchy framework developed by Kenneth Waltz. Their ontological and epistemological assumptions of order and anarchy are exactly as those of the neorealist position and the two differ only because the latter repurposes anarchy to fit their position on cooperation and interdependence. Since this section tries to make sense of the meanings of anarchy and order, it will not be

inappropriate to take TIP as a representative text of neorealist and neoliberal literature.

Anarchy

Anarchy is an elementary concept of international politics (Milner 1991). On the one hand, it is rather commonplace. Anarchy relates to the negative qualities of war, mayhem, and disharmony. It may be found in the smallest unit of the family, the neighbourhood, and is extendable to the world at large. According to this view, anarchy between states is nothing special and the best that man can do is to think of ways to overcome it.

On another hand, anarchy in international life is exceptional. It is not qualitative, but contextual. It is a unifying feature for each and every theoretical approach that tries to understand international life as distinct from domestic life. It is the solitary quality that sets life between states apart from life among states. It not only enables international politics to remain separate from and bear no resemblance to domestic politics, but also denies the comparison of international life to the life of men in a state of nature riddled with the urgent need to install civic governance and positive, actionable law.

Anarchy can, therefore, primarily be understood in at least two senses (Milner 1991: 69). The first may mean a *lack of order*. Order in this sense relates to its commonsensical meaning of tranquillity or peace, and the opposite of disorder, chaos or disruption. This is the favoured understanding of philosophers and theorists who find international life to be a domestic analogy, and therefore a site of war and decadence that is wanting of and must be alleviated only through civic union and contractual international government. These writers, dealt with at the beginning of the present chapter, find the drive for power to be pathological

in humankind, something that can meet its end only when man's urge to covet can be addressed. Because their assessment of human nature is one that is pervasive and universal in matters of power and self-interest, they imagine anarchy as a malady that strikes human society across domestic and international levels. Municipal order and the civic state put an end to the state of nature in domestic life. And it is only logically coherent for such systems of thought to assume that international anarchy can be overcome through similar means. Their treatment of international anarchy is *remedial and processual*.

They differ among themselves on the means and processes in the employment of which anarchy may be succeeded. Proposals range from the constitution of a world state on one end, to the protection of articles of peace through a morally strong surrogate authority somewhere in between, to the use of tact and able statesmanship that can moderate the excesses of war on another. Their sole concern in overcoming international anarchy is to establish a world of peace and harmony, one that seems plain as day to the optimism of the peace-schemers of the nineteenth century and inter-war idealists of the twentieth century, but one that seems quite difficult to the scepticism of the positive law tradition of the nineteenth century and political realists of the twentieth century. Their position can be understood through Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1

Anarchy as qualitative is, therefore, the condition of war and disharmony in international political life. Adherents to such a meaning of anarchy find international life to be more peaceful with the decrease in the condition of anarchy. Lower anarchy suggests greater order.

The second meaning of anarchy may be described as a *lack of government*. It refers to the characterisation of international life as one populated with states as the major unit of political interaction in the absence of a central governing authority. Theorists who employ this second meaning of anarchy offer theories that are *analytical and structural*. This position can be understood through Figure 1.2.

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┌──────────────┐              ┌──────────────┐
│              │              │  Anarchy as  │
│   Order as   │   ────────▶  │   lack of    │
│    stasis    │              │  government  │
│              │              │              │
│              │              │  (Context)   │
└──────────────┘              └──────────────┘
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
Figure 1.2

Anarchy as contextual relates to the nature of international political life as a domain of unorganised politics due to the absence of a central governing authority. Anarchy, in this sense, as we find out below, is neither good or bad, nor desirable or undesirable. Anarchy is characterised by an inherent order that relates not to peace but a stable pattern of international behaviour arising from an equilibrium of power among states. Neither order nor anarchy rises

or falls with the incidence of war and peace. This is the notion of anarchy that we turn to for discussion.

In TIP (Waltz 1979) or in his earlier work (Waltz 1959), anarchy is the very first term of a structural definition of the international system. The international system is composed of a structure and its interacting parts, states. Through his work, Waltz labours to arrive at a structural theory of international politics. He (1979: 80) lists three propositions of a structural definition of the international system:

> First, structures may endure while personality, behaviour, and interactions vary widely. Structure is sharply distinguished from actions and interactions. Second, a structural definition applies to realms of widely different substance so long as the arrangement of parts is similar. Third, because this is so, theories developed for one realm may with some modification be applicable to other realms as well.

What is his purpose for a structural definition of the system? Waltz (1979: 79) writes, 'To mark international-political systems off from other international systems, and to distinguish system-level from unit-level forces, requires showing how political structures are generated and how they affect, and are affected by, the units of the system… What is it that intervenes between interacting units and the results that their acts and interactions produce?' Structure, is his answer.

But what is the structure of the international system that he talks of? Waltz (1979:81) writes, 'Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them.' Therefore the structure at the international political level or at the domestic political level is primarily about

the nature of arrangement of units. The first attribute of structure is the ordering principle or organisational principle by which units at either level relate to each other. He characterises the international system as effected by the ordering principle of anarchy, as opposed to hierarchy within states. Anarchy is not, in his usage, the degree of violence or chaos in the world between states, neither is it an expression of the quality of international life. It is, instead, an ordering principle or the principle according to which the international system of states is organised or ordered: a self-help system without a central governing authority. Referring to the confusion about the concept of anarchy as disorder and the concept of anarchy as a lack of government, Waltz (1979: 89) asks:

> The first term of a structural definition states the principle by which the system is ordered… The prominent characteristic of international politics, however, seems to be the lack of order and of organization. How can one think of international politics as being any kind of an order at all? The anarchy of international politics is often referred to. If structure is an organizational concept, the terms "structure" and "anarchy" seem to be in contradiction… The problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking.

He (1979: 102, 103) resolves this confusion in the following chapter:

> Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence… The threat of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguish international from national affairs. But in the history of the world surely most rulers have had to bear in mind that their subjects might use force to resist or overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated with the threat of violence, so also is its presence.

And further (Waltz 1979: 103):

> If anarchy is identified with chaos, destruction, and death, then the distinction between anarchy and government does not tell us much… The uses of force, or the constant fear of its use, are not sufficient grounds for distinguishing international from domestic affairs. If the possible and the actual use of force mark both national and international orders, then no durable distinction between the two realms can be drawn in terms of the use or the nonuse of force. *No human order is proof against violence…* The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the nonuse of force but in their different structures… in the different modes of organization for doing something about it… A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force… Citizens need not prepare to defend themselves. Public agencies do that. A national system is not one of self help. The international system is. [emphasis added]

International anarchy, in this sense (Waltz 1979: 91) is not the quality of international life but a product of the co-action of self-regarding units or states. *Anarchy is the unintended production of order in international life.* This is not to mean that anarchy produces peace or tranquillity, but that it produces a stasis from which the international system is unable to recover unless massive and momentous structural changes are brought into effect by either a change in the ordering principle, which Waltz finds absolutely unlikely given unit impulses of survival, or a change in the relative capability of units (Waltz 1979: 111). It must be noted that although he scarcely mentions this, but his repeated usage of the term 'order' is not in the commonsensical meaning of peace or harmony. He implies by order stasis and equilibrium that marks the international system when international anarchy operates. Conditions of war and peace are not empirically related to the term order and anarchy, but are symptomatic of units responding to the structural imperatives of anarchy.

Therefore, conclusively, for Waltz:

(i)   Anarchy is the lack of government and not the proliferation of violence and chaos.

(ii)   The proliferation of violence or chaos (war) or the lack of it (peace) or anything in between them is not symptomatic of the breakdown or transformation of international system. Big wars or peace conferences by themselves do not change the anarchic nature of international politics. War and peace are features of unregulated competition between states. They are symptomatic of the operation of international anarchy and the balancing politics that it induces. However, wars that eliminate enough competition (and alter the relative capability of states or distribution of power in the international system of states) are system-transforming wars.

(iii)   Order is a condition of equilibrium that the system tends to slide towards because states tend to balance each other.

(iv)   Order is not peace and harmony.

In *The Anarchical Society* (Bull 1977), Bull is interested in understanding three competing traditions of thought that characterise the history of the modern states system by embodying one of three descriptions of the nature of international politics. These are (Bull 1977: 24), 'The Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views international politics as taking place within an international society.' Bull is analytically committed to the Grotian tradition in his text because the latter remains (self-admittedly) busy

in understanding the meaning, maintenance and viability of order as harmony and peace in the world among states (Bull 1977: xi). However we soon find out, that his work is not really so.

On the subject of international society, Bull explains (Bull 1977: 13), 'A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.' In the internationalist tradition where international politics is a society of states, the system of states as self-regarding actors inhabiting an international anarchy is analytically preserved. What is added to the environment of the world of self-regarding sovereign states is the impulse to combine for common interests or common values that ensure a condition of international order.

Why is international order needed? It is needed for a set of goals or purposes (Bull 1977: 16-20). These goals or purposes are listed, in descending order of importance ─ the preservation of the system and society of states, the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of particular states, the maintenance of peace, limitation of violence, keeping of international promises and contracts, and finally, the stability of sovereign juridical territory of states. Bull's internationalist tradition is therefore a position that is an amalgamation of the realist tradition of sovereignty, survival and relative gains on the one hand and the universalist tradition of the community of mankind and absolute gains on the other. With this primary understanding of the text, it seems only logically coherent to think that the author understands international order as peace and harmony in a world of states[6] despite the sovereign tendency of each state to operate for their individual interest, because, as

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[6] He repeatedly alludes to the meaning of order as qualitative, as peace and harmony. This is most clearly mentioned in his Introduction (Bull 1999: xi): '…I am thinking of order as a quality that may or may not obtain in international politics at any one time or place, or that may be present to a greater or lesser degree: order as opposed to disorder.' A discussion on order is carried out in the following section.

he explains, there remains in international life an equally strong tendency guided by the Grotian natural law tradition to combine for purposes of common interest and values. This is possible, mentions Bull (1977: 29), because international politics may be understood as guided by the Roman *ius gentium*, or 'law common to all nations' as opposed to the later positive development of international law as 'law between states'.

The Anarchical Society, however, is not an easy text to break down. This is because Bull at times seems to be interested in all four positions found in Figure 1.1 and 1.2, leaving little analytical efficiency in the end. While Waltz is self-admittedly a realist who resuscitates political realism and international political theory from an analytical vacuum (Waltz 1979: 1-17), Bull is motivated by different concerns altogether. His sole purpose in writing *The Anarchical Society* is to make sense of the concept of order. Although he sets out with one broad understanding of order as a situation or quality in international politics disposed to harmony and peace, he often uses order in very different senses through the text. A lot more consistent is his position on international anarchy which is closely allied to the Waltzian notion of anarchy.

A further source of ontological confusion is curiously found in the only note on methodology in the text, at the end of Chapter 3 (Bull 1977: 74-76). Let us begin with that. He remarks (1977: 74, 75):

> A central theme in this study is that the rules and institutions to which reference has been made carry out positive functions or roles in relation to international order. In this study what is meant by statements of this kind is simply that these rules and institutions are part of the efficient causation of international order, that they are among the necessary and sufficient conditions of its occurrence.

And further (Bull 1977: 75):

> The present study is not an attempt to apply 'structural-functionalist' explanation, in which terms such as 'function' and 'role' have a different meaning… In structural-functionalist explanation the statement that these rules and institutions fulfil 'functions' in relation to international order might be taken to imply that international society, for its own survival or maintenance, has certain 'needs', and that the rules and institutions in question are fulfilling those needs. If we can make the additional assumptions that fulfilment of these needs is essential to the survival of international society, and that these rules and institutions fulfil these functions is tantamount to endorsing them…
> The present study is not intended to provide a rationale for, or justification of, the rules of coexistence in international society or the institutions that help to make them effective.

In one single sweep, although with beaten language, Bull demolishes all claims to structural theory. Why? This is because, by his own admission (Bull 1977: xii, 75, 77), order is not an overriding value in international politics. There are other values that are also as important to the world between and among states such as maintenance of a system of states (this, however, is a structural concern, and one that sits uneasily with the maintenance of order as peace) and protection of the sovereignty of states (this is again a structural concern that implicitly accepts the 'function' of balancing politics in maintaining the system of states). And since order is not of singular importance to international political life, notwithstanding the positive role of certain laws and rules and institutions in effecting international order, it does not suggest that international society 'needs' for 'its own survival and maintenance' the maintenance of order.

A second reason as to why Bull (1977: 75, 76) denies all claims to a structural-functionalist theory is:

> The underlying assumption of the 'structural-functionalist' explanation is that of the wholeness or unity of the society being

explained, the primacy of the whole over its parts in accounting for what occurs within it, the possibility of describing the nature and purpose of each part in terms of what it contributes to the 'needs' of the whole… International society does not display the kind of wholeness or unity that would give point to explanations of this sort. It is emphasised in this study that society is only one of a number of competing elements in international politics; indeed, the description of it as a society at all conveys only part of the truth.

The second reason is less problematic. In this, he claims that structural theories operate only in systems that are closed in terms of their defining independent variable. If the world of states could entirely be characterised as either a Grotian 'society of states', operating through an internationalist tradition that describes international politics as an international society of states, limited in their conflict with one another by common rules and institutions; or, as a Hobbesian international system of states immersed in perpetual state of war of all against all; or, as a Kantian community of mankind concerned with a cooperative or non-zero game, a structural theory could be readily applied. However, since Bull finds the existence of all three elements in international politics, he thinks a structural theory premised on any one single element is a pointless task: for international life to be structurally explained there is the need of an overwhelming independent variable, in the shape of order, perpetual war, or perpetual peace, respectively.

A point that can be considered at length, however, is his first reason for opting out of a structural theory of international life. This is the point from which most of the ontological peculiarities of his text follow. He claims, as discussed above, that order is not the single most important value in international life. Therefore, he continues, as international life is inclined to value other goals such as the maintenance of the system of states as the prevailing form of political organisation or of the protection of sovereignty of individual states through the pursuit of balancing politics, the institutions and rules supporting order do not form the

ultimate conditions that support international life. Order is an isolated value that characterises

international life in only those moments when the element of international society comes

through as the strongest. Alterably, when international life seems more like a Hobbesian

system of states, there is no mark of order, but of complete chaos and disorder. At this point,

his position closely resembles the position described in Figure 1.1: order is understood as

peace and anarchy is understood as lack of order. In succeeding chapters, however, his

position begins to appropriate and hybridise Figure 1.2: order is understood both as stasis and

peace and anarchy is understood as lack of government.

In the first section of his book, anarchy is understood as a *quality* of international life

that dominates when states behave like a Hobbesian system of states, in perpetual war of all

against all. Anarchy is explained in terms of Figure 1.1, as lack of order and civility among

states. For instance, he writes (Bull 1977: 24, 25):

> The Hobbesian tradition describes international relations a state of
> war of all against all, an arena of struggle in which each state is
> pitted against every other. International relations, on the Hobbesian
> view, represent pure conflict between states and resemble a game
> that is wholly distributive or zero-sum: the interests of each state
> exclude the interests of any other.

Curiously, anarchy goes on to form the *context* of international life when states behave

like a Grotian society of states. This is at its clearest, in an otherwise supremely muddled text,

when he discusses the similarities between primitive anarchical societies and international

anarchical societies (Bull 1977: 62):

In both cases [i.e., primitive and international anarchical societies] some element of order is maintained despite the absence of a central authority commanding overwhelming force and a monopoly of the legitimate use of it [note that here anarchy is suggested to be a context, a context that lacks government]. In both cases, also, this is achieved through the assumption by particular groups- lineage and locality groups in primitive stateless societies, sovereign states in international society- of the functions which, in a modern state, the government (but not the government exclusively) carries out in making rules effective. In primitive anarchical society, as in international society, order depends upon a fundamental or constitutional principle, stated or implied, which singles out certain groups as the sole bodies competent to discharge these political functions… In primitive anarchical society, as in international society, the relations between these politically competent groups are themselves circumscribed by a structure of acknowledged normative principles, even at times of violent struggle.

Therefore, conclusively, for Bull:

(i)   Anarchy is a lack of order because the international system of states is particularly disorderly and disposed to a condition of war, mischance and mistrust. (Order as peace, anarchy as disorder)

(ii)   Anarchy is also a lack of government because common interests, values and identity along with certain 'contingent factors' such as balancing, war, great power management of international relations and diplomacy together enable an international society of states, which is primarily orderly and peaceful. (Order as peace, anarchy as context)

(iii)   Order, notwithstanding his firm denial (Bull 1977: xii), is a value-laden concept because order is characterised as peace and tranquillity that is desirable and durable, which is manifest in international politics when states behave like an international society of states born of common interests and values. The difference between common interests and common values and its implication on the meaning of international society will be discussed below.

(iv) International order is not only about the maintenance of peace but also about the maintenance of the system of states and their mutual rights of sovereignty. These are structural goals that may require disorder to be effected.

Bull's nature of treatment of international anarchy and order as polysemic concepts may be particularly observed here. Although at times confusing, his work takes international anarchy and order as *single independent variables* that determine the international political behaviour of units. While Waltz's structural account fulfils a similar objective, Bull's usage of his independent variables are wider in meaning and greater in implication. Bull appropriates both Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in explaining his variables. We find out more on this below.

Order

Order, for Kenneth Waltz (1979), represents neatly and clearly the situation in Figure 1.2: order as stasis, anarchy as context.

He frequently uses the expression 'ordering principle' to explain anarchy, by which is meant the way in which the international states system is organised. The principle of organisation of international politics is 'self-help' or international anarchy. Conversely, the world within states is organised by hierarchy. Units are functionally differentiated in life within a state where each can specialise in different functions, because although life within a state is not violence (or disorder)-proof, it is definitely the realm of interdependence, exchange and communal living. Units do not exercise private legitimate force save for instances when they must defend themselves, because otherwise their security and survival is taken care of by the sovereign state. That, in Waltzian terms, is the very essence of domestic

politics and municipal order, where men combine in communal living for purposes of security and survival, as in a Hobbesian civil state. The sovereign state may not be the ultimate repository of collective identity or value systems as in the ecclesiastical order of the Pope ruling by the rights of divine law, but is indeed the ultimate repository of collective interest. The collective interest of men living under a sovereign state in the maintenance of hierarchy stems from their private interest of security. The Waltzian state, as per Weber, is the realm of legitimate monopoly of force.

International anarchy, on the other hand is organised or 'ordered' in terms of anarchy where states live in a 'self-help' situation because no overwhelming central authority possesses legitimate monopoly of force. In Waltzian explanation (Waltz 1979: 118):

> A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to danger, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. Notice that the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all actors. The theory says simply that if some do well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside.

It is a world of uncertainty, fear and anticipation. It is a world where everyone's security is their own business because states realise that cooperation seldom pays in a world of self-regarding units. This compresses states into functional similarity, where states perform the same broad set of activities in order to secure themselves against any other. For instance, Waltz (1979: 127) writes, 'Competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors'. What shines through is their difference of relative capability which determines

relative power. States are interested in maintaining international anarchy as the ordering principle, not by design but by co-action.

Order, in the Waltzian sense does not suggest a condition of peace and harmony. War and peace are symptomatic expressions of the operation of international anarchy and balance of power politics which the latter induces. International order is on the other hand, stasis or equilibrium which the international system always moves towards, again not by conscious design but by the inclination of states to balance each other.

However, order is not always an unconscious design, because great powers often take on system-wide collective action of maintaining stability of the status-quo. Order is mostly effected by the management of international affairs by great powers, because as Waltz (1979: 199) says, 'Their extraordinary positions in the system lead them to undertake tasks that other states have neither the incentive nor the ability to perform'. He explains this in the following manner (Waltz 1979: 198):

> The greater the relative size of a unit the more it identifies its own interest with the interest of the system. This is made clear by considering the extreme case. If units grow in size as they compete, finally one of them will supplant the others. If one unit swallows the system, the distinction between the unit's and the system's interest disappears. Short of this extreme, in any realm populated by units that are functionally similar but of different capability, those of greatest capability take on special responsibilities.

And further (Waltz 1979: 209):

> The inequality of nations produces a condition of equilibrium at a low level of interdependence. In the absence of authoritative regulation, loose coupling and a certain amount of control exercised by large states help to promote peace and stability. If the members of an anarchic realm are in a condition of low interdependence, the concerting of effort for the achievement of common aims is less often required. Control rather than precise regulation, and prevention rather than coordination for positive

accomplishment, are the operations of key importance. To interdict the use of force by the threat of force, to oppose force with force, to influence the policies of states by the threat of force, to oppose force with force, to influence the policies of states by the threat or use of force: These have been and continue to be the most important means of control in security matters. With a highly unequal distribution of world power, some states, by manipulating the threat of force, are able to moderate others' use of force internationally. These same states, by virtue of their superior power, are able to absorb possibly destabilizing changes that emanate from uses of violence that they do not or cannot control.

Therefore, conclusively, for Waltz:

(i)   International order is an unconscious design, a self-reinforcing equilibrium formed through the operation of international anarchy.

(ii)   International order is largely maintained by the system-wide tasks of collective action and protection of the status-quo by great powers. This is because they alone possess the capacity and incentive to do so. Maintenance of their international position becomes tantamount to maintenance of international order.

(iii)   International order is transformed only when the system of states undergoes a structural change: either when there is a change in the ordering principle of anarchy or when there is a change in the relative capability of states in the system.

(iv)   Great powers can transform the international order if they are able to transform the relative power positions of states in the system. This can happen if a leading power drives for hegemony or promotes the amalgamation of middle states to enlarge the circle of great powers (Waltz 1979: 199).

In *The Anarchical Society*, order is understood in a number of ways. Although Bull maintains that he understands international order as the sustenance of peace and harmony, we find quite contrary positions through the book. Let us consider the first position, where order is imagined as peace.

Bull describes order in social life as a patterned, predictable state of being where three elementary goals of communal living are fulfilled (Bull 1977: 4, 5):

> First, all societies seek to ensure that life will be in some measure secure against violence resulting in death or bodily harm. Second, all societies seek to ensure that promises, once made, will be kept, or that agreements, once undertaken, will be carried out. Third, all societies pursue the goal of ensuring that the possession of things will remain stable to some degree, and will not be subject to challenges that are constant and without limit… All three goals may be said to be *elementary*: a constellation of persons or groups among whom there existed no expectation of security against violence, of the honouring of agreements or of stability of possession we should hardly call a society at all. The goals are also *primary* in the sense that any other goals a society may set for itself presuppose the realisation of these goals in some degree. [emphasis in original]

These goals are subsequently listed as 'life', 'truth' and 'property' in the text and are chosen by Bull as the ubiquitous ends of social, and later, of international political life. Needless to say, his assumptions are squarely based on natural-law theory '…which sought to deal with the elementary or primary conditions of social existence', of men as well as of nations, '…in the idiom of a different era' (Bull 1977: 6).

Likewise, Bull finds international order to be '…a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society' (1977: 8). What are these goals? As already discussed before, these are, in decreasing order of importance, the

preservation of the system and society of states, the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of particular states, the maintenance of peace, limitation of violence among states ('life'), keeping of international promises and contracts among states ('truth'), and finally, the stability of sovereign juridical territory of states ('property'). He then goes on to say that such maintenance of international order induces the creation of an international society of states, committed to the maintenance of the above elementary and primary goals, in place of an international system of states that abounds in perpetual war (Bull 1977: 13):

> 'A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.' [emphasis in original]

It may be noted here, that Bull's structural implications of order already begin by now. Look at, for instance, the arrangement of goals of international order. *The most important goals are systemic goals, those which maintain the status-quo, and may have nothing to do with peace or harmony. But with stability, yes*. The maintenance of the system of states and the safeguarding of the mutual rights of sovereignty are not guarantors of peace and harmony, in fact they require uninhibited balancing by states, often inducing war and disorder.

Despite his avowed denial of the use of a structural-functionalist method, or of the singular, indispensable value of 'order' as a constituting element of international politics in maintaining the health or existence of the international society of states, *he actually begins the construction of a structural theory of international politics from very early on in the text*. It is

apposite to mention here that a structural theory (the requirements of which have already been discussed in the discussion on anarchy) may be described as one which operates at a high level of generality. Apart from its generic implications, the second thing that marks it off from a processual approach is its focus on international politics as ordained from immanent state behaviour. He imputes no amount of will, rationality or the goodness of statesmen in maintaining international life. Although he frequently talks of the importance of both common values and interests in the maintenance of international life, he is squarely devoted to the idea of common interests as something that enables the international system of states to be termed as an 'international society'. It is similarly apposite to mention here that common interests are born of states' common/mutual interest of survival. A shared interest to survive is not civilisational or cultural in nature, they are instead functional or instrumental and, therefore, concerned purely with *realpolitik*.

Therefore, we gather, that Bull maintains, first, order is a condition of durable peace and harmony; second, order in social life is the patterned maintenance of life, truth and property; third, in international life, order relates to the fulfilment of three other goals apart from life (security of state), truth (security of sovereign contract) and property (security of sovereign territory) which are the preservation of the states system, preservation of independence or sovereignty of states and maintenance of peace; third, he often abandons his conceptual commitment to order as peace and adopts the more structural idea of order as stasis and equilibrium, which permits the maintenance of peace only after two other systemic goals are fulfilled; fourth, he refers to states' mutual interest of survival and self-preservation (common interest) as forming the basis of an essentially peaceful and collaborative international society of states which he analytically differentiates from an international system of states where war abounds. The 'common interest' of states in survival and security are concerns of *realpolitik* and barely compare with the cooperative value system that the Grotian

natural law tradition highlights. *To put it simply: Bull explains order as both collaborative peace between states, as well as an enabler of an international society of states, which may require war, strife, and disorder to maintain itself.*

The second taxonomical confusion that we find in *The Anarchical Society* is closely related to the first and is found in the second section of the book. The second section deals with 'contingent factors' of international life that maintain international order along with the common interests and values that states may share. What exactly are these contingent factors of maintaining international life? These are balance of power politics, international law, war, diplomacy, and great power management. It is not surprising that he devotes one full section of his book to understand how these institutions maintain international life. Although he never clearly makes this point, but he concedes that these institutions are structural institutions that obtain because international anarchy operates. Not only does he analytically discuss how these 'contingent factors' help stabilise the society of states, he also obliquely endorses their roles as system-induced and system-supporting. For instance, consider his chapter on balance of power politics and the maintenance of international order where he writes (Bull 1977: 107): 'Attempts to contrive a balance of power have not always resulted in the preservation of peace. The chief function of the balance of power, however is not to preserve peace, but to preserve the system of states itself. Preservation of the balance of power requires war, when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially dominant state can be checked.' This is an unapologetically structural position, which understands international anarchy as unlike domestic anarchy that must be staved off or done away with. *Instead, he seems to appreciate that balancing is a system-induced and system-supporting function.*

However, compare this with a subsequent paragraph (Bull 1977: 111):

'The idea that if one state challenges the balance of power, other states are bound to seek to prevent it, assumes that all states seek to

maximise their relative power position. This is not the case. States are constantly in the position of having to choose between devoting their resources and energies to maintaining or extending their international power position, and devoting these resources and energies to other ends…these are the matters of which the discussion of any country's foreign policy consists, and proposals that have the effect of augmenting the country's power position can be, and frequently are, rejected'

Or, this (Bull 1977:111): '…the doctrine I have been expounding does not assert any inevitable tendency for a balance of power to arise in the international system, only a need to maintain one if international order is to be preserved. States may and often do behave in such a way as to disregard the requirements of a balance of power.'

The confusion is apparent and needs no explanation. Bull nearly constructs a structural theory of international politics but imputes it with an ill-fitting processual variable of choice.

A third taxonomical and conceptual confusion relates to international order and justice. As already discussed, while he employs the term international order to explain situations of collaborative and durable peace, most of his analyses end up in explaining international order as stability and stasis, leaving at times little analytical difference between an international system of states and an international society of states. He is similarly at odds when explaining international order as essentially transformative, just and protective of common interests. While he considers justice as *morally prior* in an international society of states, he is aware of the fact that *in reality*, the latter is rather inhospitable to notions of distributive justice. This makes him, albeit grudgingly, accept order as *logically prior* to justice (Bull 1977: 97, 98).

How does he validate this? He does so, by employing the concept of justice as equal and mutual rights of sovereign states as per the positive law tradition of Vattel and Oppenheim. He defines justice in international society as the protection of the sovereign rights of states (Bull 1977: 97) as opposed to a more ubiquitous understanding of justice that

is proportional and distributive in the Grotian natural law tradition. By equating justice to the preservation of equal sovereign rights of states, he blends the promotion of international justice with the maintenance of international order, thereby robbing the former of its essentially transformative feature (Bull 1977: 97): 'Order in social life is desirable because it is the condition of the realisation of other values… International order, or order within the society of states, is the condition of justice or equality among states or nations; except in a context of international order there can be no such thing as the equal rights of states to independence or of nations to govern themselves.' This dilemma arises only because he begins his essay on order and justice (Bull 1977: 77-98) by trying to appropriate justice in the two contrasting senses of order as peace and order as stasis.

Therefore, conclusively, for Bull:

(i)   International order is described as a situation of durable peace and harmony in the world between states, one that is brought into effect despite the absence of international government or institutional rules thereof.

(ii)   International order is an enabler of an international society of states born of common interests and values of states on the one hand, and 'contingent factors' that maintain international order on the other. These contingent factors are the institutions of balancing, war, diplomacy, international law, and great power management.

(iii)   Although he purports to work out international order as peace, his work is largely about international order as stasis. He shares more with the realist tradition and with structural realism than he concedes.

(iv)   He appropriates the concept of justice which is an essentially transformative concept and strengthens the uncomfortable position that he shares vis-à-vis

order as peace and order as stasis, and order as just and order a status-quoist by recasting the concept of justice in unmoving terms of *realpolitik.*

III

This chapter has been largely devoted to understanding a few things:

(i) How are IR theories that employ *domestic analogy* in understanding international life different from those that try to understand *international politics qua international politics*? We have explored this at lengths, by comparing two groups of literature, one that is *analytical,* which imagines international behaviour as responding to a broad structure that obtains because of the *environment* of international behaviour, international anarchy; and, another that imagines international life as *remedial,* which explains accepted international behaviour as developing out of attempts and processes undertaken to overcome the *quality* of international behaviour, international anarchy.

(ii) IR theory is fascinating in itself because it is unsure of the constancy of meanings and nature of concepts that it employs. This is not to mean that we do not have working definitions of balancing or war or peace, but that we have far too many of them, often with very contradictory implications. The American realist and structural realist tradition which have been evaluated by principles of the philosophy of science on the basis of a core group of principles has remained closed to its British counterpart, through the fifties right till the end of the twentieth century. While the former was more interested in causation

and effect, the latter was and remains interested in the conceptual unpacking of reified terms.

(iii) Although Hedley Bull's work is burnt out because of his appropriation of all four positions on anarchy and order (Figures 1.1 and 1.2), his work is amazing in its theoretical diversity and analytical punch. His work is also more similar to TIP than he would have cared to admit. His work is a structural theorisation of international politics despite his denial at multiple points of the book of the same.

(iv) War and peace in international politics are mere idioms of the larger play of international anarchy. They, by themselves, are not empirically related to anarchy and order in international life. It is not the depreciation of order that causes war or the appreciation of it peace. When anarchy and order are understood in terms of Figure 1.2, war and peace are related to them conceptually and not empirically.

(v) Both Waltz and Bull (at times, unclearly) in their employment of structural tools describe international anarchy and order as single independent variables of international life, in the sense that they view international anarchy and order to be generative of the international behaviour of states.

(vi) Following from Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and the Waltzian and Bullian understanding of anarchy and order, what we have discussed till now is a complete picture of the meanings of anarchy and order across theoretical dispositions. While one end views anarchy and order processually, the other end views the same structurally. It will be the attempt of the following chapter to make sense of anarchy as generated constitutively.

Chapter 2: ANARCHY AS SYSTEMIC AND GENERATED

In the previous chapter, the discussion on anarchy and order represents the oldest question that animates the discipline: how is international behaviour to be explained? What do war and peace and all points of inflection in between hold in common? Finding commonness is an attractive vantage point in theory. It explains nearly all with very little[7]. But while theories that privilege commonness do end up explaining nearly all, they suffer from the primary problem of deduction, that of working out from initial premises that are saturated with results. Two things usually happen from here: either old theories explain new cases, or old theories are unable to explain new cases. What explains new, either in a temporal sense or with being understudied, cases is neither inductive conjectures for they can only lead one so far.

Methodology is however not the point of concern in this chapter. Rather, the point of concern here is epistemological and ontological, that of finding a suitable explanation for international behaviour that proceeds from both directions— from the systemic level as well as from the unit level of study. The discussion in this chapter is ontological because the attempt to grasp the many meanings of anarchy and order initiated in Chapter 1 follows well into the present chapter. While the study of the two kinds of anarchy and order as completed in the earlier chapter showed either sides of the levels, here, anarchy and order is discussed in a constitutive apparatus. The picture of literature we consider here may be entitled as 'systemic and generated'. They are systemic because their nature of inquiry treats

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[7]The text that primarily comes to mind is *Theory of International Politics*. While other theorists in the discipline have also made use of the structural method, TIP is foremost not only in being the first and pathbreaking text to organise the nature of inquiry around the international system but also in its high gatekeeping towards variables employed.

international life as exceptional. However, they view international anarchy as not entirely generative (as we find in Chapter 1) but generated by systemic intervening variables of interaction and identity. The resulting meaning of anarchy is greatly different from the same as a single independent variable in at least two senses: *first, anarchy is not a determining feature but a constitutive one; and, second, on account of being constitutive, its meaning differs according to the intervening effects of systemic identity and interaction, and is therefore generated.*

If we retract to the opening idea presented in Chapter 1, the game of football that international politics often seems like is a suitable expression to begin our discussion with. While the game essentially is about pursuing an inflated rolling rubber, players don't particularly mean to run after such a thing. It so happens that pursuing the ball scores an advantage for the home team over the opponents. There is an active score, but numbers mean nothing by themselves. Nothing, until the numbers rise *in terms* of each other. Making sense of anarchy and order constitutively proceeds from such an idea.

This chapter shall initially take to the discussion completed in Chapter 1 in order to discover how the literature represented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are significantly alike despite all the differences discussed. The likeness, it emerges, is from a *constriction in the nature of membership admissible in international political theory*. It shall then chalk out the kind of constitutive literature that has tried to address questions of membership, select representative texts and offer explanations as to why they have in particular been chosen. It shall then go on to consider the various kinds of constitutive anarchy that emerge from such a discussion. This chapter shall try to broadly understand the following questions:

(i)   How is membership in international politics discussed in systemic and non-systemic theories of international behaviour?

(ii)   Can membership be discussed in plurality in systemic theories?

(iii)   How can anarchy and order be understood in systemic, yet constitutive terms?

(iv)   How can anarchy and order be understood as generated?

The present chapter is divided into three sections. The first section contains a discussion on why the earlier account of international anarchy is purely generative. A large part of this answer lies in the fact that the level of the state has been foreclosed to all investigation and analysis. The first section chalks out the position taken by literature discussed in the previous chapter to the question of membership in international politics. The second section contains an analysis on two approaches in order to break this deadlock: those that open up the 'function' of states and the 'the role position' of states. Two things may be mentioned here. First, the approaches under consideration in the present chapter try to open up the level of the state while preserving the viability of the state as the primary explanandum of international politics. Unlike post-positivist writers, their examination does not preclude states from analysis but deepens it. Second, international behavioural literature discussed under Figure 1.1 also look at international anarchy as generated (*when patterned observable practice obtains a structure slowly develops around it*). However, the literature of interest in the present chapter is systemic. The second section, while considering approaches that look at international anarchy as generated, does so through systemic accounts of international life that employ systemic intervening variables of interaction and identity. In the concluding section, an analysis of this position follows.

I

As already discussed Figures 1.1 and 1.2 above represent the explanation of international politics in two different ways. But there is a latent similarity between the two groups of theories under consideration.

On the one hand, theories falling in the first group (Figure 1.1) that understand international anarchy as chaos or disorder and international order as peace are primarily of two kinds: political realism and political idealism. While certain adherents to such a notion of anarchy and peace predate political idealists and realists of the twentieth century and the formal beginnings of the discipline, the notion of the individual unit of international life has ubiquitously been the state. For political idealists of the twentieth century among whom Woodrow Wilson has bestowed the greatest intellectual influence on the development of the discipline, while the *essential* unit of international life has been the individual, the *effective* unit has been the state. Further, following the insights of Immanuel Kant or of Joseph Schumpeter, the ultimate end of international life is in its organisation of persons in the permanence of peace, hospitality and trade. For political idealists, states resemble the mere embodiment of the social aggregate of the aspirations, functions, and practices of individual persons. Even then, despite the intermediary and utilitarian use of the notion of states for political idealists, the state as an embodiment of individual persons has retained its analytical position of singularity.

For political realists of the twentieth century (one can think of EH Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Nicholas Spykman, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Herbert Butterfield or Martin Wight), their harrowing claims of *realpolitik* has seldom used any other analytical level apart from that of the state. Most of their political concerns have developed from the

need to protect the survival and power of states that they have belonged to, often leading to an intermixing of foreign policy ideals and the study of international political behaviour (Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan). Although their subject of study has been international politics, if not related to particular states or nationality, their concern has been to protect the interests of a war-time or post-war coalition of nation states (Carr, Spykman, Wight, and Butterfield).

Therefore for both political idealists and realists: *first, the state has been the fundamental basis of all inquiry; second, international anarchy and international order has been studied in terms of the prevalence of order (peace) within and anarchy (disorder) beyond the confines of the state. For both groups of theorists, despite variation in means, the end of all inquiry has generally related to the reproduction of municipal order in the international sphere.*

On the other hand, theories under Figure 1.2 offer purely structural explanation and deny the use of domestic or national precedents of central organisation in making sense of international politics. They take international life as exceptional. *Their concern with the unit of international politics is similarly the state. However, they provide certain refinements of analysis which forecloses the analytical level of states even further.* These theories look at the international system as a social[8] totality whose parts cannot aggregate to the full essence of the former. *In other words, the essence of the international system supersedes the aggregate function of all units taken together. Individual units may battle each other, may draw up peace agreements, may trade impartially, may trade violently, but taken together, the emergent picture of aggregate disorder does not represent the nature of the system. The nature of the system is, on the contrary, order.* Order does not represent a patterned durability

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[8]Social does not refer to a sociological totality of units of international life, i.e., states. It rather refers to a sense of holism, an all-encompassing totality of units of international life. The roots of such theorisation can be traced back to Durkheim's explanation of social existence. (Ruggie 1983)

of pacific relations between states. Rather, order represents a patterned durability of equivalence of power and equilibrium of systemic interests. Similarly, anarchy does not represent for them a situation of unfettered violence or disorder. Anarchy is rather an organising principle (Waltz 1979) or a permissive quality of international order (Bull 1977) that ensures an equivalence of power (because states balance each other) and equilibrium of interests (of states to preserve themselves and therefore the system).

Anarchy is not a negative feature, nor is order a positive feature of international life. Both are instead permissive features that maintain and preserve the international system of states. Questions of communal justice are replaced by questions of systemic justice. Questions of war and peace amount to symptomatic features of the play of the larger forces of international anarchy and the maintenance of international order. Higher incidence of war or concurrence of peace does not proportionately transform into a higher degree of order or disorder in the international system of states, unless there is a system-wide war or an unprecedented margin of peace that changes the terms of organisation of the system of states in the first place. To instil order, states unintentionally balance each other (Waltz 1979) or use other contingent features of restoring international order such as diplomacy, war, and great power management of international affairs along with balancing (Bull 1977). While peace is important, equivalence of power and equilibrium of systemic interests are both primary and originary.

In such a group of theorists, the primary unit of international politics is taken to be the state. For Waltz (1979: 95), this consideration is found in his description of the international system when he points out that, 'States are the units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems.' For Waltz or for most other theorists even remotely aligned with political realists, states form the primary basis of international politics. *However, what is more interesting for Waltz than most other political realists is that he forecloses all states in*

the international system to being 'like units'. How are states like units? States are like units in

terms of their functional likeness (Waltz 1979: 96-97):

> States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their
> abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of
> function. States perform or try to perform tasks, most of which are
> common to all of them; the ends [of security and survival] they
> aspire to are similar. Each state duplicates the activities of other
> states atleast to a considerable extent [because each state believes
> the worst of another's intentions in a self-help world]… The
> functions of states are similar, and distinctions among them arise
> principally from their varied capabilities. National politics consists
> of differentiated units performing specified functions. International
> politics consists of like units duplicating one another's activities.

This matures into Waltz's three-tier definition of the international system: first, the

international system is organised in terms of an international anarchy[9]. Second, the

international system is therefore a self-help system that compresses states into behaving

similarly, thereby all states are 'like units' in terms of nature and function. Third, states differ

only according to their material capabilities. Material capabilities of states reflect the

distribution of power in the international system. Naturally, in the Waltzian understanding, it

is the embedded condition of international anarchy and the dynamic condition of power

polarity alone that bear consequential effects on the international system. *The second tier of

nature and function of states is inconsequential to the international system since all states are

driven alike to secure their survival in the least and maximise their outlying interests at the

most. The second tier in the Waltzian analysis is categorically dropped out.*

   For Bull*, the international system of states is similarly closed to any kind of

assessment of variety in states, either of functional variety or of the kinds of states (nature)*

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[9]As discussed in the previous chapter at length.

that may exist. For instance, Bull admits only one class of independent political community, the modern nation-state, while explaining the nature of international politics and the nature of states admissible (Bull 1977: 8-9):

> The starting point of international relations is the existence of *states*, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population… There are, however, a great variety of independent political communities that have existed in history and yet are not states in this sense… Entities such as these fall outside the purview of 'international relations', if by this we mean not the relations of nations but the relations of states in the strict sense. [emphasis in original]

In terms of functional likeness, Bull explains that states are committed to maintaining the international society of states because they recognise three primary conditions of mutual existence (Bull 1977: 13): life (of states and the system of states), truth (of honouring contracts), and property (of protecting and respecting mutual sovereign claims on territory). The means of maintaining themselves and the system of states translates into an automatic preservation of international order.

Therefore, for both Waltz and Bull and their respective structural traditions of inquiry, the state is a subject foreclosed at their international borders. Their inquiry dispels all claims of both looking into intervening variables operating at the systemic, unit or sub-unit levels between systemic pushes and unit responses, or that of recognising that international anarchy may be of more than one kind and therefore may not always compel states into behaving similarly.

II

In the social sciences, the most natural academic consequence of reifying a social being such as the state into a natural artefact has been a wide forging of efforts to reverse the process. It has been no different in the literature on international anarchy. A large section of the academic attack on foreclosing the analytical level of the state has come from the post-positivist corner of the discipline[10] that questions the very epistemological premises on which the nature of the state and international politics has been described above. Not only does this broad association of research strategies question each assumptive theoretical premise of security, sovereignty and power found in the literature on international anarchy and order discussed so far, but also the use of empirical claims to the growth of knowledge (Lapid 1989). However, to represent the scope and nature of post-positivist literature on the nature of international politics in general and international anarchy in particular is a separate project altogether and beyond the scope of the present research.

The present research will concern itself with literature that has tried to reconcile the need to look at the state as a level of analysis *introspectively* and the nature of international anarchy *divergently*. In particular, constructivism as a theoretical turn in IR theory and the revival of the English School of *realpolitik* since the nineteen eighties has catered to both of these requirements that emerge from the extant literature on international anarchy discussed so far. Both these schools of research have tried to eke out possibilities for international anarchy to be much more than what had been discovered as an iron-rule by then: a singular

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[10]Richard Ashley (1988) and Rob Walker (1987) have written iconic accounts on the unmoving state of the discipline owing to a fixed explanandum (the state) and the inclination to look at continuities in the evolution international history instead of change.

chain of uncoordinated events compelling states to behave similarly.[11] The two texts that may complete such an analysis are *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (1993), by Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, and *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) by Alexander Wendt.

The two texts work out the respective problems of identifying variation in the 'function' and 'role' of unit variables in the literature on international anarchy and wider theories of international politics. *They fulfil the task that this research aims at completing: first, developing the literature on international anarchy to make sense of the many meanings of anarchy and order*, because; second, *only by making sense of international anarchy in its fullness, can questions of membership of dissimilar unit variables in international anarchy be negotiated.* The two texts have been chosen for reasons suggested below.

Function

The Logic of Anarchy (hereafter LOA) cannot be taken as an immediate response to theories of the international system of states and society of states by Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull. It largely develops on a widely studied volume edited by Robert Keohane in 1986[12], the very first of its kind, where a large consortium of ideas that differed from the neorealist breakthrough in international politics were tested and presented. Although LOA was designed to look deep into the neorealist research programme and offer explanations for international politics that were less externally deterministic than the writings of Kenneth Waltz, its scope transformed the ontological study of the nature of international politics to an

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[11] However, there have been differences within the realist framework on the indisputable nature of the claim made by many authors regarding balancing as the only international behaviour performed by states. Neoclassical realism and neoliberal institutionalism, for instance, have explained international behaviour variously as balancing, buck-passing, chain-ganging, and bandwagoning.

[12] The two essays by John Ruggie in the same volume have been particularly influential in discussing international anarchy as a subject of change and not continuity.

impressive degree. It did so, not by violating and dispelling neorealist claims to a singular reality of the international political system of states, but by accepting the reality in firmness but variety. While the writings of Richard Ashley or Rob Walker and other post-positivist literature on the nature of the international system has chosen to decentre the latter from its roots of security, survival and power as primary tasks and components of what makes states states, the present text is committed to all theoretical premises discussed so far, but with a difference. Their interest in the variety in states and international anarchy is what admits them into the present analysis and in pushing it forward.

LOA has contributed primarily three new elements to the literature on international anarchy. First, it has pointed out that the most crucial problem in the literature on international anarchy has been *to mistake the structure for the system*. For instance, when Waltz (1979: 82) writes, 'The three-part definition of structure includes only what is required to show how the units of the system are positioned or arranged. Everything else is omitted.' what he effectively means is *system and not structure*. This is unforced arithmetic if one remembers what Waltz writes a few pages before (Waltz 1979: 79):

> A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole… Definitions of structure must leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics of units, their behaviour, and their interactions. Why must those obviously important matters be omitted? They must be omitted so that we can distinguish between *variables at the level of the units and variables at the level of the system.* [emphasis added]

Waltz's confusion is doubly apparent. It is apparent *once*, because the problem of confusion between system and structure that LOA points out is clear. In Waltz's vocabulary, the international system is made of a structure that operates in abstraction ('structure is not something that we see') and can therefore be defined only by the arrangement of the system's

parts (material distribution of capabilities among units/states) and by the principle of that arrangement (anarchy). Left to itself, it has no material presence. It can be traced, or made sense of, writes Waltz, only with the help of borrowed indicators such as the above. Therefore, the international system is a totality of both structure and units. What Waltz ends up doing, suggests LOA, is confuse the structural level with the entire system, thereby leading to the appearance of *confusion number two*, as found in the emphasised words taken from TIP above: the unit variable is falsely posited against the system. *The unit is, LOA suggests, systemic as well. Leaving out a study of the unit does not represent systemic theory. It represents only a structural approach, for in order to study the international system and international anarchy, the two levels must be coordinated and combined.*

This strategy or approach that LOA suggests brings out the second important element that it has added to the literature on international anarchy*: unit variables cannot be an undifferentiated mass of monolithic variables*. To explain this, LOA produces a graphic which I shall reproduce here.

		ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE	
		Hierarchy	Anarchy
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF UNITS	Similar	1	2
	Different	3	4

Figure 3.2. The Configuration of Deep Political Structure

Figure 2.1 (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 23)

According to LOA, any systemic theory of international politics involves a 'deep structure' composed of the nature of organising principle (hierarchy/anarchy) and the functional differentiation of states (similarity/difference). In a truly systemic account of international anarchy, the second tier of Waltzian analysis (functional differentiation of states) is not

dropped out but fundamentally retained. This is because the similarity/variety in the nature of units, by itself, is a revealing element of how international anarchy works. For instance, both TIP and Anarchical Society work with Type 2 anarchy. LOA suggests that Type 4 anarchy is a more natural and historically accurate description of the international system.

Type 2 anarchy represents the long discussed condition of the international system producing like units out of self-interested and therefore competing states. It is born in a world that has no or more than one central governing authority, where norms and institutions as per Bull's *Anarchical Society* remain strong but not stronger than the systemic imperatives of self-help and security. These ends are born not out of an inclination to battle each other, nor for the blind race of power, but primarily for ends of survival. There is an element of difference in the implicit lawlessness described in TIP and the more careful recognition of common values and interests in *The Anarchical Society*, but both texts resemble each other greatly in terms of their disposition to privilege a world of anarchy filled with competing states that are pushed to behave in a single manner (the act of balancing) to protect and preserve themselves (through the formation of balances). The system lives because states fear. States fear because the system so lives. The circularity, yet simplicity of logic is remarkable.

Type 4 anarchy, on the other hand, has an elaborate construction but historically holds out better. Type 4 anarchy, as the figure above suggests, relates to states that are functionally different in a setting of international anarchy. Initiated into discussion by John Ruggie (1983), the question that shook up the adherents of Type 2 anarchy was: what explains international political behaviour in medieval Europe, which lived through an age of multiple centres of authority? LOA suggests that the answer to this question involves adding a third systemic level of analysis to the literature on international anarchy: *interaction capacity. For LOA, this is the third and most novel element that separates their work from TIP, as a centre*

of new growth of knowledge that can broaden and deepen the reaches of neorealism into a truly 'structural realism'. (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 38, 44)

While Waltz abandons unit level variables as unnecessary additions in a parsimonious structural theory, LOA suggests that the international system mandatorily involves a study of units. *Units in international anarchy may be both functionally similar to each other (type 2) as well as functionally different to each other (type 4) depending upon the nature of systemic interaction that is prevalent.* For instance, in an unsocialised, primordial international system such as in the times of Ancient Greece, Roman ascendancy, or medieval Europe, the nature of international politics was vastly different from present times. While the realist tradition prides in testing systemic continuity, history suggests that there has been more difference than continuity (Buzan, Jones, Little 1993: 51-56). The level of systemic interaction, owing to the two factors of technological advancement and the prevalence of shared norms and institutions, has determined the nature of international anarchy across ages. Technological advancement and the prevalence of shared norms are not unit variables. Although, in most times they emerge from unit sources, such as the innovation of nuclear weapons from the United States or the norm of R2P from particular crises of ethno-nationalism that developed in the backdrop of Soviet retrenchment from East Europe, they quickly assume system-wide usage. For example, Barry Buzan writes (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 40):

> The evolution of technology continuously raises the absolute capability for interaction available within the system. It is true that many extremely important technological factors, especially those relating to military power, can be captured at the unit level in terms of the particular capabilities commanded by individual states, and the way those capabilities affect relations with other states... Once developed to the point of cost-effectiveness, such technologies tend to spread quickly throughout the system, just as steamships and telegraphs did in the nineteenth century, and civil aviation and computer networks have done since the Second World War. Although command of these technologies is unquestionably an

element of unit power, their availability quickly transforms conditions of interaction for all units, and therefore transforms the system itself.

And further (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 40):

> The interaction capacity of a system with few shared norms will be much lower than one where significant norms are shared widely among the major actors, which will in turn be much lower than one in which shared norms have given rise to the communal institutions and organizations that are the hallmark of a maturing international society. "Lower" here refers to both the quantity and the variety of interactions.

Systemic interaction capacity mediates between the two systemic levels of structure and unit. The greater the interaction capacity in a particular system, higher the incidence of socialisation and competition, leading to a prevalence of Type 2 anarchy. The lower the interaction capacity in a particular system, lower the incidence of socialisation and competition, leading to a prevalence of Type 4 anarchy. In the second situation, units compete and socialise more vigorously in its immediate geographical reaches than in the international arena. Buzan writes (Buzan, Jones, Little 1993: 55):

> History did not move directly from a Rousseauian state of nature to a Neorealist international anarchy. Instead, a weakly interactive international system came into being quite early, but for a long period the main force of structural logic worked almost exclusively within regional subsystems... As interaction capacity improved, these subsystems increased their range. Contact eventually led to rivalry... At some point, the logic of this progress suggests that interaction capacities must improve sufficiently to end the dominance of subsystems, and shift the structure to one in which the forces of socialization and competition work most strongly at the global system level. This can occur either because several centers become strong enough to bring economic and military pressure to bear on the whole system, or because one center becomes so disproportionately powerful that it is able to impose a higher level of interaction on the rest of the system.

LOA finds world history to be following the latter route. European colonisation of the Americas, Africa and Asia led to an instantaneous start to a slow and painful development of an international society spanning nearly four centuries. The nature of an emerging international society owing to the prevalence of shared and common identity and interests is described in great lengths in *The Anarchical Society*. However, despite his best efforts, Bull's international society has been closer to an international system of states, as has been discovered in Chapter 1, and is closer to a Hobbesian international anarchy that Bull castigates in favour of a Grotian international anarchy. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Therefore, conclusively for LOA:

1) International anarchy is of at least two kinds (Type 2 and Type 4).

2) International anarchy can be of more than one widely accepted kind in the neorealist research framework (Type 2) because unit variables (states) are freed from their unchanging quality. Not only are unit variables of more than one kind owing to systemic levels of interaction but are also capable of transforming from one kind to another. Units, therefore, are neither singular nor static.

3) Unit variables are a systemic feature of international anarchy. It is only an analytical diffusion between the international system and structure that leads to the idea that units are to be left out from systemic studies of international politics or from studies of the nature and meanings of international anarchy.

4) International anarchy may be diversified into atleast two kinds owing to the level of systemic interaction. International order is greater in Type 4 anarchy than in Type 2 anarchy. Type 4 anarchies involve like units that are less likely to behave in unstable patterns owing to both functional likeness of states and

the prevalence of prudence characteristic of self-help systems. Type 2 anarchies are comparatively dynamic due to an increasing inclination of transition towards Type 4 anarchy as systemic interaction builds. Contact leads to competition and conflict, bringing down international order to both disorder (in terms of peace) and instability (in terms of stasis).

This may be represented in Figure 2.2:

Figure 2.2

In LOA, unit variables differ on account of systemic interaction that manipulates socialisation and competition. Unit variables may differ on account of their systemic 'role' as well. An exposition on this follows in the discussion on the second text under consideration, Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).

Role

 Social Theory of International Politics (hereafter STIP) is, as the name suggests, a conceptual reworking of TIP. Other than its momentous contributions to developing a truly constructivist strategy for working out 'mainstream' puzzles in international politics, it has contributed greatly to the study of theory-building in IR. Not only does it imagine a whole new way of understanding international politics *qua* international politics, it assigns a typically unpopular research strategy until then in the discipline, great significance ─ *that of conducting empirical inquiry along with epistemological forays into the subject of study*.

 STIP draws out at least two ways of doing systemic theory in international politics. The first is where the international political system is treated as an *independent variable*. The literature discussed in Chapter 1 around Figure 1.2 represents this approach. Both Bull and Waltz's efforts are concentrated in understanding *how the nature and function of the international system determines movements in unit variables*. For Waltz, the international structure, mistakenly assumed to be the international system[13], is composed of the organising principle of international anarchy, functional likeness of units, and systemic distribution of material power. Although his theoretical enterprise in TIP begins by proclaiming that structures 'shape and shove' (much less determine) states that follow systemic signals out of fear of losing out on security or other material gains, his inability to acknowledge that systemic theories are composed equally of studying unit and structural variables to explain international life lends his work a more deterministic approach than his original point of survey, i.e. 'systems shape and shove'.

 For Bull, the international system is an exceptional sphere of politics because states are keen on preserving a set of systemic goals that widely hinge on their respective needs to

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[13]See the section on 'Function' above for an exposition on this.

survive. The international system and its features of international order and anarchy serve as independent variables that measure and maintain individual state responses to systemic requirements. If one can rule out the many confusions that Bull presents us with; such as that states are *compulsively* driven to balancing behaviour by the need to preserve international order yet states may also *choose not to opt* for balancing behaviour (Bull 1977: 111), or other instances where the *'common interest and identities'* that supposedly separate a Hobbesian international system of states from Bull's anarchical society is effectively the *primordial interest of self-preservation*[14] that is a hallmark of the very international system that Bull denies in the first place, Bull's work is amply clear in favouring the precedence of the international system in determining the actions and movements of individual units.

Contra the two texts discussed that represent Figure 1.2, Alexander Wendt presents a different but related depiction of international anarchy and order through a second kind of systemic theorising: international system as a *dependent variable*. Here, Wendt retains the original explanandum (international life) but tries to do two other things: first*, to show how agents are differently structured by the system so as to produce different effects;* and, second*, to emphasise that the debate of interest is not so much between systemic theories that focus on structure and reductionist theories that focus on agents, but between different theories of system structure, and of how structure relates to agents* (Wendt 1999:12). The second point is of primary importance because STIP is equally interested in explaining international behaviour and not individual state behaviour as is all literature related to Figure 1.2 (and not the behavioural literature found in Figure 1.1). His interest is in explaining international politics *qua* international politics (Wendt 1999: 246):

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[14]See the sections on Bull's conception of order and anarchy in Chapter 1 for an exposition on this.

> This means that if we are interested in the question of how the states system works, rather than in how its elements are constructed, we will have to take the existence of states as given, just as sociologists have to take the existence of people as given to study how society works. Systemic theory cannot problematize the state all the way down, in short, since that would change the subject *from a theory of the states system to a theory of the state.* [emphasis added]

The effective difference between Wendt's attempt and Bull or Waltz's attempt at systemic theorising squarely develops through Wendt's first point of interest: *units may be constituted differently by different conditions of international anarchy.* Therefore, while Figure 1.2 suggested: order (stasis), anarchy (lack of government or context);Wendtian analysis suggests a different picture of international anarchy and order. It may be graphically described as in Figure 2.3 to which we shall return to at the end of the present section.

| Order as a function of systemic identity | → | Anarchy generated by systemic identity |

Figure 2.3

In Wendt's framework, international anarchy lives in variety. This is primarily because international anarchy is *qualitatively various*. No two states living in an anarchic world relate to each other similarly. We can consider endless examples to the tune of Wendt's hypothesis: one can use his own example of the difference between the US-Soviet Union anarchy and the US-Russia anarchy or one may use Stephen Walt's (Walt 1987) prognosis

(states balance interest and not power) and separate the US-Cuba anarchy from the US-Great Britain anarchy. Both examples admit several post-Waltzian concerns with the delimitation of international anarchy to one, unmoving kind. Alexander Wendt goes a step further in pluralising international anarchy by installing three distinct *roles* as features of the international system through which international anarchy may obtain: enemy, rival, and friend. Roles are not a unit feature but a systemic feature of shared ideas with which states relate to each other by identities of Self and Other (Wendt 1999: 257).

The prevalence of shared ideas in a particular international system is multiply realisable across a broad spectrum of intensities. States may adopt a role out of coercion, out of self-interest, or out of integral identity with it. What Wendt arrives at is a particular matrix of levels of conflict (enemy, rival, and friend) and degrees of internalisation of the same (coercion, self-interest, legitimacy). International anarchy may be plotted across the resulting 3X3 matrix where states are concentrated in their adoption of a role. Each role can clearly be variously embedded. For example, if the international anarchy is centred on the role of 'enemies', it exhibits a Hobbesian international anarchy. The Hobbesian international anarchy can be enforced on units, may be adopted by units out of self-interest, or may be absorbed by units out of legitimacy. This situation of graded internalisation similarly holds for an international anarchy that is Lockean (centred on the role of 'rivals'), or Kantian (centred on the role of 'friends').

The differentiation of international anarchy into an international system of states, and Lockean and Grotian anarchical societies has been previously attempted by Bull. Bull has arrived at this distinction by suggesting *progression in international cooperation* (tantamount to Bull's notion of international order as both peace and stasis) *to be a function of the progressive degree of common identity and interest that has been achieved among states*. The more there is cultural or civilisational oneness of shared beliefs and ideas, the more

progressive international cooperation can be. If one considers this position well, it may be found that Bull interprets international life *qua* international life as an extrapolation of this position (Wendt 1999: 252, 253). He is supremely reluctant to accept the need for reproduction of hierarchical municipal order in anarchical international life in order to attain international order. He believes that shared ideas of identity and interest can emerge in international politics despite operating without a working hierarchy. Common identities and interests do not require a central rule to be manifested. Common identities and interests can be shared by states even in international anarchy and that is primarily how international order is established, by progressing from an international system where there are no shared identities and interests to an anarchical society that possesses international order *because* of shared identities and interests.

Wendt, on the other hand, maintains that there lies a difference of immense consequence between his pluralising of international anarchy and Bull's efforts of the same. While Bull or most other writers from the realist tradition explain levels of conflict as directly reflective of the level of shared ideas, Wendt's work points out that the level of conflict or cooperation that embodies international anarchy (through roles of enemy, rival or friend) does not accrue of the level of shared ideas among them. Each kind of international anarchy may be variously internalised. In Wendt's language, sociological order (shared ideas) is not directly transferrable to political order (level of cooperation/conflict) (Wendt 1999: 251), or, 'shared knowledge or its various manifestations ─ norms, rules, etc. ─ are analytically neutral with respect to cooperation and conflict' (Wendt 1999: 253).

International anarchy can therefore be taken to be one of the three systemic identities, depending upon the prevalence and degree of internalisation of shared ideas of subject positions. If states relate to each other as enemies, degree of conflict apprehended is high, and the prevalent anarchy may be a Hobbesian one. If states relate to each other as rivals, degree

of conflict apprehended is lower than the one before, and the prevalent anarchy may be Lockean. If states relate to each other as friends, degree of conflict varies from slight to none depending on degree of internalisation of the Kantian anarchy.

International order can be taken to be a function of systemic identity. International order, as peace, depends on the nature of anarchy that is prevalent. It is least in the Hobbesian variant and most in a Kantian anarchy. International order, as stasis or stability of patterns of interrelationships between states, depends on the degree of internalisation of the prevalent anarchy. The greater the internalisation of the prevalent culture of anarchy, the more is the stability in international behaviour. The lesser the internalisation of the prevalent culture of anarchy, the lesser is the stability in international behaviour.

III

This chapter has been largely devoted to understanding the points that follow.

(i) In systemic theories, which is the interest of the present research, questions of membership have been particularly devalued when compared with questions of general international political behaviour.

(ii) The work in *The Logic of Anarchy* and *Social Theory of International Politics* are systemic inquiries of international anarchy that stand out for two reasons. First, their epistemological concerns are devoted to preserving the explanandum ‒ the realm of international politics and the realm of nation states. While they concede that international behaviour may have intervening variables from domestic sources, they are more interested in systemic variables

that may alter the professed singularity of the anarchy framework; and, second, their ontological, epistemological and methodological strategies remain partisan to the validity of the explanandum, as opposed to literature on anarchy by post-positivist theorists such as Richard Ashley (1988) or Rob Walker (1987).

(iii)   International anarchy may be understood both as a function of systemic identity and systemic interaction.

(iv)   International order rises with systemic incidence of interaction and varies with the prevalent culture of anarchy

(v)   Questions of membership or the nature of participation in international life have diversified the meaning of anarchy as purely generative and determining, by opening up the 'function' and 'role' of states. On the one hand, anarchy may be differently constituted owing to differing levels of interaction and differing kinds of identity. On the other hand, the international political behaviour of units may be variously constituted because of differing meanings of anarchy.

(vi)   In the next chapter, the prevalence of the three cultures of anarchy will be analysed. The case for assuming international life to be a Lockean or Grotian anarchy by Alexander Wendt and Hedley Bull will be considered with the aim of proposing that international life is, on the contrary, largely Hobbesian.

Chapter 3: ANARCHY AS SYNTHETIC

In the two previous chapters, it has been the effort of the present research to account for all groups of systemic theories of international political behaviour. In manner of classification, if one can follow Wendt's (1999: 10) idea that all explanations of international politics have followed from two epistemological treatments, one is tempted to accept one for the other.[15] Wendt writes, all systemic understanding of international life has either treated international life as an independent variable, or as a dependent variable. The literature composing the first chapter has treated international anarchy as an independent variable, effecting order and equilibrium among states. The literature composing the second chapter has treated international anarchy as a dependent variable, responsive to how units are differently structured, owing to an added systemic level of interaction or culture.

While there may be reasons for accepting either explanation, the present chapter seeks to show that the computation of the essential ways of international life can only proceed from a synthesis of the two. It will be the effort here to address the question of how international political life may be understood along the following points:

(i) International political life is to be understood *both* as an independent and dependent variable.

(ii) Depiction by authors in systemic literature such as Alexander Wendt and Hedley Bull, and in sub-systemic literature as Mohammed Ayoob, of international political life as a 'Lockean anarchy', an 'anarchical society' or a

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[15] See the section on Role in Chapter 2 for a discussion on this.

'Lockean core with Hobbesian periphery' is a partial analysis of international life.

(iii) International anarchy is best represented as a Hobbesian anarchy, but as different to all prior analysis on this front.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section contains an account of systemic thinkers who by making use of classical contractualist literature explain the meanings and causal powers of anarchy and what they deem contemporary international political life to be like. The present research suggests three lines of approach to the discussion: first, these thinkers have produced partial analyses of international anarchy both textually and evidentially. Second, a recurrent theme of describing international life as a 'Lockean' anarchy is a flawed representation of the former because of incongruent claims of interest and identity. Third, there is much to be earned from classical contractualist literature in making sense of international anarchy and order but much to be lost if systemic theorists mistake an allusion to contractualist theories as a 'domestic analogy'.

The second section contains an effort to develop the systemic understanding of international life as derived from all previous study by suggesting two novel ways of contemplating the same: first, international anarchy can be understood as both an independent and dependent variable in inquiries of the nature of international politics, because, second; international anarchy may be understood best as a *governing* principle of international life as opposed to the widely accepted meaning of the same as an organising principle of international life (Waltz 1979). The need to represent international anarchy as a governing principle of international life arises from the need to attend to the difficulties posed by all prior literature on this front, both textual and evidential. This can be attempted best by

looking at international anarchy as the Hobbesian Leviathan as opposed to analyses of international anarchy as a pre-contractual state of nature.

The third section contains a summary and conclusion.

I

Alexander Wendt, in the *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), characterises international anarchy as qualitatively various. He assumes this at a similar level of abstraction with which all other systemic theorists have worked, and who have correspondingly tested their assumptions not through quantitative means as is common with foreign policy or international behavioural studies, but by ascertaining how closely their notion of anarchy is able to appropriate the nature of international political life. Is international political life that is not a sphere of formally organised politics, yet has an organising principle (anarchy) to call its own, a realm of *enmity*, mayhem, and disorder? Or, is international political life that is not a sphere of formally organised politics, yet has an organising principle to call its own, a realm of measured *rivalry* that regulates and yet makes use of violence? Or, is international political life that is not a sphere of formally organised politics, yet with an organising principle to call its own, a realm of peace, *friendship* and selfless alliance? Alexander Wendt answers, international anarchy may be *all three*.

Hobbes

In the first sense, international anarchy is a Hobbesian anarchy. Units adopt the systemic position of 'enemy' whereby states are sworn to see the end of each other. Wendt (1999: 260) explains: 'Enemies lie at one end of a spectrum of role relationships governing the use of violence between Self and Other, distinct in kind from rivals and friends. All three positions constitute social structures, insofar as they are based on representations of the Other in terms of which the posture of the Self is defined.'

The systemic position of enemy or 'role' is born of the prevalence of shared ideas or a particular culture of relating the Self with the Other. This is hardly a new sociological position, accepts Wendt, for philosophers as long back as Hegel, and as recent as Carl Schmitt, have represented the mutual constitution of identity as a cardinal rule of self-identification of a unitary actor and their simultaneous interaction with another.

When this role position of enemy dominates international life, the resulting condition of anarchy is a Hobbesian one. Taking cue from a narrow (and strikingly intolerant, nearly *irrational and blinded* in hatred, as is not entirely unsurprising from a Nazi sympathiser) definition of enemy presented by Carl Schmitt (1932/1976), an 'enemy' refers to (Wendt 1999: 260) '…an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.' *The nature of violence ordinarily expected in an international anarchy from unit actors suffused with the role of the 'enemy' is unlimited violence.* Wendtian enmity is different from a condition of rivalry where the existence of the Self is not derecognised or threatened with annihilation by the Other, and vice versa. While the rival harbours revisionist interest in altering the disposition of property and behaviour of the Other, the nature of revisionism harboured by an enemy is unsparing of existence in its attack. The fundamental point describing such a role position is 'war of all against all' (Wendt 1999: 265). The onslaught of

violence has no self-limiting character, nor is it proportional to the nature of transgression committed by another, limited only by the restrictions of relative material capacities.

The Hobbesian anarchy, a site for endemic warfare and perpetual competition, propels the system to functional isomorphism (Wendt 1999: 265) or a functional likening of units. On account of severe competition of security and survival, states are inclined to behave similarly and employ similar means and intensity of unregulated violence when dealing with the Other, to the point of absolute obliteration of any functional differentiation between the two. Such a characterisation of unit identity and systemic anarchy posits four possibilities for foreign policy in the Hobbesian anarchy: first, states will respond to each other as deep revisionists that employ ceaseless violence; second, negative possibilities of interaction will dominate which limit the chances of cooperative measures; third, enmity accords relative capabilities of states with a meaning that is not derived from their intrinsic properties but from a perceived idea generated by mutual interaction; fourth, upon war, enemies will fight with unlimited violence (Wendt 1999: 262). *The logic that is intrinsic to the Hobbesian anarchy is thereby of a war of all against all.*

Such a condition of a war of all against all generates four 'tendencies' at the macro level. First, states operate in a condition of endemic warfare. True to Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Wendt (1999: 265) mentions: 'This does not mean that states will constantly be at war, since material considerations may suppress the manifestation of this tendency for a time, but as long as states collectively represent each other in Hobbesian terms, war may quite literally "at any moment occur".' Endemic warfare does not relate to unending war at all moments, or an unending battle spanning the lengths of time, but '…in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary' (Hobbes; ed., Hay: 77). Second, states progress towards functional isomorphism, as already discussed. The third and fourth relate to the elimination of unfit actors in the process of endemic warfare and a high death-rate among

states, and a near impossibility of states to remain in neutrality. Crucial to these four tendencies is the Wendtian (1999: 266) analysis of balancing as rare: 'However, in contrast to Waltz's view of balancing as the fundamental tendency of anarchy in general, the lack of inhibition and self-restraint in Hobbesian cultures suggests that *balances of power there will be difficult to sustain, with the tendency toward consolidation being dominant in the long run.*' [emphasis added]. Wendt means, simply, balancing is not much of an option when states pursue each other's 'death' or inexistence in endemic warfare. The tendency more likely to be common in a Hobbesian anarchy is not the balancing of power but the maximisation, concentration and preponderance of power.

Contrary to Realist claims to the Hobbesian framework, in the grim picture of international life that Wendt paints, where security is as deeply competitive as containing the probability of endemic warfare, unlimited violence, and a mutual derecognition of existence by states, Wendt finds the Waltzian anarchy *nowhere*. The anarchy that Waltz describes in TIP is instead a Lockean one where states compete by preserving balances for the purpose of preserving interests (Wendt 1999: 285). While it is true that the instinct for survival, endemic warfare, and functional similarity are elementary pieces of explanation in the Waltzian puzzle of international life, the latter remains a utilitarian scheme of explaining unit and international behaviour. *In other words, while Waltz finds profit in preservation of interest as primary in international politics, Wendt points out that a truly Hobbesian international anarchy is driven by profit in annihilation of the enemy. Wendt places all utilitarian motives of self-interest in a Lockean anarchy where* units recognise the Other's right to exist.

Needless to say, Wendt explains the Hobbesian international anarchy from his study of the Hobbesian state of nature where he finds life to be famously solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. He adds that the Hobbesian anarchy has been unfairly swamped by Realist

claims of explanation where all that has actually accrued of such an entitlement is mere *description* (Wendt 1999: 262-3):

> What states facing an enemy must do, in sum, is engage in no-holds-barred power politics. It has become common practice in recent IR scholarship to refer to such behavior as "Realist". If Realism is taken to be merely a description of power politics then this practice is harmless, but taken as an explanation it invites confusion, since it suggests that the existence of power politics is somehow evidence for Realist theory. This cannot be the case, at least on any non-tautological definition of Realism; conflict is no more evidence for Realism than cooperation is for non-Realism. *It all depends on what explains it.* [emphasis added]

What explains realpolitik, claims Wendt, is the mutual constitution of actor identities as 'enemy'. Realpolitik, in other words, can only be *described* in materialist theories such as Realism and can be explained in sociological or idealist theories such as constructivism. But we are faced here with a chicken-and-egg problem: Why will actors constitute each other as enemies? Wendt (1999: 264), however, has less than a satisfactory answer to offer:

> As more and more members of a system represent each other as enemies, eventually a "tipping point" is reached at which these representations take over the logic of the system. At this point actors start to think of enmity as a property of the system rather than just of individual actors, and so feel compelled to represent all Others as enemies simply because they are parts of the system. In this way the particular Other becomes Mead's "generalized Other" [Margaret Mead 1934], a structure of collective beliefs and expectations that persists through time even as individual actors come and go, and into the logic of which new actors are socialized.

In other words, role positions in the micro-level of inter-state interaction (foreign policy) eventually assume the nature of systemic property. While it is never known what in

particular exacts such an identity from unit actors, and it is next to impossible to employ *a priori* reasoning with intersubjective categories of identity, it must be acknowledged that the Constructivist addition to systemic international theories is not slight, to say the least. Even if one ignores the fact that systemic theory is *entirely* about *a priori* reasoning, and anything short of a universal explanandum or a universally relevant intervening variable[16] defeats the purpose of one, there is a recurring problem with the Wendtian analysis across his 'three cultures of anarchy'. The problem with Wendt's Hobbesian anarchy, or Lockean and Kantian ones to be discussed below, does not only revolve around incongruous claims of systemic theory and identity as 'systemic', *but in the nature of depicting international life itself.* Nevertheless, it is unfailingly necessary to also mention that while constructivism may face immense difficulty in making a seamless claim to both systemic theorising and their moot point of intersubjective identities of unit actors assuming systemic properties, yet their emphasis on non-material features of international political life is of great addition to IR theory.

The Hobbesian anarchy is primarily mistaken because Wendt studies the Hobbesian state of nature with more assumption than inference. Consider the Wendtian notion of the Hobbesian anarchy. In an international anarchy that assumes a Hobbesian character from how unit agents are structured as enemies, there is endemic warfare, unscrupulous and unceasing effort at pursuing security, and a deep revulsion towards all contestants. Until here, the Wendtian analysis seems perfectly sound. Consider the Wendtian notion (1999:260) of the role position of the enemy: '…an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.' There is endemic warfare, next to no balancing because states are jealously untrusting of each other, and no regulation of violence until the Other is systematically

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[16] See Conclusion in the present chapter.

annihilated. This sounds like a mad command of a mad general which technically for Carl Schmitt was not a very distant possibility.

Quite contrary to this, when one reads the *Leviathan* (Hobbes, ed. Hay: 77), one finds: 'And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: *and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.*' [emphasis added]. Hobbes does not admit mindless slaughter in the state of nature, and the only prize that men slay each other for is 'First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. Men in the Hobbesian state of nature kill each other for *preservation of interest* (Hobbes, ed. Hay: 77):

> The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

The Hobbesian anarchy is entirely utilitarian and is existential only because units profit in their preservation of interest. Hobbes never intended to create an irrational design of the state of nature, but an entirely rational one that by virtue of being utilitarian and rational could take the natural step of arriving at a covenant for regulation and peace in the first place. In other words, what units are deprived of in a state of nature is not reason but a regulation of unsustainable efforts at self-preservation.

Because Wendt is unable to identify interest as crucial, he finds balancing uncommon in the Hobbesian anarchy. In Wendt's account, states do not balance each other because they are both deeply untrusting and revisionist towards each other's existence. If

Wendt were to characterise the Hobbesian anarchy as a utilitarian condition where states undermine each other's *existence for purposes of interest*, balancing would seem as the most natural political formation. If the pursuit of interest is dropped out and replaced by an unreasoning pursuit of each other, one arrives at the mistaken conclusion that states do not balance but consolidate their preponderance of power. It is the combination of distrust *and interest* that compels states to balance, a missing ingredient from Wendt's analysis of both the *Leviathan* and as we shall see, international life in practice.

As another notable point, the untrusting defense of the Self continues well into the Hobbesian civil state and the Lockean state of war and state of nature in Locke's *Two Treatise.* While we will get to the Lockean anarchy next, consider the words of Hobbes when he discusses the birth of the civil state and the first two laws of nature governing man (Hobbes, ed. Hay: 80). We will use this parable again in Section II for a different purpose:

> And because the condition of man… is a condition of war of every one against every one*, in which case every one is governed by his own reason*, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a condition [where man uses reason to convene and form the Leviathan] every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man… *And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.* [emphasis added]

Therefore, after studying Wendt's Hobbesian anarchy we can conclusively put together a few points.

First, the Hobbesian anarchy is not an unreasoning period of slaughter. It is instead a period where men contest for *reasons* of *interest* and there is war due to the absence of regulation of such pursuit. Second, the right and drive of man to preserve his interest continues well into a period of regulation under the Hobbesian Leviathan. The difference that an installation of the Leviathan makes is one of regulation and not reason. A 'war of all against all', as observed above, continues well into the latter. Third, although systemic theories operate at a high level of abstraction, the Hobbesian anarchy that Wendt describes has next to no precedence in practice. No state fights another because war is cognitively embedded in the nature of relation with an Other. States fight for active interests and not out of maddening impulse to annihilate, *notwithstanding how they characterise each other to their people*. One cannot confuse between state interest and how state interest is securitised before a national audience[17]. One can indeed cite extreme examples as that of the Cold War or sub-systemic ones of postcolonial states that are born broken and bitter from a single land, but no state fights without active interest, let alone annihilate another. What Wendt characterises as an entire culture of anarchy requires at least some evidence.

Locke

Wendt's Lockean anarchy is expectedly inferred from Locke's *Two Treatises*. He suggests right at the outset, first, '…that it is not as much a self-help system as we often assume.' (Wendt 1999: 279), and second, contemporary international life is clearly not Hobbesian, but a Lockean anarchy (Wendt 1999: 270).

The Lockean anarchy revolves around the logic of 'rivalry'. While there remains little literal difference between the words rivalry and enmity, Waltz interjects that there is a vast difference between the two when studying international anarchy. *While in the first, violence is*

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[17] Securitisation or 'securitization' refers to the discursive construction of threat (Waever 1995; Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998).

unlimited to the point of annihilation, in the second, violence is regulated by states for

utilitarian purposes of interest. True to the Lockean state of nature, Wendt maintains (1999:

279):

> The Lockean culture has a different logic from the Hobbesian because it is based on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity. Like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representations are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their "life and liberty", as a right, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them. Since state sovereignty is territorial, in turn, this implies recognition of a right to some "property" as well.

The Lockean anarchy is a world of regulated violence that protects the life, liberty,

and property of states. The role position of rivalry suggests that there is still a possibility of

war, but the possibility is neither unrestrained, nor unreasoned, and neither is it separate from

a shared institution of sovereignty. Rights to life and property suggest a right of states to

protect their entitlement to survival and territory. These rights do not remain mere inter-

positional rights of life and property but translate into a shared right of sovereignty of every

state that cannot be breached to a point of extinction. The development of international law,

regimes, rules, and norms have tried to take care of this. Wendt writes (1999: 281):

> Modern inter-state rivalry, in other words, is constrained by the structure of sovereign rights recognized by international law, and to that extent is based on the rule of law. Within that constraint, however, rivalry is compatible with the use of force to settle disputes, and as such the Lockean culture is not a complete rule of law system. What this comes down to in the end is the level of violence that states expect of each other. Rivals expect Others to use violence sometimes to settle disputes, but to do so within "live and let live" limits.

According to Wendt (1999: 282), there are at least four implications of the Lockean anarchy for foreign policy of states. First, states behave in a status quo fashion towards each other's sovereignty. The preservation of sovereignty of states by all incorporates mutual trust and respect for each other. When no state has violative intentions, the status quo of life and property of states is protected and maintained. Second, as opposed to the Hobbesian anarchy, the nature of rational behaviour of states attains a more relaxed condition (Wendt 1999: 282):

> The institution of sovereignty makes security less "scarce", so risks are fewer, the future matters more, and absolute gains may override relative losses… This does not mean that states no longer worry about security, but their anxiety is less intense because certain pathways on the "game tree" those involving their own "death" have been removed.

Therefore, states worry less about relative losses because loss no longer incorporates extermination. States are able to behave in a status quo fashion because the fear of death is absent, and relative maximisation of power no longer requires the function of balancing for the purpose of survival. Balancing is instead pursued for purposes that are not as crucial as survival (Wendt 1999: 284), and is a natural corollary of limited warfare, and rational, utilitarian behaviour of states. What is balancing pursued for? Balancing, it appears, is pursued for the maintenance of the system, *short of fear of death. It is no longer a war of all against all, but a live and let live system, where balancing performs functions of 'order'.* What Wendt means by order is uncertain, considering our long discussions on the many meanings of order. Order can be both efforts at peace and efforts at securing equilibrium of interests. The crucial difference of all other accounts of order and that in Wendt's analysis is rather premised on his description of anarchy. *Lockean anarchy for Wendt contains a double narrative of self-interest and legitimacy of norms that sits uneasily with each other.* We shall explore this problem below.

The third implication of the Lockean anarchy for foreign policy among states relates to the importance of relative military power. While states are effectively aware of the institution of sovereignty and readily identify with it, it is relegated to a background position which states are simultaneously oblivious to as they jealously pursue their respective interests. The fourth implication of the Lockean anarchy relates to the self-regulation of violence on part of rivals. Violence is regulated because the nature of interaction in the Lockean anarchy is not existential, but utilitarian. *Wendt adds, while there is only a small difference in role between enemy and rival, there is a big difference in degree. This difference, Wendt suggests lies in the identification of states with a shared institution of sovereignty.* A shared institution of sovereignty relates to the protection of the status of empirical sovereignty by the accepted precedents of juridical sovereignty. States through mutual respect for sovereign *rights* are committed to the protection of other states despite the possibility of low incidence of sovereign *ability* in the latter. *This means that the protection of sovereign rights is grounded both in utilitarian motives of self-interest as well as compassionate motives of the legitimacy of shared norms.* The role position of rivalry, while containing ample scope for violence, is then a self-regulating system because although states can act out of interest, they can also crucially do so out of identity with principles of sovereignty. *Maintenance of the status quo of the system is, Wendt suggests, both a function of interest and identity.* However, if one considers Wendt's analysis of US relations with the Bahamas, one notes that Wendt (1999: 289, 290) *overwhelms interest with norm*:

> [T]he US has a status quo interest toward the Bahamas, but in order for this to be satisfying we also need to ask *why* it has this interest. My proposal is that it stems from having internalized sovereignty norms so deeply that the US defines its interests in terms of the norms, and regulates its own behavior accordingly. The US perceives the norms as legitimate and therefore the Bahamas, as a party to those

norms, has a right to life and liberty that the US would not even think of violating. [emphasis in original]

Following such an inference, Wendt goes a step further to explain that, that what sets the Hobbesian anarchy apart from the Lockean anarchy is the *practices of self-help in one and other-help in the second*. States in the Hobbesian anarchy are truly self-help states. Here states operate in an unregulated environment that supports ceaseless conflict for purposes of conservation and preservation of their own selves. Each unit is distrustful, at the least, and deeply competitive, at the worst. There is no greater regard than that for survival *contra* each other. Balances acquire a knife's edge quality, and there is greater tendency for consolidation of power than the formation of balances (Wendt 1999: 266). The conservation of the Self is equivalent to the decimation of the Other. In the Lockean anarchy, states are other-help states:

> Empirical sovereignty seems to presuppose at least tacit recognition of juridical sovereignty rather than the other way around. This reversal of the official procedure is most obvious for failed states in Africa, but it is true of many other Small Powers as well, who were only able to exclude Great Powers because the latter did not resist [during the act of decolonisation]. The "self-help" here, in other words, is one that depends on the restraint of the powerful, which amounts to a passive form of "other-help". That might still be self-help in an interesting sense, but not in the ultimate sense of *sauve qui peut* [war of all against all].

In Wendt's understanding, therefore, Lockean anarchy has primarily three points of interest. First, states act out of interest as well as identity with norms in protecting and maintaining the international system of states or the status quo of sovereign states. Second, states, especially powerful ones are able to maintain the status quo of sovereign states out of

self-restraint and self-regulation of violence. Third, states act out of other-help rather than self-help in protecting and maintaining the status quo of sovereign states.

The primary confusion that follows from such an account of contemporary international political life is twofold. First, as with his Hobbesian anarchy, Wendt's Lockean anarchy also seem weak on logic and evidence when it is compared with the nature of international life in practice. Second, it similarly fails to follow *Locke's Two Treatises* textually.

The three derivations from a Lockean anarchy noted above are essentially part of one united formula: *states in the Lockean anarchy are treated with both utilitarian and normative motives*. Therefore, in the role of rivalry, as that which Wendt finds to be truly representing contemporary international political life, there are states that are committed to their own respective interests but will not deprive another of their rights to life, liberty, and property, out of their regard for other-help. For Wendt, normative regard for juridical sovereignty (or the sanctity of accepted international borderlines) on part of strong states is the expression of other-help that protects the poor empirical sovereignty (or the actual range of powers that a state or its ruling regime wields over territory, popular obedience, and resources) of weak states. If we look at this demand historically, while indeed in international life states sometimes do not threaten each other's survival or property, it is relatively a short period of time that can alone claim this. It is incorrect to call the 'Westphalian society' as respectful of each other's survival in their pursuit of respective interest (Wendt 1999: 270). At a minimum, even till the end of the Second World War, or even before the beginning of détente in Europe, the absolute disregard for each other's survival for the pursuit of some nature of state or coalitional interest has not been an extraordinary feature that marked international life. Additionally, in the post-Cold war era, with ethno-nationalism rearing its head across East Europe and Asia, the sanctity of the institution of sovereignty has been incredibly low.

But even if one leaves out this obvious note of confusion and accepts that international life may be both embedded with pursuit of interest and identity with norms, it is unlikely to logically follow. *Wendt tries to coalesce an instrumental and functional manner of international life with a normative one*. This means, pursuit of interest indeed has a self-limiting character but this is not generated by a sense of other-help or normative compassion for the institution of sovereignty. Pursuit of interest by each state generates an international anarchy that restricts the use of violence and scope of transgression out of reasons that are purely functional, instrumental, and related with, to use Wendt's style of writing, the conservation and preservation of the Self vis-à-vis the Other. This, in effect, creates disorder in the form of war and transgression, but the character of which is not unlimited and one of order or equilibrium[18].

An unlimited strategy of warring (Hobbesian anarchy) or normative sympathy with the status quo (Lockean anarchy) is unable to explain the true character of international anarchy which is *both generative and generated* from functional and instrumental efforts of states to preserve their interests. Identity with norms of sovereignty and the practise of self-restraint by powerful states serves and promotes the status quo of sovereign states, but for reasons that are unlikely to be 'other-help'. The latter is more suitable for a Kantian anarchy as was utilitarian motives more suitable for a Hobbesian anarchy. In his effort to describe international anarchy as generated by 'shared ideas', the evidential problem that Wendt faces across his three cultures of anarchy is that neither of his depiction fully testifies to the nature of international life.

The second source of confusion arises textually. While Wendt promotes the shared institution of sovereignty as the essential feature of the Lockean anarchy, he does so because Locke notes in his Second Treatise (Locke; ed. Hay: 107), 'The state of Nature has a law of

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[18] See Pg. 49 of Chapter 2.

Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.' The one maxim that separates Locke's state of nature from a preceding state of war is the law of nature that prescribes to each to maintain and forbids to all to violate the right of all mankind to life, liberty, and property. However, the Lockean notion of property is explained as (Locke; ed. Hay: 115-116):

> But… it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in anything… but I shall endeavour to show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners… Whatsoever… he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.

If there must be a comparative study of all features of the Lockean state of nature, the claim to sanctity of property is the most problematic one. What Wendt absolves of investigation, that of the natural right of all states to maintain and conserve in themselves and equally in others by not transgressing another's territory, holds quite an opposite meaning if we read Locke's *explanation* of man's entitlement to property: *Entitlement to property can be effected through labour of the actor from a natural condition of common endowment.* What exactly is a natural condition in international life? How long can one extend the timeline of common endowment to claim entitlement to territory? Europe and particularly the non-European postcolonial world have undergone ceaseless inter-state and civil wars producing borderlands that have been subject to transgressions even as recent as the current decade. One has only to not think of the wars across West Asia, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, the Kurdish pockets of Turkey, unsettled borders in the Indian subcontinent, Ukraine, Northern

Ireland and Spain in Europe to deny that the natural condition has extended beyond international legal legislation on juridical sovereignty.

Needless to say, another source of confusion about entitlement to sovereign property has emerged from the need to preserve human rights in criminal regimes through international legal legislation and collective action by the United Nations. Just to extend this vein of thought, exercises to safeguard human rights in distant undemocratic countries by a coalition of democratic states may qualify as Wendt's 'other help', only to bring in further confusion if interest of such a coalition is less of 'other help' and greater in 'self-help' in meeting geopolitical and strategic compulsions. The voluminous literature on the ethics and geopolitics of protecting human rights across the world can testify to this problem.

Locke Again

Hedley Bull, whose work on international anarchy and international order has been previously discussed at length[19], proposed that contemporary international life is an anarchical society, which has a Lockean or Grotian character. In Bull's words (Bull 1977: 27):

> The Grotian prescription for international conduct is that all states, in their dealings with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form. As against the view of the Hobbesians, states in the Grotian view are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law. But, as against the view of the universalists, what these imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community of mankind, but rather acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and co-operation in a society of states.

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[19] See Chapter 1 for a discussion on Bull.

Alexander Wendt suggests a very similar possibility for describing contemporary international life[20] and he concedes that his analysis is greatly premised on Bull's anarchical society except for a crucial difference already recorded before[21] that informs his epistemological choice of 'shared ideas' as the independent variable that generates international anarchy.

Hedley Bull's work in *The Anarchical Society* (1977) suggests that the most appropriate description of international anarchy has two requirements. First, international anarchy is to be understood *qua* international life. Domestic analogy or the epistemological practice of comparing the progressive evolution of international life with the life of a state is misplaced. This is to say, just as domestic states have followed the path of evolution from a point of unregulated violent interaction in a state of nature till regulated enjoyment of natural rights in a civil state, international anarchy is not to be studied similarly as a pre-contractual state of nature where states must create a greater entity than itself that can promise to produce order. Even though, in the contractualist scheme, man creates a civil state to escape the unregulated violence of the natural condition, international anarchy does not require a copybook design leading to a federated world state or a supranational government to attain peace and order. *International anarchy inherently possesses order* because in an anarchical society where '… a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions', order in terms of equilibrium and peace naturally follow[22]. Second, international anarchy is unlike a Hobbesian state of nature. While the first point has already been discussed

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[20] See the section on Locke above.
[21] See Chapter 2, in the section on Role.
[22] See Chapter 1, in the section on Anarchy and Order.

in Chapter 1, we shall examine the second point in terms of Bull's prescription of an anarchical society[23].

Bull mentions several reasons as to why international anarchy is unlike a Hobbesian state of nature. However, right at the outset, he finds Hobbes' account unsuitable for comparative study since Hobbes never meant to write on the subject of states in the first place (Bull 1977: 46): 'Hobbes' account of relations between sovereign princes is a subordinate part of his explanation and justification of government among individual men.' This is entirely true, but perhaps Bull forgets that the point of comparative study while examining something as abstract and untestable as international anarchy or the very life among states may admit unrelated references as long as they are logically sustainable. His entire project in *The Anarchical Society* is precisely an exercise of that nature, his critique of Hobbesian anarchy in international life notwithstanding.

Bull believes that the condition of the Hobbesian state of nature does not obtain in international anarchy. There are three broad features in the former that he identifies as incongruous to the nature of international anarchy. First, 'In this situation there can be no industry, agriculture, navigation, trade or other refinements of living because the strength and invention of men is absorbed in providing security against one another.' To this, Bull (1977:47) writes:

> The absence of a world government is no necessary bar to industry, trade and other refinements of living. States do not in fact so exhaust their strength and invention in providing security against one another that the lives of their inhabitants are solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short; they do not as a rule invest resources in war and military preparations to such an extent that their economic fabric is ruined. On the contrary… states… establish the conditions under which economic improvements may take place within their borders.

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[23] See Chapter 1 for an examination of Bull's anarchical society.

Bull, however, confuses between unit actors. If Bull correctly interprets the state of nature as international anarchy and men in the state of nature as states in international anarchy then his refutation would have suggested that the absence of world government is no necessary bar to industry and trade *among states*. Bull forgets his levels of analyses have changed and unnecessarily involves the life of men within states as counter-evidence to Hobbes' indictment. Indeed, lives of men within states flourish for that is what Hobbes indicated as well. Bull completely overlooks that Hobbes readily agrees to what he thinks is unlikely to happen to men living in states as opposed to units living in a natural condition (Hobbes; ed. Hay: 79):

> But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. *But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.* [emphasis added]

It would appear that Bull has entirely forgotten his subjects, or worse, forgotten to entirely read the *Leviathan*! Even without this methodological slip, if he were to contest that in international anarchy the pursuit of industry and trade is seamless and there is 'no necessary bar to industry, trade and other refinements of living', one has only to point out the numerous trade wars and economic blockades that have happened since time immemorial till even the present decade, and suggest evidence to the contrary.

The second feature of the Hobbesian state of nature relates to an absence of legal and moral rules leading to an absence of justice and sense of propriety among units in the natural

condition. Bull suggests to the contrary that international anarchy is more a Lockean state of nature where justice, albeit rudimentary, prevails (Bull 1977: 48). Although in present times, international legal legislation, norms, rules, and regimes have grown in greater import than in pre-War world politics, one cannot deny that the nature of laws in international politics can be as instrumental and functional when it comes to strategic interests of states involved as normative[24].

The third feature that Bull identifies in the Hobbesian state of nature is the only one that he agrees to have been reproduced in international anarchy: that of the known disposition to war (Hobbes; ed. Hay: 77; Bull 1977: 47).

In his account of the anarchical society and in his refutation of the Hobbesian state of nature as suitable subject of analogy, Bull encounters two points (mentioned earlier, as part of the explanation of international anarchy) which he suffuses into one. Bull, on the one hand, like a true systemic theoretician is inadmissible of a domestic analogy of international anarchy. In his words, a domestic analogy means (Bull 1966: 35):

> One persistent theme in the modern discussion of international relations has been that as a consequence of… anarchy states do not form together any kind of society; and that if they were to do so it could only be by subordinating themselves to a common authority. One of the chief intellectual supports of this doctrine is what may be called the domestic analogy, the argument from the experience form individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same. The conditions of an orderly social life, on this view, are the same among states as they are within them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.

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[24] See section on Locke above, where Alexander Wendt makes similar claims of interest and norms. This is not to deny the role or significance of norms and rules of international law their due share of credit for altering a world where statecraft follows purely prudential designs, but to only maintain that norms and interest can be more divergent than convergent in nature.

On the other hand, he refutes the realist's favourite Hobbesian state of nature as unable to explain international anarchy. A study of international anarchy *must* include Bull's first interest of avoiding a domestic analogy. Accepting a domestic analogy is equivalent to conceding ground to international behavioural thinkers who believe that all of human society, that of life between states in the world and life between people in states, must install a government by means of a contract, peace treaty, covenant, charter, so as to instil peace and order in the world. Any systemic theorist of IR will refrain from accepting this position because their explanation revolves around the exceptional nature of order that is created out of an exceptional international anarchy.

However, this first systemic position need not incorporate the second position against the Hobbesian, or any other state of nature, as drawn up by classical contractualist thinkers. The latter were as interested in examining systemic causality as any systemic theorist of international anarchy. The fields, subjects and environment are certainly different, and the latter need not follow the former in their drawing up of a civil state as a natural consequence of anarchy. *What the latter can instead do is follow the former in drawing up a condition of regulation and order as a natural consequence of international anarchy. This is the nature of abstraction that systemic theory requires, one that is grounded in classical contractualist literature, yet one that differs from the same in their ultimate outcome.* This option is briefly explored in Section II.

Lockean Core, Hobbesian Periphery

In *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (1995), Mohammed Ayoob explores the question of international anarchy in the subsystemic environment of postcolonial states. Ayoob writes, postcolonial

states are trapped in a peculiar security conundrum where they vitiate against the very principles that secure them. The security conundrum that postcolonial states find themselves in terms of the West relates to a 'Hobbesian periphery' to a 'Lockean core' (Ayoob 1995: 196). He identifies several contradictory approaches to security and survival between the subsystemic and systemic subjects in question. Of these a prime subject is one where he inspects that while postcolonial states jealously guard their borderlands with the help of Lockean principles of a sovereign right to territorial integrity, their states remain unfinished projects. Lockean principles of stability of territorial possessions frequently conflict with the inclination of postcolonial states to negotiate their borderlands until their geopolitical interests of expansion and stabilisation are satiated. This is primarily a function of all state making processes, explains Ayoob, where states conduct wars both internally and externally to legitimise and extract territory, resources and popular obedience from within and outlying regions. Ayoob refers to Charles Tilly (1975: 71) while explaining this:

> The building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor…. The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state-building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities…. Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of strong states.

Ayoob further suggests that *despite and because of a period of colonisation, states in the postcolonial world have shared an uncanny resemblance with the Westphalian state making process* (Ayoob 1995: 28). Although several postcolonial writers have recorded the definite difference in the growth of states in the West and the non-West (particularly historical, anthropological, and sociological literature emerging from the subaltern studies project spearheaded by Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Gyan Prakash, Sudipta Kaviraj,

and others), Ayoob focuses on an unmistakeable continuity. States in the West and non-West have a shared geopolitical drive to increase and sustain their interests of power and security within and beyond their initial borderlands. It is through extraction, legitimation and war-making that states fulfil such a function.

Postcolonial states while protected from exogenous attack through Lockean norms and rules of the Westphalian framework continue to possess the Hobbesian drive to security maximisation. In Ayoob's investigation, laws of sovereign integrity of property that have gained precedence only after four centuries of state-making in the Westphalian framework have prematurely implicated the postcolonial world to the same fate. Therefore, while the latter cherishes their Lockean right to sovereign integrity of property, their Hobbesian inclination to battle and covet has continued. In such a situation where postcolonial states both cherish and vitiate against the broad Lockean entitlement to sovereign property, the sub-systemic anarchy that Ayoob identifies is an obviously severed one, 'a Hobbesian periphery to a Lockean core'.

The first point of observation must be concerned with Ayoob's nature of inquiry. His work is clearly sub-systemic in its investigation of international anarchy. He assigns two distinct characterisations of international anarchy based on an intervening variable of the *stage of state-making process* to explain how international anarchy and international political behaviour is generated by sub-systemic properties of units. His work, if reducible to a single sentence would sound as*: International anarchy adheres to Lockean sovereign entitlement to property only after acquiring Hobbesian satiation of property; i.e. a Lockean principle of sovereign integrity of states derives from satisfactory levels of Hobbesian acquisition and extension of power and security*. Although Ayoob did not consciously try to explain systemic or sub-systemic anarchy, and was instead interested in how the condition of insecurity is

different in the West and postcolonial world owing to respective levels of state-building, his work suggests the incongruence of norms and interest in international anarchy.

The obvious question that comes to mind is, does this mean international anarchy can never be normative? The answer to this and an alternative understanding of international anarchy through contractualist literature lies in Sections II and III.

II

The present research seeks to identify international anarchy as both an independent and dependent variable. It is only through a synthesis of literature that identifies international anarchy either as generative or generated that a fulfilling explanation can be worked out. It is also through an account of both identity and interest as systemic intervening variables that a similarly fulfilling explanation can be worked out. However, identity with norms and institutions of cooperation and peace must be admitted as purely functional, and not cultural, as suggested by Bull or Wendt. Such a suggestion shares with the neoliberal institutionalist literature developed as a supplement and complement to the neorealist framework in the seventies and eighties (Keohane and Nye 1977, Keohane 1984) the assumption that identity with norms and membership in international regimes and institutions can help in producing harmony unanticipated by neorealists. In their cumulated understanding, while the nature of international is anarchic, states can create order by accepting the regulation of institutions. Contrary to neorealist indication, states do not dwell upon relative gains vis-à-vis each other but absolute gains that may benefit all. However, the present research diverges from the neoliberal institutionalist claim of absolute gains in saying that international anarchy entirely involves the pursuit of relative gains because it serves as a governing principle that requires

states to defend their relative interests despite collective measures of peace. This thought is further attended to below.

A systemic study of international life necessarily invokes the question of the causal powers of anarchy and the meaning of order. Until now, other than literature represented in Figure 1.1, Figures 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3 has understood international life *qua* international life. The latter three representations can be reproduced as under for the reader:

|		
Order as stasis $\longrightarrow$ Anarchy as lack of government		Figure 1.2
Order as a function of systemic interaction $\longrightarrow$ Anarchy generated by systemic interaction		Figure 2.2
Order as a function of systemic identity $\longrightarrow$ Anarchy generated by systemic identity		Figure 2.3

Figure 1.2 represents a systemic generative model of international life. International anarchy produces international behaviour. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 represent a systemic generated model of international life where anarchy is differentially produced on the bases of systemic identity and interaction. All theorists represented throughout this work have attempted to do two things: first, all have explained international anarchy as either generated or generative. Second, some have alluded to contractualist theory to explain international life.

The synthesis of understanding that I suggest alters both these premises: first, international anarchy is both generated and generative. It is both an independent and dependent variable. Second, allusions to contractualist theory have usually kept to comparing contemporary international life with either a Hobbesian or a Lockean state of nature. The present research suggests that international anarchy can be best understood not through a study of the Hobbesian or Lockean states of nature but through the Hobbesian Leviathan. It might appear blasphemous, in the least, to say that the formally unorganised domain of international life can be understood through the most rigid and impossibly centralised account of concentration of regulation as the Leviathan, but it may be easier to accept this point if one approaches their study of the Leviathan differently.

As discussed earlier[25], systemic IR theory revolts against domestic analogy with contractualist literature because the obvious consequence of a state of nature has been hypothetically and evolutionally the construction of the civil state, or the all-powerful Leviathan. However, if one studies contractualist literature as an accession to order and regulation, as a form of regulation instead of a form of government, from a point of disorder and uncertainty, one may note that the organising principle of international anarchy is a *governing principle that regulates and stabilises questions of power, security, survival, and membership*. International anarchy is the governing principle in international life, not on

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[25] See Pg. 92 in the section on Locke Again.

account of a federated suprastate or collective covenant, but because it is generated by the co-action of self-interested units and thereby generates the requisite equilibrium of power necessary to maintain the institution of sovereign integrity and survival of states. Balances operate because states are interested in self-preservation. The system survives because balances operate. There is no normative guarantee of sovereign entitlement other than functional international laws that abide by the logic of international anarchy. International legal legislations such as UNGA Resolution 1514 that commits the international community to respecting sovereign entitlement to property (juridical sovereignty that protects empirical sovereignty) is downplayed when balancing requires transgression in foreign soil. The nature of transgression may be humanitarian or anti-authoritarian ('authoritarian' as ranging from genocidal regimes to covert state-sponsored terrorism) but the purpose of transgression is unmistakeably a necessity to maintain incentives of power or survival.

The present research suggests that if anarchy can be understood as a governing principle of central regulation of states as opposed to an organising principle in the absence of central regulation of states (Waltz 1979)*, it is able to evidentially sustain in contemporary international* life as both generative and generated. Second, it also best represents the Waltzian description of international structure that 'shapes and shoves', while being co-determined by the co-action of units themselves and absolves Waltz of a deterministic epithet. If anarchy is represented as a governing principle, that is both generated and generative, admits intervening variables of functional or instrumental identity and interest, then a true systemic account of international life may emerge. This is to say, international anarchy as a regulative governing principle is the natural consequence of an unregulated natural life of states. *Anarchy does not merely organise, it governs.*

Let us examine this claim further through a survey of the Leviathan in Hobbes's *Leviathan*.

In the text *Leviathan*, units in a state of nature are in a perpetual state of war. Units war each other for purposes of self-preservation and self-interest because Nature commands man to conserve himself. Men reason their way to the construction of a Leviathan not because they choose peace instead of war but because they realise that 'a common power that over-awes' may regulate their individual requirement of survival and interest. Men do not move from a state of nature to life under the Leviathan for reasons of peace, but for reasons of interest. Under the Leviathan, Hobbes writes, life is primarily characterised by two elements: rights of nature and laws of nature (Hobbes; ed. Hay: 79).

> The right of nature, which writers commonly call *jus naturale*, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.

While a right of nature is a *liberty* that allows man to conserve his self and interest as he chooses best notwithstanding a condition of perpetual war, a law of nature, *lex naturalis*, is 'a precept, or general rule', an *obligation* under the Leviathan that may impede the choices of self-interested units to ensure the survival of all. However, such impediments cannot hinder man from continuing to protect and preserve his interest of survival. In other words, rights of nature when transferred to life under the Leviathan and bound by laws of nature, are not forsaken but regulated. Although the law of nature binds, the right of nature allows a pursuit of survival of security. Hobbes writes (Hobbes; ed. Hay: 80):

> [I]t followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. *The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.* [emphasis added]

In the First law of Nature under the Leviathan, units seek central regulation not for purposes of peace but security. *Peace is a possible outcome of regulation.* The state of war endures not in an unregulated form but in a regulated form so as to protect and defend their respective interests of survival. On the second Law of Nature, Hobbes writes (Hobbes; ed. Hay: 80, 81):

> From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose him self to peace. This is that law of the gospel: *Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law of all men, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.* [emphasis added]

In the Second Law of Nature, Hobbes suggests that as long as rights of nature alone continue, life is unregulated and uncertain. With the incorporation of Laws of Nature, men acquire a shared regulation that binds each to secure them if a condition of peace fails to do

this. And the means of securing oneself should be *quid pro quo*, 'whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.'

The present research suggests that the above discussion can explain the nature of contemporary international life: first, international anarchy generates the self-preservation of states and their means of securing self-preservation and self-interest through a function of balancing (whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them) as *through the observation of lex naturalis* by men under the Leviathan. Second, international anarchy is generated through *jus naturale,* or the natural right and liberty of states to self-preservation and self-interest. Third, international anarchy creates order among states through legal and normative inspiration to maintain peace. Yet, fourth, international anarchy reinstitutes order through the maintenance of stasis or equilibrium of interests by according each state their right to defend themselves. International anarchy, as both an independent and dependent variable, may therefore be represented as in Figure 3.1:

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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐
│                 │              │                 │
│  Order as peace │   ───────▶   │  Anarchy as a   │
│  and stasis     │              │  governing      │
│                 │              │  principle      │
│                 │              │                 │
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────────┘
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Figure 3.1

III

This chapter has been devoted to understand the points that follow.

(i)   A full picture of international anarchy requires attention to both its generated and generative qualities. It is both an independent and dependent variable in inquiries of international political life. Systemic literature in IR theory has generally chosen either position and has been unable to look at a wider picture that their subject demands. A synthetic account certainly comes at an initial price of parsimony but revels in the ultimate prize of holism.

(ii)   International anarchy is generated by both the systemic intervening variables of identity and interest. Identity, however, does not relate to a normative regard for rules and absolute gains accruing of regimes, but is purely functional and instrumental to maintaining the pursuit of relative interest.

(iii)   The above points bring pause to think about the nature of systemic theorising in IR. Systemic inquiries of international political life *cannot* afford two things. First, variables employed must be suitable for *a priori* reasoning. Assumptions of the harmonic effects of Wendtian and Bullian culture or values, intersubjective positions of Wendtian identity, or of unconditional Wendtian friendship and alliance characteristic of a Kantian anarchy is not admissible. Second, following from the first, such research strategies cannot cohabit with evidence from contemporary international political life.

(iv)   Systemic theorists' use of classical contractualist literature has been impeded by their disregard for domestic analogy. While the contractualists make use of analogical reasoning to compare and predict similar results for international

evolution towards a world government as found in the transcendence of a natural society of mankind, the analogical reasoning of the former can be made use of without reproducing the necessary outcome. Inquiries of international political life based on social contract theory is the best testing ground for inspecting the causal powers of anarchy and the nature of contemporary life among states at large.

(v)   International anarchy may be represented as the Hobbesian Leviathan where rights of nature and laws of nature compare and combine to create a fuller picture of international politics.

CONCLUSION

It was stated at the outset that the purpose of this inquiry is two-fold. First, to bring to order a large group of literature that has not been classified, organised, or systematically analysed before. This large group of literature, although quite small in comparison with that of international behavioural research, relates to systemic accounts (and the positions that can be broadly derived therefrom) of international anarchy and order. Second, to try to create a synthetic account of international anarchy that may explain international political life. The purpose of this research has been to bring greater clarity to independent or piecemeal attempts at making sense of the elusive subjects of international anarchy and order. My analysis and repurposing of several prior claims on the subject occurs not out of an interest in suggesting a brighter idea, or a more competent explanation, but in suggesting a more competent *representation*.

My first two chapters identify several kinds of analyses and representations on the subject of international anarchy and order. My observations relate to numerous ways in which anarchy and order have been characterised by classical realists and idealists, peace schemers and publicists of 19th century and 20th century interwar Europe, neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists, the old English School of Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, John Vincent, and Adam Watson, the revival of the English School by Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones, postcolonial security studies developed by Mohammed Ayoob, and the constructivism of Alexander Wendt. The many meanings of international anarchy and order have been classified into four distinct universal representations found in Figures 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3.

My third chapter suggests an extension of all prior study in the following direction:

1. International political life can be understood maximally through classical contractualist literature. There is a methodological difference between the strategy of domestic analogy and adopting the analogical reasoning of classical contractualist literature. If systemic accounts on anarchy can appreciate this difference, it may provide the most useful epistemological tool to interpret, analyse, and study untestable variables like international anarchy and order.

2. On account of being untestable variables, international anarchy and order can be best explained or understood through representations.

3. A novel representation may include a treatment of international anarchy as the Hobbesian Leviathan which fulfils an explanation of the former as generated and generative.

My research has attempted to create a new approach to the systemic study of international anarchy and order based on previous studies in this direction.

It has, first, suggested a new methodological approach to systemic inquiries of international life, as distinct from domestic analogy, which may include the analogical reasoning of classical contractualist literature to explain international life. This methodological approach as explained in Chapter 3 relates to an exclusion of the prescribed outcome of the creation of a world state, as found in all accounts of domestic analogy, and instead suggests that a solitary adoption of the analogical strategy found in classical contractualist literature may help us understand and characterise international life as distinct from domestic life.

Second, it has suggested a new ontological approach to international anarchy and order found in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3. It is suggested that a full picture of international anarchy may be understood as both generated by and generative of international political behaviour, and comprising the concerns of both identity and interest. In this synthetic account, international anarchy is explained as a governing principle of international behaviour as opposed to the more common understanding of the same as an organising principle. The difference between the two relate to a distinctively governmental function of anarchy, despite the absence of formal government, as opposed to a commonly identified organisational one. In this account international order is viewed as both peace and stasis.

Third, it has suggested a new representation of international anarchy and order by a study of the Hobbesian Leviathan in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. The ontological approach mentioned above and as developed in Chapter 3 has been examined with the respect to life under the Hobbesian state of nature and the Hobbesian Leviathan. My research has tried to suggest that such a representation may duly explain contemporary international life.

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