

India's Economic Relations with Kazakhstan under the Look North Policy

**Thesis Submitted to Jadavpur University for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Arts)**

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Certified that the thesis entitled “**India’s Economic Relations with Kazakhstan under the Look North Policy**” submitted by me for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts to Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the Supervision of Professor Imankalyan Lahiri, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata and that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before any degree or diploma anywhere/elsewhere.

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Signature of Candidate
Date:

**I dedicate this work to
my dearest Mother, Ganga Kayal and
Father, Kangsari Kayal**

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List of Abbreviations

| | | |
|---------|---|---|
| AF:PAK | : | Afghanistan and Pakistan |
| CARs | : | Central Asian Republics |
| CASAREM | : | Central Asia South Asia Regional Electricity Market |
| CCAP | : | Connect Central Asia Policy |
| CIA | : | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CICA | : | Conference on Interaction and Confidence: Building Measures in Asia |
| CII | : | Confederation of Indian Industry |
| CIS | : | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CNPCI | : | China National Petroleum Corporation International |
| CSTO | : | Collective Security Treaty Organisation |
| DRDO | : | Defence Research and Development Organization |
| EACU | : | Eurasian Customs Union |
| EEU | : | Eurasian Economic Union |
| EIA | : | Energy Information Administration |
| EU | : | European Union |
| EXIM | : | Export Import |
| FDI | : | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FTA | : | Free Trade Agreement |
| GAIL | : | Gas Authority of India Limited |
| GDP | : | Gross Domestic Product |
| IDSAs | : | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses |
| IEA | : | International Energy Agency |
| IFS | : | Indian Foreign Service |
| IGC | : | Inter: Governmental Commission |
| IM | : | Indian Mujahedeen |
| IMF | : | International Monetary Fund |
| IMU | : | Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan |
| INSTC | : | International North South Transport Corridor |
| IPI | : | Iran Pakistan India Pipeline |
| ISRO | : | Indian Space Research Organization |
| IT | : | Information Technology |

| | | |
|-------|---|---|
| ITEC | : | Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation |
| J&K | : | Jammu and Kashmir |
| JV | : | Joint Venture |
| JWG | : | Joint Working Group |
| LNG | : | Liquefied Natural Gas |
| LOC | : | Line of Credit |
| LOC | : | Line of Control |
| MBD | : | Million Barrels per Day |
| MEA | : | Ministry of External Affairs |
| MOC | : | Ministry of Commerce |
| MOD | : | Ministry of Defence |
| MOU | : | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MTOE | : | Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent |
| MW | : | Megawatts |
| NAM | : | Non: Aligned Movement |
| NATO | : | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGG | : | New Great Game |
| NPCIL | : | Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited |
| NSG | : | Nuclear Suppliers Group |
| OECD | : | Organisation for Economic Co: operation and Development |
| ONGC | : | Oil and Natural Gas Corporation |
| ORF | : | Observer Research Foundation |
| PPP | : | Purchasing Power Parity |
| RATS | : | Regional Anti: Terrorist Structure |
| RSC | : | Regional Security Complex |
| SCO | : | Shanghai Cooperation Organisation |
| TAPI | : | Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (Pipeline) |
| TCF | : | Trillion Cubic Feet |
| UN | : | United Nations |

Introduction

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, five new countries with a similar history but dramatically different identities appeared on the map of the globe, in the form of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. These nations collectively make up Central Asia, which is often regarded as the heartland of the Asian continent. These nations are unique and have become more and more significant in recent times mainly due to the rise in global demands for energy. Moreover, since the early 1990s, these are viewed as a Russian turf geopolitically. The United States is interacting with them, China is interested in them, and all five of their presidents have been invited to India as major guests for Republic Day. The history of Central Asia is extensive, and the region is diverse in terms of both the natural environment and the people that live there. The largest nation in Central Asia is Kazakhstan, whose capital city is Astana Nur:Sultan.

This group of countries is likewise quite young, averaging 30 years in age, but they have already achieved a high level of stability and development. There is a plethora of oil, gas, and uranium present, all of which are of great strategic importance. Because of their secular cultures, these countries have avoided becoming extremist hotbeds. From this vantage point, regional and global countries are vying for diplomatic, economic, and military control over the Central Asian Republics due to their increasing importance on the contemporary geopolitical chessboard. A power struggle developed in New Great Game as a result of the Americans' presence. In the eyes of many nations and organisations, this is their playground. Some were interested in the region's natural wealth, others sought political influence, while yet others sought to limit the spread of Islamic terrorist groups in the area. Included among these nations is India, which has had extensive interactions with Central Asia for centuries. Nowadays, India recognises the strategic and economic value of Central Asia, in addition to its historical and cultural significance. India and Kazakhstan have extensive relations across many domains, from trade and energy to international collaboration and even national security. In 2015, these connections were strengthened when Narendra Modi travelled to all five Central Asian Republics, becoming the first Indian Prime Minister to do so. Much

development has occurred since then, especially in commercial, military, and energy-related spheres.

India places a high strategic value on Kazakhstan because of its location between two nuclear-armed nations, namely China and Russia. Kazakhstan has a large Muslim population but is also diverse in religion and culture. The geostrategic objectives of India get a new dimension as a result. Pakistan would benefit greatly from increased regional clout in light of the Taliban's recent revival in Afghanistan. The Central Asian Nations have often expressed gratefulness towards India for its cooperation in addressing these issues, and they share its desire to prevent terrorism from spreading to their countries. Stop the growth of religious extremism and secure themselves from the dangers of the drug trade. There was almost \$2 billion worth of trade between India and the five Central Asian countries in 2018. On the other side, it was projected that China's commerce during the same time period was at least \$60 billion. Central Asian are being wooed by Beijing financially. It is also advantageous because of its proximity to the area. The constraints of geography are wreaking havoc in India. India's land connection is hampered by Pakistan, which also reduces its manoeuvring space. Many initiatives never get off the ground, and bilateral trade suffers as a result. Hence, in light of all of these difficulties and geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for India to deepen its relations with Central Asia in order to regain its shared history with the area and increase its strategic advantage against Pakistan.

Stability and prosperity in Central Asia, as well as regional collaboration with South Asia, are in India's best interests. As a result, India has begun implementing its Look North Strategic plan. India's Look North Policy is based on strategic bilateralism in Central Asia. This implies country-specific strategies relating to individual Central Asian states. The policy reminds the present generation in Central Asia that India is a very old friend, with no record of intrusive or aggressive behaviour towards the newly emerged republics. As Prime Minister P.V. Narashima Rao had stated in September, 1995, "For India, Central Asia is an area of high priority, where we aim to stay engaged far into the future. We are an independent partner with no selfish motives. We only desire honest and open friendship and to promote stability and cooperation without causing harm to any third country". India's Look North Policy has the objective of promoting peace and mutual prosperity based on democracy and a secular ethos, the binding forces between India and Central Asia. Since developments in

Central Asia would have an impact on the dynamics of South Asia, India's Look North policy assumes special significance.

The unique connections between India and Kazakhstan are propelled by ancient links, the evolving strategic situation and economic potential. Kazakhstan is important for India owing to its geo: strategic location, its commercial prospects, its energy resources and its multi: ethnic and secular structure. Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia. It is also the most prosperous, stable and democratic country in the region, with the most free economy. Kazakhstan's geographic existence between Russia and Asia, along with the long border with China, makes it a country of great strategic importance. Though India has no border with Kazakhstan, and it has an interest in the states bordering Kazakhstan, it must ensure that this region is not influenced by those that are inimical to the security interests of India. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan has the largest energy resources and the highest economic potential. It is also the world's leading producer of uranium, and has substantial deposits of silver and gold. It has the most developed commercial, legal and regulatory environment in Central Asia. Importantly for India Kazakhstan has a multi: religious, multi: ethnic, democratic and secular structure. Kazakhstan too is opposed to religious extremism in its neighbourhood. It does not promote any kind of political Islam and exercises strict control over radical Islamic forces. It has shown great interest in India's experience of unity in diversity and pluralist democracy. It is keen to partner India in combating terrorism.

In the economic sphere Kazakhstan represents a sizeable consumer market. Also, its vast deposits of gold, silver, chromium, uranium and hydrocarbons need to be tapped and converted into products of value. Further, it has abundant water resources for electricity generation. It is the only country in Central Asia with which India has considerable trade relations. India has set up an inter: governmental Joint Commission with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for the purpose of bilateral trade and economic cooperation. Indian businessmen are exploring the possibilities emerging from the interactions between India and Kazakhstan. In Almaty, the joint Kazakh: India pharmaceuticals venture is nearing completion. More than 30 Indian companies have offices in Kazakhstan and are investing capital in the Kazakhstan economy. There is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between India and Kazakhstan for the development of small enterprises and creation of new work places. The main inhibiting factor in bilateral trade is the high cost of transportation of goods between the two countries. However, India is in the process of constructing a railway

route between Chabahar port in Iran and Kazakhstan, to facilitate the movement of freight since the spirit of friendship and cooperation now exists between New Delhi and Almaty, positive developments in all spheres are a reasonable expectation.

India's efforts to promote its economic interests in the energy rich and economically powerful Central Asian region almost inevitably come up against impediments and problematic issues. This is bound to happen given India's intent to become a significant player in Asia and the World. The main difficulties now are geographical and infrastructural. The absence of a shared border and poor transport linkages hinder the flow of Central Asian resources to the Indian market and vice versa. The major dynamics of global politics adversely effects the growth of India's connections with Kazakhstan. The two nations have long drifted apart and there has been a vacuum in their mutual engagement, both economic and political. India's own lack of adequate export:import infrastructure has also majorly impeded its economic outreach to the Central Asian states. Commercial flows to and fro have seen little progress. It must be admitted, over a period, in the past India's foreign policy makers have evinced a lazy and negligent approach towards Central Asia.

In the post:Cold War period, in the last years of the 20th century and the initial years of the 21st century, India and have Kazakhstan figured little in each other's foreign and diplomatic policies. The absence of a political will to boost bilateral ties have largely accounted for the low:key involvement of either nation with the other. However, when India focused on its Look North Policy, concurrent with Prime Minister Narashima Rao's visit to Central Asia in 1995, it was acknowledged that the strategic and security objectives would be sustainable largely on strong trade and economic ties. India's presence in the Central Asia energy sector was meager in the past. However, India's ONGC Videsh Limited now owns 25% share in Kazakhstan's offshore Satpayev block on the Caspian Sea and propose to invest in and contribute to the exploration work. This block is estimated to have over 250 million tons of oil reserves and may produce up to 287,000 barrels daily.

Bilateral trade between India and Kazakhstan increased by about 75% focus US\$ 120 million in 2005 to US\$ 210 in 2006. India mainly exported tea, pharmaceutical, medial equipments, machinery, tobacco, valves and consumer items. From Kazakhstan India imported asbestos, soft wheat, steel, aluminum, wool and raw hides. The above facts indicate that India's bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan is in a fledgling state, but with potential to become

wider, more comprehensive and strategic. Recognising this, president Nazarbayev visited India in January 2009 and concluded a civil nuclear cooperation accord. Kazakhstan promised to supply over 2000 tons of uranium to India.

In April 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Kazakhstan and signed an agreement for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. It envisaged cooperation in fuel supply, nuclear, medicine, use of radiation technologies for health care, reactor safety mechanisms, scientific and research information, exploration, and mining of uranium, and the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. India and Kazakhstan signed a partnership agreement allowing for India's participation in the implementation programs in Kazakhstan. The complementarity of need and their satisfaction add sheen to the developing closeness between the two nations. Kazakhstan needs heavy investment for its energy field. India proposes to be a big investor. Kazakhstan's energy sector seeks a market. India provides a huge market.

India's Look North Policy is part of its grand strategy for emerging as an important factor in Central Asia. It has been over two decades since the Look North Policy was adopted as a major foreign policy initiative with a focus on engaging India with the countries in the region. India's proactive engagement with the Central Asian region accelerated at the start of this century. Launched in 1995, the policy drew India's focus on developing ties with post-cold war Kazakhstan, which is located in Central Asia at the heart of the region known as Eurasia. In terms of territory it is the 9th largest country in the world and is rich in natural resources. In 2009, India and Kazakhstan signed a strategic partnership Agreement. This enabled the two countries to give meaning and structure to their burgeoning relationship.

The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent states in Central Asia prompted India to embark on a new foreign policy initiative, 'Look North', going into the 21st Century. The political reordering in 1990:1991 brought into limelight the vast energy resources and rapid economic growth potential of the Central Asian Republics. Kazakhstan emerged as one of the largest economies of the Central Asia. India's Look North Policy was an appreciative response to Central Asia's emergence as an economic power centre with global ramifications. India's Look North Policy aimed to fill the gap with new mutually beneficial economic treaties with the energy rich nations of Central and West Asia.

Over the last few years, the Look North Policy has gained top priority in India's foreign policy. The policy is based on realism and pragmatism. The economically resurgent Central Asia landscape quickly became strategically significant. More recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stressed the importance of the Look North strategy and the Connect Central Asia Policy in India's foreign relations. In his view, the Look North policy marks a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and its place in the evolving global economy. India's economic liberalization programme synergizes well with the Look North policy for forging partnerships with the energy rich growing economies in Central Asia. The Look North Policy aims to expand India's profile in the trade, manufacturing mining and services sectors in the central Asian region. India and Kazakhstan are in the process of redefining and strengthening their relations in post:Cold War era. A significant advantage in this process is the absence of conflict in the bilateral relationship through history. In February 1992, during Kazakhstan president Nazarbayev's first visit to India, diplomatic relationship between the two countries was established. In the following year, 1993 Indian Prime Minister Shri Narashima Rao's visit to Kazakhstan gave impetus to the growing bilateral relationship. Immense good will was generated between the two states the said visits of the Executive Heads of the two countries reflected the newly engendered bonhomie.

Review of Literature

The research on '*India's Economic Relations with Kazakhstan under the Look North Policy*' have gone through numerous reviews of literature in compatibility with the subject of research. A literature survey on India:Kazakhstan economic relations and India's Look North Policy reveals that very little and fragmented work has been done on the subject. However, social scientists have recently started exploring this area and a few well books, journal articles are now available. The book '*China and India in Central Asia: A New "Great Game"?*' By Marlene Laruelle, Jean:Francois Huchet, Sebastien Peyrouse, and Bayram Balchi (Ed.), Palgrave, 2010, is a well:versed literature contain different dimensions of the approaches of both China and India towards the emerging 'Great Game' in Central Asia. There are various chapters which touched upon issues of India: China cooperation and conflicts in Central Asia. An elaboration of approaches of major power to get their foot hold in Central Asia has been discussed in chapter concerning the nature and extent of the ongoing

play of Great Game in Central Asia. Besides, chapter and dedicated an India and China's role in the reconstructive process of Afghanistan which is a gale for India to Central Asian region.

Given the broad scope identified in the research objectives of this work, the discussion of relevant literature must take place at the Meta level of works with similar overall objectives to this one. Given that the CARs came into existence a little more than two decades ago, only three such pieces of contemporaneous scholarship that focus on the holistic analysis of Indian policy in the region, and are rigorous enough their examination, have been identified. The most significant of these is '*Mapping Central Asia: Indian Perceptions and Strategies*' by scholars Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse. Published in 2011, the book is an edited volume of essays by Indian scholars with expertise on Central Asia, AF:PAK, China and Russia. The work is divided into three sections, the first focuses on the history of India's engagement in the region, the second on the contemporary relationship, and the third on flashpoints like Tibet, Kashmir and Xinjiang and what role they play. The essays by the Indian experts are largely descriptive and provide a valuable source of data, and are used extensively within the body of this work.

In the introduction, they talk of two paradoxes within India and Central Asia relations that motivated them to create this work. The first concerned the mismatch between the intense speculation by scholars and experts about India's huge potential in the region and the sad reality of its actual engagement so far. The second was seen as the lack of codification of Indian elite thinking on the issue within Western scholarship on the subject. Laruelle first explores a geopolitical reading of the agency of external actors in Central Asia in the post:Cold War period. Much of her focus is spent on a critique of the most popular of the conjectural frameworks for explaining Central Asia today, the Great Game.

Finally, she discusses the conceptualization of the New Silk Road and its use within the discourse of China, India, the United States and other major powers, arguing that the Silk Road presents countries with an opportunity to play up cultural, civilizational and trade links, lending a special national flavour to the discourse. Looking specifically at India, she critiques another cognitive structure that is offered by Indian elites to explain their country's agency in the region: historical analogy. She suggests that Indian scholarship on the subject is stooped in history, using collective memory of a glorious shared past, to argue a great future for relations between India and the CARs. She argues that while the use of the Great Game, the

Heartland and the New Silk Road frameworks as an explanation of Indian agency is valid for the agency of other powers as well, the use of historical analogy as a basis to explain a great potential for the present, is a uniquely Indian approach. To her, this legitimization of the current situation, through the use of references to histories and civilization.

In her explanation of frameworks offered to deconstruct Indian strategy in Central Asia, Laruelle does not offer a particularly Indian point of view. That is to say she does not frame Central Asia within a broader perspective of India's international relations. She does not critique or provide an explanation of India:Central Asia ties as a subset of an Indian grand strategy and, therefore, eschews an explanation of some of the greater objectives of Indian foreign policy and how this resonates in its ambitions in Central Asia. Her explanation of things from the perspective of India's international relations is limited to a critique of the use of historical analogies, and a reduction of India and Central Asia ties to simply an element of mythmaking within Indian foreign policy.

Other significant contributions of Peyrouse's commentary on articulations of Indian involvement in Central Asia. To him, India's late start in the region in the nineties was understandable due to the country's focus on domestic issues and its faltering economy. However, as he notes, it is its later failure that is more serious and a symptom of a greater systematic malaise. He notes that India's inability to position itself as a model to the CARs. He says that this is in part because India's democratic status creates doubts in the minds of Central Asian elites as to its intentions; yet India's refusal to play up its democratic values costs it normative support from the opposition and civil society. Thus, India is playing a losing game to China and Russia, with whom the authoritarian elites are happy to work, and to the West, because they openly support Central Asian civil society. This is an important observation, and shapes the tone of the evaluation of Indian strategy. Similarly, in the conclusion, Laruelle and Peyrouse note the huge potential that exists for India and Central Asia ties, and posit that, should India be able to get its game together, several economic niches and avenues for security and energy cooperation exist, which India could use to extend its presence in the region. However, as they add, the large amount of geopolitical uncertainty that surrounds the broader region in areas like Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tibet and Xinjiang is out India and CARs' control, and this aspect will need to be addressed before India can envisage a presence that matches that of China and Russia. In summary, the volume is a germinal contribution to contemporary literature on India and Central Asia relations, and,

given its wide focus that cuts across the fields of geopolitics, history, economics, foreign policy and society, it remains the first choice of students seeking to comprehend India's motivations in Central Asia.

Another significant work on the subject of India's involvement in Central Asia is the Nirmala Joshi edited volume, *'Reconnecting India and Central Asia: Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions'* published in 2010. The work explores the security and economic extents of India and Central Asia ties, giving voice to the thinking of Indian elites on the subject of Central Asia. Joshi's introduction is followed by a chapter on the Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India written by scholars Arun Sahgal and Vinod Anand. Sahgal and Anand adroitly identify the prevalent security conditions in both India and Central Asia that drive the two to cooperation in the field. They explain the complicated internal dynamics of Central Asia, and contrast the various faces of the agency exercised by outside players like China, Russia and the West against each other. To them, the salience of Central Asia lays in the region's hydrocarbon reserves and the fact that it lays at the crossroads of important trans:continental pipelines, communication links and multi:modal transportation networks. They frame Afghanistan as a vital geopolitical bridge that links Central and South Asia, and it is through Afghanistan that India seeks ties with Central Asia along the energy and security vectors. They also hint that Indian strategy in Central Asia and Afghanistan is closely linked to an emerging grand strategic vision for its relations with the world, particularly China and Asia. Though they do not indulge in a thorough discussion of this dimension.

Joshi, writing in the third chapter, Responses to Non:Traditional Threats & Challenges, provides valuable commentary on the linkages between cross:border terror, Islamic radicalism, narcotics and weapons trafficking, and India's domestic security concerns. She highlights the delicate interplay and the commonality of these threats to both India and the CARs, which arise from extremist groups like the Taliban, and the jihadi Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). To India, the predominance of the Taliban in Afghanistan goes hand:in:hand with the impudence with which Pakistani:sponsored terror groups operate in Kashmir. For the CARs, the Taliban support of the IMU and other Central:Asian jihadi networks has caused serious unrest in restive parts of the region like the Fergana valley. she provides a valuable starting point for this analysis, which is provided in the second chapter of this work.

The final chapter, written by scholar Gulshan Sachdeva, focuses on Regional Economic Linkages and puts forward a neo:liberal trade argument for increased cooperation between India and the CARs, which, is argued, will generate prosperity and peace in the regions. he suggests that India seeks to cement a place for itself in the evolving Asian economic architecture, and that it sees access to Central Asia as a stepping:stone to economic engagement with the Eurasian continent. According to him, India does this in two ways: First, with its focus on Central Asia as a valuable potential resource for hydrocarbons, as India desperately tries to diversify sources for its increasingly energy hungry economy; and, second, with its emphasis on the development of a number of trans:Eurasian pipelines, road and rail links, and communication networks, and its participation in a number of regional security and economic arrangements. Scholar Gulshan Sachdeva provides a valuable point for this analysis, which is provided in the chapter three and chapter four of this work.

Another book used in this study that, *'India and Central Asia: The Mythmaking and International Relations of a rising Power'* by Emilian Kavalski, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2008, start with the discussion of the changing dynamics of India's foreign policy after the end of Cold War when India's closely associated with the phenomenon of assertiveness and pragmatism. The post:cold war foreign policy of India towards Central Asia is now based more on pragmatism nature than historical and cultural ties and relationship. The book elaborates pragmatism of India's foreign policy in relations to countries of Central Asia and other powers surrounding Central Asia and their perceptions. In addition, the book also describes India's objective and interest perception and their realization through a constructive frame work. Kavalski also examines how, in the post:cold war complexities; India has formulated a Look North Policy to promote its ties with Central Asia. Post:cold:war period has witnessed a paradigm shift in global politics. The Soviet Union was dissolved. Non:alignment as a policy was no longer feasible. According to Kavalski India had to overhaul its strategic vision in this changed context. Kavalski believes India's relations with Central Asia stem from a long and shared historical experience. India's Look North policy therefore has not emerged in a vacuum. India presents its own structural viability as an example to the Central Asian nations. Look North Policy advocates regional co:operation for the stability and prosperity of Central Asia. The author also discusses India:China competition in the region. This competition is colored by India's bilateral relations with China. The author concludes that Indian diplomacy lacks the power to influence thinking in

the nations of Central Asia and fails to impact the decision-making process of those nations by presenting options of choices that are more attractive than others.

Another book '*Geopolitics and Energy Resources in Central Asia and Caspian Sea Region*' by Shams-Ud-Din (Ed.), Lancers Books, 2000, is a well-versed in combining facts of development associated with the rise and growth of Central Asia as an independent unit of analysis. The composition and Chaptalization of the book is based on various aspects of development in the field of economic, political socio-cultural and security scenario affecting Central Asia's approaches and understanding with the understanding and interests perception of other countries of the world. A very good picturization of both internal and external development of the Central Asia is on the one hand and various powers including India in the other has been established. Besides, India's thrust for economic and energy security aspect has been well managed.

The book '*India and Central Asia: A Reader*' by Xinru Liu (Ed.), Permanent Black, 2012, emphasized the socio-cultural and economic dimensions including the trade route of India's relations with Central Asia. The gradual evolution and development of Central Asia and the changing nature of the approaches of India towards the region of Central Asia has been well addressed. India's contribution towards the nation building process in Central Asia and Central Asian perceptions towards India in their mutual relationship has been well established.

The book '*India and Central Asia: Redefining Energy and Trade Links*', by Angira Sen Sharma, Pentagon Press, 2010, provides clear picture of the energy resources of the Central Asian republics along with India's energy requirement and needs. Again, the book tries to address the nature and extent of India's bilateral relationship with countries of Central Asia. Another aspect of the book which tries to establish transport linkages and connectivity from Central Asia's region to the world market.

The author believes that India's interest in Central Asia is driven by its geo-strategic location and its rich natural resources. She traces India's historical trade ties with Central Asia through the ancient silk route. She points out that India's economic presence in the region is far below the historical potential. She seeks a better understanding of India's relations with Central Asia through its existing relations with the five Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. India's energy scenario and need for energy co:operation play a vital role in its bilateral relations with these countries. However, India's engagements have expanded to include investments in trade links, development assistance, capacity building and nurturing of a diaspora. She examines the problems related to trade and explores solutions. India's historical goodwill gives it a competitive edge in Central Asia. Sharma refers to rich hydrocarbon reserves in Central Asia and identifies Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan as reliable alternative sources of oil and gas. This will reduce India's dependence on West Asia. In India's total international trade, the share of these Republics is meager. Accordingly, there is scope for expanding the cooperation to other areas and establish India's presence in the fields of pharmaceuticals and information technology.

Sharma points out that relatively small Indian companies are now engaged in the region. India can however invest more in capital and technology. She concludes by discussing transport linkages and various alternative routes that may be opened up. The one through Pakistan and Afghanistan is hampered by the deteriorating security scenario in these two countries. However, the International North:South Corridor and the Chabahar route are available options. Once ready, these routes will save time and money and resolve the connectivity problem.

Another book '*Central Asia: A Strategy for India's Look:North Policy*', by Suryakant Nijanand Bal, Lancer Publishers, 2004, discusses the conflicting, concerning, prospective, strategic and non:strategic issues in context to India's Look North policy. In this context, this book touches the fact, India is always aware of her trade relations with Central Asian countries as a continuity of the silk route which prevailed in ancient times and that the trade relations still prevail actively as far as the market is concerned regarding the exchange of merchandise items and above all exploring the energy resources available in Central Asia. As far as non:economic goals are concerned, the security issues of combating terrorism, the active intervene of nuclear powers like China, USA, Iran and Russia and ensuring political stability which is under constant threat due to the fundamentalist ethical religion communities existing in this region with special reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The book states that India's Look North Policy needs obvious attention because this policy aims at India's objective and purpose of utilizing the energy rich potentiality, of the region.

The book also enumerates India's viewpoint and outlook as far as strategic locational advantages is concerned that Central Asia is a heartland region exercising games of the games, where India needs to promote her already mentioned economic non-economic activities.

The book *Local Rules: The New Power Contest in Central Asia*, by Alex Cooley, Oxford University Press, 2012, details the dynamics of the actions taken by the United States, Russia and China as they attempted to exert influence in Central Asia between 2001 and 2011. He identifies the strategic interests of the great powers and their tools of influence in Central Asia. He then proceeds to assess their impact on Central Asia's political institutions and practices. The author believes that the great powers have different security goals and strategic purposes in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. Accordingly, Washington, Moscow and Beijing can pursue their interests in the region without conflict. He also believes that the Central Asian States, even the weaker ones, are not passive pawns in the strategic manoeuvrings of the great powers, but are important actors in their own right.

The author refers to the Local Rules that guide political life in Central Asia. He also describes the restructuring of the political system in Central Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Cooley highlights the regional strategies and consequent dilemmas of the three great powers over the last decade. The author believes that Russia, the region's former imperial power, continues to be a privileged partner in some parts of Central Asia. He discusses Moscow's levers of influence and efforts to remain dominant in the region. However, he believes that Moscow's regional policies and tactics have remained unstable and reactive, as also subject to its self-image as a great power and its prevailing relations with United States and China. Cooley also analyses China's recent rise as a regional power in Central Asia. He believes Beijing has upgraded the regional infrastructure in Central Asia to link it with its western Province through roads and railway networks. Beijing has also invested heavily in Central Asia's oil and gas sectors. This has already dramatically reoriented the region towards the east. He concludes by drawing lessons from the interplay of Central Asian politics and security, in the context of the great power rivalry and regional political stability. Cooley believes that the experience of the Big Three will help the European Union and India to develop their regional strategies in Central Asia.

The article, *'India and Kazakhstan should share Complementary Objectives'* by P Stobdan, (Vol. 33, No. 1, 9 January 2009) describes the evolution of strategic significance of Kazakhstan not only for India but also for the three major power namely China, Russia and US to establish their foothold in Kazakhstan in particular and Central Asia in general. Stobdan believes the Central Asian region is not only a geo:political entity but it also carries deeper civilizational and historical significance for India. Stobdan, however, stresses the security dimension of the new environment in Central and South Asia following the Soviet collapse. He outlines the emerging security challenges and the avenues for cooperation on various issues within a regional framework. He believes that unstable Pakistan and Afghanistan and Af:Pak borderlands are a common threat to both Central Asia and India. With the signing of Joint Working Groups on counter:terrorism and defence cooperation agreements with some of the Central Asian states, he believes that India's policy towards Central Asia is becoming energised and pro:active, unlike in the past when it was reactive. Stobdan believes non:military security elements are also posing a great threat in the region, including India and Central Asian states. Stobdan suggests that India's approach towards Central Asia should involve a positive engagement with the region because Central Asia offers vast opportunities for India to participate in the economic growth of the region, as also to effectively meet the challenges to its vital security interests. The article *'India's Soft Power in Central Asia: Why it must work in the Look North policy'* by Ramakrushna Pradhan, (Vol. LIII, No. 29, July 2015) exposes India's strategic desire for Look North Policy in reference to Central Asia's huge economic and energy potentiality. The article urges for pro:active and growing relations between India and Central Asia with special reference to Kazakhstan. It also touches upon India's strategy of using soft power diplomacy to impact and attract dimension of bilateral relationship in different fields of economic, political and security significance. The article *'India:Kazakhstan Relation: Challenge and Prospect'* by Vijay Kumar Bhatia, (Mainstream, Vol. XLVII, No. 38, September 2008) emphasizes India's historical and cultural relationship with countries of Central Asia as a basis foundation of India's strategy and economic relationship. This article discusses the foundations of India:Kazakhstan relationship by addressing India's interest perceptions and objectives and to the official, and formal attitude of Kazakhstan towards India's approaches in this region. It also tries to address various problems and challenges confronting in materializing this relationship and the future prospect of the existing relationship.

The article *'India:Kazakhstan: Emerging Ties'*, by Meena Singh Roy, (Strategic Analysis, Jan:March 2002) is a very good work in the field of India:Kazakhstan relations. It examines the basis of India:Kazakhstan relations and attempt address the driving forces the emerging ties, roadblocks and means to strengthen the ties and future prospect of comparative between the two countries. The article titled as *'Nuclear Fuel and the Emerging Dynamics of Indo: Kazakhstan Relations'* by Deepti Srivastava, (Mainstream, Vol. XLVIII, No. 33, 2010) briefly summarizes the importance of Kazakhstan in India's foreign policy as a faster growing economy in Central Asia and the largest producer of crude oil uranium in the world. The article brilliantly imposes India's quest for the need of energy security and various imperatives of India: Kazakhstan relationship.

The article, *'India:Kazakhstan Relations: Challenges and Opportunities'* by Ashok Sajjanhar, published in Gateway House, (November 20, 2013) is a well:versed article which encompasses Kazakhstan's strategic position in particular and Central Asia in general and activities of Kazakhstan associated with regional initiatives and dialogue process to establish peace and stability in this region. This article also analyses an understanding of various areas of cooperation between Kazakhstan and India. The possibility of opportunities within the framework of cooperative mechanism has been well addressed. Special report of Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, *'India and Kazakhstan: New Ways Ahead'* by Zakir Hussain (February 18, 2009) provides insight upon Kazakhstan's potentiality in terms of energy related issues and resources. This article not only addresses the nature and scope of India's relations with Kazakhstan in the field of nuclear security arrangement and material but all so the governmental formalities needed for carry forwards the relationship at national and international level. Besides, economic dimensions and various approaches to economic dimension of this relationship has been well address. The report, *'India's role and Interests in Central Asia'* by Ivan Campbell, Saferworld, October 2013 is an analytical view point regarding the evolution and development India's engagement in Central Asia since the last decade India's objectives in Central Asia has been perceived from two primary concern: security and diversifying India's energy supplies in order to sustain economic growth and security the concern for the grow of radical islamist groups which may pose to India's security. In addition, the article brilliantly exposes India's need to tap commercial potentialities of Central Asia. So, these books and articles are useful and secondary sources for research.

Research Objectives

This study incorporates a wide range of perspectives to fill in the gaps in the current literature and shed light on the facts of India's foreign policy and the character of interstate economic interactions between India and Kazakhstan.

Considering the importance of these statements, the primary objective of this research is to investigate them in depth and evaluate their present applicability to India's economic cooperation with Kazakhstan. Based on this premise, this research investigates the economic ties between India and Kazakhstan and analyses the current trend of economic cooperation between the two countries. The aim of present research is to explain that the absence of direct means of transport which is the main obstacle in developing India's relation with Kazakhstan, inter regional trade are creating demand for viable transport connectivity, land linking arrangements and important transit services which could be achieved at its best by reviving and restoring the legendary silk route and also a few more routes which would directly connect India:China and Central Asia. And here Kazakhstan can play a key role in developing these routes into a reality as it has good relation with both China as well as India without irking US and Russia. This would further improve the chances of increasing cooperation between South Asia, Central Asia and China, keeping India in the centre. With this a new phase of more dynamic and vibrant relationship between India and Kazakhstan can be viewed.

With the foregoing context and factors in mind, the suggested research attempted to emphasise the trade and energy challenges and point forth strategies to fix them. This research aims to analyse how this has posed significant difficulties for the country and how the expanding Chinese factor is competing with India's interest in the country of Kazakhstan. Under the framework of India's overall engagement with Kazakhstan, this research seeks to analyse how India's economic diplomacy could be recast and implemented. This research will evaluate Kazakhstan's development into a politically and economically stable nation, as well as the strengthening of India's Central Asia strategy. India and Kazakhstan have a great opportunity to take their relationship to a new, deeper level in light of the current political, geopolitical, and economic landscape on a regional and global scale. There is no doubt that both India and Kazakhstan contribute to peace, security, progress, and development not just

in their own areas, but globally. The people of both nations, as well as the rest of the globe, stand to benefit from even closer ties between their governments, and this is why strengthening and deepening these ties is so important. The purpose of the research is to better understand the factors influencing the security situation in Central Asia. This research endeavours to provide insight on the challenges confronted by Indian policymakers as they outline border security strategy by referencing India's foreign policy practices in the realm of national security situations towards the northern frontier and the adoption of the "three evils" (terrorism, separatism, and religious fundamentalism). In order to conclude, it should be noted that despite various policy measures, the Indian government has not seen much success with its relations with Kazakhstan. Last but not least, it examines India's economic security with Kazakhstan and its ensuing behaviours, as well as its relations with the two leading countries in the area, Russia and China, using India's economic strategy in Central Asia as a case study.

Hypothesis

This research tries to address the hypothesis that:

- India's Look North Policy of 1995 and India's Connect Central Asia policy of 2012 facilitated the development of bilateral relations between India and Kazakhstan.
- Complementarities of economies of these two countries made their favourable trade partner.
- India's drive for energy resources in the international markets brings India closer to Kazakhstan.
- India:Kazakhstan have convergence of interests in security issues of the region.

Research Questions

- Why is Central Asian region an important area for South Asian region as a whole and India in particular?
- What is the ground reality of India adopting Look North Policy in 1995 and how far India was successful in achieving these objectives?
- Has Kazakhstan been any importance to help India fight back terrorism and vice:versa?
- Has India been able to set up a vibrant and dynamic economic and trade relation with Kazakhstan?

- Can India:Kazakhstan relation help India to have a strong and vibrant “Connect Central Asia Policy”?
- Which factors are working as main drivers for India’s foreign policy making towards Kazakhstan.

Research Method

This study uses a qualitative approach to look at what influences and determining factor of India's economic ties to Kazakhstan. By focusing on the “why” and the “how,” rather than just the "what," qualitative research methods provide for a more in:depth understanding of the beliefs and mindsets that influence Indian approach in the Central Asia region. The right method selection, a variety of participants and their viewpoints, the researcher and the subjects' reflexivity, and the use of various techniques and procedures are all essential components of qualitative research. Equally valuable is the fact that qualitative research methodologies provide an approach predicated on interpretation, subjectivity, and adaptability. This approach is process:oriented rather than outcome:oriented since it explicitly acknowledges the influence of the research process on the study circumstance and takes into account the interdependence of behaviour and context in the formation of experience.

A growing understanding of the limitations of quantitative research and a reaction to its rigidity led to the emergence of qualitative methodologies. While quantitative research continues to place an emphasis on measurable variables and hypothesis testing, qualitative research adopts a more philosophical stance in its pursuit of an understanding of the social sciences via the lenses of participant observation and in:depth interviews. This is crucial to the methodology adopted in this study, which goes beyond the examination of basic trade and economic data and bilateral security cooperation to evaluate the reasons behind India’s Look North policy in the development of its strategy of economic engagement with Kazakhstan. Given that the study’s direction is heavily influenced by the opinions of Indian researchers, who have diverse perspectives on India and Kazakhstan, it's important that the chosen methodology accurately represents these factors and behaviours. A qualitative methodology was selected because it accommodates these variations while providing a reasonable lens through which to conduct analysis. Nevertheless, as the study focuses on the security and economic agreements between India and Central Asia in general and interactions between

India and Kazakhstan in specific, some quantitative data has been incorporated in the analysis. Primary and secondary sources of information have been used to fill in the gaps in the research. India's Central Asia Strategy have been examined through a case study of India and Kazakhstan's relations, with an emphasis on the two countries' economic and commercial ties. The following sections identify the qualitative tools used in this work and explain the design, research questions.

Qualitative Case Study

A qualitative case study is a method of research that enables the use of a range of data sources to explore a phenomenon in its context. Author Robert Stake claims that naturalistic, holistic, ethnographic, phenomenological, and biographic research methods are all included in a qualitative case study, and that a case study is characterized as a type of research by interest in particular situations rather than by the methods of inquiry utilized. Given that they are created to meet the requirements of a specific case, case studies provide flexibility that other qualitative methodologies cannot. When a study's goal is to provide answers to how and why questions, when it is difficult to influence the behaviour of the research objects, when investigating contextual factors is essential owing to their importance to the phenomena, and when the lines between the reality and environment are blurry, a case study design may be used. Due to the lack of a formalised institutional framework for foreign policymaking, the distinctions between the context and the phenomena are hazy in the current situation, where the study's main emphasis is the factor that determines India's economic involvement with Kazakhstan and the research subjects are Indian policymaking elites.

To properly undertake a case study, the case or unit of analysis, as well as the study limitations, must be determined. The phenomena under investigation is represented by the case or unit, and the limits set by the researcher serve to demarcate what is not part of the phenomenon under investigation and to provide some indication of what is outside the scope of the study. The case for this study might be generally defined as India's economic strategy towards Kazakhstan. The specifics of the case to be examined include the following: the process: how is it that India's economic strategy is developed with respect to Kazakhstan? What are the determinants and who are the players influencing this policy? Furthermore, what are the elements that affect this policy? Although acknowledging cultural and socioeconomic dimensions, this research concentrates on a political viewpoint, as it examines

India's ties to the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan specifically within the framework of international relationships and geopolitics. An intrinsic case study served as the basis for the investigation presented here. According to this perspective, an intrinsic technique is used to offer a better knowledge of a certain case. While the conceptual and analytical frameworks produced may have minimal theoretical contributions to the discipline, that is not the major objective of the case study. Instead, the case study is intrinsic because India's economic interactions with Kazakhstan reflect a unique circumstance that is distinct of other cases. It is possible to have a single case with embedded units. Examining embedded units within a case makes it possible to examine subunits located within a larger case, as data may be analysed within the subunits independently. As a result, the first literature review's identified variables of India's economic connections with Kazakhstan may be viewed as "embedded units" inside the broader case and their influence on the strategy and vice versa can be investigated. Overall, experts perceive the qualitative single case study approach as deficient in methodological rigour and overly prone to researcher subjectivity, despite its enormous merits.

Data Collection and Analysis

Document content analysis of all available and relevant information regarding India and Kazakhstan economic relations under Look North policy and its future trends, which includes books and journals, as well as historical documents are reviewed. Primary data for this work was obtained from multiple sources, which included official Indian documents, press releases, inter-governmental legislation and agreements, speeches, annual reports, trade data. In India, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Defence (MOD), the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) play a pivotal role in shaping the country's international relations. The main source of data remains archival and library research. This work therefore relied on analysis of official discourse from these sources. The work analyses public utterances of Indian elites in print journals like The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times, The Mint, The Times of India, The Economic and Political Weekly, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy and online sites like The Diplomat and Asia Times to supplement its observations. Secondary data for this work was mostly obtained from books, journal articles, conference papers, research papers, various websites and newspaper reports. The secondary data served as a valuable source for background

information on India and Central Asia relations, aided in the creation of a conceptual framework to comprehend Indian strategy, and provided a base through which Indian opportunity and challenges in the region could be evaluated.

For the collection of secondary data, various libraries have visited in India. Some of them are Jadavpur University Central and Departmental library. On the other hand, I have visited Dr B R Ambedkar Central Library, JNU, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, library, United Service Institution of India library (USI), Parliament library, Observer Research Foundation library, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Indian Council of World Affairs Library (Sapru House), Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, and American Library.

For the analysis of qualitative data, Microsoft word have used. For the analysis of statistical data (like trade volume, price, etc.), a statistical package has used like Excel. Statistical data have presented through various diagrams and charts which has followed by an analysis.

Structure of Chapterization

This thesis contains five substantive chapters that explain India's Economic Relations with Kazakhstan under the Look North Policy in addition to the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter reveals that the background reality of the 1990s then proceeds with outlining the post:Cold War trajectories of India's foreign policy making. On the other hand, chapter provides the background for contextualizing the narrative assessment of the Look North policy. In this setting, the chapter details articulation of Look North policy with the roles played by India in Central Asia for development of a proactive engagement in the region and India's bilateral relations with Kazakhstan. India's foreign policy formulation has remained in the grips of conceptual tensions, strategic uncertainty, and geopolitical constraints. The middle two chapters explain the economic, political and energy relations and determinants of India's foreign policy and the resulting action India has taken. The chapter four explain securitization of the region and India's regional security strategy for cooperation and India's role in Kazakhstan. The final chapter provides India:Kazakhstan Relations in the Contemporary years: The China factor.

Chapter 1, *India's Look North policy and Implications for India:Kazakhstan Relations*, provides an area that is left unexplored in previous studies with reference to Kazakhstan and that tries to come up with a deeper understanding of the underlying factors behind the foreign policy behaviour of India. On the other hand, India has largely been considered economic power and economic development plays an important role in ensuring Indian stability. With reference to Central Asian region in general and Kazakhstan in particular, the energy and economic relations are growing amid better security environment since India launch its Look North policy and Connect Central Asia.

The chapter covers India's Look North policy, which emerged in the new millennium, predicated on the increasingly convergent security, economic and energy concerns that both regions shared. India's national security and energy security works as prescription for India's foreign policy towards Kazakhstan while ensuring international prestige for India. The foreign policy of India towards Kazakhstan guides about two important political processes; frontier security and innovative diplomacy as at play in Central Asian region. The common threat perceptions due to embedded and similar threats, the security cooperation between India and Kazakhstan is institutionalized in form of SCO. The political construction of identity by Indian political elite as an innovative turn towards multilateralism is a way to maintain the static image. The chapter also highlights India's need to collaborate with Kazakhstan with regard to the ever-present security threats emanating from radicalisms. India nurtures a historical, strategic relationship with Russia which, combined with furtherance of relations with the Central Asian Republics, is clearly an integral part of India's overall foreign policy objectives.

Overall, the chapter deals with the important factors that combine in the making of India's foreign policy towards Kazakhstan. India's economy has been consistently on a growth trajectory over the last few decades. The rising demand for energy resources has been in tandem with the burgeoning industrial sector. This phenomenon explains India's focus on improving bilateral and multilateral relations with the Republics in Central Asia, particularly in the economic realm.

Chapter 2, *India's Economic and Political Engagement with Kazakhstan*, provides an explanation of the India's economic engagement with Kazakhstan that shape Indian strategy in Kazakhstan. The chapter build an argument by emphasising that historically the central

Asian region played an important role in India's economic and commercial activity. India's imperative to trade, economic engagement and seek greater connectivity, and India's need for global recognition of its great power ambitions. In its exploration of India's economic imperatives to trade with Kazakhstan, the chapter highlights the macroeconomic conditions in place that facilitate trade between India and the Kazakhstan, and explain the motivations of both partners to do so. India's burgeoning economy and the movement of its trade flows away from the West toward its extended neighbourhood has contributed to the increase in trade between India and burgeoning economy. Similarly, the Kazakhstan attempt to restructure their economies away from energy exports, contribute to their interest in India as an economic partner. The benefits of increased trade with the Kazakhstan are tangible, and given the increasing prominence of Indian multinational companies this is an important driver of Indian interest in the region. There is yet another motivation for India to trade with Kazakhstan: the potential benefits such trade if conducted overland through Afghanistan and Pakistan can bring to a broader region that is in search of stability and prosperity.

The political relations are not only confined to get access of energy resources, but also supports certain political values such as democracy, protection of human rights, respect of sovereignty, and protection of environment. India's relations with Kazakhstan in Central Asia is based on political values which they share. Thus, both countries should work together to engage in the field of investment, science and technology, education, climate change, connectivity, and so on. New Delhi needs reconnoitering relations in the framework of cooperative engagements with Russia, Iran and even China. This is based on the fact that since actual trade figures are so low, it seems inevitable that there will be manifold growth in overall trade as India is able to approach the Kazakhstan in more a direct manner, with the creation of new trade routes.

The chapter also reveals, for much better economic and trade relations, it is highly recommendable that both sides engage in economic dialogue that is aim at resolving the persisting trade and economic issues at the earliest so as to make sure that these issues do not come on the way to future progress and development. Unless these issues are not resolved, satisfactory progress is not likely to come soon. As a whole it is possible to ascertain that essentially there has been a strengthening of positive dynamics in all aspects of the Kazakhstan:Indian relations. The main condition of taking them to a qualitatively new level is

full:scale realization of the arrangements achieved at the top:level and finding new ways and areas of co:operation, especially in the economic and trade spheres.

Chapter 3, *India's Energy Security in Kazakhstan*, provides India's rising energy security concerns and the role the Kazakhstan can play in assuaging these. Arguing that India sees energy cooperation with the Kazakhstan not simply as a goal unto itself, but also as a foot in the door for its trade, connectivity, the chapter explores this paradigm. The chapter explores the geopolitics of energy security and explains in detail India's energy imperatives and its need to diversify its sources, given its rapidly growing economy and the burgeoning numbers of its middle:class. It provides an overview of India's energy imports and consumption levels, and empirically explains how the CARs, with their energy:export oriented economies, can help with India's diversification agenda. It provides Kazakhstan energy reserves, the oil, gas, nuclear, wind and hydropower sectors. Chapter explain India's current energy engagement with the Kazakhstan before the conclusion outlines how India sees successful energy cooperation as a springboard for the furthering of trade and connectivity ties:and its great power aspirations.

This chapter also has examined the overall energy scenario and the intense competition among China, India and Russia for the energy resources of Central Asia, particularly of Kazakhstan. This Chapter has arrived at the inevitable conclusion that energy critically affects the global and regional geopolitics of the 21sat Century. Currently, energy is the prime motivator of geopolitical corporation. In the context of India's long:term geo:strategic and geo:economic objectives, Kazakhstan is viewed as an important source of energy resources, such as oil, natural gas and uranium or what may be termed as fossil fuels and nuclear fuel. For the purpose of gaining access to Kazakhstan's vast energy reserves, India seeks to enhance its influence by different means and strategies. Given Kazakhstan's enormous proven reserves of oil and natural gas. India's engagements are likely to increase and accelerate in the near term. In the bigger picture, India's economic gambit on focused development of trade ties with Kazakhstan and proceeding from them towards Eurasia will depend heavily on building connectivity. The evolving security situation in the region is also an important variable for confederation at present and in the foreseeable future. These circumstances and the achievement of India's objectives are explored in the following chapter.

Chapter 4, *Securitization of the Region and India's Role in Kazakhstan*, provides an internal security environment in Central Asia continues to be as fluid and reactionary as it was two decades ago, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Central Asian region played an important role in India's economic and commercial activity. This chapter discuss the security relations had also played role in developing such relations. The chapter notes that the lack of security on the north:western border hampered economic relations until recently. India and Kazakhstan growing security related cooperation helped revitalized economic activity after the launch of Look North policy. It also analyses the impact of various issues like terrorism, drug trafficking. The continuation of the writ of authoritarian regimes in the region poses complex challenges for the internal stability of the CARs. The 'crisis of legitimacy' that affects the governing elites has direct implications for the state building process, and prevents the development of effective political institutions, and of a political opposition. The nature of the regimes, also impacts the socio:economic conditions for the majority of the population of the CARs (with Kazakhstan an exception), compromising human security in the region. Finally, the relations between the CARs continue to be dogged by conflict and limited cooperation. This facilitates an environment where other actors (great and secondary powers) are able to exercise agency in the rapidly evolving geopolitical environment in Central Asia. The difference being that today the CARs are also able to control and facilitate external agency (to an extent), thereby confirming scholarly postulations about simultaneous scenarios of cooperation, competition and potential conflict occurring in the region.

For India, the Central Asian security environment coalesces with that of the greater South Asian region in the subcontinent's hinterland of Afghanistan, Kashmir and northern Pakistan. It is this combination of security threats emanating from the South and Central Asia security environments that concerns India's policy:makers the most. These threats are of three types: First, the possibility of a scenario of ethnic strife and instability in Afghanistan that could end up destabilizing the entire sub:continent and parts of Central Asia should the Taliban return to power after a Western withdrawal; Second, the constant fear of the export of Islamic radicalism and terror across the two regions, from transnational groups like the IMU, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State; And finally, the proliferation and trafficking of weapons and narcotics that is inexorably linked to terror groups that operate in the regions.

When linked with India's natural security objectives, it is easier to comprehend why security and addressing these threats are fundamental to India's Central Asia strategy. The delicate

interplay between these threats and the dilemmas posed by home grown radicalism challenges India's overall stability and future. Additionally, the need to prevent Pakistan from using Afghanistan, and a potential Taliban return to power, to seek strategic balance against India, also shapes India's security interactions with Afghanistan and Kazakhstan. In response to these compulsions, India has initiated an active security and military cooperation paradigm with the CARs in general and Kazakhstan in particular. Therefore, as a determinant of India's strategy in the region, security remains of paramount geopolitical importance to the country's elite. This chapter, in explicating this, provides a valuable contribution to answering some of the questions posted in the research hypothesis.

Chapter 5, *Factors Influencing Indian Foreign Policy: Issues in India:Kazakhstan Relations* talk about, the growth of full:scale relationships in the contemporary years between Kazakhstan and India fully meets the wishes of our countries. India's emphasis on improving economic relations bilaterally and multilaterally is evident. The recent political realisms dictate the crucial need to reevaluate the role of modern India and the further development of closer relations with the leading Asian state to be included in the priority list of the Kazakhstan foreign policy. The chapter talk about cooperation in the field of tourism sector. On the other hand, India and Kazakhstan Cultural and humanitarian ties and scientific and technical cooperation are also developing progressively. Expansion of Kazakhstan and Indian relations displays, every opportunity to raise the strategic partnership to an even higher level and to fill relations between two countries. with new meaning and content for the sake of the friendship and prosperity.

This chapter also discuss India's interactions with China in the region before evaluating the efficacy of Indian agency in Kazakhstan. The biggest cause of concern for India in Kazakhstan is China, because China wants to keep India away from the Central Asian region. The official Chinese press declares India as the geopolitical competitor. The chapter examine, in that region India finds China as an already established and important rival. China is a critical competitor for India in Kazakhstan as it is in the process of increasing its influence in the region through the construction of additional pipelines and the acquisition of further energy assets. India's strategies of economic engagement with Kazakhstan are dependent on the willingness of Nur:Sultan. The chapter also analyse, the competition among China and India for strategic influence in Kazakhstan. To add to the adverse circumstances India and China have been less than cordial in their relations irrespective of global and bilateral issues.

In Central Asia region, Kazakhstan is the major trading partner of India. In the contemporary years Kazakhstan holds great import to India particularly in terms of huge natural resources and its budding economy and as well owing to its geo: strategic location.

Contribution of the Research

The contributions of this work to the literature are now acknowledged after providing a summary of the pertinent literature and the gaps in previous research on the topic of India's economic strategy towards Kazakhstan. The absence of a coherent, India: specific conceptual framework is one of the gaps in the current literature that outlines ideas of India's economic strategy and agency in Kazakhstan.

Throughout history, the countries of Central Asia have been a strategic target for major nations. The primary justification given in the majority of currently academic publications and in a preliminary review of the literature on India's foreign policy towards Kazakhstan is to justify India's national interest in relation to the absence of a direct transportation link. Kazakhstan is home to significant energy reserves, and both China and India have been eyeing the country for expansion of their energy and political spheres. India's foreign policy is shaped by domestic concerns and the desire to meet the energy demands of its expanding economy. This research argues that Kazakhstan actually plays a role in ensuring India's energy security. India's ties with Kazakhstan are affected by a variety of factors, not just energy. India's presence in Kazakhstan is driven by the country's commitment to expanding its economic, security and commercial ties with the Asian power. This thesis takes into account that having a rising economy and expanding commercial links with Kazakhstan are India's top priorities. India quickly established diplomatic ties with Kazakhstan those ties have continued to strengthen through time. There is a great focus on the thesis that each actor, such as India and China, U.S is busy to extending their power footprint in the Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, in light of the proliferation of new participants and the growing complexity of the situation there.

So, the study concludes that the rivalry between India and China would hinder their cooperation: oriented policies, and that the expanding Chinese presence in Kazakhstan will have an impact on India's economic participation there. Rising Indian prosperity bodes well

for regional harmony and security. In order to sustain its economic influence in Kazakhstan, India needs maintain relations with Russia. India's growing prosperity will also boost the country's self-assurance and encourage it to work more closely with its Central Asian countries.

This study builds its own narrative for why South Asia and specially India are so involved in the Central Asian area, and it finds that this involvement is driven by a desire to meet the region's expanding supply of economic opportunities, national security guarantees, and quest of energy. Indian policymakers are now more conscious of the border security issue, security ties, and how unpredictable Afghanistan and hostile Pakistan have previously impeded commerce with the Central Asian states. Considering India's emphasis on developing domestic infrastructure and its understanding of the value of trade and transit routes, Kazakhstan views India as a beneficial economic partner. To facilitate trade with the countries of Central Asia, India has financed the development of Iran's Chabahar Port. The regional nations benefited from the investment in infrastructure and transportation linkages since they could more easily access global markets and collect transit fees on commercial activity. India is projected to maintain its position as a major actor in the Central Asian region due to its growing economy, expanding commerce, massive consumer market, and well-developed infrastructure.

This research suggests that India's efforts to strengthen its economic ties with Kazakhstan, both bilaterally and in the global arena, are becoming increasingly apparent. India's ambition is to eventually export its manufactured goods (make in India products) in the booming Central Asian market, and the SCO is seen as the primary platform through which this goal may be achieved. India sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a promising forum for establishing cooperative ties with other Central Asian governments for the purpose of gaining access to the economic benefits associated with such an alliance. In my opinion, the aforementioned ideas are the most realistic way to advance economic ties between India and Kazakhstan; they will make all potential areas of collaboration, especially those pertaining to energy resources, more viable moving ahead, and therefore eliminate the need to negotiate with numerous nations.

Limitations and Further Scope of Research

The dynamic and changeable nature of the subject and object of this work presents the greatest caveat. Many developments in India's energy strategy and regional objectives have been achieved since 2012, when the Connect Central Asia policy was first announced. However, on a larger scale, paradigm shifts in Indian foreign policy occurred in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the 1998 nuclear tests, and, more recently, the election of PM Narendra Modi in 2014. In the same way, there has been a lot of uncertainty about the Central Asian Republics and there will continue to be. Several developments and change had taken place even as this dissertation was being written, with the United States pulling out of Afghanistan and China making great strides towards economic domination. Consequently, despite the fact that this dissertation aims to offer a relevant addition to the subject, there is always the possibility that what is relevant now will no longer be relevant tomorrow. However, this research has been solely focused on the Indian viewpoint, offering only a scant understanding of Kazakhstan's and generally Central Asian opinions on the matter. As there is so little research on Central Asian perspectives on the region's links to India, this is a potential direction for research that was not possible within the scope of this dissertation.

The current research is based on the belief that there is opportunity for and reason to do more research on how the political processes developing in Central Asia can be compared to political processes developing in other parts of the world. Furthermore, India's economic involvement in Kazakhstan is consistent with its policy towards other resource-rich and strategically significant regions, such as Africa and the Middle East. In many ways, the political climate in Africa is analogous to that in Central Asia, with both regions boasting a strategic position, abundant natural resources, and rapidly developing economies. A Doctorate thesis covering many regions and tracing the conventional and cutting-edge methods used in India's foreign policy would have been a challenging assignment. This research serves as a basic input for a fresh and all-encompassing approach by explaining India's economic engagement with Kazakhstan under the Look North policy. This would make it easier for future research to understand India's economic policy from the perspective of regional comparison.

CHAPTER: ONE

India's Look North Policy and Implications for India: Kazakhstan Relations

Introduction

In 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated, five new nations emerged on the world map with a shared history but a remarkably distinct identity: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Together these countries form that is called Central Asia the heartland of the Asian continent. The western world calls them 'The Stans' it is colloquial as well as derogatory, a sweeping generalization that ignores the uniqueness of each country. It has been regarded by scholars as a mistake as each of these countries are distinct and increasingly very important in their own unique ways. On a geopolitical level, Russia sees them as its turf. On the other hand, America is engaging with them from a security perspective. Moreover, China is eyeing them and India has also been engaging with them diplomatically, such as by inviting their leaders as Republic Day chief guests in 2021.

Central Asia is a region rich in history and has a blend of identities and ethnicities as well as a diversity of both scenery and culture. There are shimmering mountains, stunning highlands dazzling lakes, ancient cities, bustling markets and a hospitable people. Yet for all its uniqueness Central Asia has taken a very long time to get noticed. Historians have also given many reasons which makes the region stand out. The first is the disappearance of the Silk Road. Until the 16th Century, Central Asia flourished due to the Silk Road network. It was at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. On the other hand, ideas, trade and people flowed through this region but with the advent of colonialism, the trade routes changed as sea routes between Europe and Asia emerged. Gradually the Silk Road empires lost their power. Clan based nomadic kingdoms took charge with little consciousness of their history, they concealed themselves from the world. The second reason was due to the creation of five new countries in the region with the dissolution of the USSR in the late 20th century.

They all had a common Persian suffix ‘The Stan’ (Romanized suffix Estan) a word that simply translates to ‘The Land Of’ (A Place Abounding In) each of the five states were named as lands of their dominant ethnic group, much like England, Finland and Poland were. The dominant ethnic groups in the region are the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz, the Tajiks, the Turkmen and the Uzbeks. Now to many westerners, the lands of these people are just exotic bucket list destinations that all sound the same. Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia, its capital is Astana Nur:Sultan. It is home to 19 million people and most of them are of Kazakh descent.¹ The others belong to 130 other ethnic groups. Then there is Kyrgyzstan, a smaller and more mountainous country home to 6.5 million people.² Bishkek is its capital city and the term Kyrgyz literally means ‘We are Forty’ which refers to 40 clans that once united to defend the land. To the west is Uzbekistan, one of the only two double landlocked countries in the world, meaning a landlocked country with neighbors that are also landlocked countries. So double landlocked Uzbekistan’s capital and largest city is Tashkent. A lot of Indians know the city, because of India’s second Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the historical significance of the city in resolving Indo:Pakistan tensions during the mid:1960s. To the south is Turkmenistan, its capital and largest city is Ashgabat. This country is known for its grand boulevard’s grandiose architecture and state of the art buildings all of which happen to be made a white marble. Turkmenistan is also home to the Darwaja gas crater, also known as the ‘gates to hell’ owing to the fact that it has been burning ever since it caught fire in an accident in 1971. Finally, the region includes Tajikistan, which is a smaller Republic with 9.1 million people and its capital and largest city is Dushanbe.³ These are all also young countries of just 30 years old, yet they are stable states and reasonably developed. They are rich in strategic resources like oil, gas and uranium. These Republics manage to steer clear of radicalism and their societies are largely secular. They have a strong influence of Sufism but religion is not a central factor in people’s lives there, religious education is not mandatory and religious extremism is frowned upon. One can say that political Islam is all but non:existent here. This has been the status for the last 30 years. From this perspective and with growing significance of Central Asian Republics in today's geopolitical chess board,

¹ “Kazakhstan.” UN Women-Europe and Central Asia, www.eca.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/kazakhstan, Accessed 17 Feb. 2021.

² Chepelianskaia, Olga and Madhurima Sarkar-Swaisgood. “Kyrgyz Republic climate change and disaster risk profile.” Working Paper Series, *United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific*, 2022, www.unescap.org/kp/2022/kyrgyz-republic-climate-change-and-disaster-risk-profile#. Accessed 17 Feb. 2021.

³ Skakova, Dana, and Eric Livny. “Tajikistan Diagnostic”. *European Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, March, 2020. P,7, www.ebrd.com/documents/strategy-and-policy-coordination/tajikistan-diagnostic.pdf. Accessed 17 Feb. 2021.

regional and global powers are competing for their resources diplomatically, economically and militarily. These include but are not limited to USA, Russia, China and India. After the 9/11 attack on USA, Central Asian Republics became the center of America's logistics network. US and NATO troops were stationed there in at least three of the five countries. Central Asian Republics made them a staging ground for their missions to Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan alone is said to have processed nearly 5.3 million servicemen in the last few years, that is 98% of all US military personnel involved in the war until 2014.⁴ The arrival of the Americans led to a power struggle of New Great Game. Many external actors see this region as their backyard. Some wanted the natural resources, some wanted clout and some wanted to keep a check on Islamic terrorism in this region. India was one of these countries owing to its very long history of engagement with Central Asia. Economically, Central Asian cities like Fargana, Samarkand and Bukhara played an important role in connecting India with China and Europe historically. On the other hand, cultural exchanges also flourished between the two regions, such as the spread of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and beyond. Today the importance of Central Asia for India is not merely civilizational or historical, it is also geopolitical and economic. Over the years, India's ties with Central Asian Republics ranged from trade, energy and multilateral cooperation to national security. These ties were reinforced in 2015 when Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit all five Central Asian Republics. Since then, a lot of progress has been made, particularly in the field of defense and energy sector.

Central Asia is of great strategic importance to India and it lies between two nuclear powers: Russia and China. Also, it is located at the interface between the western and Islamic world. As mentioned earlier, it is predominantly Muslim but also multi:ethnic and secular. This adds a new dimension to India's geostrategic interests. Influence in this region means an upper hand on Pakistan especially now with the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan. The Central Asian Republics share these concerns with India and they too want to stop terror from spilling over into their region as well as to shield themselves from illicit narcotics trade. In November 2021 the foreign ministers of all five Central Asian Republics were in New Delhi for the third India Central Asia Dialogue and on the other hand, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit was held in Islamabad, Pakistan. Interestingly, Central Asian

⁴ Dzyubenko, Olga. "Mission accomplished" for US air base in pro-Moscow Kyrgyzstan." *Reuters*, 2014. www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-usa-base-idUSBREA251SA20140306. Accessed 20 Feb. 2021.

Republics sent their delegates to Delhi instead of Islamabad. This was by far their biggest message of intent to improve ties with India. It is a clear sign of how new Delhi's ties with Central Asia are deepening. The region is at the heart of China's Belt and Road Initiative. So, Beijing holds a considerable financial clout here mainly through investments. China has invested US\$19.2 billion in Kazakhstan.⁵ In 2020, India's cumulative trade with all five Central Asian Republics was US\$ 2 billion while for the same period China's trade was estimated to be at least 60 billion dollars.⁶ It has often been pointed out that 'Beijing is winning them over with check:books'. Its proximity to the region also helps in this regard. Here India is suffering from two main factors:

1. The tyranny of distance.
2. Pakistan hampers its land connectivity and limits India's room to maneuver geopolitically.

The result is that many projects do not take off as bilateral trade gets told. So given all of these challenges such geopolitical cross currents it is extremely vital for India to formulate policies to strengthen its ties with Central Asia, to reclaim its shared history with the region and to build its strategic depth. This chapter is an attempt to analyze the strategic, security, energy, economic, developmental, and cultural dimensions of the Look North and Connect Central Asia strategies.

Ground Reality of India's Look North Policy and Engagement with Central Asia

The development of India's Look North policy, launched almost at the same time with economic reforms, has been remarkable. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India's foreign policy saw a new orientation. In the beginning of 1991 India launched its Look East policy and West Asia policy for the progress of bilateral relations with South East Asia and West Asia respectively.⁷ Similarly, new ideas were incorporated into the foreign policy viewpoint through which relations with countries in India's extended neighbourhood, the

⁵ Sidana, Gunjan. "China's growing engagement with Central Asia." *Indian Council of World Affairs*, Government of India, April, 2022. www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=7235&lid=4891. Accessed 17 Sept. 2022.

⁶ Bansal, Aarti. "Continuity in India's ties with Central Asia". *Observer Research Foundation*, Feb. 2021, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/continuity-india-ties-central-asia. Accessed 18 May 2021.

⁷ Muni, S. D. "India's Look East Policy: The Strategic Dimension." *Institute of South Asian Studies and National University of Singapore*, Working Paper, no. 121, February 2011. www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/121-indiaococ-ocyllook-eastoco-policy-the-strategic-dimension/. Accessed 20 Mar. 2021.

nations in the Central Asian region, received a strategic thrust. India's extended neighbourhood strategy, which was a key component of the "Gujral Doctrine" in the middle of the 1990s, where the idea of its Look North policy first emerged. It has been almost three decades since the Look North policy was launched. Observed from the political, economic and security perspectives, the Look North policy was probably designed to overcome the isolation in relation to the Central Asian region. On the other hand, Look North policy points out very significant issues in the lexicon of India's foreign policy. In the post: Cold War period, the Look North policy was clearly manifested by 'democracy and literacy' as stated by P.V. Narasimha Rao. This policy was a broad articulation of India's desire and rationale for connecting with its extended neighbourhood in Central Asia. Another immediate factor contributing to the emergence of India's Look North policy had much to do with India's domestic economic liberalization drive, which compelled the P.V. Narasimha Rao administration to pass through domestic economic and political realities. In its response, Rao's government initiated a series of economic reforms and articulated the Look North policy in the context of these reforms, particularly promotion of economic integration and democracy with Central Asian Countries.

Additionally, under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, the opening up of India's economy that had been shuffling, served to put in place a brand: new policy background. After the emergence of unipolar world, previous structures of India's foreign policy had some positive changes. Look East policy seeks to strengthen existing connections with Southeast Asia, particularly with Indonesia and Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Burma. India's foreign policy has been promoting multilateralism toward South East Asia.⁸ India was compelled to explore other choices in order to protect its economic and geopolitical interests, both regionally and internationally, and South East Asia presented a viable area of interest in this regard.⁹ Since 2015, India's Look East policy has developed into a more proactive 'Act East' policy and has both economic objectives and strategic considerations.

Therefore, as India's Look East strategy aims to improve bilateral ties with its eastern neighbours in general, and become a part of regional cooperative organisations in Southeast Asia, similarly with the Look North policy, it seeks to strengthen ties with countries

⁸ Naidu, G. V. C. "India and East Asia: The Look East Policy." *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 1, Spring 2013, pp. 53-74.

⁹ Muni, S. D. op. cit.

throughout Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, as well as with the whole of Eurasia. India and Central Asia historical, cultural and social relations date back millennia to the 3rd century BCE.¹⁰ The two civilizations have influenced each other in the field of art, architecture and language of the Achaemenian, Sassanian, Mauryan, and Gupta empires. It can be said in this perspective that India and Central Asia relations are now aimed at building a bridge towards a prosperous future engagement with mutual benefits.

India's foreign policy also recognized the growing importance of the Gulf States in West Asia, but failed to negotiate free trade agreements with the Gulf of Cooperation Council (GCC). However, India's rapid growing needs for energy imports, and the expansion of exports to the Gulf over time resulted in the GCC states becoming India's foremost trading partners. With its look east policy India signalled a new focus on its extended neighbourhood that was made possible by its internal economic reforms. In this perspective, India's foreign policy assumed new dimensions with the additional features of a Look West Asia Policy, a Connect Central Asia policy (CCAP), and a more intense engagement with Central Asia Republics. As the mutual dependencies between India and its extended neighbourhoods continued to grow apace, New Delhi bestowed high priority to the renewal of historical geographical connectivity and the construction of new corridors for transport of goods and energy to and from the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and South:East Asia.

In 1995 Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao made it clear that for India, Central Asia is an area of high priority, with an aim to stay engaged far into the future. He remarked, "We are an independent partner with no selfish motives. We only desire honest and open friendship and to promote stability and cooperation without causing harm to any third country".¹¹ As Rao would explain in 1995, the objective of the Look North policy was to draw as much as possible, cooperation and regionalization of India's foreign policy from the Central Asian countries. Furthermore, the Look North policy tries to follow the logic and successes of India's Look East policy to Southeast Asia.¹² In the contemporary times the making of foreign policy of any country based on strategic realism and prosperity gives high priority to

¹⁰ Kothari, Raj Kumar. "India's Strategic Interests in Central Asia: Expanding Vistas of Partnership in the Post-Soviet Era." *World Affairs, The Journal of International Issues*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2020, pp. 100–17. Jstor, www.jstor.org/stable/48622910. Accessed 2 Apr. 2021.

¹¹ Kavalski, Emilian. *Central Asia and the rise of normative powers: Contextualizing the security governance of the European Union, China, and India*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2012, p. 125.

¹² Ibid.

security as well as economic and national interest. Similarly, Look North policy gives the impression on India's foreign policy discourse that New Delhi has strategic goals and India's foreign policy footprint reaches outside the South Asian region. Ultimately in 1995 the launch of Look North policy reshaped India's traditional foreign policy discourse. The discourses of Look North policy reflect India's attempt to escape from the suffocating boundaries of the South Asian geopolitics.¹³ From this viewpoint, Look North policy encourage regionalization of India's foreign policy toward different geopolitical regions.

It is important to recognize that the Look North policy was also supported by strategic and diplomatic developments, which changed the outlook of India and Central Asia relations in engaging each other. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union has started a new diplomatic journey of India and Central Asian relations. For India, the end of the Cold War undermined the strategic notion of non-alignment policy that had been the bedrock to India's foreign policy. In this perspective the changing of geopolitical and strategic situation in global politics favored the development of closer political and security ties between India and Central Asian Republics. Overall, the Central Asian countries in general and Kazakhstan in particular figure well in India's Look North foreign policy outlook. During the last two decades India's economic and security relations with the Central Asia has been increasing and fruitful. After the launched of Look North policy, the initial time of period India tried to rejuvenate and revitalizing its traditional bonds with Central Asian region. As a result, India's strategic alliance with the Soviet Union underwent visible change. Indian foreign policy makers were constrained to look for new strategy in order to introduce a new dimension to the country's foreign policy. It may be remembered that the Central Asian Republics as a young nation had emerged as the geopolitical centre of the super power like US, Russia and China. The breakup of the Soviet Union created a geopolitical vacuum in Central Asian region.¹⁴ The changing strategic climate in the Central Asian region that favored the development of closer political and security ties between India and the Kazakhstan. India's Look North policy provided an opportunity and find a passage to the competitive Central Asian strategic environment and further fulfill its security and economic policy interests. As a matter of fact, Look North policy was a foreign policy instrument through which India's economic and strategic interests could be complemented.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ishikawa, Yohei. "The new Great Game: Central Asia struggles to balance three powers". *Nikkei Asia*, 20 October 2021, www.asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/The-new-Great-Game-Central-Asia-struggles-to-balance-three-powers. Accessed 5 Jan. 2022.

The Look North policy has had a strong security, economic and strategic orientation from the outset. This foreign policy aimed at developing closer relations with the landlocked region of central Eurasia. Developing relations with Kazakhstan, through this policy, has been India's strategic need for some time. Not only is India keen to gain access to Kazakhstan's uranium, oil and natural gas, but a land route through the country of Central Asia is an essential component of its broader Look North policy. India has already signed an agreement on nuclear energy with Kazakhstan, as a result Kazakhstan will supply natural uranium to India.¹⁵ India has also gained Kazakhstan's assistance in cracking down on various terrorism and separatist activity.¹⁶ In the contemporary times India's policy makers realise the importance of Kazakhstan to fight back terrorism and vice versa.

As a matter of fact, India's Look North policy has tremendously helped India to integrate with Kazakhstan and India's engagement with Central Asian Countries has been the pillar of India's Look North policy and this policy decision has facilitated rapid development in ties with the region. Moreover, an observable progress in the economic liberalization policy has been in the form of an increasing foreign direct investment between India and Kazakhstan. India faces competition from China for influence in Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular. On the other hand, the key potential obstacle to its Look North policy is a hostile Pakistan and volatile Afghanistan rather than China. The fact that India has opened up its economy to international trade and has launched foreign policy initiatives to knock up closer trade and economic relations with neighbours and extended neighbours is no secret. As a result, there are enormous economic opportunities for the Central Asian Republics as a part of India's emerging trade strategy. In other words, the Look North policy represents India's desire to become recognised as a regional role model for a secular, multiethnic order. It is important to remember that India's post-Cold War foreign policy trajectories had a significant impact on the Look North foreign policy discourse, hereafter this foreign policy action did not develop in a vacuum.¹⁷

Though Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular have enormous untapped natural resources, the region seems to have been more or less neglected by the Indian policy makers in New Delhi. Kazakhstan's natural gas reserves measure approximately 100 trillion cubic

¹⁵ Embassy of India, Government of India, Astana, Kazakhstan, www.indembastana.gov.in/page/agreements-signed/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2021.

¹⁶ India, Kazakhstan sign five key agreements, *The Hindu*, 8 July 2015, p 5.

¹⁷ Kavalski, Emilian, Op. cit. p. 138.

feet, and are primarily located in the Caspian region.¹⁸ Kazakhstan was one of the top ten fastest-growing economies until 2015, mostly as a result of the growth of its abundant oil, gas, and coal resources as well as its export-oriented strategies. By the 12th-highest proven crude oil reserves in the world, the nation is the largest oil producer in Central Asia. Since 2002, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) per person has increased sixfold.¹⁹ India has its own interests to open trade routes to Central Asian region via Chabahar port in Iran. Therefore, India is also desperate to get as much oil, natural gas and uranium from Kazakhstan. After the end of the Cold War and economic liberalisation, the development model resulting from Look North policy has tremendous potential to make India's foreign policy successful.

Definitely, India is looking North to balance its connections with the West. In fact, it comes out that the objectives underlying the Look North policy include the need for national security and greater energy security for Indian agency in the Central Asian region in general and Kazakhstan in particular. Huge natural energy resources in Kazakhstan's territory have brought about a competition/rivalry between India and China for controlling the precious uranium and oil which are expected to be necessary to sustain the high economic development both countries are currently enjoying. India values economic and energy strategy towards Kazakhstan as an important and mutually beneficial area of cooperation. Both countries have signed a contract on exploration in the petroleum sector and energy cooperation agreements in 2010-2011.²⁰ The two countries have also signed an agreement about future supplies of uranium to India, as a result Kazakhstan has delivered 5000 metric tons of uranium to India in 2015-2019.²¹

India's Look North policy has to look Kazakhstan first. In contemporary times India's trade volume with Central Asia has been increasing day to day. Kazakhstan emerges as a significant uranium exporter to India and has a huge impact on the country's overall economic development in addition to fulfilling India's energy needs. India's Look North

¹⁸ Asian Development Bank. *Central Asia Atlas of Natural Resources*. 2010, p. 55.

¹⁹ International Energy Agency and European Union. *Kazakhstan Energy Profile*. June 2021, p. 2. www.iea.org/reports/kazakhstan-energy-profile. Accessed 8 Nov. 2021.

²⁰ Pradhan, Ramakrushna. "India-Kazakhstan energy relations: Looking back and looking ahead." *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 13. No. 2, August, 2022, p. 103-118. doi.org/10.1177/18793665221093798. Accessed 17 Dec. 2022.

²¹ Akhmetkaliyeva, Saule "Recent Developments in India Kazakhstan Energy Cooperation." *Eurasian Research Institute*, akhmet yassawi university, Weekly e-bulletin, July 2015. www.eurasian-research.org/publication/recent-developments-in-india-kazakhstan-energy-cooperation/. Accessed 27 Nov 2021.

policy is meaningless if it does not have any impact on country's economic development. It has also been observed that India's economic engagement with Kazakhstan has been expanding. Through various types of agreements that India signs with countries in the Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular, the interest of energy security and economic engagement should be an important element.

India has agreed to establish a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan based on shared values and commitment to democracy aimed at a broad-based development of relations in the political, security, economic, energy, cultural, military and technology fields. In this regard, India has many joint ventures in Kazakhstan. After the launch of Connect Central Asia policy, Indian industries have set up offices there and are actively investing in Kazakhstan.²² In view of strategic and security concerns, India has to engage with Kazakhstan and allocate a special position in its foreign policy. It will be mutually beneficial if India engages Kazakhstan much more closely economically, especially in the field of uranium and oil exploration. India gratefully remembers Kazakhstan's support which made possible India's association with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Kazakhstan is also a strong supporter of India's bid for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

India's contemporary foreign policy towards Kazakhstan has four dimensions: economic, energy, strategic and security. These factors are closely linked. If India is to be a credible participant in the Central Asian security architecture, increasing the current level of economic engagement is essential. India's extended neighbourhood recognises its potential as a strategic partner, largely because of its economic potential and expansion. Despite the hurdles, it has been observed that in the last two decades, India and Kazakhstan's economic relationship has expanded rapidly.

Initially India's Look North policy was driven by secularism, democracy, and literacy mainly on the part of India's foreign policy. But in contemporary times, India:Central Asia relations in general and India:Kazakhstan relations in particular, Strategic factors have risen in importance as a dominant force. Moreover, implication of Look North policy for India and Kazakhstan relations now reflects imperatives from both sides. Now India's policy makers understand that after the end of the Cold:War Look North policy was very necessary to

²² Singh Roy, Meena. "India-Kazakhstan: Emerging ties." *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2002, pp. 48-64.

rejuvenate historical ties and to reconnect with young Central Asian Republics. There is much talk about India's role as a balancer in Central Asia. Members of SCO like Kazakhstan and Russia have often expressed an optimism in increasing Indian engagement with Central Asia as a counter balance to China's geopolitical sway. It is obvious that India would want to pursue this position in foreign policy objectives toward Kazakhstan. India and China have been portrayed by some geopolitical analysts as natural competitors for influence in Kazakhstan. After the development and enactment of the Look North policy it encouraged regional cooperation with the Central Asian states and facilitated the overall bilateral relations between India and Kazakhstan. As a result, India has been expanding its defence and commercial ties with Central Asian nations. India's role in the Central Asian region as part of an overall Look North approach is limited while at the same time, Indian foreign policy makers acknowledge the significance of international trade routes through Central Asia.

India's Look North Policy and Strategic Objectives

As India's Look North foreign policy develops, it is extending beyond its initial objective of seizing the opportunities presented by the energy sector and economic growth of Central Asia. India's economy has been expanding steadily; thus, the strategy now has a much wider purpose. Many objectives have been pursued under the Look North policy during the years since its inception including regional economic integration, reform and liberalisation, sustainable economic growth, and improvement of the security governance in the region. The following paragraphs cover the main focus areas of the Look North policy.

The objectives of the Look North policy were to promote peace and mutual property, democracy, secularism, stability and integrity of Central Asian republics, and economic integration in Central Asian region. India's strategy lies in supporting the development and stabilization of democratic and secular political systems in Central Asia based on the assumption that the domino effects of the spread of religious extremism could endanger India's own domestic peace and security. An obvious extension of this logic makes it understandable that India opposes racial and religious extremism in the region. India therefore saw an opportunity to enhance its position in Central Asia by aiding the democratic practice and exchange its own experience in the power vacuum created by the disintegration

of the USSR. The narratives underlying the Look North policy are heavily influenced by this idea.²³ This strategy also focused on integrating Central Asia through collaboration agreements in the areas of energy, security, and economy in the stage of regionalism, which will help India in expanding its influence in the region for security and strategic success with a primary focus on Kazakhstan. India realised that its extended neighbours in the north have a huge reserve of natural resources. Indian foreign policy makers came to realise that the energy economy of Central Asian could fulfill its domestic energy requirements. Look North policy wanted to expand ties with these enormous hydrocarbon reserves economies of Central Asia and to encourage regional economic integration. As a consequence, the most prominent example of regionalism in recent times is India's permanent membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Scholars Suryakant Nijanand Bal and Nirmala Joshi often mention the need for India to adopt a proactive foreign policy with Central Asia under the Look North strategy.²⁴ Rao's approach to the Central Asia was shaped by strategic consideration, and the strategic engagement with Kazakhstan served as a balancing factor in India's dealing with Pakistan and China. Political instability in Afghanistan and Central Asia remained the key factor in the rise of terrorism related threats to northern parts of India and as such the strategic cooperation between India and Central Asia was crucial to India's national security. On the other hand, the decision to liberalize the Indian economy resulted in significant changes in India engagement with the Extended neighbourhood. In this perspective, the immediate objectives of Look North policy were to revive trade and economic ties with Central Asia which were important to India.

According to Suryakant Nijanand Bal, India used a variety of strategies in its effort to foster regional cooperation through the strategic Look North policy. With regard to Central Asia, India adopted a strategic stand to restart political and economic relations with the Central Asian nations. In addition, this policy seeks stability in Afghanistan and Kashmir, which is only a stepping stone to long term peaceful relations with Central Asia. In this framework, India initiated a promotion of democracy in Afghanistan through the lens of Look North policy. Geopolitical peace of Afghanistan is very crucial for India's future strategic engagement with Central Asia in general, Kazakhstan specially. India has been contributing

²³ Kavaliski, Emilian, Op. cit. pp.90-98.

²⁴ Bal, Suryakant Nijanand. *Central Asia: A Strategy for India's Look-north Policy*. Lancer Publishers, 2004. pp. 3-10.

more and more resources to the development of democratic institutions in Afghanistan since the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, in order to reform their (Central Asia) political and economic systems and to manage the complexity of their multiethnic and pluralist communities, Central Asian republics looked towards India for assistance and direction. The republics of Central Asia have no interest in Islamic fundamentalism and are determined about upholding democracy, secularism, and the free market economic system. While Kazakhstan remains one of the most stable of the Central Asian states, there are still concerns in administrative circles about Islamic violence becoming a serious threat in the future. As a result, foreign policy of India emphasized on proactive policy in Kazakhstan and replace its old reactive attitude.²⁵ India's Look North policy also suggested an increase in economic interaction with Central Asia in sectors such as trade, investments, science and technology, tourism, etc. and to forge energy links with several countries of this region as a means to strengthen economic understanding.

In this context, proactive Look North strategy has prioritized India's regional engagement with Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular. Look North policy also highlighted shared secular principles and called attention to challenges including terrorism, narco-funded violence, religious extremism, and ethnic violence. India's involvement with the region was motivated by these common security objectives. According to some policy makers, this was expressed through the Look North strategy, which placed an emphasis on common problems and a desire to promote stability and cooperation.²⁶ From this perspective, India and Kazakhstan have a convergence of interests in security issues of the region. Additionally, Kazakhstan served as India's foothold in the region. In 2015, India and Kazakhstan signed a bilateral defence and Military Technical Cooperation agreement. India's military cooperation with Kazakhstan in the region has been significant for both countries. A joint declaration called 'Tej Kadam' between India and Kazakhstan was released in 2015 during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Kazakhstan and discussed the growing threat of terrorism in the region.²⁷ The battle against terrorism and extremism in the region will continue to be a priority for both nations. As a result, nearly 200 members of the Kazakh Defense Forces have received military training in India. A joint military drill called KAZIND:2018 between the

²⁵ Kavalski, Emilian. *India and Central Asia: The Mythmaking and International Relations of a Rising Power*. IB Tauris, 2010.p.86.

²⁶ Menon, Rhea, and R. Sharanya. "Realizing India's strategic interests in Central Asia." *Carnegie India*, 1 December, 2019. www.carnegieindia.org/?lang=en. Accessed 5 Feb. 2021.

²⁷ "Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Kazakhstan". Embassy of India, Astana, Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 11, July 2015.

two countries was also conducted.²⁸ Strong strategic cooperation fostered by a number of recent high-profile visits has helped the relationship to flourish.

The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), was institutionalized at the initiative of Kazakhstan, which has recently emerged as a significant organisation bolstering peace, stability, and security in Asia. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has emphasized on a transformation of the CICA into the Organization on Security and Development in Asia. President Nazarbayev expressed appreciation for India's ongoing assistance with CICA's anti-terrorism efforts.²⁹ Therefore, the security scenario and counter terrorism efforts in the region are very significant for both the countries and as such issues will determine the security scenario in Central Asia as well as Kazakhstan's stability. Gradually, the importance of Kazakhstan in preventing the spread of terrorism in the region is increasing.

However, the Look North policy's attempts to serve India's specific strategic interests in Central Asia could also be seen in the context of a comprehensive conceptual agenda. Under this policy programme, the government of India revealed certain specific interests in Central Asia: India's interests are mainly in terms of access of oil and gas for its own energy needs and economic development. Secondly, there are various security challenges including terrorism, drug and arms trafficking especially stemming from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Thirdly, the opposition from Pakistan and China as a strategic obstruction for India in pursuing a strategic depth towards Central Asia.³⁰ India's Look North policy emphasizes the development of proactive engagement that priority in the promotion of economic reforms in Central Asia that result in more rapid and consistently distributed growth. In the beginning of liberalisation, privatization and globalisation in India the economic engagement with Kazakhstan remained the focal point of India's engagement in the region. Economic and energy relations between both the countries should be maintained for the sustaining India's economic growth. It is said that without robust trade and economic ties, India may face difficulties in maintaining the strategic and energy security goals of the Look North

²⁸ "India, Kazakhstan to boost defence and military cooperation". Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. October 2018. www.indbiz.gov.in/india-kazakhstan-to-boost-defence-and-military-cooperation/ Accessed 10 Feb. 2021.

²⁹ "Tej Kadam". Embassy of India, Astana, Kazakhstan, www.indembastana.gov.in/news_detail/?newsid=97. Accessed 11 Feb. 2021.

³⁰ Kavalski, Emilian. *India and Central Asia: The Mythmaking and International Relations of a Rising Power*. IB Tauris, 2010. pp. 83-85.

programme.³¹ Furthermore, within the portrait of the Look North policy India tried to encounter China in Central Asia and create a diverse set of perspectives.

India's Connect Central Asia Policy and Proactive Engagement in Post 2012 Era

Over the years, India's Central Asian policy has grown in importance and it continues to be one of the major focus areas of the country's diplomatic efforts. In addition to this, Central Asia is becoming an important geopolitical arena, with various regional and global powers vying for influence and access to the region's abundant oil and energy resources. Recently, extra-regional powers such as China and Russia have becoming prominent players in the region. At the same time, the United States, a significant actor in the region, is trying to adapt its approach to the Central Asian Republics along the lines of the shifting geopolitical landscape. Under such circumstances, India's Connect Central Asia policy examines options for India's potential future engagement with the region.


India announced its new Connect Central Asia policy in 2012, which is focused on a proactive approach to politics, economics, and people-to-people relations with Central Asian countries. The role that India hopes to play in the near future in Central Asia is reflected in this approach to policy. One of the goals here is to reestablish ties with a region with which India has a shared history spanning generations. Moreover, it is now increasingly clear that India's strategic and economic objectives reflect its perspective on the role it wishes to play in Central Asia. Regaining ties to the region is the goal. India has historical and cultural ties that influence multilateral cooperation. E. Ahmad, Minister of State for External Affairs, explained the new strategy in Bishkek in June 2012 during the inaugural India:Central Asia Dialogue. He said the following:

*“India is now looking intently at the region through the framework of its ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy, which is based on pro-active political, economic and people-to-people engagement with Central Asian Countries, both individually and collectively”.*³²

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ahamed, E. “India’s “Connect Central Asia’ Policy”. Keynote Address at First India-Central Asia Dialogue, Bishkek. June 12, 2012. www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19791/. Accessed 12 Oct., 2021.

Objectives of India's 'Connect Central Asia' policy³³



With the new tagline of Commerce, Connectivity, Consular, and Community, India's Connect Central Asia policy aims to foster closer connections with the Eurasian area.³⁴ It is interesting to note in this regard that Kyrgyzstan was the host for the first India:Central Asia dialogue in 2012, while Kazakhstan hosted the second in 2013. In order to provide insights to the governments on both sides, this Track:II India:Central Asia Dialogue has been set up with the aim of establishing a regular annual roundtable platform between academics, scholars, government officials, and business representatives from India and the Central Asia Republics. This indicates that India clearly placed a high value on the Connect Central Asia strategy and

³³ Source: Keynote Address by MoS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue, June 12, 2012. www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19791/. Accessed 12 Oct. 2021.

³⁴ Singh Roy, Meena. "India's 'Connect Central Asia' Policy: Building Cooperative Partnership." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, vol. 8, no. 3, July-September, 2013, pp. 301-316.

the region, as evidenced by the fact that both the External Affairs Minister SM Krishna and Vice President Hamid Ansari conducted follow-up visits there in July and November of 2012.

As stated earlier, the goal of India's Connect Central Asia policy is to provide a clear and comprehensive blueprint for the country's proactive engagement with Central Asian nations, in particular Kazakhstan. The policy's foundation lies in expanding India's steadfast and long-term strategic interest as well as serving to be commensurate with India's growing stature on the international platform. The Central Asian University, being established in Bishkek is only one example of how India's Connect Central Asia programme is laying an emphasis on India's soft power in the region. It is also worth noting that the Connect Central Asia policy is not drastically different from the others because it did not emerge in isolation but rather as an interactive improvement over prior Look North policy and should be interpreted as such. While, the Connect Central Asia policy is a step in the right direction and strengthening the preexisting strategic-security paradigm of collaboration.³⁵ Therefore, the Connect Central Asia policy brought new features to India's approach to the region.

In security and geopolitical terms, the Connect Central Asia policy aims to build on the existing strong bilateral partnerships that India maintained with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to confront an impending issue that of Afghanistan, and its destiny following the removal of Western soldiers. To achieve this goal, high-level visits and strategic conversations would continue, along with bolstering security and military collaboration and preparing joint training exercises. In this sense, Connect Central Asia may be seen as India's attempt to link Afghanistan to the region, with the assistance of Kazakhstan's efforts to combat terrorism and extremism by implementing a regional strategy for Afghanistan's economic growth. The Connect Central Asia policy further affirms Afghanistan's importance as a major part of any overland access route as well, addressing the necessity of strategic collaboration between India and Central Asia to ease trade between South and Central Asia.³⁶ The policy sought to increase India's trade with Central Asia despite its focus on the trade of energy and natural resources. Under this policy, India intended to boost its economic prospects by capitalizing on its technology skills in non-traditional areas like banking, medicines, and education, and

³⁵ Ahamed, E. 2012. Op. cit.

³⁶ Muzalevsky, Roman. "India's 'Connect Central Asia' Policy Seeks to Compensate for Lost Time." *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 9, no. 176, September 2012. www.jamestown.org/program/indias-connect-central-asia-policy-seeks-to-compensate-for-lost-time/. Accessed 1 Nov. 2021.

expanding its network of connections between people. In addition, we plan to increase our efforts to provide direct flight links to the region's major cities.

The other goal of India's Connect Central Asia policy has been to promote India as a powerful nation by leveraging India's experience and competence in developmental cooperation, innovation, and nation building. India aspires to make up for decades of lost ground to China and other powers by leveraging its existing technological, connectivity, and innovative strengths. New Delhi places an emphasis on regional exchanges as a means of finding regional solutions to regional problems and this has been reaffirmed by the Connect Central Asia policy. It promotes regional infrastructure development that will connect South Asia to Eurasia via the Central Asian Republics (INSTC for example).

The recent pledges made by India to support the continuation of the Chabahar port project in Iran may be regarded as the first step in establishing an alternative route to Central Asia. For India, Chabahar Port is crucial since it serves as the gateway that opens the route for trade and commerce with Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing the passage through Pakistan, a nation inimical to India. The proximity of the Chabahar Port to the landlocked nation of Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries, has earned for it the moniker "The Golden Gate".³⁷ In addition to its strategic location, Chabahar holds the promise of connecting the important business growth centers in South Asia (India), the Middle East (Dubai), Central Asia and Afghanistan.³⁸ The Iranian port of Chabahar will be Delhi's primary 'Gateway' to Afghanistan and onward to landlocked parts of Central Asia.³⁹ The transit potential presented by the port for India's access to Afghanistan and Central Asia has been well established. To give shape to their strategic plans, India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed a MoU for the development and construction of transport infrastructure, with Chabahar port as the nodal hub in the trade corridor linking India with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

As highlighted in an article published in the *Indian Council of World Affairs*, the development of the Chabahar Port and India's investments must be considered in the context of the growing rivalry between India and China, particularly in relation to the development of

³⁷ "Why Iran's Chabahar port is important for India". *The Economics Times*, October 23, 2014.

³⁸ "India's Chabahar port plan is to counter China's plan to develop Gwadar port: Media", *The Economics Times*, July 12, 2018.

³⁹ Dave, Bhavna. "Resetting India's Engagement in Central Asia: From Symbols to Substance". Policy Report, *Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, January, 2016, p. 9. www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PR160202_Resetting-Indias-Engagment.pdf; Accessed 2 Oct. 2021.

the China:Pakistan:Economic:Corridor (CPEC) and China's commitment to spend US \$ 46 billion to develop the Corridor and the Gwadar Port.⁴⁰ These issues will be discussed in greater details in chapter 5. Furthermore, in an article published by the *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, Harsh V. Pant argues that India continues to face problems while developing the Chabahar Port as it does not enjoy a significant position in Iran's foreign policy. In the meantime, Iran is contending with the economic sanctions imposed on it by the US. Moreover, the instability in Afghanistan has the potential to impede the development and full activation of the Chabahar project.⁴¹ The Chabahar Port is expected to act as a counter to Pakistan's Gwadar Port which is barely 70 kms away and is being developed by China.⁴² It must also be noted in this regard that India happens to be a founder of the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) by way of a 7,200:km multi:modal network from Iran to Russia.⁴³ The corridor allows India to bypass Pakistan and access Central Asia and beyond.

More recently, governmental level strategic talks between India and Central Asia took place in 2019 and as per the Ministry of External Affairs, in this meeting India proposed the creation of the India:Central Asia Development Group (CADG) to advance the development relationship between India and Central Asian nations.⁴⁴ It is essential to generate investment, particularly in the area of Small and Medium Enterprises:joint initiatives in order to improve and encourage trade, business as well as to create regional and international transport corridors. This would include developing the transit and transport potential of their countries. The same report by the Ministry of External Affairs mentions that the development of the International North:South Corridor (INSTC) and India's efforts to modernize the infrastructure of the Iranian port of Chabahar, which could serve as a vital link in trade and

⁴⁰ Bhattacharjee, Dhrubajyoti. "China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)," *Indian Council of World Affairs*, Issue Brief, May, 2015. P. 2. www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=5103&lid=835. Accessed 3 Oct. 2021.

⁴¹ Pant, Harsh V "India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port: Choppy Waters." *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, April 2, 2018. www.csis.org/analysis/india-iran-cooperation-chabahar-port-choppy-waters. Accessed 10 Oct. 2021.

⁴² Stobdan, Phunchok "To make Chabahar a 'Game Changer' Central Asian states need to be roped in", *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, December 12, 2017. www.idsa.in/idsacomments/to-make-chabahar-a-game-changer-central-asian-states_pstobdan_121217. Accessed 4 Nov. 2021.

⁴³ Salimova, Gulzar. "International North-South Transport Corridor: South Caucasus-centred approach." *The South Caucasus-centred Transport Hub: The Crossroads of the East-West and the North-South Corridors*, Edited by Mahir Humbatov, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, pp. 99-121.

⁴⁴ "India-Central Asia dialogues aim to boost bilateral trade & bilateral defence cooperation." Ministry of External Affairs, India, Economic Diplomacy Division, October. 2020. www.indbiz.gov.in/india-central-asia-dialogues-aim-to-boost-bilateral-trade-bilateral-defence-cooperation/. Accessed 16 Mar. 2022.

transportation communications between the markets of Central and South Asia, are both commendable in this context.⁴⁵

To facilitate trade, a good logistics company should be hired, and going forward, the Chabahar port should be used as the port of favorite for trade with Central Asia. Most recently India hosted the India:Central Dialogue in 2020 to strengthen the bilateral ties between India and Central Asia.⁴⁶ Promoting connectivity and development alliances between the two regions was emphasised, as well as igniting trade and business alliances by removing the connectivity barrier. For important development initiatives in the areas of connectivity, energy, etc., India is providing this region with an additional \$1 billion line of credit.⁴⁷ The establishment of the India:Central Asia Business Council (ICABC) was a result of coordinated efforts to increase trade and economic cooperation and to foster direct business relationships between India and the Central Asian nations.⁴⁸

When it was announced, most policy makers in India and Europe saw the Connect Central Asia policy as a breath of new air and an opportunity for India to correct the major flaws in its prior strategy for the region. Due to its strategic minerals, Kazakhstan immediately became the cornerstone of India's "Connect Central Asia" initiative in 2012. Due to Kazakhstan's strategic location, undeveloped energy potential and mineral richness, India accords Kazakhstan a high priority under the Connect Central Asia programme. In this light, we can assert that the formulation of the Connect Central Asia policy helped Kazakhstan and India establish highly crucial bilateral ties.

Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of Kazakhstan for India

Kazakhstan has been one of the most vociferous advocates of regional cooperation. The primary goals of Kazakhstan's foreign policy discourse are the development of a politically stable, economically sustainable, and peaceful region. These goals are in line with India's Look North policy, which aims to promote democratic peace, security government, and shared prosperity across the Central Asian region, as argued by Salimova.⁴⁹ In this

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Salimova, Gulzar. Op.cit.

perspective, a vital aspect of India's relations with Kazakhstan has always been the compatibility of their strategic interest at the regional level. In this regard, certain common areas of common interest between India and Kazakhstan may be discerned and these include but are not limited to, the perceptions about the non-traditional security threats, the origin of the sources of these threats, drug trafficking and illegal arms trade. The political instability in Afghanistan is a major security risk for neighboring countries in Central Asia as well as parts of northern India. Most Kazakh and New Delhi policymakers consider drug-related crimes as the primary security concern emerging out of Afghanistan. According to UN estimates from 2010, Afghanistan was the primary source of opium for the world's heroin supply, providing approximately 80 per cent of the world's opium.⁵⁰ Kazakhstan and India also understand that regional peace and prosperity are essential to the country's economic wellbeing. In this perspective, India and Kazakhstan have convergence of their national security interest of the region. The proposed TAPI gas pipeline would go from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan before reaching India. As per a report published by the CSIS Russian and Eurasian Program, this plan has strong support in Kazakhstan.⁵¹ To a lesser but still noticeable extent, India and Kazakhstan have been major contributors to humanitarian assistance in volatile Afghanistan.

Over the last several decades, the question of energy security has acquired immense significance for India's economic development. India is trying to enhance its presence in Kazakhstan for energy security and is pursuing a proactive foreign policy, while Kazakhstan is keen to restore its influence in India's petroleum and uranium import markets. In this regard, the expansion of Kazakhstan's trade links with India, as discussed earlier, is very encouraging. The core element of this approach is the Indian government's financing in rapid industrialization as well as transit and energy infrastructure throughout Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan.

The importance of Kazakhstan to India is also based to a certain extent on its role as an important node in the large Central Asian and Caspian basin zone. This is an area that is rich

⁵⁰ "The International Heroin Market". Office of National Drug Control Policy, The White House, President Barak Obama, www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/global-heroin-market. Accessed 4 Oct. 2021; also see Kermani, Secunder. "Meth and heroin fuel Afghanistan drugs boom". BBC News Afghanistan, December 2021. www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59608474. Accessed 9 Feb. 2022.

⁵¹ Kuchins, Andrew C., Jeffrey Mankoff, and Oliver Backes. "Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Kazakhstan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests." A Report of the CSIS Russian and Eurasian Program, *Centre for strategic and International Studies, Rowman and Littlefield*, June, 2015. p. 22.

in energy resources and might serve as a gateway for trade and communication between Europe and Asia in the near future. Kazakhstan's geopolitics in recent years are being significantly influenced by energy, which has become the single most important force. The geopolitical prominence of the region can be further attributed to both its advantageous geographical position and its abundance of natural resources. As a result, India's foreign policy in Kazakhstan is embedded within the country's broader geopolitical goals in the region, which include the development of economic and infrastructure links, the suppression of terrorism, separatism and extremism, as well as participation in multilateral organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Nonetheless, India has been trying to increase its economic and energy cooperation with Kazakhstan by expanding its sphere of influence in the region.

Because of Kazakhstan's strategic location, the Central Asian region is especially vulnerable to shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Kazakhstan's oil industry is one of the largest in the world, which allows the country to play a special and pivotal role in the balance of power in the region. China and India, two of the most populous countries in Asia, are both interested in Kazakhstan given the country's huge energy reserves. As a result, the two nations are redoubling their efforts to secure the region for their own benefit and survival. Therefore, India and China's energy policy in Kazakhstan have considerably broader and deeper repercussions. India and China are strategically placed to compete with one another in Central Asia and recently, state-owned enterprises from India and China have fought for Kazakh oil and natural gas, to meet this very end.

It may also be argued that energy security is not only a top political and economic priority for India, but also a critical role in maintaining international peace and order. As a result, Kazakhstan is working to establish positive energy interactions with superpowers such as the United States, Russia, and India. It's also crucial to point out that Kazakhstan has showed its support for strengthening a regional energy cooperation framework that is balanced among all the powers. The main objective of Kazakhstan's national energy strategy is to supply steady and diverse hydrocarbon supplies to the world markets. Therefore, India is currently and prospectively the best market for Kazakh energy exports. One hurdle in this regard has been the fact that the pipelines connecting India to Central Asia via Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran would need to pass through Pakistan and Afghanistan. Due to the huge distances and high costs involved, there has been a noticeable difficulty for India to

implement Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipelines (TAPI) and Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline (IPI). Nevertheless, India is making regional energy strategy a priority.

Over the years, India's approach to Kazakhstan has gained considerable momentum, and the country's simultaneous growth as a major economic and nuclear power enables it to take a leading position in its immediate neighbourhood, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. However, it is also observed by the Ministry of External Affairs that the Indian stance on the region has undergone some noticeable shifts. Former prime minister of India Pandit Nehru and Indira Gandhi visited Almaty in 1955.⁵² In 1993, the Prime Minister of India travelled to Kazakhstan, which served as a catalyst for further developing relations between India and Kazakhstan. In June of 2002, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, travelled to Kazakhstan to participate in the 1st CICA Summit and hold bilateral talks.⁵³ In 2011, Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, travelled to Astana. Several agreements between India and Kazakhstan were finalized and signed during the visit to both countries. Three of the most significant were:

Firstly, Agreement between ONGC Videsh Limited and KazMunaiGas on the Satpayev Exploration Block.

Secondly, Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and Thirdly, Joint Action Plan for strengthening the Strategic Partnership between India and Kazakhstan.

Joshi mentions that on a single trip in 2015, Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi became the first Indian leader ever to travel to all five of the Central Asian states.⁵⁴ In addition, in August of 2005, ONGC, an Indian government-owned business, merged with Mittal Industrial Group to form OMEL, an organisation that has since made significant efforts to purchase energy assets in Kazakhstan. Similarly, in terms of commerce and investments, Kazakhstan is India's most important partner in the Central Asian region. The value of goods traded between India and Kazakhstan in 2018 was close to US\$ 1.2 billion,

⁵² “India-Kazakhstan Relations”. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2014, www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/KAZAKHSTAN_DEC2014.pdf. Accessed 14 Oct. 2022.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Joshi, Heena. “India restores historic ties with Central Asian nations under PM Modi: Former envoy to Kazakhstan”. *ANI news agency*, September 2022. www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/india-restores-historic-ties-with-central-asian-nations-under-pm-modi20220904022123/ Accessed 14 Oct. 2022.

indicating a moderate level of economic involvement of India in Kazakhstan.⁵⁵ The reports published by the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) amply shows that during the period of the coronavirus pandemic in the year 2020, exports from Kazakhstan totaled US\$1.98 billion, while exports from India totaled US\$ 325 million.⁵⁶

It has been estimated that Kazakhstan's oil reserves are worth 30.0 thousand billion barrels (bb) according to the BP Statistical Report 2021. Additionally, Kazakhstan has a considerable potential for natural gas. In comparison to the rest of the world, it has proven gas reserves of 2.3 trillion cubic metres and estimated reserves of 5 trillion. (See the figure below). Along with this, Kazakhstan's unexplored oil reserves in the Kashagan and Tengiz regions have become the focus of strategic conflicts between major countries due to its low domestic consumption and rising export capability.

According to the Oil and Gas Journal, however, Kazakhstan has shown to be sitting on massive crude oil and natural gas reserves, (See figure 1 and 2) making it Eurasia's second:largest endowment after Russia and the world's 12th:largest after the United States. In the area around the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan has the most extensive oil deposits. As output from the productive Kashagan and Tengiz oilfield continues to rise, Business Monitor International predicts that Kazakhstan's net exports of crude oil will range between 1.42 and 1.55mbpd through 2027. Indian businesses can benefit greatly from Kazakhstan's enormous hydrocarbon resources and the country's recent investment in massive production and transportation infrastructure projects. As part of its efforts to diversify the country's energy mix, the government of Kazakhstan has also resumed its pursuit of developing a nuclear energy programme.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ "India-Kazakhstan Relations". Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2019.

⁵⁶ "India and Kazakhstan import & export." www.oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ind/partner/kaz?dateAvailableSelectorCountry1=exportDateCountry1Available18. Accessed 2 Oct. 2022.

⁵⁷ "Energy Resource Guide: Kazakhstan Oil and Gas". International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. www.trade.gov/energy-resource-guide-oil-and-gas-kazakhstan. Accessed 12 July 2022.

Figure 1:Kazakhstan’s Total Proved Reserves of Oil⁵⁸





Figure 2:Kazakhstan’s Total Proved Reserves of Natural Gas⁵⁹




⁵⁸ Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, 70th edition, July 2021, www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2022.

⁵⁹ Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, 70th edition, July 2021.

Furthermore, Kazatomprom dominates the market for the sale of natural uranium, which is used to generate carbon-free energy generation at nuclear power plants around the world. According to the World Nuclear Association which is an international organization which focuses on promoting nuclear power along with supporting the companies that form the global nuclear industry, Kazakhstan has been a major uranium supplier for more than 50 years, and in 2009 it overtook Australia as the world's largest uranium producer. Kazakhstan produces roughly 21,819 tU of uranium per year and holds 12% of the world's uranium reserves in 2021.⁶⁰ (See the below figure). As the country's sole nuclear power company, Kazatomprom has first dibs on the country's substantial uranium reserves. According to Kazatomprom (National Atomic Company, Government of Kazakhstan) Kazakhstan is the world's largest and most cost-effective uranium producer.⁶¹

Kazakhstan Uranium Production from 2010:2021⁶²



⁶⁰ “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan”. World Nuclear Association. www.world-nuclear.org/ . Accessed 3 Feb. 2022.

⁶¹ “Why invest in Kazatomprom”. Kazatomprom, National Atomic Company, Government of Kazakhstan. www.kazatomprom.kz/en/investors/pochemu_investirovat_v_kazatomprom#:~:text=Natural%20uranium%20undergoes%20several%20processing,and%20marketer%20of%20natural%20uranium. Accessed 3 Feb. 2022.

⁶² Source: World Nuclear Association.

In general, the idea of energy security is crucial when a state is deciding on its domestic and foreign policies. Any nation's ability to have uninterrupted access to energy reliably over the long term is crucial to its economic stability and prosperity. In more ways than one, the stability of political development is guaranteed by energy security, which also plays a crucial role in ensuring national security, since these have become inter-related aspects of growth over time. The Central Asian region and Kazakhstan in particular, has mostly served to maintain India's nuclear energy security. It is clear that in the future, India will have to rely on Kazakhstan as a supplier to support its energy needs, therefore it cannot disregard the significance of this country. As economic expansion has accelerated, energy security has become a crucial factor in determining of India's policies. In this light, Kazakhstan is of utmost importance in satisfying India's energy needs. Among all the nations that export energy, Kazakhstan has the greatest potential for energy reserves which helps to meet India's rising energy requirements. Three pertinent aspects have in this regard been used to illustrate Kazakhstan's importance to India. Firstly, its geostrategic location, followed by its economic potential, particularly its oil resources, and last, its multi-ethnic and secular structure.

From this perspective it is clear that India has aimed to strengthen its strategic and commercial connections with Kazakhstan as both the countries heavily rely on energy imports and exports to maintain their respective rates of economic development and sustainable growth. It is a known fact that India's energy strategy is devoted on securing energy supplies with an objective of supporting its expanding economy which places a significant emphasis on Kazakhstan's energy resources to support its economy. In the Eurasia region, Kazakhstan is an emerging actor based on its abundance in hydrocarbons resources and its placement in India's extended neighbourhood offers enticing opportunities for India to diversify its energy source because it is the world's sixth-largest consumer of coal, oil, and gas.

In terms of energy security, Kazakhstan is extremely important to India owing to the fact that Kazakhstan is the only nation after Russia with the resources to support and meet India's energy security and hydrocarbons requirements as well as nuclear fuels. Nirmala Joshi, a scholar, contends that India played a significant role in Central Asia's energy industry, particularly in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan.⁶³ The result of this was that India's policy

⁶³ Joshi, Nirmala, (ed.) *Enhancing India-Central Asia Engagement: Prospects and Issues*. United Service Institution of India, 2014.

makers started paying attention to the nation's energy security. The Indian Embassy in Kazakhstan has further noted that, from the standpoint of nuclear energy, India and Kazakhstan have been in active collaboration especially in the energy sector under the auspices of multilateral organisations like CICA, SCO, and the UN organisations in the area of energy security. While on the one hand, these international organisations have helped India attain its bigger ambitions and goals, on the other hand, India has significant trade and investment potential with other SCO members, thanks to the strong SCO:India connection and is developing a value addition to the multilateralism of the SCO.

Accordingly, India has traditionally placed a high value on its relationship with Kazakhstan in the area of energy security. In addition, the Manmohan Singh administration in India had singled out energy security as a significant threat to India's national security, which may further highlight the fact that Kazakhstan and India share key political and cultural traditions which, along with the necessity for energy cooperation, should form the basis of India's alliance with Kazakhstan going forward. In other words, it is amply clear that Kazakhstan has the potential to become an important energy security partner for India. India's extended neighbourhood needs to put energy at the top of their priority. In case of any delay from the Indian side, Kazakhstan may sign all of its future contracts with western corporations who are also active in the region. It is largely believed by industry experts that by 2050, the world's energy sector as well as resource availability will have undergone profound changes, becoming more intricate and perilous in the process. Kazakhstan is looking forward to India's increased involvement in Central Asia. With regard to future possible engagement with Central Asia, Kazakhstan sees India as an ally with whom it has historically shared many common values and principles. While India's active role in the region, especially under the current circumstances might also support Kazakhstan's multifaceted foreign affairs, it is also true that in order to have better access to Kazakhstan's vast uranium and hydrocarbon reserves, India is eager to forge deeper ties with Kazakhstan.⁶⁴

India's Look North Policy and Central Asian Regionalism

The beginning of the 1990s was a turning point in international politics. This period witnessed the end of the Cold War between the two military blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union also brought about the

⁶⁴ Kuchins, Andrew C., Jeffrey Mankoff, and Oliver Backes. Op.cit.

domestic and foreign policy reorientation of former Soviet client states, especially India. Similarly, India was forced to change and re:evaluate its foreign policy towards Central Asia. To start a new journey, Narasimha Rao launched its Look North policy in 1995 to initiate re:engagement with Central Asia and emphasized regionalization of India's foreign policy that is, the development of distinct external policies toward energy rich Central Asia. The international politics surrounding energy, economic, and trade issues are increasingly gaining precedence over the political and military ones.

With a shift from geo:politics and geo:strategy to geo:economics, the economic dimensions of international politics have become prominent. The post:Cold War phase in international relations witnessed a distinct trend towards regional integration which appeared to be an effective device to serve economic and commercial objectives of these states. Regionalism has positively affected trade, economic cooperation and many trans:border issues and problems are increasingly being dealt at a regional supranational level. Regionalism as an instrument of the Look North policy process also supports economic growth strategies, greater social equality and democratization. After the post:Cold War period India's foreign policy efforts towards increasing regionalism have been used as a means to boost development by promoting peace and cooperation with Central Asia. This can be seen as India's effort towards regional economic cooperation and willingness to provide political and diplomatic priority to its extended neighbourhood. Consequently, the regionalism contained in the Look North strategy debates which makes clear that India wants to strengthen through cultural ties with Central Asia.⁶⁵

In the contemporary times, SCO has been the backbone of India's interaction with regional institutions in Central Asia. During the mid:1990s, Central Asian region had no institution for regional integration. As a consequence, SCO was the only regional group for promoting regionalism in the region. At the beginning of the SCO, India was not a member of this regional platform. In other words, SCO was a China:dominated organisation. The SCO is the only global platform where China has been participating from its creation.⁶⁶ The SCO's anti:terrorism strategy is dominated by China's perception of the three evils of terrorism,

⁶⁵ Kavalski, Emilian. Op. cit.

⁶⁶ Prantl, Jochen, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Legitimacy through (Self-) Legitimation?" in Dominik Zaum (ed.), *Legitimizing International Organizations* (Oxford, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 Jan. 2014), doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672097.003.0008, accessed 21 Nov.2021.

separatism, and religious extremism.⁶⁷ It is the only regional group that can be seen as a unique geostrategic impact point and a case study of new Asian regionalism. India considers the SCO to be a diplomatic opportunity. From the perspective of India, national economic growth will be hampered if energy security and counter-terrorism issues are not addressed. Ultimately, in 2017, India has become a comprehensive member of the SCO at the Astana Summit.⁶⁸ This new status meant that India became eligible to participate in a wide range of sectors, including infrastructure, civil aviation, computer software, pharmaceutical, military, space, tourism. India's participation in the SCO will enable the organization to play its biggest role in world politics. At the Astana Summit in July 2005, for the first time India became an observer member in SCO and subsequently participated in all SCO forums open to Observers.⁶⁹ At the SCO summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 23:24 June 2016, India signed a Memorandum of Obligations (MOO) to obtain the status of Member of SCO. India participated in a SCO anti-terror exercise at Chebarkul, Russia, in August 2018. In accordance with the SCO Charter, the exercise involved tactical level actions in a global counter terrorism or counter insurgency setting. India took part in the SCO military exercises for the first time since becoming a full member in 2017.⁷⁰ Subsequently, India and other SCO member states signed an agreement for cooperation in the areas of Digitization and Information and Telecommunication Technologies. The India:SCO relations were originally limited to trade in goods, but they have since been expanded to cover trade in services and investment.

Emilian Kavalski argues that India's full membership in the SCO is one of the most important signs of India's pragmatic foreign policy stance toward Central Asia as it helps and improves India's ability to balance Chinese influence in the region.⁷¹ In this perspectives India's vision for the development of free trade agreement in Eurasian Economic Union community with New Delhi as a major player, may be considered as a significant development. This was an indication of the importance that Central Asia places on India (and vice-versa) in any emerging multilateral economic architecture in the region. Simultaneously,

⁶⁷ Mukerji, Asoke. "India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation." *Observer Research Foundation*, Raisina Debates, December, 2020. www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-shanghai-cooperation-organisation/ . , Accessed 22 Nov. 2021

⁶⁸ "India, Pak to become full SCO members at Astana summit: China." *The Economic Times*, 2018, July 13, p. 15.

⁶⁹ "Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Division." *Ministry of External Affairs*, Government of India, 2022.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kavalski, Emilian. Op.cit.

this marks a significant change in India:Kazakhstan relations. It is amply clear that the importance of regional cooperation to the stability and prosperity of Central Asia is emphasised by the Look North policy since the only means to secure the economic development at the moment are regional integration. India has thus realised the importance of fostering regional economic cooperation while looking beyond Pakistan. In this sense, Look North policy was a reflection of India's post:Cold War foreign policy priorities wherein it has stepped out of its South Asian focus and forging close relationships with Kazakhstan specially, now forms an integral part of its Central Asian policy.

Currently it may be observed that a new kind of power equation is emerging in the Central Asian region where India is bound to be a major player based on its rapidly developing economic and political clout globally. It is also pertinent to note that Kazakhstan recognizes this status of India as a rising power and it is significantly reflected in the nature of bilateral relationship which has now being upgraded to the level of a strategic partnership, which means that this relationship now encompasses greater political, economic, defence, and scientific areas and greater people:to people contact related initiatives. Furthermore, both countries are members of various regional forums like SCO, OIC, CICA and UNO which brings them on a common footing with regard to pertinent global issues. The Look North policy thus highlights India's innovative contribution to the creation of an effective structure of Asian peace and advocates a regional security system as a component of a larger global security system. To handle serious challenges such as international terrorism, peace building, transnational crime and illegal trade, and deterioration of the environment, etc., it is essential to develop a network of regional organisations. This will probably help the cause of regional integration and security between India and Central Asia in general and with Kazakhstan in particular.

Another landmark in India's participation in regionalism came when India has involved with SCO's Regional Anti:Terrorism Framework (RATS). India has participated in its joint exercises against terrorism and maintains a database of terrorism data.⁷² In recent past India and Kazakhstan military exercise KAZIND:21 have conducted and promoted regional security cooperation. This growing military and diplomatic ties between the two countries will gain momentum as a result of this exercise. The cooperative exercise also demonstrates

⁷² Kundu, N. D. "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Significance for India." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, 2009, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 91-101

the two countries' robust resolution to combat terrorism and willingness to work together to do so.⁷³ This will open a direct communication channel between the Delhi and Kazakhstan forces on counter-terrorism issues. On the other hand, India must use this regional platform to cooperate with China and Pakistan to fight back terrorism. As a member of the SCO, India needs to focus its diplomatic efforts on improving connectivity with Eurasia and expanding trade. Eurasia is a natural resource-rich region and an Indian product market.⁷⁴ It will enable India to execute its policy of Connect Central Asia and finding new opportunities in the Look North policy. As a consequence, India's participation in the debates and activities of the SCO may not be an easy task, since the SCO is an organization led by China. China's strong support for Pakistan is well known. Although Russia has long been a friend of India, relations between Moscow, Pakistan and China are rapidly heating up. For India, the strategic requirements of the SCO are in terms of economy, energy resources, as well as security issues related to terrorism in the region. India's inclusion in the SCO might be constructed as a successful outcome of its Look North policy. After joining the organization, India hoped that the forum would produce a compatibility in strategic interests between India and Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular.

The SCO opens the door of economic cooperation for India as it provides early trade between member states while also addressing the issue of energy shortage in India. Participation of India in the SCO also reflects the evolution of trade and investment relations with Kazakhstan. At present, it is better to sign the free trade agreement between India and Eurasian Economic Union and enter the Eurasian integration path without interfering with the access to goods, raw materials, capital and technology. The opening of the International North South Transport Corridor and the proposed Chabahar project will make it possible for Indian goods to enter the developed markets in Europe and Asia.⁷⁵ It deepens our understanding and generates new ideas and new ways of co-operation as this region is well known for its minerals, especially oil, natural gas, uranium and hydropower. India is a weaker in terms of energy resources, but is looking for safe and important energy consumers. As a result of India's economic growth and energy demand, the priorities in India and Central Asia relations become clear: solve security issues and balance the increasing Chinese influence in

⁷³ "Opening Ceremony Indo-Kazakhstan Joint Military Exercise Kazind-21". Ministry of Defence, Government of India, September, 2021.

⁷⁴ Singh Roy, Meena. "India's Option in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation." *Strategic Analysis*, July-August, 2012, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 645-650.

⁷⁵ Pattnaik, J. K., and Pradhan, R. P. (eds.). "Chabahar: Gateway to North- South corridor." *The Sangai Express*, 6 December, 2016.

the region. The SCO will enable India to take part in issues involving its own interests and help resolve issues related to terrorism.⁷⁶

Overall, India is an important player in the Asian balance of power in diplomatic and political terms. In this SCO led multilateral forum India's role has been increasing. There has been much progress in India's Look North policy and Connect Central Asia policy since it was first formulated in 1995 and 2012 respectively. After a slow start, India's northern neighbours have rediscovered and engaged India. India's economic recognition has been growing and shows rising potential at least for the next decade. At the beginning India's Look North policy was based on security, economy and democracy, now it is shaped by strategic realism.

Chapter Conclusion

With reference to Central Asian region in general and Kazakhstan in particular, the energy and economic relations are growing amid better security environment since India launched its Look North policy in 1995 and Connect Central Asia policy in 2012. The focus of this chapter is on India's Look North policy, predicated on the increasingly convergent security, economic and energy concerns that both India and Central Asia shared. India's national security and energy security works as prescription for India's foreign policy towards Kazakhstan while ensuring international prestige for India. The foreign policy of India towards Kazakhstan by and large, rests on two important political processes; frontier security and innovative diplomacy as at play in Central Asian region. At the regional level, the common threat perceptions due to embedded and similar threats, the security cooperation between India and Kazakhstan is institutionalized in form of SCO and it may also be argued that the political construction of identity by Indian political elite as an innovative turn towards multilateralism is a way to maintain the static image. Therefore this chapter highlights India's need to collaborate with Kazakhstan on issues ranging from energy security, cultural synergy to the ever-present security threats emanating from radicalisms. India nurtures a historical, strategic relationship with Russia which, combined with furtherance of relations with the Central Asian Republics, is clearly an integral part of India's overall foreign policy objectives.

⁷⁶ Humayun, R. T. "Pakistan and India Accession to SCO: Future Prospects and Challenges." *Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies* (bilgesam), 11 January, 2016, pp. 1-7.

Overall, the focus of this chapter has been on the important factors which together combine to formulate India's foreign policy towards Kazakhstan. It has been observed that India's economy has been consistently on a growth trajectory over the last few decades and the rising demand for energy resources specially uranium has been in tandem with the burgeoning industrial sector. This phenomenon necessitates a renewed focus on the part of India on improving bilateral and multilateral relations with Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia, particularly in the economic and energy realm. On the other hand, it may also be observed that India has been making an effort to correct its prior miscalculations by renewing emphasis on its cultural and civilizational connections with the Central Asian Republics on the one hand, as well as its technological and innovative skills on the other when it articulated the Connect Central Asia initiative. Although the Central Asian Republics are aware of the shared history and cultural affinities, these have not yet resulted in concrete advantages for their current relationship.

CHAPTER: TWO

India's Economic and Political Engagement with Kazakhstan

Introduction

Unlike in the past, since the post-Soviet period, India-Kazakhstan trade and economic relations have undergone a dramatic change, with both sides very much eager to start a much better and broader economic relations. India is among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with CARs states. Indian government extends its exports, business deals, visits, organize trade fairs, and also invite CARs delegations to visit India. In order to enhance, economic interaction both are interested in establishing the institutional mechanisms for further engagement and development. Economic relations provided the much-needed sound foundation for enlarging the strategic relations. Since then, there witnessed continuous improvement in every aspect of bilateral economic relations. Why the prospering economic and trade relations is not able to reach its potential is another question. To answer this question will take some more time and it would be wrong to expect everything at once. Economic relations have played no less significant role than defence relations in bringing the relations between the two democracies closer. It comes into play when all forms of cooperation between the two democracies came to a standstill. This chapter argues that there is huge scope for improvement in trade and economic relations given the fact that both sides work hard to remove the present barriers.

The implementation of economic liberalization and globalization policies in 1991 was the most important decision taken by India that has no doubt opened the way for easy passage of Kazakhstan goods, capital, services and technology. That today, Kazakhstan has become India's important trading partner, major collaborator in joint ventures and the largest investment partner in Central Asia. The economic complementarities between India and Kazakhstan in the areas of trade and investment has been the bonding factor bringing the two countries closer than never before in the history of India-Kazakhstan relations. The Indian

need for capital and the Kazakhstan needs for market can be fulfilled by working closely together.


To free from the economic crisis and the need to integrate its economy to the international economy, India in 1991 brought certain economic policy changes. India has introduced changes in industrial and trade policies to improve its efficiency, productivity and competitiveness of its economy. Besides, it also brought changes in industrial licensing, foreign collaborations, investment by NRIs, portfolio investment by foreign institutional investment, reduction in tariff rate and simplification of export:import procedures, opening of the IT:sector, reducing public expenditure investment norms to attract inflow of capital from both the domestic and foreign enterprises in sectors like banking, insurance, retailing etc. All of these changes were the engine of growth for Indian economy.

Today, there are very good reasons why Kazakhstan would like to engage in a closer economic and trade relations with India. India's economic performance speaks for itself. Since the liberalisation of its economy, India was able to maintain an annual average growth rate between five to seven per cent. Given the current growth rate, it is projected that by the end of the second decades of the twenty first century, India would become the third largest economic power behind United States and China. India, with the second largest population in the world, the eight largest industrial economies, ranked second to U.S. in terms of world's largest pool of scientist and engineers and last but not the least its middle:class size is double that of Japan. India had replaced Germany to become the fourth largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity in the year 2000. Given India's significant achievement in the last almost one and half decades. European Scholars was compelled to make certain statements that are in favor of India. Their statement calls for closer cooperation between India and other powerful countries.

The expanding trade relation reflects the close interests of the two countries. The two:way trade between India and Kazakhstan had witnessed a significant jump from US\$113.14 million in 2005, India:Kazakhstan bilateral trade has grown to US\$280.59 million in 2009. During this period India's imports from Kazakhstan has grown much faster than exports (Figure 3). In 2009 India registered a negative trade balance of US\$12.73 million. It is interesting to note that prior to the financial crisis in 2008 India had a positive trade balance with Kazakhstan. However, and though as on today India's trade balance with Kazakhstan is

negative, over the last six years there is not much change in that volume (See Figure 3). What is significant is the fact that throughout these periods, India enjoys a favorable balance of trade with Kazakhstan at an increasing pace.

Figure 3: India and Kazakhstan Merchandise Trade (2010:2018)⁷⁷



Despite of not reaching a satisfactory level, Kazakhstan is India’s leading trade and investment partner in Central Asia. The reason why the trade and economic relations is not able to reach its satisfactory level is the absence of direct land and sea routes to the region. To reach at a satisfactory stage, both sides must have to develop a consensus on underlying trade and investment related issues and concerns. The chapter seeks to explain the economic engagement between the two countries. It also discusses the significance of the economic and trade relations. It also explores economic and trade issues that have circumscribed the prospering relations. Later, it explores the implications of the recent financial crisis to trade relations and to Indian economy. Lastly, it focuses on areas of future prospects.

⁷⁷ Source data: ITC Trade Map, www.trademap.org/tradestat/Bilateral. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020

History and Evolution of the India:Kazakhstan Relations

India and Kazakhstan had mutual historical and cultural engagements since the time of immemorial. The discovery of Harappa excavations has found direct proof of mutual relations between India:Central Asia. In this regard, the evidence of ruins of camels and horses were found from Harappa spots which show that caravans were led by CARs to the Indus basin.⁷⁸ On the other hand, the Aryans were arrived from Central Asia to India along with the culture and language of the region.⁷⁹

Besides, the civilizational and geo:cultural connections between Indo:Kazakhstan, the role of various empires also explored their historical and cultural bonds. In this respect, the cultural and religious interactions (theatres, astronomy) between India and Central Asia during the kingdom of Greeks.⁸⁰ The Indo:Greeks Kingdom had jointly established Taxila, Pushkalavati and Sagala capitals. The region was the crossroad between Greeks and Indians which had also infused the cultural interactions between both India and Kazakhstan. The Greeks had been assimilated the religious values of India in the region by worshipping Indian Goddess and celebrating Indian festivals. Moreover, the use of Persian language and Greek artistic style on the sculptures of both Indo:CARs resulted as the primary sources of cultural assimilation. On the other hand, Sakas have also influenced the western part of India who was the original natives of Central Asia. Besides, Mauryan Empire was one of the largest empires in the ancient historical period which had been expanding its rule throughout the North:Western part of India. The Mauryan Empire was also one of the most important mediators between Central Asia and India.⁸¹ The flow of Buddhism was the largest source of interaction between Indo:Central Asia Republics which was spread by great Mauryan kings named Ashoka and Bindusara.⁸² Thereafter, Kushanas had settled their monarchy in India as well as Central Asia Republics and enjoyed the common social interactions.⁸³ As the people of the both regions they used to wear same clothes such as leather shoes and turbans.

⁷⁸ Abuseitova, M.K. "Historical and Cultural Relations Between Kazakhstan, Central Asia and India from Ancient Times to The Beginning of The XX Century." *Dialogue, Journal of Astha Bharati*, October-December, 2004, vol.6, no. 2.

⁷⁹ Rahman, Abdur. "India's Interaction with China, Central and West Asia." Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 20

⁸⁰ Bernard, Paul. "The Greek kingdoms of Central Asia." *History of civilizations of Central Asia: The Development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations, 700 B.C. to A.D. 250*, edited by Janos Harmatta, et al. vol. 2, 1994, pp. 99-129.

⁸¹ Modelski, George. "Kautilya: Foreign policy and international system in the ancient Hindu world." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1964, pp. 549-560.

⁸² Kumar, B. B. "India and Central Asia: links and interactions." *India and Central Asia: Classical to Contemporary Periods*, edited by Roy, J. N, and B.B. Kumar, Astha Bharathi, 2007, pp.3-33.

⁸³ Ibid.

Moreover, Bactrian language had largely influenced the majority of the ancient Indian languages during that time. At the same time, Buddhism was spreading via Gandhara and Kashmir to the Central Asia.⁸⁴ Thus, Kushan civilization had the strongest impacts on the Indian technology, military, art and culture, pottery, religion, economy etc.

The Turks arrived from Central Asia in India during the 11th century, the key targets of these invaders were to spread the Islam as a dominant religion and plunder the Indian wealth. Some Turk scholars had worked in India in various fields such as mathematics, medical and astronomical science.⁸⁵ Hence, it had established mixed kind of relations between India and Central Asia. During the 13th century, Mongols had brought Central Asian civilization in India and Indian languages had been impacted indelibly. India had taken some of their words from the Persian language such as Guru, Mani, and Asman, Kalam, Zahar, Iman⁸⁶. The elite of 19th century Bengal were bilingual in Farsi (Persian in English) and Bangla. Raja Rammohan Roy edited and wrote in a Farsi newspaper, and the favourite poet of Debendranath Tagore, Rabindranath's father, was Hafez, a 14th century poet from Iran. So impactful was Farsi's role that India's largest language today, Hindi, takes its name from a Farsi word meaning "Indian."⁸⁷ All Indian languages like Bengali, Punjabi, Marathi, Gujarati, Telugu, and Hindi etc. contain a great number of Persian words and phrases for which they have no synonym⁸⁸. Further expansion of Mongolian invasion also led to the spread of Sufism in India through the medium of a number of traders who had come from Central Asia in Kashmir. At the same time, Kashmiri people had also learned the art of making shawls, firework, gold:beating, and bottle making from the Mongols. Hence, the deep:rooted historical and cultural engagements of Mongols had strengthened the cooperation between India:Central Asia.

⁸⁴ Behrendt, Kurt. "The Buddha and the Gandharan Classical Tradition." *Arts of Asia*, vol. 47, no. 2, 2017, pp. 65-75.

⁸⁵ Al-Sahli, Haila Abdurrahman. "Turks in India: Their presence and contributions to Islam and civilisation: An historical and analytical study." *West East Journal of Social Sciences*, vol. 2, no. 2, 2013, pp. 36-46. www.wejournals.com/index.php/WEJSS/index. Accessed 5 July 2020.

⁸⁶ Ali, Akbar Khansir and Nasrin Mozafari, "The Impact of Persian Language on Indian Languages." *Theory and Practice in Language Studies*, vol. 4, no. 11, November 2014, pp. 2360-2365. www.academypublication.com/issues/past/tpls/vol04/11/20.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2020.

⁸⁷ Papi, Maryam. "The Persian language has a rich history in India, but it's slowly dying out." *Quartz India*, September 8, 2017. www.qz.com/india/1072665/the-persian-language-has-a-rich-history-in-india-but-its-slowly-dying-out/. Accessed 2 July 2020.

⁸⁸ Khansir and Mozafari, *The Impact of Persian Language*, pp. 2360-2365.

Noteworthy, the Mughal came from Central Asia during the 16th century and ruled over India till 1857⁸⁹. They had brought the Central Asian and Iranian culture in India and launched a new cultural history during the medieval period. Therefore, their language and culture, as well as goods, were exchanged between the two regions. In this context, during the Mughal period, Central Asia had shown great attraction towards the Indian culture & heritage. They had expanded their kingdom throughout the Indian Territory such as Delhi, Lahore, Agra and Fatehpur Sikri coinciding with the Central Asian towns Samarqand, Bukhara, Khorasan, and Balkh. Thus, Delhi became the new place of abode of cultural absorption between the Indo:Central Asia. In this background, in the 16th and 17th century the cultural and religious carriers were not a part of India only it also reflected the Islamic cultural dominance in India.

There is evidence of ancient Indian influence on Central Asian texts and books. In the eastern region of Central Asia, the Kharoshti language was adopted for writing official records. Furthermore, the fields of medicine, astronomy, astrology, and theatre and literature all benefited from the use of the Sanskrit and Brahmi languages. But these scripts were also used for the historical evidence of a number of Central Asian languages. In addition, Indian scientific thought was well admired in Khurasan. Albomasar Balkhi, a renowned scientist from Khurasan, travelled to India in search of a higher education in mathematics, to provide only one example. The entire picture of long-term interactions among Central Asia and India thus displays systematic linkages between them.

Religions like Buddhism and Islam had played a significant role in the interactions between India and Kazakhstan during the earlier history. Buddhism was founded by Gautama Buddha in Northern India during the 5th century BCE. It had been spread in India, Sri Lanka, China, Afghanistan, Korea, Japan and Central Asia. The Buddhism was entered in the Southern and Central East Asia through the Silk Road. It had affected cultural dimension in India as well as Central Asia. In this regard, the Buddhist monasteries, stupas and images found in Central Asia as well as Afghanistan also. The Gandhara art was being practiced in Buddhist stupas during the Greek period. Notably, during Kushan Empire, Buddhism had been reached to Central Asia via merchants. For instance, Kanishka was a most prominent follower of

⁸⁹ M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Empire and Its Successors*, Political History, UNESCO 1996, page. 302-326. www.en.unesco.org/silkroad/sites/silkroad/files/knowledge-bank-article/vol_V%20silk%20road_the%20mughal%20empire%20and%20its%20sucessors.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2020.

Buddhism and patronized the Graeco-Buddhist art form which influenced the architecture of the Central Asian region. The assimilation of culture had been started to evolve between India-Central Asia since the period of Ashoka. He got edicts (proclamation) inscribed on the stone pillars and installed them throughout his kingdom. Even, the Mongols had also followed the teachings of Buddha during the 16th century, and they invited Buddhist scholars to teach the people. The author established that Buddhism partly became responsible for the expansion of the cultural and religious ideas from one civilization to another. As a result, there were many Buddhist temples and paintings found in the region which shows their societal interactions. However, the India's relations with Central Asia in the early medieval period had been encountered with the expansion of Buddhist teachings and devotion.

Islam was the most popular religion which was spread by the Arab merchants in India. It had created a huge space for Central Asian invaders and scholars in Delhi Sultanate during the medieval period. It was supported and substantiated by renowned work like Zia-Ud-Din Baruni's *Tarikh-e-Firoz-Shahi* had given an account of the mutual activities of the people of Central Asia with India during 13th and 14th century. On the other hand, Sufi saints of the two regions had explored their relations by exchanging their thoughts and views with each other. In this regard, Delhi was being a center of Muslim literature, art and heritage during that time. Thus, these two religions resulted as a great source of ancient heritage and moral sentiments among the peoples of two regions. Despite all these facts, during the 17th to 19th century, Britishers had expanded their administrative rule over the whole India. Simultaneously, Central Asia was also influenced by Russian empire in the late 19th century. Such major dynamics had affected India and Central Asian relations. Central Asia becomes a state of important influence between Russia and British India where both had shown their interests on Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva Khanate. Hence, the common history of religion and cultural exchange have been started a new phase in political and economic engagements between India-Central Asia.

India and Central Asia Republics' economic engagements had been started since the recorded history. Saka and Kushanas developed commercial relations between India and Central Asia⁹⁰. On the other hand, Greeks had also developed bilateral trade via the Red Sea and

⁹⁰ A. R. Mukhamedjanov, "Economy and Social System in Central Asia In the Kushan Age," *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Volume II, p. 278. <https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/knowledge-bank/economy-and-social-systems-central-asia-kushan-age>. Accessed 4 July 2020; also see, Singh, Amit Kumar. "India and Central

Indian Ports, as well as various hordes of coins, were found in Punjab. Central Asia had been exchanging the rice, ginger, and cinnamon with India which further had strengthened the economic engagements. The Kushan Empire had expanded trade relations between India and Central Asia. The most of the Indian merchants had been importing goods from Bukhara, Samarkand, and Ershi which were being considered as the largest trade center of Kushanas Empire. During Kushanas period, there were many commodities which were being exchanged between India:Central Asia.⁹¹ The main trading commodities such as species, perfumes, medicines, lacquers, dyes, silk, food products, Moreover, Kushan had also established the coin-based monetary system in India. Thus, it clearly proves that economic engagements between India and Central Asia had been established and reached a pinnacle during the Kushanas Empire (2 B.C.). The Mughal dynasty also played an important role in exchanging India's economic and commercial engagement with Central Asia. The merchants of the whole subcontinent were engaged in trade and economic activities during the Mughal times. By seeing the comprehensive list of commodities, it can safely be presumed that there could be a considerable quantum of trade had been existing between both the regions. The Indians worked as slaves in Central Asia in various fields such as soldier, weaving, art texturing, and agriculture. As time was passed, these people had not remained under the slavery system. They had been started working independently and settled down in Central Asia and even went to the extent of claiming that, most of them had been even returned to India.

India had been importing horses and camels from the CARs. Apart from this, the horses were used for transportation and consequently enhanced people to people contracts. In this backdrop, during the medieval period, the demand for horses had been increased and estimated that India imported 50000 horses from the Central Asian region⁹². The main export commodities of India to Central Asia were 'spices, perfumes, medicines, lacquers, dyes, silk, rice, sugar, vegetable oils, cotton, precious woods, pearls, precious and semi:precious stones, etc. At the same time, India used to receive precious metals, non:ferrous metals, purple dye, coral, wine, slaves and decorative pottery and glassware. Seemingly, Indian shawls, tea, silk,

Asia: An Interpretation of Mutually Indelible Historical Relationship and its Multi-Faceted Impact.” *International Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies*, vol 2, no.7, 2015, p. 67, www.ijims.com/issue.php?issue=207. Accessed 12 2 Sept. 2020.


⁹¹ Pandey, Sanjay. “Indians in Central Asia.” *Diaspora Studies* vol. 1, no. 1, 2007, pp. 17-30.

⁹² Gommans, Jos. “Mughal India and Central Asia in the eighteenth century: An Introduction to a wider perspective.” *India and Central Asia Commerce and Culture 1500-1900*, edited by Scott Cameron Levi, and Muzaffar Alam, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 39-63.

fabrics were more popular in the CARs in the historical economic relations. ‘Silk’ was one of the significant products being exported the Central Asian countries. Hence, the said exchangeable goods increased the foreign trade of India and Central Asia as well. The number of merchants and their migration in both the regions vice:versa had been increased exponentially.

India and Central Asia had been connected through the various land routes during the ancient period (see map 1). The various Indian trade routes during the earlier times such as; Northern Grand Route, Trans:Iranian Route, Trade Routes of Northern India and Southern and Western Indian Trade Routes. These routes had maintained India’s trade and commercial contacts with Central Asia as well as other parts of the world throughout the recorded history. Indians traveled to Central Asia and other regions about 2000 years ago. On the other hand, various Central Asian tribes and ethnic races had come to India via the said routes. In this connection, the most convenient route between India:CARs had been passed via the cities of Taxila & Peshawar along the Kabul River valley into Bactria. On the other hand, the Kashmir and Trans:Asian trade routes were the mainland routes between both regions.

Map 1: Silk Route Ancient Trade Route⁹³



⁹³ Source of Map: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Silk-Road-trade-route>.

Since the first century B.C. 'Silk Road' was the most popular trade route through which goods had been exchanged between both the regions. Silk Route was made to strengthen the economic engagements via eastern shore of the Mediterranean across the Middle East, Bactria, Samarqand, India, and the Central Asian region and all the way to China. Along with goods, culture and religion had also been exchanged via these routes between both the regions. In addition, the Buddhism and Islam were spread through The Old Silk Route via Kashmir to Afghanistan, Central Asia and finally reached to China. Therefore, it had become more popular trade route over the course of the old ages.

India and Kazakhstan: Through Medieval Times

Ancient manuscripts, stored in Indian libraries and archives are depositories of information about relations of Kazakhstan with Indian rulers, about the steppe trade with Indian merchants. In the area of commerce also interactions between India and Central Asia increased both ways during the Moghul period. Indian merchants during this period began to expand their trade with Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia including Kazakhstan. Historians are now of the view that many aspects of Kazakhstan:Indian relations during 16th century:18th century centuries are yet to be researched carefully. The trade between Kazakhstan and India was mainly conducted through Afghan intermediaries. Contemporary Kazakh historians note that relations particularly of trade, commerce and culture between Kazakhstan and India got interrupted many times due to prolonged military conflicts and political disorder in surrounding regions.

It is well known that writing of the famous text Babur Nama started in Central Asia and was completed in India. The text mostly devoted to history and geography of India is believed to have had Kazakh roots according to literary experts. It was Turkmen poet and Bairam Khan's son Abdul:Rahim with his knowledge of Turki and Persian who was assigned the task of translating Babur Nama into Persian. Manuscripts of the historian, poet, gifted chieftain and Kashmir ruler of medieval epoch Mirza Muhammed Haidar Dughlati (1499:1551) : descendant of Kazakh clan Dughlat : are vivid proof of these interrelations. Mirza Haidar Dughlati later sustained the tradition of relations in historiography. His master book Tarikh:e:Rashidi became a symbol of historical and literary contact between India and Kazakhstan.

In the 19th century a completely new route via East Turkistan emerged as a new bridge of linkages between India and the Semirech'e region while the traditional route of contact from southern Kazakhstan via Hindu Kush to the Punjab plains ceased. This new route mainly originated from Punjab and Kashmir and passed through Ladakh moving north across Karakorum pass into Kotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Ser:ju, Tash:Kurgan and through Kyrgyz mountains to the Semiryechye. In most of the reference books, the Issyk:kul and Almalyk are frequently mentioned as important halting posts. This route later became an important extension of the traditional Silk Route. The route was promoted as strategically and economically important for British India. Hundreds of British Political officers, explorers, surveyors and traders traversed this route to Central Asia.

India and Kazakhstan: Through Modern Times

During the days of the Soviet Union, direct ties between India and Kazakhstan were as extensive as before. All:round relations, including political and cultural between Kazakhstan and India were guided by the Indo:Soviet relationship and through Moscow. However as early as in 1947, a delegation from Kazakhstan participated at the First Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi⁹⁴. The event is still being considered as significant for Kazakhstan. In modern times, Jawaharlal Nehru along with Indira Gandhi visited Almaty in 1955. 50th anniversary of this historical visit was celebrated in 2005. The visit by Nehru and Indira Gandhi specially left a deep imprint about India among the Kazakh officials, intelligentsia and the common people. Soon after her visit, hundreds of girls who were born around that time were named after Indira. The name Indira soon became Kazakhised and became a popular name in Kazakhstan. In fact, the Indo:Kazakhstan Friendship Society sent a photo album of Indira in Kazakhstan to Indira Gandhi in 1980.

Dr. Radhakrishnan visited Kazakhstan in 1956 in his capacity as Vice President⁹⁵. He met academician Satpaev, then the president of the National Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan.

⁹⁴ Ulbolsyn, Amrenova. "Strategic partnership of Kazakhstan and India." Astana city, The Center for Asian Studies, enter for Advanced Multidisciplinary Studies (CEAM) at the University of Brasilia (UnB), July 2011, pp. 1-12. <https://boletimneasia.wordpress.com/?s=Strategic+partnership+of+Kazakhstan+and+India>. Accessed 2 Sept. 2020.

⁹⁵ "India-Kazakhstan Relations." Embassy of India, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, www.indembastana.gov.in/docs/India_Kazakhstan_Relations.pdf; Accessed 5 Sept. 2020; also see, Bandyopadhyay, Lopamudra. "Recent India-Kazakhstan Relations: Venturing Towards Greater Cooperation."

Interactions in the field of science, technology, education and culture also remained active throughout the Soviet period. Many Kazakh intellectuals including veteran writers like Mukhtar Auezov and Anwar Alirnzhhanov visited India and widened the scope of close literary and cultural ties between India and Kazakhstan.

India was among the first country to recognize the independence of Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbayev's first official visit after Kazakhstan got independence was to India in 1992, which shows importance of New Delhi to Astana. Diplomatic relations were established on 22 February 1992 during this visit, when an appropriate Protocol was signed by Tuleutay Suleymenov, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, and Madhavsinh Solanki, then Minister of External Affairs, Government of India. The implementation of the Protocol started by opening of the Embassy of India in Almaty in May 1992, and subsequent establishment of the Embassy of Kazakhstan in New Delhi in 1993.

Kazakhstan and India have a lot uniting them. First of all, they are united by history. The ties go back as far as the 2nd century B.C. and the Silk Road. This research study is intended to trace and understand the developments and various factors that are shaping Kazakhstan and India relations since 1991. It explores the role of factors like resources, politics and strategy, defense, Islamic resurgence, trade and investment, and inter:state cooperation between India and Kazakhstan. Though there is obviously an element of continuity from the past in the relations between Kazakhstan and India, focus in the present study is mainly on the contemporary policies and issues after the disintegration of the USSR.

It is obvious that the depth and the range of the India:Kazakhstan cooperation still are not consistent with the potential and possibilities on both sides. One of the reasons is the lack of effectively operated transport route, mutual payment problems between partners on both sides, and also the narrow commodity structure in the trade between two countries. But it is imperative for both the countries to proceed on the path of reform and cooperation. The present work tries to analyze the contemporary situation and outline measures required to intensify the trade and economic cooperation because both countries stand to gain enormously from a sustained partnership.

Institutionalization of India and Kazakhstan Economic Engagements

During the ancient time, India and Central Asia Republics (CARs) had enjoyed dynamic merchant trade, and both regions were exchanged various goods during this period. Despite these historical trade relations, both India:CARs have not enjoyed cordial economic and commercial relations due to the breakup of USSR. After the emergence of independent Central Asian nations, they had initially faced a brutal recession with the effect of disturbance on the production network and loss of subsidies from the former USSR, lack of experience in private sector, inefficient infrastructure and lack of institutions for a market economy.

Over the past decade, India has created a new institutional apparatus to facilitate trade and investment with Kazakhstan. The Indian government has set up bilateral intergovernmental commissions for trade and economic, scientific and technical cooperation with all five Central Asian countries, which have been meeting on a regular basis. Relations are further institutionalized through joint working groups in various fields, namely information technology, science and technology, hydrocarbons, military:technical cooperation, and others. Indian government has also signed double taxation avoidance agreements with these states, and India bank have interbanking arrangements with countries in the region.

In order to achieve a significant level of cooperation, India has established some institutional mechanisms with Kazakhstan. In this context, the two-way visits on June 3:5, 2000, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev visit to India and on the other hand, the visit of former Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Kazakhstan which deepened the relationship between both countries⁹⁶. After that, India also invited Kazakhstan's delegates to visit industrial centers and interact with Indian businessmen. After that, Indo:Kazakh Joint Business Council was held in Almaty during 2004⁹⁷. In this meeting, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Kazakhstan Chamber of Commerce & Industry had been organized a collaborative program where they had shown them the engineering products. Chamber of Foreign Commerce of Kazakhstan and Federation of Chambers of Commerce of India (FICCI) will serve to promotion of business linkages, also emphasized the importance of closer interactions between investment promotion agencies of

⁹⁶ Mavlonov, Ibromkhim R. "Central Asia and South Asia: Potential of India's Multilateral Economic Diplomacy in Inter-Regional Cooperation." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 30, no.2, Apr-Jun, 2006, pp.424-448.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 430.

the two countries⁹⁸. Also, India and Kazakhstan had established the Indo:Kazakhstan Joint Business Council. Under this Council, both the countries had signed trade agreements, avoidance of double taxation treaty and also included technological assistance⁹⁹. Kazakhstan also wanted to sign a multilateral agreement with Iran and Turkmenistan for the construction of transport corridor which is directly connecting to India¹⁰⁰. Also, India provided US\$1 billion loans to Kazakhstan while it has granted a major tax allowance to Indian Industrial Corporation. Thus, both states also work significantly to launch a broad collaboration and commerce in IT sector, banking sector, science & space research and increased the degree of bilateral trade relations. By 2018, a total of 48 bilateral agreements and documents at the interstate and intergovernmental level between Kazakhstan and India were concluded (including four Protocols on results of sessions of the joint Kazakh:Indian intergovernmental commission), 14 documents were signed between the ministries, departments and the non:governmental organizations. The basic documents which have laid the foundation of mutual relations of both states are:

List of Important Bilateral International Agreements between Kazakhstan and India¹⁰¹

| INTERSTATE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS | DATE AND PLACE OF SIGNING |
|---|--|
| Declaration of Main Principles and Directions of Intergovernmental Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India | Signed in New Delhi on 22nd February, 1992 |
| Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India on Trade and Economic, Science and Technology Cooperation | Signed in Kazakhstan on 16th October, 1992 |
| Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India for creation of an Intergovernmental Commission on Scientific and | Signed in Kazakhstan on 16th October, 1992 |

⁹⁸ “Tej Kadam: India-Kazakhstan Joint Statement.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25437/Tej_Kadam_India__Kazakhstan_Joint_Statement. Accessed 10 Sept. 2020.

⁹⁹ Malik, Ishfaq Ahamd, and M. Afzal Mir. “India’s Economic Relations with Central Asian States.” *International Journal of Development Studies and Research*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2014, pp. 75-86.

¹⁰⁰ Daly, John C. K. “Kazakhstan looks to India, Iran for access to the world’s Oceans.” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, December 4, 2015, vol, 12, Issue, 217. www.jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-looks-to-india-iran-for-access-to-the-worlds-oceans/. Accessed 10 Sept. 2020.

¹⁰¹ Embassy of India, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. www.indembastana.gov.in/page/agreements-signed/; also see, Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in India, <http://mfa.gov.kz/en/delhi/content-view/list-of-bilateral-international-agreements-between-kazakhstan-and-india>. Accessed 11 Sept. 2020.

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|--|--|
| Technical Cooperation | |
| Science and Technology Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India | Signed in Almaty on 25th May 1993 |
| Air Transport Agreement between the Governments of India and Kazakhstan | Signed in Almaty on 10th September, 1993 |
| MOU on Co:operation between the Ministry of Science & New Technologies of Kazakhstan & the Department of Atomic Energy of India | Signed in Almaty on 13th January, 1996 |
| Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of India | Signed in New Delhi on 9 December, 1996 |
| Convention on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Income and Capital Tax Evasion between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of India | Signed in New Delhi on 9 December, 1996 |
| India:Kazakhstan Joint Declaration | Signed in New Delhi on 12th February, 2002 |
| Agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of India on Creation of a Joint Kazakhstan:India Working Group on Countering International Terrorism and other Crimes | Signed in Almaty on 3 June 2002 |
| Agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of India on Protection of some types of tea, rice and mango on Kazakhstan Territory | Signed in New Delhi on 23 January, 2009 |
| Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of India on Cooperation in Application of Technical Regulation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards | Signed in New Delhi on 23 January, 2009 |
| MOU between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. and JS NAC KazAtomProm of Kazakhstan | Signed in New Delhi on 24th January, 2009 |
| MOU between ISRO of India and National Space Agency of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in the field of Space Activities | Signed in New Delhi on January 24, 2009 |
| Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India on Cooperation in Culture, Arts, Education, Science, Mass Media and Sports | Signed in Astana on 12 May 2010 |
| MOU between Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT:In) (Department of Information Technology) of India & Kazakhstan | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 16th April, 2011 |

| | |
|---|--|
| Computer Emergency Response Team (KZ:CERT) of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in Information Security | |
| Agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture of India and the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan for Cooperation in the field of Agriculture & Allied Sectors. | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 16th April, 2011 |
| Agreement between the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of India & the Ministry of Health of Kazakhstan for Cooperation in the field of healthcare | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 16th April, 2011 |
| Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India on Cooperation in Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy | Signed in Astana on 15 April 2011 |
| Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of India for Creation of an Information Technology Training Centre in Kazakhstan | Signed in Astana on 27 January 2014 |
| Agreement between Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C:DAC) and & L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University for establishing India:Kazakhstan Center of Excellence in ICT at Nur:Sultan | Signed in New Delhi on 27th January, 2014 |
| MOU between Governments of India and Kazakhstan for establishing an Educational Center in the sphere of Information and Communication Technology in Kazakhstan | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 27th January, 2014 |
| Contract between “National Limited Company KazAtomProm” and the Department of Atomic Energy of India for supply of natural uranium concentrate | Signed in Astana on 7 July 2015 |
| Memorandum of Understanding between the “National Company Kazakhstan Railways” and “Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited” | Signed in Astana on 7 July 2015 |
| Memorandum of Understanding between the “National Export and Investment Agency “KAZNEX INVEST” and “Invest India” | Signed in Astana on 7 July 2015 |
| Memorandum of Understanding between “Samruk:Energo” and the State Corporation “Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited” | Signed in Astana on 7 July 2015 |
| Long:Term Contract for Sale and Purchase of Natural Uranium Concentrates between JSC “NAC Kazatomprom” and Directorate of Purchase & Stores, Department of Atomic Energy, GOI | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 8th July, 2015 |

| | |
|---|--|
| MOU between the Ministry of Railways of India and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy on Technical Cooperation in the field of Railways. | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 8th July, 2015 |
| Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of India on Defence and Military:Technical Cooperation ¹⁰² | Signed in Astana on 8 July 2015 |
| Agreement on Defence and Military Technical Cooperation. | Signed in Nur:Sultan on 8th July, 2015 |
| Tej Kadam: India:Kazakhstan Joint Statement | Issued in Nur:Sultan on 8th July, 2015 |

Within the framework of the given agreement regular seminars, meetings under joint scientific projects, lecturing in both countries, an exchange of experts etc. were carried out. Besides, the agreement defines a legal basis for cooperation within the framework of working Kazakh:Indian subcommittee on science and technologies. The above discussion has shown that both the regions are been making several MoUs, protocols, agreements, bilateral visits, dialogues, summits etc. to enhance economic and commercial cooperation. These agreements mainly concentrate on the business and investment deals which increase their commercial ties. Through this chapter, a sincere effort has been made to map the trends and patterns of the trade between both the regions.

Factors Influencing India and Kazakhstan Bilateral Economic Relations

India:Kazakhstan economic relations is most likely to be influence by a number of factors. This includes the following points:

- A. India's long:term GDP growth in a liberal and free market society and the advantage that would accrue from trade and investment with India to Kazakhstan are likely to influence bilateral trade and economic relations.
- B. For the Kazakhstan to be in competition with other emerging economic power needs a country which can satisfy Kazakhstan interests to remain a pre:dominant economic power, India is one of them. India in the coming decades has a significant role to play.
- C. India and Kazakhstan in the coming decades would depend on the supply of energy from other countries to meet its increasing energy needs. This may compel both countries to work together for nuclear power generation.

¹⁰² “Signing of Agreements with other Countries.” Press Information Bureau Government of India, Ministry of Defence, 05 FEB 2018. www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleashere.aspx?PRID=1519147. Accessed 12 Sept. 2020.

- D. Kazakhstan needs for a manpower in the working age group and the presence of large quantity and quality of manpower in the working age group in India is also another factor to be considered. India has a high skilled and highly qualified workforce well versed with English and able to adjust in any condition is what Kazakhstan need.
- E. Tap the regions energy resources and pursue geostrategic and economic goals are one of the major factors in India and Kazakhstan engagement.
- F. India is also trying to contain China as China is a big Asian power. Another major factor is to prevent Pakistan's influence in Central Asian Republics; India is also improving its relations with Afghanistan and Iran. India is providing training assistance to Afghanistan armed forces, India is welcoming Afghan students, media is collaborating with Afghan media, and numbers of Indian Journalists are working there. India has also offered them assistance in information technology IT sector. India is also capturing Afghan market for the export of cheaper Indian goods. Collaborating in Afghanistan's reconstruction programmes. From Afghanistan India can easily create insecurity problems for Pakistan and it can pose threat to Pakistan from two sides. With the presence of India in Afghanistan it can easily prevent any kind of Muslim block having soft corner for Pakistan.

Significance of India:Kazakhstan Economic Relations

Economic ties with Kazakhstan accelerated following the opening of India's economy in the early 1990s. India's economic interests in Kazakhstan center on energy and connectivity to the Central Asian region. Kazakhstan also remains significant to India's objective of alleviating energy poverty, (See figure 4) key to the latter's overarching goal of development. Delhi's growing economy benefits from access to Kazakhstan's surplus hydrocarbon reserves and opportunities for investment in upstream oil and gas exploration.

Figure 4: Total Energy Consumption in India, 2019 ¹⁰³





Figure 5: India's Energy Demand in 2030 by Type of Fuel Source ¹⁰⁴



¹⁰³ Source of data: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

¹⁰⁴ Source: McKinsey and Company analysis, January 2014. www.mckinsey.com/. Accessed 15 Sept. 2020.

The importance of oil for India can be seen from the fact that in 2006 oil accounted for 36 per cent of the country's primary energy mix. Since India is relatively poor in oil and gas resources, it has to depend on imports to meet its energy needs. with import:dependence at an all:time high of 90% of domestic consumption, assured supply of oil at reasonable and stable prices is a fundamental economic, political and security priority¹⁰⁵, India's oil import bill was close to US\$90 billion in 2008:09. Due to this dependence, policy makers are worried about oil price volatility and its impact on inflation, economic growth, and foreign exchange reserves. It is believed that India's energy security can be increased by (a) diversifying both its energy mix and its sources of energy imports; (b) seriously perusing overseas acquisitions of energy assets; and (c) initiating policy reforms to attract foreign investment as well as improving domestic production, distribution and consumption. In the last few years, energy diplomacy has also become one of the main agendas of the country's foreign and security policy. India is seriously pursuing the nuclear energy option, as well as sources beyond the Middle East¹⁰⁶. In this scenario, the new energy sources of Kazakhstan are going to play an important role in Indian energy strategy in the coming years. In the early 1990s there was frequent discussion about the Central Asian region becoming another Middle East. Since then, such scenarios have become relatively more sober. However, the Central Asian republics definitely possess 3 to 4 percent of proven global oil and gas reserves.

Kazakhstan could play an important role in diversifying Indian imports. Due to a relatively better economic environment, Kazakhstan is seen by India to possess real potential. Major oil production is expected in the coming decades in Kazakhstan. India's total trade turnover with Central Asia has grown from US\$108m in 2000 to US\$1.5bn in 2017, according to the IMF's *Direction of Trade Statistics*. The bulk of this trade consists of imports of crude oil and chemical products from Kazakhstan. There is potential for the relationship to develop further, primarily through Indian importation of additional mineral resources from Central Asian countries. Economic links have remained constrained, however, as there is no shared border. The shortest route from India to Central Asia passes through a hostile Pakistan and an unstable Afghanistan. Therefore, trade between the two regions is presently conducted through China.

¹⁰⁵ Sanjaya Baru, "Energise Energy Diplomacy." *The Economic Times*, October 10, 2019.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

The countries of this region provide good investment opportunities for Indian businesses. This is clearly shown by London-based Indian steel tycoon Laxmi Mittal. He owns a 5.5-million-ton capacity steel plant in Kazakhstan employing more than 50,000 people¹⁰⁷. From there he supplies the Chinese market. To facilitate trade and investment with this region, Indian policy makers in the last decade have created an institutional framework. India and Kazakhstan big push to bilateral commercial and economic ties as well as in the area of energy cooperation. A breakthrough was made in bilateral relations when the agreement between ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL) and KMG, the National Oil Company of Kazakhstan was signed in respect of the off-shore Caspian Sea block of Satpayev. Both agreed to expedite the signing of the package of documents on Satpayev Block on the transfer of 25% share from KazMunaiGaz JSC to ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) of India¹⁰⁸. A significant achievement was the signing of MOU between the National Company KazAtomProm and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited for cooperation between the two sides, inter:alia, on supply of Uranium to India to meet its energy requirement¹⁰⁹. India has been trying to gain a foothold in Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon sector since 1995¹¹⁰. But it was only in 2009 that the Heads of Agreement was signed between the OVL and the KMG. This was followed by an Exploration Contract between India's Ministry of Oil and Gas and the KMG in 2010. Kazakhstan is fast becoming a major source for metals and minerals. Iron and steel account for about 50 percent of India's imports. Zinc and its compounds constituted another 27.7 percent of imports and about 16 percent is accounted for by salt, Sulphur, lime and other minerals. Thus, more than 90 percent of India's imports are on account of these commodities. Significantly, oil and natural gas do not feature in this list of major import items. On the other hand, pharmaceuticals, coffee, tea, spices, textiles and apparel are the main segments of exports from India. The rapid increase of contacts between business and strategic communities has played a significant role in strengthening understanding and cooperation between India and Kazakhstan.

¹⁰⁷ Vinod Anand (ed.), *Perspectives on Transforming India-Central Asia Engagement: Prospects and Issues*, Vij Books Pvt Ltd, 2011, p. 179; also see, Laruelle, Marlène, and Sébastien Peyrouse, (eds.) *Mapping central Asia: Indian perceptions and strategies*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013. p. 132.

¹⁰⁸ "India and Kazakhstan agree to expedite signing of Satpayev Block." Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=68104. Accessed 20 Sept. 2020.

¹⁰⁹ Tej Kadam: India - Kazakhstan Joint Statement, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25437/Tej_Kadam_India__Kazakhstan_Joint_Statement. Accessed 20 Sept. 2020.

¹¹⁰ Dikshit, Sandeep. "India proposes hydrocarbon pipeline from Kazakhstan." *The Hindu*, March 6, 2013.

The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) has set up Joint Business Councils with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz republic. Recently the governor of the West Kazakhstan region invited Indian industry to invest in areas such as extraction of sunflower oil, wheat production, wool, leather, construction of elite housing complexes and five:star hotels. Many Indian business organizations and think:tanks have identified such areas of cooperation as energy, food processing, textiles, tourism, information technology, education, consultancy services, petrochemicals and construction.²³ Another area of major interest to Indian businesses would be to participate in the continuing privatization process in the region.

If the Central Asian countries are able to reform their land policies, there is a tremendous possibility of investment in the agricultural sector. Investment opportunities can be identified. For Kazakhstan, it could include oil and gas, power generation and distribution, telecommunication equipment, medical equipment and supplies, agricultural machinery, food processing and packaging, construction and engineering services and mining.


The current economic, strategic and political scenario, both regionally and internationally, presents immense potential for India and Kazakhstan to qualitatively and quantitatively enhance their engagement to bring it to a significantly higher level. Both India and Kazakhstan are factors of peace, stability, growth and development not only in their regions but also in the world. Stronger and deeper relations between these countries will further contribute to increasing prosperity and security for the peoples of the two countries as also for the world as a whole.

Kazakhstan Economic Development as a New Economic Zone for India

Kazakhstan is the largest country of all the Central Asian republics. It is rich in hydrocarbon resources and its oil and natural gas reserves attract competition from powers from within and outside the region. Kazakhstan with its huge oil reserves is describe as destined to become ‘another Saudi Arabia’. It is the largest producer of petroleum in the Central Asian Republic. In 2000, it produces 35.252 million metric tons of oil. Kazakhstan with recent recoveries of oil has come to occupy fifth place in the world among the oil rich countries.

For the several year Kazakhstan has achieved economic stability and the country’s economy has grown at an average rate of about 4.9% from 2006:2019. It has emerged as one of the fastest growing and stable economies among the Central Asia. GDP reached an all:time high of 11.5 % in Sep 2006 and a record low of :2.4 % in Jun 2009¹¹¹. Liberalisation of the currency exchange market, government’s measures to support entrepreneurs as well as technical and financial restructuring have played a key role to ensure a high growth rate of industrial development. The percentage of high:tech exports (as a share of manufactured exports) from Kazakhstan have grown from just 4.46% in 1995 to 37.17% in 2014. (See figure 6)

Figure 6: Medium and High:Technology Exports from Kazakhstan (% manufactured Exports)¹¹²




Kazakhstan represents a big attraction for foreign investors. Investment appeal of the Kazakhstan market is due to availability of vast natural resources, size of the market, strategic importance of Kazakhstan, and also stable internal political conditions and presence of corresponding legislative base. Since 1991, direct foreign investments into the economy of Kazakhstan reached 30 billion US dollars by 2006. But as the need for investments is not

¹¹¹ “Kazakhstan Real GDP Growth” CEIC data, [www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/kazakhstan/real-gdp-growth#:~:text=The%20Gross%20Domestic%20Product%20\(GDP,an%20average%20rate%20of%204.5%20%25..](http://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/kazakhstan/real-gdp-growth#:~:text=The%20Gross%20Domestic%20Product%20(GDP,an%20average%20rate%20of%204.5%20%25..) Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

¹¹² Source: The World Bank Data, <https://data.worldbank.org>.

exhausted Kazakhstan is still interested in widening them. Priority directions for investments are: a fuel and energy complex; agriculture; infrastructure, including transport, telecommunications; and social infrastructure. Strategies to attract foreign capital represent such methods as financial leasing, sale of shares of the large enterprises to the foreign companies, attraction of foreign investments in venture manufacture.

Figure 7: Gross Inflow of Direct Investment in Kazakhstan from Foreign Direct Investors: Breakdown by Total and India (over a period mln USD)¹¹³




Due to the favorable investment climate and tax regime, Kazakhstan has attracted inwards foreign investment worth more than \$147064 million by 2017 (see figure 8). FDI flows grew by 166 per cent, from \$ 964 million in 1995 to \$2,561 million in 2002. Inward FDI stock grew by 19 per cent, from \$12.9 billion in 2001 to \$15.4 billion in 2002.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, India’s Inward FDI stock grew, from \$1.1 million in 2005 to \$129.8 million in 2011:2012 financial year, that is very good figure from Indian side. (See figure 7 and 8).

¹¹³ Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan, <https://nationalbank.kz>.

¹¹⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, FDI in brief: Kazakhstan, <https://unctad.org>. Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

Figure 8:Kazakhstan FDI Stocks Overview¹¹⁵




The outlook of the Kazakhstan market is closely connected with further integration into international economic relations, utilisation of unique reserves of energy and mineral resources, vast possibilities to export industrial and agricultural products, optimum employment of country's transit potential and also with availability of highly qualified specialists in different spheres. The main economic content of more than 15 years of independence has become transition from the central command planning to a market system. Rate of growth of major indicators of development of oil extractions and deposits in Kazakhstan is one of the highest in the world. During a comparatively short period Kazakhstan succeeded in more than doubling the value of extraction and deposits. Kazakhstan foreign trade is increasing day to day. In 2007, 2012, 2018 export from Kazakhstan was USD 47.8 billion, USD 86.4 billion USD 61 billion respectively. (See figure 9)

Kazakhstan today is a dynamically developing market-oriented state, whose uniqueness in post-cold war space is marked by its political economic and social stability. Kazakhstan is carrying out an Industrial and Innovation Development Strategy aimed at building high-tech, English-speaking economy with capabilities in aerospace, biotechnology, IT and peaceful atomic energy. Kazakhstan is striving to be among 50 competitive nations of the world. Kazakhstan initiated new restructuring of economy which was realized through radical

¹¹⁵ Source: Trading Economics.com.

economic reforms to open up the economy and actively integrate into the world trade system, oil extraction, natural resources, privatization program, the market economy mechanisms and modernized financial and banking system, created investment friendly environment. That formed a solid foundation for the dynamic economic growth.

Figure 9:Kazakhstan’s External Trade: Total Turnover Trade Growth (2007:Jan:Feb 2019)¹¹⁶



Kazakhstan has had tremendous economic development during the 2000s, which has been fueled by the initial wave of market-oriented liberalization, massive natural resource exploitation, and robust FDI. Due to the country’s continuous economic progress, it has moved from a low-income to a middle-income economy, which has improved the quality of life and decreased the prevalence of poverty. The goal of the Kazakhstani government’s 2050 development model is to hasten the country’s transition to a modernized, knowledge-based, diversified, and privately-driven economy. The slowdown in 2022 was mostly attributable to the conflict in Ukraine and the negative effects it had on the rest of the world. As a result of these actions, Kazakhstan has been enjoying moderate GDP growth. In 2022, growth in the economy is projected to slow to a still-impressive 3%. GDP growth is anticipated to quicken to 3.5 percent in the upcoming fiscal year of 2023–24.¹¹⁷ As of the year 2021, the average GDP per capita in the globe was at \$12,230. However, GDP in Kazakhstan rose to USD

¹¹⁶ Source: Deloitte CIS Research Centre, Business Outlook in Kazakhstan 2019. <https://www2.deloitte.com>.

¹¹⁷ “World Bank in Kazakhstan Overview.” World Bank, www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/overview#3. Accessed 2Nov. 2022.

10,374 per capita, or USD 197.11 billion for the entire nation. So, as of right now, among the world’s leading economies, Kazakhstan is presently rated 54th.¹¹⁸ (see figure 10)

Figure 10:2010:2022: Evolution: India and Kazakhstan’s Annual GDP Growth Rate¹¹⁹





Figure 11:Kazakhstan’s Top Three Export Categories in India¹²⁰



¹¹⁸ “Indicator of Economy in Kazakhstan”. World data, www.worlddata.info/asia/kazakhstan/economy. Accessed 3Nov. 2022.

¹¹⁹ Source: Trading Economics. <https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/gdp-growth-annual>.

¹²⁰ Source: Deloitte CIS Research Centre, Business Outlook in Kazakhstan 2019. <https://www2.deloitte.com>.

There are huge economic opportunities for mutual cooperation between Kazakhstan and India. Kazakhstan is taking active steps to increase the sustainability of its economy. The economy of Kazakhstan has continued to grow at a reasonably high rate. Now, about 70% of the total Central Asian GDP accounts for Kazakhstan which is over USD135.

India's Economic Liberalisation: A Boost for Trade and Investment Opportunities in Kazakhstan

The primary goal of economic liberalisation is free flow of capital between nations, efficient allocation of resources and competitive advantages. This calls for removal of protectionist reforms like tariffs, trade laws and trade barriers. The gradual relaxation in India's restrictive policies has put India on par with other attractive destinations for foreign investors. Liberal policies make it cheaper for companies to access capital from investors consequently leading to higher profits.

A major shift in India's policy occurred when India embraced economic liberalisation and reforms program in 1991 aiming to raise its growth potential and integrating with the world economy. The last few years have been one of great economic resurgence for India and extraordinary economic revival since 1991 is historically unprecedented. It is not only India, but Kazakhstan too has been going through a historic transformation. Led by strong domestic demand, an even stronger exporter performance, rising investments, and large-scale foreign capital inflows, the economies of both India and Kazakhstan are today growing at a fast pace. While in the case India, the last three years have seen an average annual growth of 7.6%¹²¹, in Kazakhstan's case the figure is an equal impressive 4.9%¹²². India's Industrial policy reforms gradually removed restrictions on investment projects and business expansion on the one hand and allowed increased access to foreign technology and funding on the other. Measures to remove roadblocks were introduced like automatic route for technology agreements in high priority industries and removal of restriction of FDI in low technology areas as well as liberalisation of technology imports etc. In a bid to attract Indians abroad, the Government extended permission to NRIs and Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCBs) to invest up to 100 % in high priorities sectors.


¹²¹ GDP Growth of India, <http://statisticstimes.com/index.php>; India Real GDP Growth, CEIC Data, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en>. Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

¹²² Kazakhstan Real GDP Growth, CEIC Data, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en>. Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

These policies have succeeded in unlocking India's enormous growth potential and powerful entrepreneurial forces. The move from socialist reforms to a new competitive friendly policy has earned rewards. Since 1991, successive Governments, across political parties, have successfully carried forward the country's economic reform agenda.

India's foreign investment policy has been formulated with a view to encouraging FDI into India. The process of regulation and approval has been substantially liberalised. FDI under automatic route is permitted in most activities/ sectors, except in a certain restricted sector where prior approval of the Government is required. Government of India welcomes FDI in all permitted sectors, especially for development of infrastructure, technological up gradation of Indian industry through 'Greenfield' investments and in projects having the potential of creating employment opportunities on a large scale. Investment for setting up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and establishing manufacturing units are also welcomed. (See figure 12)

Figure 12: India's Foreign Direct Investments, 2010:2019, (Value in USD Million)¹²³



Liberalisation reform and its impact on trade, particularly exports, has been one of main issues among economists and policy makers in the global arena. The foundation of export led growth hypothesis led to pay the attention on how exports growth is possible in a country. This is the reason for shifting trade policies from adopting import substitution trade strategy

¹²³ Source: Trading Economics, Reserve Bank of India.

to export promotion strategy since the early 1980s. This shift has created a wave of liberalisation reform in the global context with the belief that export promotion helps to create more employment, increases output, earns foreign currency, mobilises domestic resources and saving optimally so that the economic benefits reach to the wider group of people. In the liberalised economic policy regime, a country participates in international trade reducing its tariff and non:tariff barrier so that business communities perform better and country successes to achieve the faster economic growth and engagement.

The post:cold war witnessed a major economic crisis in India that was a result of the oil price shocks due to the Gulf war of 1990, disintegration of long time strategic and economic partner Soviet Union and a sharp depletion of its foreign exchange reserves. India took the bold steps of implementing economic reforms that bring an end to the license raj and opening up of private sectors. The reforms process includes reducing tariff and non:tariff barriers, relaxation of FDI rules, exchange rate and banking reforms, was instrumental for the robust and prosperous growth of the Indian economy. The decision to open up its economy and integrate it to the international

Economy would always remain the basis of the successful Indian economy. Many observers argue that paradigm shift in the economic systems of both India and Kazakhstan led to major repercussion on the relation between the two countries.

The relationship between India and Kazakhstan gain momentum with PM Manmohan Singh's official visit to Kazakhstan in 2011 which held out an opportunity to create a special bilateral economic and strategic relationship with the signing of the "Joint Action Plan". Realising the potential areas This plan provides a 'Road Map' of trade growth that included the hydrocarbons, civil nuclear energy, space, information technology and cyber security, high technology and innovative technology, pharmaceuticals, health care, agriculture and cultural exchanges and dynamism for economic development. From 2001 onwards, investment cooperation between two countries has increase and various initiatives and policy measures have been undertaken from time to time in order to promote trade and economic cooperation, though trade and economic ties continue to be much below their potential. According to Kazakhstan sources, the balance of trade between the two countries in the year 2000 was 75 708,3 thousand US dollars. In 2010, India become the ninth largest economy in the world in terms of GDP and in 2019 India become third largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and its economic

performance. After the decades of failing to realise its full potential, India has become one of the world's fastest growing large economies in a range of activities, from information technology to subsistence agriculture. Ironically, the economic relations failed to make much impact as the India:Kazakhstan bilateral trade in 2010:2011 stood at just USD\$ 310.59 million, out of which India's exports to Kazakhstan stood at US\$ 172.16 million and India's imports amounted to just US\$ 138.42 million. India investment in Kazakhstan is estimated to be US\$ 267.1 million, the bulk of which is in the energy sector, while Kazakhstan investment in India is estimated to be of the order of US\$ 126.8 million, primarily in the pharmaceutical, engineering, tea, coffee. Priority areas for expanding bilateral economic cooperation are energy sector, pharmaceutical, food products, Information Technology.


With this, trade and investment relations with other countries and foreign investment inflows started improving in a way that had never experienced before. The average GDP growth rate in the first decade after the liberalization of Indian economy hovers around 5.6 per cent. Taking into account the development in international relations, especially with regard to Kazakhstan's growing economic concerns and India's geo-economic interest, it is important to investigate the future prospects in the economic relations between these two countries. As states with similar economic goals, aiming for integration into the world economy, the areas of potential cooperation between these two countries need to be explored as, along with its cooperation, there is also growing global economic completion.

Against this background, where do, India and Kazakhstan, stand in terms of economic engagement? Despite the fact that the India and Kazakhstan economies have been dynamically growing at 4:7 % a year and moreover often described as mutually complementary, trade between the two countries has stagnated. In free market economies governments can persuade, but cannot compel or direct business. This is the most challenging task because in both countries this is now a private sector driven activity. But unfortunately trade between India and Kazakhstan is still led by the public sector, and focus is too narrow, namely petroleum oils, bituminous minerals, radioactive chemical elements, uranium, Pharmaceutical Products etc.

Development of Trade Relations between India and Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has a long-standing and friendly relationship with India which has been reinforced by cultural links such as a common language, democratic traditions and economic relations. However, this relationship has resulted in trade expansion between the India and Kazakhstan. India is currently Kazakhstan's largest bilateral trading partner in Central Asia region. In 2018, the merchandise trade between them increased to some extent to US\$ 1.2 billion. Although the overall trade between Kazakhstan and India showing 26.5 percent increase during a last year. Their trade relation has been developing over the year (see figure 13).

Figure 13: India and Kazakhstan Balance of Trade (Value in USD Million)¹²⁴



The most recent development in Kazakhstan's trade relationship with India has been the progress in discussions regarding a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The process for negotiating an FTA started in 2015. Between India and the Eurasian Economic Union on the feasibility of an FTA. The Leaders acknowledged that the proposed FTA would create an enabling framework for expanding economic linkages between Kazakhstan and India.

¹²⁴ Source: Tradingeconomics.com

Kazakhstan and Indian agreed to explore the possibility of such an agreement after an economic analysis of its viability was undertaken. The joint feasibility study was completed, highlighting that the Indian and Kazakhstan economies were complementary and that considerable potential exists to foster and strengthen bilateral trade and economic relationship.

India took the initiative role by introducing economic reforms process. Economic reforms programme and the resulting economic developments in India are the main driving factor behind the closer economic partnership. India eagerness for a better economic partnership was very much clear when the Indian Commerce Department counted Kazakhstan among the five Emerging Markets in the Central Asia along with China, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and others. This is further strengthened by the frequency of official visits from India to Kazakhstan and vice:versa. President Nursultan Nazarbayev visited India in February 1992. Thereafter, he has visited India in 1993 (transit visit), 1996, 2002 and 2009. He was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi on January 26, 2009. Prime Minister of India Shri Narsimha Rao visited Kazakhstan in 1993, Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in June 2002, Dr. Manmohan Singh in April 2011 and Shri Narendra Modi in July 2015 (bilateral visit) and June 2017 (SCO summit). Vice:Presidents of India Shri K.R. Narayanan and Shri Hamid Ansari visited Kazakhstan in 1996 and 2008 respectively.

Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi participated in the 17th SCO Summit in Astana on June 8:9, 2017. India was admitted as a full member of the SCO during the Summit. He met President Nazarbayev on the margins of SCO summit in Qingdao, where he expresses India's desire to strengthen economic and trade cooperation with Kazakhstan. The main agenda of his visit was on trade, investment and transfer of technology. Foreign Office Consultations (FOC) at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers are held to discuss the entire range of bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest.

Despite of the economic reforms by India, Kazakhstan exports to India was hindered by market access barriers, high import tariffs, lack of adequate infrastructure and direct land access owing to bureaucratic delays import licensing, customs procedures, procurement practices and procedures are neither transparent nor standardized and lastly discrimination against foreign suppliers. For more trade turnover India wants Kazakhstan to reduce its tariff

rates on Kazakhstan exports to India. However, with gaining understanding of the need to expand the relations, India on its side have taken steps to bring down its tariff rates and a commitment for further progress. Such a move has no doubt helped in expanding the trade relations. However, India is still not fully satisfied with the present level of tariff rate and additional duties imposed on India. exports to Kazakhstan.

India:Kazakhstan Economic and Trade Engagement in the 21st Century and the New Beginnings

Economic factor has played a key role in bringing the two countries closer and in transforming the relations. Since the initiation of the economic reforms, Indian economy has witnessed a dramatic improvement and no way of stopping. Such an improvement has attracted the attention of the Kazakhstan Businesses that there has been an increase in the number of Kazakhstan firm's presence in India. Kazakhstan is the biggest trade partner of India among Central Asian. The liberalization process has opened the excellent opportunity for the Kazakhstan firms to access Indian market and changed its mindset about the Indian economy from a poor, underdeveloped economy to an emerging market.

Today Kazakhstan has emerged as the largest trading and strategic partner and the largest investor of India in Central Asia. This is viewed in terms of the significant improvement in India's exports to Kazakhstan and the improving investment towards India. However, if we look at the total trade turnover, it is far below the potential due lack of direct land access to insufficient India exports to Kazakhstan and vice versa. Nevertheless, the good news is that the balance of trade is in favor of India. Indian Officials has charged Kazakhstan for its firmness to undergo more reforms that would provide more market opportunities for Indian goods and services. They are not satisfied with the level of market access that has been provided to them. They wanted more reforms and more market access. They are of the view that the Kazakhstan market remains much more open to India firms and their products than the Indian market is to Kazakhstan trade and investment. Today, Indian firms are increasingly making its presence felt in Kazakhstan. The India:Kazakhstan Inter:Governmental Commission (IGC) established in 1993 is the apex bilateral institutional mechanism for developing trade¹²⁵, economic, scientific, technological, industrial and cultural cooperation

¹²⁵ "India - Kazakhstan Relations." *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.* www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/december_2018.pdf Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

between the two countries¹²⁶. The year 2018 marked the 26th anniversary of diplomatic relations between India and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is India's largest trade and investment partner in Central Asia. Bilateral trade between India and Kazakhstan reached US\$ 1,032.81 million in 2017:18. Kazakhstan has become the main supplier of uranium to India. India and Central Asia's biggest nation Kazakhstan has desired to push their trade turnover to five billion US\$ from the current one billion US\$ taking advantage of favourable business climate in both countries.

Work to expand trade and economic cooperation is carried out jointly with the Kazakhstan:Indian Business Council. Tengri Bank in Almaty, of which Punjab National Bank is the shareholder, assists Indian companies in Kazakhstan. A major Indian farming company Farm2U cooperating with "Kazakh Invest National Company" interested in developing gardening in Kazakhstan. The Refex group of companies is also expected to soon finalise an agreement on rare earth metals processing and the acquisition of the Drozhilovsky deposit. Additionally, the large energy company NTPC is ready to enter the Kazakh market to implement an alternative energy project with a capacity of over 100 MW. In 2002 during Indian Petroleum Minister's visit to Kazakhstan a memorandum of understanding was signed under which Kazakhstan's national company 'KazMunaiGaz' and Indian company ONGC Videsh agreed to set up joint working group on development of oil and gas projects within the intergovernmental commission¹²⁷.

Efforts are still going on for expanding the level of trade and economic relations that India and Kazakhstan enjoy at present. This is reflected in the number of official visits from India to Kazakhstan and vice:versa that is aimed at transforming economic relations through resolving the underlying trade disputes. India from its side has also taken the most important step of eliminating quantitative restriction on a large number of products thereby opening ways for Kazakhstan Manufacturers Company.

¹²⁶ "Tej Kadam: India-Kazakhstan Joint Statement." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25437/Tej_Kadam_India__Kazakhstan_Joint_Statement. Accessed 27 Sept. 2020.

¹²⁷ "Potential for expanding Kazakh-India ties huge, says Envoy." Asian News International, Feb 16, 2018, www.aninews.in/news/business/business/potential-for-expanding-kazakh-india-ties-huge-says-envoy201802161425040001/. Accessed 28 Sept. 2020.

India:Kazakhstan Bilateral Merchandise Trade and Investment

India is also known for investing to other countries. When India have made policy changes to attract investment from other countries, it has also made policy changes in overseas investment that was first undertaken in 1992, followed by further liberalisation in 1995. Since then, there emerged certain policy changes from time to time and Reserve bank of India (RBI) replaced Ministry of Commerce to look after the overseas investment policy. India and Kazakhstan today signed an agreement to amend the two:decade old bilateral tax treaty under which information exchanged between the two countries. the protocols to amend the existing Double Taxation Avoidance Convention (DTAC) between the two countries provides internationally:accepted standards for effective exchange of information on tax matters. The initial DTAC between India and Kazakhstan was signed on December 9, 1996, for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of evasion with respect to taxes on income¹²⁸.

Very recently India's government announced on September 20th a cut in the corporate tax rate for domestic firms and new domestic manufacturing companies to 22 percent from 30 percent. The new tax rate will be applicable from the current fiscal which began on April 1st. Corporate Tax Rate in India averaged 34.52 percent from 1997 until 2019, reaching an all:time high of 38.95 percent in 2001 and a record low of 25.17 percent in 2019¹²⁹. This step would help increase India exports and to provide Indian industry access to new markets and technologies thereby help them to become globally competitive. The Indian steel company Ispat scored a significant victory by securing a foothold in Kazakhstan in November of 1995. The company acquired stakes in Karmet, the largest metallurgical plant in Temirtau¹³⁰. Among the major companies that have made significant investment in the Kazakhstan are NTPC, ONGC Videsh Limited, CG Corp Global, India Power, RV Healthcare, Refex Energy, PNB etc.

India's Overseas Investment has witnessed significant improvement since 1996. The value of approved Indian Investment abroad has increased India's FDI outflows more than doubled in 2017 to \$11.3 billion, mostly led by public sector enterprise Oil and Natural Gas Corp. It is

¹²⁸ "India, Kazakhstan agrees to amend tax treaty." *The Economic Times*, June 6, 2017.

¹²⁹ "India Corporate Tax Rate." *Trading Economics*, www.tradingeconomics.com/india/corporate-tax-rate. Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

¹³⁰ Yermukanov, Marat. "Kazakhstan-India Relations: Partners or Distant Friends?" *The Jamestown Foundation*, November 16, 2004. www.web.archive.org/web/20081018193815/http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2368860. Accessed 25 Sept. 2020.

also important to note that most of India's OFDI during this period (1975:90) was largely directed to other developing countries at similar or lower levels of development. A further break:up of the regional concentration of India's OFDI reveals that Southeast and East Asia accounted for 36 per cent of this investment while Africa was the next largest beneficiary with 17 per cent of India's approved OFDI equity¹³¹. Moreover, West Asia and Central Asia claimed 10 per cent each¹³². The Kazakhstan has been one of the largest recipients of Indian investment, receiving roughly 9.57 percent of India's investments abroad [Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment (O:FDI) in terms of Volume of Outward Investments during First Wave 1975:90]¹³³. Indian investment to Kazakhstan is not restricted to energy sector, but now spreading beyond the energy sector to include other sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, healthcare, travel, luxury hotels, engineering services and manufacturing, Several Indian nationals and Indian companies have a significant presence in Kazakhstan. ArcelorMittal Temirtau is a major investment by a non:resident Indian, the headquarters of which are located in Luxembourg¹³⁴. Among the Indian companies, Tata group is the major investor in Kazakhstan.

This good relations between the India and Kazakhstan have achieved a qualitative new character in the post:Cold War era but the economic ties between them continue to pose a major challenge to the relations as bilateral trade is inadequate, despite the robust partnership between the two countries. Compared to India's economic relations with Kazakhstan, it has done good business with its other partners like Russia which is five times more than its economic integration with Kazakhstan. Hence, for strengthening the bilateral ties further, the political leaders of both countries have repeatedly initiated measures to bolster trade and economic engagement.

Trade and commerce form a crucial component of the rapidly expanding multifaceted relations between India and Kazakhstan. In recent years, there has been a significant jump in

¹³¹ Pradhan, Jaya Prakash. "Indian outward FDI: a review of recent developments." *Transnational Corporations* (UNCTAD), vol. 24, no. 2, 2017, pp. 43–70. www.unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeia2017d3a2_en.pdf. Accessed 2 Aug. 2020.

¹³² Divya Chaudhry, Priyanka Tomar and Pallavi Joshi, "Deconstructing Indian Overseas Foreign Direct Investments: Historical and Contemporary Trends." *Oxfam Discussion Papers*, March 2018, p. 9.

¹³³ Pradhan, Jaya Prakash. "Outward foreign direct investment from India: Recent trends and Patterns." *Gota, Ahmedabad, Gujarat Institute of Development Research*, Working Paper no. 153, February 2005, p. 23. www.mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12358/. Accessed 2 Aug. 2020.

¹³⁴ Sajjanhar, Ashok. "India-Kazakhstan relations: Challenges and opportunities." *Gateway House*, November 2013. www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-relations-challenges-and-opportunities/. Accessed 5 Aug. 2020.

export and import resulting in a huge trade turnover. The trade volume has moved from US\$ 146.891 million in 1995¹³⁵ to US \$1196.86 million in 2018¹³⁶, registering a more than eight:fold increase. Indian exports have contributed less than the India's import from Kazakhstan in reaching this level. India's exports to Kazakhstan have been increasing steadily over the years, 1990:2018, with an average annual growth rate of around 4,9 per cent per annum¹³⁷. The data reached an all:time high of 11.5% in September 2006.

However, when it comes to import from Kazakhstan, India remains a relatively less significant export destination for Kazakhstan because of the absence of land connectivity and direct land access between India and Kazakhstan. and the slow growth of India export to Kazakhstan. During 2007:09, annual FDI inflow into Kazakhstan was continuously above US\$11 billion. On the other hand, outward FDI from Kazakhstan reached US\$6.8 billion every year. Kazakhstan's FDI flow to India has been minimal till date.¹³⁸ However, the figure of Indian export to K Kazakhstan in recent years has improved significantly. Since 2014, there has been a significant growth in India export to Kazakhstan, with 2006:07 reaching the highest growth rate. The report shows real GDP growth touching a high of 10.08% in 2006:07 in terms of factor cost, the highest since liberalisation of the economy in 1991 and the second highest ever, behind 10.2% during the Rajiv Gandhi administration in 1988:89. Under the old series, growth in 2006:07 was 9.57%.¹³⁹ Kazakhstan Exports to India was US\$954.08 Million during 2018, according to the United Nations Comtrade database on international trade¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁵ "Trade and Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and India." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India www.mfa.gov.kz/en/delhi/content-view/torgovo-ekonomiceskoe-sotrudnicestvo-mezdu-kazakhstan. Accessed 5 Aug. 2020.

¹³⁶ "Bilateral Trade between India and Kazakhstan during last five years." Embassy of India, Astana, Kazakhstan, www.indembastana.gov.in/page/investment-statistics/. Accessed 10 Aug. 2020.

¹³⁷ "Kazakhstan Real GDP Growth." CEIC data, www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/kazakhstan/real-gdp-growth. Accessed 10 Aug. 2020; also see, "Kazakhstan GDP growth (annual %)." *The World Bank*, www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?. Accessed 10 Aug. 2020.

¹³⁸ Ashok Sajjanhar, "India-Kazakhstan relations: Challenges and opportunities." *Gateway House*, 20 November 2013. www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-relations-challenges-and-opportunities/. Accessed 2 Sep. 2020.

¹³⁹ "India clocked 10.08 per cent growth under Manmohan Singh's tenure: Report." *The Economic Times*, August 18, 2018, www.economicstimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-clocked-10-08-pc-growth-under-manmohan-singhs-tenure-shows-data/articleshow/65444247.cms. Accessed 2 Sep. 2020.

¹⁴⁰ "Kazakhstan Export to India." Trading Economics. www.tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/exports/india#:~:text=Kazakhstan%20Exports%20to%20India%20was,updated%20on%20February%20of%202023.&text=Base%20metals%20not%20specified%20elsewhere%2C%20cermets. Accessed 2 Sep. 2020.

The progress in economic and trade relations since 2010 may be attributed to the political and strategic understanding that both countries started enjoying after the establishment of Indo-Kazakh Joint Business Council. With this, the annual growth rate of India-Kazakhstan trade also improves. Merchandise exports from India to Kazakhstan grew 2017:18. India exported 46.92 million kg of tea to the region during April-January 2017:18, down from 49.63 million kg in the previous year, even as the total imports in the region went up. Exports from India fell 6.05 percent from a year earlier to USD 26.13 billion in August 2019, due mainly to a 12.29 percent slump in sales of gems and jewellery.¹⁴¹ This strong performance reflects the highest annual percentage growth in Indian exports to Kazakhstan over the past decade.

India-Kazakhstan trade relations is at the threshold of significant improvement given the present level of improvement continues. This can be seen from the fact that India and Kazakhstan were successful in clinching the target, trade between India and Kazakhstan has grown by 20.06 percent, from US\$ 16.50 million in 1995 to US\$ 303.71 million in 2010. The average trade during this period was of US\$ 113.88 million. During 2007:2008, imports grew more than 500 times. It may be due to the shot up in mineral and oil prices in international market.¹⁴²

India-Kazakhstan Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, industrial and cultural cooperation is the main institutional mechanism to review economic cooperation. It integrates many working groups on trade and economic cooperation, modernization and industrial cooperation, energy, investment projects, tourism and culture, science and technology and IT¹⁴³. Mechanisms such as the Kazakhstan-India Business Council (KIBC) {the partnership between the Foreign Trade Chamber of Kazakhstan (FTCK) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (FICCI)}, India-Kazakhstan Trade, Investment, Technology, economic promotion Council {partnership between FICCI and Chamber of International Commerce of

¹⁴¹ "India export to Kazakhstan." Trading Economics.

www.tradingeconomics.com/india/exports/kazakhstan#:~:text=India%20Exports%20to%20Kazakhstan%20was,updated%20on%20February%20of%202023.&text=Base%20metals%20not%20specified%20elsewhere%2C%20cermets. Accessed 2 Sep. 2020.

¹⁴² Kaur, Jaspreet and Sandeep Kaur. "Indo-Kazakhstan Trade: Barriers and Prospects." *Central Asia Journal*, no. 70, Summer 2012. www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issue_70/06_indo_Kaz_trade.html. Accessed 3 Sept. 2020.

¹⁴³ "13th India-Kazakhstan Inter Governmental Commission Meeting." Embassy of India, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. www.indembastana.gov.in/news_detail/?newsid=182. Accessed 3 Sept. 2020.

Kazakhstan}, An MoU on cooperation in the space sector was signed between ISRO and National Space Agency of Kazakhstan 2009. ISRO has given its proposals for construction of two communication and one radar satellite to Kazakh side and is waiting for response. KIBC along with Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council (Pharmexcil) under the Indian Ministry of Trade and Industry organized a Kazakh:Indian Pharmaceutical Business forum on December 5:6, 2016, in which more than 40 Indian pharmaceutical companies participated. Atomic energy cooperation was started in January 2009, when the National atomic company Kazatomprom and Nuclear Power Corporation of India signed an MoU. In November 2009 a contract was signed for the supply of 2.1 thousand tons of uranium concentrate by 2014. On its expiry, a new contract was signed between “Kazatomprom” and the Indian Department of Atomic Energy for supply of 5 thousand tons of uranium concentrate by 2019.¹⁴⁴ During the PM’s visit to Kazakhstan in July 2015, both sides agreed to enhance cooperation in the field of Space including its application for governance and development¹⁴⁵. APEEDA responsible for promoting Indian agro:products visited Almaty and Astana in June 2018 and conducted wet sampling of different varieties of Indian mangoes in prominent stores of Kazakhstan. This was received with great enthusiasm by the people of Kazakhstan. Similarly, a Tea delegation visited Almaty in August 2018 and conducted tea promotion events and held B2B meetings¹⁴⁶. India provides capacity building assistance to Kazakhstan in various specialized fields under ITEC program sponsored by the Ministry of External Affairs.¹⁴⁷ For the development and deepening of bilateral relations in the field of agriculture¹⁴⁸, the parties agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of agricultural research and education between JSC "National Agrarian Research and Education Center" of Kazakhstan and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research¹⁴⁹. Given the high potential in the field of cinematography and audiovisual cooperation, the Indian side proposed signing a Memorandum on cooperation in the field of television and radio broadcasting as well as the exchange of audiovisual programs between JSC Republican Television and Radio

¹⁴⁴ “Trade and Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and India.” Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in India, www.mfa.gov.kz/en/delhi/content-view/torgovo-ekonomiceskoe-sotrudnicestvo-mezdu-kazahstanom-i-indiej. Accessed 4 oct. 2020.

¹⁴⁵ “India-Kazakhstan Relations.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/december_2018.pdf. Accessed 4 oct. 2020.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.


¹⁴⁸ “India and Kazakhstan agree to expedite signing of Satpayev Block.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=68104. Accessed 4 oct. 2020.

¹⁴⁹ “Kazakhstan and India expand horizons of cooperation and increase volumes of goods turnover.” Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in India. www.mfa.gov.kz/en/delhi/content-view/kazahstan-i-india-rassiraut-gorizonty-sotrudnicstva-i-narasivaut-obemy-tovarooborota. Accessed 4 oct. 2020.

Corporation "Kazakhstan" and Public Broadcasting Agency of India Prasar:Bharati¹⁵⁰. Investment cooperation, on the other hand, is much needed for increasing bilateral economic relations between India and Kazakhstan.

As for export:import relations, the main items of traditional exports from India are tea, ready-made garments, drugs and pharmaceuticals, coffee, tobacco, rice and leather goods. Recently, some of the non-traditional items like electronic goods, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, Electrical machinery and equipment and parts have also shown strong growth.

Figure 14:Top Ten Item India’s Export to Kazakhstan in 2018 (value in USD million)¹⁵¹




¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Sources: Trading Economics

India's total import from Kazakhstan in 2018:19 was US \$ 514,078.42 Million. India's import was dominated by Crude Petroleum oils, medium oils and preparations, Asbestos, Ferro:chromium and Phosphorus. The import basket of India for the products imported from Kazakhstan is highly skewed, such that the top 5 products amount to 97 % of total imports by India from Kazakhstan.

Figure 15: Items of Import by India from Kazakhstan in 2018 (Value in USD Million)¹⁵²



Analysing the trade trends between India and Kazakhstan it can be noted that one of the weak characteristics of the trade relations has been the narrow base of the trade basket. The composition of the Indian exports to Kazakhstan shows that agricultural products such as tea, coffee, rice, tobacco, spices, pharmaceutical products, and textiles and accessories constitute nearly 80 percent of the exports. Similarly, Crude petroleum oil, Copper cathodes, Ferro chromium, Natural gas and Natural uranium dominate the Kazakhstan export basket to India.

¹⁵² Source: Embassy of India, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan's industrial sector depends mainly on the extraction and processing of the natural resources and also on heavy industry specializing in construction equipment, tractors, agricultural machinery and military products. The manufacturing activities are limited to textile, chemical products and fertilizers. The former Soviet republic is in transitional phase. Also, it has rapidly growing middle class and signs that the hydrocarbon prosperity is being felt widely. Thus, there have been required huge imports in pharmaceuticals, tea, food processing, machinery and equipment, paper and paperboards, consumer durables and services. On the other hand, India has a proficiency to provide these requirements. Thus, it has two-fold significance for India.

From US\$758,371.89 million in 2014:15, India:Kazakhstan bilateral trade has grown to US\$844,156.51 million in 2018:19. During this period India's imports from Kazakhstan has grown much faster than exports (Table) In 2018 India registered a negative trade balance of US\$:604,716 million. It is interesting to note that prior to the financial crisis in 2008 India had a positive trade balance with Kazakhstan. However, and though as on today India's trade balance with Kazakhstan is negative, over the last two years there is not much change in that volume. The trend is shown in detail in the table below.

Table 1: Bilateral Trade Figures 2004:2019 (Values in US \$ Millions)¹⁵³

| Year | India's Total Imports from Kazakhstan | India's Total Exports to Kazakhstan | India's Total Trade |
|---------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 2004:05 | 111,517.43 | 83,535.94 | 195,053.37 |
| 2005:06 | 149,165.73 | 103,090.53 | 252,256.26 |
| 2006:07 | 185,735.24 | 126,414.05 | 312,149.29 |
| 2007:08 | 251,654.01 | 163,132.18 | 414,786.19 |
| 2008:09 | 303,696.31 | 185,295.36 | 488,991.67 |
| 2009:10 | 288,372.88 | 178,751.43 | 467,124.31 |
| 2010:11 | 369,769.13 | 249,815.55 | 619,584.68 |
| 2011:12 | 489,319.49 | 305,963.92 | 795,283.41 |
| 2012:13 | 490,736.65 | 300,400.58 | 791,137.23 |
| 2013:14 | 450,199.79 | 314,405.30 | 764,605.09 |
| 2014:15 | 448,033.41 | 310,338.48 | 758,371.89 |
| 2015:16 | 381,007.76 | 262,291.09 | 643,298.84 |
| 2016:17 | 384,357.03 | 275,852.43 | 660,209.46 |
| 2017:18 | 465,580.99 | 303,526.16 | 769,107.15 |
| 2018:19 | 514,078.42 | 330,078.09 | 844,156.51 |

¹⁵³ Source: Department of Commerce, Government of India; also see, UN Comtrade, 2020

Investment cooperation, on the other hand, is much needed for increasing bilateral economic relations between India and Russia despite the former's efforts of initiating 49 percent foreign direct Investment (FDI). In fact, India's investments in Kazakhstan are greater than Kazakhstan's investments in India.

Kazakhstan's FDI flow to India has been minimal till date. Kazakhstan's outward FDI initiatives are driven by the need for economic diversification beyond mining and improvement in competitiveness through overseas experiences, adoption of internationally accepted standards of corporate governance, etc. Therefore, its FDI destinations have been developed countries with very high concentration in The Netherlands, Italy and UK. Likewise, India's contribution in FDI stock of Kazakhstan is also low. Despite having an investment treaty (bilateral investment promotion agreement) between India and Kazakhstan, which came into force in July 2001, cross: border investment relations are weak¹⁵⁴.

In 2005:06, India's OFDI stock in transition economies including Kazakhstan stood at US\$3.02 billion, out of total stock of about US\$12 billion. A predominant share of this was concentrated in Russia. Since then, a number of investment avenues opened up in Kazakhstan, mostly in sectors such as oil and natural gas, pharmaceuticals, banking and information technology. It is clear that energy security is the primary motivation for India's investment interests in Kazakhstan. The long:standing bid of Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India for joint oil exploration with KazMunaiGaz (both are state:owned oil and gas companies) in the Satpayev Block has been a highlight of this motivation and with the signing of the deal, the ONGC is expected to invest about US\$400 million.¹⁵⁵

India and Kazakhstan Changing Composition of Trade

As highlighted in the chapter, India has registered a positive growth in its trade with Kazakhstan, which has increased significantly by fivefold during the last decade, from US\$ 195,053 million in 2004:05 to US\$ 844,156 million in 2018:19. Both the countries are characterized by large markets. Underlying this increase in total trade has been a significant rise in India's exports to as well as imports from Kazakhstan. While India's total exports to

¹⁵⁴ "A Note on India-Kazakhstan Trade and Investment Relations." CUTS International, www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/Briefing_Paper-India-Kazakhstan_Trade_and_Investment_Relations.pdf. Accessed 4 Nov. 2020.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid; also see, Bhatia, Vijay Kumar, India-Kazakhstan Relations: Challenges and Prospects, *Mainstream*, vol. XLVII, no 38, 2009.

Kazakhstan have increased more than five-fold in 2018:19 compared to 2004:05. With a view to boosting bilateral trade relations with Turkey, an important endeavour could be enhanced sourcing of the country's imports from India, in which India has export capability and competitiveness. This would entail identification of potential items of India's exports, which would be based on the following analysis. Selection of potential items of India's exports to Turkey, based on low share of India in Turkey's import basket of major commodities; keeping in view India's global export capability, as also Turkey's demand for import of such commodities. This would further entail identification of potential export items to each market, up to the 6:digit HS code.

A look at composition of India's exports to Kazakhstan, however, raises doubts as to whether the recent trends in exports can be maintained. India's export basket has been dominated by primary and resource-based products. The past growth rates in these exports are unlikely to be maintained, partly because as a part of India's new mineral policy, it may seek higher value addition for minerals and thus discourage such exports and partly because Kazakhstan's demand for such imports connected with the current investment boom may not be sustainable. There are some signs of diversification in Indian exports in recent years. Exports of auto components, pharmaceuticals and machinery items have been increasing over the last few years. Acceleration in the growth rates of these manufactured products may be essential for achieving the target 2 of India's exports to Kazakhstan. India's import from Kazakhstan began to take momentum during the last decade (i.e., since 2001), and this is mostly led by minerals and metals sectors. Kazakhstan imports enjoying high demand elasticity in the domestic market, India's bilateral imports may not be capped in the medium term. The sensitive issue of bilateral trade imbalance can be addressed effectively by making inroads into the Kazakhstan market with India's technology-intensive exports.

Structure of India's Import from Kazakhstan

In recent years, India's imports from Kazakhstan have been diversified, and certain sectors continue to dominate in the bilateral trade. Other imports are spread thinly in almost all the manufacturing sectors as shown in (below Table) India's imports from Kazakhstan comprise with petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals; radioactive chemical elements; asbestos and titanium and manufacturing products. India imports small quantities of agricultural of its

total bilateral imports. India's bilateral imports are mostly concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Four dominant sectors comprising of chemicals, machinery, base metals, and textile & clothing contributed around 85 per cent to bilateral imports in 2016:17. Among these sectors, the largest and the most dynamic sector has been that of machinery import and petroleum oils. Its share in the total.

Table 2: Structure of India's Bilateral Import from Kazakhstan: 2010:2017¹⁵⁶

| HS Sec | Description of HS Sections | Imports (US Dollar thousand) | | | | | | | |
|--------|---|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| | | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| 1 | Petroleum oils | 0 | | 0 | 334,438 | 792,187 | 233,812 | 134,002 | 931,581 |
| 2 | Uranium ores and concentrates | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 34,974 | 0 | 93,053 | 0 |
| 3 | Asbestos (excluding crocidolite and products made from asbestos) | 28,960 | 38,109 | 74,538 | 52,829 | 47,839 | 59,760 | 40,564 | 24,106 |
| 4 | Phosphorus | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 745 | 8,619 |
| 5 | Ferro:chromium, containing by weight <= 4% of carbon | 2,951 | 2,798 | 2,877 | 4,211 | 3,205 | 2,212 | 1,672 | 4,081 |
| 6 | Sodium dichromate | 1,630 | 824 | 652 | 3,204 | 1,551 | 1,023 | 2,352 | 2,654 |
| | Unwrought zinc, not alloyed, containing by weight >= 99,99% of zinc | 38,181 | 17,935 | 20,085 | 4,640 | 19,096 | 11,915 | 11,708 | 5,693 |
| 7 | Chromium trioxide | 4,577 | 4,506 | 4,798 | 5,468 | 4,552 | 4,530 | 2,707 | 2,346 |
| 8 | Unwrought titanium; titanium powders | 0 | 0 | 831 | 745 | 3,758 | 2,204 | 1,360 | 985 |
| 9 | Ferro:chromium, containing by weight > 4% of carbon | 3,714 | 2,163 | 3,292 | 4,266 | 3,446 | 2,742 | 18,119 | 11,712 |
| 10 | Hides and skins of bovine | 0 | 163 | 0 | 90 | 1,314 | 115 | 226 | 790 |
| 11 | Plants, parts of plants, incl. seeds and fruits, | 0 | 0 | 7 | 9 | 42 | 34 | 169 | 368 |
| | Total Import (All Products) | 157,500 | 122,562 | 163,994 | 441,841 | 924,993 | 337,545 | 320,361 | 1,040,262 |

Note: Estimation based on aggregation of products at 6:digit HS.

Bilateral imports increased marginally from 46,872 US Dollar thousand in 2010 to 60,329 US Dollar thousand in 2014. The Pharmaceutical sector export increase much during this period due to significant growth in overall bilateral imports. Some of the sectors such as minerals, plastic products, automobile sector and cinematography products also witnessed substantial penetration in the domestic market. According to the UN statistics, India's bilateral imports despite being affected adversely by the global meltdown during that time. Robust growth has

¹⁵⁶ Source: International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map, <https://www.trademap.org>.

been noticed in some of these sectors which are generally technology-intensive in nature, thus enjoying a high demand elasticity in the domestic market. Imports are seen as improving in some sectors due to the Kazakhstan policy liberalisation exports in order to conserve domestic resources. In terms of composition of India's bilateral imports from Kazakhstan, sectoral shares are improving for minerals, pulp products, textiles & clothing, and base metals. India's bilateral pattern of imports clearly indicates that demand for technology intensive products is becoming strong in the domestic market whereas demand for labour intensive and resource-based products is gradually strengthen in recent years.

Kazakhstan's global pattern of export is similar to its bilateral exports to India. Petroleum oils products constitute a small proportion of Kazakhstan's total export, but are expanding over the years. Contrary to its earlier practices, mineral exports are improving in the country's trade basket. Manufacturing exports dominate Kazakhstan Central Asian export. Some of the major sectoral drivers of exports are energy, engineering, metallurgy and chemicals. Other important export sectors are plastics, footwear, cinematography products, etc. and many of these have grown fast in the pre-crisis period. Constant up-gradation of technology, product development, constant rise in R&D expenditure and indigenisation of foreign technology accompanying FDI, are the important factors for the structural transformation taking place in Kazakhstan export.

Structure of India's Export to Kazakhstan

India's exports to Kazakhstan are highly concentrated where in many sectors (Tea, pharmaceuticals, medical products, Telephone apparatus, Raw tobacco and construction machinery) take the lion's share of 79 per cent of the total bilateral exports in 2012 (Table). These dominant sectors are mostly resource-based and labour intensive in nature, though some of them are partially technology intensive sectors. The shares of sectors like Tea, pharmaceuticals as well as fats & Oil are picking up recently. For the last several years, mineral sector dominated India's bilateral export basket with Kazakhstan but its prominence declined significantly in recent years. Especially during the period of recent episode of recession, the share of pharmaceutical sector declined noticeably to emerge as the first largest export sector of India to Kazakhstan in 2015.

Table 3: Structure of India's Bilateral Export to Kazakhstan: 2010:2017¹⁵⁷

| HS Sec | Description of HS Sections | Imports (US Dollar thousand) | | | | | | | |
|--------|---|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| 1 | Pharmaceutical products | 46,872 | 46,075 | 50,986 | 63,807 | 60,329 | 48,264 | 37,184 | 38,303 |
| 2 | Coffee, tea, maté and spices | 42,796 | 59,327 | 47,219 | 37,387 | 39,129 | 34,485 | 30,236 | 31,485 |
| 3 | Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors | 5,122 | 7,607 | 12,972 | 18,963 | 8,725 | 15,618 | 10,910 | 8,754 |
| 4 | Electrical machinery and equipment | 1,576 | 33,607 | 50,451 | 31,251 | 6,489 | 2,125 | 1,871 | 2,821 |
| 5 | Optical, photographic, cinematographic | 608 | 2,467 | 791 | 971 | 1,794 | 1,302 | 13,284 | 3,201 |
| | Organic chemicals | 1,482 | 1,355 | 1,772 | 1,361 | 881 | 1,125 | 1,121 | 1,699 |
| 7 | Ceramic products | 2,134 | 3,724 | 2,525 | 1,154 | 4,264 | 4,727 | 3,362 | 2,425 |
| 8 | Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted | 7,166 | 17,428 | 18,417 | 15,365 | 28,583 | 14,901 | 2,136 | 3,636 |
| 9 | Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted | 23,881 | 32,252 | 42,995 | 57,983 | 48,359 | 22,629 | 5,468 | 7,087 |
| 10 | Miscellaneous chemical products | 958 | 956 | 731 | 1,251 | 1,173 | 631 | 5,068 | 3,610 |
| 11 | Rubber and articles thereof | 1,612 | 3,359 | 2,460 | 4,461 | 2,681 | 3,007 | 2,274 | 797 |
| 12 | Articles of iron or steel | 725 | 655 | 968 | 3,100 | 3,117 | 1,041 | 1,312 | 675 |
| 13 | Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials | 155 | 3,307 | 838 | 1,634 | 1,055 | 1,421 | 1,456 | 1,229 |
| 14 | Oil seeds, Essential oils and oleaginous fruits | 1,328 | 835 | 651 | 817 | 723 | 330 | 331 | 601 |
| | TOTAL IMPORT (All products) | 146,212 | 236,117 | 262,961 | 275,732 | 237,906 | 168,372 | 125,026 | 118,397 |

Note: Estimation based on aggregation of products at the same level 2:digit HS.

However, both mineral, Pharmaceutical and base metal sectors have complemented each other in focusing exports to the market of Kazakhstan. From the base metal sector, substantial exports are made in the form of iron ores, slag and ashes. In the process, base metal sector became the third largest export sector of India to Kazakhstan.

Besides Pharmaceutical, and metal products, India has a major export interest in the electrical machinery sector products. Bilateral exports are also significant in certain sectors like Tea, Coffee products, Optical Photographic and Articles of apparel, Miscellaneous chemical, cement and machinery & mechanical appliances. Some of these sectors have not only enjoyed a high export share but have also continued to maintain high growth in recent years, which has also been true of some dynamic sectors such as rubber, articles of Iron or steel,

¹⁵⁷ Source: International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map, <https://www.trademap.org>.

prepared food, minerals, cement, etc. The nature of India's bilateral export basket indicates that these sectors fall mostly in the categories of resource-based and labour-intensive products. India's attempts to export technology-intensive products have been much below its potential as shown from its current engagement with Kazakhstan. India needs to improve its export efforts to meet the specific import requirements of Kazakhstan if it has to have wider market access without a bilateral FTA.

India's Bilateral Trade Imbalance with Kazakhstan: Sustainability Issue

There is a growing concern in India relating to sustainability of mounting bilateral trade along with surging trade imbalance between them in the medium term. Some argue that India is an emerging country with a large demand for imports to enhance its exports and also to meet growing domestic demand for consumption including modernisation of its industrial sector. While others argue that excess of consumption over production may lead to an unsustainable current account deficit. Both arguments assume that import from Kazakhstan is competitive compared to many other suppliers in the domestic market. However, cost efficiency of Indian imports from Kazakhstan is an empirical question that needs to be examined.

In the trade literature, laissez-faire is preferred because it is welfare enhancing in nature. Cost efficiency principle has been the driving force behind laissez-faire and this has been argued in several trade theories. There are reasons to believe that Kazakhstan could be a cheap source of bilateral imports. In recent years, world trade is dominated by 'global products' which are produced in several countries at different stages of production, based on an international division of labour. Regional trade is growing fast because of rise in activities relating to 'production fragmentation'. The basis of production fragmentation has been to bring down the cost of production to maintain global competitiveness.

Present global trade flows indicate that Kazakhstan is a major global player in production fragmentation in diversified sectors in Central Asia, and India's imports may be surging from Kazakhstan in these product segments because of its competitive imports. Such trade activities would promote trade in intermediate products at the bilateral level. India is a major importer of primary and technology intensive products for sustaining its ambitious Programme of industrialisation and the country's growing needs for energy consumption (see

table 2). As India is gearing up with its new 'manufacturing policy' to intensify its domestic industrialisation in the medium term, its dependence on imports for competitive technology intensive machineries is becoming important. Since machineries in technology-intensive product segments are expensive in industrialised countries, Kazakhstan could be an alternative source because it is gaining global reputation as a competitive supplier of machineries. However, the competitiveness of Kazakhstan products in the Indian market is an empirical question that needs empirical examination.

Potential Areas of Cooperation with Kazakhstan for Enhancing Bilateral Relations

With the growing economic and trade relations between India and Kazakhstan, it also becomes necessary for both countries to identify potential areas of strategic economic cooperation. There are number of areas where they can have close cooperation for the mutual benefit. These include infrastructure, textiles, IT, Telecommunication sector, construction materials, oil and gas, knowledge industries such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology and in the field of education and healthcare etc. It is especially relevant, since the Kazakh Government is establishing industrial clusters in: tourism, oil and gas machinery building, food processing, textile, transport logistics, metallurgy and construction materials. Similarly, uncertainty in the of sphere of cooperation in the field of the information technologies, developed basically as a result of initiatives by the Kazakhstan side, also negatively influences the general course of mutual relations.

Bilateral Collaboration in the Field of Infrastructure Development

An important area of bilateral co:operation could be infrastructure development, owing to an increasing need for better infrastructural facilities, coupled with Kazakhstan's endeavour for rapid economic growth. Kazakhstan's emerging economy presents a need for infrastructure investments in various industries, which include construction, residential and non:residential buildings, transportation and energy.

Areas that hold potential would include development of highways and roadways, development of railway networks and power systems. For example, Kazakhstan and India

have to intensify private sector interaction, it is much needed to establish direct trade routes between the two countries, in particular within International North:South Transport Corridor (INSTC)¹⁵⁸. The International North:South Transport Corridor (or INSTC) is a joint initiative of India¹⁵⁹, Iran and Russia, which signed an agreement to this effect in 2000 and ratified it in 2002, with Azerbaijan joining the agreement in 2005. The four countries lie along the route of the corridor geographically and are building it to secure common economic interests with the free flow of goods and passengers¹⁶⁰. The Leaders agreed that the Kazakhstan:Turkmenistan:Iran rail:link, operationalised in December 2014, become a linked corridor of the INSTC. The Leaders also welcomed ongoing bilateral discussions aimed at setting up a dedicated freight terminal in one of the Western sea:ports of India for trade with Kazakhstan. They hope that these initiatives will serve as the basis for enhanced economic and commercial interaction between the two countries in the days ahead. In this connection, the Parties welcomed signing of Memorandum on Mutual Understanding on Technical Cooperation in the sphere of railways between the NC 'Kazakhstan Temir Zholy' JSC and the Ministry of Railways of India¹⁶¹.

The corridor stretches from ports in India across the Arabian Sea to the southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas from where goods would transit through Iran and the Caspian Sea to ports in the Caspian Sea. From there, the route would stretch along the route made its way down to Mumbai, then went over sea to Bandar Abbas, journeyed northwards through Iran and Azerbaijan to St Petersburg, and then from St Petersburg back to Chabahar. Nevertheless, the delegates at the table were positive that INSTC and Chabahar could provide a big change in Central Asia with India becoming a key player in supporting huge trade and profits and being able to facilitate the practicalities and possibilities of increased trade and investment between Kazakhstan and India. While Kazakhstan wants access to the Indian Ocean, which will open up vast and dynamic markets of South and Southeast Asia for Kazakh goods, improved access to Central Asia would also mean that India can access the transportation routes to Russia and European countries. Overall, The Nordic nations,

¹⁵⁸ "India, Kazakhstan to Deepen Ties in Oil, Gas Sector." September 20, 2017, India Today.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Sarma, Hriday and Dwayne R Menezes. "The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC): India's Grand Plan for Northern Connectivity." Polar Research and Policy Initiative. <http://polarconnection.org/india-instc-nordic-arctic/>. Accessed 3 Nov. 2020.

¹⁶¹ "Tej Kadam: India-Kazakhstan Joint Statement." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25437/Tej_Kadam_India_Kazakhstan_Joint_Statement. Accessed 3 Nov. 2020.

countries of Central Asia (CA), the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean are all connected by the multifunctional International North:South Transport Corridor, which runs through the western half of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). (see map 2)¹⁶².

Map 2: International North:South Transport Corridor Route¹⁶³



Large Indian Companies also need to bid for infrastructure and construction projects in Kazakhstan in the field of road and railway construction, electric power transmission and distribution, telecommunications, power generation etc. Several new projects are being undertaken with the support and assistance of International financial Institutions like ADB, WB, EBRD, IDB etc. Indian construction companies could explore business opportunities to meet infrastructural requirements, also contributing largely to economic development. Closer

¹⁶² Swaraj, Sushma. “Kazakhstan and India: New Horizons for Cooperation.” Minister of External (Foreign) Affairs of India, 21, December, 2018. www.mfa.gov.kz/en/content-view/susma-svaradz-kazakstan-men-ndistan-yntymaktastykty-zaa-kkziekeri. Accessed 10 Nov. 2020.

¹⁶³ Source: Eurasian Development Bank. Centre for Infrastructure and Industrial Research Almaty, Moscow 2021.

cooperation in the field of infrastructure can yield mutual benefits to both the countries. The Government of India is seriously taking the issue in terms of reviewing its policies to create an investor friendly environment in sectors such as roads, ports and airports. Private sector participation in management, green:field airports, terminals and shipping berths and capacity augmentation has been initiated. This creates a great opportunity for Kazakhstan private companies that would bring huge benefit to both countries. With their expertise and proven track record, Indian companies would have an excellent chance of being successful in some of these projects. It is imperative for Indian companies to look at the Kazakh market in a pro:active manner if they wish to garner a substantial part of the new projects that are being undertaken in Kazakhstan.¹⁶⁴

The official North:South Transport Corridor Project must be seen in light of a broader attempt by regional Central Asian countries to create as many trade and transport opportunities as possible. Today's developments mirror the continually evolving system of multiple routes and relationships of the historic Silk Road. In addition to following developments in the official North:South Transport Corridor, it will be equally important to track the web of bilateral infrastructure and trade routes developing in the region.

Bilateral Collaboration in the Field of Education Sector

Investment in human capital is one of the major means to accelerate growth of an economy. Among the various measures of investment in human capital, education is the most vital for achieving a high rate of growth¹⁶⁵. The enrichment of human capital through education is not only critical to ensure economic prosperity but also crucial in human development. Kazakhstan has requirements of quality secondary education, vocational education and training, and tertiary education, thereby strengthening links to the labour market. However foreign institutions are currently allowed to establish a physical presence in Kazakhstan, transnational provision can be offered through a collaborative arrangement (e.g., joint degrees). Recently, 25 English teachers from schools of different regions of Kazakhstan were

¹⁶⁴ Sajjanhar, Ashok. "India-Kazakhstan relations: Challenges and Opportunities." *Gateway House*, 20 November 2013. www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-relations-challenges-and-opportunities/. Accessed 20 Nov. 2020.

¹⁶⁵ "India and Kazakhstan agree to expedite signing of Satpayev Block." Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=68104. Accessed 20 Nov. 2020.

trained at the English and Foreign Language University of Hyderabad. On the other hand, the contribution of Kazakhstan in imparting medical education to some of our students. Currently, there are around 3,200 of Indian students studying at various universities of the country¹⁶⁶.

Education continued to be a strategic priority in India's national development initiatives. Meeting of Education Ministers of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Member States held in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2018. To celebrate the 1,150th anniversary of prominent philosopher Al:Farabi, the Kazakh:Indian Scientific:Educational and Cultural Center named "Al:Farabi House" was inaugurated in Delhi. The Center's activities will be aimed to develop cultural dialogue and further strengthen cooperation¹⁶⁷. education continued to be a strategic priority in India's national development initiatives which helped in achieving substantial progress in improving access to and quality of school and higher education. India's major interventions to strengthen technology use and integration in education such as SWAYAM:an integrated platform for online courses offering more than 1500 courses free of cost; National Academic Depository; National Knowledge Network; DIKSHA portal connecting teachers in sharing their best practices; e:Pathsala a digital repository of school textbooks; Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN) to tap the talent pool of scientists and entrepreneurs internationally to encourage their engagement with institutes of Higher Education in India; Scheme for Promotion of Academic and Research Collaboration (SPARC) to improve research collaboration between reputed Indian Institutes and highly ranked global Institutes of repute through Joint Research Projects etc. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme was started in 1964 as a form of bilateral assistance and capacity building through training programmes, study tours, technology transfers and, in some cases, aid for disaster relief¹⁶⁸. Kazakhstan has been India's ITEC partner since 1992. Since then, nearly 1000 scholars from Kazakhstan have availed the programme. In 2018, there has also been participation in each other's defence expositions. India will also likely actively cooperate with Central Asian countries in tackling two of the big problems affecting

¹⁶⁶ Swaraj, Sushma. "Kazakhstan and India: New Horizons for Cooperation." Minister of External Affairs, Government of India, 21, December, 2018. www.mfa.gov.kz/en/content-view/susma-svaradz-kazakstan-mendistan-yntymaktastykty-zaa-kkziekeri. Accessed 20 Nov. 2020.

¹⁶⁷ "India-Kazakhstan Cultural Educational Center in Delhi." News 18, 23 August, 2019. www.news18.com/news/india/kiren-rijju-inaugurates-india-kazakhstan-cultural-educational-center-in-delhi-2281439.html. Accessed 20 Nov. 2020.

¹⁶⁸ "ITEC Programme." Embassy of India, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, www.indembastana.gov.in/page/itec-programme/. Accessed 20 Nov. 2020.

our contiguous regions, terrorism and drug trafficking¹⁶⁹. The increased engagement with Kazakhstan through an inflow of students and professionals from the Kazakhstan into India could foster stronger ties between the two countries¹⁷⁰.

India's support to the efforts aimed at establishment and functioning of the University of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (USCO) as also the action plan and measures on development and modernization of the national education systems of the SCO member states for 2019:2020. On the margins of the SCO meeting, the bilateral meetings were held between India and Kazakhstan for further cooperation in the education sector and to invest more in making higher education more job/work:relevant and equipping students with special emphasis on enhancing employability and skills.¹⁷¹. India's significant achievements in some of the knowledge:oriented sectors may be attributed to well orient higher education system. Indian educational institutions can establish partnership with universities and higher education institutes in Kazakhstan, and can also facilitate exchange programmes, and joint study programmes and degrees, and promote research in science and technology. The regular contacts between academic and strategic communities have played a significant role in strengthening cooperation between India and Kazakhstan. The academic and educational institutions in both countries are maintaining active exchanges¹⁷².

Bilateral Collaboration in the Field of Energy Sector

Kazakhstan's estimated total petroleum and other liquids production was 1.77 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2017 (Table). Kazakhstan possesses significant reserves of oil, gas, coal and uranium¹⁷³. These resources are unevenly distributed across the country and their production, transportation and use has been challenging for grid connectivity, the environment and

¹⁶⁹ Swaraj, Sushma. "Kazakhstan and India: New Horizons for Cooperation." Minister of External (Foreign) Affairs of India, 21, December, 2018. www.mfa.gov.kz/en/content-view/susma-svaradz-kazakistan-men-ndistan-yntymaktastykty-zaa-kkziekeri. Accessed 20 Nov. 2020.

¹⁷⁰ Mullen, Rani D. et al. "India-Central Asia Backgrounder." Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program, *Centre for Policy Research*, January 6, 2014. www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/policy-briefs/India-Central%20Asia_0.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020.

¹⁷¹ "Education continued to be a strategic priority in India's national development initiatives." Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 17-October-2018. www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=184242. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020.

¹⁷² "India Kazakhstan Relations." Embassy of India, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. www.indembastana.gov.in/docs/1641538665bilateral.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020.

¹⁷³ "India-Kazakhstan conference recommends increasing trade ties." *Observer Research Foundation*, 18 December, 2008. www.orfonline.org/research/india-kazakhstan-conference-recommends-increasing-trade-ties/. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020.

regional geopolitics¹⁷⁴. According to the Oil & Gas Journal, Kazakhstan has proven crude oil reserves of 30 billion barrels as of January 2018—the 2nd–largest endowment in Eurasia after Russia, and the 12–largest in the world, just behind the United States. Kazakhstan has the largest proven oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan's crude and condensate output increased by 4.8% in 2018 and reached 1.814 million bpd. In 2017, Kazakhstan produced 1.73 million bpd of crude oil. According to Business Monitor International, Kazakhstan's net exports of crude oil is forecast to fluctuate around 1.42:1.55mbpd through 2027 as production increases from the prolific Kashagan and Tengiz fields¹⁷⁵. India attaches immense importance to Kazakhstan in the field of energy security¹⁷⁶. After Russia, Kazakhstan is the only country which is endowed to help meet India's energy security. This includes nuclear fuel and hydrocarbons.

India to Expand Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Kazakhstan

India and Kazakhstan signed a civil nuclear agreement on fuel supplies. Under the agreement, Kazakhstan will provide uranium and related products to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL). This agreement could also cover joint exploration of uranium in Kazakhstan and construction of nuclear power plants in the future. Supplies of uranium to India could start in 2009, said then:Kazatomprom President Mukhtar Dzhakishev¹⁷⁷.

It has huge reserves of uranium as well as oil and gas. Kazakhstan has the second largest deposits of uranium at 1.5 million tons, constituting approximately 17 per cent of the world total. It is poised to emerge as the number one supplier of uranium in the world. Astana is planning to add Uranium output capacity from the current 6,673 metric tons Uranium (MTU) to 30,000 tons MTU by the end of 2018. (Table) In 2008 the President of Kazatomprom, the nodal national atomic company set up in 1997, announced that it aims to increase the share of Uranium supply from the present 12 per cent to 30 per cent of total world uranium output by

¹⁷⁴ Karatayeva, Marat and Michèle L. Clarke. "Current energy resources in Kazakhstan and the future potential of renewables: A review." *Energy Procedia*, no. 59, 2014, pp. 97-104.

¹⁷⁵ "Kazakhstan-Oil and Gas." The International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. Department of Commerce, 7 January 2019 www.export.gov/article?id=Kazakhstan-Oil-and-Gas. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020.

¹⁷⁶ "Kazakhstan, India agrees to enhance energy cooperation." Asian News International, April 14, 2018, www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/kazakhstan-india-agree-to-enhance-energy-cooperation201804141134320001/. Accessed 27 Nov. 2020.

¹⁷⁷ India, Kazakhstan in civil nuclear cooperation pact, Business Line, April 16, 2011; Kazakhstan agrees to supply uranium to India, World Nuclear News, 8 July 2015. <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/UF-Kazakhstan-agrees-to-supply-uranium-to-India-0807156.html>.

2015. This will be done through joint ventures with the following prospective shares in various segments: 12 per cent of uranium conversion market, 6 per cent of enrichment, and 30 per cent of the fuel fabrication market. The nuclear agreement signed with Kazakhstan makes it the fourth country besides the US, France, and Russia that would supply uranium to India for civilian energy purposes.

Energy cooperation between Kazakhstan and India is not limited only to nuclear fuel. Kazakhstan has huge hydrocarbon reserves. It has approximately 40 billion barrels of oil reserves, which could well increase up to 100 billion barrels by 2015. Current annual production is 90 million tons, which is expected to increase more than 35 per cent by the end of 2012 to 140 million tons. Gas reserves in Kazakhstan are approximately 3 trillion cubic metres and expect to increase its annual gas output to roughly 70 billion cubic meters by 2015. The shelf lives of oil and gas is estimated to be around 50 years and 75 years respectively. India and Kazakhstan signed hydrocarbon agreements raising the stake of OVL (ONGC Videsh Ltd.) and its partner OMEL's (Mittal Energy Limited) stake in Satpayev oil field in the Caspian Sea from the present 10 per cent to 25 per cent. Rest of the 75 per cent will be retained by KazMunaiGas of Kazakhstan¹⁷⁸. It is estimated that three prospective oil fields, Satpayev, Eastern Satpayev and Karina, contain up to 253 million tons of recoverable deposits, which is equivalent to 1.85 billion barrels.

Table 4:Kazakhstan Uranium Production by Mines (tonnes U)¹⁷⁹

| Province and Group | Mine | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|----------------------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Chu:Sarysu, Eastern | Tortkuduk & northern Moinkum (Katco) | 3661 | 3558 | 4322 | 4007 | 4003 | 3519 | |
| | Southern Moinkum & Kanzhugan (Taukent/GRK) | 1075 | 1129 | 1174 | 873 | 781 | 616 | |
| Chu:Sarysu, Northern | Uvanas & Eastern Mynkuduk (Stepnoye:RU/GRK) | 1234 | 1192 | 1154 | 1341 | 1222 | 974 | |
| | Central Mynkuduk (Ken Dala.kz) | 1622 | 1800 | 1790 | 1770 | 1953 | 1898 | |
| | Western Mynkuduk | 1003 | 998 | 870 | 880 | 1004 | 901 | |

¹⁷⁸ Potential for expanding Kazakh-India ties huge, says Envoy, Asian News International, Feb 16, 2018, <https://www.aninews.in/news/business/business/potential-for-expanding-kazakh-india-ties-huge-says-envoy201802161425040001/>; Accessed 28 Nov 2020; also see, "India and Kazakhstan agree to expedite signing of Satpayev Block." Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=68104. Accessed 28 Nov 2020.

¹⁷⁹ Source: World Nuclear Association.

| Province and Group | Mine | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------|
| | (Appak) | | | | | | | |
| | Inkai 1, 2, 3 (Inkai) | 1701 | 2047 | 1922 | 2418 | 2413 | 2202 | 2654 |
| | Inkai 4 (South Inkai) | 1870 | 2030 | 2002 | 2007 | 2058 | 2037 | 1617 |
| | Akdala (Betpak Dala) | 1095 | 1020 | 1007 | 1042 | 1000 | 900 | 800 |
| | Budyonovskoye 1, 3 & 4 (Akbastau) | 1203 | 1499 | 1594 | 1630 | 1778 | 1941 | 1546 |
| | Budyonovskoye 2 (Karatau) | 2135 | 2115 | 2084 | 2064 | 2108 | 2359 | 2081 |
| Syrdarya, Western | North and South Karamurun (GRK) | 1000 | 1000 | 941 | 956 | 1015 | 718 | |
| | Irkol (Semizbai:U) | 750 | 750 | 700 | 781 | 700 | 678 | |
| | Kharasan 1 (Kyzylkum, now Khorosan:U) | 583 | 752 | 858 | 1095 | 1354 | 1564 | 1601 |
| | Kharasan 2 (Baiken:U) | 603 | 888 | 1135 | 1503 | 1838 | 1762 | |
| Syrdarya, Southern | Zarechnoye (Zarechnoye) | 942 | 931 | 876 | 800 | 817 | 802 | 776 |
| Northern, Akmola region | Semizbay (Semizbai:U) | 470 | 411 | 400 | 440 | 542 | 450 | |
| | RU:1 (Vostok, Zvezdnoye) | 370 | 331 | 298 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| TOTAL | | 21,317 | 22,451 | 23,127 | 23,607 | 24,586 | 23,321 | |

India to Expand Hydrocarbon Cooperation with Kazakhstan

India is considering expanding hydrocarbon cooperation with resource-rich Kazakhstan including exploration and production of hydrocarbons¹⁸⁰ and participation of Indian companies in the oil and gas sector of Central Asia's biggest country. Indian firms could participate in the oil and gas sector of the biggest country in Central Asia. In its turn, Kazakh authorities seek for the opportunity to provide India with gas.¹⁸¹ While India will also explore the possibility of implementing a petrochemical project in Kazakhstan Astana has expressed interest supplying gas to India. This was decided at the 13th meeting of the Indo-Kazakh Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) on trade and economic, scientific, technical, industrial and cultural cooperation held in Astana from 19:20

¹⁸⁰ Pradhan, Ramakrushna. "India-Kazakhstan energy relations: Looking back and looking ahead." *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, no.1 3, no. 2, 2022, pp. 103-118.

www.journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/18793665221093798. Accessed 2 Nov. 2022.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

September 2017¹⁸². India and Kazakhstan also decided to explore the possibility of cooperation in the field of delivery of nuclear fuel and its components. India has broached the idea of a hydrocarbon pipeline with Kazakhstan that would bring fuel through a five:nation route. India unveiled the concept of the pipeline, which in future could be extended to Russia, during a meeting between External Affairs Minister¹⁸³. Further strengthen the engagement by addressing issues of concerns to Indian investors, particularly in Kazakh hydrocarbon sector¹⁸⁴.

In addition, India invited Kazakhstan to join the International Solar Alliance. It was decided to deepen cooperation in the coal, mining and mineral sectors of the economy. India has also proposed to organize training and capacity building programs with the help of the Geological Survey of India and the Indian Bureau in the field of exploration and mining regulation for the staff from Kazakhstan. The two sides will continue to actively cooperate in the space sector in the development of communication satellites; the launch site and launch vehicles; Earth observation satellites, terrestrial segments and applications. The Ministers also discussed possibilities of implementing joint projects to build / lease or purchase of terminal facilities in the western ports of India (Mundra and Mumbai) and the creation of optimal transport schemes between Kazakhstan and India.

The Kazakh side expressed interest in sending Kazakhstan patients to clinics / hospitals in India. In turn, the Indian side will provide the necessary support to simplify the visa regime for patients and their accompanying persons. Also, an agreement on the creation of a telemedicine network node of Central Asia in Kazakhstan was reached at the meeting. India has proposed to sign a Memorandum on cooperation in the field of television and radio broadcasting as well as the exchange of audiovisual programs between JSC Republican Television and Radio Corporation "Kazakhstan" and Prasar:Bharati.

¹⁸² Petroleum Minister visits Kazakhstan for co-chairing the 13th Inter-Governmental Commission meeting, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20-September-2017. www.pib.gov.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=20. Accessed 4 Nov. 2021.

¹⁸³ Dikshit, Sandeep. "India proposes hydrocarbon pipeline from Kazakhstan." *The Hindu*, March 6, 2013. P. 6.

¹⁸⁴ "India, Kazakhstan to expand oil, gas, nuclear ties." *Business Standard*, September 20, 2017. P.5.

Bilateral Collaboration in the Field of Agriculture and Allied Sectors

India's collaboration with Kazakhstan's in the agriculture sector needs to be explored. The two countries have also agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of agricultural research and education between JSC "National Agrarian Research and Education Center" of Kazakhstan and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. India is also ready to receive IT specialists from Kazakhstan to share experience in information technology and software production. India and Kazakhstan the signed of Plan of Action between JSC "KazAgroInnovation" and Indian Council of Agricultural Research for cooperation in the field of agriculture¹⁸⁵. The document envisages cooperation between the two Ministries in the field of agricultural research and technologies, food and agricultural production. It also envisages cooperation in the spheres of agricultural science, food processing, crop production, plant protection and agricultural trade.¹⁸⁶

Bilateral Collaboration in the field of Information and Communication Technology

With Kazakhstan still on the path of modernization and computerization, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is another area for co:operation. With the strength and capability that India possesses in the realm of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Indian IT firms could explore opportunities in Kazakhstan, and focus on investing in subsidiaries and joint ventures in the areas of e:governance, financial services and e:education¹⁸⁷. India during this visit also showed interest in setting up an India:Kazakhstan Centre of Excellence at the Eurasian University in Astana, enhancing further India's presence in the Republic's IT sector¹⁸⁸. Indian companies could also share their expertise in providing software programmes and services for banks and financial institutes in the region. Designing specialized e:learning courses on the web for providing technological assistance, manufacturing knows how, and other technical areas also present opportunities. Such initiatives would help industry promote education in remote

¹⁸⁵ "Tej Kadam: India - Kazakhstan Joint Statement." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25437/Tej_Kadam_India__Kazakhstan_Joint_Statement. Accessed 5 Dec. 2020.

¹⁸⁶ Foshko, Katherine. "India-Kazakhstan: Beyond energy II." Gateway House, 28 APRIL 2011, www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-looking-beyond-energy-ii/. Accessed 5 Dec. 2020.

¹⁸⁷ "India, Kazakhstan agrees to further bolster defence cooperation" *The Indian Express*, August 3, 2018.

¹⁸⁸ Sarma, Angria Sen. "India, Kazakhstan need to look beyond economic cooperation." Observer Research Foundation, 29 April, 2011. www.orfonline.org/research/india-kazakhstan-need-to-look-beyond-economic-cooperation/. Accessed 12 Dec. 2020.

areas, create employment opportunities and provide healthcare, thereby contributing to overall development of Kazakhstan.

Bilateral Collaboration in the Field of Space and Military:Industrial Cooperation

India and Kazakhstan have agreed to further develop bilateral cooperation in the military:industrial sphere¹⁸⁹. India and Kazakhstan Defence Cooperation includes military:technical cooperation, military education and training, joint military exercises, bilateral exchange of visits and cadet youth exchange programmes¹⁹⁰. India and Kazakhstan agreed to step up military cooperation, especially in the areas of defence production. The two countries restored the Memorandum of Cooperation on defence in January 2017. Both countries are 'strategic partners' since 2009¹⁹¹. Over 200 Kazakh defence forces personnel have undergone military training in India till date. Both countries successfully conducted a company level joint military exercise 'KAZIND:2018' in South Kazakhstan¹⁹². In its 2006 defence policy document Kazakhstan focused on the Indo:Pacific region, including India and Egypt as export markets. It is a fact that being part of the former USSR, Kazakhstan holds some military interest in India. The Indian Navy is currently equipped with hundreds of torpedoes that were produced in Kazakhstan during the Soviet era. Kazakh specialists in this field are clearly expecting to carve out and foster their own niche within the Indian naval arms market. It is believed that Kazakhstan and India have been carrying out some 4/5 joint projects aimed at modernizing and repairing the torpedoes of the Indian Navy. Kazakhstan has also claimed that it has designed a new torpedo called Kazy. India and Kazakhstan have also established a forum for early action in servicing and possibly modernizing Kazakh military hardware because a majority of India's defence equipment is of Soviet origin.

¹⁸⁹ "India, Kazakhstan to boost defence and military technical cooperation." Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Defence, 4 October 2018, www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1548606. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020.

¹⁹⁰ Swaraj, Sushma. "Kazakhstan and India: New Horizons for Cooperation." Minister of External Affairs, Government of India, 21, December, 2018. www.mfa.gov.kz/en/content-view/susma-svaradz-kazakstan-mendistan-yntymaktastykty-zaa-kkziekeri. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020

¹⁹¹ "India-Kazakhstan Defence Ministers Vows to Boost Military Cooperation." *News Desk EurAsian Times*, February 4, 2019. www.eurasiantimes.com/india-kazakhstan-defence-ministers-vows-to-boost-military-cooperation/. Accessed 15 Dec. 2020

¹⁹² Ibid.

The Embassy of Kazakhstan in New Delhi said in a release this agreement was reached during the fifth Joint Inter-Governmental Kazakh-Indian Working Group meeting on military-technical cooperation¹⁹³. The Vice-Minister of Defense and Aerospace Industry Shaymergenov Timur led the Kazakh delegation at the talks, while the Indian delegation was led by Joint Secretary (Planning and International Cooperation), Ministry of Defence, Shambhu Kumaran. During the meeting both sides discussed prospects for cooperation between defence enterprises as well as further boosting interaction in the field of cyber security and peace making, the embassy release said¹⁹⁴.

Military-technical cooperation is an area of future co-operation¹⁹⁵. Certain steps have been taken in this regard. An important event was opening in January, 2003 of the office of military attached of Kazakhstan at Kazakhstan Embassy whose activity is aimed at the further deepening of bilateral cooperation in military sphere¹⁹⁶. India's partnership with Kazakhstan in UN Peacekeeping reflects its desire to support Kazakhstan in its contribution to global peace. The contingents of both countries worked together over the past one year to prepare for this joint deployment. The Kazakh contingent will join the Indian Contingent at Lebanon¹⁹⁷. Kazakhstan is to deploy its armed forces under the Indian Battalion for United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission. This is a historic first for both countries, as also the first such deployment under the aegis of the UN. This level of cooperation is unprecedented. Kazakhstan is to deploy its first armed force to serve for UN peacekeeping, while for India it is the first time to send the mixed forces to the mission. Indian Battalion (IND BATT) as a more experienced party in peacekeeping for more than six decades will lead the IND-KAZ BATT¹⁹⁸. India and Kazakhstan have established a forum not only to cooperate on fight against terrorism but also for 'early action' finalising agreements in military and technical cooperation. It has given special attention to defence co-operation between the two countries. This co-operation envisages joint production of military hardware

¹⁹³ Tej Kadam, Op. cit.

¹⁹⁴ "India, Kazakhstan to enhance military-industrial cooperation." *Business Standard*, 13 June, 2018, New Delhi. www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/india-kazakhstan-to-enhance-military-industrial-cooperation-118061300280_1.html. Accessed 20 Dec. 2020.

¹⁹⁵ "India and Kazakhstan agree to expedite signing of Satpayev Block." Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=68104. Accessed 20 Dec. 2020.

¹⁹⁶ "India, Kazakhstan agrees to further bolster defence cooperation." *The Indian Express*, August 3, 2018. P. 6.

¹⁹⁷ India and Kazakhstan agree to boost, Op. cit.

¹⁹⁸ Yergaliyeva, Aidana. "Kazakh-Indian forces join for UN mission in Lebanon." *The Astana Times*, 16 October 2018. www.astanatimes.com/2018/10/kazakh-indian-forces-join-for-un-mission-in-lebanon/. Accessed 20 Dec. 2020.

such as torpedoes and heavy machine:gun barrels. Kazakhstan also co:operated in India's space programme by allowing the launch of Indian satellite from its territory (Baikanour cosmodrome operated by Russia). In return, it is said, India agreed to train Kazakh pilots.

Another significant agreement between India and Kazakhstan that was signed related to space research. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the National Space Agency of Kazakhstan have signed an agreement to help and co:operate with each other in space activities. Kazakhstan hosts the famous Baikonur Cosmodrome. Despite being a major centre for space research, Kazakhstan has more or less remained a passive partner of Russia. The current agreement signed between India and Kazakhstan is expected to assist the Kazakh space Programme in a big way. Kazakhstan expects technology transfers from India in the space arena.

Bilateral Collaboration in the Field of Health and Medicine

Pharmaceutical products now constitute India's primary export to the Kazakhstan¹⁹⁹. Sold mostly as over:the:counter drugs, India supplies Kazakhstan with more than 30 percent of its pharmaceutical needs. Kazakhstan is set to overcome its dependence on imported insulin with an Indian firm planning to produce the drug at a facility in Almaty, reflecting the growing interest in Central Asia among India's pharmaceutical companies. India's RV Healthcare has inked a long:term agreement with the Kazakh health ministry to supply insulin and cancer medicines over 10 years²⁰⁰. The firm's new plant in the suburbs of Almaty is set to begin producing insulin within three years, after the drug is registered with local authorities²⁰¹. The Indian firm also signed a memorandum of cooperation with state:run Kazakh Invest for supporting the project, which Kazakh officials said, will end their country's complete dependence on imported insulin. Indian pharmaceuticals industry has done well in all the states of the region²⁰². Apollo group of hospitals serve patients across multiple countries such

¹⁹⁹ India and Kazakhstan agree to expedite. Op. cit.

²⁰⁰ Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. "India, Kazakhstan eye expanding trade turnover by 5 times." *The Economic Times*, Nov 14, 2018.

²⁰¹ Laskar, Rezaul H. "Indian firm to end Kazakhstan's dependence on imported insulin." *Hindustan Times*, May 22, 2019.

²⁰² Kothari, Raj Kumar. "India's 'Connect Central Asia Policy': Emerging Economic and Security Dimensions." *Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 2, no. 6, 2014, pp. 239-245. DOI: 10.13189/ sa.2014.020605.

as Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Kazakhstan using telemedicine and teleradiology services²⁰³. There is a great demand for Indian pharmaceutical products in the region. This sector is quite advanced and Indian pharmaceutical companies are known across the globe with their medicines being exported across the continents. Indian pharmaceutical companies can establish JVs with Kazakh and Kyrgyz partners and cater to the markets of Central Asia as well as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).²⁰⁴

Chapter Conclusion

India and Kazakhstan have managed to foster a multifaceted relationship, anchored within a long history of cultural ties and affinity. For India, this relationship is governed by geopolitical and economic priorities that dictate the terms of bilateral ties, including energy trade, infrastructure development, and security cooperation.

This chapter has provided an explanation of the India's economic engagement with Kazakhstan that shape Indian strategy in Kazakhstan. India's imperative to trade, economic engagement and seek greater connectivity, and India's need for global recognition of its great power ambitions. In its exploration of India's economic imperatives to trade with Kazakhstan, the chapter highlights the macroeconomic conditions in place that facilitate trade between India and the Kazakhstan, and explain the motivations of both partners to do so. India's burgeoning economy and the movement of its trade flows away from the West toward its extended neighbourhood has contributed to the increase in trade between India and burgeoning economy. Similarly, the Kazakhstan attempt to restructure their economies away from energy exports, contribute to their interest in India as an economic partner. The benefits of increased trade with the Kazakhstan are tangible, and given the increasing prominence of Indian multinational companies this is an important driver of Indian interest in the region. There is yet another motivation for India to trade with Kazakhstan : the potential benefits such trade if conducted overland through Afghanistan and Pakistan can bring to a broader region that is in search of stability and prosperity.

²⁰³ Bhat, T.P. "India: Trade in Healthcare Services." *Institute for Studies in Industrial Development*, New Delhi, March 2015, p. 19. www.isid.org.in/pdf/WP180.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec. 2020.

²⁰⁴ Zafar, Athar. "India-Central Asia: Finding New Synergies for Greater Engagement." *Indian Council of World Affairs*, 9 July, 2015. www.icwa.in/pdfs/PB/2014/IndiaCentralAsiaPB09072015.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec. 2020.

Today, India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. It comprises the dynamic economy and vast market. India has been trying to integrate knowledge-based economy to sustain and stable growth in future, India therefore, needs to get access to continuous energy cooperation. To get constant energy supply, India needs to develop strong political relations with Kazakhstan that have natural resource reserves in the large aspect. The political relations are not only confined to get access to energy resources, but also support certain political values such as democracy, protection of human rights, respect of sovereignty, and protection of environment. India's relations with Kazakhstan in Central Asia are based on political values which they share. Thus, both countries should work together to engage in the field of investment, science and technology, education, climate change, connectivity, and so on. New Delhi needs re-connoitering relations in the framework of cooperative engagements with Russia, Iran and even China. This is based on the fact that since actual trade figures are so low, it seems inevitable that there will be manifold growth in overall trade as India is able to approach Kazakhstan in more a direct manner, with the creation of new trade routes. Secondly, is the fact that Kazakhstan is not in fact seen only as a destination for Indian economic engagement, instead it is seen as a bridge to the markets of greater Eurasia, as newer connectivity and infrastructure links are created. India's support of the INSTC and various other transport infrastructure projects including the Chabahar port in Iran, should be seen in this light, as India seeks more efficient access to Kazakhstan and greater overland connectivity to Europe and Russia, all the while hoping that the benefits of greater regional economic integration can stabilize the broader South and Central Asian regions.

Several areas present excellent opportunities for enhancing bilateral cooperation. In addition to Information Technology, Pharmaceuticals and Textiles, areas like Space, Small and Medium Business, Power generation, Food Processing and Agriculture also present rich potential for deepening the engagement. Civil nuclear energy cooperation presents good prospects for further diversifying bilateral economic and commercial contacts. In addition to supply of Uranium by Kazakhstan to India, both countries can collaborate successfully in related areas to mutual advantage and benefit. The biggest problem in enhancing bilateral commercial exchanges is the lack of a direct access route between India and Kazakhstan. India is not able to take advantage of Kazakhstan's geographical proximity because it cannot use the land route through Pakistan and Afghanistan on account of the unstable security situation in these countries. Indian companies are, however, exploring the possibility of establishing joint ventures in Kazakhstan in several areas to get over this logistical

bottleneck. Another important reason is the lack of adequate and authentic information available in Kazakhstan about the potential and prospects of collaborating with India, and Vice:versa.

Economic and commercial relations between India and Kazakhstan have been dynamic, vibrant and expanding. It can, however, be added that current level of interaction does not fully reflect the existing potential and is not commensurate with the strong and close relations and understanding between the two countries in all other fields. Both sides are serious about the opportunity of developing closer, long-term commercial ties that would be mutually beneficial. Economic and trade relations and investment cooperation has a huge scope for improvement.

India and Kazakhstan have a long distance to be covered. This is reflected from the fact that even after more than one decade of bilateral economic relations, India's ranking in terms of list of countries exporting to Kazakhstan is very low. However, except for pharmaceutical products, among the top 15 merchandise imports by Kazakhstan, Indian exports figure less than one percent²⁰⁵, while Kazakhstan exports account for nearly 2 per cent of India's import products (Kazakhstan export value to India \$840M)²⁰⁶. In addition, the bilateral trade between the two countries is less than 1 per cent of global trade. At last, one can also conclude that there are huge scopes for improvement in the trade relations between the two democracies. Today, as experienced never before, Kazakhstan companies are involved in a broad spectrum of economic activities ranging from industrial machinery to consumer goods, and from information technology to consultancy services. If the Bilateral investment treaty which both India and Kazakhstan are working closely together gets materializes then one can expect more investment firm Kazakhstan to India and vice versa. Because it would provide legal protection against arbitrary and discriminatory government actions.

For much better economic and trade relations, it is highly recommendable that both sides engage in economic dialogue that is aim at resolving the persisting trade and economic issues at the earliest so as to make sure that these issues do not come on the way to future progress and development. Unless these issues are not resolved, satisfactory progress is not likely to

²⁰⁵ Ashok Sajjanhar, Op. cit.; also see, "Country Profile-Kazakhstan." *Trade Promotion Council of India*, November 30, 2018. www.tpci.in/blogs/country-profile-kazakhstan/. Accessed 23 Dec. 2020.

²⁰⁶ "Kazakhstan". *The Observatory of Economic Complexity*, www.oec.world/en/profile/country/kaz/#Exports. Accessed 23 Dec. 2020.

come soon. As a whole it is possible to ascertain that essentially there has been a strengthening of positive dynamics in all aspects of the Kazakhstan:Indian relations. The main condition of taking them to a qualitatively new level is full:scale realization of the arrangements achieved at the top:level and finding new ways and areas of co:operation, especially in the economic and trade spheres.

CHAPTER: THREE

India's Energy Security in Kazakhstan

Introduction

In this early stage of the new millennium, the world's systems are under the threat of serious disruptions owing to increase demand for raw materials and energy resources. The systems can only be sustain and operated in a stable manner if there is access to mineral and energy resources. However, the resources being limited, the economic potential of the world is restricted by deficits in supply. This is the most critical problem that is exercising most countries at the present time. In this context a country's energy security critically determines its protection and economic progress. Countries are therefore focused on a stable and sufficient supply of energy through energy diplomacy and a conscious positioning of foreign policy.

In 1991 India's economy took a new turn through economic reforms and liberalized policies.²⁰⁷ The liberalization of the industrial sector caused a significant search in economic growth leading to India becoming the third largest global economic in respect of annual rate of economic growth after US and China. It is estimated that India's economy may surpass Japan's economy around 2033.²⁰⁸ If the rate of growth achieved in the last decade continues according to that trend, then India's economy may overtake that of France in 2025 and that of Germany in 2039.²⁰⁹ The problem of maintaining the rapid economic growth was a challenge to the Indian authorities since India does not have enough energy resource. The question of sustaining the rate of economic growth and social progress in related to sufficient and steady import of energy resources. India has large deposits of coal which will still not meet the

²⁰⁷ Ahluwalia, Montek. "Economic Reforms in India Since 1991: Has Gradualism Worked?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 16, no. 3, 2002, pp. 67-88.

²⁰⁸ Kwasnicki, Witold. "China, India and the future of the global economy." *Institute of Economic Sciences, University of Wroclaw, Poland*, MPRA Paper no. 32558, 25 July, 2011, pp. 1-9. www.mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32558/1/MPRA_paper_32558.pdf. Accessed 26 Dec. 2020.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

countries regular and routine needs. India is constrained to import considerable amounts of oil and gas amounting to 75% of its needs. There are uncertainties in respect of maintain the flow of imported energy resources in the context of sifting geopolitical situations in the world with particular reference to the middle East and certain parts of Africa. US sanction's on and the continuing conflicts in parts of Africa have forced India's decision makers to look elsewhere for supply of oil and gas. Also, the demand for energy has increased with regard to emerging global powers, namely, China, India and Brazil, which intern has pushed up the prices. The rise in cost of energy impose in a major strain on a consuming country like India, which ranked fourth in the world in the consumption of energy after US, China and Russia in 2010:2011.²¹⁰ India is forced to compete with major powers to ensure adequate and uninterrupted supply of energy resources. This is especially so with regard to China as both countries attempt to tap the resources in the middle East, Africa and the countries bordering the Caspian Sea. The problem has been aggravated by the continuing decline in the production of global energy. It is of serious concern that the rivalry between India and other countries for meeting the need for oil and gas may result in arm conflict. Inevitably, therefore the procurement of energy resources is linked to India's national security. According, India's two:fold concern is to secure the supply of energy resources from the supplier countries, and avoid future conflicts. To that end, India must diversify the sources from where it imports oil and gas.

India's economic growth and social development are contacted to energy security and so the procurement of oil and gas is a key factor that impacts India's foreign and domestic policies. In the last decade, India has experience rapid economic growth marked by enhanced energy consumption. It goes without saying that a high rate of economic growth can only be sustain by the availability of energy raw materials. India's own energy resources are relatively low ensuring India's stable economic growth. Other than petroleum natural gas deposits are not sufficient for the country's needs. India is thus forced to depend on the import on the energy resources. Though India has vast coal reserves, the quality of the coal is low. It does not lend

²¹⁰ Yilmaz, Serafettin and Olga Daksueva. "China-India Energy Policy in the Middle East: a Comparative Analysis." *Global Review Winter*, 2014, www.academia.edu/9901163/China_India_Energy_Policy_in_the_Middle_East_A_Comparative_Analysis. Accessed 27 Dec. 2020; also see, "India is increasingly dependent o imported fossil fuel as demand continues to rise." U.S. Energy Information Administration, 14 August 2014, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17551.. Accessed 27 Dec. 2020.

itself for use at thermal power plants and metallurgical plants. Additionally, India does not produce uranium to feed the nuclear power plants.

India has become the world's third largest consumer of energy. This factor makes it imperative for India to enhance its energy production in the decades ahead. The planning commission has estimated that a growth rate of 8% in terms of GDP would require the energy supply to be three times its present quantum by 2031:32.²¹¹ Electricity generation must also be five times the present production. Domestic energy reserves are not adequate to cater to the increased demand, consequently, the country is heavily dependent on foreign resources.

The shortage of domestic energy resources causes much stress in a country like India that hosts a population of 1.3 billion. A large portion of this population has no access to electricity. India is aware that such deprivation in a sizeable part of the population is an impediment to India's aspirations to be recognized as a world power. Accordingly, India is determined to achieve energy security through reforms in the energy sector and proactive energy diplomacy. India is keen on acquiring energy assets in foreign countries. India's present energy diplomacy is not as strong as that of China which has a significant presence in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, India's oil and gas companies operate in most of the resource-rich areas of the world thus improving the global reach of these companies.

India's planners and policy makers do not view Kazakhstan as merely a source of oil and gas, though Kazakhstan plays an important role in meeting India's energy security needs. The relationship with Kazakhstan transcends hydro carbon purchases who paving the way for India to engage in trade and other inter connectivity with the entire region of central Asia.²¹² This chapter at the outset explores both these patterns in India's relationship with Kazakhstan. It outlines energy security theoretically then proceeds to depict the geopolitics of energy security and explains India's energy security strategy. The second section attempts to explore this important notion, that the energy policy, as a subset of India's national security

²¹¹ Talmiz Ahmad, Gas Potential at the Bay of Bengal: Implications for India's Energy Security. *A New Energy Frontier: The Bay of Bengal Region Institute of Southeast Asian Studies*, edited by Sudhir T Devare, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2008, pp. 36-60; see also, Patra, Sudhakar, and Kabita Kumari Sahu. "Green Growth and Energy Use in India." *Handbook of Research on Economic and Political Implications of Green Trading and Energy Use*, edited by Ramesh Chandra Das, IGI Global Book Series, 2019, pp.252-265.

²¹² Sachdeva, Gulshan. "Regional Economic Linkage." *Reconnecting India and Central Asia: Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions*, edited by Nirmala Joshi, Pentagon Press, 2011 pp. 105-161.

aims drives and determines India's policies towards Kazakhstan. The third section in the chapter dwells on India's relationship with Kazakhstan in detail and the role of energy. The fourth section expands on the bilateral relationship with specific regard to energy security. It then brings up the context of India's burgeoning energy requirements. It ends with an overview of the energy scenario, the energy reserves of the two nations, and an analysis of the relative demand and supply position. The fifth section highlights the importance of Kazakhstan resources. It then traces the evolution of the bilateral energy cooperation between India and Kazakhstan. Finally, it follows India's nuclear cooperation with Kazakhstan, and concludes that energy cooperation is the best strategy for India to achieve its greater economic and cultural aims in Kazakhstan.²¹³

This chapter analyses the compulsions and priorities in the procurement of energy, then projects the energy outlook for the country in necessary detail. It outlines India's existing patterns of sourcing, supply, demand and consumption of energy. It then plots these data against India's projected needs for economic growth and poverty alleviation. It proceeds to analyse the geopolitics of India's energy security, the traditional dependence on Middle East suppliers, and its apprehensions of Chinese hegemony, which cumulatively warrants India's search for alternative sources of supply. This chapter illustrates in detail Kazakhstan's efficacy as a source of energy. It describes the different and available energy resources in Kazakhstan, extending from hydrocarbons to uranium and hydroelectric power and explores their potential with respect to India's ambitions. The final section in the Chapter describes and analyses the present levels of the nuclear energy resource cooperation between India and Kazakhstan.

The Concept of Energy Security: A Theoretical Outline

In earlier times the concept of energy security was designed around the source and supply of oil in the backdrop of geopolitical enmities. The present paradigm of energy security has considerably evolved from that basic design. Now there is no universal concept of energy security.²¹⁴ In the present age, there are multiple concepts of energy security. The International Energy Agency (IEA), the path-breaker in energy security matters describes

²¹³ Joshi, Nirmala. "India-Central Asia Energy Cooperation." *India and Central Asia: Two Decades of Transition*, edited by P. L. Das, Oxford University Press. 2012, pp. 50-61.

²¹⁴ Mahalingam, Sudha. "India's Energy Security Challenges." *Strategising Energy an Asian Perspective*, edited by Sumit Ganguli, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd. 2014, pp.15-30.

energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”²¹⁵ There are many aspects to energy security. Long term energy security is largely about investing in the supply of energy to support a nation’s economic growth and environmental concerns. In contrast energy security in the short term is about the capacity of the energy structure to promptly respond to unexpected shifts in the balance between demand and supply.²¹⁶ The measurement of energy security depends on the data in respect of different energy sources (coal, oil, gas and renewable), the intermediate enablers (electricity, refineries) and transportation modes (grids, pipelines, ports, ships). Since all of these carry the inherent risks of supply interruptions or failures, the security of unhampered energy supply is seriously threatened. However, the IEA has stated that energy security can be improved through the following means:

- A. Promotion of diversity, efficiency and flexibility in the field of energy.
- B. Collective readiness to respond to energy emergencies.
- C. Achievement of international cooperation among all global players in the energy markets.

Traditionally, the factors concerned with energy security include the sources of supply the quantum of demand, prevailing geopolitics, existing market structures, and the national and global institutions involved. However, this paradigm has since changed. At the present time the factors involved in energy security include additional elements such as environmental impact, technological capacities and the availability of several different renewable sources. Energy security can be envisioned as an economic concept, or as a subset of national security. The notion of energy security manifests itself in various spheres such as foreign policy, defense, and diverse trade and investment strategies.

The IEA definition given above lists four different dynamics of energy security. It mentions the supply and demand, availability at reasonable costs, the environmental impact, use of technology to increase the efficiency of energy, and the geopolitics of energy that facilitate accessibility. Contemporary observers mention the progress with the first three dynamics.

²¹⁵ A.F. Alhajji. “What Is Energy Security? Definitions and Concepts.” *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 45, no. 50, 2007, pp. 39–45. www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=2786. Accessed 26 Dec. 2020.

²¹⁶ Lt Col Dhall, Vivek. *India’s Energy Security*, Vj Books India Pvt Ltd. 2013.

Energy become cheaper as additional sources are found, less harmful and more efficient. However, the geopolitical dynamic remains plagued by uncertainty.

The contemporary age is such that economic and social growth can only be sustain if there is an adequate supply of energy. The concept of national security encompasses the subject of economic security. In turn economic security necessarily comprises energy security. (Dhall, 2013, pp. 2:3). Production and acquisition of energy is critical for resource:rich countries such as Kazakhstan and resource consuming countries such as India. Energy is the vital power driving the services that characterize the modern age, such as transport electricity, heating, cooking, food preservation, lighting, communication, and the host of systems that enable commercial and industrial operations. The role played by energy is so critical that its secure acquisition enjoys top priority in state policy. The sources of energy become viable only if the supplies are adequate, affordable dependable, secure, available without interruption, ecologically compatible and sustainable over the long term. The objective of countries that do not possess sufficient energy resources is to acquire energy that is continuously available safe, low:priced, optimally non:polluting, and capable of being procured from a number of different producers.

The consumers of energy have the common goal for usage of energy in a maximally efficient manner so as to obviate wastage. Energy is not only the vital ingredient for the progress on countries but is the key driver for large, multi:billion:dollar energy companies and the national governments of the day. The issue of energy can prolong or cut short the tenure of national governments. With a view to diversifying the sources of energy, India, China and other countries of Asia and the world are focusing on Central Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular, in order to tap into the vast reserves of oil and gas present in the region. The energy:rich republics of Central Asia are increasingly aware of the international demand for their energy resources and their growing stature on the world stage. In this context, the different global powers have resorted to varying strategies for engaging in the energy, security, and trading sectors in the region, as well as for coping with the constraints and challenges that are encountered in the process. In the 21st Century, while energy security is accorded top most significance, it is yet to be vested with an accurate definition.²¹⁷ The

²¹⁷ Kurian, Anju Lis, and C. Vinodan. "Energy Security: A Multivariate Analysis of Emerging Trends and Implications for South Asia." *India Quarterly*, 2013, vol. 69, no. 4, pp.383-400.

consumers and importers of energy resources describe energy security as their right to procure and utilize dependable sources of energy at fair prices, where the energy is produced through methods that are safe and environmentally non-damaging.²¹⁸

In modern times energy is indispensable for economic and social growth, and the strengthening of the military.²¹⁹ With very few exceptions, all operations that promote a country's economic and political status are heavily dependent on ready access to energy resources and their efficient utilization. The unimpeded exploration of energy resources and success in the achievement of strategic and sustainable arrangement for procurement and utilization are critical to the promotion of peace, stability and economic development in the world. In this context, India's energy security is faced with critical demands and uncertainties. Firstly, there is a rapidly rising dependence on imported oil. Secondly, the regulatory structure is subject to dynamic changes and adjustments. Thirdly, the pricing policies relating to natural gas are not transparent. Fourthly, there is a shortage of skilled man power. Fifthly, there are gaps in the infrastructure relating to transportation, storage and refinement of crude oil. And sixthly, the national energy strategy in the short and medium terms, evinces a dependence on fossil fuels as the dominant source of energy.²²⁰ It is clearly essential that India's energy sector be protected and sustained with the formulation of fully integrated and consistent energy security policies.

Being heavily dependent on imported energy, India is overly wary of physical disruptions in the procurement of oil natural gas and Uranium, as well as the unpredictable increases in prices. For countries that produce and export energy resources, the concept of energy security comprises the security of supply and the security of demand. Essentially, the concept of energy security varies for different countries at different periods of time. For India, energy security is ensured by way of the total control of these strategic resources by the state. Further, India's energy security is related to the safe transportation of energy resources from their sources to the international markets. While in an earlier age India and China were committed to self-sufficiency, both the countries have ensured their place in the new age by

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ "British Petroleum Energy Outlook." www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2019.pdf. Accessed 27 Dec. 2020.

²²⁰ Ibid.

rapidly recognizing the new needs of their growing economies, adjusting to their new dependence on global markets, and sharpening their ability to achieve energy security.²²¹

Scholars have traditionally described energy security as subject to uninterrupted supplies and steady prices. This concept of energy security does not match up to the compulsions of the contemporary age when production and supply of oil are deliberately reduced in order to restrict the flow of energy resources to hostile countries, as also to lessen the adverse impact of fossil fuels on the world's climate.²²² Traditionally, the state was deemed to be solely responsible for ensuring energy security. According to that school of thought, energy security is all about the supply of energy resources. In those views, the focus of energy security is on oil. Also, self-sufficiency in energy resources is considered to be the measure of security.²²³ In the 1970s, the oil producing nations of the middle east drastically reduced the export of oil owing to political conflict with the western powers and the disruption caused by the Iranian revolution. Subsequently the major oil importing countries decided to reduce oil consumption and imports. However, since then, the number of oil suppliers has increased, the quantity of proven reserves has risen significantly, prices have become transparent and the oil market has been liberalized. Presently, more than 80 percent of the energy consumed globally is sourced from fossil fuels. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), such dependence on fossil fuel will continue for another few decades. This situation impacts the world in different ways, particularly in the economic and geopolitical spheres. Investors, technologists, consumers and governments try to expand their influence over energy resources. They even try to use oil as a weapon to subdue the military industrial complex of adversarial countries, limit their economic growth and weaken their security.²²⁴ The business sector largely operates according to the sufficient, dependable and affordable supply of energy. For this sector energy security is about its unfailing ability to obtain such energy resources. In order to operate viable, competitive and productive business enterprises, both in the short and long terms, it is necessary for the supply of energy to be secure and reliable and the relevant infrastructure to be adequately supportive.²²⁵

²²¹ Yergin, Daniel. "Ensuring Energy Security." *foreign affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2, 2006, pp. 70-71.

²²² Kurian, Anju Lis, and C. Vinodan, Op. cit.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Mulligan, Shane. "Energy, Environment, and Security: Critical Links in a Post-Peak World." *Global Environmental Politics*, vol.10, no.4, 2010, pp. 79-100. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/404384. Accessed 27 Dec. 2020.

²²⁵ "Energy Security: A World Business Perspective." ICC, Commission on Environment and Energy. OGEL, no. 4, 2007, www.ogel.org www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=2688. Accessed 28 Dec. 2020.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes energy security as the safety, certainty and reliability of energy supplies, efficient management of global energy resources, as well as the protection of the environment.²²⁶ The stated objective the IEA is to foster international cooperation in the matter of energy security.²²⁷ Different agencies perceive energy security as relative to their own priorities. In practice, it is not possible to achieve energy security to fit any of the concepts totally. Total energy security is not practicable or realistic. A more feasible approach to energy security is the assurance of sufficient and dependable supplies of energy at fair prices without hampering principal national values and objectives.²²⁸ Energy security implies non:interference with a country's sovereignty integrity and normal functioning of its economy. In the contemporary global scenario, energy security is haunted by a number of significant situations, such as political conflicts, escalations in energy prices, terrorism, rapidly growing demand from emerging economies like China and India, the operations of market speculators, inequitable distribution of resources that favour major consumers even at the expense of economically weaker countries, the adverse environmental spin:offs from the production and utilization of energy, climate change cause by carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels, nuclear proliferation caused by the diversion of energy resources to the manufacture of bombs, or accidents in the implementation of nuclear energy technology.²²⁹

Perceptions of energy security differ among geographical regions according to their respective economic, environmental, social, and technological status.²³⁰ Further, analysts examine the energy security progress of a country by its ability to cope with unexpected fluctuations in the price and quantity of imported energy, diversification of existing network of energy sources and supplies, the advancement of energy production technology, the quantum of energy consumption, the patterns of trade and the capacity to replace fossil fuels with alternative sources of energy. A country's foreign policy strategy takes into account the need to maintain energy supplies by building political rapport with the exporters of energy, at once ensuring the safe delivery of energy supplies, agreeing to invest abroad, granting overseas development aid, and retaining governmental control through national state:owned

²²⁶ "International Energy Outlook." www.eia.gov/ieo. Accessed 28 Dec. 2020.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Yergin, Daniel. "Energy Security in the 1990s." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 1, 1988, pp.110-132.

²²⁹ BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 68th edition. www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf. Accessed 28 Dec. 2020.

²³⁰ "British Petroleum Energy Outlook 2019." Op.cit.

oil companies. In a market-based economy, energy security is sought to be enhanced by efficiently interacting with national and international markets, with the objective of reducing the dependence on imports. This can be achieved by improving the efficiency of energy use, liberalizing the domestic energy markets, facilitating the reduction of energy costs, encouraging investments in the field of renewable energies to replace fossil fuels, improving channels of communication and flows of information, and allowing the markets to achieve a strategic equilibrium between demand and supply.²³¹ A pragmatic approach for a country to achieve energy security is to strike government control and market forces. So as to facilitate sustainable economic growth. Undue emphasis on either state control or market forces will impede the attainment of optimal energy security.

Geopolitics of Energy Security vis-à-vis India's Energy Security Strategy

Historically, national strategy has always been impacted by geopolitics. In the contemporary times, geopolitics is described differently according to the context. However, generally, geopolitical studies are based on the usage of natural resources and the manner in which geographic factors influence national and foreign policy. A country's geographic circumstances influence its development and evolution. States that make good use of their geographic factors forge ahead and rise in stature on the global stage. A country's geography in terms of its energy resources determines its potential for development. Accordingly, its energy geopolitics must take into account the locations of energy supply, the centers of energy demand, the transit routes, and energy prices. In the geopolitics of energy, a state seeks to advance its own interests, and its policies determine the efficacy of the national strategy for economic growth.

Energy resources drive the global economy and are the key factor in bringing about stability and security in the world. Internationally, the demand for energy has risen steeply over the last few decades, and the adverse fallout of massive fossil energy consumption has become a global concern. In the circumstances, the conscientious countries of the world are keenly interested in the reduction of dependence on fossil fuels and the creation of an efficient and sustainable communities that is interested in transitioning to renewable sources of energy.

²³¹ Yergin, Daniel. Op.cit.

The increased frequency of geopolitical conflicts and aggressive rivalries among the major global powers are attributed to, among other factors, the steep rise in the demand for energy and the consequent pressures on the sources of energy. Further, the large economies of the world are encountering unprecedented threats to their energy security. The energy producing states are becoming increasingly unstable in the face of powerful nations vying for control over their resources. The maritime supply routes have become a contentious issue among energy consuming countries, particularly with the increase in acts of terrorism and piracy. And, importantly, all the countries of the world are exercised over the negative impact of fossil fuels on the environment, leading to climate change.

In the contemporary age, geopolitical issues are not confined within a region but, have global ramifications. This owes to the increasingly important role played by natural resources such as oil, coal, natural gas, and uranium, that together critically impact a country's national and international strategy. The world has come to recognize energy resources as indispensable ingredients for social and economic development, as well as national and international security. These resources have come to gain priority in the formulation of a country's foreign policy, and their production, acquisition and usage determine the success of foreign policy strategies.

Mineral resources, particularly energy resources, have featured prominently in classical geopolitical studies, as in Mahan's treatise on naval power, and the significance of technologies, such as steam, to maritime power. In Mackinder's "Heart Land" concept, the availability of energy resources is the Central issue.²³² It refers to the heart of Eurasia that is akin to a vast fortress region. This landlocked territory is particularly rich in natural resources. The vast lands are extremely fertile and rich with water reserves and energy coal, and oil. The Caspian Sea region renowned for its oil reserves.²³³ As an essential part of the Heart Land, Central Asia is presently experiencing the so-called New Great Game.²³⁴ The chief participants in this game of intense rivalry and competition are the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO nations on the one hand, and Russia, China and member

²³² Dhaka, Ambrish. "The Geopolitics of Energy Security and the Response to its Challenges by India and Germany." *Geopolitics*, vol. 14, no. 2, 2009, pp. 278-299.

²³³ Fernandes, Carla Patrício and Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues. "Geopolitics of Energy and Energy Security." *Lisbon: Portuguese National Defense Institute*. 2017
www.run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/41897/1/cf_ac_tfr_geopoliticsofenergy_2017.pdf. Accessed 2 Jan. 2022.

²³⁴ Ibid.

states of the Shanghai cooperation Organization on the other.²³⁵ All these important players are vying for influence in the region and control over the exploration, production, supply contracts, pipe lines, and energy routes.²³⁶

From the 1990s, global resources, particularly fossil fuels, came under the stress of rapidly growing international demand for energy. In this scenario, energy geopolitics gained momentum. After the end of the Cold War the world recalibrated its priorities, and energy security assumed critical importance in national strategy.²³⁷ Since 2000, an increasing number of scholars have written treatises on global energy and the associated energy geopolitics. In many studies of the factors relating to energy, analysts have given emphasis on the related geopolitical perspectives. They have found geopolitics to be characterized by energy politics and energy security. In the context of the present period, energy geopolitics is largely an analysis of national security and international politics. These factors dominate the global energy scenario.

In studies of the geopolitics of energy, the consuming countries are found to be challenged by factors relating to the accessibility of foreign energy resources and their control, besides the formation of energy corridors. These constraints are related to the assurance and security of energy supplies, and largely emanate from the bilateral and multilateral relations among the different actors involved in the energy scenario. In the classical concepts of energy geopolitics, the nations and their militaries were the principal protagonists. However, in the present times, the actors are multiple and varied, comprising governments, and diverse international and national corporations. As a modern phenomenon, energy markets are sought to be captured by cartels and monopolies that impede the play of perfect competition in the global energy system. All of these different entities involved in the complex energy system attempt to engage in prospecting, extraction and production, processing, transportation, marketing and distribution of energy and distribution of energy.

While accessing foreign energy resources, the importing countries have a common objective based on three parameters. Firstly, the quantum of energy must satisfy domestic demand, strengthen national security and boost economic growth. Secondly, the supply of energy

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid. p.27.

needs to be adequate and uninterrupted. This is important since supply disruptions, such as those that occurred in the 1970s, result in a set back to the national and domestic and global politics. Thirdly, nations are concerned with the prices of energy resources and costs of energy imports, that need to be rational and justifiable. Consuming countries view these three concerns as determinants of the security of supply. The countries producing oil have similar interests and concerns, such as the stability of demand rational pricing and the dependability of long-term buyers. These countries have the common objective of getting reasonable returns on their investments relating to exploration and exploitation of energy reserves, as also the growth, prosperity and sustainability of their economies.

Energy resources significantly impact geopolitical realities. In the modern world energy is one of the primary sources of economic power, political control, military might, and global influence. At the same time, volatility of energy crisis and fluctuating supplies of energy can be causes for a nation's vulnerability to economic downturns. Just as energy can trigger and drive economic development and national wellbeing, its insufficiency can cause economic instability and decline. Historically energy and geopolitics have inevitably and inextricably been intertwined.²³⁸ In the course of the 20th century nations have scrambled to access energy resources. In the process they have created political alliances. Energy has the ability to determine the winners and losers in wars. Such phenomena have continued in the 21st century and remain the most significant strategic factors in the realm of global and regional geopolitics.²³⁹

All through history, nations have remained dependent on geopolitics. The diverse domains of a country, such as its political ideology, formulation of strategy and processes of decision making, are significantly influenced by the geographical features of the territory it occupies. Renewed authors, namely, Mackinder, Mahan and Spykman have dwelt on classical geopolitics. On the other hand, authors such as Aron, Kissinger and Huntington have introduced new dimensions in modern geopolitics, particularly relating to the geopolitics of energy. Though the resources have been different, energy has always been an important part of human evolution. The adoption of changes in the types of energy resources is generally slow, particularly when new technologies are introduced. In the 18th and 19th centuries coal

²³⁸ Ibid, p. 31

²³⁹ Ibid, p. 32.

was the main source of energy. However, in the contemporary age, nations are attempting to reduce their consumption of coal in order to protect the environment, climate and society from its adverse effects. In the 20th century, oil replaced coal as the primary resource. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, consuming countries have become increasingly wary of oil as resource since it can be used by oil producing nations as a geopolitical weapon. Owing to oil remaining a principal energy source within the available energy mix, countries are trying to diversify their sources of energy. In the wake of a new consciousness regarding environmental health and climate change, nations are veering to the enhanced usage of natural gas, and power from wind, water, sun and other renewable, in place of fossil fuels.


While there is a distinct increase in the energy obtained from renewable, and governments encourage the production and consumption of such energy, it will take a long time for renewable to be able to compete with fossil resources as the source of energy. This is a discernible shift in the global energy scenario. The traditional sources of energy are being challenged by newly emerging energy markets. According scholarly estimates, the world GDP will more than double by 2040 in the wake of the increasing prosperity in first growing developing economics.²⁴⁰ However, in 2040, around two-thirds of the world's population is expected to reside in countries having relatively low per capita energy consumption. Even in the present trend of rapidly rising demand for energy, the forecasts for the future indicate a massive need for more energy.²⁴¹ Around three-fourth of the current increase in energy demand owe to the energy consumed in the industrial and household sectors. In the Evolving Transition (ET) context, where there is marked improvement in standards of living, two-thirds of the growth in energy demand is driven by India, China and Other rapidly developing nations in Asia. It is expected that among the emerging economies that will trigger global economic growth, India and China will account for around half of the increasing demand for energy. The expected doubling of the global GDP and the manifest rise in general prosperity will be responsible for the increase in world energy demand. Over 80% of the increase in world output owes to developing economies. India and China contribute around half of that growth.²⁴² (see figure 16).

²⁴⁰ British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2019." Op. cit.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² "British Petroleum Energy Outlook: 2019." Op. cit.

Figure 16: India and the Global GDP Growth Past and Projected Contributions (1995:2017, 2017:2040)²⁴³



Consequent upon international accords and agreements, the demand and consumption of coal are being gradually reduced. It is estimated that the demand for oil will accelerate in the short term before the rate of growth begins to decelerate.²⁴⁴ The demand for natural gas, particularly in the liquefied form, is expected to grow faster than oil or coal.²⁴⁵ The pace of electrification continues to rise the world over. Accordingly, three-fourths of the growth in primary energy is attributable to the power Sector. Consequent upon global concerns over environmental pollution and climate change, renewable energy is presently growing the fastest among the different sources of energy. By 2040 renewable energy will constitute half of the growth in global energy supplies and will become the principal source of power.²⁴⁶ The

²⁴³ Source: BP Energy Outlook-2019, p.19

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

supply of natural gas is evincing strong growth because of its increasing availability and rising international demand. This phenomenon is manifest in the steady expansion in the usage of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Over the next 20 years, within the fuel mix, a gradual transition to renewable sources of energy is expected to take place, with nuclear and hydroelectric power accounting for half of the growth in energy supplies. In this context, India has massive untapped potential for hydroelectricity generation.²⁴⁷ However, the global economy is expected to be largely driven by oil, gas and coal. At the present time the nations of the world unanimously acknowledge the challenges in the way of satisfying the increasing global demand for energy, and the adverse impact of carbon emissions, even as economies continue to grow and prosper.²⁴⁸

Considering the criticality of energy in the nations development, it is necessary for the government to formulate energy policies with clear objectives. Firstly, there is a need to harness and utilize domestic sources of energy to the extent possible and practicable. Secondly, there must be suitable infrastructure to store transport, process, distribute and utilize energy resources. Thirdly, in order to ensure the steady and adequate supply of energy, there is the need to acquire or build the need to acquire or build energy assets. Fourthly, in the interests of energy security, it is important to diversify the foreign sources of energy. Fifthly, in the context of environmental pollution and climate change, there has to be increasing investments in the development and utilization of renewable energy resources. Sixthly, with a view to optimizing the cost of procurement of energy, there has to be improvement in the efficiency of operations at every stage of the energy system, improvements in energy conservation, promotion of innovation, and the development of technology.²⁴⁹ In order for India to achieve energy security, the government must attend to all the aforesaid important parameters. The country's indigenous sources of energy are not big enough to ensure energy self-sufficiency. In the circumstances the Indian government has formulated long-term strategies to meet the needs of energy security.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Dasgupta, Arnab. "India's Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region: A Critical Aspect of India's Energy Security." *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2018, pp. 39-57.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies: India, 2006.

²⁵⁰ Dietl, Gulshan. "India and the Global Game of Gas Pipelines." Routledge, 2017, p. 143.

Diversification of Energy Imports and Acquisition of Equity Oil by India's State-owned Oil Companies

India's important sources of energy, in the form of oil, natural gas and nuclear resources, are located abroad. Accordingly, they feature in India's foreign policy initiatives and strategies. In order to achieve energy security, the acquisition of energy assets is deemed to be a pragmatic step. The need to achieve energy security has always been an essential part of foreign policy, since India has traditionally relied on oil imports to meet its energy requirements. India's foreign policy objectives and formulations of strategy are geared towards achievement of energy security. In the process, it has been considering necessary to diversify the sources and suppliers of energy, to acquire energy stakes abroad, to secure the procurement of hydro carbon resources, to efficiently store energy, and to coordinate with countries in India's immediate and extended neighborhood.²⁵¹ Over the last few decades, in accordance with India's recalibrated energy security strategy, India has developed new ties with Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, Myanmar and Venezuela. Moreover, the country has developed cooperative alliances with a number of oil producing nations in Africa and Middle East. In addition to ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), the companies involved in acquiring energy assets abroad are Oil India Limited (OIL), Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), Reliance India Limited (RIL), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL). India's public sector companies, such as ONGC and OIL, have been permitted by the Government to purchase stakes in foreign oil and gas fields and companies.

In 1989, OVL was formed with mandate to carry forward India's objective to achieve energy security. To that end, OVL spearheaded the country's mission to purchase foreign energy assets. Since then, India has made progress in this regard by successfully investing in Iran, Sudan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Libya, Vietnam, Syria, Lebanon, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Angola. By way of explored and potential oil and gas reserves, Kazakhstan ranks among the top ten countries in the world. India procures energy in the form of natural gas from foreign sources to satisfy its present requirements and projected future demands. This has necessitated participation in pipeline projects. Consequently, there is the ongoing challenge to ensure route security, manage massive investments, and engage in critical political negotiations. In the interests of achieving energy security, India purchases

²⁵¹ Pardesi, Manjeet S., and Sumit Ganguly. "India and Energy Security: A Foreign Policy Priority." *Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World*, edited by Pant, Harsh, Routledge, 2013, pp. 99-127.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from foreign sources and builds new infrastructure by way of terminals to store such imports.

In order to preempt sudden disruptions in supply, or unforeseen rise in prices and as a significant part of its energy security strategy, India has taken care to build up a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This helps the country to avoid economic losses in the wake of oil shocks, and renders the country less vulnerable to oil being used as a political weapon. The economic importance of maintaining a Strategic Petroleum Reserve is highlighted by the number of occasions when oil has been used as a political weapon in the dynamics of global politics and international relations. It is possible for the government to earn extra revenues from the strategic petroleum reserves when the prevailing oil prices are higher than the prices at which the reserves had been purchased. The additional returns accrue to the government when the higher selling price is in conformity with the prevailing international price. The Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve Limited (ISORL) a part of the state-controlled Oil Industry Development Board of India (OIDBI), manages the SPR.

As a part of its energy security strategy, India has been engaging in the exploration and production of domestic sources of energy, with the objective of reducing energy imports. In the mix of domestic energy resources, increasing reliance on one particular fuel may put the domestic energy supply at risk. In other words, if the domestic energy mix is sufficiently diversified, and if these energy substitutes are local and renewable, there is reduction of risk in the domestic supply. Finally, the diversification of fuel features importantly in the country's energy strategy. In effect, there is a purposeful effort to diversify the energy mix by resorting to different types of fuels. Traditionally, India has largely relied on Coal, Oil and natural gas. In order to reduce dependence on these energy resources, the country has sought to increase the share of renewable and nuclear energy within the energy basket.

India's Growing Need for Energy Diplomacy

In course of time, India has become increasingly dependent on energy imports from the middle East and Central Asia. This has resulted in an enhancement of risk and uncertainty associated with the supplies of oil and gas from these sources. This is so because these oil producing countries have reduced the production of oil and gas as a ratio of their reserves. While their oil and gas reserves have gradually depleted, their own domestic consumption has increased. Consequently, they have reduced the proportion of their reserves that can be

exported to the oil consuming countries of the world. Moreover, the middle East has been increasingly riven by different political conflicts. At the same time the production of oil from India's own reserves has remain static since 1995. Only in 2010, the production was boosted with the participation of the private Sector, but this escalation did not contribute to an increase in the strategic petroleum reserves.²⁵² The International Energy Agency has estimated that, by 2030, about one-third of India's energy consumption domestic supply of oil and natural gas.²⁵³ Even so, India would depend on foreign sources for about 90% of its demand for Oil. It is also estimated that, between 2010 and 2030, India's consumption of Coal will increase by 97%.²⁵⁴ This is so because the energy consumed by the power sector is estimated to rise by 104%.²⁵⁵ Keeping this estimate in view India has been attempting to diversify its energy supply sources abroad such as in Kazakhstan and other oil and gas producing countries.

Kazakhstan has the largest proven reserves of natural gas.²⁵⁶ However, at the present time, the country is committing its attention to the production of natural gas and not to the exploration of other exploitable reserves. This is a consequence of inadequate investments, regulatory constraints, and geological obstacles in some regions. According to the estimates of different Kazakhstan government agencies, by 2030, there would be normal growth in oil production and exports. Given the existing geopolitical circumstances, particularly the stagnant pipeline projects, supplies of Kazakhstan's oil and gas to India may not flow as desired. The North:South Transport Corridor, including the Chabahar Port Project, is estimated to save transit time by 50% and cost by 30%. However, in the prevailing adverse geopolitical dynamics, this is not expected to manifest anytime soon.

In the context of the stalled projects for importing energy from Central Asia, India has little choice but to seek other sources of energy, and initiate energy diplomacy with different oil and gas producing countries. At this time, the issue of energy security has assumed serious

²⁵² "Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics." Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Economic and Statistics Division, 2015-16, pp. 1-14, www.petroleum.nic.in/sites/default/files/pngstat_1617r.pdf. Accessed 6 Jan. 2022.

²⁵³ "India Energy Policy Review." International Energy Agency. 2019, www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/gas. Accessed 6 Jan. 2022.

²⁵⁴ Powell, Lydia. "India's Energy Security: The Government's Role." *Dialogue*, 2013, vol. 14, no.3, pp. 34-46.

²⁵⁵ Gokarn, Subir. et al. "Energy 2030: Backgrounder." *Brookings Institution India Center*, December 2013, pp. 14-15, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Energy-2030-Brookings-India-Backgrounder.pdf. Accessed 6 Jan. 2022.

²⁵⁶ "Country Analysis Brief: Kazakhstan." U. S. Energy Information Administration, 2017, www.eeep.es/en/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2017/EIA_Country_Analysis_Kazakhstan_10may2017.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan. 2020.

proportions and features prominently in India's energy policy. Even as India continues to maintain favourable bilateral ties with Kazakhstan, it recognizes the importance of investing in the energy sectors in other energy rich parts of the world. India's energy security initiatives include forging trade ties with major global energy partners, energy equities, participating in energy pipelines, securing sea routes, an organizing technology transfer. In the back drop of uncertain global and regional political developments, both energy producing and energy consuming countries are seeking multi:polarities in their energy strategies. Accordingly, by 2030, considering present energy consumption and projected energy demand, a multilateral structure is expected to take shape. Instead of subjecting energy security to any one country or region, the arrangements for procurement of energy will involve a few major suppliers.

Both bilateral and multilateral collaborations are key to India's energy future and energy security. The risks associated with strengthening energy security include supply risk, market risk and technical risk. In order to successfully deal with the given risks, India needs to strengthen its ability to cope with supply shocks, not only by maintaining an adequate strategic petroleum Reserve but also by establishing dependable bilateral and multilateral ties through deft oil diplomacy. India and Kazakhstan are in the process of establishing and institutional mechanism to facilitate a formal and structured environment of energy interdependence. It is not possible for any one nation to control the pipelines and sea lanes associated with the conveyance of energy resources. As the concept of interdependence is becoming increasingly clear in the export and import of oil resources, India and Kazakhstan are finding more motivation for close co:ordination. It is estimated that, for the next 25 years at least, hydrocarbon resources will continue to dominate the global energy mix.²⁵⁷ In keeping with the growing need for interdependence, the international oil suppliers and consumers are beginning to integrate their respective operations in feasible ways. India is deploying its energy diplomacy at bilateral, regional and global levels by way of encouraging corporate joint ventures and engaging in Government:to:Government partnership with Kazakhstan.²⁵⁸ In the global scenario, and in the Indian context, energy security is being recognized as a multi:faceted challenge.

India's full membership in the SCO enables it to combine with other member countries in a joint campaign against terrorism and drug trafficking. This forum offers India a significant

²⁵⁷ India Energy Policy Review, 2019, Op. cit.

²⁵⁸ Singh Roy, Meena. "India's Interest in Central Asia." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 12, 2001, pp. 2273-2289.

opportunity to integrate with the countries of Central Asia and Eurasia. Importantly, such integration will lead to energy and economic cooperation. Kazakhstan is a key member of the SCO, which has the potential to play a significant role in the Central Asian region particularly in the context of strengthening the security and cooperation network. Given the growing U.S. influence in the region, the SCO led by China and Russia helps to restore the balance of power. The U.S. is wary of the SCO evolving into an organization that can potentially impede U.S. plans for expansion of influence in the region. With the cooperation of Kazakhstan, India can benefit from the SCO platform to further its energy security strategy.²⁵⁹ India and other member states of the SCO, under their collective auspices, can work towards achieving regional stability. A meaningful relationship with the SCO is expected to be beneficial for India by way of increased energy dealings with Kazakhstan, bolstering India's energy security and facilitating Indian investment opportunities with the other SCO members.

With countries of contiguous regions becoming members of the SCO, the organization so strengthened can be of significant benefit to South, South:West and Central Asia. Certain SCO states such as Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan possess massive hydrocarbon fuel deposits and other energy reserves. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, with their vast hydroelectric energy resources, if open to joint exploration and exploitation of the reserves, have the potential, to ensure energy security for all the nations in the region. The leading member states of the SCO are committed to obtaining support for the organization's policies in other multilateral forums like the G:20, BRICS, and OPEC in matters relating to energy.

India and Kazakhstan Relations: Role for Energy

In line with its objective to achieve energy security, India seeks to access the vast energy resources of Kazakhstan and also trade in other commodities in order to build a mutually gainful relationship with this important energy supplier. The agencies through which India seeks to realize its objectives are the country's leading energy corporations, banks, and other public sector investment agencies that are expected to integrate their operations and thereby define the size and scope of recent acquisitions around the world. India has the long-term strategy to gradually access Kazakhstan's energy resources through relevant acquisitions. Though the five Central Asian states gained their sovereignty in 1991, India made a late entry in the region by way of meaningful acquisitions and investments with regard to the vast

²⁵⁹ Mukhamedzhanova, Dina. "Kazakhstan and India: Economic Cooperation amidst Asian Regionalisation." *Paper presented at the First India-Central Asia Dialogue*, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, ICWA New Delhi: India, 2012, pp. 65-76.

energy related opportunities obtaining there. Other major powers were quick to enter the Central Asian arena and expanding their oil market. Even so India has succeeded in building positive relations with the newly established republics. It is now considered to be a significant player in the region. India is committed to enhancing its energy relations with Kazakhstan through appropriate investments. In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, India has maintained a steady flow of investments towards Kazakhstan, and is thus viewed favourable by the leaders of the Central Asian states. In order to study the progress of India's energy deals in Central Asia, it is necessary to describe the attending circumstances that helped to promote the country's ties with the Central Asian states, particularly with the maximally energy-endowed state of Kazakhstan in a period spanning more than a decade.

The formal relations between India and Kazakhstan commenced soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. India was among the first nations to accord recognition to Sovereign Kazakhstan. Diplomatic relations between India and Kazakhstan were established in 1992.²⁶⁰ India's Embassy was inaugurated in Astana in 1992, while Kazakhstan's Embassy in New Delhi opened in 1993.²⁶¹ The relations between the two countries are supported by their historically close and favourable ties. In the present time, in the Central Asian region, Kazakhstan is India's most significant partner. The two countries are engaged in expanding mutual cooperation in keeping with the acknowledged potential in the areas such as trade and commerce, logistics and connectivity, oil and gas, and people-to-people engagements in culture and tourism. Kazakhstan's Minister of Energy, Mr. Bozumbayev, has expressed positive interest in joining India in the process of expanding bilateral relations. To that end, he has invited investments in Kazakhstan's different sectors, especially in the hydro carbon sector.²⁶²

In 1993, the India-Kazakhstan Inter-governmental commission was set up as the principal bilateral institutional agency responsible for developing trade and expanding economic, scientific, technical, industrial, and cultural cooperation between the two nations. The Commission is jointly headed by India's Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas and Kazakhstan's Minister of Energy. At the 13th meeting of the Commission, it was decided to vigorously pursue the strategy of engagements between India and Kazakhstan that was formulated in course of the two visits of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to Kazakhstan in

²⁶⁰ "India-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2019. www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief_kazakhstan_Sept.19.pdf. Accessed 15 Jan. 2020.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

2015 and 2017. Kazakhstan features as one of the significant energy resource countries with which India has cooperates in the civil nuclear field through a contract for purchase of uranium.²⁶³ This civil nuclear deal is India's most important achievement in Kazakhstan's energy sector. In 2008, pursuance of civil nuclear cooperation with the member countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), India obtained Kazakhstan's support of India:specific exemptions.²⁶⁴ In the following year, in 2009, Kazakhstan signed an agreement with India for the supply of 2,100 tonnes of Uranium to India until 2014.²⁶⁵ Two years later, in 2011, in course of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Kazakhstan, a further agreement was signed for cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.²⁶⁶

All informed discourses, scholarly studies and press coverage of the India:Kazakhstan relationship, particularly in relation to an Indian Prime Minister's visit to Kazakhstan are centered around India's growing demand for energy. India's stated objective in respect of civilian nuclear energy is to work towards dramatically expanding its nuclear power capacity. By 2032, India proposes to achieve a nuclear power capacity of 63 Gigawatts (GW). Such an increase is to be viewed against the installed capacity of around 7 GW in 2019.²⁶⁷ With the introduction of energy resources such as gas, hydro, nuclear and renewable, India proposes to set up supercritical units to replace the traditional inefficient coal:fired thermal units. It is expected that, by end:2022, 46.8% of India's installed energy capacity will be service by non:fossil resources such as nuclear, hydro and renewable. By 2027, this proportion is expected to rise to 56.5%.²⁶⁸

In the wake of disasters and leakages in some nuclear power plants, as happened in Fukushima, Japan, it was expected that the nuclear industry would experience slower growth. However, countries interested in nuclear power do not appear to have altered their long term plans for development of this source of energy. In India, the demand for nuclear fuel in the near and medium terms remains substantial and unchanged. Kazakhstan is expected to contribute significant quantities of Uranium to help India to meet its requirement of nuclear

²⁶³ Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Government of India (2017). Petroleum Minister visits Kazakhstan for co-chairing the 13th Inter-Governmental Commission meeting.

www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=170965. Accessed 15 Jan. 2020.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ "India-Kazakhstan Relation." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2018.


www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/december_2018.pdf. Accessed 15 Jan. 2020.

²⁶⁷ "India Energy Policy Review-2020." International Energy Agency, pp. 163-166. www.iea.org. Accessed 15 Jan. 2020.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

energy, even as India is in the process of developing its domestic uranium deposits. At the same time, according to, estimates made by OPEC, India’s demand for hydrocarbon resources is projected to grow rapidly (see figure 17).

Figure 17: India’s Hydro Demand, 2018–2040 (value in mboe/d)²⁶⁹



Also, the IEA has estimated India’s demand for oil to grow from 3:3.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to over 5 million barrels per day in 2020.²⁷⁰ Further, by 2024, the IEA forecasts arise in India’s refining capacity to 5.7 million barrels per day. In the event, India is set to become an attractive destination for investments in refineries. Though India’s domestic production is likely to increase only marginally, India’s demand for oil is expected to grow from 4.4 million barrels per day in 2017 to 6 million barrels per day by 2024. In the process, India’s oil demand growth is likely to exceed China’s by mid:2020s.²⁷¹ Accordingly, in India’s relations with Kazakhstan, energy is expected to feature prominently in the 21st century. On the subject of the initiatives being under taken for transforming India into a gas:based economy, the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas and Steel, Shri D. Pradhan, has stated that the rapid deployment of natural gas will be the biggest game changer for achieving greater environmental sustainability and flexibility in India’s energy system. The Minister further

²⁶⁹ Source: OPEC.

²⁷⁰ Foshko, Katherine. “India-Kazakhstan: Beyond energy.” *Gateway House*. 14 April, 2011. www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-looking-beyond-energy/. Accessed 18 Jan. 2022.

²⁷¹ Verma, Nidhi and Promit Mukherjee. “India’s oil demand growth set to overtake China by mid-2020s.” IEA. *Reuters*, 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-india-energy-ia/indias-oil-demand-growth-set-to-overtake-china-by-mid-2020s-ia-idUSKBN1Z90CD. Accessed 18 Jan. 2022.

stated that natural gas would serve as a transition fuel in the country, and the government proposes to raise the share of gas from 6.2% to 15 percent in the energy mix by 2030.²⁷²

Kazakhstan is in a position to assisting India in addressing these needs. After Australia, it is the Second largest source of recoverable uranium. It is estimated to possess 15.19% of the world's total Uranium reserves.²⁷³ (See table 5). According to projections made from current trends, Kazakhstan is likely to become the foremost global supplier of Uranium in the next few years with a predominant presence in the Uranium extraction, enrichment and fuel fabrication markets. Kazakhstan possesses 7.8 billion tonnes of proven and extractable oil resources, as well as 100 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This energy-rich country is all the more important for India since the hydrocarbon resources in the middle East and the West are not open to Indian investments.²⁷⁴

Table 5: Top Eleven Uranium Resources by Country in 2017²⁷⁵

| | tonnes U | percentage of world |
|--------------|-----------|---------------------|
| Australia | 1,692,700 | 28% |
| Kazakhstan | 906,800 | 15% |
| Canada | 564,900 | 9% |
| Russia | 486,000 | 8% |
| Namibia | 448,300 | 7% |
| South Africa | 320,900 | 5% |
| Brazil | 276,800 | 5% |
| Niger | 276,400 | 4% |
| China | 248,900 | 4% |
| Mongolia | 143,500 | 2% |
| Uzbekistan | 132,300 | 2% |

²⁷² "Future of India's energy sector." Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India. 2020 www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=199350. Accessed 25 Jan. 2022

²⁷³ Foshko, Katherine. 2011. Op. cit.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Source: World Nuclear Association.

India's strategic relations with Kazakhstan have been given a fillip by the nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries and the announcements regarding ONGC's hydrocarbon investments. However, it may be noted that ONGC has invested in Kazakhstan's relatively small Satpayev field. This field has an estimated 253 million tonnes of recoverable deposits.²⁷⁶ The Satpayev field accounts for 3% Kazakhstan's proven reserves. From India's point of view, the deal helps in the diversification of the country's strategic oil sources. Further, it also presents the potential for bigger future investments in the Satpayev deal proves to be a success.²⁷⁷ At the same time, success will hinge on India's ability to transport hydrocarbons from Kazakhstan to India despite the absence of stable and reliable overland routes. A propose of the Satpayev fields since the extracted oil cannot directly flow into the Indian market, the resource will be sold within the region, and the financial proceeds will be used to purchase oil from India's traditional sources.

Given the intent to bolster its energy security, India considers Kazakhstan to be an extremely important source. In India's view, Kazakhstan is the sole nation, after Russia, that has the potential to assist India in ensuring energy security. In the case of nuclear fuel, in the short term, India's need is substantial and there are fewer impediments to trade. However, the quantum of Uranium that India is committed to buy from Kazakhstan is less than 4% of Kazakhstan's projected Uranium production in the same period. Following the India:Kazakhstan nuclear deal, Kazakhstan has become the fifth country after the US, France, Australia and Russia that is ready to supply Uranium to India for civilian energy purposes. In the said agreement, it is envisaged that the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) will import at least 120 tonnes of Uranium annually from Kazakhstan.²⁷⁸ The energy co operational between India and Kazakhstan in the short term is significant as it heralds an immensely important energy security relationship in the long term and is expected to broaden into a strategic partnership. This analysis, therefore, attaches significant value to the current introductory phase of India:Kazakhstan energy cooperation.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Khairi, Abuzar. "India and Central Asia towards Emerging Partnership." *Business Central Asia*, 2015. pp. 8-9.

²⁷⁸ Stobdan, Phunchok. "India and Central Asia: Untying the Energy Knot." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2016. pp. 14-25.

India's Energy Strategy in Kazakhstan: A Speculative Sketch

In the late 1990s, looking to a rapid projected rise in the need for energy, India began to explore the alternative sources of energy in the world. In the process, India turned its focus on the geographically proximate countries that were rich in energy reserves, mainly in Central Asia, that were located in the extended neighborhood. India's energy strategy was largely driven by the need to ensure energy security. That apart in Kazakhstan, India also sought trade ties and economic cooperation. Given this considered approach, India made no effort to play a role in the political affairs of Kazakhstan or the larger Central Asian region. India was aware of the influence the U.S. exerted towards bringing about a regional political and commercial equilibrium. In the circumstances, India shaped its own strategy based on national security issues and economic parameters.

Accordingly, in the initial years, India sought to position itself in Central Asia in general, and Kazakhstan in particular, as a benign power playing a constructive role. In that period, the world, including India had become increasingly aware of the vast proven energy resources in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. In the wake of its birth as an independent republic, Kazakhstan recognized the need to rapidly explore, develop, and export its energy resources, by way of crude oil and natural gas to other countries. However, the country found itself facing internal and external constraints in conveying its resources to interested buyers. In the context of its land locked position, it was clear that exporting oil and natural gas would require the construction of expensive infrastructure. The immediate absence of infrastructural facilities impeded a quick realization of the potential benefits. In seeking to bolster its energy relations with Kazakhstan, India was conscious of its growing need for energy to sustain its economic growth and ensure its energy security. India also envisaged a positive change in the political and economic dynamics in the concerned developing nations with the construction of a land bridge across South and Central Asia for transportation of energy and other commodities. Therefore, there was a larger picture to be considered while promoting bilateral energy and economic ties with Kazakhstan.

In lying with its foreign policy strategies, India expressed its keenness to invest in the exploration and production of oil and gas in Kazakhstan even before the construction of the proposed over land pipe lines. India continues to believe that Central Asia, particularly

Kazakhstan, presents the opportunity for diversification of energy sources. In that context, India remains interested in tapping the energy resources in that region. In the event, as global and regional dynamics have played out, India is actively engaged in enhancing its presence in the energy sector of Kazakhstan. With the focus on oil and natural gas, in 2009, Kazakhstan's KazMuniasGaz and India's ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL) have signed an agreement for oil and gas cooperation in the Satpayev block.²⁷⁹ Subsequently, India's OMEL was replaced by ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL).²⁸⁰ Further to this agreement in 2011, the two countries inked an agreement for OVL to have a 25% share of the Satpayev block. In 2009, Kazakhstan's National Atomic Company Kazatomprom and India's Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in the field of atomic energy.²⁸¹ Later in the same year, the two countries finalized a deal for the supply of 2.1 thousand tonnes of Uranium concentrate by 2014. When this contract expired, Kazatomprom and the Indian Department of Atomic Energy signed a new contract for the supply of 5 thousand tonnes of Uranium concentrate by 2019.²⁸²

Accordingly, Kazakhstan and India delineated their areas of cooperation and investment to include atomic energy. To that end the two countries have initiated political, legal and institutional measures for facilitating real-time collaboration. In 2019, in course of the Kazakhstan:India Investment Forum convened in Delhi, the two countries agreed to promote a number of projects in the energy Sector.²⁸³ As a follow-up to these discussions, negotiations were held with National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPCL), Investment Fund of India, and the Millennial India International Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. In effect, Kazakhstan has become India's largest trading and strategic partner in Central Asia. In an environment of increasing globalization, the two countries are significantly engaged in sustaining each other's economic growth.²⁸⁴

In the context of its expanding relations with Kazakhstan and the Eurasian region, India has entered into a new and important sphere of economic activity. Consequently, India is

²⁷⁹ Verma, Singh Sudheer. 'Indo-Kazakh: Potential Sectors for Investment', *Diplomatist*, 2019, www.diplomatist.com/2019/12/26/indo-kazakh-potential-sectors-for-investment/. Accessed 21 Jan. 2022.

²⁸⁰ Ibid; also see: "Mittal pulls out of OVL's Kazakh project." *The Hindu*, November, 18. 2009. p. 8.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury. Op. cit.

²⁸⁴ Moore, Scott. "Peril and promise: a survey of India's strategic relationship with Central Asia." *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2007, pp. 279-291.

contending with the challenges in the establishment of trade and transportation routes for the conveyance of energy and other goods from the Central Asian region, that will potentially boost economic activity in Central Asia and in South Asia. In a number of cases, India is having to secure energy deals along with concomitant investments in facilities for extraction and processing, as well as in infrastructural development of ports, pipelines, roads, and railways that are designed to ultimately convey the commodities to India. The Chabahar and INSTC projects will potentially benefit both the producer and consumer countries. These projects will ultimately enhance India's economic presence in the larger region of South Asia and Eurasia, as well as enable India as an emerging power to wield political, economic and cultural influence. In the context of these projects and the balance of ensuing benefits, India stands to gain more than its Central Asian partners. However, these projects will also help the Central Asian states to become less captive to Chinese and Russian trade and more open to trading with the outside world. Given its proven expertise in the construction of domestic infrastructure, India has the potential to positively impact the infrastructural requirements of Central Asia by way of trade and transit routes for the regional products. India's investments in relevant infrastructure and transportation links will enable the Central Asian republics to access global markets and even earn transit fees on the flow of trade.

The steadily expanding energy relations and the sharp focus on trade and supply routes are indicative of India's major interest in the Central Asian region. India's increasing prominence in Central Asia is not limited only to that region alone but also extends from there to Europe and other parts of Asia. India's emergence as a major economic power is helping to re:configure the economic activities in Asia and has the potential to increasingly impact the patterns of Asian trade and commerce. It is well known that China's foreign policy is geared towards securing more global energy resources. In such a scenario, India is all the more concern about ensuring energy security and the sustenance of economic growth through heightened diplomacy. India's political leaders and influencers of domestic and foreign policies have been increasingly conscious of the dynamics of achieving energy security. The diversification of energy resources both at home and abroad features prominently in India's strategy going forward. The rapid growth in economic activities and the ongoing search for different trade and transportation routes for conveyance of energy resources point to the probability of India playing an increasingly influential role in the Central Asian region, and particularly in Kazakhstan. It is noteworthy that factors relating to the country's border

security and political relations in the immediate and extended neighborhood are intertwined with India's energy strategy.

Energy Scenario in India and Kazakhstan: Analysis of Demand and Supply

The rapid economic growth following upon India liberalizing its economy in 1991 resulted in energy security becoming a priority area of interest among policy makers. In India, a rapidly growing propensity to consume energy has resulted from upgraded life styles, emergence of a 200 million:strong middle:class, population growth, and reorientation and modernization of industry and the economy. India has achieved a robust economic growth for over two decades, and it is envisaged that such growth will again be manifest in the near term. In this context, energy assumes prime importance in the country's national security paradigm. As with many other countries, India is concerned about protecting the environment through the increased use of renewable sources of energy. At the same time, in order to sustain the rapid pace of economic growth, India has necessarily to resort to energy from fossil fuels that negatively impact the environment. Along with the issue of economic growth, India is also concerned with programmes for the alleviation of poverty. Accordingly, India formulates policies that are reflective of all these concerns. India faces challenges that issue from conflicting interests. On the one hand, the country must arrange for adequate energy for meeting the needs of economic growth and the demands of a growing consumerist population by powering manufacturing and service industries. On the other hand, the country must provide energy aimed at alleviating poverty, mainstreaming the majority rural populace, and weaning people away from traditional fuel resources.

As a rapidly emerging economy India's energy consumption patterns increasingly reflect the characteristics of industrialized economies. In order to alleviate poverty, there is a need to provide 500 million Indians with access to electricity. The rural masses will require to be transitioned from the usage of bio:fuels to more efficient methods of cooking. Significant progress has already been achieved in these areas. By 2020, 99.9% households have been provided with electrification. Further, by the same year 80 million new LPG connections

have facilitated the transition to cleaner cooking systems.²⁸⁵ Since 2000, about 750 million people have gained access to electricity in India. Further, the programmes to help replace bio:fuels in cooking have been vigorously implemented.²⁸⁶

It is important to note that India's per capita consumption of commercial energy is only 20% of the global average. This figure importantly features as an index to the nation's economic growth. Keeping this factor in view, this section proceeds to study India's extant growth projections, patterns of energy consumption and supply, and the country's energy mix, with particular focus on the imports of hydrocarbons, gas and other energy resources.

While poised to become the world's third-largest consumer market, India at once aspires to elevate the lives of all its citizens and achieve the status of a high middle income country by 2030.²⁸⁷ India is the world's largest democracy and the second most populous country, with around 1.35 billion people.²⁸⁸ In 2022, India was ranked as the fifth-largest economy in the world, with a GDP of \$ 3.53 trillion.²⁸⁹ In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), India ranks third behind U.S. and China.²⁹⁰ In the context of having become one of the world's fastest growing economies, with a projected annual GDP growth of around 7.5%, India is set to significantly growth.²⁹¹ Importantly, the expanding middle class and the diversification of the economy towards manufacturing as triggered by shifting domestic consumption patterns are expected to be the principal drivers of GDP growth (See figure 18). These factors are expected to lead to a massive rise in energy consumption and significantly impact the environment. India is presently the fourth largest energy consumer in the world. The country's energy needs are projected to rise dramatically, making it the world's third largest consumer by 2035. As evidenced over the post decades, India's demand for energy has

²⁸⁵ "India's energy policy: Key findings of the IEA's in-Depth Review." International Energy Agency, 2020, www.iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2bb811d9-2de6-4e7e-84e8-546111762f21/India-2020-Launch-Presentation.pdf. Accessed 23 Jan. 2022.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ "The World Bank in India: Overview." The World Bank, www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview. Accessed Jan. 23 2022; also see, "India poised to become third-largest consumer market: WEF." The Economic Times, January 9, 2019, p. 7.

²⁸⁸ "Future of Consumption in Fast-Growth Consumer Markets: India. Insight Report." World Economic Forum. 2019, www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Consumption_Fast-Growth_Consumers_markets_India_report_2019.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan. 2022.


²⁸⁹ Armstrong, Martin. "This chart shows the growth of India's economy." World Economic Forum, 26 September 2023., www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/india-uk-fifth-largest-economy-world. Accessed 2 Nov. 2022.

²⁹⁰ Future of Consumption in Fast-Growth Consumer Markets: India. Op. cit.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

increased steadily across all sectors, including agriculture, industry, commercial and residential, and is expected to continue to grow. The following sections give an overview of India’s energy consumption patterns and imports.


Figure 18:India’s Economy, Population and Energy Indicators: Growth Trends²⁹²



India generally uses three kinds of energy resources for varied purposes. Coal is largely used for power generation, oil is the mainstay of transport and industry, and biogas is the chief resource for residential heating and cooking. Bio energy and coal are available from domestic sources, while oil and natural gas are largely imported. In 2017 India’s total primary energy supply (TPES) was 882 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), about two-thirds of which (554 Mtoe) were available through domestic production. Industry had the major share of India’s total final consumption (TFC), followed by the residential sector transport, services, and agricultural sector. (See figures 19 and 9).

²⁹² Source: International Energy Agency.

Figure 19: India's Energy System by Fuel and Sector, 2017: an Overview²⁹³



*Other renewables include hydro, wind and solar.

**Services includes commercial and public services, agriculture and forestry.

***Industry includes non:energy consumption.

Notes: Bioenergy data are estimated by the IEA; the year runs from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018.

Among all the Sectors, energy consumption in the industrial Sector increases the least 10 quads more than the reference case in 2050, and the increase is distributed almost evenly across the industrial subsectors. It may be observed that improvements in technology has a smaller aggregate effect on energy use in the industrial sector than the types of products made. In the matter of the composition and combination of different industries, India's economic growth is largely dependent on manufacturing industries. Since these industries consume relatively more energy, India experiences a faster rise in the usage of energy which translates to a larger share of the global industrial sector total. The increase of 38 quads in India's industrial sector in 2050 for the combination case is equivalent to adding more than 4% to global energy use in the reference case.

²⁹³ Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Balances 2019, www.iea.org/statistics/. Accessed 23 Feb. 2021.

Figure 20: Per capita Energy use in India’s Industrial Sector in 2050 Compared with OECD Average in 2018²⁹⁴





Figure 21: India’s Industrial Sector Fuel Use Across Cases: History and Projection²⁹⁵



²⁹⁴ Source: US Energy information Administration

²⁹⁵ Source: US Energy information Administration.

Per capita industrial energy usage in India increases in each of the cases (see figure 20). As a result of compounding slower technology development with industrial composition shifted toward manufacturing, the combination case, Indian Industrial energy usage in 2050 can rise to 52 British thermal units (Btu) per person. On a per capita basis, this level is equivalent to the current OECD average.

The shares of fuel remain consistent across all three cases in India's industrial sector in 2050, even after the changes in the composition of industry toward manufacturing (see figure 21). Among the heavy coal using industries, such as paper, cement, and steel, coal remains the preferred industrial fuel throughout the projection period. There is a hardly any change in fuel shares despite the rapid growth in these industries. That is so because coal is still relatively inexpensive. In the chemical sector, there is considerable growth in the use of liquids and natural gas, but the relative growth is stable, which keeps the shares almost constant.


Coal as a resource dominates India's energy system as it is used for power generation. India leads the growth in consumption (36 Mtoe).²⁹⁶ Oil is used for transport and industry, while biomass is the resource for residential heating and cooking. Both Bioenergy and coal are produced domestically, while oil and natural gas are largely imported. In 2017 India's total primary energy supply (TPES) was 882 million tonnes of oil equivalent nearly two-thirds (554 Mtoe) of which are met by domestic production. Industry has the major share of India's total final consumption (TFC), followed by the residential sector, transport sector, and the service sector including agriculture. This broad scenario is reiterated as a prelude to the following sections.

In terms of energy resources, industry consumes a mix of coal, oil, natural gas, electricity, biofuels, wind, solar, and fossil fuels, which together represent 56% of total consumption (See figure 22). With a share of 29% of total final consumption (TFC) in 2017, the residential sector is the second largest energy consumer. In respect of residential energy consumption, the traditional use of biomass for heating and cook accounts for the biggest share (see figure 23), though the absence of adequate data makes the number uncertain. The transport Sector is the third largest consumer of energy, mainly oil fuels, accounting for 17% of total final consumption (TFC) in 2017. The demand for energy in the transport sector has

²⁹⁶ Bp statistical review 2019, p. 2. <https://www.bp.com/>

more than doubled in a decade, accounting for 25% of the growth of TFC. Finally, in 2017, the service sector including agriculture consumed 12% of TFC, with electricity accounting for more than half. As projected in the International Energy outlook (2019), India's energy consumption is set to increase rapidly (See figure 24).

Figure 22: 1990:2017: India's Total Final Consumption (TFC) By Source (Value in Ktoe)²⁹⁷



²⁹⁷ Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Balances 2019.

Figure 23: 1990:2017: India's Total Final Consumption (TFC) By Sector (Value in Ktoe)²⁹⁸





Figure 24: 2010:2050: India's Projected Primary Energy Consumption in Four IEO – 2019 Cases²⁹⁹



²⁹⁸ Source: International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/countries/india>. Accessed 2 Mar. 2021.


²⁹⁹ Source: U. S Energy Information Administration.

According to current projections India is expected to experience the fastest demand growth in all forms of energy resources and the largest additional demand (5.4 md/d) in the period up to 2040.³⁰⁰ (see figures 25 and 26).

Figure 25: 2018:2040: India’s Primary Energy Demand by Fuel Type³⁰¹

| | Levels mboe/d | | | | Growth mboe/d | Growth % p.a | Fuel shares % | | | |
|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 2018 | 2020 | 2030 | 2040 | | | 2018 | 2020 | 2030 | 2040 |
| Oil | 4.6 | 4.9 | 7.2 | 9.8 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 24.5 | 24.5 | 25.1 | 26.0 |
| Coal | 8.4 | 9.1 | 13.1 | 17.1 | 8.6 | 3.3 | 44.9 | 45.2 | 45.7 | 45.4 |
| Gas | 1.0 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 6.9 | 7.9 |
| Nuclear | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 6.8 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.8 |
| Hydro | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 3.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Biomass | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 21.5 | 20.4 | 15.2 | 11.5 |
| Other renewables | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 11.5 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 4.9 |
| Total | 18.8 | 20.2 | 28.7 | 37.5 | 18.8 | 3.2 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Figure 26: 2017:2040: India’s Projected Coal Demand (value in Mtoe)³⁰²



³⁰⁰ “World Oil Outlook 2040.” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. (OPEC), 2019, www.opec.org. Accessed 2 Mar. 2021.

³⁰¹ Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

³⁰² Source: British Petroleum (bp) energy-outlook-2019.

It is expected that the growth in the consumption of coal will increase at a decreasing rate compared to the past. However, these trends may be different in other countries and regions. Nevertheless, the demand for coal with respect to India and other emerging Asian economies will continue to rise. India remains the largest growth market for coal. Its share of global coal consumption is expected to more than double to around 25% in 2040. This phenomenon of increasing coal consumption in India and other developing Asian countries owes to a strong growth in the demand for power, as these economies manifest significant development and rising prosperity.

The rapid growth in the demand for energy in Asia, as evidenced in India, China and other developing economies in the continent, establishes Asia as the largest market for energy imports.³⁰³ At the same time, trade disputes and the growing concerns regarding energy security may affect the pattern of energy flows, a phenomenon that gives rise to the alternative “Less globalization” Scenario.³⁰⁴ The global energy system is largely impacted by international trade. It drives economic growth and permits nations to diversify their sources of energy. In the event any escalation in the trade disputes that have recently for serious repercussions on the energy outlook.³⁰⁵ The alternative scenario of “Less globalization” is a consequence of an increase in trade disputes that persistently affect the energy system. Any reduction in the transparency of the global economy may adversely affect energy flows. A reduction in the rate of growth of individual economies will reduce the level of world GDP by 6% and energy demand for 4% in 2040. This is most evident in the Energy Transition (ET) Scenario, where the fall in GDP growth is manifest in countries and regions that are most reliant on foreign trade.³⁰⁶ The risks associated with imported energy and the consequent reduction in energy consume are largely manifest in traded fuels, such as oil, gas and coal even as there is a slight increase in the supply of renewable energy.³⁰⁷ Such a trend is generally observed in individual countries where a reduction in the demand for energy results in a shift in the fuel mix in favour of domestically produced energy resources. A scaling down of energy demand and reduced trade flows will have significant consequences on oil and gas imports (see figure 27). In turn, this will affect the largest exporters of oil and gas in

³⁰³ British Petroleum (BP) Energy Outlook: 2019 edition, pp. 71-73. <https://www.bp.com/>. Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.


³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

the world.³⁰⁸ In the matter of imports, the major importers of oil and gas, such as India and China, will experience energy deficits that are smaller than in the Energy Transition (ET) Scenario. The fall in the quantum of imported energy results from both the reduced level of overall energy consumed and the divergence from oil and gas towards domestically produced renewable.

Figure 27: 2040: Difference Relative to Energy Transition (ET) Scenario: India and the World Fuel Demand and India’s Net Imports (Oil and Gas) in Alternative Scenario: Less Globalisation.³⁰⁹




India’s booming power market is significantly driven by private Sector investments, and the overall focus is increasingly sifting toward renewable energy resources. The country has committed to raise its renewable energy capacity to 175 Giga Watts (GW) by 2022 and further to 500 GW by 2030. By the same target year, 2030, India is pledged to achieve 40% non:fossil fuel generation capacity in the power sector. To that end India’s principal stake holders have formed a Leadership Group For Industry Transition that will be responsible for transforming the hard:to:decarbonizes and energy:intensive sectors. However, the capacity additions in July 2019, as published in the Ministry of Powers monthly report, were by way of two 660 Mega Watt (MG) thermal Coal Power Plants. In the first seven months of 2019, while 11 thermal plants with a total capacity of about 4.8 GW were commissioned, only one 330 MW hydro project was brought online. In 2014, the Ministry of Power launched a

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Source: BP Energy Outlook: 2019 edition, www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-energy-outlook-2019.html. Accessed 2 May 2021.

number of initiatives to improve accessibility to electricity and expand the country’s energy grid, particularly the Integrated Power Development Scheme. This scheme envisages the installation of transmission lines, meters, solar panels and other related projects.³¹⁰

Figure 28: India’s Fossil Fuel Consumption and Dependence on Imports³¹¹



With currently over 90% of its energy production coming from fossil fuels, it is evident that India has a very high dependency on such energy resources (see figure 28). According to the estimates published by British Petroleum India’s reliance on fossil fuels will reduce slightly to 87% in 2035.³¹² As a result of the high demand for fossil fuels, coupled with a relative shortfall in domestic fossil fuel resources, India’s energy imports are projected to substantially increased by 2035. Further, despite large domestic reserves of coal, there is expected to be an increase in coal imports. According to projection made by Mckinsey, by 2030, India’s imports will rise from 30% of the current energy supply to over 51% (see figure 29). This will be the highest proportion of energy imports for a major world economy at that stage. In these circumstances there are serious concerns attaching to India’s energy security and heavy dependence on imports. There are uncertainties with regard to the availability of

³¹⁰ “World Oil Outlook 2040.” Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2019, www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/WOO_2019.pdf. Accessed 3 Apr. 2021.


³¹¹ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

³¹² BP Energy Outlook: 2019 edition, Op. cit.

energy resources, besides their deliverability and technology. Further, there are risks associated with sudden disturbances at the source or along the transit route, or at destination. Finally, policy makers must factor in the existence of geopolitical fault lines and “choke points”. Such potential hazards need to be taken into account while dealing with a country’s energy security.

In 2021, India was ranked as the world’s third:largest energy consumer.³¹³ According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2012, inspite of its domestic fossil fuel resources, India’s dependence on imported fossil fuels rose to 38%. As India continues to modernize, there is a gradual shift of the population from rural to semi:urban and urban areas. In the process, there is a movement away from the usage of traditional biomass and waste resources, and people are increasingly resorting to other energy resources, such as fossil fuels. The government is faced with the challenge of meeting the country’s rapidly growing demand for energy. In the circumstances, the government must look for and secure affordable energy supplies. At the same time, it must looked to attracting investments for domestic hydrocarbon production and infrastructure development (Dietl, 2017).

Figure 29: India’s Dependence on Energy Imports³¹⁴




³¹³ “Country Analysis Executive Summary: India”. U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022. www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/IND. Accessed 21 Oct. 2023.

³¹⁴ Source: “India: Towards Energy Independence 2030.” McKinsey & Company, 1 January, 2014, www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/india-towards-energy-independence-2030. Accessed 2 Oct. 2022.

According to current data and future projections, India will continue to largely depend on the import of fossil fuel energy. There is therefore an element of risk associated with India’s energy Security. It is necessary, at this stage of the paper, to furnish an adequate understanding of the specificities of India’s fossil fuel dependence and its relevance to Kazakhstan. The following section of this chapter dwells on India’s dependence on energy resources comprising oil and natural gas, areas that largely define its energy cooperation with Kazakhstan. The section will also relate to India’s efforts to overcome the different challenges to its energy security.

In 2021, India continued to be the world’s third-largest consumer and net importer of oil and net importer of oil and petroleum products. At present, India’s demand for oil is 4.8 million Barrels per Day (MBD), while domestic production is 1 MBD (see figure 30). As of now, India imports about 71% of its oil. According to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) data, India’s Oil demand will rise to 8.2 MBD by 2040. At the same time, India’s domestic production will be stagnant at around 1 MBD.³¹⁵ By 2040 it is envisaged that India will import up to 90% of its oil.

Figure 30: 2002:2021: India’s Production and Consumption of Petroleum and other Liquids.³¹⁶




³¹⁵ “Country Analysis Brief: India.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017 www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/IND. Accessed 2 Dec. 2022.

³¹⁶ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

In the context of India’s large dependency on imports, it is critical to consider the different sources of India’s imports and the quantities of crude oil India receives from diverse parts of the world (see figure 31). Presently, India imports 16% of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia, the country’s largest oil supplier. Almost 61% of India’s imports is sourced from the pertinent Gulf region. At the same time, 14% of imported crude is from the Western Hemisphere, and 14% from Africa. The turmoil resulting from the Arab Spring adversely affected India’s import basket. This happened while India was attempting to diversify away from the traditional sources, such as Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Nigeria. Further, western sanctions on Iran compelled India to reduce its imports from Iran from a high of 16% in 2009 to as low as 6%. While oil prices continue to be volatile, frequently dipping and rising, the higher cost of Middle Eastern crude has provided additional motivation for India to diversify away from the Persian Gulf.³¹⁷ A significant implication emerging from India’s Oil import dependency is the recourse to the Indian Ocean and oil tankers as the principal means for the transportation of crude. The Ocean routes may potentially be laden with risks for India as they are known to be geopolitical choke points.

Figure 31: 2021: India’s Country:Wise Imports of Crude Oil³¹⁸



India has traditionally been an agrarian economy, and this segment continues to feature largely in India’s GDP. In the event, natural gas plays a key role in the country’s economic


³¹⁷ U.S. Energy Information Administration. Op. cit.

³¹⁸ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

growth due to its contribution to the fertilizer industry. As a substitute to coal, natural gas contributes importantly to electricity generation. In 2021, India continued to be the world’s fourth largest importer of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Owing to demands emanating from rapid economic growing, India is expected to become the second largest such importer. While self-sufficient till 2004, LNG impose began thereafter. In 2014, India imported 29% of its total LNG requirement of 18,550,000 cubic metres. (See figure 34). India’s demand for natural gas is projected to increase with some estimates quantifying the need to rise to about 5 trillion cubic feet (TCF) in 2035.³¹⁹

The country’s domestic production is expected to fall short of the increased demand, and according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) report presents data suggesting that India will need to import up to fifty:fifty of its LNG requirements (see figures 33 and 34). While studying the sources of India’s LNG imports, Qatar emerges as the principal supplier, accounting for over 40% of total imports.³²⁰ The other sources of LNG are United States, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Oman and Angola (see figures 32). Considering the risks associated with dependency on imports, there is a felt need to diversify away from Qatar and increase the domestic production. Since India’s imported LNG is totally transported by tankers across the Indian Ocean, LNG suffers from the same threat perception as associated with Oil.

Figure 32: 2021: India’s Country:Wise Imports of Liquefied Natural Gas³²¹



³¹⁹ U.S. Energy Information Administration. Op. cit.

³²⁰ “Country Analysis Executive Summary: India.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022. www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/IND. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.

³²¹ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Figure 33: 2010:2021: India’s Production and Consumption of Natural Gas³²²





Figure 34: 2008:2018: India’s Imports of Liquefied Natural Gas (Value in million cubic meters)³²³



Having identified and expended on India’s energy import dependencies, the following section attempts to gauge the impact of this dependency as well as the concomitant geopolitical issues, with particular reference to the earlier indicated fault lines and “Choke Points”. This is

³²² Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

³²³ Source: CECI Data, www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/india/natural-gas-imports. Accessed 2 Feb. 2021.

then related to India's energy diplomacy and the government's efforts to bring about the strategic security of India's energy future in the long term.

In the prevailing circumstances, India can consider a number of options both within the country and abroad in order to safe guard its energy future in the long run. Internally, India needs to explore possible new sources of energy, take better recourse to renewable sources and nuclear power, and ensure optimum energy efficiency.³²⁴ Externally, India needs to continue to diversify its energy sources, make significant investments in foreign energy resources, enter into energy deals and partnerships, and also secure Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC).³²⁵ In such a context, India views Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular as a potential means to diversify energy sources, make meaningful investments, enter into partnerships and potentially facilitate overland conveyance of energy without the need for SLOC. India's diplomatic forays into Central Asia and elsewhere in the world may be seen in this light.

In India's relations with Kazakhstan procurement of hydrocarbon resources takes pride of place. While India remains one of the world's principal importers of oil, it is also experiencing a growing demand for natural gas. In the event, Indian Companies are negotiating with Kazakhstan for active participation in upstream, midstream and downstream processes in the oil and natural gas sectors.³²⁶ The subject is under the close scrutiny of scholars and experts who concentrate on India's energy security. Devendra Kaushik and Kathrine Foshko, Scholars agree on the importance of Kazakhstan for both hydrocarbon resources and as a uranium source and the significance of the country in India's nuclear energy plans. Katherine Foshko stakes further that there is a strong potential for linking hydroelectric power generation capacities in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to the South Asian electricity grid in a future scenario. Devika Sharma, Scholar, writes that India is initiating practical measures for diversification, investment, technological upgradation and the search for alternative routes. In addition, she affirms that India views the Central Asian Countries as potential sources for procurement of energy resources and associated activities.

³²⁴ Ajay Mathur, Koshy Cherail, and Deepti Mahajan. "Incentivizing change in energy choices." *India's Energy Security*, edited by Ligia Noronha and Anant Sudarshan, Routledge, 2009, pp. 179-190.


³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Dhaka, Ambrish. "South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics." Mangal Deep Publications, 2005.

Kazakhstan: Energy Reserves Overview

The earlier section discussed the imperatives attaching to India's energy security. It also dwelt on the importance accorded to Kazakhstan for securing India's energy future. This Section now considers two pertinent factors, such as Kazakhstan's energy reserves (see figure 35), and the willingness of Kazakhstan to supply energy resources to India. The following paragraphs shed light of energy reserves available in Kazakhstan to India's search for energy security. This section also attempts to analyse Kazakhstan's willingness to provide energy resources to India. It also presents the argument that Kazakhstan not only veins India as a trading partner for energy resources but also as a means where by it can balance its interests with other powers in the region.

Figure 35: 2017: Kazakhstan's Proven Reserves of Energy Resources (value in billions of tonnes oil equivalent)³²⁷



Kazakhstan is the largest of the Central Asian Republics. It is marketed rich in energy reserves that include oil, natural gas, and coal, as also Uranium reserves for nuclear fuel.³²⁸


The country meets its domestic consumption needs through a mix of Coal, gas and oil reserves. Coal features prominently in the provision of energy for domestic requirements,

³²⁷ Source: Mirlan, Aldayarov. et at. "Stuck in transition: reform experiences and challenges ahead in the Kazakhstan power sector (English)." *Directions in Development- Energy and Mining*, World Bank Group. 2017. www.documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/104181488537871278/pdf/113146-PUB-PUBLIC-PUBDATE-2-27-17.pdf. Accessed 2 Oct. 2021.

³²⁸ Stobdan, Phunchok. "India and Kazakhstan should Share Complementary Objectives." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 33 no. 1, 2008, pp.1-7.

while oil and gas resources are largely directed towards exports. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration Kazakhstan possesses oil reserves estimated at 30 billion barrels. These reserves are located Onshore in the Western part of the country and offshore in the Caspian Sea. The Kashagan Oil field in the Caspian Sea region is considered to be the largest in the world, with estimated reserves at 9 billion barrels. According to the British Petroleum (BP) Statistical reviews of world energy, published in 2019, Kazakhstan produced over 91.2 million tonnes of oil in 2018. The growth rate of production was 2.6% between 2007 and 2017, while the rate of growth was 4.9% in 2018. In 2017, Kazakhstan exported about 1.3 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensate.³²⁹ It is expected that, by 2040, Kazakhstan will produce 4 million barrels per day (MBD). The exports are also expected to increase proportionately (see figure 36). In the world energy scenario, Kazakhstan records a very high production of primary energy (see figure 37). It may be noted that Kazakhstan's domestic consumption of petroleum is very low compared with the quantum produced. Accordingly, the country's exports of petroleum to foreign countries are expected to increase. (See figure 38). A number of Indian Companies have presently evinced interest in the exploration of Kazakh Oil fields.

Figure 36: 2010:2040: History and Projection of Kazakhstan's Production of Petroleum and other Liquids³³⁰



³²⁹ "Country Analysis Executive Summary: Kazakhstan." US Energy Information Administration, 2019, www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Kazakhstan/pdf/kazakhstan_exe.pdf. Accessed 3 June 2021.

³³⁰ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Figure 37: 2010:2016: Kazakhstan’s Production of Primary Energy (value in quadrillion british thermal units:QNTU)³³¹





Figure 38: 2008:2019: Kazakhstan’s Production and Consumption of Petroleum and other Liquid Energy Resources³³²



³³¹ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

³³² Source: “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Kazakhstan.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019.

The dry gas reserves in Kazakhstan are estimated to be 85 trillion TCF. Presently, its production is 1.4 TCF, with the major part of it being pumped back into the oil fields in order to enhance oil production.³³³ Since the gas fields in the West are not connected to the domestic hubs of consumption in the Centre and east of the country, Kazakhstan is compelled to import gas for domestic consumption. However, present projections indicate that suitable pipeline infrastructure will be in place in the near future. As such, Kazakhstan has the potential to be a principal exporter of natural gas in the foreseeable future. India thus remains interested in the projected developments.

Another important natural energy resource in Kazakhstan is Uranium. Kazakhstan possesses 12% of the world's proven uranium reserves and it produced about 22,800 tU in 2019.³³⁴ In 2009, it was ranked as the world's top Uranium producer, accounting for almost 28% of global production.³³⁵ In 2018, Kazakhstan produced 41% of the world's Uranium.³³⁶ The government in Kazakhstan proposes to raise the level of Uranium exports even higher. They have also set in motion the initial activities, including a feasibility study, for installation of a reactor at Kurchatov.³³⁷ For over 50 years, Kazakhstan has remained a significant source of uranium. Between 2001 and 2013 its Uranium output rose from 2022 tonnes per year to about 22,550 tonnes per year. Accordingly, it became the world's leading Uranium producer. In 2011, even with a capacity of around 25,000 tU/yr., Kazatomprom decided to limit its production to 20,000 tU/tr. However, as evident the limit was exceeded.³³⁸ Kazatomprom owns 5 of the 17 Uranium mining projects, while the remaining 12 are joint ventures with foreign equity holders. Some of these projects are producing well below their capacity (Stobdan, 2008, PP. 3:4). In 2017, the production amounted to 23,321 tU.³³⁹ The quantum was reduced to 21,705 tU in 2018. However, in 2019, the production was increased by about 5% to 22,808 tU. Kazakhstan is an important member of the Nuclear Suppliers group (NSG), and is key to India's efforts to diversify its Uranium sources. As indicated earlier India is actively engaged with Kazakhstan for the procurement of this vital energy resource.³⁴⁰

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ "Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan." World Nuclear Association, 2020. www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/kazakhstan.aspx. Accessed 14 June 2021.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.


³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Stobdan, Phunchok. 2008. Op. cit. p. 2

It is estimated that Kazakhstan will increase its supply of liquid energy resources from 1.8 mb/d in 2018 to 2.1 mb/d in 2024 (See Figure 39). While phase one of the massive Kashagan oil field is producing to its full capacity of around 370 tb/d, its operator has indicated the possibility of raising production by 100 tb/d through the technique of debottlenecking. In the medium term, Kazakhstan expects the production of liquid energy resources to increase owing to outputs from the Tengiz Future Growth Project. From 2022, these additional outputs are expected to add 260 tb/d to the existing fields capacity of 600 plus tb/d. Further increases in the country’s total oil production is projected to materialize beyond the medium-term horizon when the three biggest field complexes, Kashagan, Tengiz and Karachaganak, begin to supply this energy resources.

Figure 39: Kazakhstan’s Total Projected Supply of Liquid Energy Resources (value in mb/d)³⁴¹



The Significance of Kazakhstan for India in Terms of Energy Resources

The British geographers Halford Mackinder has stated in his article titled “The Geographical Pivot of History” that Central Asia with its vast natural resources is poised to be the great pivot of the manufacturing and modern age. He further argues that the state power that will use these massive natural resources as a geostrategic instrument will potentially assume the

³⁴¹ Source: The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

status of an empire in the contemporary world. Since the beginning of the present new century, owing to rapid economic growth, accelerated industrialization and increasing population, there is intensified competition among great powers for control over the vast energy resources of Central Asia and other potential sources. The geo:political ramifications of these energy sources have led states to diversify and secure their energy resources. In this context the massive energy resources of Kazakhstan present opportunities that the world can hardly ignore.

Over a long period of time, Central Asia's resources of oil and natural gas have been produced and transported under the aegis of the Soviet administration. However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these vast energy resources have drawn much global interest. Among the five newly formed republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan is found to possess vast reserves of oil and natural gas that can potentially be substituted for the reserves in the Middle East. Accordingly, Kazakhstan has assumed the status of the most important country in Central Asia in terms of energy resources. This is borne out by the British Petroleum Company (BP) Statistical Review of world Energy, 2019, that ranks Kazakhstan as the country with the largest proven oil reserves in Central Asia.³⁴² According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Kazakhstan's proven crude oil reserves of 30 billion barrels as of 2018 render in the second largest endowment in Eurasia after Russia. It has also the twelve largest endowments in the world, just behind the United States.³⁴³ As expected, Kazakhstan became a vibrant Centre for energy competition among large powers.

Central Asia as a region had the potential to provide alternative resources in a world dominated by supplies from the middle East. In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries were observed to be following multi:polar foreign policies. In Kazakhstan, India recognizes the opportunity to diversify its sources of oil and natural gas. In turn, India provides Kazakhstan with a significant leverage to achieves. As a consequence of being the most important country in the region by way of oil and natural gas reserves, Kazakhstan's foreign policies are more complicated relative to other countries in Central Asia. Given its position as an important supplier of oil, Kazakhstan acknowledges that energy is a basic component of its foreign policy.

³⁴² "BP Energy Outlook 2019." The British Petroleum Company. www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2019.pdf, Accessed 24 June 2021; also see, Sharma, Raghav. India in Central Asia: The Road Ahead. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Special Report*, no. 62, 2009, pp.1-15. www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/579834852SR63-Ragav-CentralAsia1.pdf. Accessed 24 June 2021.

³⁴³ "Country Analysis Executive Summary: Kazakhstan." Op. cit.

However, from the start of the 21st Century, Kazakhstan has found its options begin to diversify. In this context, India has emerged as a rapidly developing economy requiring increased energy inputs to sustain its growth momentum. Following India's return to Central Asia, this time to access oil and natural gas for its burgeoning economy, Kazakhstan's importance in Central Asia found new emphasis. India provides Kazakhstan with the opportunity of additional hydrocarbon exports without miscellaneous tariffs and taxes on transit through third countries. Even as Kazakhstan continues to expand its relations with the US, it is also evincing keen interest in developing relations with India. In this context, India's membership of the SCO provides Kazakhstan with the opportunity to conduct a multi:vector foreign policy. In effect, Kazakhstan seeks to optimize its national objectives through balancing four major actors in Central Asia, namely, US, Russia, China and India.

India has witnessed the phenomenon of rapidly growing consumption in the face of a relatively flat production capacity resulting from a growing dependence on oil imports to meet the domestic demand.³⁴⁴ India's crude oil imports grew by almost 8% from 2020, which makes the country the world's third largest net importer of oil.³⁴⁵ The major portion of India's oil requirements are sourced from countries in the middle East.³⁴⁶ India's need for natural gas is continually on the rise. While the domestic production of natural gas has increased, India because a net importer of natural gas since 2004 when the demand over took the supply.³⁴⁷ According to Diet (2017), India's import of natural gas is projected to keep increasing. India has formulated different import schemes, including for both Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and pipe line projects in anticipation of the gradually increasing demand.³⁴⁸

Since 90% of India's Energy imports are sourced from offshore fields or from across the sea, any threatened disruption to the sea routes is a constraint to ensuring the country's energy security.³⁴⁹ India's imported energy resources are transported by way of sea:laws mostly from the Middle East. The security of the Indian Ocean is therefore critical to India's interests. In this context, India is interested in Central Asia to secure alternative sources of oil

³⁴⁴ Country Analysis Brief: India. Op. cit.

³⁴⁵ "Country Analysis executive Summary: India." U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2022, www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/India/india.pdf. Accessed 23 Dec. 2022

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Singh, Sanjoy. et al. "Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy." Indian Navy, Naval Strategic Publication (NSP) 1.2, October, 2015, pp. 1-103. www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf. Accessed 21 Oct. 2021.

and natural gas. The US naval domination of the Indian Ocean has come under the potential threat of an expansionist China.³⁵⁰ In the circumstances, both India and US view the North South overland corridor as a relatively more secure route for transporting oil from the Central Asian region to India. If Afghanistan succeeds in achieving stability in the future, the installation of pipelines conveying oil and natural gas will open a transportation route that is free from Chinese interference.

In the prevailing geo:politics of South Asia, the sea routes used by India to import energy resources could potentially be disrupted by China or Pakistan. Also, owing to US sanctions importing oil from Iran may not be feasible. Moreover, while China has pipeline projects to directly link with Kazakhstan's oil and Turkmenistan's gas, it is not possible for India to install pipelines to directly connect with Central Asia. Nevertheless, India can benefit from its strong ties with the Central Asian states to explore diverse energy routes.

India's former External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, had envisaged the development of cooperative energy security networks in Central Asia as an important objective of India's foreign policy. In 2009 at the International Conference on Cooperative Development, Peace and Security in South and Central Asia, in Kolkata, India, Mr. Mukherjee pointed out, in the area of hydrocarbons; there is a meshing of interests between the consuming countries of South Asia, principally India, and the supplying countries of Central Asia such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.³⁵¹

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Kazakhstan in 1992, the energy cooperation between the two countries has increased. Further, since the start of the 21st Century, the energy companies of India, including Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), have succeeded in enhancing their presence in Kazakhstan's energy sector. ONGC:Videsh Ltd. owns a 25% stake in the Alibekmol project and 10% in the Kurmangazi Project.³⁵² The Alibekmol field is situated in Western Kazakhstan, South of Aktobe City. The

³⁵⁰ Scott, David. "India's drive for a 'blue water' Navy." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, Winter, 2008. pp. 1-42. www.jmss.org/article/view/57675. Accessed 3 Oct. 2021.

³⁵¹ "EAM's address at the International Conference on Cooperative Development, Peace and Security in South and Central Asia." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 1 March, 2009. www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/999/EAMs+address+at+the+International+Conference+on+Cooperative+Development+Peace+and+Security+in+South+and+Central+Asia. Accessed 23 Apr. 2021.

³⁵² Kaushiki, Nishtha. "The New Great Game and India's Connect Central Asia Policy: Strategic Perspectives and Challenges." *Journal of International and Area Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2013, pp. 83-100.

Kurmangazi field is the least developed of Kazakhstan's Oil field projects.³⁵³ The Indian State has proactively extended support to the State-owned oil and gas companies to seek investment opportunities and acquire assets in the Tengiz and Kashagan oil fields as well as the Kurmangazi and Darkhan exploration blocks in Kazakhstan.³⁵⁴ In addition to cooperating in commercial energy, the two countries established a Joint working Group in order to formulate a comprehensive plan for including India in Kazakhstan's different oil and gas projects.³⁵⁵ However, in 2005, there was a setback for India when China's CNPC outbid India's ONGC to purchase PetroKazakhstan, one of Kazakhstan's biggest oil companies.³⁵⁶

India's effort to participate in Kazakhstan's energy Sector is important for both countries. The bilateral agreements and India's initiatives to enhance its presence in Kazakhstan's energy sector serve India's objective to diversify its energy sources, and also serve Kazakhstan's multifactor foreign policy objectives. As Kazakhstan continues to diversify its international energy exports, Russia is no longer the only destination for its oil exports. In Kazakhstan's energy sector, other than Russia, China is India's principal competitor. In recent years, China has succeeded in enhancing its presence in Kazakhstan's energy sector. In the event, India began to explore the potential for building an oil pipe line through Afghanistan.³⁵⁷ Such a pipeline will enable India to import more oil from Kazakhstan in the future. It will also inevitably intensify the competition among India, China and Russia over Kazakhstan's oil as well as oil from the other parts of the Central Asian region.

India's need for energy has continued to grow at a rapid rate. In consequence, Kazakhstan as an energy source featured prominently in India's new energy perspective. The country's energy policy for Kazakhstan was faced with a new dimension in the form of China's aggressive search for energy. India's quest for alternative energy sources in Kazakhstan was accelerated by China's efforts to encircle India in the Indian Ocean. Kazakhstan's oil, gas and uranium have the potential to furnish India with significant leverages in its energy security strategies.

³⁵³ Country Analysis Executive Summary: Kazakhstan. Op. cit.

³⁵⁴ Weitz, Richard. "Kazakhstan and the new international politics of Eurasia." Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Silk Road Paper and Monographs, 2008, www.silkroadstudies.org/publications/silkroad-papers-and-monographs/item/13084-kazakhstan-and-the-new-international-politics-of-eurasia.html. Accessed 23 Apr. 2021.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ostrowski, Wojciech. "Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan." Routledge. 2010.

³⁵⁶ "Country Reports: Uzbekistan." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2012. www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044485. Accessed 23 Apr. 2021.

³⁵⁷ Lelyveld, Michael. "Kazakhstan: Talk of Oil Pipeline Through Afghanistan Seen as Premature." *Radio Free Liberty*, 2002. www.rferl.org/content/article/1098817.html. Accessed 21 Nov. 2021.

India:Kazakhstan: Engagement and Cooperation for Energy

India's quest for multiple sources of energy was intensified and accelerated in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008:09. There are a number of reasons for the debates and discourses that have taken place on the subject of India's strategy to diversify its energy sources and seek alternative energy resources. Firstly, India's domestic reserves of oil and gas are far short of the quantities required and consumed. According to most scholars, India's domestic natural gas reserves will have been depleted by 2040.³⁵⁸ Their rationale for such a projection was that India, given its rapid economic growth and entry into World Trade Organization (WTO), will increasingly import machinery and cars that run on oil. Secondly, in the context of its low domestic reserves of oil and natural gas, India is compelled to explore abroad for energy resources and ensure energy security. Currently, India's Oil imports are majorly from the Middle East (International Energy Agency, 2022). However, the volatile geopolitics plaguing the Middle East from time to time have motivated India to tap other suppliers of oil and natural gas. Russia and Central Asia are the two principal markets that may potentially enable India to diversify its energy imports. For the purpose of attaining energy security, it stands to reason that India will look to arranging additional sources for its energy supplies. If oil supplies from any source dries up for whatever reason, India would continue to import oil from other sources in order to meet the needs of its economy and the military. Thirdly, India is globally acknowledged to be a growing economic and military power. It is already a nuclear power and is engaged in rapidly modernizing and upgrading its military prowess. These efforts would be seriously hampered without the attainment of energy security. Fluctuations in the flow of imported energy will adversely impact India's ambitious growth strategy.

India's search for foreign oil sources is driven by its lack of domestic energy resources. India's energy security policy is based on the diversification of oil sources. In that context, since 1990, for diversifying its oil sources, India has proactively built trade relationships with key countries around the world. These efforts have since enabled India to enhance its oil imports. According to US Energy Information Administration, 2012, India's oil imports have risen markedly from 1990. India's foreign policies have been reoriented in order to encourage a global search for oil resources and the fostering of ties with different countries

³⁵⁸ Singh, Utkarsha. "Examining the impact of natural gas use on Indian economy and environment." *Indian Institute of Technology Bombay*. www.iitb.ac.in/en/research-highlight/examining-impact-natural-gas-use-indian-economy-and-environment#:~:text=It%20shows%20that%20the%20natural,has%20been%20declining%20since%202011. Accessed 22 Nov. 2022.

for securing oil supplies from them. In the process of this campaign, India has identified oil rich Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan as a potential source of different energy products such as oil, natural gas and specially uranium resources.

This chapter has thus far sketched the big picture of India's energy security imperatives and the potential importance of Kazakhstan's energy reserves. It will now attempt to depict the specifics of India's energy related connections with Kazakhstan, and justify the hypothesis that Kazakhstan will enable India to majorly diversify its energy imports and secure its energy future. In the Aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rapidly evolving scenario in the newly independent Central Asian republics, India has sought to establish and enhance energy cooperation with the republic of Kazakhstan. India recognizes energy-rich Central Asia, led by Kazakhstan, as one of the world's most dynamically developing regions. In the wake of the economic liberalization that took place in the early nineties, India's foreign policy became particularly assertive after 1998 and this activation led to the identification of Kazakhstan as a potential source for oil exploration and energy cooperation.

India's ties with Kazakhstan received a significant boost when India signed the nuclear agreement with the US in 2005 and was given access to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India immediately commenced negotiations with Kazakhstan for the supply of uranium. These talks led to the signing of a series of agreements between India and Kazakhstan in 2009 during the historic visit to India of President Nazarbayev, who was honored as the Chief Guest at the January 26 Republic Day celebrations. In 2015, India's ONGC:Videsh Ltd. (OVL) achieved its first success that was symbolized by PM Modi launching Oil exploration and drilling operations in the Satpayev block.³⁵⁹ Earlier negotiations resulted in ONGC purchasing a 25% stake in the Satpayev block on the Caspian Sea with an estimated total reserve of 1.75 billion barrels.³⁶⁰ The deal worth US \$ 400 million was finalized in 2011 during PM Sing's visit to Astana. In 2013, however, ONGC Videsh failed in its efforts to buy the 8.4% stake of Conoco Philips in the massive Kashagan oil field. The offer of ONGC Videsh worth US \$ 5 billion was rejected by the government of Kazakhstan which then proceeded to acquire the stake and resell it to China's CNPCI.³⁶¹ In this context, a former Indian diplomat observed that India still needed to learn how to negotiate with Kazakhstan's influencers and policy makers. Despite the setback, in 2014, Kazakhstan extended

³⁵⁹ Stobdan, Phunchok. 2016, Op. cit. p. 18.

³⁶⁰ Stobdan, Phunchok. "India and Central Asia: The Strategic Dimension." KW Publishers Pvt Ltd. and Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. 2020, pp. 262-263.

³⁶¹ Ibid. p. 264.

compensatory offers to ONGC in the North Caspian region, and restored positive relations with India. It is to be noted that India is not importing its share of the production of the Satpayev field, and is opting to sell the same in the open market and utilize the proceeds for purchasing crude from its regular suppliers. However, ONGC has gained valuable technological knowhow and operating experience in the distinct environment attaching to drilling operations in the Caspian.

In 2009, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and Kazatomprom signed a memorandum of understanding during President Nazarbayev's visit for cooperation, including for the supply of uranium to India.³⁶² In 2011, during PM Manmohan Singh's visit an additional civil nuclear agreement was signed. By 2014, consequent upon the agreements of 2,100 tonnes of uranium from Kazakhstan.³⁶³ The civil nuclear agreement remains operational on India is in talks for building reactors in Kazakhstan. In the context of India's uranium requirements for nuclear fuel having since risen manifold, analyst Katherine Foshko projects Kazakhstan as a major supplier for fulfilling India's annual need of on estimated 8,000 tonnes.³⁶⁴ Kazakhstan's foreign policy is aimed at diversifying international partners and this principle applies to its energy exports. Such a policy justifies India's enhanced engagements with the country.

Role of Kazakhstan in India's Nuclear Energy Security

In the backdrop of India's large and increasing demand for energy, a concerted effort needs to be made for exploration and exploitation of the gamut of conventional renewable and non:conventional sources addition to the application of the highest energy efficiency standards. In pursuance of India's long:term strategy for energy security, the aim will be to achieve self:sufficiency. With that aim in view resource diversification will be the critical factor. In other words, it will be essential to enhance the proportion of renewable, hydroelectricity and nuclear energy in the overall energy mix. The policy for boosting the share of nuclear energy in the nation's energy mix is justified by the need to decrease the dependence on global fossil fuel resources in consideration of planetary environmental issues. The respective targets for the domestic production of coal, hydroelectricity and renewable energy are yet to be achieved. Further, in order to exploit the full potential of domestic uranium resources, India needs to develop and deploy proto:Type Fast Breeder Reactors

³⁶² Ibid. pp.266-268.

³⁶³ Ibid.


³⁶⁴ Foshko, Katherine. "India-Kazakhstan: Beyond Energy". *Gateway House*, 14 April, 2011. www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-looking-beyond-energy/. Accessed 23 Nov. 2021.

(PFBRs) and connected fuel cycle facilities.³⁶⁵ At a Technology Day award function related to India’s nuclear power development in 2004 Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam said as follows:

*“Let us celebrate the success of our nuclear power development scientists and engineers and their partners in the industry for making the dream of fast breeder reactor a reality for the nation, which will lead the country towards total energy security within the next two decades. Let us empower the nation with quality power.”*³⁶⁶

On this occasion, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam elaborated on the principal factors concerning India’s energy security and the potential challenges (Dhaka, 2009 P. 289). In order to produce more nuclear energy than is allowed by domestic uranium resources, India needs to access global sources of uranium. In the Indian and global context, it is necessary to optimally exploit the natural resource base for developing nuclear power and meeting the growing demand for nuclear energies (See figure 40). The process of producing nuclear power increased technological and human capital. With the application of the highest safety standards, there will be no negative impact on human health and ecosystems.

Figure 40: 2018:2040: India’s Demand Growth for Nuclear Energy (value in mboe/d)³⁶⁷




³⁶⁵ Raj, B. (2004). Fast Breeder Programme: An Inevitable Option for Energy Security. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, Retrieved from <http://www.dae.gov.in/node/208>.

³⁶⁶ Kalam, A. (2004). Technology for Societal Transformation. Address at The Technology Day Award Function, Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, Retrieved from <http://www.abdulkalam.nic.in/sp300604.html>.

³⁶⁷ Source: The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

In a study conducted by India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) on domestic energy growth over a period of 50 years it was concluded that the cumulative uranium imports in that period would approximate to 30% of the total energy imports and the nuclear share of electricity generated would rise from the existing 3% to about 25% of the total. India could emulate the success of Japan and France in harnessing nuclear energy so as to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons. The usage of uranium to generate electricity would enable fossil fuels to be limited to activities that are not conducive to the application of nuclear fuels, such as transportation. It is envisaged that the supply of fossil fuels will not keep pace with the increase in energy consumption. Accordingly, there is an urgency in the plans to develop alternative energy sources. In the field of nuclear energy, Figure 41 shows the consumption history and projected demand up to 2040. In a graph displaying Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), India’s nuclear energy consumption is projected to grow continuously. This presupposes an uninterrupted supply of uranium in the future. With 45% of the world’s uranium deposits Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer in 2021 (see table 6).³⁶⁸ For India, Kazakhstan has been an important source of uranium and a major supplier of the nuclear fuel since 2009. India’s domestic uranium reserves are relatively small and the country depends on uranium imports to fuel its nuclear power industry. In this context Kazakhstan has assured India of uninterrupted supply of uranium that would significantly contribute to India’s nuclear energy security in the long term.

Figure 41: 2011:2040: India’s Nuclear Energy Consumption. History and Projections (billion kilowatt:hours)³⁶⁹



³⁶⁸ “World Uranium Mining.” World Nuclear Association. November. 2022, www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx. Accessed 12 Dec. 2022.

³⁶⁹ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2016, p. 171.

Table 6: 2009:2018: Top Ten Uranium Producing Countries in the World (production from mines, value in tonnes U)³⁷⁰

| Country | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Kazakhstan | 21,317 | 22,451 | 23,127 | 23,607 | 24,689 | 23,321 | 21,705 | 22,808 | 19,477 | 21,819 |
| Australia | 6991 | 6350 | 5001 | 5654 | 6315 | 5882 | 6517 | 6613 | 6203 | 4192 |
| Namibia | 4495 | 4323 | 3255 | 2993 | 3654 | 4224 | 5525 | 5476 | 5413 | 5753 |
| Canada | 8999 | 9331 | 9134 | 13,325 | 14,039 | 13,116 | 7001 | 6938 | 3885 | 4693 |
| Uzbekistan (est.) | 2400 | 2400 | 2400 | 2385 | 3325 | 3400 | 3450 | 3500 | 3500 | 3500 |
| Niger | 4667 | 4518 | 4057 | 4116 | 3479 | 3449 | 2911 | 2983 | 2991 | 2248 |
| Russia | 2872 | 3135 | 2990 | 3055 | 3004 | 2917 | 2904 | 2911 | 2846 | 2635 |
| China (est.) | 1500 | 1500 | 1500 | 1616 | 1616 | 1692 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 |
| Ukraine | 960 | 922 | 926 | 1200 | 808 | 707 | 790 | 800 | 744 | 455 |
| India (est.) | 385 | 385 | 385 | 385 | 385 | 421 | 423 | 308 | 400 | 615 |
| South Africa (est.) | 465 | 531 | 573 | 393 | 490 | 308 | 346 | 346 | 250 | 385 |
| Iran (est.) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 40 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 |
| Pakistan (est.) | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| Brazil | 326 | 192 | 55 | 40 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 29 |
| USA | 1596 | 1792 | 1919 | 1256 | 1125 | 940 | 582 | 58 | 6 | 8 |
| Czech Republic | 228 | 215 | 193 | 155 | 138 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Romania | 90 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| France | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Germany | 50 | 27 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malawi | 1101 | 1132 | 369 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total world | 58,493 | 59,331 | 56,041 | 60,304 | 63,207 | 60,514 | 54,154 | 54,742 | 47,731 | 48,332 |
| tonnes U ₃ O ₈ | 68,974 | 69,966 | 66,087 | 71,113 | 74,357 | 71,361 | 63,861 | 64,554 | 56,287 | 56,995 |
| % of world demand | 94% | 91% | 85% | 98% | 96% | 93% | 80% | 81% | 74% | 77% |

Between 2006 and 2008, owing to dwindling domestic uranium reserves, India's electricity generation from nuclear power declined by 12.83%. In 2008, upon a waiver permitted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), India has entered into bilateral arrangements for civilian nuclear energy technology cooperation with several countries such as France, United States, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Namibia, and Russia. India is in this manner making up for the 33 year period of nuclear isolation. In addition to this group of seven countries having civil nuclear deals with India, Canada has recently entered into agreements for supply of uranium to India. A memorandum of understanding between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and Kazatomprom, a Kazakh national Company, there is a provision for Kazakhstan to supply Uranium to India. The two countries entered into a further agreement in 2011, covering such areas as research and development (R & D), Science and technology, and other factors related to nuclear energy.³⁷¹

³⁷⁰ Source: World Nuclear Association.

³⁷¹ Raja, Rameez. "India's Quest for Power and Status: A Study of India's Nuclear Policy." IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 21, no. 9, 2016, pp. 1-9. www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2021%20Issue9/Version-13/A2109130110.pdf. Accessed 21 Jan. 2022.

In 2011, during PM Manmohan Singh's visit to Kazakhstan, an agreement on cooperation in the field of peaceful usage of atomic energy was signed.³⁷² In 2015, during PM Narendra Modi's visit to Astana a new five-year purchase Agreement was signed for purchase of 5,000 tonnes of Uranium.³⁷³ As per the contracted schedule the supplies have been regularly forthcoming. In 2008, Kazakhstan extended support to India in the obtention of India-specific exemption allowing civil nuclear cooperation with member countries of the nuclear supplies group. Further, Kazakhstan supported India's membership of the NSG at the plenary session in Seoul in 2016.³⁷⁴ India's nuclear cooperation with Kazakhstan has been renewed for the supply of uranium from 2019 to 2024. By 2020, Kazakhstan had already supplied a total of 9,000 tonnes of uranium. The details of the renewed and currently operative agreement are worked out jointly by Kazakhstan's minister of energy and India's minister of petroleum. Currently 80% of India's requirement of uranium is met by Kazakhstan.³⁷⁵ Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia together account for over two-thirds of the world's production of uranium from their mines. In 2021, Kazakhstan produced the largest share, 45%, of the world supply of Uranium from mines, followed by Namibia 12%, Canada 10%.³⁷⁶ In the five-year period between 2019 and 2024, Kazakhstan, the largest global producer of uranium (see table 6) proposes to enhance the quantum of supplies to India to 7,500:10,000 tonnes.³⁷⁷

With regard to India's position in the field of nuclear fuel, its known uranium reserves are estimated to be around 78,000 tonnes, that is, around 0.8 percent of the world's reserves. Such a limited reserves can only enable the production of 10,000 MW of electricity. At present, India's installed capacity to generate power is 140,000 MW. Of this total, nuclear energy accounts for only 4120 MW. Regrettably the country's 17 reactors operate at 46 percent capacity, which is less than half of their total potential, owing to a shortage of uranium. Given clearance of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), India will be able to run its reactors to full capacity by obtaining nuclear fuel from various countries under agreements for proper safeguards. India's first uranium imports are expected from France and Canada.

³⁷² "India-Kazakhstan Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2018. www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/december_2018.pdf. Accessed 21 Jan. 2022.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ "India and Kazakhstan to renew uranium supply contract for 2020-24." 2019, November 18. *Business Standard*, p. 6.

³⁷⁶ "World Uranium Mining Production." World Nuclear Association. 2022, www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx. Accessed 4 Oct. 2022

³⁷⁷ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Op. cit.

According to India's Department of Atomic Energy, since 2009 India had imported 4458 tonnes of natural uranium from Kazakhstan (See table 7 and 8).

Table 7: Uranium Imported by India from Kazakhstan from 2014.³⁷⁸

| Year | Source | Form | Tonnes |
|---------|-------------|-------------------------|--------|
| 2014-15 | TVEL | UO ₂ pellets | 297 |
| | Kazatomprom | UOC | 283 |
| 2015-16 | Cameco | UOC | 251 |
| | TVEL | UO ₂ pellets | 346 |
| 2016-17 | Kazatomprom | UOC | 1924 |
| | Cameco | UOC | 1234 |
| | TVEL | UO ₂ pellets | 187 |

Table 8: 2011:2014: Country Wise Quantity of Uranium Imported by India.³⁷⁹

| Year | Firm/Country | Material | Quantity (in MT) |
|---------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| 2011-12 | M/s. JSC TVEL Corporation, Russia | Natural Uranium Di-oxide Pellets | 296.08 |
| | M/s. NAC KazatomProm, Kazakhstan | Natural Uranium Ore Concentrate | 350.00 |
| 2012-13 | M/s. JSC TVEL Corporation, Russia | Natural Uranium Di-oxide Pellets | 295.64 |
| | M/s. NAC KazatomProm, Kazakhstan | Natural Uranium Ore Concentrate | 402.50 |
| 2013-14 | M/s. JSC TVEL Corporation, Russia | Natural Uranium Di-oxide Pellets | 296.31 |
| | M/s. NAC KazatomProm, Kazakhstan | Natural Uranium Ore Concentrate | 460.00 |

³⁷⁸ Source: World Nuclear Association.

³⁷⁹ Source: Nayan, Rajiv. "Governing Uranium in India." Danish Institute for International Studies, Report, 2015 pp. 1-66. www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diisreport2015-02_pdf.pdf. Accessed 4 Oct. 2022.

India and Kazakhstan have entered into a new deal on nuclear fuel that has opened up fresh avenues of cooperation for both countries. There is a convenient match between India's quest for energy security based on clean energy sources and Kazakhstan's quest for a strategic market. India's ambitious plans to meet its power requirements in the period leading up to 2050 can only be accomplished through full-fledged engagement with Kazakhstan.³⁸⁰ In a statement published by Kazakhstan's Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry, Kazakhstan is currently the world's biggest uranium miner, ahead of Australia and Canada.

Being aware that its strategic rivals are striking deals with Kazakhstan, India is keenly striving to take advantage of its position as Kazakhstan's extended neighbor. Having observed and identified all geo-strategic interests, including great power rivalry, India has entered into significant agreements in order to secure its interests in Kazakhstan. In this backdrop, under a specific accord, Kazakhstan has agreed to export a minimum of 120 tonnes of uranium annually to Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). The agreement includes joint exploration of uranium in Kazakhstan and also the construction of nuclear power plants in the near future. The agreement supports the desire of Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan's leading nuclear company to engage in comprehensive nuclear activities with India. In turn, India proposes to leverage its agreement with Kazatomprom not only for sourcing uranium but also for making use of Kazatomprom's 10% stake in India's Westinghouse Electric Corporation to update the nuclear power generation technology.³⁸¹

The Indo-Kazakh nuclear agreement provides for certain terms and conditions for Kazakhstan's supply of uranium to India. However, both the countries have agreed to enter into a comprehensive agreement at an appropriate stage for overall cooperation in the civil nuclear energy field. The pact will be designed to facilitate the smooth and efficient operation of India's atomic plants. Kazakhstan has evinced particular interest in purchasing atomic reactors from India in the near future. Further, Kazakhstan has invited India to participate in mining uranium in its territory and also offered to provide the relevant expertise for the purpose. In addition to the supply of uranium, the proposed comprehensive agreement will cover joint exploration of nuclear fuel and construction of new atomic plants.

³⁸⁰ Srivastava, Deepti. "Nuclear Fuel and Emerging Dynamics of Indo-Kazakh Relations." *Mainstream*, vol. 48, no. 33, 2010, www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2219.html. Accessed 10 Oct. 2022.

³⁸¹ Stobdan, Phunchok. 1016, Op. cit. pp. 1-7.

Chapter Conclusion

The concept of energy security is high on the policy agenda of all nations and has come to acquire critical importance. In this context, countries or regions that are rich in energy reserves have become important locations with regard to global politics. Accordingly, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has assumed great significance owing to the region's rich untapped oil and gas reserves. In a short period, energy-rich Kazakhstan has become witness to the competing energy interests of major players such as Russia, US, China and India. Kazakhstan provides an alternative to the energy sources of the Middle East. India sees significant opportunities in Kazakhstan for sourcing oil and gas in order to achieve its national energy security objectives.

Kazakhstan sees India as a fast-emerging Asian power. India's economy began to boom from the early 1990s. The country's fast pace of economic development has brought about a great surge in the demand for energy. Accordingly, India's foreign policy accords high priority to Central Asian energy.³⁸² India has been traditionally dependent on imports of oil and natural gas from the Middle East. In the last two decades, the need to diversify energy sources beyond the Middle East has assumed growing importance. Accordingly, in pursuance of its objective to diversify energy routes India became interested in energy-rich Kazakhstan. However, in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, India sees China as a significant rival. China's existing and proposed pipelines and the ongoing acquisition of energy assets pose a significant challenge for India's energy security strategies. Importantly, India will give shape to its energy security strategies in Central Asia according to when and if Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will export its oil and gas by way of pipelines through the south.

In the backdrop of the geopolitical volatility in the Middle East and the accompanying uncertainties, India is compelled to consider its growing need for energy and arrange for energy security by means of a diversification of energy sources. In order to mitigate the risks associated with the existing uncertainties, India seeks to intensify its energy engagement with Kazakhstan.³⁸³ India's past and ongoing engagements with Central Asia clearly indicate that it has decided to actively pursue its energy cooperation with the Central Asian Republics, as

³⁸² Maytdinova, G. "The Indian Factor in the Geopolitical Realities of Central Asia." *Geopolitical Dynamism of India-Tajikistan Relations*, edited by Jyotsna Bakshi, Pentagon Press. 2013, pp. 36-45.

³⁸³ Dar, Firdous Ah, and Tabasum Firdous. "India's Response to New Great Game in Central Asia." *Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. 02, no. 01, 2014, pp. 41-42.

also initiate greater economic and trade partnerships in keeping with the country's global aspirations as an emerging power. On the one hand, India and the Central Asian Republics have the mutual desire to engage in security and strategic cooperation. On the other hand, there is the constraining reality of the adverse political environment enveloping the conduit countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In such unfavorable circumstances, an objective review of Central Asia's viability as an accessible source for ensuring India's energy security appears to suggest that energy cooperation is more aspirational in nature than practical. According to scholar Meena Singh Roy India has all along been aware of the extant barriers that inhibit India from directly accessing Central Asia via an overland route, in addition to the country's limited spending power, and the stiff competition from China and Russia for the energy resources of Central Asia. However, India's active overtures to Central Asia have not been limited to the singular objective of sourcing energy resources.³⁸⁴ Both China and Russia have the advantage of being contiguous to Central Asia and Sharing borders with the region. In the circumstances there needs to be an alternate understanding of India's involvement in Central Asia. The emphasis is rather on India's search for greater economic and trade engagements with the larger Eurasian region, subject to inter connectivity and access through Central Asia, that will emerge from energy cooperation.

An alternate understanding of India's objectives does not negate the significant actions India has already taken towards diversifying its energy sources, as detailed earlier in this chapter. The narrative of Kazakhstan as a significant source of energy resources, whether hydrocarbons or Uranium, is definitive. The country will remain an important source in the long term. However, in the short run it will be unrealistic to accord priority to Central Asia over the Middle East or Africa as an energy source. In this context, given Central Asia's relatively lower priority as an absolute source of energy in the short run, one must Endeavour to fathom India's continued and serious efforts towards engaging with the region on energy issues. A careful consideration leads to the explanation suggested above in respect of an alternate reading. India's intensive engagements with Kazakhstan is aimed at accessing their tangible resources that India covets. However, with regard to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, India desires to expand its engagements beyond the limited energy goods on offer. This is suggestive of an Indian grand strategy for Central Asia.

³⁸⁴ Roy, Meena Singh. "India-Kazakhstan: Emerging ties." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2002, pp. 48-64.

This chapter has examined the overall energy scenario and the intense competition among China, India and Russia for the energy resources of Central Asia, particularly of Kazakhstan. This Chapter has arrived at the inevitable conclusion that energy critically affects the global and regional geopolitics of the 21st Century. Currently, energy is the prime motivator of geopolitical corporation. In the context of India's long-term geo-strategic and geo-economic objectives, Kazakhstan is viewed as an important source of energy resources, such as oil, natural gas and uranium or what may be termed as fossil fuels and nuclear fuel. For the purpose of gaining access to Kazakhstan's vast energy reserves, India seeks to enhance its influence by different means and strategies. Given Kazakhstan's enormous proven reserves of oil and natural gas. India's engagements are likely to increase and accelerate in the near term. In the bigger picture, India's economic gambit on focused development of trade ties with Kazakhstan and proceeding from there towards Eurasia will depend heavily on building connectivity. The evolving security situation in the region is also an important variable for confederation at present and in the foreseeable future. These circumstances and the achievement of India's objectives are explored in the following chapter.

CHAPTER: FOUR

Securitization of the Region and India's Role in Kazakhstan

Introduction

When it comes to developing foreign policy, the security of a country is a top priority for world leaders. Undoubtedly, the new Central Asian Republics confront comparable difficulties, such as the presence of disruptive elements attempting to raise tensions in the region. The development of a security framework in Central Asia that includes outside actors like the United Nations is a direct effect of this. Over the course of the post-Cold War period, the Central Asian Republics have come to see powerful outside actors like China and the United States as a necessary check on their own regional ambitions. In contrast, India places a high priority on maintaining lines of communication with the Central Asian Republics. India wants to establish an enduring partnership with Central Asia in order to position itself favorably in this respect. The rationale behind that, it may assist India in containing both China to the east and the Islamic world to the south. India has also been successful in steadily increasing the strength of its military presence in the Central Asia.³⁸⁵

The Theoretical Framework of Securitization

The “Copenhagen School” was a closely affiliated group of academics that used to work out of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)³⁸⁶ in Denmark’s capital city.³⁸⁷ The two most renowned members of the school, Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, have created three analytical frameworks to better understand the idea of security. The idea of Security may be

³⁸⁵ Sahgal Arun and Anand Vinod. “Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India”. *Reconnecting India and Central Asia Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions*, edited by Nirmala Joshi, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2010, pp. 33-79. www.silkroadstudies.orgf. Accessed 21 May 2021.

³⁸⁶ Wilkinson, Claire. “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 38, no.1, 2007, pp. 5–25.

www.journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010607075964. Accessed 21 May 2021.

³⁸⁷ Collins, Alan. “Contemporary security studies.” Oxford University Press, 2016.

classified into three distinct categories: security sectors, the regional security complex theory, and the theory of securitization. Buzan is credited with developing the concept of the Sectors of Security, whereas Ole Waever is credited with developing the Regional Security Complex Theory.³⁸⁸ It is stated that the Regional Security Complex Theory is a part of the Copenhagen School's comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding security issues.³⁸⁹ It is generally acknowledged that the highly structured theory developed by Buzan and Waever: which tries to provide a ramified set of criteria, models, and categories of regional complex: is the most useful analytical tool for studying the dynamics of regional security.

Bill McSweeney was the first person to refer this group as the "Copenhagen School."³⁹⁰ McSweeney stated that Buzan's *People, States, and Fear* has become the standard and necessary resource for studies of security since its initial publication in 1983. Understanding the dynamics of international security is fundamental to the work of the Copenhagen School.³⁹¹ There was a consensus among experts in the years following the Cold War that traditional notions of what constitutes a secure nation needed to be expanded to incorporate concerns like climate change, poverty, and human rights. In light of these facts, the Copenhagen School established its theory of state security.

Researchers Barry Buzan and Ole Waever developed the concept of societal security as the most effective lens through which to examine the rise of alternative security agendas in the aftermath of the Cold War.³⁹² Changes of this magnitude are rarely seen in academic fields, and this one changed the face of security research forever.³⁹³ When compared to state security, which prioritizes territorial sovereignty, societal security looks at a society's capacity to preserve its own language, cultural practices, religious beliefs, and national norms. *Security: A New Basis of Analysis* by Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Waever, which explores a sectoral analysis of security in accordance with the expanding discourse, is

³⁸⁸ Inomjon, Bobokulov. "Central Asia as a Security Complex: Theory and Practice." *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2012, pp. 105-111.

³⁸⁹ Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. "Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security." Cambridge University Press, 2003.

³⁹⁰ McSweeney, Bill. "Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school." *Review of International Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1996, pp. 81-93. doi:10.1017/S0260210500118467.

³⁹¹ Wæver, Ole. "Politics, security, theory." *Security Dialogue*, vol. 42, no. 4-5, 2011, pp. 465-480. www.journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010611418718. Accessed 14 Oct. 2022.

³⁹² Buzan, Barry. "Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World." *Theories of New Regionalism. International Political Economy Series*, edited by Söderbaum, Fredrik, and Timothy M. Shaw. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

³⁹³ Smith, Steve. "The Contested Concept of Security." *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, edited by Ken Booth, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp. 27-62.

the most important work that sets out the theoretical foundation for this discussion.³⁹⁴ Therefore, four separate points of analysis: global, non-regional sub-systemic, regional, and local: are used to analyse the conventional five sectors of security, including the military, environment, society, economics, and politics.

Securitization is a process that has been institutionalized in many fields, including the military. This sector enjoys dominant position because states must employ force to maintain their distinctive, sovereign claim over a certain region and people. Military security is generally viewed as a two-tiered issue, with the first level being the actual offensive and defensive armament abilities of a state and the second level involving the perceptions of those abilities and intentions by other states. This is especially true when securitization is focused on border threats. Although the state is the securitizing player herein, several other players, including pressure organisations, military intelligentsia, and spy agencies, participate in the discourse on securitization in democracies. After the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a clear shift toward the supremacy of regional military security dynamics, which had previously been controlled by international level dynamics. In this perspective, In Central Asian regions where there are many weak or failed nations, the local levels take control and securitization creates microregions. Compared to the other four domains, the securitization of environmental sector and environmental values has a much shorter history; furthermore, due to the volatility in environmental threat perceptions, both the field and discourse are still evolving.³⁹⁵

There are serious issues with the concept of economic security. It may be found in debates over international political economy, namely those that focus on the connection between political framework of anarchy and the market economy.³⁹⁶ A huge portion of countries might suffer immediate repercussions from a financial collapse of national or global markets under the newly emerging global system.³⁹⁷ During a severe economic downturn, people may be unable to afford food, shelter, and medical care, threatening their basic survival. The funding of national defence may be seen as at risk by state actors during a financial crisis or collapse. As a result, initiatives to securitize economic vulnerability are discussed in terms of political and ideological policy within the context of global political economy. The scenario presented

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Buzan, Barry. et al. "Security. A New Framework for Analysis." Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1998, P. 91.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 201.

here demonstrates the need of considering economic ‘security spillovers’ while attempting to comprehend the driving forces behind the overall security strategy.

Historically, non:military challenges to political entities like international society or international law have been the focus of political security. The principles that can come under aspects of security in this sector are human rights, other than demands relating directly to the condition of individuals; thus, this sector is probably the primary locus at which individual:level security appears on the security agenda.³⁹⁸ According to most analysts, the state is the most important conceptual anchor in the political sphere. Even though sovereignty is a concept that emphasizes the absolute right to self:governance, it is viewed as jeopardized by any partiality. Therefore, even slight transgressions are taken seriously.³⁹⁹ There is often a connection between regional dynamics and bilateral political security based on global and regional considerations. The primary mechanisms of political security, however, occur at bilateral to regional levels and involve a number of smaller groups of state, many of which would frequently be considered sub:complexes in other sectors, especially the military.

The analytical techniques developed by the Copenhagen School, which are applied to the study of security and securitization, have made important contributions to the study of international relations. The phrase “regional security complex” was coined in 1983 to describe groups of countries whose principal security issues are so intertwined that the security of any one of them can't be considered in isolation.⁴⁰⁰ This definition was originally developed to explain the interplay between the state and its dominated political and military security sectors,⁴⁰¹ but it was updated as it became apparent that the number of actors in the security sphere was growing and the state's traditional role was becoming less central.⁴⁰² In 2003, this was narrated to describe a collection of units whose security issues are inextricably connected due to their large securitization, de:securitization, or both processes.⁴⁰³ There are essentially two starting points from which the notion of regional security complexes emerges. Those two types of thought are known as the “materialist” and “constructivist” perspectives,

³⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 120.

³⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 121.

⁴⁰⁰ Buzan, Barry. “People, states and fear: the national security problem in international relations.” Wheatsheaf Books, 1983; also see, Buzan, Barry. “People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.” (2nd ed.). Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid. p. 30.

⁴⁰² Bobokulov, Inomjon. Op. cit. p. 107.

⁴⁰³ Buzan, Barry. 1998, et al. Op. cit.

respectively. The territoriality notion is central to the materialist approach, whereas the securitization concept is central to the constructivist approach.⁴⁰⁴

The concept of securitization in a regional security complex was the focus of Constructivism within the framework of the Regional Security Complex.⁴⁰⁵ According to Buzan and Waever, each distinct area will have a different security objective since diverse players have securitized the security agenda or sectors of security.⁴⁰⁶ This method of securitization would then demonstrate the distinctiveness of a regional security complex in relation to other complexities.

The security interdependence of Central Asian republics may be comprehended by looking at the region's regional security cooperation. The spread of terrorism and the prevalence of extremist groups are the key security concerns of the country, and several republics in Central Asia are members of the SCO. The region has seen an increase in separatist activities due to the emergence of ethno-nationalism and religious extremist ideology. The financing of such extreme groups by terrorist organisations is another obstacle in the region. The member states of the SCO, including India, have come to the conclusion that these issues pose the biggest security threat to the safety of nation and to the peace and stability of the Central Asian republics. Drug trafficking and international criminal organisations have been connected to the escalating terrorism between Central Asia and Afghanistan in past few years. Through a declaration, plan of action of founding the SCO:Afghanistan contact group, the SCO has securitized the problem as part of the regional vulnerabilities in Central Asia.⁴⁰⁷ This explanation makes it clear that the political sphere is high on the security environment of Central Asian republics.

The Regional Security Complex hypothesis explains how the mutually dependent traits of amity and hostility interact throughout the securitization process among the India, Afghan,

⁴⁰⁴ Buzan, Barry. and Ole Wæver. 2003, Op. cit. pp. 4-5

⁴⁰⁵ Weaver, Ole. "Securitization and desecuritization." *On security*, edited by Lipschutz, Ronnie D. Columbia University Press. 1995, pp. 46–86.

⁴⁰⁶ Buzan, Barry. and Ole Wæver. 2003, Op. cit. p. 4.

⁴⁰⁷ "SCO for combating drug, terror, crimes in Afghanistan." EAG Eurasian Group, 30 March, 2009. www.eurasiangroup.org/en/sco-for-combating-drug-terror-crimes-in-afghanistan. Accessed 3 Mar. 2021; also see, Alimov, Rashid. "The role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in counteracting threats to peace and security." *UN chronicle*, vol. 54, no. 3, 2017, pp. 34-37. www.un-ilibrary.org/content/journals/15643913/54/3/19. Accessed 3 Mar. 2021; also see, De Haas, Marcel (ed.). "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a full-grown security alliance?" *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, November 2007.

Russian, and Chinese units in Central Asia, with the SCO serving as the arena for the process and interactions. Based on my view that the security community theory and the regional security complex theory work well together to create a solid theoretical framework for comprehending regional security. The Regional Security Complex Theory facilitates in the construction of the study of security architecture, while the Security Community Concept delves more deeply into the internal features of nations that impact the security dynamic in the region.⁴⁰⁸

Central Asia is comprised of five independent republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) that have a shared linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage dating back millennia. Despite efforts to highlight distinctions in political and economic growth as a way of distinguish themselves, all of them share hydroelectricity, energy, and transportation infrastructure and have ongoing border issues. The newly independent nations of Central Asia have become wealthier, according to Bobokuloy, and they have come to realize that their national security issues and common interests exist alongside one another. Geopolitical competition in the area has grown more intense, and international military forces are present in the area and in Afghanistan.⁴⁰⁹

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, scholars and policymakers have begun discussing the emergence of a New Great Game in Central Asia. For many nations, Central Asia is a region of competing interests because of its rich energy resources and geopolitical positioning. Aside from the two long-standing enemies, the United States and Russia, China and India have become important geopolitical stakeholders in Central Asia. In general, geopolitical, military, and economic issues are areas where big countries have mutual interests.⁴¹⁰

When looking at the Central Asia Regional Security Complex in further detail, it becomes clear that the presence of many security issues at various levels is the primary cause of instability in the region. In addition, it is becoming evident that the security issues faced by the Central Asian republics are interconnected. Crisis in Afghanistan has reached critical levels, and as a result, international problems including terrorism and drug trafficking have

⁴⁰⁸ Ekaterina, Klimenko. "Central Asia as a regional security complex." *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, vol, 12, n. 4 2011, pp. 7-20.

⁴⁰⁹ Bobokulov, Inomjon. "Central Asia: is there an alternative to regional integration?" *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 1-2, 1 December. 2006, pp. 75-91, doi.org/10.1080/02634930600903056. Accessed 4 Mar. 2021.

⁴¹⁰ Ekaterina, Klimenko. 2011, Op cit. p. 9.

emerged. Overall regional issues in the twenty-first century have huge consequences, particularly for human security because of the substantial influence on people, which have thus become the primary cause of internal conflicts and have a great potential for global and regional spillover. As a result, there might be an increase in both traditional and unconventional security risks, which could lead to regional instability in Central Asia.⁴¹¹

The security dynamics of the Central Asian Regional Security Complex may be traced back to the competition between the world's superpowers; this competition is an outgrowth of geopolitics and foreign alliances, and it is the result of the economic and strategic aspirations of Russia, China, and the Americas. Afghan territory is seen as a buffer zone between the security complexes of the Gulf states, Central Asia, and South Asia.⁴¹² Due to the absence of a strategy for the Afghan war and the facts that neighbourhood countries are currently engaged in Afghanistan's domestic growth, the country has shifted from its traditional role as an insulator to that of a connecting link between the Central Asian and South Asian Regional Security Complex. China and India have had an influence on Central Asia through the SCO and the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan.⁴¹³

Ever since the Central Asian states were granted independence, the concept of regional integration has prompted a renewed emphasis on securitization and security institutionalized across the area. While major world powers did have a role in establishing the currently functional security institutions (such as the SCO and CSTO as Central Asian initiatives intended to solve the region's security challenges), regional conditions and intergovernmental institutions had a much larger role. In light of this, securitization-related concerns thus constituted a significant component of the SCO's activity. As a result, the member nations worked together to combat and counter the "three evils" of terrorism, radicalism, and separatism. The thesis of the regional security complex posits that these "three evils" pose serious challenges to their survival. Along with the Resolution on the Formation of the SCO, the Shanghai Convention on Counterterrorism, Separatism, and Radicalism was approved during the constituent meeting that took place in Shanghai on June 15, 2001. This declaration

⁴¹¹ Ibid. pp. 18-19

⁴¹² Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia." *Peace Research Institute Oslo Paper*, 2012, pp. 1-62.

www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7214. Accessed 21 Sept. 2022.

⁴¹³ Ekaterina, Klimenko. Op cit. p. 112.

was considered to be one of the most important SCO agreements.⁴¹⁴ The Central Asian security complexity can be called the “centred great:power complex” because of the impact of the region’s major powers and the linkage of their interests with the security concerns and objectives of the region’s republics. This complex would continue to exist as long as the powerful nations’ priorities remain diverse.

Regional Securitization and Landscape of Central Asia

Central Asia’s history and geography have had a role in shaping the region’s current security situation.⁴¹⁵ Due to their shared history with the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics all share a type of authoritarianism in their current governance models (Kort, 2004, p. 73). Central Asian republics have been plagued by economic stagnation, crime, and corruption since the Soviet Union’s demise, as well as the emergence of reformation movements centred on Islamic fundamentalism and extremism (Kort, 73). The Taliban and Al:Qaeda's for terrorist organisations in Afghanistan raises further concerns, and their constant mobility has exacerbated religious extremism in the Central Asia.⁴¹⁶ The security situation in Central Asia is exacerbated by a combination of geographical factors and the legacies of Soviet authority (Kort, 73). Since the Soviet Union explored the region's abundant oil and gas reserves, Central Asia has gained a geopolitical importance as well (Kort, 9). Presently, the region’s natural resources have attracted foreign countries including the US, China, Russia, and India that share similar goals, mostly to provide the country’s energy requirements.

Currently, India has a strong presence in the area, focusing more on economic needs than security:related issues, but the two fields are closely intertwined since India's economic prosperity in Central Asia is directly correlated with the security environment in that region. In this context, it is important to define “security.” The phrase has two different meanings. There are two main concerns here: firstly, the political, economic, and military stability of the states in Central Asia are at stake, and secondly, India's position in the region is also

⁴¹⁴ Al-Qahtani, Mutlaq. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Law of International Organizations.” *Chinese Law of International Law*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2006, pp. 129-147. www.academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article-abstract/5/1/129/294436?redirectedFrom=PDF. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022; also see, Albert, Eleanor. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. 2015. www.cfr.org/background/shanghai-cooperation-organization. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.

⁴¹⁵ Michael, Kort. “Nations in Transition: Central Asian republics.” Facts on File, Inc. 2004.

⁴¹⁶ Menon, Rajan. “The New Great Game in Central Asia.” *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2003, pp. 187-204. doi: 10.1093/survival/45.2.187. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.

vulnerable. After the fall of the Soviet Union, several countries have competed with one another to gain a larger foothold in the Central Asian economy. While an example, Russia's economic clout has been steadily eroding as other nations, such as China and India, have risen to prominence. India, in particular, is keen to maintain its current status. For Russia, China, and India, security is a precondition for economic growth, and economic progress is a means to guarantee security; so, these three countries are at the centre of the security struggle. Interactions between foreign and internal players in Central Asia have an impact on the region's internal security situation.⁴¹⁷ Because of their shared internal security challenges and external agency, the nations of Central Asia are interdependent when it comes to the security dangers and prospects they experience as part of a Regional Security Complex (RSC).⁴¹⁸

The internal security mechanisms of Central Asia are more thoroughly examined in the following paragraphs, as well as the part that outside forces make in impacting the region's security structure. Just about all the countries in the Central Asian Region are struggling with a “problem of legitimacy,” and this is a primary factor affecting the region’s internal stability.⁴¹⁹ This challenge of legitimacy has arisen because these regimes do not have the backing of the people, yet they have managed to stay in power by centralizing authority.⁴²⁰ Dynasty, regional, and interest-based informal networks of influence form the backbone of administration in the region, and they only serve to exacerbate the lack of democracy.⁴²¹ The story of country and state formation is only a just over three decades old, yet the concentration of political power has already led to the chaotic growth of governmental

⁴¹⁷ Allison, Roy. “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia.” *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 3, 2004, pp. 463–483. doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00393.x. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.; also see, Trivedi, Ramakant. “Non-Traditional Security Threats in Central Asia Regional Perspective of Comparative Perspective.” *Comparative Politics (Russia)*, vol. 2.4, no. 6, 2015, pp. 109-123. www.comparativepolitics.org/jour/article/view/278?locale=en_US. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.

⁴¹⁸ Rakhimov, Mirzokhid. “Internal and External Dynamics of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia.” *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2010, pp. 95–101. doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2010.04.002. Accessed 25 July 2022; also see, Allison, Roy and Lena Jonson. “Central Asian security: internal and external dynamics.” *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, edited by Allison, Roy and Jonson, Lena, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Brookings Institution Press. 2001. pp. 1-23.

⁴¹⁹ Stronski, Paul and Russell Zanca. “Societal Change Afoot in Central Asia.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October, 2019. Pp.1-8, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/8-29-19_Stronski_Zanca_Central_Asia1.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2022; also see, Bellina, Séverine, et al. “The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations.” Commissioned by Norad and French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, *Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation*, Norad Report 20, 2009, pp. 1-44. www.institut-gouvernance.org/docs/the_legitimacy_of_the_state_in_fragile_situations.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2022; also see, Mellon, James G. “Myth, Legitimacy and Nationalism in Central Asia.” *Ethnopolitics*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 137–150. doi.org/10.1080/17449050902725660. Accessed 25 July 2022.

⁴²⁰ Cooley, Alexander. “*Great Games, Local Rules*.” Oxford University Press. 2012.

⁴²¹ Sahgal, Arun, and Vinod Anand. “Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India.” *Reconnecting India and Central Asia: Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions*, edited by Nirmala Joshi, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. 2010, pp. 33-79,

institutions and governance systems and the accumulation of vast amounts of wealth among the elites rather than being distributed for the benefit of the populace at large.⁴²²

The willingness of local leaders to profit themselves by using the conflicting interests of external players against one another has also been defined by this concentration of power. Furthermore, there is constantly the potential of a violent uprising from a suppressed opposition as long as authoritarian governments tolerate all kinds of dissent in order to maintain a firm grasp on power. The world saw how unstable circumstances in Central Asia truly was at the time during the Andijan rebellion in May 2005, which the Uzbek President Islam Karimov participated in crushing to demonstrate that his elites still effectively controlled the country and which resulted in the deaths of 700 citizen.⁴²³ The civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997, the Andijan event in 2005, and the political unrest in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 were all important sources of volatility for the Central Asian republics, but they nonetheless made a lot of progress. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan both saw peaceful changes of government in 2016 and 2017 respectively, and their new administrations appear to be supportive of regional integration and a good neighbor strategy. As we have seen with the emergence of political Islam, this implies that their style of governance runs the risk of producing a suppressed yet strong opposition that can make significant contributions negatively to the security dynamics of the region.

The geostrategic condition in Central Asia is a second factor that shapes the region's domestic security landscape. Making a generalized statement about the whole of Central Asia is unreasonable. Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan, have managed to change the trend and assure more evenly distributed prosperity and social progress across their citizens. The region's poorest nations, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the most

⁴²² Cooley, Alexander. 2012, pp. 17-33.

⁴²³ Hartman, Jeffrey W. "The May 2005 Andijan uprising: What we know." Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, *The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute*, 2016, pp. 1–64). www.isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/06/2016-Hartman-the-May-2005-Andijan-Uprising-What-We-Know.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2021; also see, "Burying the Truth: Uzbekistan Rewrites the Story of the Andijan Massacre." *Human Rights Watch*, D1706, 2005. www.refworld.org/docid/43ba858b4.html. Accessed 6 June 2021; also see, Fazendeiro, Bernardo Teles. "Uzbekistan's defensive self-reliance: Karimov's foreign policy legacy." *International Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 2, 2017, pp. 409-427. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iw062>. Accessed 6 June 2021.

populated Uzbekistan, have not had much steady economic growth and development over the past 20 years.⁴²⁴

The difficulty, from the viewpoint of economic security, emerges from the Central Asian republics' fragile economies, which are heavily dependent on either agribusiness or the energy industry, leaving them extremely exposed to other states.⁴²⁵ As a corollary the shortage of funds also causes the decline or destruction of once-extensive regional infrastructure systems. Ever since, several interregional projects, including hydro and energy networks, as well as economic partnerships, have been hampered. In order to encourage growth in the economy and draw in foreign investors, especially those from India, regional development requires a continuous rejuvenation of the infrastructure and communication networks.

The vicinity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in particular, has a major role in shaping Central Asia's security and military picture. Instabilities in their political systems, issues with drug trafficking, and terrorism are of greater concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. States in Central Asia serve as both a breeding ground and a recruiting ground for terrorist organisations. Any efforts to stabilize Afghanistan have so far been ineffective, and the presence of NATO forces there has not set a good example anyway. Since the U.S. and its allies withdrew from Afghanistan since 2014, the Taliban rule has risen to power and retaken former territory. Consequently, the Afghan government is currently incapable of protecting its own citizens or its frontiers security. From a geopolitical standpoint, the difficulty in accessing the border is exacerbated by the difficulty in conducting surveillance due to the hilly landscape. Because of this, the borders between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and Afghanistan and Turkmenistan become porous, facilitating the movement of terrorists and drug traffickers into Central Asia and, from there, Russia and China. Because since nineties,

⁴²⁴ Kim, Younkyoo, and Stephen Blank. "Non-Traditional Security (NTS) in Central Asia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives." *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, vol. 10., no. 1, 2012, pp. 123-152. doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2012.06.10.1.123. Accessed 6 June 2021; also see, Mahnovski, Sergej, "Economic dimensions of security in Central Asia." *Project Air Force, RAND Corporation*, 2006, (pp. 1–83). www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG417.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2021; also see, Joshi, Nirmala. "Responses to Non-Traditional Threats & Challenges. *Reconnecting India and Central Asia: Emerging security and economic dimensions*, edited by Joshi, Nirmala. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2010, pp. 81-114. www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/Monographs/2010_03_MONO_Joshi_India-Central-Asia.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2021.

⁴²⁵ Krunkaityte, Edita. "Post-9/11 Security Dynamics in Central Asia." *Wilson Center*. www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/post-911-security-dynamics-central-asia. Accessed 2 May 2022.

the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) has mostly been responsible for the terrorist incidents that have occurred in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Until recently, terrorism had not reached the other two republics in Central Asia. However, Islamist extremists have now turned their attention to these two countries. Kazakhstan, whose 70% of the populace is Muslim, was the target of terrorist incidents in Aktobe and Almaty in 2016. In a similar manner, a terrorist attack was committed in Tajikistan in July 2018; it was the country's first terrorist attack since 2010.

After Islamic State (IS) suffered military defeats in Syria, the region of Central Asia became increasingly vulnerable to a terrorist attack.⁴²⁶ It's also possible that the Islamic State could move towards Central Asia in the near future. The Taliban leadership has publicly stated that its political aspirations are limited to Afghanistan, but the idea of cooperation between them and the Islamic State is still being addressed in the media and scholarly communities. It was anticipated that things would get worse in Afghanistan and subsequently Central Asian region. Such a security climate has an impact on both present and upcoming regional economic activities.

India's level of involvement in regional affairs, which can take the form of a number of different arrangements, is subject to the outcomes of its investigation of the complexities of security challenges in Central Asia. There are two main pillars upon which it functions to maintain peace and order in Central Asia. As a first step, it uses economic pressure to attack the root causes of terrorism and separatism. Secondly, India collaborates diplomatically and militarily with the Central Asian Republics as well as other nations that have a substantial footprint in the region. India's approach to security problems in Central Asia, however, goes beyond the simple economic logic of sustaining regional peace. Rather, it participates increasingly in security affairs through political initiatives and diplomatic interaction. The reality that India and Pakistan coordinated their activities towards Central Asia republics in 2017, is evidence of this.

⁴²⁶ Lynch, Thomas Francis, et al. "The return of foreign fighters to Central Asia: Implications for US counterterrorism policy." National Defense University Press, 2016. pp. 4-10. www.ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-21.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2022.

This partnership first developed in 2001, when the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formed.⁴²⁷ The SCO has been the most prominent organisation in Central Asia since its inception because of the role it plays in maintaining peace and order in the region.⁴²⁸ Based on its location, economy, and geopolitical standing, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is of interest to India. India has vital security and economic objectives in this region, and it is critical to highlight that its members occupy a massive area bordering India's extended neighbourhood.⁴²⁹ Russia supported India's entry into the SCO during its early years because it would help to redress the organization's economic imbalance, that was at the time controlled by China. To counter this, China has increased its energy and economic footprint in the region and is planning extensive infrastructural and pipeline projects as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Consequently, Pakistan was admitted to the SCO at the same time. While Russia provides overall security and China dominates the Central Asian economy, India must seek a foothold for itself politically and economically. The nations of Central Asia would be relieved to see India challenge the dominance of Russia and China.

In addition, it has been increasingly apparent that the SCO would assist India in linking its territory, promoting economic cooperation, and working closely with the Eurasian region to combat terrorism.⁴³⁰ India and Russia had decided to take part in the 2018 SCO combating terrorism military drills in Russia.⁴³¹ One such initiative is the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), whose goals include the collection, analysis, and dissemination of pertinent evidence; the development of datasets of terrorist networks; and the upkeep of relationships with other security groups.⁴³²

As a result, there is strong evidence linking socio-economic development and national security.⁴³³ The majority of Central Asian nations continue to suffer numerous and varied difficulties with regard to their governments' ability to manage their

⁴²⁷ Michel, Casey. "It's Official: India and Pakistan Join Shanghai Cooperation Organization." *The Diplomat* 12 2017, www.thediplomat.com/2017/06/its-official-india-and-pakistan-join-shanghai-cooperation-organization/. Accessed 2 May 2022.

⁴²⁸ Stobdan, Phunchok. "SCO Membership is a Stepping Stone; India's Real Destination is Central Asia." *Wire*, January 26, 2022, www.thewire.in/diplomacy/what-india-can-expect-from-shanghai-cooperation-organisation. Accessed 2 May 2022.

⁴²⁹ Raghavan, P. S. "India's pivot to Eurasia." *The Hindu*, 20 June 2018. P.7

⁴³⁰ Anurag Tripathi, A. "India's entry to SCO: issues, implications." *Deccan Herald*, June 13, 2017, p. 5.

⁴³¹ Raghavan, P.S. 2018, Op. cit.

⁴³² Bolonina, Aleksandra. "Security Dimension of Chinas Presence in Central Asia." *IRIS, Asia Focus*, 2019, p. 108. www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Asia-Focus-108-Eng.pdf. Accessed 4 Oct. 2022.

⁴³³ Picciotto, Robert, and Rachel Weaving, (eds.) "Security and Development: Investing in peace and prosperity." Routledge, 2013.

energy resources, build their infrastructure, and ensure the safety of their food and medicines. These difficulties have a significant impact on the region's overall security.⁴³⁴ The difficulty of the Central Asian nations to establish agreements on matters like shared resources, migration, and boundaries, as well as the failure to update the communications and transportation systems put in place during the Soviet era, have been blamed for impeding the region's general economic growth and hindering better security engagement between the governments.⁴³⁵

The involvement of outside actors seeking to sway the Central Asian power structure is ignorant of both the strategic and security context as well as India's capacity to boost its position in the area. It is assumed, under the framework of the New Great Game, that the projection of external players produces a condition of competition and collaboration not only among the external powers in the region, but also between the external powers and the CARs themselves. Throughout the Central Asian power structure, Iran and Turkey are viewed as minor players, while Russia, the U.S, China, India plays the roles of major nations. Central Asia's internal security has been profoundly impacted by the emergence of this formidable alliance between a superpower, a regional force, and the aspirations of the region's leaders. Russia's current redefinition of hegemony in its strategic backyard through its bilateral security agreements with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is a compelling illustration of how the external player affects domestic security in Central Asia.⁴³⁶ From this vantage point, the national security setting in the region is influenced not only by China's growing energy and economic activity, but also by the West's participation through civil society and global non-governmental organizations.

Last but not least, the capacity of the countries in the region to collaborate successfully in the security domain is hindered by the role of strong authoritarian leaders, who maintain a high level of domination over decision-making in the security and strategic sectors within their

⁴³⁴ Kayani, Saima A. Human Security and Central Asian States. *Policy Perspectives*, vol. 15, no,1, 2018, pp. 95-112. www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/polipers.15.1.0095. Accessed 4 Oct. 2022.

⁴³⁵ Peyrouse, Sébastien. "Human security in Central Asia: Can the EU help out?" *Europe- Central Asia Monitor*, no, 21, 2011, pp. 2-4. www.eucentralasia.eu/2011/10/human-security-in-central-asia-can-the-eu-help-out/. Accessed 28 Oct. 2022.

⁴³⁶ Matveeva, Anna. "Russia's changing security role in Central Asia." *European security* vol. 22, no. 4, 2013, pp. 478-499, doi: 10.1080/09662839.2013.775121. Accessed 28 Oct. 2022; also see, Indeo, Fabio. "The Role of Russia in the Central Asian Security Architecture." *Central Asia Policy Briefs*, no. 48, *OSCE Academy in Bishkek*. 2018, www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/PB48The_Role_of_Russia_in_the_Central_Asian_Security_A. Accessed 28 Oct. 2022.

country. To describe a situation in which individual countries feel obligated to seek security guarantees from international organisations and institutions such as the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.⁴³⁷ Despite being multilateral organisations, the SCO and CSTO are nevertheless supported by powerful individual countries, namely China in the case of the SCO and Russia in the case of the CSTO. This only strengthens the function of an external agency within the security dynamics in the region. This, along with the other variables mentioned above, helps shape India's views on Central Asia and influences how the country should pursue its national security interests there.

The Afghanistan Factor in Indian Securitization

Afghanistan has traditionally served as a “buffer state,” absorbing the shocks of countless power struggles, whether they were between the great powers of antiquity or the superpowers of the Cold War, thanks to its location at the meeting point of powerful empires. Afghanistan's situation and internal politics have generally not changed since the end of the Cold War, as the globe has gone from bipolarity to unipolarity and is currently in the process of changing to a multi:polar world. While the current unipolar world is intrinsically unstable, disruptive, and confrontational, a world in which multiple spheres of influence coexist would be more equitable, peaceful, and stable.⁴³⁸ Buzan and Waeber contend that regional dynamics, rather than global dynamics, are more important in determining a region's security condition. Afghanistan is seen as a buffer zone between three competing regional security architectures. Those areas including South Asia, Central Asia, and the Arabian Gulf.

It is no longer appropriate to describe modern:day Afghanistan as an insulator, a region of minimal connection between the RSCs. Because of its growing influence in the domains of terrorism and drug trafficking, Afghanistan now poses a serious threat to the security of any of the three RSCs to which it is linked. According to the Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory developed by Buzan and Waeber, Afghanistan affects the securitization of the aforementioned three RSCs, with a particular focus on the South Asian complex, where India,

⁴³⁷ Schweickert, Rainer, Inna Melnykovska, and Hedwig Plamper. “External drivers of institutional change in Central Asia: Regional integration schemes and the role of Russia and China.” Kiel Working Paper, no. 1763. 2012. Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). www.econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwifwkwp/1763.htm. Accessed 4 Oct. 2022.

⁴³⁸ Mukherjee, Subrata. “Towards Multipolarity.” *The Statesman*, 29 March 2022, p.6.

as the growing regional superpower, is aiming to expand its area of interest outside the region, particularly into Central Asia.

This theory relies heavily on a geographical framework. It is generally accepted that states that share a common border cannot afford to terminate ties with one another, while global and distant countries can. While the United States, Moscow, and China can put some distance between themselves and the military conflict country of Afghanistan, neighbours Iran, Pakistan, and India are unable to do so due to their proximity both physically and politically. Regardless of whether Afghanistan fits into the world order, the country's national security interests are directly threatened by the current security circumstances there. This relative autonomy of regional security, according to Buzan and Waever, represents a system of international security relationships that is fundamentally different from the inflexible framework of bipolarity that characterized the Cold War.⁴³⁹

Insulator Afghanistan and India:Kazakhstan Convergence of Security Interests of the Region

Afghanistan has been an isolator for its neighbourhood RSCs for a few decades due to its lack of domestic securitization. However, in recent years, the country's domestic security crisis has had a profound impact on its neighbours, and the region has therefore become a zone of increasing controversy for influence. Afghanistan is now known as a hotbed of terrorism due to its thriving drug trade, deep-seated Islamic extremism, and lackluster sense of national identity. Afghanistan cannot be disregarded by its neighbours any longer as a worldwide participant in the deadly domains of terrorism and drugs. While Afghanistan is central to any of these regions' primary security concerns, such worries still shape how they interact with the country, which in turn reflects regional disputes and internal conflicts.⁴⁴⁰

According to Kristian Berg Harpviken, a thorough understanding of Afghanistan's security relevance necessitates an in-depth examination of the security dynamics of both the Central Asian Region and South Asia (Harpviken, 2010, p. i:iv). As Harpviken points out, the Central Asian countries do not have a strong feeling of security, and collaboration has been driven

⁴³⁹ Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. 2003, Op. cit.

⁴⁴⁰ Harpviken, Kristian Berg. "Afghanistan in a Neighborhood perspective: General Overview and Conceptualization." *Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) paper*. 2010. www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=395&type=publicationfile. Accessed 3 Dec. 2022.

mostly by the involvement of Russia and China. Kazakhstan has repeatedly shown its ambition to become the dominant power in Central Asia. Although Afghanistan gets low priority from the five Soviet successor republics, they do maintain links with a number of Afghan organisations. Therefore, the security concerns emanating from Afghanistan might not be as large or as widespread as those in the Persian Gulf or South Asia, but they nevertheless pose a serious problem and must be taken seriously.

Afghanistan has a far more pervasive impact on the heightened security measures taken in the Central Asia region. However, it is still necessary to keep a closer eye on the situation inside Afghanistan than was previously the case, and the same might be said for the South Asian region as a whole. After being invaded by the Soviet Union in 1989, Afghanistan has since been a key player in the region's growing security concerns. Afghanistan has altered not only the regional geopolitics but also the international ties in the region. Today, Afghanistan plays a significant role in the national security of India and the securitization of South Asia as a whole.

Researcher of international relations in India tend to agree that Afghanistan is strategically located at the junction of the South Asian Regional Security Complex and the Central Asian Regional Security Complex; as such, the security situation in Central Asia has significant overlap with that of South Asia, Afghanistan, and the northern regions of Pakistan and Kashmir. In 2003, just after the 9/11 attacks, researchers Buzan and Wæver said that Afghanistan worked as a buffer between the RSCs around it.⁴⁴¹ Furthermore, the perception of Afghanistan's involvement in various regional security architectures has changed in the post:9/11 era, which is primarily marked by rising transnational Islamic extremism, transnational terrorist organisations, and the ongoing movement of weaponry, drugs, and migrants across South and Central Asia.⁴⁴²

When placed in the framework of India's policies towards Central Asia, Afghanistan is now considered within India as both a connecting point and a buffer zone. To prevent radicalism and instability in Central Asia from spreading to India, Afghanistan acts as a buffer zone between the two regions. Moreover, other academics argue that Afghanistan is better

⁴⁴¹ Sharma, Anurag. "Post 2014 Afghanistan: Challenges to India's Securitization." Graduation Thesis, *School of Advanced Air and Space Studies*, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 2014 www.airuniversity.af.edu/Library/. Accessed 6 Dec. 2022.

⁴⁴² Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. 2003, Op. cit.

understood not as an insulator but as an aggregator of interests, uniting the overlapping territories on which it stands.

The escalation of security concerns within and surrounding Afghanistan has pushed the region to the forefront of the global geopolitical agenda. The strategic and economic significance of the area is important for India.⁴⁴³ For this reason, it serves as a unifying factor between India and the Central Asia. They have very similar political views on the issues in Afghanistan are, quite similar to how they were throughout the 1990s. For example, controlling non-traditional challenges like drug trafficking and illegal movement and exploitation of people, stopping the growth of radical Islam and its political repercussions, and preventing terrorism from disturbing the region's fragile power balances. The engagement among India and Kazakhstan during the civil war was also significant. These two countries fought alongside each other on the side of the Northern Alliance, which supported the opposition to the Taliban who were supported by Pakistan. Considering the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, 'this has become all the more important', said Nurlan Zhalgasbayev, the Kazakh ambassador to India. The cooperation of Kazakhstan and India in the fight against terrorist groups is in their mutual interest. There is effective collaboration between the armed forces of the two nations, as evidenced by the periodic "KAZIND" joint military exercises and the presence of Kazakhstan's military in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, as part of an Indian battalion.⁴⁴⁴

India and Kazakhstan have convergence of interest in security issues of the region. To further improve their military cooperation, India and Kazakhstan recently held their fifth annual bilateral military mission, KAZIND:21.⁴⁴⁵ This exercise is an essential component of and Kazakhstan's military cooperation. In August of 2021, the fifth Kazind:21 took place in Kazakhstan in an effort to further solidify the developing strategic connection between the two countries.⁴⁴⁶ Following UN supervision, the training has given the military forces of India

⁴⁴³ Wadhwa, Anil. "India's extended neighbourhood: Prospects and Challenges." "Keynote address at 6th IISS-MEA Dialogue at *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, March 4, 2014, www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/6thIISSMEADialogue_secretaryeast. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.

⁴⁴⁴ Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. "Kazakh-India counter-terror ties aimed at curbing fundamentalism and extremism: Envoy." *Economic Times*, 6 May. 2021.

⁴⁴⁵ Siddiqui, Huma. "KAZIND-21: Wider scope in the 5th edition includes counter terrorism and insurgency". *Financial Express*, 30 August 2021, p. 6.

⁴⁴⁶ "India, Kazakhstan Carry Out 5th Edition of Joint Military Drills KAZIND-21". *Business Standard*, 2021, www.business-standard.com. Accessed 3 May 2022, p. 7.

and Kazakhstan the chance to practice counterinsurgency and terrorist operations in a remote, mountainous setting.⁴⁴⁷

The two countries have also committed to maintaining their cooperative efforts in the combating of terrorism and fundamentalism, which will involve the sharing of relevant data. In a joint statement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan expressed concern about the growing threat presented by terrorism in various sections of their respective countries' surrounding regions.⁴⁴⁸ Furthermore, they emphasised the need for a safe and secure atmosphere to foster economic growth without violence. Here, they have stressed the value of consistent communication between government agencies and the Joint Working Group on Counter:Terrorism. Furthermore, the two heads of state have decided to ramp up their collaboration within the SCO framework, recognizing its potential as a complementary platform to their current bilateral and regional efforts.⁴⁴⁹ As a result, India and Kazakhstan share a concern for regional security.

Both India and Kazakhstan have considerable concerns about the many security issues that may arise from Afghanistan as the America begins to leave the nation starting in 2014.⁴⁵⁰ There is a danger that the country could become destabilized and divided along ethnic and religious lines if President Ashraf Ghani's new government has trouble getting its feet under it. This would have devastating ramifications for the neighborhood as a whole. After the devastating effects of the Afghan bloody conflict on both India and the Central Asia Republics in the past, it is clear that both countries would prefer to prevent a similar crisis. The scenario in Afghanistan was intricately related to that of Tajikistan, which became embroiled in its own civil war in the 1990s.⁴⁵¹ Kashmir was a subject of unrest in India as well; for ten years, local rebels collaborated with transnational terrorist organisations,

⁴⁴⁷ Pakrasi, Susmita. "India, Kazakhstan joint training exercise KAZIND-21 to begin from today". Hindustan Times, 3 August 2021, p. 5.

⁴⁴⁸ "India, Kazakhstan to Continue Active Engagement in Fight Against Terrorism". Business Standard, 2021, www.business-standard.com. Accessed 3 May 2021.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Koser, Khalid. "Transition, Crisis and Mobility in Afghanistan: Rhetoric and Reality". *International Organization for Migration*, January 2014, pp. 13-16. www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/migrated_files/Country/docs/Transition-Crisis-and-Mobility-in-Afghanistan-2014.pdf. Accessed on 12 June 2021.

⁴⁵¹ Tousley, Scott W. "Afghan Sources of the Tajikistan Civil War." 1995, U.S. *Army Command and General Staff College*, Master Thesis, pp. 31-51.

resulting in a bloody insurgency that ultimately cost thousands of lives and left the region mostly out of India's government's sphere of influence.

After outlining Afghanistan's importance and the areas of mutual interest among India and Kazakhstan, it is crucial to explain the distinctive character of the problems that originate in this area. Doing so would help people understand how India interacts with the Central Asian nations on security issues. In the contemporary geopolitical scenario, resurgence of Taliban poses a serious threat to the stability of all Central Asian states. The comeback of the Taliban to government in Afghanistan would have a substantial influence on neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, despite the fact that neither of these countries shares a border with Afghanistan or has a sizable minority there or strong economic ties to the nation. The most negatively affected by a Taliban takeover would be India's important security allies in Central Asia, these countries are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan respectively.

In this light, India must be aware of the problems caused by the Taliban's political revival. India has a sizable investment in the nation, and it is concerned about the security of the many assets there. A restoration to power by the Taliban would almost probably result in an Indian withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the country's partnership with India in terms of economic growth. The restoration of the Taliban would also indicate that a leadership friendly to Pakistan's interests and obedient to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) would rule in Kabul, providing Pakistan with the geopolitical comfort and space it so desperately seeks. The Taliban's history of aiding and sheltering various Islamist and fundamentalist organizations, such as those deliberately targeting India, makes this picture much more dangerous. In this regard, the kidnapping of Indian Airlines IC 814 in 1999, which was redirected to Afghanistan, and the following negotiations India had to have with the hijackers, with Taliban acting as mediator, are still fresh in Indian memories. This incident serves as proof of the serious threat that a combination of the ISI, Taliban, and numerous jihadi organizations pose to India's national security.⁴⁵²

There are allegations that the Taliban provided sanctuary or otherwise enabled the activities of a number of other extremist Islamic organisations, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its branch, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET),

⁴⁵² Taylor, Paul D. "India and Pakistan: Thinking about the Unthinkable." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 54, no.3, 2001, pp. 40-51.

the Harkat:ul:Mujahedeen (HUM), and the Jaish:e:Mohammed (JEM). The region's permeable boundaries are a contributing factor to the growing insecurity. Its base is in the shaky borderlands among Afghanistan and Pakistan, and after having great success in other parts of the world, mainly Europe, it has lately joined with the IMU to target areas in Central Asia. In this regard, India's worst nightmares were coming true: the LET, the HUM, and other Kashmir: and India:centric terrorist organisations were still utilizing Afghanistan as a platform to undertake assaults on Indian soil, and there was evidence that this was happening in coordination with a variety of other global actors, including those from Central Asia.

The expansion of weaponry and the trafficking of narcotics in the border areas of South and Central Asia pose a combined and potentially lethal menace. Extensive proliferation of armaments is fueling Jihadi bloodshed in the region because of external forces' participation. Given the widespread usage of such weaponry during the Kashmir militancy, India is particularly worried about the proliferation of weaponry because it fears that jihadi groups may use them there and in Kashmir. However, the exact same is applicable in the Central Asia, where the increase of guns weaponry has sparked concerns about a deteriorating law and order situation, with Jihadi groups and crime syndicates and other militias among those who have access to them.

In spite of its reduced visibility, the danger posed by drug trafficking is increasing. Today, Afghanistan produces more opium than any other country.⁴⁵³ The country's reliance on revenue from heroin sales has increased in recent years due to record poppy harvests, despite Western efforts to reduce the drug's popularity. Huge profits from opium smuggling directly correlate with the monetary support the Taliban provide to other Islamist groups because the trade is conducted fully clandestine and is mostly controlled by militias and groups linked with the Taliban. Although the Taliban is accountable for the production and supply within Afghanistan, radical Islamist organizations are responsible for ensuring that the heroin is transported to Moscow and Eurasia via the Central Asian region, where they may benefit from it.⁴⁵⁴ Although India is not a significant heroin consumer, the financing of narcotics

⁴⁵³ MacDonald, David. "Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, outlaws and scorpion tales." London: Pluto, 2007.

⁴⁵⁴ Cornell, Svante E., and Niklas LP Swanström. "The Eurasian drug trade: A challenge to regional security." *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 53, no.4, 2006, pp.10-28; also see, Cornell, Svante E., and Niklas LP Swanström. "The Eurasian drug trade: A challenge to regional security." *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 53, No.4, 2006, pp.10-28.

trafficking for Islamist groups is a serious problem for the governments of India (especially given the current addiction epidemic in the border state of Punjab).

Given the importance of Afghanistan and the adjacent neighboring regions of South and Central Asia to the current India:Kazakhstan security scenario, it seems likely that India and the Central Asia have a similar strategic interpretation of these threats. Whereas there have been some genuine criticisms from researchers that the authoritarian governments in the Central Asia have exaggerated the menace of Islamic Extremism and volatility in Afghanistan as a popular narrative to excuse many of their political abuses, a potential threat does emerge, particularly to India, arising from this fragility. Considering Pakistan's active engagement in channeling violence and instability from Afghanistan towards India, as shown above, India continues to be concerned of dangers that come from the region. This security fear influences India's approach regarding Central Asia as a whole and Kazakhstan in specific, as confirmed by policy:makers contacted during the research for this study. Many analysts argue that it is the single most important part of India's foreign policy towards Kazakhstan. This segment's focus on potential dangers is intended to assist better comprehend the factors that have influenced India's Central Asia policy and the present course of action India has taken.

India's Security Interest and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

China has absolute power inside the SCO. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's original purpose was to counter terrorism, separatism, and extremism directed towards China; but the SCO's influence has now expanded to include both regional and international issues. China has been using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to exert pressure on member states to curb separatist movements by the Uighur and Tibetan peoples and other anti:Chinese groups. China offers financial opportunities to SCO members, especially in the growing Central Asian energy industry, in exchange for their cooperation on important policy concerns.⁴⁵⁵ Since terrorism, separatism, and extremism are important concerns for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is no surprise that the organisation has extended its domain of influence to include Afghanistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan

⁴⁵⁵ Famularo, Julia. "The Latest from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. " *National Interest*, 24 September. 2013. www.nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-latest-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-9118. Accessed 13 June 2021.

signed an agreement in 2005 to help stabilize the region and combat the threat of terrorism and the opium trade, both of which affect SCO member states.⁴⁵⁶

The SCO is worried about the spread of Islamic extremism and the drug gangs from an insecure Afghanistan, regardless of China's and Russia's overwhelming political and economic goals in that country. Afghanistan presents similar difficulties for India, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offers a venue for coordinating efforts towards regional security. In 2005, India became a full-fledged observer state in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. India has been a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and presently holds a permanent seat. India is eager to play a larger role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a member rather than an observer state because it benefits economically and politically from the organization's efforts to solve the key issue of securitization and energy pipeline.

India has taken the initiative to enter the Shanghai Cooperation Organization because it will allow the country to more effectively pursue its objectives in the Central Asian Region and to access more economic opportunities in the Eurasian continent. In order to enhance its securitization inside the region, SCO also gives India a venue to interact with Pakistan and China more positively. However, some analysts, including Mena Singh Roy, are suspicious of China's motivations for permitting India to join the SCO. Roy claims that India will have less influence in the SCO due to China's strong presence in the organisation. Besides its own ambitions in the Eurasian and Southern Asian regions, China will utilize the SCO as a tool to challenge India's position in both of these regions. China would pursue SAARC membership on the condition that India be granted full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Furthermore, China and Pakistan have complementary objectives in Central Asian, India will also have to cope with the China:Pakistan nexus within the SCO.⁴⁵⁷

No matter what obstacles arise, India must maintain its dialogue with the SCO's member countries and go forward with its attempts to achieve its foreign policy goals and improve its constructive dialogue with regional powers that threaten it. SCO not only helps India with the

⁴⁵⁶ Khalil, Ahmad B. "Afghanistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization." *The Diplomat*, 14 July 2021, www.thediplomat.com/2021/07/afghanistan-and-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/. Accessed 14 Aug. 2021

⁴⁵⁷ Singh Roy, Meena "Dynamics of Expanding the SCO." *Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses*, 4 April 2011. www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DynamicsofExpandingtheSCO_msroy_040411. Accessed 16 Aug. 2021.

securitization problem, but it also helps India develop closer economic, political, and social relations with Afghanistan, which are of greater importance than India's long-term strategic objectives. As a result, even at the super-complex layer, Afghanistan affects India's national security and affords it an opportunity to constructively interact with its antagonistic neighbours.

In summary, this area is crucial to India's national security and its fight against Islamic extremism. As a result of its strategic location between India, Kazakhstan, and the Middle East, Afghanistan (the Insulator) has emerged as a key factor in India's foreign policy towards Central Asia. India's positive interactions in Afghanistan and Central Asia have the potential to influence the Islamic world views, which will in turn influence to supportive they are of India's anti-terrorist efforts. As a result, Afghanistan is now a crucial region for India's development, wealth, and security, rather than merely a transit point between Central Asia and the Middle East.

Pakistan Interplay with India's National Security

India's national security goals in the larger South and Central Asian areas are mostly driven by internal considerations based on its sizable Muslim minority, deeper strategic objectives pertaining to Pakistan's involvement in the region, and an effort to restrain India's own capacity to project impact as a growing force.⁴⁵⁸ Since the partition, there has been tension between India and Pakistan; the main point of disagreement has been the state of Kashmir. A thorough analysis of India-Pakistan ties is outside the purview of this study because the topic of relations between India and Pakistan and the consequent "nuclearization" of the region that happened over the past three decades has been the focus of much scholastic discourse.⁴⁵⁹ Furthermore, in this context, it is important to analyse how India's security policy regarding Central Asia is influenced by the country's engagement with Pakistan and how it in turn influences India's perspective of and links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. In these perspectives, it is indeed important to consider the complex dynamics within India, Pakistan,

⁴⁵⁸ Pant, Harsh V. "India's Challenge in Afghanistan: With Power Comes Responsibility." *Center for The Advanced Study of India*, vol. 12, no. 02, 2010, pp.1-40.

www.pdfsemanticscholar.org/cc09/97bc263c3c2596dc7aefe52aef2078a4c796.pdf?_ga=2.196756012.1263261283.1590599841-982332807.1590599841 Accessed 16 Aug. 2021; also see, Pant, Harsh V. "India in Afghanistan: a test case for a rising power." *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2010, pp.133-153.

DOI: 10.1080/09584931003674984. Accessed 16 Aug. 2021

⁴⁵⁹ Cohen, Stephen P. "India Rising." *The Wilson Quarterly (1976-)*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2000, pp.32-53.

and Afghanistan, and the difficulties those pose for India given the region's geographical proximity.

The open border between Pakistan and Afghanistan stretches for 2,640 kilometers across the provinces of Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and the central Pashtun areas of both countries.⁴⁶⁰ Afghan claims on the Pashtun regions and the disputed Durand Line boundary continue to pose an existential threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani government has responded to this threat by trying to exert influence over Kabul's Taliban leadership. The Pakistani government's backing of the Taliban regime that took power in Afghanistan in the 1990s is a prime example of this phenomenon, as is the country's earlier support for different Pashtun-led Islamic associations who fought in the civil war in Afghanistan.

In recent years, countering Pakistan's intentions in Afghanistan has emerged as a top priority for India's policymakers when considering their country's approach to the region of Afghanistan and Central Asia. In particular, India's aid to Afghanistan's reconstruction was evident in the domains of development, humanitarian assistance, and the arts. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been met with speculation that India's announced \$500 million investment in the strategically crucial Iranian port of Chabahar is a more muscular approach towards Afghanistan and Central Asia.⁴⁶¹ By developing the Chabahar, India hoped to circumvent Pakistan, which restricted Afghan access to its transportation routes and restricted Indian overland transportation permits into the area, and build additional crucial maritime connections that would increase commerce and resource accessibility to sources of energy in Afghanistan and Central Asia via Iran.

There is also worry that Pakistan would try to convince those governments to adopt an Islamic agenda, even though it is now widely acknowledged in India that the Central Asian Republics' authoritarian ideologies are far different from the political Islam that gave rise to Pakistan. Given the interdependence of the South and Central regional security architectures, Indian academics continue to worry that Pakistan may try to counter India's position as regional hegemon by supporting extremist organisations like the IMU and the Taliban.

⁴⁶⁰ Wazir, Asmatullah Khan. "Withdrawal of the US Troops from Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan-Challenges and a Way Forward." *Journal of Peace and Development*, vol. 2, December 2012, pp. 89-99.

⁴⁶¹ Singh, Sandeep, and Bawa Singh. "Geopolitics of ports: Factoring Iran in India's counterbalancing strategy for "Sino-Pak Axis"." *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2019, pp. 169-182.

India is a Hindu-majority country with a sizeable Muslim population (the world's second biggest, by some estimates), thus it is understandable that the country is concerned about how the turmoil in the wider Islamic world (and particularly in its immediate neighbourhood) would affect its own Muslim community. India considers security problems emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan to be potentially destructive to the social fabric and integrity of the nation, particularly when taken along with the larger problem of Kashmir and its delicate and contentious status within India. From the standpoint of internal security, this anxiety guides Indian policy decisions and diplomatic ties with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Since India's partition in 1947, the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir has been at the centre of conflict between India and Pakistan. Only a small fraction of the territory is now under Indian administration; Pakistan still holds onto Azad Kashmir and the Gilgit-Baltistan region, while China is in charge of Aksai Chin. While the two nations continue to argue over who will control Kashmir, the Line of Control (LOC) has effectively become the de facto boundary between them. For most of the 1990s, Kashmiris protested New Delhi's meddling in the region's politics by taking to the streets in large numbers to demonstrate their support for the insurgency taking place in Jammu and Kashmir at the time. There was immediate involvement from Pakistan, which helped facilitate infiltration over the Line of Control and trained terrorists in a network of camps across Azad Kashmir. The ISI no longer required the large number of Mujahedeen across the Durand line after the Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, therefore Pakistan diverted them towards the LOC and India. By the mid-1990s, Kashmir had become the heart of a full-fledged cross-border terror struggle, which had begun as a political protest campaign in the region but had quickly escalated into violence under Pakistani leadership. India dispatched its armed forces to deal with the problem, and the armed forces are still responsible for maintaining security in the country.

A key security problem for India is the possibility for bases to be established in the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan border area by radical Islamic organisations supportive to Pakistan's objectives. This is especially true if the historical precedent of Kashmir in the 1990s is used as a benchmark. Posing a serious threat to Indian strategy in the region is the unrestricted movement of weapons, jihadists, and operational funding. The political atmosphere in Kashmir is a major concern for India, and the country is worried that the revival of terrorist organizations throughout the LOC could have disastrous consequences there. Indian policymakers still worry that Islamic terrorists from Afghanistan and Central

Asia may invade the region when the West leaves. The army's departure from Kashmir is still being called for, but India cannot afford further security threat to its unity, especially at a time when its efforts need to be directed on growth in the economy. India has a sizable Muslim community, and it is unclear how much trouble in the Islamic world and the aftermath of the "War on Terror" have cost them. India has widespread support from the Islamic world for its foreign policy and international stances, but there is rising worry about the presence and influence of domestic extremist organisations like the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Similar movements have had a significant influence on India during the past few decades.

According to the stated perspective, India's security and geostrategic goals in the larger South:Central Asian area are significantly impacted by these difficulties. It has been demonstrated in this chapter that India is concerned about its domestic security since any instability emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Central Asia might pose severe difficulties to its internal stability with relation to Kashmir and have a potentially combustible role in fueling communal Hindu:Muslim hostilities. When it comes to external threats, India is concerned that Pakistan may utilize its influence in the region to undermine India on the ground and in its broader relationships with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Furthermore, as the researcher Stephen Blank has shown, the conventional and nuclear drama scenarios of a potential war between India and Pakistan are inextricably linked to acts of terror and atrocities in South and Central Asia and the wider conflict they may trigger. This demonstrates the fragility of India's ties with Central Asian region to the dynamics between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Strategic Cooperation between India and Kazakhstan

The analysis makes an effort to describe ongoing security reengagement of India with Central Asian region in the post:9/11 era in addition to recent "Look North" and "Connect Central Asia" strategies it launched. The research might have determined how India's objectives and the conditions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia interacted in terms of security. With this in mind, the following section offers a concise account of the strategic partnership among India and Kazakhstan in contemporary times, with an emphasis on the period following September 11th, 2001, and a concentration on the bilateral and regional contacts between the

two countries. Relationships between India and Kazakhstan on security and strategic within the context of multilateral initiatives are discussed.

India's strategic partnership with Kazakhstan mirrors the value it places on the country for ensuring its supply of reliable energy, especially nuclear energy. During President Nazarbayev's visit to India for the country's 60th Republic Day festivities in January 2009, a number of treaties were signed, including ones pertaining to space and military cooperation as well as a joint declaration of strategic alliance.⁴⁶² India has sent many high-level officials to Kazakhstan since they announced their strategic alliance. General VK Singh, India's army chief, travelled to Astana in 2011 after visiting Uzbekistan to expand on ongoing cooperative training exercises and extend an invitation to Kazakhstani officers to receive education and training in Indian military academies.⁴⁶³ Col. Gen. Zhasuzakov Saken Adilkhovich, the head of the Kazakh armed forces, travelled to Delhi in December 2014 to strengthen ties between the two countries in the areas of defence and counterterrorism.⁴⁶⁴

With regards to space and naval technologies, India and Kazakhstan have extensive collaboration in the defence industry. As of right now, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is working in tandem with the Baikonur Cosmodrome and the National Space Agency of Kazakhstan on a number of space technology projects.⁴⁶⁵ In contemporary geopolitical scenario, as space becomes increasingly militarized, this is becoming increasingly significant. A substantial number of torpedoes made in Kazakhstan are now in use by the Indian Navy. According to a media statement from the Government of India, India and Kazakhstan conducted the 4th Conference of the Joint Working Group on Combating Terrorism in May 2017; numerous new avenues of partnership were discovered, particularly India's support for the expansion of the Kazakh Navy in the Caspian Sea, collaboration in the

⁴⁶² Sajjanhar, Ashok. "India-Kazakhstan relations: Challenges and opportunities." *Gateway House*, 20 November, 2013. www.gatewayhouse.in/india-kazakhstan-relations-challenges-and-opportunities/. Accessed 22 Mar. 2021.

⁴⁶³ Kucera, Joshua. "Indian Army Chief Visiting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan." *Eurasianet*, 17 November 2011, www.eurasianet.org/indian-army-chief-visiting-kazakhstan-uzbekistan. Accessed 22 Mar. 2021; also see, "India-Kazakhstan Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 2014. www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/KAZAKHSTAN_DEC2014.pdf. Accessed 22 Mar. 2021.

⁴⁶⁴ "Kazakhstan army chief hopes to boost defence ties during six-day visit to India." *Business Standard*, 9 December 2014, www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/kazakhstan-army-chief-hopes-to-boost-defence-ties-during-six-day-visit-to-india-114120900240_1.html. Accessed 25 Mar. 2021.

⁴⁶⁵ Siddiqui, Huma. "Military and Space Cooperation is the main focus of India-Kazakh relations." *Financial Express*, 2 January 2019, www.financialexpress.com/defence/military-and-space-cooperation-is-the-main-focus-of-india-kazakh-relations/1431693. Accessed 2 Apr. 2021

production of weapons and ammunition, the upgrading of Indian torpedoes in India itself, and bilateral military exercises.

India and Kazakhstan evaluated and discussed the condition of terrorism in their respective areas, particularly the issue of state-sponsored, cross-border terrorism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.⁴⁶⁶ The two nations have spoken about the problems that various terrorist organisations are currently posing, such as indoctrination, foreign terrorist combatants, drug smuggling, and the use of the internet by terrorists.⁴⁶⁷ Exchange of information, capacity development, mutual legal aid, best practices for combatting violent extremism, and joint participation in multilateral organisations like the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have all been highlighted as crucial to bolstering the two countries' counter-terrorism partnership.⁴⁶⁸

Role of India in Kazakhstan's Security Matrix

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, five new independent states emerged in Central Asia, the most prominent of which is Kazakhstan. India and Kazakhstan have been strong and cordial partners since the Cold War's conclusion. A lot of progress has been made in the collaboration between the two nations recently, and things are only going to become better in the years to come. Thus far, the two nations' primary motivation for working together has been a shared goal to deepen their strategic relations and cooperation. This partnership is becoming more solid due to its complementary economic and security aspects. India's foreign policy today heavily influences Kazakhstan, and the reverse is also true. With the shifting geopolitical landscape of the world and growing economic interconnectedness, India has recently viewed Kazakhstan as a vital economic, security and energy partner as well as maybe a potential transitional superpower that might contribute to regional peace and harmony.

India places a high priority on Kazakhstan for both energy security and national security. India is worried about the growth of radical Islamist organisations that may pose a terrorist danger, and Central Asia region has long been viewed as a potential hotbed for religious

⁴⁶⁶ "4th meeting of India-Kazakhstan Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 3 May, 2017. www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm. Accessed 2 Apr. 2021.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

extremism.⁴⁶⁹ Numerous jihadist organisations are supposedly established in Central Asia, and it has been extensively acknowledged that since the fall of the Soviet Union, the region has been a fruitful breeding ground for such organisations. New Delhi is understandably worried about the spread of extremism throughout the region because of the global character of these organizations and their connections to the Taliban and other terrorist groups in bordering countries. Concerns have been raised that the advent of jihadist organisations, particularly in the region of Kashmir, might represent a severe danger to India's national security if not curbed.

The strategic relationship between India and Kazakhstan has been marked by steadfast support and collaboration in global forums, with the goal of bolstering each other's organizations and nations. For instance, Kazakhstan is in favour of India playing a bigger part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). It would also be relevant to mention that India is a participant in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Asia, which was financed by Kazakhstan. Furthermore, India's ambition for a seat on the UN Security Council has received significant backing from Kazakhstan, and in response, India has backed Kazakhstan's candidature for a non-permanent seat on the council for 2017:18.⁴⁷⁰

India and Kazakhstan have both shown that they are opposed to terrorism and want to work for a peaceful Asia, thus they have a common goal of preserving peace in the area. Afghanistan has been identified by both India and Kazakhstan as the region's epicentre of destabilization and drug trafficking. Based on this policy convergence, the two countries have committed to working together to end the war in Afghanistan as soon as possible and to rebuild the country. India and Kazakhstan have been working together on security issues, such as countering regional threats like terrorism, through a combination of diplomatic efforts and collaborative training and military engagements.

India sees Kazakhstan as strategically important because of the country's rising influence in the region. In 2010, Kazakhstan finished its presidency of the Organization for Security and

⁴⁶⁹ Sahgal, Arunand Anand, Vinod. "Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India". *Reconnecting India and Central Asia Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions*, edited by Nirmala Joshi, *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program*, 2010, pp. 33-79,

www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/1004Joshi-V-Strategic.pdf. Accessed 2 Apr. 2021.

⁴⁷⁰ "India-Kazakhstan Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 2018. www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/december_2018.pdf. Accessed 3 Apr. 2021.

Co:operation in Europe (OSCE), and it also launched the Central Asian regional initiative, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Asian forum to which India participate representative. These changes demonstrate the efforts of the Kazakh government to increase its international prominence.

Kazakhstan and India's expanding collaboration in preserving security, including combating terrorism, Islamic radicalism, narcotics trafficking, global organised crime, illegal migration, etc., has been a prominent component of their strategic contact with one another. India and Kazakhstan both place a high value on collaboration in the developing characteristics of post:War Afghanistan, in boosting cooperative efforts and the sharing of strategic intelligence in other high:risk fields, etc., because all of these elements pose a cumulative danger to the well:being of the regions of Central and South Asia.

India's growing relationship with Kazakhstan is important in light of the country's strategic objectives in the Central Asian area. The political and economic relationship between India and Kazakhstan encompasses a wide variety of fields, from commerce and military to security and academia. In general, India has contributed significantly to the economic and security growth of Kazakhstan, and particularly in the twenty:first century, India's connections with Kazakhstan have assumed critical importance. Each nation is steadily growing economically and militarily, and neither has any pressing bilateral issues. It would be advantageous for both nations to have closer connections. The partnership will be put on better terms by the shared goals of countering terrorism, creating a fair and equitable global order, and protecting citizens from harm on a regional and worldwide scale.

India places a high priority on Central Asia because of its geopolitical location. India and Kazakhstan view one another as key allies in the effort to advance peace, stability, and economic growth throughout Asia, particularly in the Central Asian area. India is keeping a close eye on the situation in Central Asia and is convinced it must speak out about the national security issues that the region's countries face. The security and tranquilly of both India and Central Asia will be impacted by any changes, whether they are good or bad, that occur in the regions.

The Central Asian Republics face a number of security difficulties, including terrorism, drug smuggling, arms smuggling, organised crime, separatism, ethnic disputes, etc. India and Kazakhstan are well aware of these issues. Throughout Central Asia, the subject of terrorism

has recently emerged as a serious concern that has stunted the region's growth by causing social and political unrest, uncertainty, and volatility. The proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan has made these concerns more pressing for Central Asians, since those two nations have been a springboard for terrorist attacks. India and Kazakhstan have similar long-term goals in terms of fighting terrorism, outlawing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and combatting other forms of organised crime. When both parties agree that the Central Asian Republics' sustainable economic success depends on peace, stability, and security, collaboration in addressing these issues makes a lot of sense. The partnership may benefit both countries' international and regional interests.

In keeping with this concept, India established a Joint Working Group with Kazakhstan for the purpose of information exchange and frequent discussions. This is a crucially important development for upcoming defence cooperation projects between India and republics of Kazakhstan. Sharing the necessary weapons and equipment to combat terrorism and associated concerns might be a major area of mutual benefit for the two states. In addition, frequent activities that might improve the current awareness of security problems should be carried out.

This goal would be accomplished by the establishment of English:cum:IT laboratories and the deployment of military training teams to the countries of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the stationing of a team in Tajikistan to teach the English language to military members. Furthermore, the Indian Navy is purchasing thermal and electrical torpedo materials and components from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and there is some cooperation with Kazakhstan on the construction of undersea naval weaponry.

One may suggest that a convergence of ideas on numerous international and regional challenges has also evolved with a strategic awareness of the necessity to improve this cooperation between India and Kazakhstan. It is well known that both nations are committed to exploring the possibility of establishing deeper, long-lasting strategic connections that would be profitable to both nations. Furthermore, in order to improve the contemporary level of strategic collaboration up to the available potential, strong political engagement and ambitious policy actions are very much necessary. This indicates that there is a great deal of untapped potential in the many areas of complementarity between India and Kazakhstan.

Chapter Conclusion

Central Asia's domestic security situation is just as fragile and sensitive as it was twenty years ago, even after the conclusion of Cold War and the Soviet Union's disintegration. There is a complex set of security threats to the Central Asia Republics' domestic stability caused by the persistence of oppressive governments in the region. There is a clear correlation between the "crisis of legitimacy" afflicting the ruling classes and the difficulty of constructing a viable state and a strong political opponent. Security of individuals in Central Asia is further undermined by the fact that the regimes in most countries (Kazakhstan being an exception) have a negative effect on the country's economic growth. Last but not least, the Central Asia Republics' continued conflict and minimal collaboration provide an atmosphere that allows other players (major and auxiliary states) to exercise influence in Central Asia's fast changing geopolitical landscape. The paradox is that modern Central Asia Republics may also influence and assist authorities, giving support to research arguments that collaboration, competitiveness, and regional conflict are all playing out in the region at once.

Politically and strategically, India's views on Afghanistan, Kashmir, and northern Pakistan as a single territory where the security situation in Central Asia combines with that of larger South Asia. The mixture wave of security risks coming from the South and Central Asian security settings has been the main source of worry for Indian policymakers for the past twenty years. Here, three different types of dangers may be identified: firstly, the restoration of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan following western departure raises concerns about the spread of ethnic unrest and volatility over the whole subcontinent and portions of Central Asia; secondly, the continual worry of the export of Islamic extremism and terrorism across the two countries from transnational groups like the IMU, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State; and lastly, the prospect of a nuclear arms race between the two regions.

The importance of addressing these challenges becomes clearer when placed in the context of India's national security and the strategy of India's policy for Central Asia. India's prosperity and security are at risk due to the complex relationship between these vulnerabilities and the difficulties provided by indigenous radicalization. Additionally, the necessity to stop Pakistan from utilizing Afghanistan and a future Taliban takeover to attain strategic equilibrium with India also influences India's security relationships with Afghanistan and Kazakhstan. As a

direct result of this, India has shifted its paradigm towards one of proactive military and security collaboration with Central Asian in general and Kazakhstan in particular. However, security remains the most important geopolitical factor for India's foreign policy decision makers to consider while formulating a policy for the Central Asian region. Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a significant theoretical or analytical contribution to addressing some of the issues raised by the research hypothesis.

CHAPTER: FIVE

Factors Influencing Indian Foreign Policy: Issues in India:Kazakhstan Relations

Introduction

Indian political ideologies that have an impact on Central Asia are placed in the context of Indian history and Indian perspective, with a particular focus on India's foreign policy objectives toward Kazakhstan. The relationship between the two countries dates back to the Silk Road period. Through Turkestan, the southernmost region of Kazakhstan, this route connected China to the rest of the western world. During the time of the Silk Road, nomadic and seminomadic Saka peoples travelled from southern Kazakhstan to India. Throughout history, the Silk Road has been instrumental in fostering cooperation, facilitating commerce, and disseminating new ideas. One of the most significant results of this trade route was the spread of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and China. The Buddhist religion was instrumental in facilitating and strengthening ties between Kazakhstan and India. The spread of Buddhism to Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia the beginning of a new era in the history of interaction between the two civilizations. As evidence, we may look to the numerous Buddhist monasteries and training institutes that now thrive throughout Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Therefore, the cooperation and links that are deeply ingrained and still visible in the commonalities of cuisine, language, attire, and culture now may be traced back to the ancient times. Therefore, the people of Kazakhstan have a particular place in their hearts for India. For this reason, Indian visitors have a long history of visiting Kazakhstan.

India's post-Cold War strategy in Central Asia has made improving ties with Kazakhstan a top priority. There has been a dramatic shift in the situation over the last several decades, and India's interactions with the rest of the world are now much more diverse and expansive. This research focuses at the ways in which both continuity and change have played a role in shaping India's foreign policy toward Kazakhstan. Both tradition and modernity may be seen in India's approach to foreign policy with respect to Kazakhstan. Many elements have been

highlighted so far that influence India's foreign policy with Kazakhstan. These elements include long-standing geopolitical concerns, which are driving much of the discussion towards a New Great Game. Domestic issues also have a role, which is addressed in the thesis. India's foreign policy with Kazakhstan may be better understood via a constructivist lens, which sheds light on the myriad of factors at play in the tying together of India's geopolitical, strategic natural resource, security, and diplomatic interests.

The research finds that India has been a beneficial economic partner of Kazakhstan throughout the span of time by analysing economic (trade) and energy links. India's economic ties to the Central Asian country have a lot of potential. Multilateralism is a foreign policy approach that India has actively promoted. India's foreign policy strategy of promoting regional integration aids in responding to regional security architecture and governance requirements. The issue that emerges now is what forces are most influential in shaping India's foreign policy. As previously said, answering in black and white would not accurately represent India's complicated foreign policy process. Thus, the chapter weighs empirical aspects to frame India's foreign policy in Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan.

Geopolitics of the Heartland


Halford Mackinder, a British geographer, revived the idea of geopolitics in international relations with his Heartland Theory in 1904. According to Mackinder, who wrote an essay titled "The Geographical Pivot of History," the state that dominates Central Asia: "the great pivot" during the modern era would become a superpower due to the region's abundant natural resources. The modern-day Heartland is delineated by the Caspian Sea and includes Russia and the five former Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In the wake of the USSR collapse in 1991, the Central Asian nations also declared their independence. These new countries form the current basis of Mackinder's article's pivot region, making them essential to any geopolitical assessment of the Heartland. Russia is, and has always been, the dominant power in the Central European area.

Developed by Mackinder almost a century ago, the Heartland Theory is a classic in the field. As a result of this theory, geographical considerations are integrated into the practice of

international politics. The thesis revolves on the idea of a pivot area or Heartland, an expansive region in Eurasia whose regional political dominance by a certain country would decide that country's supremacy in global politics. This theory paints a simplistic and deterministic picture of global politics as being entirely determined by available physical assets. In a nutshell, the idea rests on the following central tenet.

*Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
 Who rules the heartland commands the World:island;
 Who rules the World:island commands the World.*⁴⁷¹

Map 3: Mackinder's Pivot Area/Heartland⁴⁷²



This study focused on Central Asia, a key region in modern times. In the last few decades, this area's influence among global and regional superpowers has grown significantly. India once again took an interest in Central Asia, praising its abundant natural resources. In terms of economic value, the energy deposits in the Caspian region are among the world's most significant. The Heartland paradigm has an important role in modern international politics,

⁴⁷¹ Mackinder, Halford J. "The geographical pivot of history (1904)." *The geographical journal*, vol. 170, no. 4, 2004. pp. 298-321.

⁴⁷² Source: Mackinder, Halford J. "The geographical pivot of history (1904)." *The geographical journal*, vol. 170, no. 4, 2004. pp. 298-321.

especially in India's attitude to Central Asia. A common theme in discussions of Indian foreign policy towards Central Asia is the idea that it is motivated by strategic diversity. As an example, India's strategy is driven by geopolitical considerations, such as the country's desire to prevent the spread of terrorism and the ascent of a regional hegemon like China. The geo:economics of the area guides India's foreign policy decisions so that the country may benefit from the region's abundant energy resources. According to researcher Nalin Kumar Mohapatra, India's strategy towards Kazakhstan is structured by a geo:political, and geo:economic approach that seeks to increase the availability of energy to consumers and prevent any one state from monopolizing the supply of energy. When examining India's strategies toward the region, it is essential to use a geopolitical analysis.

Geopolitical Triangle: The New Great Game Between Major Powers

Central Asia's power struggle has been going on for centuries. Central Asia's location at the geopolitical crossroads of Eurasia and its proximity to two nuclear superpowers, Russia and China, have ensured the region's prominence in international consciousness. Geopolitical relevance of Central Asia after the Cold War never diminished, and the area instead became a battlefield for regional and extra:regional powers because to the vast potential with natural resources and strategic and economic advantages. All of the world's leading nations now consider Central Asia to be an important part of their strategic sphere of influence.⁴⁷³ A new great game of the struggle for energy has emerged in the heartland area, as energy deficit country seek more reliability and diversify in their energy supplies. The United States, China, the European Union, Japan, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and India are just some of the nations that have stepped up their efforts to control and administrate the region's energy resources as a result of the intensified competition for oil and other forms of energy. The New Great Game revolves mostly on oil and natural gas and pipeline geopolitics. This chapter examines India's foreign policy regarding Kazakhstan in the context of its search for energy in the former Soviet stronghold and the present:day global power competition between China, the United States, and Russia.

Changes to the conventional great game have resulted in the emergence of the New Great Game. The struggle for control over Central Asia's energy resources by major and regional

⁴⁷³ Rumer, Eugene. "The US Interests and Role in Central Asia after K2." *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:3, Summer, 2006, pp. 141-154. www.doi.org/10.1162/wash.2006.29.3.141. Accessed 4 Jan. 2022.

countries has been dubbed the New Great Game. Obtaining control of energy pipelines and transportation corridor is the main objective of the New Great Game in Central Asia. India has emerged as a major player in the Great Game over the last several decades, which has seen a shift to new patterns and new players. India's goals in the New Great Game include more wealth, secure energy supply, rapid economic development, and a more powerful political and military posture. From this vantage point, India's role in easing the New Great Game is crucial. It is undeniable that geopolitics plays a significant role in, and will continue to play a significant role in, shaping India's foreign policy. The geopolitical component of foreign policy preferences thus exists, and the rules of the game may evolve over time. The geo: strategic importance of India is based on its security concerns and regional strategies. This helped, along with India's strategic plans, to give the country a control over the world's energy supply.

Central Asia's location in the geographic centre of Eurasia presents challenges for the efficient conveyance of vital energy supplies. Logistically, there is no simple way to connect Kazakhstan's energy resources with the sea routes used by India, the world's largest consumer of energy. Country like, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Turkey are eager to benefit from Central Asian energy. However, only a select few countries have the power to affect the geopolitics of this region. Although Russia is still a major player in international affairs, the West and China's expanding sphere of influence need additional consideration when analysing the geopolitics of energy in Central Asia. Moscow has had a foothold in the region of Central Asia. Russian interests would be undermined by the involvement of western forces in Central Asia. India's sluggish expansion is also important to keep in mind. First and foremost, since the West's presence in Central Asia during the Cold War constituted a direct challenge to Russia's longstanding hegemony in the region.

Since the 1990s, Russia has worked to strengthen contacts with the CAS in the energy areas, due in large part to the importance of the oil reservoirs situated in the Central Asian heartland. But it became difficult for Russia to retain its hegemony in CAR due to China's expanding position in the area, and the increasing presence of new actors. Recent years have seen unprecedented growth in the ties between Russia and India. India has to keep its relationship with Russia strong if it is to be successful in this geopolitical game. To counter China's growing influence in Central Asia, Russia is also taking deliberate steps toward

closer diplomatic and economic ties with India.⁴⁷⁴ Therefore, Russia advocated for India's membership in the SCO, whereas China proposed including Pakistan only under certain conditions. Indeed, China is progressively growing its influence in the region under the SCO's banner, including military relations, presumably with a long-term objective of displacing Russia as global hegemon.⁴⁷⁵ Russia's primary motivations for supporting regional organisations like the CSTO, EAEU, and CIS are to counteract the growing influence of China and the United States in the area, however this has not yet been accomplished. However, it seems that Russia is trying to use India's potential membership in the EAEU as a counterweight to China's growing economic influence in Central Asia.⁴⁷⁶ According to these perspectives, if India wishes to maintain relations with Kazakhstan, it must first maintain good relations with Russia.

As a matter of crucial geopolitical realism, the United States has been preventing Russia from acquiring a monopoly on Central Asian energy resources, which is an essential geostrategic fact. Russia is likewise worried about American influence and presence in Central Asia. In the event that tensions between the United States and China continue to escalate, the region's closeness to China may be useful. Not only that, but both China and Russia have foreign policies that seek to limit American involvement in Central Asia.⁴⁷⁷ However, Russia seeks to establish a strategic triangle with India and China to oppose a hegemonic, unipolar global order headed by the United States.⁴⁷⁸ However, India, China, and Russia are all battling in Central Asia for the region's energy resources. India's concern for its energy supply and Russia's regional priorities are at odds with China's geo-economic objectives in Central Asia. Indian interest in Kazakhstan has been spurred in large part by increased Chinese foreign policy action in the nation. In the eyes of India's foreign policy elite, China is a major strategic rival in Kazakhstan.

According to this analysis, there is a connection between Indian and Russian interests. It's clear that India and Russia have forged a solid strategic alliance. Russia seeks to preserve and

⁴⁷⁴ Jiang, Yuan. "Russia's strategy in Central Asia: inviting India to balance China." *The Diplomat* (2020): 1-4. www.thediplomat.com/2020/01/russias-strategy-in-central-asia-inviting-india-to-balance-china/. Accessed 6 Jan. 2022.

⁴⁷⁵ Mohapatra, Aswini K. "India and Central Asia; Interests, Opportunities and Challenges." *Bi-Annual Journal of International Politics*, (Teheran), vol.1, no. 2, Summer and Autumn, 2008. pp. 55-76.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁷ Rumer, Eugene. *Op. cit.* p. 151.

⁴⁷⁸ Rinna, Anthony. "Central Asia and The India-Russia Partnership." *The diplomat*, 27 January 2015, www.thediplomat.com/2015/01/central-asia-and-the-india-russia-partnership/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2022.

expand its geopolitical dominance, while India seeks to grow its power and influence in Central Asia. However, there is a convergence of interests between India and Russia at the moment. As a consequence, Russia has welcomed increasing Indian participation in Kazakhstan. Therefore, Russia is establishing deeper connections with India, while China is the greatest danger to both India and Russia in Central Asia.⁴⁷⁹

The Factors of United States, Russia, and China in India's Policy Towards Kazakhstan

Currently, Kazakhstan is the site of this New Great Game, which has numerous participants with similar goals but different tactics. The United States of America, Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran are the primary actors. There is intense competition among these countries to acquire and maintain political and economic influence over Kazakhstan's energy resources, particularly the country's uranium deposits.

The United States is pursuing numerous goals in Central Asia, particularly expanding the region's economy, and gaining access to energy resources.⁴⁸⁰ After the end of the Cold War, the United States prioritized democracy promotion, security, and energy in its strategy toward Central Asia.⁴⁸¹ Under the guise of Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States seeks to eradicate terrorism and Islamic extremism throughout Afghanistan and Central Asian region.⁴⁸² After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy focused on countering Islamic extremism and establishing a more secure political order in the region. Consequently, India has consistently backed the U.S.'s efforts in Central Asia to curb the influence of extremist Islam.⁴⁸³ The United States seeks to limit China's influence and maintain dominance over oil and gas pipeline. The United States' support for democratization in Central Asia was important in bringing about all these desired outcomes.⁴⁸⁴ To accomplish

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Weitz, Richard. "Averting a new great game in central Asia." *Washington Quarterly* 29.3 (2006): 155-167. doi.org/10.1162/wash.2006.29.3.155. Accessed 12 Jan. 2022.

⁴⁸¹ Levine, Ilya. "US Policies in Central Asia: Democracy, Energy and the War on Terror." Routledge, 2016. pp. 67-68.

⁴⁸² Torkelson, Thomas D. "Ideas in Arms: The Relationship of Kinetic and Ideological Means in America's Global War on Terror." Air University Press, 2008. pp. 59-104.

⁴⁸³ Rudenko, Ye I. "American, Chinese and Russian Factors in Interaction of Central and South Asian States." *News of the National Academy of sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, Vol. 6, No. 328, 2019, pp. 118-125. doi.org/10.32014/2019.2224-5294.220. Accessed 1 Feb. 2022.

⁴⁸⁴ Levine, Ilya. Op. cit.

regional integration and to support a free market economy, the United States is fostering ties with the Central Asian republics.

In particular, modern-day Central Asian republics have realised that the United States' objectives are not to encourage Democratisation but rather to secure influence over their mineral resources.⁴⁸⁵ Kazakhstan was the primary target of American geopolitical interests in the Central Asian region. Because of its proximity to China, Kazakhstan is seen as strategically important by the United States. Similarly, the United States is interested in limiting Chinese strategic and political dominance in this region. Another important landlocked country, Tajikistan is southern entryway into Central Asia. The strategic importance of Tajikistan's position between Afghanistan and Central Asia is underscored by the fact that all forms of international drug trafficking must travel through the country. Central Asia has become a breeding ground for not just illicit narcotics and weapons but also for extremism and the ideology that supports it. Therefore, the United States is paying greater attention to Tajikistan in order to achieve its national security goals in the area. Overall, Tajikistan was a key player in the New Great Game as a whole.

The United States has a primary interest in Kazakhstan because to the country's stockpile of nuclear and biological weapons technology from the Soviet period and to the dominance of Chinese and Russian companies in the energy pipeline industry. Government diplomats in the United States place a high value on energy diversification. Hydrocarbon and uranium deposits in Kazakhstan are enormous and very valuable. However, it must be emphasised that Kazakhstan is a major producer of both fossil fuels and uranium. Several major American oil and gas firms, including ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, have funded projects in Kazakhstan.⁴⁸⁶ Currently, the United States is collaborating with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the Baku:Tbilisi:Ceyhan oil pipeline. Indian analysts believe that the expansion of Kazakhstan's infrastructure would provide optimal conditions for American and other foreign enterprises (India) to take part in the country's economic growth via investment.

⁴⁸⁵ Rudenko, Ye I. Op. cit.

⁴⁸⁶ Cohen, Ariel. "US Interests and Central Asia energy security." *Backgrounder* 1984 (2006): 1-11. www.heritage.org/europe/report/us-interests-and-central-asia-energy-security. Accessed 1 Feb. 2022.

The US has, therefore, worked hard to keep the friendship with Kazakhstan ever since it became an independent country.⁴⁸⁷

The foreign policy goals of US in Central Asia are intrinsically linked to the larger purpose of establishing global preeminence. From this vantage point, Indian political elites are particularly dissatisfied with the United States' role in the Kazakh oil fields because, contrary to popular belief, it is not Russian or Chinese oil companies that stand in India's way of entering the Kazakh hydrocarbon market but rather American company hinderance to enter.⁴⁸⁸ However, American efforts to enlist Central Asian states in a conflict with Iran, India is also quite unhappy.

The exploitation of Kazakhstan's energy reserves is a big industry in which Russia plays a significant role. Given their shared history, close proximity, and economic links, Russia continues to play an important role in Kazakh foreign policy. Drug smuggling and Islamic radicalism in Central Asia have caused a number of issues in southern Russia. Russia's goal, from these viewpoints, is to protect its security interests in the volatile neighborhood. In order to achieve its economic goals, Moscow plans to participate in the exploration and production of the region's natural resources. The majority of Kazakhstan's oil, gas, and electrical infrastructure is now owned and operated by Russian firms. Russia has already made significant investments in many energy and transportation projects in Kazakhstan. Russia may benefit from its pipeline monopoly in Kazakhstan by shipping hydrocarbon products to other countries.

Russia's influence and importance in Kazakhstan's energy infrastructure continue to grow. China's economic influence in Kazakhstan is expanding, although Russia is still the country's most important trading partner. Citizens of Russia provide critical services in the fields of business management, technology, and administration in Kazakhstan. Russia's military presence in Kazakhstan has grown steadily over the last several years. When it comes to international security, Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role. More than sixty negotiations coordinate defence and military:technical cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia, and

⁴⁸⁷ Almadiyev, Bekbolat. "Kazakhstan and America: The Frontiers of Energy Diplomacy." *European Researcher*, Vol. 94, No. 5, 2015, pp. 356-364. www.erjournal.ru/journals_n/1433331800.pdf. Accessed 2 Feb. 2022.

⁴⁸⁸ Rudenko, Ye I. Op. cit.

the two countries also work together under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).⁴⁸⁹

According to some Indian authors, Moscow is the inherent force behind all that occurs in the former Soviet Central Asia and offers the region a complete assurance. As a result, it is sometimes argued that Russia is the only country through which India can communicate with this region, particularly in the areas of security and energy. Russia, on the other hand, wants to keep Pakistan out of Central Asian problems even though it generally welcomes India's potential and existing multifaceted presence in the region. Given its flexible relationship with Russia, which extends to the Central Asian region, it is obvious that all of this is quite convenient for India.⁴⁹⁰

In addition to being a significant regional factor, China is Kazakhstan's burgeoning economic power. China wants stable relations with the neighboring nations and peaceful boundaries. China has a voracious appetite for energy. Future economic development in China depends critically on the availability of oil and natural gas. For the purpose of ensuring its future energy needs, China desired control over the energy resource in Kazakhstan. The most significant energy partner of China in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. About 20% of Kazakhstan's oil supply is under Beijing's control.⁴⁹¹ The best solution for China's desire to diversify its supply of energy is Kazakhstan.

Similar to that, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China also heavily relies on Kazakhstan. In addition to being an important energy exporter and supplier to China, Kazakhstan has an abundant in oil and gas reserve. In Kazakhstan's energy industries, China has made investments totaling over \$14 billion.⁴⁹² Additionally, Kazakhstan is the biggest producer of uranium in the worldwide. China receives the majority of uranium from Kazakhstan, with the remaining amount going to Europe, Canada, and the US. Additionally, Kazatomprom invested in China's nuclear power industry, and China and Kazakhstan both participated in

⁴⁸⁹ Rousseau, Richard. "Kazakhstan's strategic and military relations with Russia." *Diplomatic Courier* 20 (2011). www.diplomaticcourier.com/posts/kazakhstan-s-strategic-and-military-relations-with-russia. Accessed 6Feb. 2022.

⁴⁹⁰ Rudenko, Ye I. Op. cit.

⁴⁹¹ Pradhan, Ramakrushna. *Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia: India's Position and Policy*. Routledge India, 2020. P. 233.

⁴⁹² Donnellon-May, Genevieve. "Powering China's Nuclear Ambitions." *The Diplomat*, 20, September, 2022. www.thediplomat.com/2022/09/powering-chinas-nuclear-ambitions/. Accessed 12 Oct. 2022.

collaborations for uranium mining.⁴⁹³ By growing its shipments to China, Kazakhstan, the top exporter of uranium to that nation, will be able to contribute even more to the nation's energy needs. All of these power struggles were intertwined in the network of relationships that shaped the 'New Great Game' in Kazakhstan.

Indian researchers have noted that China and India are the two main participants in Central Asia's new great game. The tight military and defence relations between China and Kazakhstan have faced opposition from Russia. Kazakhstan is buying Chinese weapons and military hardware. Therefore, Russia is increasingly losing its market for weapons in the Central Asian countries. The SCO was another venue that China utilized. China has become a significant energy partner in Kazakhstan.⁴⁹⁴ Beijing agreed to provide Kazakhstan a US\$10 billion credit for oil in April 2009, and the same month, China announced a second US\$10 billion loan to the SCO in order to assist its economically disadvantaged members. There is already a crude oil pipeline between China and Kazakhstan that runs through Xinjiang.⁴⁹⁵ There have been demonstrations against Chinese industrial building as a result of China's expanding economic and geopolitical influence in Kazakhstan.

In 2016 Anti-Chinese sentiment also fueled a wave of demonstrations over a proposed land reform in Kazakhstan.⁴⁹⁶ Kazakhstan is much more reliant on Delhi than Beijing. In order to counterbalance China, Kazakhstan is searching for new allies like India. Kazakhstan acknowledged that although China's expanded participation offers numerous benefits, its hegemonic push has also stoked suspicion among its civil society. Kazakhstan is attempting to balance Chinese influence to creates relationship with India. According to the following table, Kazakhstan is working to improve diplomatic ties with India by arranging more regular visits between the two countries, signing numerous agreements, and promoting tighter

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Pradhan, Ramakrushna. Op. cit. p. 234.

⁴⁹⁵ Wani, Ayjaz. "India and China in Central Asia: Understanding the new rivalry in the heart of Eurasia." *Observer Research Foundation*, Occasional Paper, no. 253, February, 2020. p. 9. www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-china-in-central-asia-understanding-the-new-rivalry-in-the-heart-of-eurasia-61473/. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.

⁴⁹⁶ Mikheyev, Pavel "Dozens Protest Against Chinese Influence in Kazakhstan." *Reuters*, 4 September. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-china-protests-idUSKCN1VP1B0. Accessed 23 Feb. 2022. Also see, Neafie, Jessica. "Anti-Chinese Sentiment, the BRI, and COVID-19: Kazakhstani Perceptions of China in Central Asia". *Central Asia and the Covid-19 Pandemic. The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia*, edited by Caron, JF., Thibault, H. Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, pp. 75-95. doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7586-7_5. Accessed 23 Feb. 2022.

commercial ties (see table 9).⁴⁹⁷ The balance of power between India, China, and Russia in Kazakhstan presents a threat to their economic and geopolitical ties. Focusing at the manifestation of non:zero:sum game in the struggle among China and India in Kazakhstan.

Table 9: India and Kazakhstan High Level Official Visits and Agreements⁴⁹⁸

| Who Visited | Country | Agreements | Year |
|------------------------------------|------------|---|------|
| P.M Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao | Kazakhstan | 1. Protocol on Cooperation between Ministry of External Affairs of India and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. 2. Agreement on Cooperation in Science & Technology. | 1993 |
| President Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev | India | 1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital. | 1996 |
| President Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev | India | 1. India:Kazakhstan Joint Declaration. | 2002 |
| P.M Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee | Kazakhstan | 1. Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Tourism. | 2002 |
| President Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev | India | 1. Extradition Treaty between India and Kazakhstan. 2. Protocol between India and Kazakhstan on accession of Kazakhstan to WTO. 3. Memorandum between the governments of India and Kazakhstan on cooperation in application of technical regulations and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 4. Agreement between the governments of India and Kazakhstan on protection of certain indications of tea, rice and mango on the territory of Kazakhstan. 5. MOU between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. and JS NAC KazAtomProm of Kazakhstan. 6. MOU between ISRO of India and National Space Agency of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in the field of Space Activities. 7. Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership between India and Kazakhstan. | 2009 |
| P.M Dr. Manmohan Singh | Kazakhstan | 1. Agreement for Cooperation in the peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy. 2. MOU between Indian Computer Emergency | 2011 |

⁴⁹⁷ Wani, Ayjaz. Op. cit.

⁴⁹⁸ Source: "High Level Visits." Embassy of India. Astana, Kazakhstan; also see, "List of Bilateral International Agreements between Kazakhstan and India." Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in India. www.indembastana.gov.in/page/agreements-signed/. Accessed 23 Feb. 2022.

| Who Visited | Country | Agreements | Year |
|--|------------|--|------|
| | | <p>Response Team (CERT:In) (Department of Information Technology) of India & Kazakhstan Computer Emergency Response Team (KZ:CERT) of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in Information Security.</p> <p>3. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil Matters.</p> <p>4. Agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture of India and the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan for Cooperation in the field of Agriculture & Allied Sectors.</p> <p>5. Agreement between the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of India & the Ministry of Health of Kazakhstan for Cooperation in the field of healthcare.</p> | |
| P.M Shri Narendra Modi | Kazakhstan | <p>1. MOU between the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports of India and the Ministry of Culture and Sports of Kazakhstan on Cooperation on Physical Culture and Sports.</p> <p>2. Long:Term Contract for Sale and Purchase of Natural Uranium Concentrates between JSC “NAC Kazatomprom” and Directorate of Purchase & Stores, Department of Atomic Energy, GOI.</p> <p>3. MOU between the Ministry of Railways of India and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy on Technical Cooperation in the field of Railways.</p> <p>4. Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons.</p> <p>5. Agreement on Defence and Military Technical Cooperation.</p> <p>6. Tej Kadam: India:Kazakhstan Joint Statement.</p> <p>7. MOU between “Samruk:Energo” and the State Corporation “Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited”.</p> | 2015 |
| MoS for External Affairs and Culture Ms. Meenakashi Lekhi | Kazakhstan | 1.Cultural Exchange Program between the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Culture and Sports of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the years 2022:2025. | 2022 |

On the other hand, Kazakhstan almost openly discusses its plans to utilize India as a counterbalance to China. Decision:makers in foreign policy in India thought that the world as a whole, not just India, should be concerned about China’s expanding dominance in Central Asia. In addition to its own interests, New Delhi is concerned about the Chinese BRI, which

also affects the interests of the Central Asian countries. Since 2013, China has aggressively supported BRI initiatives throughout Central Asia.⁴⁹⁹ The strategic goals of China's BRI are to encourage the distribution of resources, extensive market connectivity, and the unrestricted and regular movement of economic forces. Supporting the nations to accomplish economic cooperation and to participate in deeper and more extensive regional economic cooperation and collectively constructing an open architecture that helps everyone.⁵⁰⁰

The BRI proposes to integrate the Central Asian with a brand: new, extensive transit system.⁵⁰¹ In addition, India and China share similar political stances on a number of issues that concern the Central Asian region, such as Islamic radicalism, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, etc. The SCO is the vehicle by which China advances its strategy in Central Asia, despite the fact that the disagreements between India and China are widely acknowledged within the SCO structures.⁵⁰²

China has, in fact, obstructed India's attempts to strengthen and expand its diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, and has only made sincere attempts to impede Indian large business on the commercial front. India's strategic perspective on geopolitics of Kazakhstan is hampered by China's expanding engagement in Kazakhstan, as well as by its huge financial assistance, military assistance, and political control in the area.⁵⁰³ In Kazakhstan, India and China will interact geopolitically and economically in either region where they already work together in other regions of the world where their interests do not coincide. There is no doubt that the Chinese influence in Kazakhstan is detrimental to India. However, given the current geopolitical situation, India and China's partnership through Kazakhstan in particular and the Central Asian in general must be seen from a negative perspective.⁵⁰⁴

From these viewpoints, the influence of external actors (China) has been important, but not pivotal, in the relationship between India and Kazakhstan. However, India sees the United

⁴⁹⁹ Rudenko, Ye I. Op. cit.

⁵⁰⁰ Vakulchuk, Roman, et al. "BRI in central Asia: overview of Chinese projects." *Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (CADGAT)* (2019), pp. 1-5. www.osce-academy.net/en/research/cadgat/. Accessed 23 Feb. 2022.

⁵⁰¹ Vakulchuk, Roman, and Indra Overland. "China's Belt and Road Initiative through the lens of Central Asia." *Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative*. Taylor and Francis, 2019. pp. 115-133.

⁵⁰² Pradhan, Ramakrushna. Op. cit. p. 234.

⁵⁰³ Bid.

⁵⁰⁴ Rudenko, Ye I. Op. cit.

States and China as significant political obstacles to expanding India's bilateral ties with Kazakhstan. This research highlights the fact that India's success story in Central Asia is not as impressive as it may seem at first glance. India's projected foreign policy objectives have been dealt with in a methodical manner, as shown by the country's limited success in building ties over a lengthy time. The new great game debate highlights how distinctiveness of India's foreign policy. The discussion also provides light on the fact that various actors are producing different inter:state interactions and new patterns of engagement, proving once again that history does not repeat itself.

Factor of Strategic Material Interests

The pursuit of energy resources, strategic material interests, and economic engagement are taken into account within the framework of the partnership between India and Kazakhstan as a result of India having a taste of globalisation. However, it is thought that the strategic material interest is the most important. The complex energy links among Kazakhstan and India is a contemporary phenomenon. From the early Silk Road to the modern New Silk Road, transit route was very crucial. But still its composition is constantly changing. The significance of this research is to outline factors of India's foreign policies towards Kazakhstan. India's foreign policy must take into account its strategic material vision, because it is crucial in two ways; Firstly. It has previously been mentioned and emphasised in relation to Indian foreign policy, but it is crucial to update the version in light of India's current foreign policy regarding Kazakhstan. Secondly. The expansion of economic ties via access to markets and the construction of direct energy transit projects is one of India's key strategic material interests in international affairs.

Since India's government decided to open up economy in the 1990s, development has been highlighted as a top goal. India's foreign policy is undoubtedly influenced by the economic openness for modernization. Indian policy architects focus on 'good neighbours' as a policy shows how important it is to build relationships with neighboring states. Alternatively, a new national interest in Indian foreign policy focuses on the idea of an expanded neighbourhood.

India is already a major force in South Asia, but it aspires to play a more significant role on the international stage. The notion of a 'extended neighbourhood' may help bridge this gap.⁵⁰⁵

India's foreign policy with Kazakhstan is heavily influenced by strategic material interests related to the country's economic growth. Dealing with energy problems, developing energy routes, investing in and maintaining transportation connections, ensuring access to markets through trade deals, and maintaining and improving transportation linkages all require a multifaceted approach from foreign policy. When discussing the New Great Game, pipeline politics, and energy resources, it is necessary to begin with a consideration of the strategic material interests that underpin these issues. Without a question, these are the perspectives through which most analyses of India's foreign policy toward Kazakhstan are seen. The reason behind this emphasis on strategic material interest is the attractiveness of the argument and the abundance of facts and figures to support this pure realpolitik argument.

Central Asia has historically been the most favored corridor for Indian trade and travel. Central Asia is a part of India's extended neighborhood. In addition, Central Asia contributed to the growth of the cultures with which it came into connection.⁵⁰⁶ India is eager to take advantage of this opportunity by establishing cordial relations with Central Asia because of the transit link it will provide to European markets. The Silk Road, which aided in India's economic growth in the history and is now contributing to India's economic prosperity once again. Through the Silk Route, India was connected to Central Asia from the third century B.C. until the fifteenth century A.D.⁵⁰⁷ India has had a long history of trade and cultural exchange with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Xinjiang. Throughout history, trade has been the driving force, and with it has come cross-cultural exchange.⁵⁰⁸ In modern time every country on Earth is concerned about the depletion of natural resources. India's growing energy ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization members and Kazakhstan demonstrate the urgent necessity for India to diversify its energy supplies.

⁵⁰⁵ Scott, David. "India's "extended neighborhood" concept: power projection for a rising power." *India Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, April-June, 2009, pp.107-143.

⁵⁰⁶ Amb. Chauhan, Narinder. "India-Central Asia: why is the Region Important for India?" *Financial Express*, 22 January. 2022. p.6.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Joshi, Nirmala. "Reconnecting India and Central Asia." *Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions*, Singapore: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2010, pp. 19-32.

By focusing on India's strategic material interests, this study highlights two emerging phenomena in India's economic relations with Kazakhstan. In the first chapter, highlight that energy as a strategic material interest, a key policy derivation, through a discussion of the evolution of India:Kazakhstan engagement. India's relationship with Kazakhstan has been developing through a series of tests of legitimization, solidarity, and progress. India gained access to Kazakhstan via the multilateral SCO alliance. Second, the materialist aspect of India's engagement and pattern of trade relations with Kazakhstan is not a break from India's past, which is an essential issue in the present research. It's a continuation of India's traditional commercial ties with Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan, a country rich in energy resources, is interested in doing business with India, while India is interested in Kazakhstan's expanding market.

Is it sufficient to draw the conclusion that India has become one of the most important and influential players in the New Great Game and that collaboration between Russia and India aims to counterbalance China, as existing literature suggests? The presence of Chinese military outposts is more worrisome to Russian authorities than recent signs of India's growing inclusion in the area. As with the US, it is improbable that Russia will attempt to strike a balance with regard to India. The New Great Game is marked by a significant transition, according to the geopolitical perspective.

India's foreign policy's mentioned energy interests are shown as enduring, and the fascination of India's economic partnerships with Kazakhstan is recognized. The patterns of engagement between India and the countries of Central Asia must be understood. The current analysis underlines that while economic objectives and strategic material interests should not be separated, doing so results in an incomplete picture. India's ties with Kazakhstan continue to be centered on soft power, aid diplomacy, and resource diplomacy. It has been established that energy and national security interests were the main concerns. According to these perspectives, India wants to interact actively with multilateral organizations like the SCO. The SCO offers India the only international forum where it can conduct relations with China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in close vicinity. Combating new and emerging security risks is prime purpose of SCO. Overall, as India:Central Asia relations expanded, strategic material interests took center stage.

Afghanistan and Pakistan Factor in India's Kazakhstan Policy

Afghanistan is one of the countries that border Central Asia, which is completely landlocked. The presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has had a significant negative impact on India's primary strategic interests in Kazakhstan. The goal of terrorism is obviously to disrupt plans for economic integration and growth. The volatile and unstable situation in Afghanistan, as well as the ongoing fight against terrorism and the result of that conflict, are guaranteed to have an influence on stability and consequences for the security situation in Central Asia. Terrorism that is based in Afghanistan and is supported by Pakistan may look for safe havens within the neighborhood. The Taliban supported actively by Pakistan linkages.⁵⁰⁹ Terrorism is the biggest threat to peace, stability, and cooperation. The biggest challenge for India's relations with Central Asia is unfortunately posed by terror, and this is a priority for not only the bilateral relationship between India and Central Asia but also India's regional interface with Central Asia and processes such as the Heart of Asia Process, which although it focuses on Afghanistan, brings the impact of terrorism into our region. The situation in the region has still not stabilized calibrated by sophisticated state sponsorship from Pakistan's inter:services intelligence (ISI).⁵¹⁰ ISI terrorism in the region has become the only certainty in a zone of uncertainty, directly challenging the transitions in Central Asia and India towards socio:economic development.

When seen from this angle, the decision:makers in India's foreign policy have to be concerned about the growing number of security risks in the country's northern region. The improvement of India's land transport link with Central Asia via the Chabahar port and Afghanistan is the primary focus of India's diplomatic talks with Kazakhstan. Until now, India and Kazakhstan's economic and energy ties continue to be hampered by a number of fundamental obstacles, one of the most significant of which is a lack of land connectivity. The land connection between India and the economies of Central Asia has been hampered by the instability of Afghanistan and the hostility of Pakistan for a considerable amount of time. Another important factor is that, India is having hostile neighbour on the north eastern frontier like China. Similarly, India's political hostility with China caused non availability of direct access to Central Asian republics. Government of India want to rejuvenate of

⁵⁰⁹ Waldman, Matt. "The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents." *Crisis States Research Centre, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University*, June, 2010. p. 3.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

traditional India:Central Asia trade routes passing through Ladakh and Xinjiang, but this route depends on Chinese political will.⁵¹¹

The instability that exists in the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is intimately connected to both the national interests and the security of India. In fact, the significant number of Pakistani terrorists got training at terrorist training camps in order to prepare for fighting against India. There has been an active Pakistani hand in provoking recent acts of cybercrimes in India as well as attacks on the Indian Parliament and the state legislative assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as isolated terror attacks in Indian cities. As a result, India's security and sovereignty are closely connected to the instability in Afghanistan and the hostile stance taken by Pakistan. As a result, it is essential to build strong relations with the Central Asia in order to combat potential conflicts in the future. Overall, Taliban in Afghanistan and the ISI in Pakistan, have the potential to negative effects for India's national security. As a consequence of this, it is very necessary for India to play a more active role in the regional security matrix of Central Asia and to take steps to prevent instability from spreading into Central Asia. In these points of view, the construction of a gas pipeline that would connect India and Turkmenistan has been an issue of attention, despite the fact that it is not yet obvious whether or not such a plan would be feasible. India is still worried that a pipeline would have to pass through both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This would put the pipeline at risk owing to the instability in Afghanistan, and also offering Pakistan the possibility to threaten India's access to energy sources.⁵¹²

On the other side, India would need to increase its transport connection with other nations, especially Central Asia, which is nearest neighbor. For instance, The International North:South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a connectivity project that involves the movement of cargo through ship, rail, and road connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The intended path of the INSTC connects all of these countries. In addition, Prime Minister Modi suggested that the Kazakhstan:Turkmenistan:Iran Rail Link could be able to function as a connected corridor to the INSTC. The planned Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan Trilateral Transit Trade Agreement (PATTTTA) was mentioned by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015.⁵¹³ India has been proposed several new pipelines projects. The regional and geopolitical conflicts with Pakistan and Afghanistan have hampered all of these

⁵¹¹ Warikoo, K. "Ladakh: India's Gateway to Central Asia." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 44no. 3, 2020, pp. 177-192.

⁵¹² Pradhan, Ramakrushna. Op. cit. pp. 141-142.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

pipeline projects. India has to put in significant effort to establish a regional framework for energy cooperation incorporating Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan so that oil and gas may be transmitted from Central Asia to India.

India has an ambitious plan to transport natural gas from Central Asia via the Turkmenistan:Afghanistan:Pakistan:India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Starting in Turkmenistan, the project travels through some of Afghanistan and Pakistan's most dangerous volatile regions and then final destination to India.⁵¹⁴ Furthermore, the gas pipeline connecting Iran, Pakistan, and India (IPI) has been considered the most vital project from a strategic perspective. Additionally, it is regarded as the most economically feasible route connecting India and Central Asia. In spite of its continued potential for facilitating gas imports, the IPI project has proven to be the most disputed of the pipeline proposals. The future of this project is in doubt due to disagreements between India and Pakistan about transit costs, as well as financial and security difficulties, and US sanctions on Iran.⁵¹⁵ The Turkmenistan:Afghanistan:Pakistan gas pipeline project would be jeopardized by the construction of tunnel between Central Asia and India.

As a whole, the unstable political situation in Afghanistan and the hostile stance of Pakistan have impeded Indian foreign policy goals in Central Asia, and in Kazakhstan in particular. India and Kazakhstan's bilateral ties have been centered on the situation in Afghanistan. In recent years, India has once again been compelled to reach out to Central Asia in order to solve the difficulties in Taliban:ruled Afghanistan. As a result of the changing situation in Afghanistan with the evacuation of US soldiers, the security concerns of India and Kazakhstan have converged.⁵¹⁶

Chabahar Port Factor in India's Gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia

For India, Chabahar Port is the gateway that opens the route for trade and commerce with Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing the passage through Pakistan, a nation inimical to India. The proximity of the Chabahar Port to the land:locked nation of Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries, namely, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Bajpai, Arunoday. "India and Central Asia: Afghanistan Factor". *World Focus*, vol. 43, no. 512, August 2022.

Tajikistan etc has earned for it the moniker ‘The Golden Gate.’⁵¹⁷ In addition to its strategic location, Chabahar holds the promise of connecting the important business growth centers in South Asia (India), the Middle East (Dubai), Central Asia and Afghanistan.⁵¹⁸ The Iranian port of Chabahar will be Delhi’s primary ‘Gateway’ to Afghanistan and onward to landlocked parts of Central Asia.⁵¹⁹ Much has been said and written about the transit potential presented by the port for India’s access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. While these benefits are abundantly clear in India’s strategic planning, certain realities have to be factored in. Firstly, the regional complexities posed by a hostile Pakistan and a fiercely competitive China must be taken into account. Secondly, the Iran:US standoff in the matter of Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal may invite US sanctions upon nations that continue to relate to Iran strategically and commercially. Thirdly, the region is beset with security challenges from forces that are opposed to the government of Afghanistan, as well as from the unrest obtaining in the Baluchistan region of Iran. India has to contend with and safeguard itself against the volatility prevailing in the region. Fourthly, it is a challenge for India to garner the economic resources necessary to maximize the potential offered by the land, sea and rail links that connect India to Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Eurasian region through Iran.

Ideally, international agencies may combine with regional partners to provide a new thrust to the revival of old connections and the building of new corridors. The Chabahar Port and the Turkmenistan:Afghanistan:Pakistan:India gas pipeline are two projects that should give a fillip to the economic growth of the Central Asian countries while meeting India's strategic and economic objectives. The ministry of external affairs, New Delhi, has released a statement to the press that indicates India's purpose as “significantly enhancing Afghanistan’s overall connectivity to regional and global markets, and providing a fillip to the ongoing reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in the country”.⁵²⁰ Concurrently, the expeditious completion and usage of the route through Chabahar port would greatly contribute to

⁵¹⁷ “Why Iran's Chabahar port is important for India.” *The Economics Times*, 23 October, 2014. www.economicstimes.indiatimes.com/slideshows/nation-world/why-irans-chabahar-port-is-importantfor-India/slideshow/44914183.cms. Accessed 21 Mar. 2022.

⁵¹⁸ “India's Chabahar port plan is to counter China's plan to develop Gwadar port: Media”, *The Economics Times*, 12 July, 2018. www.economicstimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-chabahar-portplan-is-to-counter-chinas-plan-to-develop-gwadar-port-media/articleshow/52633906.cms. Accessed 24 Mar. 2022.

⁵¹⁹ Dave, Bhavna. “Resetting India’s Engagement in Central Asia: From Symbols to Substance.” *Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, January, 2016, p. 9. www.rsis.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/PR160202_Resetting-Indias-Engagment.pdf; Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.

⁵²⁰ “Inter-Governmental MoU between India and Iran.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 6 May, 2015. www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/25185/InterGovernmental_MoU_between_India_and_Iran. Accessed 23 Mar. 2022.

furthering India's Connect Central Asia policy. Afghanistan's location in India's neighbourhood affects the peaceful growth and political stability of the subcontinent itself. In many aspects, India's strategic interest flows well beyond Afghanistan and South Asia. Accordingly, in pursuance of its strategic planning, in the initial phase India has committed to invested \$500 million towards the construction of the Chabahar port.⁵²¹ Pakistan continues to resent the expansion of India's influence around its own neighbourhood. Resultantly, it disallows the transit of Indian goods through its territory bound for Afghanistan. Given this constraint, India is building an alternate route to the landlocked countries of Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran's Chabahar port. This port will act as the point of convergence of goods transiting to the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan through Iran.

To give shape to their strategic plans, India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed a MoU for the development and construction of transport infrastructure, with Chabahar port as the nodal hub in the trade corridor linking India with Afghanistan and Central Asia.⁵²² India has since completed construction of the Zaranj:Delaram highway in Afghanistan that links Zaranj to Delaram in the adjacent Farah province, where it connects with the Garland highway.⁵²³ In 2017, Afghanistan was ready with the feasibility study and detailed design of the Chabahar:Zaranj:Farah Railway line that is aimed at further strengthening and enhancing regional economic co:operation to support and sustain development and stability in both Afghanistan and across the wider region.⁵²⁴ The road network will give India and Iran access to the heart of Afghanistan and its major cities of Kandahar, Kabul and Mazar:e Sharif and thence onward to Central Asia.⁵²⁵ Overall, see the map how the India:Central Asia and Kazakhstan is connecting through Chabahar port and sea route. (See map 4, 5 and 6)

⁵²¹ Salem, Saber. "New opening to the old gateway: Chabahar Seaport and The Economic and strategic benefits to the region." *Jindal Journal of International Affairs*, 2016, pp. 1-14; also see, Ali, Wajid. "Strategic and Socio-Economic Importance of Gwadar and Chabahar Port." *International Journal of Political Science and Governance*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2020, pp. 07-12.

⁵²² Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. "India in Chabahar: a regional imperative." *Asian Survey*, vol. 58 no. 4, 2018, pp. 660-678.

⁵²³ Pant, Harsh V. "India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port: Choppy Waters." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, March, 2018; also see, Chowdhury, Jayanta Roy. "Rail Link to Pay Iran Bill." *The Telegraph*, 31 August, 2012.

www.telegraphindia.com/1120831/jsp/business/story_15918680.jsp#.VZPOCxuqqko. Accessed 24 Mar. 2022.


⁵²⁴ "India-Iran Agreement on Chabahar Port." Gen. Dr. V. K. Singh (Retd.) provided this information in reply to a question in Rajya Sabha, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 21 July, 2001. www.pib.nic.in/newsite/mbErel.aspx?relid=147456. Accessed 25 Mar. 2022.

⁵²⁵ Pattnaik, Jajati K., and R. P. Pradhan. "Chabahar: In the Grand Chessboard of India's Geo-Strategic Calculus." *Mainstream weekly*, 26 July 2016.

Map 4: Chabahar Port to Central Asia through Mazar:e Sharif Connectivity⁵²⁶




Map 5: Chabahar Port and India:Central Asia Connectivity⁵²⁷



⁵²⁶ Source: Vivekananda International Foundation.

⁵²⁷ Source: Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation. www.jamestown.org/program/the-taliban-takeover-of-kabul-and-implications-for-the-india-iran-afghanistan-uzbekistan-transit-corridor/. Accessed 25 Mar. 2022.

Map 6: Chabahar Port and India:Kazakhstan Connectivity⁵²⁸



Factor of International North:South Transport Project in India's Kazakhstan Policy

One of the factors behind India's push to develop the Chabahar Port has been access to Afghanistan. Chabahar is the gateway to the International North:South Transport (INSTC) project which, in terms of time and space, affords better opportunities to India to establish transport connectivity between Europe, Central Asia, and India.⁵²⁹ For the Republics of Central Asia, Chabahar port will serve as their outlet to the Indian Ocean. From India's point of view the proposed 7,200km INSTC running north through Iran and Afghanistan will vitally provide India with access to the five Central Asian Republics, Russia and onward to Europe.⁵³⁰ The INSTC, even in its existing and work-in-progress state, enhances India's transit potential for trade.

⁵²⁸ Source: Quora.

⁵²⁹ Taneja, Kabir. "India's strategic unicorn in Chabahar." *live mint*, 12 December, 2017. www.orfonline.org/research/indias-strategic-unicorn-in-chabahar/. Accessed 26 Mar. 2022.

⁵³⁰ Bhat, Anil. Chabahar, "India's strategic gateway on fast track, VS. OBOR." *Outlook*, 1 October, 2017. www.outlookindia.com/newscroll/chabahar-indias-strategic-gateway-on-fast-track-vs-obor/1158519. Accessed 26 Apr. 2022.

India's policy makers and analysts view Iran as an important partner in as much as it serves as India's gateway to Central Asia. The Chabahar port project, complete with connected routes, and the INSTC project merit special attention.⁵³¹ INSTC is a major commercial venture between India and Iran. It is a multimodal trade route that will connect India to Central Asia, Russia and Northern Europe through Iran. The development of Chabahar port will be an appropriate step in this direction.⁵³² The proposal for the INSTC was first mooted in a trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Russia at St. Petersburg in September, 2000.⁵³³ Work on the INSTC project has been delayed on account of the volatile security situation in Afghanistan and the controversy over Iran's nuclear programme. The project was given a boost when eleven new countries of Central and West Asia signed on the relevant agreement. However, the Indian and Iranian joint effort at Chabahar, as part of the North South Corridor, has become the most secure route for movement of goods into Afghanistan and Central Asia.⁵³⁴ From India's stand:point, Iran is the pivot of the trade corridor since several of the routes by road and rail to the Central Asian Republics, Russia and Northern Europe go through Iranian Territory. The efficacy of the INSTC project is in the time:economy and cost optimization it makes possible, in the matter of giving India access to Europe and Russia, besides Afghanistan and Central Asia.⁵³⁵ Experts envisage that the INSTC consists of a four:fold transportation process. The INSTC positions itself as one of the most strategic projects to carry forward India's relationship with Iran.⁵³⁶

For India, the INST Corridor brings significant ongoing benefits. After China and the United States as the world's third largest energy consumer,⁵³⁷ India will be the favored destination

⁵³¹ Singh Roy, Meena. "November–December) Iran: India's Gateway to Central Asia." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 36, no. 6, November-December, 2012, pp. 957-975.

⁵³² Capt, Sodhi, H. "Chabahar A Strategic Gateway." *Centre for Air Power Studies*, 6 July, 2015. www.capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_HPS_2.pdf. Accessed 3 Apr. 2022.

⁵³³ Roy, Meena Singh., and Lele, A. (Eds.). "Engaging Iran in the New Strategic Environment: Opportunities and Challenges for India." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 35, no. 1, January, 2011, pp.88-105. www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700161.2011.530986?needAccess=true. Accessed 4 Apr. 2022; also see, Pant, Harsh V. "India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port: Choppy Waters." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, March, 2018. www.csis.org/analysis/india-iran-cooperation-chabahar-port-choppy-waters. Accessed 5 Apr. 2022.

⁵³⁴ Fair, C. Christine. "India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints." *A Century Foundation Report*, 23 September, 2010, p. 7. www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1681753. Accessed 10 Apr. 2022.

⁵³⁵ Sajjanhar, A. "Chabahar: A game changer in Eurasia?" *Observer Research Foundation*, 19 December, 2017. www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chabahar-a-game-changer-ineurasia/. Accessed 10 Apr. 2022.

⁵³⁶ Pattnaik, Jajati K., and Pradhan, Rudra P. (Eds.). "Chabahar: Gateway to North- South corridor." *The Arunachal Times*, 7 November, 2016.

⁵³⁷ U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). "Country Analysis Executive Summary: India". 17 November, 2022. www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/IND. Accessed 4 Dec. 2022.


for regional resources. Also, Indian exports will flow to the Republics carved out of the erstwhile USSR. The Corridor will help India to unleash its strategic potential as an emerging great power.⁵³⁸ In the bigger picture, Chabahar plus INSTC could be India's answer to China's much-vaunted Belt-and-Road Initiative for transnational connectivity (see map 7). This comparison becomes stark at Chabahar which is located only 70kms from China's Gwadar Port Project in Pakistan.⁵³⁹ It is important to note that the North-South Corridor covers 6,245 kilometers, which is much shorter than the existing maritime transport route stretching across the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea for 16,129 kilometers. For India, the Chabahar based INSTC will be 40% shorter than the current Indian Ocean-European transport route through the Red Sea, Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. The new route is expected to reduce the cost of Indian trade by 30%.⁵⁴⁰ It is envisaged that the North-South Corridor may be connected with the existing South-East Asian Transport Corridor. Such a link will provide both India and Iran with a new outlet for better economic integration with other regional economic groupings, Such as European Union (EU) and Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), subject to political will and interest of concerned investors and transporters.

⁵³⁸ Muzalevsky, Roman "Unlocking India's Strategic Potential in Central Asia." *Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press*, October, 2015. P. 39. www.apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA623563. Accessed 10 Apr. 2022.

⁵³⁹ Khan, Zahid Ali. "China's Gwadar and India's Chabahar: An Analysis of Sino-India Geo-Strategic and Economic Competition." *Strategic Studies*, vol. 32/33, 2012, pp. 79–101. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/48527627. Accessed 1 Jan. 2022; also see, "Chabahar connect: Strategic port opens up India's access to Afghanistan and beyond." *Times of India*, 5 December, 2017. P.6.

⁵⁴⁰ Tanchum, Michael. "Iran's Chabahar Port Transforms Its Position." *The Jerusalem Post*, 4 January, 2014. www.jpost.com/opinion/op-ed-contributors/irans-chabahar-port-transforms-its-position-337167. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022; also see, Samofalova, Olga and Vzglyad. "North-South Corridor from Russia to India to Compete with Suez Canal." *Russia Beyond*, 12 April, 2016. www.rbth.com/business/2016/04/12/north-south-corridor-from-russia-to-india-to-compete-with-suez-canal_584017. Accessed 12 Apr. 2022.

Map 7: Chabahar and International North:South Transport Project⁵⁴¹



Besides, the INSTC is an important factor in India’s concerns about Afghanistan. From Afghanistan’s point of view, the strategic location of Chabahar Port in Iran, that acts as a land bridge to Central and South Asian markets, enables it to integrate its markets with the regional and global economies. And, as expected, the usage of Chabahar port is subject to political alliances among India, Iran and Afghanistan. Both burgeoning and established economic powers race to consolidate their hold over important sea lanes and ports. From the Indian perspective the Chabahar Port fulfils additional objectives relative to Afghanistan. The port will facilitate the larger objective of integrating Afghanistan in a regional trade and transit network. Also, New Delhi envisages that the enhanced regional co:operation by way of this port will lead to all stakeholders recognizing Afghanistan as an opportunity for co:operation instead of competition. Such an ambience would help to further the cause of stability in Afghanistan. India has led the way in encouraging regional integration.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴¹ Source: Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture. www.en.otaghiranonline.ir/print/33189. Accessed on April 2022.

⁵⁴² Bhatnagar, Aryaman, and Divya John. “Accessing Afghanistan and Central Asia: Importance of Chabahar to India.” Special Report, *Observer Research Foundation*, 4, October, 2013. www.orfonline.org/research/accessing-afghanistan-and-central-asiainportance-of-chabahar-to-india/. Accessed 12 Apr. 2022.

Chabahar port is additionally significant in India's strategic planning in as much as it sets off China's growing clout in the Indian Ocean region. In this first quarter of the 21st Century, China has grown to be a dominant naval power in Asia. It is also observed that China is in the process of expanding its naval presence in the Indian Ocean region in the same way as it is acting in the South China Sea. As such, it poses a serious threat to other regional and extra:regional powers. The concerned nations keenly observe the military activities of Pakistan and China at Gwadar Port and away from it. Mr. A.K. Antony, India's former defence minister had declared China's presence at Gwadar to be a matter of concern for India.⁵⁴³

India's Soft Power Factor in Kazakhstan

Before providing a detailed account of India's soft power outreach, it is important to define soft power and discuss how India has employed this notion to further its goals in Kazakhstan. American political scientist Joseph Nye is credited with coining the term "soft power" in 1990 to describe the balance of political influence in the world after the Cold War.⁵⁴⁴ Joseph Nye emphasises the importance of institutions, education, culture, ideology, and technology when determining a state's strength. When it comes to choosing which countries would emerge on top, Joseph Nye demonstrated how the world system was shifting, with factors like population, location, and raw materials becoming less important. In his book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Joseph Nye defines power as the "ability to do things, control others to do what they would not necessarily do."⁵⁴⁵ He defined soft power as the ability to set and influence the narrative, and he outlined the role of institutions as a tool for developing agenda:setting behaviour. According to Nye, the capacity for attraction can be developed through the application of values, culture, and policy. (See table 10)

⁵⁴³ "Chinese presence at Gwadar Port is a matter of concern: Antony." 6 February, 2013, *The Hindu*, www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinese-presence-at-gwadar-port-is-a-matter-of-concernantony. Accessed 13 Apr. 2022.

⁵⁴⁴ Wagner, Jan-Philipp NE. "The effectiveness of soft & hard power in contemporary international relations." *E-International Relations Students*, 14 May, 2014.

⁵⁴⁵ Nye, Joseph S. "Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power" New York. 1990.

Table 10: Joseph Nye’s Chart of Power Behavior and Resources of Soft Power⁵⁴⁶

| | Hard | Soft |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| Spectrum of Behaviors | Command Coercion Inducement | Agenda setting Attraction Co:optive Power |
| Most Likely Resources | Force sanctions Payments bribes | Institutions Values culture policies |

A different definition of “soft power” comes from Joseph Nye, who defines it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment, getting others to want the outcomes that you want, the ability to shape the preferences of others, and the ability to attract.” In this perspective, Culture, value systems, and diplomacy are all examples of things that can attract people.⁵⁴⁷ Hard power, on the other hand, is defined by Joseph Nye as “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will.”⁵⁴⁸ Recent academic scholarship on India’s soft power has focused on the region of Central Asia, and these interpretations have served as the basis for this discussion.

For India, what exactly does “soft power” necessarily imply? Former UN Undersecretary General and former Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor, reportedly provided a straightforward explanation of what soft power actually means.

“It means acknowledging that India’s claims to a significant leadership role in the world of the 21st century lie in the aspects and products of Indian society and culture that the world finds attractive.”⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁶ Source: Nye Jr, Joseph S. “Soft power: The means to success in world politics.” Public affairs, 2004. P. 8.


⁵⁴⁷ Ibid. PP. 5-6.

⁵⁴⁸ Nye, Joseph S. “Propaganda isn’t the way: Soft power.” *The International Herald Tribune*, 2003.

⁵⁴⁹ Tharoor, Shashi. “Indian Strategic Power: Soft.” *Global Brief Magazine*, 2009, www.globalbrief.ca/2009/05/soft-is-the-word/. Accessed 15 July 2022.

Different facets of India’s soft power at work in Kazakhstan, including the country’s development aid, its use of service sector expertise in the region, its cultural diplomacy, etc (see figure 42). India has been making an effort to equalize the playing field by leveraging its soft power assets, and this endeavour was formalised under the ‘Look North’ strategy. Further, the Look North policy highlights secularism, democracy, and literacy as state characteristics, an approach shared by India and Central Asia.⁵⁵⁰ India has been called a soft power model due to the country's status as the biggest democracy and the home to the huge population. As a liberal democracy with a diverse cultural heritage and some moral compass in its foreign policy, India has gained substantial benefits from its “soft power” on numerous occasions.⁵⁵¹ India has a rich and still:impressive history of democracy, but for decades, its government has not prioritized promoting democracy abroad.⁵⁵² India, in past few years, has to take a more proactive role in spreading democracy. India has taken a defensive stance toward advancing democracy in an effort to maintain a compromise between Western expectations and national realities. Since the year 2000, India has been gradually increasing her efforts to spread democracy around the world. Central Asia has been a great place for India’s democratic model to flourish ever since the Soviet Union collapsed.

Figure 42: Major Sources of India’s Soft Power Matrix⁵⁵³



⁵⁵⁰ Pradhan, Ramakrushna. Op. cit. p. 131.

⁵⁵¹ Jaishankar, Dhruva. “India rising: Soft power and the world’s largest democracy.” *Brookings Institute India*. 17 September 2018. www.brookings.edu/opinions/india-rising-soft-power-and-the-worlds-largest-democracy/. Accessed 15 July 2022.

⁵⁵² Wagner, Christian. “India’s soft power: Prospects and limitations.” *India Quarterly*, Vol. 66, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 333-342.

⁵⁵³ Source: Shetty, Salil, and Tara Sahgal. “India’s Soft Power: Challenges and Opportunities.” *Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies*, Occasional Paper, December 2019. www.rgics.org/occasional-papers/. Accessed 16 July 2022.

The diplomatic and military collaboration between India and Kazakhstan in the face of international terror, extremism, drugs, and weapons smuggling, as well as India's use of soft and smart power to build on its cultural capital, give credibility to the extended neighbourhood concept's applicability to Central Asia. The concept of an extended neighbourhood, as described by professor David Scott in an article for the *India Review* journal, is as follows:

The vision of an extended neighborhood involves power projection by India; be it hard power military and economic projection or be it soft power cultural and ideational strands. It has become the conceptual umbrella for India; eastwards, southwards, northwards and westwards.....of the opportunities available to India outside South Asia.⁵⁵⁴

It has been previously addressed how India uses security and economic "hard power" towards Central Asian region. This study makes an effort to analyze the foundations of India's soft power in light of the factors that have shaped the relationship between India and Kazakhstan.

Yoga is a discipline with roots in ancient India that aims to improve one's well-being on all levels, including physical, mental, and spiritual. Practices of yoga can be traced back to Buddhist and Jain texts, as well as the Darshanas, the Mahabharata, and the Ramayana.⁵⁵⁵ In recent years, popularity of yoga among Kazakhs has increased. In 2013, 8 percent of Astana's residents were yoga practitioners.⁵⁵⁶ Furthermore, in the modern times, yoga has emerged as a significant exercise among professional athletes in Kazakhstan.⁵⁵⁷ The United Nations General Assembly recognized June 21 as International Day of Yoga.⁵⁵⁸ This year, almost forty Muslim countries participated in the worldwide event, demonstrating that yoga does not have to conflict with religion. On the contrary, it promotes peace, mutual respect, and the avoidance of many potential conflicts. For the first time, Kazakhstan joined with and over

⁵⁵⁴ Scott, David. "India's "extended neighborhood" concept: power projection for a rising power." *India Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, April to June, 2009, pp. 107–143.

⁵⁵⁵ Basavaraddi, Ishwar V. "Yoga: Its origin, history and development." *Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India*, 23 April, 2015. www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?25096/Yoga+Its+Origin+History+and+Development. Accessed 20 July 2022.

⁵⁵⁶ Zhumabayeva, Kamila. "Yoga Gaining Popularity in Kazakhstan." *The Astana Times*, 17 July 2015. www.astanatimes.com/2015/07/yoga-gaining-popularity-in-kazakhstan/. Accessed 20 July 2022.

⁵⁵⁷ Vinnikov, Denis, et al. "Prevalence of supplement use in recreationally active Kazakhstan university students." *Journal of the International Society of Sports Nutrition*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 10 April, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12970-018-0220-4>. Accessed 20 July 2022.

⁵⁵⁸ Bhattacharyya, Ananta, et al. "Yoga for Promotion of Health." Conference Held on International Day of Yoga-2015 At Kolar." *Journal of Ayurveda and integrative medicine*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2015, pp. 305-206. doi: 10.4103/0975-9476.172425. Accessed 20 July 2022.

190 other countries that took part in Almaty, around eight hundred yoga devotees took their mats and practices many exercises.⁵⁵⁹ In 2016, Almaty hosted the second annual International Day of Yoga celebration at the Al:Farabi Kazakh National University's Main Stadium.⁵⁶⁰ Serik Zharasbayev, a government official in Kazakhstan, has declared yoga to be a self-improvement discipline that provides the way to physical beauty. He stressed the importance of yoga in achieving mental and spiritual peace.

The impact of India's diaspora on the country's foreign policy is an important topic to examine. If India's diaspora continues to grow, how will this affect the country's foreign policy toward Kazakhstan? The Indian diaspora is an important part of India's soft power in Kazakhstan. The diaspora of multiple generations has increased India's "soft power" by spreading Indian culture worldwide. In the past, during the Bronze Age, Central Asia was home to the people of the Indus Valley Civilization and the Harappan Civilization.⁵⁶¹ There was a community of Indian merchants in Central Asia beginning around the middle of the 16th century that would continue to operate for the next four centuries.⁵⁶² Trading between India and Central Asia was common among the Peshawari people. These businessmen invested their money into grain in the Bukharan Emirate and cotton in Ferghana. Aside from that, they also participated in Bukhara's legitimate money lending industry.⁵⁶³ The diaspora of Indians is at a critical juncture in time. The Indian diaspora has the potential to become a valuable strategic asset for the Indian government in the near future.⁵⁶⁴ Therefore, India should endeavour to direct emigration to Kazakhstan, a rising power in the international system, in order to maximize the strategic influence of its diaspora in the future.

The modern:day Indian population in Kazakhstan comprises primarily of students, investors, workers, and employees of Indian or international firms. Managers, business owners, and investors make up a sizable percentage of the population. There are around 7,800 members of

⁵⁵⁹ Zhumabayeva, Kamila. Op. cit.

⁵⁶⁰ "The 2nd International Day of Yoga Celebrated in Kazakhstan." Embassy of India, Astana, Kazakhstan. www.indembastana.gov.in/news_detail/?newsid=137. Accessed 21 July 2022.

⁵⁶¹ Possehl, Gregory L. "The Indus civilization: a contemporary perspective." Rowman Altamira, 2002; see also, Kapur, Devesh. "The Indian Diaspora and Indian Foreign Policy: Soft Power or Soft Underbelly?". *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India*, Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 185-209.

⁵⁶² Levi, Scott Cameron. "The Indian Diaspora in central Asia and its trade, 1550-1900." Volume:3, Brill, 2002.

⁵⁶³ Markovits, Claude. "The global world of Indian merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama." vol. 6. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

⁵⁶⁴ Kapur, Devesh. "Indian diaspora as a strategic asset." *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 38, no. 5, February, 2003, pp. 445-448.

the Indian diaspora living in Kazakhstan, out of a total of 19,490. More specifically, 900 of them are studying to become doctors.⁵⁶⁵ The achievement of Ispat International, an NRI business, has led to the establishment of a large number of additional Indian businesses in Kazakhstan. These businesses include Ajanta Pharma, Dr. Reddy's Labs, Ranbaxy, Core, Lupin, IPCA, and USV. While the Indian diaspora is currently small, it is expected to grow in the future as a result of improved economic relations and new opportunities made possible by recent economic reforms in CARs, especially in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.⁵⁶⁶ It's also important to remember that there are a number of India Culture Centers in the country of Kazakhstan, all of which are quite active in promoting Indian culture and enrolling large numbers of young Kazakhs to training courses. Due to the increased communication, more Indian educators of yoga, music, and dance are expected to arrive in Kazakhstan. There is an active promotion of Indian culture thanks to the efforts of the Indian Cultural Center in Almaty. Also, there have been a number of Indian cultural events in Kazakhstan.⁵⁶⁷

In the coming decades, the Indian diaspora community in Kazakhstan will be an important part of India's "soft power." The prosperity of India's diaspora is intrinsically related to the country's burgeoning capacity as a hub for technology, innovation, and education, which is attracting attention from countries like Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia. India's achievements in the fields of information technology (IT), business process outsourcing (BPO), medicine (health care), education, and media (television).⁵⁶⁸ The diaspora has helped the economy of India in several ways, including the flow of funds and investments, the flow of knowledge and expertise, and the transmission of social and professional networks that have developed in Kazakhstan.

Equally crucial, India's cultural outreach is a significant component of soft power in Kazakhstan. India's foreign policy naturally gives enormous weight to its extended

⁵⁶⁵ Singh, Roy Meena, "Chitra Rajora asked: What is India's diaspora policy in Central Asian countries?" *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 31 May. 2021, www.idsa.in/askanexpert/indias-diaspora-policy-in-central-asian-countries. Accessed 20 July 2022.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁸ Bhattacharya, Indrajit, and Kunal Sharma. "India in the knowledge economy-an electronic paradigm." *International journal of educational management*, vol. 21, no. 6, 2007, pp. 543-568. doi.org/10.1108/09513540710780055. Accessed 20 July 2022; also see, Rajeev, Meenakshi, and B.P. Vani. "India's export of BPO services: understanding strengths, weaknesses and competitors." *Journal of Services Research*, vol. 9, no. 1, Apr. 2009, pp. 51-67. www.go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA199685855&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=09724702&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7Eaaa969ab. Accessed 23 July 2022.

neighbourhood policy, and this includes the promotion of Indian culture in Kazakhstan. The use of soft power is a key part of several current policies, including the Look North, Extended Neighbor, and Connect Central Asia initiatives. The Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of all the soft power aspects of Indian foreign policy.⁵⁶⁹ Indian efforts to increase its moral legitimacy and soft power in Central Asia, such as the “Look North” and “Connect Central Asia” policies, are worthy of consideration as foreign policy strategies. Connect Central Asia was more concerned with “soft” than “hard” power, as seen by its concentration on communication networks and technological advancements in healthcare, academia, and travel.⁵⁷⁰

Indian cultural soft power features both ancient and contemporary elements, from the Buddha to Bollywood. Given that India is the birthplace of Buddhism, its culture has been present in Kazakhstan for a very long period.⁵⁷¹ The Mughal Empire’s sway in the region and the generations-long impact of Indian mathematics, astronomy, and other sciences on Arab and Islamic ideas have both been documented.⁵⁷² One cannot overstate the importance of this cultural heritage as a form of soft power, as it provides the foundation for modern relations between India and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is heavily influenced by contemporary Indian culture. India’s former ambassador to Kazakhstan, Ashok Sajjanhar, argues that Bollywood movies, dance, and other forms of Indian popular culture are among the country’s most notable cultural exports.⁵⁷³ During the Soviet era, Bollywood became a popular trend in Kazakhstan. Bollywood films and the social and cultural subjects they explored impressed audiences in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani people are still attracted to Indian melodies. Many

⁵⁶⁹ Shetty, Salil, and Tara Sahgal. Op. cit. p. 13.

⁵⁷⁰ Kavalski, Emilian. “India and Central Asia: A Strategic Culture “Look North” for its Normative Power.” *Central Asia and the rise of normative powers: Contextualizing the security governance of the European Union, China, and India*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012. pp. 125-147.

⁵⁷¹ Abuseitova, M Kh. “Historical and cultural Relations Between Kazakhstan, Central Asia and India from Ancient Times to beginning of the 20th Century.” *India and Central Asia: Classical to Contemporary Periods*, edited by B.B Kumar and J.N Roy, Astha Bharati, 2007, pp.43-56.

⁵⁷² Kumar, B B. “India Kazakhstan relations: the cultural dimensions.” *India Kazakhstan Perspective: Regional and International Interaction*, edited by K Santhanam, Kuralay Baizakova and Ramakant Dwivedi. The India-Central Asia Foundation and Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, 2007, pp. 1-19; also see, Sajjanhar, Ashok. “India-Kazakhstan relations: Challenges and opportunities.” Embassy of India in Kazakhstan, 20 November 2013.

⁵⁷³ Embassy of India, Astana Kazakhstan. “India-Kazakhstan Relations.” www.indembastana.gov.in/docs/1641538665bilateral.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2022.

Kazakhs, especially younger generations, are familiar with the names Raj Kapoor, Mithun Chakraborty, and Aishwarya Rai. They are also aware of Indian tea and spices.⁵⁷⁴

For India, its development cooperation policy is the most visible instrument of soft power. India, however, had seen the value in bolstering its soft power by offering funds and directing its attention on humanitarian aid. The Indian government has been trying to use its influence in Kazakhstan by promoting the country's knowledge, healthcare, and innovation industries. Additionally, since the early 1990s, India has maintained a Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) initiative in the region, which has provided training to over 3000 students, including nearly 1290 scholars from Kazakhstan.⁵⁷⁵ The Indian government also exercises considerable sway in Kazakhstan by way of cultural diplomacy, which it bases on the country's rich cultural and civilizational traditions. Towards this objective, the government uses the services of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) to implement a number of cultural programmes throughout the country of Kazakhstan. The Swami Vivekananda Cultural Center (SVCC) in Astana, on the other hand, hosts a wide range of cultural events and programmes, such as yoga, dance, and music lessons, and the commemoration of Indian holidays. Through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations Scholarship Program, India offers financial aid to Kazakh students studying a wide range of subjects at Indian universities. One of the primary objectives is to organize academic conferences and foster collaboration with Kazakh educational institutions. At this juncture, relations between India and Kazakhstan are poised to enter a new, more exciting phase.⁵⁷⁶ As a whole, it seems that India's success and recognition in Kazakhstan are mostly attributable to its soft power.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has explained a number of important factors of Indian strategy in Kazakhstan, such as India's need for commerce and its need for improved connectivity. The comparison of

⁵⁷⁴ Ghosh, Shruti. "The phenomenon of Mithun Chakraborty in Kazakhstan." *Bengaluru Review*, 20 December 2019. www.bengalureview.com/2019/12/20/mithun-chakraborty-kazakhstan/. Accessed 25 Aug. 2022; also see, Sajjanhar, Ashok. "Perspectives on India-Kazakhstan Relations: Challenges and Opportunities." *Perspectives on Bilateral and Regional Cooperation: South and Central Asia*, edited by Rashpal Malhotra, Sucha Singh Gill and Neetu Gaur, Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 2013, pp. 39-46.

⁵⁷⁵ Embassy of India, Astana Kazakhstan. "Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme." www.indembastana.gov.in/page/itec-programme/. Accessed 25 Aug. 2022.

⁵⁷⁶ "Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre." Embassy of India, Astana Kazakhstan. www.indembastana.gov.in/page/icc/. Accessed 26 August 2022.

numerous elements that influence the formulation of India's foreign policy throws light on several political strategies for adjusting Kazakhstan to India. It is impossible to ignore the importance of strategic material factors. There is no doubt about the significance of energy resources for a nation recognised as a global factory with excessive demand to support its industrial sector. It is clear that India places a high priority on strengthening its bilateral and multilateral economic partnerships. India is advancing its plan to secure and dominate markets in Kazakhstan so that Indian goods can be sold there, and the flourishing SCO is thought to be the best tool for doing so. Through SCO, bilateral and multilateral efforts to secure energy supplies and gain access to Kazakh markets are carried out. As a consequence of bilateral discussions, the gas pipeline connecting Central Asia and India will be operational. In this perspective, Turkmenistan intends to use TAPI to pump gas into India. Turkmenistan is the starting point for the pipeline that will carry natural gas to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Considering this context, it is clear that India wants better access to Kazakhstan and more overland connectivity to Europe and Russia, which is why it is supporting the INSTC and other transport infrastructure projects like the Chahbahar port in Iran.

In particular, the economic collaborations between India and Kazakhstan provide a window of opportunity for the Central Asian states to guarantee the economic growth of both countries. The pattern of economic ties and trade between India and Central Asia is reflected in these connections. Trade with the Central Asian region has been hampered by tense regional security in the past. The political elite in India has become more aware of the frontier security problem as a result of their own experiences, and as a result, they have begun to implement new strategies, such as increased regional integration. This research reveals the nuanced dynamics at work beneath the surface of India's foreign policy toward Kazakhstan, which is often attributed to narrow material or national interests. Regarding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, India can present itself as a normative leader at this stage. Central Asian countries see the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an appealing multilateral setting because it provides all the benefits of joining a multilateral alliance at zero cost to the member countries. India has been actively expanding its ties in the areas of international trade and energy through SCO.

Most importantly, India's ability to project hard power in the areas of economic and political security in Kazakhstan is constrained. Therefore, India's soft power is crucial to achieving its

goals in Kazakhstan. India's foreign policy and political values are sources of the soft power that builds on the country's rich cultural and civilizational heritage and that it espouses toward Kazakhstan. To equalize the playing field with other actors in Central Asia, India uses soft power instruments such as development aid, technical cooperation, innovation, knowledge sharing, and cultural diplomacy in Kazakhstan.

Conclusion

Foreign policy is an important lens through which to analyse a country's international ties and its involvement in global politics. Furthermore, the technique for assessing a state's foreign and economic strategy is to investigate the factors that form the state's foreign policy stance. Attempting to provide light on the driving forces behind India's foreign policy, this study recognises a new frontier that has been overlooked in prior research with regard to Kazakhstan. This research therefore argues that energy and national security should play a significant part of economic engagement between India and Kazakhstan under the Look North and Connect Central Asia policy. Thereby, this research offers a thorough examination of underexplored factors influencing India's energy, economic, and security policy in the region. In order to fully explain this, it is necessary to get an understanding of a wide range of concepts, including: India's foreign policy doctrines as applied to the context of the Central Asian as a whole and Kazakhstan specifically; the historical context of India:Central Asia ties; and the construction of these experiences by leadership.

India's strategy towards Kazakhstan is guided by the country's commitment to national security, energy security, and economic development, all of which contribute to India's growing worldwide stature. There are three main tenets of Indian foreign policy toward Kazakhstan: economic security, energy security, and national security diplomacy. In this scenario, uncertainty in Afghanistan and state-backed terrorism in Pakistan fuel to this sense of danger in India's objectives toward Kazakhstan. From this vantage point, it appears that both countries have a common understanding of security threats. Through the Shanghai Collaboration Organization (SCO), India and Kazakhstan are able to formalised their security ties for enhanced energy and commercial cooperation.

Indian foreign policy has been greatly impacted by the theories of great power politics in modern international relations. The majority part of international relations analysts has used India's material capabilities as a bench mark of its power. This is particularly most important topic because academics have long debated whether or not India qualifies as a great power, but they all seem to agree that India poses a serious challenge to the unipolar world order. India's progress toward great power status was evaluated by looking at indicators like its growing economy and its willingness to increase its military spending. India's foreign

policy elites think, Central Asia, and particularly Kazakhstan is a strategically vital zone where emerging powers have fought and will continue to fight for influence in decades to come.

This study examines India's growing economic ties with Kazakhstan, and it finds that the driving force behind India's direct involvement with Kazakhstan is the pursuit of India's own national interests. Analysis suggests that India's interest in Kazakhstan is motivated by the need to secure access to Kazakhstan's abundant supply of uranium, oil and natural gas. The study takes into account that a rapidly expanding Indian economy has a high priority for meeting its rising energy demands. This analysis points out India's ties to the Central Asian republics are dominated by neo-realist and balance of power perspectives. Taking into account the findings and projections of the aforementioned works, it is clear that India's involvement in Kazakhstan is motivated by a desire to satisfy the country's ever-increasing energy needs. Based on the findings of this study, it appears that India's cooperation with Kazakhstan is driven mostly by their shared interest in energy resources. However, a critical analysis of the connections between India and Kazakhstan reveals that energy partnerships were introduced much later than a decade of economic collaboration.

Geopolitical circumstances of Central Asia after the end of the Cold War are multifaceted and multidimensional. India's foreign policy to Kazakhstan as discussed in this research explicitly, and India's interaction with the regional player China, Russia, and Iran in this region, help this study further the debate on great game geopolitical rivalries is absent in this area. Each nation has a wide range of objectives for Central Asia, but considering their other priorities, the resources they have to accomplish them are constrained. This entire foreign policy idea can be understood as include the establishment of a strategic partnership between India and Russia as well as the strengthening of its ties with Kazakhstan.

This study aims to demonstrate that national security, as seen in the India and Central Asia scenario, is not a static phenomenon. It would appear that the measures taken by India and other SCO members to combat terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism are strengthening state collaboration and establishing SCO as a reliable security architecture. India and Kazakhstan are working together on security issues because they both think about problem of regional security. However, the fundamental tensions caused by Afghanistan's insatiability and Pakistan's state-sponsored terrorism should be removed for the regional

stability and prosperity. Although protecting of north western boundary is a priority in terms of India's overall security, the officials of New Delhi have been working to find a solution to the terrorism:related threat. In the case of India and Central Asian states, a similar threat is more linked to the tensions faced by the political elites of these states. After all, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist threats, exist in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan, giving credence to India and Central Asia region's perception of a similar threat. The SCO has served as a platform for India and Kazakhstan to build collective action techniques in response to common security threats.

Clearly, India's current foreign policy relies heavily on its strong involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for strategic partnership with Kazakhstan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization serves as a vehicle for India to advance its multifaceted image. India is attempting to play the role of promotion in its own economic matters, and it is doing so by choosing a partnership approach. Regional collaborations put an emphasis on identifying similar issues and considering how these might be solved through collaboration. India's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has given it a platform from which to help elevate the status of Central Asian powers. With the support of the SCO, India is able to make measured, positive progress in Kazakhstan. According to this research, India's presence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represents an effort to strengthen ties with Russia and the Central Asian states. In order to boost its security ties, advance its economy, and improve its global perception, India is using the SCO as a vehicle to foster regional collaboration and institutional development.

This research offers a series of concluding observations based on the research objectives presented in the background of the study: Regarding the first point, this study comes to the conclusion that although economic dimensions play a significant part in understanding India's foreign policy, ideational variables are as crucial. The first evidence:based chapter develops an alternative narrative of great power politics, for the explaining of "New Great Game" concept, by examining the dynamics of the "New Great Game" theory. The "Great Game" is no longer trying to exert influence through the use of physical force or direct control of territory on the "new chessboard." The end of the Cold War and economic liberalisation in India have had an effect on the current foreign policy goals of India, which must be taken into account while discussing the country's preferred foreign policy options.

After the end of the Cold War, India's Look North policy has become an integral part of New Delhi's approach to the Central Asian region.

India's expanding economic, energy, and commercial ties with Kazakhstan, as described in Chapters Two and Three, are reflective of India's traditional role as the centre of Asian regional economic commerce, which is a key foreign policy aim for the Indian government. Historically, commercial links with the Central Asian republics did not form or thrive because of security was difficult owing to factors such as an antagonistic Pakistan, border disputes between India and China, or an unstable Afghanistan. Until recently, India's commercial ties to Central Asia were limited by the country's lack of security on its northwesterly border. India, working under the SCO's aegis, has bolstered security cooperation with Central Asian nations in an effort to revive economic activity with the region. Since the launch of the Connect Central Asia initiative in 2012, India's economic ties with the Central Asian countries, and Kazakhstan in particular, have expanded.

India's foreign policymakers were confronted with underlying tensions due to the continued insecurity of the country's northwestern boundary. Chapter four focuses on the topic of frontier security as a means of analyzing the challenges experienced by India. The study focuses on terrorism and religious fanaticism as potential dangers to India's national security. In this way, the issue of frontier security is talked about more in India and then through the SCO in Central Asia. This is because security challenges need to be fixed quickly before countries join the global war against terrorism. The presents an argument in favour of India adopting a fresh and different political reaction to the conventional Russian and Chinese dominance in Central Asia by using the SCO as a platform. India sees the organization as a crucial platform of its foreign policy as it seeks to increase its regional influence. India and other SCO representatives place a strong focus on a non:interfering policy and a single energy market. Specifically, the SCO's objectives of economic development and collaboration with non:traditional security threat have made it an interesting regional institution for India and Central Asian republics.

In order to construct the above:mentioned line of argument and create a unified view of India's foreign policy approach towards Kazakhstan, the research emphasizes the following reasons. The research centers its attention on contemporary factors that have contributed to the development of India's economic cooperation with Kazakhstan. The relationship between

India and Kazakhstan on the international stage is dynamic and multifaceted. The research recognises the importance of India's national security and energy security in giving background for developing its Central Asian strategy. Given that economic interests must always serve as the driving force behind India's foreign policy and political practices, it is clear that India's approach is not one-dimensional but rather multifaceted.

This research looked into several factors impacting India's economic development and energy efficiency. This research establishes a connection between reliable energy sources, national security, and economic development. This research also argues that India's policies toward the Central Asian republics and the "Look North" strategy radically shifted in the post-liberalization era due to increased energy demands. This study examines significance of Kazakhstan to India's economic development and energy security. This research looked at how energy plays a key role in India's economic success, as well as how the nuclear cooperation deal between India and Kazakhstan has created opportunities for the country. This study discusses the role of foreign powers and the difficulties faced by India during uranium extraction in Kazakhstan.

Since India's independence, the oil and gas industry has played a crucial role in the country's economic development. In the making of foreign policy, that industry had an impact on India's geopolitical and geostrategic decisions. The energy industry has taken on particular importance since rising commercial energy use is closely correlated with the expansion of the Indian economy. Several initiatives have been undertaken by the Indian governments to guarantee a steady energy supply from Central Asian republics. Joint partnerships between Indian (OVL) and Central Asian big oil companies (KMG) were recognized. Following its economic liberalisation, India has taken several important initiatives to relieve its energy requirement, one of which is privatizing the energy industry. As part of its foreign strategy and economic diplomacy with Kazakhstan, India has been seeking to equalize the country's energy demands. India's energy needs and economic aspirations may be met in large part because to the country's Look North and Connect Central Asia policies towards Central Asia. India is now making an effort to concentrate on its Connect Central Asia and Look North strategies in order to address its domestic energy demands.

India's foreign policy is shifting as a result of the country's growing energy needs, which have led it to focus more on the newly independent Central Asian states, which are home to

vast quantities of hydrocarbons. To protect its economic and energy interests in the area, India has placed more importance on maintaining positive relations with the Central Asian Republics, with a specific emphasis on Kazakhstan. India's policy toward Kazakhstan reflected long-standing ties of togetherness and collaboration between the two nations' institutions and populaces. The region of Central Asia is part of India's extended neighbourhood. Access to enormous oil and gas deposits is a significant strategic benefit for both global and regional powers following the creation of these Central Asian Republics. The fact that Kazakhstan is indeed a resource-rich country and that Central Asia is strategically located in the "heart of Eurasia" have both contributed to its increase in global prominence. Kazakhstan is strategically located among the Central Asian republics because to the country's substantial oil, gas, and uranium deposits. When Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991, India acknowledged it as a sovereign nation and promptly opened an embassy in the country the following year.

This research's key claim is that, India's energy requirement has really been consistent over the past two decades. In response to this need, India is looking at expanding its portfolio of energy sources, and nuclear power has emerged as a reliable and environmentally friendly choice. In this perspective, it is important for Kazakhstan, with its massive untapped energy reserves, to diversify its export destination to emerging India. According to the results of this research, energy independence is directly linked to a flourishing economy. This research is important because it examines the opportunity of the nuclear collaboration agreement and economic involvement between India and Kazakhstan. Important foreign participants in Kazakhstan's quest for uranium and energy reserves are also discussed, along with their respective strategies for getting these resources. Economic ties between India and Kazakhstan are discussed, as are their potential for growth in the future.

Several international relations theories, such as realism and liberalism, as well as a variety of political economy methods, have emerged to explain the phenomena of India's ascent. The theoretical foundations of liberal theory and its different facets, which concentrated on economic liberalisation and privatization and all of which promote increasing energy use in public life, have been explored in the current research. This research can help us understand the connection between a booming economy and a corresponding rise in energy demand. This research draws parallels link among energy independence, economic expansion, and nuclear

power. Because of this, the study contributes to our knowledge of energy and economic stability in the post:liberalization age of India.

India and Kazakhstan have been working together in the field of civil nuclear energy agreement since 2011. With this deal, the two countries are committing to further economic cooperation and trade. The nuclear cooperation deal between India and Kazakhstan has given India tremendous new possibilities in the Central Asian area. Possibilities for further collaboration between India and Kazakhstan in particular and Central Asia in general were also opened up as a result of this agreement. There has been an increase in economic activity since the signing of this agreement. In the meanwhile, the Indian government has begun a large:scale initiative known as the Connect Central Asia strategy. The advancement of trade ties among both India and Kazakhstan has been helped along by this approach as well.

In this study, examine the relevance of nuclear energy and petroleum from an Indian viewpoint. India intends to increase pipeline connection with the Central Asian for this reason. From this vantage point, the study highlights the significance of the Iranian Chabahar port and the INSTC for sustainable connections to Central Asia. Nuclear power can help India eliminate its reliance on foreign energy imports and move toward its goal of energy independence. The World Nuclear Association estimates that twelve percent of the world's uranium is located in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan surpassed all other countries in uranium output in 2020. From this vantage point, India has to maintain cordial ties with Kazakhstan in order to get uranium from that country. Given India's position as the world's second:most populated nation, the prospect of nuclear energy there is huge.

Research looked at how various foreign actors in Kazakhstan are attempting to obtain sway over the country's energy resources and the results were analysed from an Indian perspective. China's desire to keep India out of the Central Asian area is the primary reason for India's apprehension in Kazakhstan. India has been labelled by official Chinese media as a major rival in international politics. Kazakhstan is strategically located to provide China with a steady supply of oil, gas, and uranium to meet the country's growing energy needs. There has been a noticeable uptick in China's interest in Kazakhstan. Similarly, China built a pipeline connection from Kazakhstan to tap into the country's abundant energy reserves. China sees Central Asia as an attractive market for its goods. Not only has China increased its focus on the area since September 11, but so has the United States. To further its goal of encouraging

free markets in the area, the United States is actively supporting the Arab Spring. While Turkey and Iran have a strong commercial interest in Kazakh oil and uranium resources, the United States has long-term plans to acquire dominance of the region's energy resources under the cover of "Operation Enduring Freedom." Pakistan is concerned with religious fundamentalism in Kazakhstan; hence the Islamabad is actively constructing mosques and funding religious schools there. As a result, India faces challenges in Central Asia from a variety of outside actors.

The current study makes the assumption that there is potential for further investigation into the possibility of comparing the economic processes taking place in the Central Asian scenario to those occurring in other geopolitical regions. Covering more than one area and analyzing India's foreign policy from both a historical and contemporary perspective would have been a challenging PhD thesis topic. This study contributes to a more comprehensive view of India's foreign policy from a comparative territorial viewpoint by laying the groundwork for an entirely new and comprehensive method by shedding light on India's economic policy with Kazakhstan.

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Appendix I: Photos Taken During the Field Trips

