Mind and Language

In Search of a Theory of Interpretation

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Mind and Language --In Search of a Theory of Interpretation **submitted by me for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts at Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the supervision of Professor Madhucchanda Sen, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University. And that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before for any degree or diploma from anywhere/elsewhere.**

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There are many theories in Philosophy, but I have discussed specially two theories in them. First one is how we understand others mind, which we call the problem of others mind in philosophical terms, and the second one is how we understand others language. Regarding these two problems what we do is that we use to interpret two things, which are the linguistic behaviour and non-linguistic behaviour. During this job what we do we actually try to impose something over the human being: it may be mental or some other meaning of stated word.

Sometime it may possible that, we try to understand other minds by his/her language. That's why we think that the theory of linguistic interpretation and the theories regarding understanding of other minds are trying to give the answer of same question. It may be said that, in these two situations what we do is actually the same job, and during doing this job we observe that, in this two special matter, two subjects use to come closer which are psychology and the linguistic philosophy. So I have tried to make a theory which is the "Theory of Interpretation."

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Chapter 1

Chapter 1

Knowing Others by Their Language

1.1 What do we mean by learning a language?

Language is basically a complex system. It has various dimensions. When we start to learn any new language, we will have to learn some sets of skill from others. Actually learning any kind of language depends on conditions around us. To know the meaning of any language we should have to focus on our very particular goals, which means understanding the sentence which the speaker wants to say.

The skill of learning of any language means the knowledge of an intended language, which we actually want to learn, which helps us to communicate, which serves as a means to express ourselves and a means of understanding others. Actually this is a kind of proficiency that is associated with the mastery of a language. Proficiency means acquiring various skills, like speaking, writing, listening, reading etc.

Proficiency of language means the ability of any person to use language with a level of accuracy. There is not any singular definition of language proficiency. To understand the language spoken by others it is very much important to understand the linguistic structure, this helps us to search patterns and being able to describe or compare to analyze the linguistic phenomena. Discovering a new language from a linguistic aspect often helps us to enrich and understand the meaning of the language.

1.2 Meaning of language according to Frege, Fodor and Von Humboldt

The rationalist tradition in philosophy of language and in linguistics takes language as nothing but an instrument of thought. Frege insists that the thought-content is prior to matters of use. Frege said that communicative function of a language is "merely peripheral". He said that the "expression of thought must form centrally in explanations of syntactic and semantic facts".[1] According to Fodor language has no semantics per se as distinct from the content of the thoughts it expresses. According to Fodor "Learning English," "isn't learning a theory about what the sentences mean, rather it's to learn how to relate its sentences with its corresponding thoughts." That is, for example, to "know Bengali" is to know, how to form sentences. We would not say we know English if for example we use 'there are rabbits' to express the thought that there are cats.[2] Wilhelm von Humboldt has most famously articulated the rationalist tradition in linguistics.

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 – 1835) was very famous for discussing the function of languages. Humboldt says that language ought to be studied not as a fully-formed ways but, dynamically. He says that language "is not a work (ergon) but an activity (energeia)" He says that, it is only the language which makes our knowledge possible. For Humboldt, language is the power which defines the intellectual nature of a man, and determines that person's relation to reality.[3]

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[1]Moravcsik Julius M. 1981."Frege and Chomsky on thought and language". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6(1) p.106.

[2]Fodor Jerry A."Concepts – Where Cognitive Science Going Wrong" 1998. p.9.

[3]Humboldt, Wilhelm von. "Man's Intrinsic Humanity: His Language." Humanist Without Portfolio: An Anthology of the Writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Tr. Marianne Cowan. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, p. 235-298.

1.3 Structure of language

We know very well that language is being used to communicate our thought. But the structure of language helps us for the communication with others. Chomsky says that "people's use of language does not tightly serve utilitarian goals of communication but is an autonomous competence to express thought".[4] The function of language is communication, which is an instrument of thought, but it is not only a tool for expressing thought. Now the question is whether language does more than expression of thoughts or not. We may make the claim that the language is an instrument of thought in form of claims: 1) a weak and 2) a strong claim. The weaker claim is, language is used firstly for the expression of thought, and the stronger claim is that language helps us to structure a thought. Actually thought is very much independent. The thought of a speaker of a language can be expressed by a speaker of a very different language. But this is not true that only language is the medium or a language is essential for thought process. Animals also have a rich mental life which involves thoughts of many kinds but they have no natural language. There is a discontinuity, or a partial overlap, between animal thought and human thought. How do we account for this discontinuity? Why is it that humans are capable of thinking these particular types of thoughts? Some may say that it is due to the fundamental mechanisms of language which structure these thoughts in a proper way. The stress on the fundamental mechanisms of language and not on any particular natural language is a crucial distinction that will be described below. The term language here refers to the fundamental mechanisms in a desirable quality of which the production and comprehension of natural languages become possible. This is in contrast to the use of the term language which means a particular natural language such as Bengali or English.

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[4]Pinker, Steven & Paul Bloom. 1990. "Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral and Brain Science", p.719

1.4 The function of a language

Language has a definite function. The language faculty has an effect that of allowing us to communicate. But the question is that, what is the descriptive role of this function which plays within the theory. How does the claim of the function of language is communication fit in with an explanatory theory of language? Moreover, since the notion of function makes the best sense within a systematic account of functional attribution, a good way to translate the function of language is to look at its primary mechanisms, to look at the way they are structured and the way in which they operate. The claim is that the nature of the basic mechanisms of language indicates that its primary function is nothing but being an instrument of thought.

Let us first discuss about the meaning of the claim that the function of language is primarily to support communication. Communication is usually understood as a linking or transfer of information. Communication is mainly seen through two models, which are the encoding-decoding model, and the second one is the inferential model.

The encoding-decoding model is also known as the message model which involves the speaker to encode a message and transmit it via sound/sign to the hearer, who then decodes the message. This is the common-sense and folk psychological notion of language where language is used as a medium of ideas. An analysis of metaphorical expressions used in English, for example, shows that English speakers conceptualize the way they communicate in terms of the conduit metaphor. The conduit metaphor is actually a dominant class of figurative expressions which is used when discussing metalanguage. Whenever anyone speak or write to insert their mental contents like thoughts, feelings, concepts, etc, into containers like words, phrases, sentences, etc and whose contents are then extracted by

listeners and readers. Thus the language is viewed as a conduit which conveys the mental content between people.

1.5 The conduit metaphor

The concept of the conduit metaphor was originally explored by Michael Reddy in his article "The Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language about Language".[5] "The contemporary theory that metaphor is primarily conceptual, conventional, and part of the ordinary system of thought and language can be traced to Michael Reddy's now classic essay. With a single, thoroughly analyzed example, he allowed us to see, albeit in a restricted domain, that ordinary everyday English is largely metaphorical, dispelling once and for all the traditional view that metaphor is primarily in the realm of poetic or 'figurative' language. Reddy showed, for a single, very significant case, that the locus of metaphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience. Though other theorists had noticed some of these characteristics of metaphor, Reddy was the first to demonstrate them by rigorous linguistic analysis, stating generalizations over voluminous examples."[6] This is of course not only a folk psychological concept, but it is taken seriously by many linguists and philosophers.

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[5]Reddy, M.J. (1979)."The conduit metaphor. A case of frame conflict in our language about language. In A Ortony (Ed.). Metaphor and Thought" Cambridge University Press, p- 284-310

[6]Lakoff, G.(1992). "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor" (p-204). "In A Ortony (ED), Metaphor and Thought," 2nd ed Cambridge University Press , p203- 204

Metaphor is an essential and crucial structure of thought in a language. All of our natural languages are known by the presence of predictable metaphorical expressions, which Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refer to as conceptual metaphor.

Metaphorical analysis is a method of understanding of any text by analyzing and identifying the metaphors which is used in that text. The word metaphor specially symbolizes a different thing. For example a metaphorical representation of a word like deep shadow in a poem might be represents of sadness.

1.6 Problem of "message model" communication

On the other hand, there are problems with the message model of communication. It cannot suitably describe the way by which we successfully and predictively disambiguate the utterances. It also cannot treat with cases of non-literal uses of language, in which the hearer does not decode but can infer the meaning of an utterance by using various clues. There is also the problem of the reference of utterances.

According to the inferential model, communication involves the hearer who identifies the intention of the speaker. In producing an utterance, a speaker communicates by giving evidence of what they intend to communicate. The hearer then uses the linguistic meaning of the utterance of this evidence, which is the only part in order to infer the message that the speaker intended to communicate. There is a distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker's meaning. Linguistic meanings are simply one part of a larger set of data which a hearer actually uses it in order to infer what the speaker actually intended to communicate, or what the speaker wants to mean. This larger set includes a set of shared beliefs and presumptions that speakers and hearers have an understanding with each other. It also

includes a set of inferential strategies and a predictable pattern of inference from linguistic meaning to speaker's meaning.

As mentioned above, in much of the empirical and the theoretical work into language it is understood that the function of language is nothing but the communication. Very often this is the starting point of the discussion tradition and the modern system holds that language serves communication by allowing speakers to disclose to hearers to the conceptual contents of understanding that language communication is mainly the collection of related evolutionary arguments, according to which the adaptive of language use is its communicative function; language fitness is said to correspond to communicative success.

Productivity is known as a general term for linguistics, referring to the limitless ability of using any natural language to say any new kind of things. It is also identified as a type of creativity. The term productivity may also be applied in a very narrower sense of any constructions or any particular forms which can be used to create new instances in a very same way. So, productivity is mostly discussed in connection with word formation. "The normal use of language is not only innovative and potentially infinite in scope," says Noam Chomsky, "but also free from the control of detectable stimuli, either external or internal"[7]

The structure of language shows the evidence of a complex design for the communication of propositional structures. The function of language is nothing but communication. For making this claim, it is said that, as there was a selective advantage in human evolutionary history for using language for communication, so its primary function must be therefore the communication.

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[7]Chomsky Noam: "Language and Mind" Third Edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1968) p.11

1.7 language is an instrument of thought

This is the strong claim in consideration to language which is an instrument of thought. This is of course not to refute that animals can think without language, and from this we should not imply that, all thought is due to the underlying the mechanisms of language. Animal cognition is exciting indeed but it has a missing of a specific kind of thinking which appears to be unique to humans.

Linguistic productivity is known as a part of the creative aspect of language in use. It is mainly the capacity to produce and understand an unlimited number of sentences. This feature of language was noticed by Descartes, who viewed productivity in all domains. Linguistic systematicity refers to the fact that our ability to produce and comprehend expressions of a certain kind guarantees that we can produce or comprehend other systematically related expressions. The common diagram of systematicity holds that anyone that can understand the sentence like Jane loves Thomas - can also understand the sentence Thomas loves Jane - certainly, it is impossible to understand one without also understanding the other. Now the question is, what accounts for this systematicity of abstract linguistic structures, or, more particularly, what is our ability to construct structural representations of sentences? The answer should be that, productivity and systematicity are perhaps the best indicators of the creative and open-ended nature of human language.

1.8 Argument of Fodor

As Fodor eminently argued that, language is productive and systematic, and so is thought.

First Argument:

Fodor points out that thought have the same compositional character as semantics does. Suppose someone understands the sentence "Tim is taller than Mike". This would entail that the person in question will also understand the sentence "Mike is taller than Tim". Similarly if someone is capable of thinking that "Tim is taller than Mike", then she will also be capable of thinking that "Mike is taller than Tim". Fodor claims that the only way in which we can explain this fact about thought is by saying that thought itself has a compositional character. This actually amounts to saying that there is a language of thought.

Second Argument:

The second argument relies upon the features of mental processes. Fodor wants to claim that mental processes in general are systematic rational processes. They have properties which are similar to inferences which we study in Logic. And just as in logical inferences we move from truths to truths. Thought processes are also endowed with this truth preserving character. The parallel runs even further. Logical inferences, when valid, have a truth preserving character because of their form.

Similarly mental processes are truth preserving because of their form. What the language of thought hypothesis claims is that "sentences in our head have a syntactic form, and it is because of this syntactic form that they can interact in a systematic way".

Fodor also claims that folk psychological explanations draw upon the relation between syntactic properties of thought and causal properties of those thoughts. It is through this relation that Fodor tries to demonstrate how a folk psychological theory explains behavior of a person by ascribing mental states to that person and by showing how the

content of those mental states have properties that make the mental state causally efficacious and in turn produces behavior.

There is no non-arbitrary limitation of constraining the length of thoughts. Like any sentences, we can have the infinite numbers of different thoughts. And just as sentences are related to each other in a systematic way, thoughts too are also related to each other systematically. Though there are immense change in linguistics and cognitive science since 1970s, but Fodor's main argument is that, for why both language and thought are productive and systematic remains unchanged? Language and thought both utilizes a generative procedure which allows the creation of a limitless set of structured expressions. This procedure of course cannot be responsible for all of our thought processes, mainly of what we share with animal cognition is very much rich and complex but does not involve language or its underlying mechanisms. Some human thoughts are not just more complicated than animal thoughts; they are structured in a productive and systematic way that is unavailable to non-human animals.

It might seem contradictory to try to express in language the sort of thoughts that would or would not be possible without the underlying mechanisms of language to generate them. But these basic mechanisms are of course not linguistics in nature.

The theory of meaning actually tries to explain the concepts of a particular language or to correlate with the concepts with words in that particular language. A theory of meaning suggested by Davidson, is the ability to make a meaningful translation of a sentence.

The knowledge of language is distinguished from other practical abilities. It is, not a concealed thoughts in a deeper level. The study of thought is actually conducted by the study of language. Any natural knowledge of meaning is manifested in the actual use of the language.

If we take the philosophical lessons we get from Folk Psychology, Radical Interpretation and Davidson's Theory of Meaning then we will be able to explain how understanding people's speech and understanding their mind go hand in hand. Let us first talk about Davidson's theory of meaning.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2

Donald Davidson's Radical Interpretation

2.1 Introduction

Davidson's question was what kind of knowledge is needed for re-describing an uninterpreted utterance as an interpreted one. This type of process is named as 'Radical Interpretation'. He investigates the best way to interpret the evidential base on which this process conducts. The real difficulty is that we must not individuate the evidential base by reference to facts, as we have no access of any prior radical interpretation. Davidson argues that the propositional attitudes or intentions of most of the speakers fall into this category. After discarding Quine's approach of 'Radical Translation' as inappropriate for it's negligence of the semantic structure of interpreted utterances, Davidson draws the outline of his own truth-theoretic approach on which the interpretation of speech and attribution of propositional attitudes can proceed at the same time. He attempt to answer about three questions of truth theories on which his approach is based: (1) whether this theory can be given for a natural language as a whole, (2) whether the evidence on which the verification go along, and the technical equipment of satisfaction and related notions, meet the above constraints, and (3) whether they can really provide the task of Radical Interpretation.

Radical Interpretation is an interpretation made by any person who is trying to make sense of the utterance of a speaker, where there is no prior knowledge of the speaker. This sort of interpretation involves attributions of beliefs and desire to the speaker and attribution

of meanings to their utterances.[1] Donald Davidson (1973) was the philosopher who introduced this term. In the work of the indeterminacy of translation W.V.O. Quine also introduced the phrase "Radical Translation"[2]. Radical Translation is the translation that a person gives of a speaker's language, where there is no prior knowledge of the speaker's language in the context. He argued that, knowing any language is actually having the capacity to understand any expression of that particular language, and the ability to specify what any sentence in that language may mean.[3]

2.2 Radical Interpretation and its importance

Radical Interpretation of Davidson plays a more important role in his theory of meaning than Quine's Radical Translation does in his theory of meaning. It is however debatable as to what the role Quine's notion of radical translation plays in Davidson's theory of Radical Interpretation.

A radical interpreter is a person who has no knowledge of the language of the speaker. What he does is that he builds up a theory of meaning on the basis of the assent or dissent of the speaker on a particular circumstance. He assumes the assent as an attitude of holding a sentence to be true. He then interprets the speaker's verbal behaviour on this assumption. The ascription of belief to the speaker goes hand in hand with the ascription of meanings to his utterances.

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[1] Davidson Donald, "Truth and Meaning," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p.17

[2] Martin Robert (1987). "Chapter 6: Radical Translation". The Meaning of Language (6th ed.). MIT Press. pp. 53

[3] Lepore Emileand Kirk Ludwig; "Donald Davidson; Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality" p- 26.

Radical Interpretation means like that, when someone is placed into a community and starts to speak a kind of language, which another person may not understand at all. Radical Interpretation of Davidson is taken by anyone who is trying to investigate a hypothetical stand point of the investigation of language, mind, action and knowledge. Now the question arises here that how could a person understand a language? And how could he exactly find out the meaning?[4]

Kurt utters the words "Es regnet"[5] and under the right conditions we can understand that he has said that it is raining. The interpretation that we give of this utterance is that Kurt means by the words "Es regnet" that it is raining. About this interpretation we may ask two questions: 1) How we do this interpretation? 2) How do we know that we have correctly interpreted Kurt's utterance? In this chapter we are going to discuss these two questions in the light of Davidson's theory of Radical Interpretation. First of all Davidson is claiming that we should try to look at the conditions under which Kurt utters the word "Es regnet" or assents to the word: "Es regnet". The condition here is the condition of raining. As people usually believes that it is raining, when it is raining I ascribe the belief that it is raining to Kurt. And since people who believe that it is raining usually utter sentences which mean that it is raining, this helps me to interpret Kurt's utterance in this ways. So the proposed interpretation of Kurt's utterance is that Kurt is saying that it is raining. But we need to know whether this proposed interpretation is a correct interpretation. For this, we need to gather evidence for the proposed interpretation.

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[4]Davidson Donald; "Truth and Meaning,"1967, p- 17.

[5]Davidson Donald: "Radical Interpretation", 1973, p-63.

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2.3 Problems of Interpretation

The problem that an interpreter faces is not peculiar to the situation where the interpreter is interpreting a foreign language. The problem also affects an interpreter when she is trying to interpret the utterances of a person who belongs to her own language community. The difference is only in degree. First of all the interpreter has to identify the language spoken by the speaker as her own language. Then she may come up with an interpretation of the utterance of a speaker and that interpretation may also be correct. The problem, however, lies in the sort of evidence that the interpreter might have for proposing such an interpretation. The real point here is what would count as evidence for any proposed interpretation be it the interpretation of the utterance in a foreign language or an utterance in my own language. My interpretation of the utterance made in my own language too is radical. This is so because if we are unable to decide what sort of evidence would count as a deciding evidence for the correctness of an interpretation then every proposed interpretation will be radical just in the sense translations are radical according to Quine.

Radical Translation is actually a kind of a thought experiment which is introduced by W. V. Quine in the late 1950's. Actually the translation of any theoretical sentences is indeterminate. As Quine claimed that, language is nothing but a social skill. He regards the language just as a natural phenomenon in society. According to him, when a child starts to learn his or her mother tongue or an adult starts to learn any second or third language they can naturally acquire that by continuous and systematic language learning. In that sense a linguist can translate any sentence into English to some other unknown languages. Firstly, the linguist will use the direct translation of a sentence. Such as after hearing a lot of utterances of a word 'Gavagai' whenever the linguist sees rabbits, he predicts the word 'Rabbit' will be the correct translation of the word 'Gavagai'. Thus the linguist can conclude

the correct translation of the word 'Gavagai'. It is an assumption that a sentence and its translation are sharing the same meaning. The importance of indeterminacy of translation is indeterminacy of meaning, which means that the meanings of theoretical sentences of natural languages are not fixed by any empirical data. The fact is that, the radical translator is definitely bound to impose as much meaning as possible.

In addition indeterminacy of translation also applies to the interpretation of speaker's personal language, and even to someone's past utterances. The indeterminacy of translation proposes that what we count as evidence is uncertain, as there are no such entities as meanings.

The idea of Radical Interpretation is an extension and modification of Quine's idea of Radical Translation,[6] which was developed by Donald Davidson in 1960's and 1970's. Quine is concerned with the extension of empirical data which determine the meanings of sentences of a natural language. In "Radical Interpretation", Davidson is concerned with a question, about how a person could know to interpret another's language. For example, how could one know about the interpretation of the German sentence "Es regnet" as meaning that it is raining? The required knowledge for interpretation differs from the required knowledge for translation. This is so because one could know that "Es regnet" is translated as 'someone is running' without knowing the meaning or the interpretation of either sentence. In a very recognizable circumstance the native speaker can hold that a sentence may be true. Davidson's radical interpreter tries to understand the meaning of those sentences. Although the methodologies which applied in the popular two contexts that is Quine's Radical Translation and Davidson's Radical Interpretation should not be regarded as competitors.

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[6]Harman, "An Introduction to 'Translation and Meaning', Chapter Two of Word and Object"; (MIT Press, 1960)

These two contexts are designed to answer different questions. The fact is that, interpretation is broader than translation; and sentences which cannot be translated can still be interpreted.

2.4 What kind of knowledge is needed for interpretation?

Now the question is what kind of knowledge is needed for interpretation? So we are now asking the question as to what would count as evidence that can either prove a proposed interpretation as a correct or incorrect one. The answer may be the knowledge of all the meaningful expressions in ones language. As for example in German, the utterance that Kurt made means it is raining and Kurt was speaking German. So by uttering the words "Es regnet", Kurt actually wanted to say that it was raining.

When a person utters something for an interpreter it is essential that, he is able to understand which non-linguistic intention of the speaker has caused to make this linguistic utterance. So what we are doing, while we are interpreting a speaker is establishing a causal link between the non-linguistic intentions of the speaker and his linguistic act.

On the basis of behaviouristic data the "causal" theories of Ogden and Richards and of Charles Morris attempted to analyze the meaning of sentences.[7] To connect words with non-linguistic facts is a hard job because words are finite in number while sentences are not. Sentences are nothing but the synchronization of words; which helps to interpret sentences. This is why knowledge of the entire set of words of a language alone cannot suffice as a guaranteed root to the understanding of any sentence in that language.

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[7] In The California Undergraduate Philosophy Reviewed Article vol. 1, Fresno, CA: California State University, Fresno. pp. 25-33.

There are very systematic interrelations among the thoughts of a thinker. For example, if we consider the thought that X loves Y, then we also can consider the thought that Y loves X. Systematicity is actually a crucial property of human thought. A skilled speaker or an interpreter can interpret of his own utterances, or of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the words, in the utterances. It can only possible, for the systematic relations between the meanings of utterances. During our lifetime, we can create an infinite number of thoughts. Or it may be said that we have the capacity of productivity of infinite thoughts, which we can express in our language. So there is a correlation between the systematicity and productivity.

Recursive feature of language is essential to explain new sentences. But the basic difficulty is that we cannot attach a sense of intentions for interpreting speech independently. The reason is that, interpreting an agent's intentions, his beliefs and his words are parts of a single project, so we cannot make the full intentions and beliefs as the base of evidence for a theory of radical interpretation.

Now the question is what would serve to make interpretation possible. The answer is the interpreter must be able to understand any of the infinity of sentences which the speaker utters. Now the problem is that radical interpretation cannot take as evidence for the meaning of the complex sentences.

The thing is that the theory as the specification of a function taking utterances as arguments and having interpretations as values. Without the description of apparent reference to meanings or interpretations, the person who knows the theory can interpret the utterances to which the theory applies.

The second requirement of the theory of interpretation is that it can be supported or verified by evidence by to an interpreter. But it must apply to an utterance which would be natural to think of to provide evidence of particular interpretations recognized as correct. And this case will arise for the interpreter who is dealing with a language which he already knows. The speaker of a language cannot be able to produce an explicit finite theory for his own language, but can test the correctness of interpreted utterance.

Davidson's argument is that "Es regnet" which is a speaker's utterance can have a non-standard meaning, rather than it may be possible that the speaker can mean something non-standard at the time of uttering this. Linguistic conventionalism typically holds that Kurt, in uttering "Es regnet", might mean that someone is running. But his words do not actually mean that. Davidson's view of language helps him to claim that the nonstandard meanings can be attributed to a speaker's utterances. In his article "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", Donald Davidson tried to make an interesting solution about the problem of meaning and to the associated problems concerning the understanding of the use of natural language. This solution is very much surprising when we compare it with Davidson's prior writings in the ground of the philosophy of language. Davidson utters at the end of his article about concerning the use of language and the problem of understanding. He uttered that, "no learnable common core of consistent behaviour, no shared grammar or rules, no portable interpreting machine set to grind out the meaning of an arbitrary utterance"[8]. However, in many cases the communication of interpretation of non-standard utterances becomes successful, because an interpreter tries to grasp the speaker's relevant intentions rather than the meaning of the utterance. In a single communicative exchange it contains an innovation of utterances which is successfully interpreted. It is not the meaning of that particular utterance that one is trying to say is identified, but it is that, what a speaker means to

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[8] Davidson Donald; "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"(1996) p-475

communicate something at the time of an utterance. To understand this theory I have discussed The Theory of Folk Psychology in my fourth chapter.

2.5 Malapropism and Interpretation

In his essay "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", philosopher Donald Davidson said that Malapropisms disclose something about how people develop the meanings of words. He argues that language competence does not mean to learn for setting a meaning for each word, and also not for strictly applying those semantic rules to interpret other people's utterances. Rather, he argues that, people also should continually have to make a use of other contextual information to interpret the meaning of any utterance, and then they should modify their understanding of every word's meaning which is based on those interpretations.

Davidson makes his research with an interesting linguistic phenomenon named Malapropism. Malapropism is nothing but the wrong use of a word or better to say an entire phrase which creates confusion with a similar word or phrase. It has an extra-effect of a humorous one. This humorous effect can be intentioned (as Davidson himself presents this at the beginning of his article), and in this case the Malapropisms become a metaphorical tool, or unintentional, which happens as a cause for the lack of knowledge from the speaker's part.

Davidson thinks that Malapropism is a very critical theory inside the philosophy of language; perhaps it is more challenging than indexicality or metaphor. The interesting fact about Malapropisms is that they are not at all rare phenomena. On the contrary, in our everyday speech, we meet them quite often. However, people reach, in a relevant number of cases, an agreement on the meaning of what they say.

The word "Malapropism" derives from a fictional character named "Mrs. Malaprop" who played a character in Richard Brinsley Sheridan's 1775 play The Rivals. Mrs. Malaprop frequently speaks by using some of the word which do not have any meaning which she intends to mean but which sound similar to that particular word. So an occurrence of nonsensical speech error is called a Malapropism when a word has the similar in sound.

In Act 3 Scene III, she declares to Captain Absolute, "Sure, if I reprehend anything in this world it is the use of my oracular tongue, and a nice derangement of epitaphs!"[9] This is completely a nonsensical utterance but as soon as we here this we can understand this, we may easily correct this like; "If I apprehend anything in this world, it is the use of my vernacular tongue, and a nice arrangement of epithets",[10] although these are not the only words that can be substituted to produce an appropriately expressed thought in this context, and commentators have proposed other possible replacements that work just as well.

Other Malapropisms spoken by Mrs. Malaprop includes "illiterate him quite from your memory" (instead of "obliterate"), "he is the very pineapple of politeness" (instead of pinnacle) and "she's as headstrong as an allegory on the banks of the Nile" (instead of alligator)[11].

Malapropisms do not happen only as an intentional comedic play, but it also happens in our ordinary speech. That may be called as "speech error".[12] Some examples are often quoted in the media. Welsh Conservative leader Andrew Davies encouraged the Conservative party conference to make breakfast (Brexit) a success. Bertie Ahern, former Taoiseach of

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[9]Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (2008) [1775], "The Rivals: A Comedy"

[10]Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (2008) [1775], "The Rivals: A Comedy"

[11]Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (2008) [1775], "The Rivals: A Comedy"

[12]Fay David; Cutler Anne (1977). "Malapropisms and the Structure of the Mental Lexicon". Linguistic Inquiry. 8 (3): 505–520.

Ireland, warned his country against "upsetting the apple tart" (apple cart) of his country's economic success.[13]

During one Senate hearing, Philippine presidential communications assistant secretary Mocha Uson stumbled on the legal phrase "right against self-incrimination" by invoking her "right against self-discrimination" instead.[14] Former world heavy weight champion boxer Mike Tyson, upon being asked about his next plans moments after losing in a world title fight with Lennox Lewis, declared that "I might fade into Bolivian" (oblivion).[15]

So Malapropism is an use of an incorrect word in a place of a word which is similar to it in sound. As a result the utterance becomes nonsensical or sometimes humorous. Here is another famous example of a baseball player Yogi Berra, as he says "Texas has a lot of electrical votes", rather uttering "electoral votes". Malapropisms happen as an error in our daily speech. Donald Davidson said that, Malapropisms are actually a complicated process by which the brain can translate thoughts into any language.

Humorous Malapropisms are one kind of Malapropism where it can attract the utmost attention, whereas weak Malapropisms are very much common in our everyday speech and writing.

In his essay "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"[16], the famous philosopher Donald Davidson says that Malapropisms actually help to reveal that how people process the meanings of words. He says that language skill must not merely involve of learning a set of

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13Mayer Catherine (2007-04-26). "Mr. Popularity" .

[14]Ager Maila. (2017-10-04) Mocha invokes right against self-discri… er, incrimination at Senate hearing. Philippine Daily Inquirer.

[15]"Mike Tyson fades into Bolivian". 30 January 2017 – via You Tube.

[16]Davidson Donald "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" (1986),p-32

meaning for each word, and then only strictly applying those semantic rules to decode other people's utterances. Rather, he says, people must repeatedly make use of additional contextual information for interpreting the meaning of utterances, and then modifies their understanding of each word's meaning based on those interpretations.[17]

The ultimate evidence of a theory cannot be the correct interpretations, as the Radical Interpretation, is supposed to supply an understanding of particular utterances which is not given in advance. So for the general case, the evidence must be accessible to someone who does not know the process of interpreting utterances.

2.6 Translation and Interpretation

Now we can discuss about the method of translation which is the process from the language interpreted into the language of the interpreter. This type of theory is an effective method for going from an arbitrary sentence of the alien tongue of a familiar language.

A theory of translation involves three languages: 1) the object language, 2) the subject language, and 3) the meta-language. Without knowing the meaning of any sentence we can able to know which sentences of the subject language translate into the object language. Now if the subject language happens to be identical with the theory of the language then someone who understands the theory can use the translation to interpret utterances.

But the problem is that we cannot mention a sentence which belongs to one's own language. As for example, "Es regnet" in Kurt's language is translated as 'It is raining', which we cannot be able to say as others own language. If we accept this difficulty, there remains

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[17]From a lecture of Prof. Madhucchanda Sen, Jadavpur University, Kolkata in a Refresher Course on Literary Studies and the Question of Interdisciplinarity (18.01.2021) on " Radical Translation and Malapropism".

the fact that the method of translation will not be able to be reaching the theory which helps us to interpret our own language.

The interpretation depends on the utterances of simple sentences. For example, for getting a theory of translation for a satisfactory theory of interpretation of our own language, we want to have a huge form of simple sentences. A satisfactory theory for interpreting the utterances of any language will reveal the significant semantic structure.

2.7 How Interpretation may be possible? - Davidson, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty

One of the things that Davidson is proposing here is that the meanings that a speaker assigns to his or her utterances can in principle be understandable. The process of interpretation may not always guarantee understanding but that does not suggest that we cannot understand others and their utterances in principle. If we suggest that we cannot in principle understand others and their utterances then that would lead to a thesis that assumes a "Private Language". The scepticism regarding the possibility of understanding other people's minds and other people's utterances has its root in the Cartesian picture of mind. If we view the mind as an insulated box which is self-contained and impenetrable then such a picture would be faulty. Wittgenstein famously brought forward his "beetle in the box" thought experiment to show that the very idea of a Private Language and the kind of view regarding the mind that follows from such a view of language is wrong.

If meanings were entities that speakers had in their minds which were private then how is it possible that anyone else could possibly understand what they say by the use of language? Wittgenstein says that if meanings were like beetles in boxes that the user kept

them in, then it would be difficult for anyone to open that box and look at them and know them. Actually no one would have any way of knowing whether the beetle that the other has in her box is anything like the beetle I have in my box. Moreover, it would also be impossible for anyone to know if there was any beetle at all in the speaker's box. There would be no way of knowing if the speaker was uttering sounds that he or she assigned meanings to or was just making noises that sounded like words. And of course there would be no way of knowing whether in a conversation two speakers were actually talking about the same thing.

This has actually led to the classic debate regarding the possibility of knowing other minds. It is here that both understanding other people's mind and other people's language come together.

With regard to the question of understanding others we must remember that all that we are able to do is to observe the behaviour of other people be it linguistic behaviour or any other sort of behaviour. So the question is whether we can take those behaviour as indicative of minds behind them, and with regard to linguistic behaviour the question would be whether such behaviour indicates that the mind behind the behaviour is actually assigning some meaning to them. Wittgenstein says that if we are incapable of understanding others and their utterances then we would have to assume that we live in a solipsistic world.

If we are to refrain from accepting that we are inhabitants of a solipsistic world then we shall have to specify how is it that we understand other minds and the utterances made by others. Both Wittgenstein and Davidson would give up the Cartesian view that the mind is an insulated impenetrable box. Davidson's Principle of Charity and Principle of Rationality, which I will discuss later all suggest that we do in fact share a great deal with others and unless we did it would not be possible for us to understand them.

I would like to say that Wittgenstein was actually trying to indicate to us an idea which is in fact crucial to our understanding of how communication and interpretation is possible. We are indeed subjects and subjects by definition should have some sort of privilege over what is given to the subject - i.e. the subjective. What we need to remember is that we are not the only subjects and there are other subjects in the world. Not only are there other subjects but also there are other subjects with whom we need to deal with in our lives. Use of language, for Wittgenstein is a social act which is performed by each subject within a space which is shared by other subjects. This may be called an inter-subjective space. The ways in which we use words and ideas are constantly regulated by practices of the use of those ideas and words within the inter-subjective space I find myself in. This is so because we share our lives and ways of living with these other people. And it is within this shared life that language is used and it cannot be a private game I play. It is in principle sharable.

I would like to add that Morris Merleau-Ponty's ideas regarding embodied mind, embodied consciousness and bodily conduct may help us here. Merleau-Ponty's embodied mind thesis gives us a better-rounded notion of the mind which is absolutely antithetical to the Cartesian view. Within Merleau-Ponty's thesis we cannot and must not make a sharp distinction between bodily behaviour and intelligent behaviour (like thought). The intentionality of the human mind, for him, can be best understood within a unified understanding of human action or behaviour. The Physiological and the Psychological is not separated within this thesis. In "The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science," (New York: Routledge, 2008) Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavisay that Merleau-Ponty is proposing that the body is "a constitutive or transcendental principle, precisely because it is involved in the very possibility of experience". Now this experience is not only the experience of the world of material objects but also the experience of others in my world. They say that "the notion of an embodied mind or a minded body is

meant to replace the ordinary notions of mind and body, both of which are derivations and abstractions". I feel that the conception of an embodied mind can in fact bypass the sort of problems that we have faced in trying to explain how we may try to understand others and the utterances of others when we have only their behaviour to observe. By questioning the binary of physical behaviour and intelligent behaviour Merleau-Ponty is able to shed light on how we may understand the mind of others and the meanings they assign to their utterances by observing their behaviour. This is so because neither minds nor meanings are linked with some secret storehouse under Merleau-Ponty's thesis of embodied mind.

If we look at Merleau-Ponty's later works on art and language we shall see that they resonate the kind of understanding of communication and interpretation that we find in Davidson and Wittgenstein. However I shall not go into a detailed discussion of this here. I would however like to mention that in his "Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language" (Hugh J. Silverman (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press , 1973), he addresses similar questions as Davidson.

Ted Toadvine writes in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on Morris Merleau-Ponty[18]

Merleau-Ponty summarizes his research after Phenomenology as focused on a "theory of truth" exploring how knowledge and communication with others are "original formations with respect to perceptual life, but … also preserve and continue our perceptual life even while transforming it"[19]. Expression, language, and symbolism are the key to this theory of truth and provide the foundation for a philosophy of history and of "transcendental" humanity. Whereas the study of perception could only provide a "bad ambiguity" that mixes

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[18]https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/merleau-ponty/#ExprLangArt

[19]Ponty Maurice Merleau, "Un inédit de Maurice Merleau-Ponty," 2000, pp.41–42/287

"finitude and universality", Merleau-Ponty sees in the phenomenon of expression a "good ambiguity" that "gathers together the plurality of monads, the past and the present, nature and culture, into a single whole"[20]

In Merleau-Ponty it seems to me that we can get a glimpse of how interpretation may be possible in this way.

So in the end of this chapter we have addressed the important questions like whether communication is at all possible, whether we can understand other people's minds and their utterances. And I have tried to show that within the discussions we find in Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty and Davidson we may find answers to these questions. I will in the chapters that follow discuss only how Davidson tries to answer these questions.

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[20]Ponty Maurice Merleau, "Un inédit de Maurice Merleau-Ponty," 2000, p- 48/290

Chapter 3

Chapter 3

Tarski's Theory of Truth

3.1 Introduction

Davidson has taken help from Tarski's theory of truth in order to construct his theory of meaning. A theory of interpretation for an unknown object language structurally reveals the theory of interpretation for a known language, and a system of translation from the unknown language into the known. In 'Theory of Truth', Tarski first showed this.[1]

In Tarski's style a theory of truth is that it entails, for each sentence s of the object language and the form of a sentence is:

'*s* is true if and only if *p*'

The T-sentences are obtained by replacing "*s*" by a canonical description of s, and "*p*" by a translation of *s*. The finite number of axioms, are of two kinds: 1) on the basis of the conditions of satisfaction of simple sentences under which a sequence satisfies of a complex sentence, and 2) the conditions under which the simplest sentences are satisfied. Actually truth is defined for closed sentences in terms of the notion of satisfaction. Tarski shows that in the language of the theory contains enough set theory.

Tarski was interested in formalized languages which have no indexical or demonstrative aspects. He treated sentences as vehicles of truth. But natural languages are

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[1]Tarski Alfred, ''The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages'', first published in Polish in 1933 and in English translation in 1956.

full of indexical features. That's why sentences may vary in truth according to time and speaker.

3.2 The defence of Tarski's claim

The defence of the claim is a theory of truth, modified to apply to a natural language, which can be used as a theory of interpretation. It consists in attempts to answer three questions:

1. Is it reasonable to think that a theory of truth can be offered for a natural language?

2. With no prior knowledge of the language to be interpreted would it be possible to tell that such a theory was correct on the basis of evidence possibly available to an interpreter?

3. If the theory is known to be true, then would it be possible to interpret utterances of speakers of the language?

The first question is the assumption that a theory of truth can be given for a natural language; the second and third questions address whether such a theory would satisfy the demands which we have made on a theory of interpretation.

1. The question is can a theory of truth be given for a natural language?

A significant portion of a language is used to state its own theory of truth. According to Tarski's Convention T, it is the test of the sufficiency of a theory that it entails all the T-sentences. This test apparently cannot be met without assigning the quantificational form to the sentences of the language.[2]

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[2] Patterson D; "Theories of Truth and Convention-T", (1956), p. 187-188

3.3 Convention T

Convention T is known as to be the accepted method for dealing with a host of problems. Such as sentences that attribute attitudes, modalities, general causal statements, counterfactuals, attributive adjectives, quantifiers like "most", and so on. Frege did not have a theory of truth like Tarski's theory. He wanted the structure of a kind for which a theory of truth can be given.

A theory of truth in detail can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, truth will be characterized, not for the whole language, but for a part of the language, which is grammatically clumsy, but will contain infinity of sentences which tire out the power of the whole language. The second part will match of the remaining sentences for which truth has been characterized.

2. Next question is can a theory of truth be verified by appealing to evidence available before interpretation has begun?

Convention T says that a theory of truth is very much satisfactory if it generates a T-sentence of the object language. It says that a theory of truth is empirically correct, without verifying that the T-sentences are true. The relevant evidence can consist entirely of facts about the behaviour and attitudes of speakers in relation to sentences by the way of utterances as the T-sentences talk about only the closed sentences of the language. A theory must introduce semantical notions like satisfaction and reference. A theory of truth demands for a theory that can be tested only by that sentence.

In Tarski's work, T-sentences are taken to be true as the biconditional and understood as a translation of the sentence's truth conditions. But without the point of radical interpretation we cannot move ahead for the correct translation. Tarski was able to define

truth as basic and to take out the explanation of translation or interpretation, while each utterance has its own interpretation. Truth is a single property which attaches or fails to attach to utterances, and truth connects with fairly simple attitudes of speakers.

In rephrasing Convention T without appealing to the concept of meaning will give us a satisfactory theory of truth. For every sentence *s* of the object language, it must need to be that *s* is true if and only if *p*, where '*p*' is replaced by any sentence that is true if and only if *s*. This particular theory is proved by evidence that T-sentences are simply true. It is also necessary to say, what replaces "*p*" translates *s*. There is no chance that if we demand of T-sentences, a theory of interpretation will emerge. And this will happen if we took the T-sentences only in isolation. Individual T-sentences will in fact serve to yield interpretations by putting appropriate formal and empirical restrictions on the theory as a whole.

A speaker holds a sentence to be true because the sentence in his language means what he believes. The available evidence to an interpreter is that, T-sentences are true. But the evidence cannot make the speaker be able to describe his beliefs and intentions. The attitude actually demands a theory on the same evidence as interpretation. Knowing the sentence to be true, and knowing the meaning infer beliefs, and enough information about beliefs. But Radical Interpretation should rest on evidence that does not assume knowledge of meaning or detailed knowledge of beliefs.

A single attitude which is applicable to all sentences can be accepted as true. We can begin by holding a sentence true, or accepting it as true. We cannot make finely discriminated distinctions among beliefs. It is an attitude by which the interpreter can recognize before the interpretation. It may be possible that he know a person who wants to communicate a truth by uttering a sentence without having any idea about what is the truth. There is no reason to

judge other attitudes towards sentences, but all the evidence may be completed in terms of holding sentences to be true.

3.4 How can Convention T be used to support a theory of truth?

At certain times under specified circumstances the available evidence is just that the speaker of the language interpreted different sentences to be true. Now the question is how can this evidence be used to support a theory of truth? From one aspect we have T-sentences, in the form:

(T) "Es regnet" is true in German language when it is uttered by a at the time of b if and only if it is raining near a at the time of b.

On the other hand, we have the evidence, in the form:

(E) Kurt is a person of German speech community and Kurt holds the truth that "Es regnet" on Saturday at noon time and it is Saturday at noon and it is also raining near Kurt on Saturday at noon.

We should, consider (E) as evidence that (T) is true. Though (t) is a universal quantifier, to support the claim of the first step would be to gather more evidence:

(GE)(x)(t) (if a belongs to the German speech community then a holds true "Es regnet" at b if and only if it is raining near a at the time of b).

The objection is that Kurt, or anyone, may be wrong about whether it is raining near him or not. And for this reason for not taking (E) as conclusive evidence for (GE) or for (T); and the reason is not to expect generalizations like (GE) to be more than generally true. We

want a theory which satisfies the formal constraints of truth theory, and maximizes the agreement in the sense of making Kurt or others right. We cannot take the concept of maximization since sentences are infinite in number.

For devising a theory of truth for an unknown native tongue, first we have to look for the best way to fit our logic, to get a theory satisfying Convention T, onto the new language. For all time in patterns of inference, the evidence are classes of sentences which always held true or always held false by almost everyone. To settle matters of logical form, the first step is to identify predicates, singular terms, quantifiers, connectives, and identity in theory. The second step is all about indexical. These types of sentences sometimes held true and sometimes false for the changes in the world. The last step deals with the remaining sentence, on which there is not uniform agreement, or whose truth value does not depend systematically on changes in the environment.

3.5 Tarski's 'Semantic' account of truth

The general structure which Tarski articulates in his 'semantic' account of truth is very much identical with that where Davidson explicates as the basis for a theory of meaning:[3] Tarskian truth theory also can generate, for each and every sentence of the object-language. A T-sentence which specifies the meaning of each sentence is to specify the conditions under which it is true. Actually Davidson's work shows us the requirement of Tarski's Convention T which can be seen as the basic requirement for an adequate theory of meaning.

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[3]Davidson Donald; "Truth and Meaning", Synthese, 17(1): 304–323; 1967, reprinted in Davidson 1984: 17–36.

This problem of difference may be seen, in the closely related two important theories of Tarskian truth theory and a Davidsonian theory of meaning:[4] A theory of meaning for a natural language should be an empirical theory –which should be applied to actual linguistic behaviour – and it will be empirically verifiable. A theory of meaning will be adequate just like an empirical theory, and so that it will be adequate to the actual behaviour of the speaker, like the formation of T-sentences.

To explain the problem of the interdependence of meaning and belief the process is holding belief consistently as far as possible. This includes by conveying truth conditions to unknown sentences to make native speakers right as often as possible, by our own view of what is right. The justification is the procedure of disagreement and agreement. More sentences we accept or reject the better we understand the rest, whether or not we agree about them.

We may not find a way to interpret the utterances of other people's behaviour as helpful to set of beliefs which is mostly dependable and true by our own values, and there is no reason to think that being as rational as me, is necessarily depends on our beliefs.

In philosophy we use definitions, analyses, reductions. These are intended to carry us for better understanding, to others to whom we want to understand epistemologically or ontologically. According to him, in the centre stands a formal theory, of truth, which imposes a complex structure on sentences. These are the given application by the form of the theory and the nature of the evidence. This is a partial interpreted theory. This allows us to reconcile the need for a semantically articulated structure with a theory which is testable only at the sentential level. The only conditions under which speakers hold sentences true, can give a

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[4]Davidson Donald , "The Structure and Content of Truth" The Journal of Philosophy,(1990), p-279-328.

satisfactory theory, with an interpretation of each sentence. The theory itself can give us truth conditions. We need to show, if such a theory satisfies the specified constraints.

3. If we know that a theory of truth satisfies the formal and empirical criteria, the question is that how can we interpret utterances of the language?

A theory of truth entails a T-sentence of the object language, and a T-sentence gives truth conditions. It is, therefore, simple to say that a T-sentence "gives the meaning" of a sentence. Not, by naming or describing an entity that is a meaning, but simply by saying that in what conditions an utterance of the sentence is true.

If the truth value were mattered, then the T-sentence for "Snow is white" could be said that 'it is true if and only if grass is green' or '2 + 2 = 4' may be said that 'it is true if and only if snow is white'. So there will be no satisfactory theory of truth which will produce such abnormal T-sentences, but this confidence does not certify us to make more of T-sentences.

We may claim that it is not alone the T-sentence, but the proof of a T-sentence which permits us to interpret the unknown sentences. The proof reflects the logical form of the theory which assigns the sentence, and thought to reveal something about meaning. But in fact from some true theory of a particular T-sentence, we know no more about how to interpret a certain sequence of sentences.

We can interpret a particular sentence for a correct theory of truth that deals with the language of that sentence. For then not only the T-sentence to be interpreted, but we also know the T-sentences for all other sentences. Then we use to see the place of the sentence in the language as a whole, and want to know the role of each part of the sentence, and also want to know the deal about the logical connections between this sentence and others.

### 3.6 How can it help in interpreting a single sentence?

Now the question is how can it help in interpreting a single sentence to know the truth conditions of others? The answer is that, a speaker also holds other sentences to be true or false, which may be a help. More such information and interpretation may possible. But such information and the theories are not needed, for the information about sentences weather held true under various circumstances. Now if we knew that a T-sentence satisfied Tarski's Convention T, then it was true, and we could then easily use it to interpret a sentence. But then the problem is that in radical interpretation we cannot assume that, a T- sentence satisfies the translation criterion. A substitute principle is the totality of T-sentences which will fit the confirmation about sentences held true by native speakers. But Tarski implicit for each T-sentence, can be indirectly elicited by a holistic limitation.

Actually the meaning of any sentence derives from a particular place of that sentence. Davidson realized that, the claim to give truth conditions is to give the meanings of sentences is not true in every description. For instance "it is raining" is true iff it is raining. But at the same time it is not true if the tear shaped liquid globules of water falls from anywhere. So "it is raining" and "small tear shaped liquid globules of water" have different meanings. But Davidson found no problem of gapping between truth conditions and meaning. For him the holistic constraint of the theory of meaning construct T-sentences to fit the total pattern of sentences which held true by speakers to ensure the theory that contains only those descriptions of truth conditions that give meaning.

A T-sentence of an empirical theory of truth can be used to interpret a sentence. We also know that the T-sentence is entailed by some true theory that meets the formal and empirical criteria. It is not necessary to know the theory in a particular case. For if the constraints are adequate, the range of acceptable theories will be such that any of them yields

some correct interpretation for each potential utterance. The absurd hypothesis that the constraints narrow down the possible theories to one, and this one implies the T-sentence. Then we can justify in using this T-sentence to interpret Kurt's utterance of "Es regnet" as his saying that it is raining. As Quine has emphasized, the trade-offs between the beliefs we attribute to a speaker and the interpretations we give his words, but the resulting indeterminacy cannot be so great.

Davidsonian theory of interpretation is, actually based upon Tarskian truth theory. But a truth theory provides only the formal structure on which linguistic interpretation is based. This type of theory needs to look at the interconnections between utterances and the behavioural attitudes. Our daily ordinary speeches are full of ungrammatical constructions with incomplete sentences or phrases. So the linguistic understanding cannot be a simple matter of the mechanical application of a Tarski-like theory. Davidson argues that, when linguistic understanding depends upon a grasp of the formal structure of a language, that structure always stands in the basic need of modification in the light of actual linguistic behaviour. For him understanding a language is actually the matter of constantly adjusting the interpretative presuppositions where the utterances to be interpreted. This is nothing but a type of skills and knowledge which are not at all specifically linguistic and general ability to get on in the world to make relation with others.

Chapter 4

Chapter 4

Folk Psychology as a Theory

4.1 Introduction

I take Folk Psychology to be the basis—whatever it is—of our ability to describe, interpret, and predict each other by attributing beliefs, desires, hopes, feelings, and other familiar mental states. The nature of Folk Psychology has been the topic of extensive debate. This paper will present a different option. I argue that Folk Psychology should be seen as something like a model, in a specific sense of this term. This idea will be presented initially as a modification of the Theory-Theory, a modification that draws on ideas from recent philosophy of science. But once the main ideas are on the table, we will also see the possibility of a new kind of mixed view of Theory- Theory and Simulation Theory. My suggestion is that one aspect of ordinary folk psychological skill might best be described not as grasp of a theory but as something like facility with a model. Perhaps when we find ourselves engaging in ordinary, unreflective folk-psychological interpretation, we are bringing something like a model to bear on the person we are trying to interpret. Basic facility with the folk-psychological model does not require using a particular construal of it. Many construals are possible. And it is also possible to have facility with the model, and have a sense of which target systems are appropriate for it, while not having much of a construal at all.

The question is what is the meaning of the term "Folk Psychology"? About this question many philosophers answered that, Folk Psychology is actually a 'conceptual

framework' or a 'network of principles' which is used by ordinary people to understand, explain, and predict their own and other people's behaviour and mental states. Being able to explain and predict human behaviour on this view involves mastering a theory which is a folk psychological theory.

Contemporary philosophical discussion of Folk Psychology mainly focuses on the question of the status of Folk Psychology as a science of mind brain. There are two strong distinct point of this discussion. The first one is all about the relevant scientific theory which derives from the neuroscience and focused on the claim that Folk Psychology must be eliminated in the favour of this theory. Churchland (1981) has been the major proponent of this eliminativist claim. There is also a considerable literature which takes on the eliminativist challenge and tries to respond to it in various ways.[1]

Now the question is why we are discussing about Folk Psychology? Actually, the fact is that, by discussing Folk Psychology what we are actually trying to understand is how we can understand others mind. This topic has been discussed in both Philosophy and Cognitive Science that how could we understand others mind. This is called Folk Psychology.

The quality of human beings is that they can understand others mental state and they also can predict and can make an assumption of other's mental state. Usually they can do it by ascribing their beliefs, desire and others propositional attitudes. The content of Folk Psychology may be regarded as the particular concepts and practices employed by an ordinary person to understand, explain, and predict the human psychology. The kind of thing that ordinary people do while they understand other people's mind may be regarded as employing a folk psychological theory.

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[1]Kitcher, 1984; Horgan and Woodward, 1985; Baker, 1987, unpublished; Boghossian, 1990.

Now we can say that Folk Psychology is a concept of mental conception of belief, desire, pain, pleasure etc. It is a collection of a concept taken in a particular way to state the mental state in a rational frame work. It is very much possible to describe others behaviour by this rational framework. Some believe that we have a conceptual framework or a network of principle. But this is very much implicit. This stays covertly in our mind. By the help of this network of principles we can explain the behaviour of a person and can rationalize them in terms of belief, desire, pain, pleasure or ascription of other propositional attitude.

We may describe like this that when someone desire X, then he/she behave Y, again if someone belief X then he/she desire Y and as a result he or she behave Z. So here the principle may call the logical connection. So it seems that there is a rational argumentational fraction. Some of the philosopher says that this is nothing but a theory. As if a theory of mind is auctioning with us.

According to Ravenscroft if we describe our belief, desire, then we can understand that, there must be a theory which is working in ourselves. So we are talking like this.[2]

It is being said that Folk Psychology is being characterized by the idea that there is a real me or "self" which resides in my body and it is the subject of my experiences. This term is used by many functionalist philosophers and by many cognitive scientists to refer human psychology and helps them to guess the human behaviour. A theory of mind in each daily life says about the mental states and behaviours.[3]

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[2]Ravenscroft Ian, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory/>.

[3]Horgan T and Woodward J., "Folk Psychology is here to stay", The Philosophical Review 94, no. 2 (1985): 197.

4.2 The Cognitivist view

The daily understanding of our mental states constitutes a folk theory of mind which is called by Wilfred Sellars's "the myth of the given" (Sellars 1956). Sellars did not believe that the substance of our mental life is simply presented to us; that means, he denied that our beliefs about our own mental states take place in a restricted epistemic status. Cognitivist of 1960's tried to explain the folk capacity to explain behaviour.[4] They said that we manage to explain and predict behaviour by employing a kind of "Theory". This theory is called Folk Psychology and this Folk Psychology enables us to ascribes beliefs, desire and others intentional mental states to human beings in order to explain their behaviour. 1960s also helps us to understand of our mental states to constitute a folk theory of mind. Cognitive scientists started to hypothesize the internal episodes as the causes of explicit behaviour. The term "Theory" was useful to make the posited figurative structures to have adequate level of complexity and depth. Therefore, the cognitive scientists took the illustrative approach of positing internally represented theories when they tried to explain our folk capacity to predict and explain behaviour.

4.3 Fodor's concept of Folk Psychology

According to Fodor, by using this Folk Psychology or the principle of implicit network or the conceptual framework we use to understand others mind and try to explain other people's behaviour. By using this theory we also can forecast about others behaviour.[5] This theory is

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[4]Ratcliffe Matthew - 2006 – "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences" 5 (1):31-52

[5]From the online lecture of Prof. Rupa Bandyopadhyay, Jadavpur University, Kolkata on "Folk Psychology".

called Representational Theory of Mind. But not every philosopher believes this.[6] The Representational Theory of Mind takes as its starting point of commonsensical mental states, like thoughts, desires, perceptions, beliefs and imagines. This type of states are said to have "Intentionality" – they use to refer to things, and also use to evaluate with respect to properties like consistency, truth, accuracy and appropriateness. Representational Theory of Mind defines such intentional mental states as relations to mental representations, and explains the intentionality of the former in terms of the semantic properties of the latter. For example, to believe that 'Elvis is dead' is to be appropriately related to a mental representation whose propositional content is that 'Elvis is dead'.

4.4 Theory–Theory and Simulation Theory

Now comes the Theory–Theory. Theory–Theory is a view about that how we understand other people's mind.[7] It is called "Theory- Theory" because this theory says that we can understand others mind because I employing a kind of theory of mind. So here we are ascribing two levels of theory, one is Theory- Theory and the other is Simulation Theory. So our theory that how we understand others theory of mind is that we employ a theory. So the word Theory-Theory is being used by two times. This theory is called Folk Psychology. In this Folk Psychology there are two things. One is conceptual framework and other is the network of principle.

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[6]Baker Lynne Rudder, "Folk Psychology", in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, ed. Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (MIT Press, 1999), 319.

[7]Gopnik Alison and Wellman Henry M., "Why the Child's Theory of Mind really is a Theory", in Davies and Stone, Folk Psychology: The theory of mind debate, 232–258; Henry M. Wellman, The Child's Theory of Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990); Alison Gopnik and Andrew N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

The Theory-Theory tries to explain our Folk Psychological practices by saying that folk psychological theory is a theory not merely in some abstract, but in the sense in which people use such a theory to engage themselves in the folk psychological practices. In cognitivist terms, it may be said that a theory of some domain X is to employ a set of representations or a complex representational structure whose content constitutes a theory of X. These two features of such representational structures bear on the Theory–Theory vs. Simulation dispute. First, the content of a representational structure need not be consciously accessible. Second, representational structures can have many different kinds of representation 'bearers' (Von Eckardt, 1993), such as; a mental representation can be replaced by a propositional data.

In Philosophy and Psychology, Simulation Theory is a theory which helps us to understand others, mainly in common sense psychological or in folk psychological clarification and prediction of action.[8] The main claim is that, understanding any other person is a matter of re-production or making a copy of other's pain, pleasure, beliefs, desires, and also some other mental states in our own mind. In this way the interpreter creates a model to understand the other person, in a very similar way. In some cases, the interpreter willingly and consciously imagines herself as in the same way of other's position and tries to see it from her own perspective with the same background of pain, pleasure, beliefs, desires etc.

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[8]Gordon Robert M., "Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You", in Mental Simulation, ed. Tony Stone and Martin Davies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995); Jane Heal, "Replication and Functionalism", in Davies and Stone, Folk Psychology: The theory of mind debate; Goldman, "In Defense of the Simulation Theory".

4.5 The debate between Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory

Much of this debate has been structured by an opposition between the Theory-Theory and simulationism.[9] The Theory-Theory holds that our folk psychological capacities involve the use of a theory, grasped by the interpreter, of how minds work. Simulationism holds that we interpret and predict others by simulating their thought processes in our own reasoning mechanisms. Recently, this standard opposition has been transforming. Perhaps the difference between the two options collapses under closer scrutiny (Davies and Stone 2001). Perhaps, alternatively, the original distinction does make sense, but the true view is a more complex one, involving elements from both of the standard stories and more besides (Nichols and Stich 2003).

Actually this theory is nothing but empathizing with other people. This is a type of understanding or adopting of someone's point of view, or perspective, in our own imagination. Such as to interpret a request like, "Please show some empathy for Richard!" is actually saying to use our own imaginative capacity to think about the world from Richard's perspective. According to Simulation Theorists, mental simulation is a re-production of someone's mental states. Currie and Ravenscroft make this point quite nicely. Imagination recreates the mental states of others.[10]

The debate between Theory-Theory vs. Simulation Theory has produced a significant amount of both a priori and empirical argumentation. There are severe disagreements regarding these issues. The principal reason is that, there is no theory which can be articulated in sufficient

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[9]Davies and Stone (1995), Stone and Davies (1996), and Caruthers and Smith (1996) are useful collections, containing classic and more recent papers on both sides of the issue.

[10]Currie, Gregory and Ian Ravenscroft, 1997, "Mental Simulation and Motor Imagery", Philosophy of Science, 64(1): 161–80.

Detail to oppose each of the theories. There are many points of insufficient articulation. According to the simulation theory, a person simulates another person's situation by inputting their own mental states to other.

From this discussion, we can say that Folk Psychology is a child of functionalism. Lewis interprets Folk Psychology as a functionalist theory; that means a theory which identifies mental states in terms of their causal-functional relations. Some philosophers interchangeably use the terms "Theory-Theory" and "Functionalism" in their discussion. It says that, environmental states, mental states, behavioural states, are connected causally. We all are aware of this causal connection. Now if these are causally connected with each other, then it will be a rational one and as well as logical. Fodor tried to connect the causal relation to semantic and semantic to syntactic, as the Theory–Theory does. So, we can say that, Folk Psychology is one of the psychological theories that is used to predict the human behaviour.

Folk Psychology is actually a connection of concepts taken in a particular way. Folk Psychology is a mere collection of concept. It is a rational framework which connects one concept to another with some underlying logic. By the help of this logic it is possible for a human being to explain or describe other people's mental state or behaviour.

4.6 Can we accept the theory of Folk Psychology?

Now the question arises that can we accept the theory of Folk Psychology? Paul Churchland was an eliminativst.[11] The eleminativist tries to replace the theory of Folk Psychology. They tried to explain the human behaviour in a new way. The eleminativism says that mental state does not exist. This theory argues that mental states are actually useless. Rather to say that the

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[11] From online lecture of Prof. Maushumi Guha, Jadavpur University, Kolkata on "Folk Psychology".

folk concepts (belief, desire, and propositional attitude) are basically useless and these should be eliminated.

There arise many questions about the status of Folk Psychology in various ways among the philosophers. The question is that whether Folk Psychology will be eliminated in favour of our future scientific theory by mind-brain or some questioned whether Folk Psychology is eliminable; some says that Folk Psychology should be eliminated.

Folk Psychology is resulting inductively by the process of describing the experience of human behaviour. Folk accounts are different with a long tradition with neuroscience of attempting to eliminate the subjective by an approach named eliminative materialism. On this point of view, proponents argue that Folk Psychology is a misguided theory for attributing and explaining the human mental states, when neuroscience provides a more appropriate alternative (Churchland, 1981, 1986). Eliminativists consider that our behaviour can be wholly explained in terms of brain states, and that is why they hope, that will eradicate Folk Psychology from scientific view.[12]

Now the question is whether we can make a distinction between the mechanistic nature of neuroscience and the law's of Folk Psychology. This is a general question in the field of mental health and law. But there is a disagreement about in view of the relation of neuroscience to law. Psychiatry and Psychology occasionally treat people as mechanisms as well as agents. As a result, these disciplines are in the branch of Folk Psychology, and the translation to law is very easy than it is for purely mechanistic neuroscience. Demanding the significance of neuroscience it will always be able to clarify exactly how neuroscientific findings assumes that they are valid and relevant to a legal issue.

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[12]Churchland Paul, 'Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes'; Paul Churchland, "Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior", in Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical essays on commonsense psychology, ed. Radu J. Bogdan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35–52.

A big empirical question about Folk Psychology may be raised here. That is if we accept that our regular talk about mental states totally establish on the theory of mind, which remains to be predicted whether the theory is true or not? The future research in Psychology or Neuroscience may establish that Folk Psychology is false. And if it establishes that Folk Psychology is not true, then there will not be any such things like beliefs and desires, pains, hungers etc. This kind of doctrine is called eliminativism, and it is being discussed amongst philosophers of mind over the last 20 years.

Now if Folk Psychology does not exist, then there is no use of Theory–Theory. According to Paul Churchland, by eliminaton of Folk–Psychology we can replace their Neuroscience, to understand or predict others mental state or behaviour, as it will be very much technical to predict others mind.

Stephen Stitch also wanted to eliminate Folk Psychology. He stated that Folk Psychology will no longer be the ultimate framework to understand the human behaviour or their mental state.

Before the development of modern science and academic psychology, human cultures shared a Folk Psychology, which is the bunch of beliefs and practices about psychological issues in a specific culture. The folk developmental psychology is a part of native psychology which is the consequent of ethno theories of development. It emerged from displeasure with psychology's insensitivity, and collapse to connect with, the local situation of rural and low class people and underground cultures around the world.

The question about the relation of mind to its environment, both in Folk Psychology and science is in a dualism, where mind and environment treated as different objects. This may be our metaphysical culture rather than an undeniable fact of nature. The powerful

trends in psychology and cognitive science disagree that mind and environment must be treated as a unity.

The basic hypothesis of evolutionary psychology is correct. Human minds can adopt various modules. Many models in the social sciences are based on Folk Psychology; either may be directly or indirectly. The idea that humans are rational agents is well matched with a partially model of theory of mind. Fodor holds a central processor with the significant role of maintaining an overall model of the agent's environment with using that model to show the rational action. Fodorian agent could be known as a rational maximizer. In the standard formulation of evolutionary psychology it seems contradictory with rational choice theory as a descriptive state about human behaviour. If there is no general principle device and if there is nothing like a central processor then it is hard to see how a rational actor model could illustrate the model of human action. When humans react to problems, which are very much vital in the environment, in which our cognitive mechanisms shaped, and when they do so in the environment relevantly like those familial environments, and when fitness consequences associate well with individual welfare, then of course human behaviour may make the most of expected utility. But humans frequently act in environments very diverse from those in which psychologically modern humans produced and much human behaviour is not bound for the problem that were critical to our ancestors.

The fact is that, numerous significant problems cannot be solved by modular mechanisms. Fodor said logically that the pragmatics of language cannot be handled by a specialist device (Fodor 1983). One important thing is to know what a sentence means; and the intentions that lie behind its utterance. This is not solvable problem by shortcuts from a limited database which is an encapsulated device. All the things which the hearer knows are potentially important and potentially used in decoding the speaker's intent. The same problem

arises in many domains of interest to evolutionary psychology. It is not at all always understandable that there are dependable and consistent causes across generations. Both the conditions must be met, if the selection constructs an expert mechanism to solve these types of problems. So the most significant version of evolutionary psychology may be somehow nearer to Fodorian architecture.

Now the question arises that, though neuroscience is affecting common-sense understandings of human activities and identities, then why does this matter? First of all, 'Folk Psychology' of people or unspoken thought of minds helps us to guide that how they interpret and react to behaviour. So if Neuroscience changes Folk Psychologies, it might be rapid to correspond of shifting in social communications.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5

Principle of Charity

5.1 Introduction

This chapter mainly outlines the notion of the Principle of Charity which is proposed by Donald Davidson, to consider the rationality and interpretation of a speaker's statement. Basically it looks into the charity's role as a principle governing not only to search of knowledge about the meaning by the radical interpreter, but also to find the justification of beliefs about meaning in general. To interpret the foreign speaker, it considers the aspects of the principle and analyses their function as a guide to the radical interpreter. On the basis of the observable behaviour, this principle also discusses the limitations of assistance to the interpreter, and it also highlights the basic need to extend the notion of interpretation from the understanding of linguistic utterances to the understanding of the person.

The Principle of Charity is a principle which helps us to interpret someone's statement. It is a philosophical standpoint which helps us to interpret the sentence which the speaker wants to convey. It also helps us to interpret of others beliefs and utterances. It actually maximizes others thinking and utterances by the help of truth or rationality.

Davidson often referred to it as the principle of rational accommodation. He said that, we use the principle to make a maximum sense of others thoughts and words at the time with an aim to interpret of optimizing with the speaker agreement. The principle also can make a sense of any speaker's utterances if anyone not able to understand their meaning. Principle of

Charity helps us to treat people as an intelligent person, and if we treat them as intelligent then we can easily evaluate them by their argument.

Principle of Charity actually needs to interpret the speaker's utterance in the most rational way. Possible method of this principle is mainly avoiding the irrationality and falsehood to the speaker's statement. Principle of Charity also helps us to improve the ability to form a strong argument.

5.2 Examples

Principle of Charity can be understood by the help of some example:

Example 1)

Jerry: Scientists successfully landed somebody on Mars; therefore, it may possible that we should be able to do something for the aged person, which may be to give company for them.

Here is a way to evaluate the argument: the first premise is false, because scientists can't manage to land any person on Mars. So it's a bad argument.

It would be therefore uncharitable to Jerry, to think that he believes this because scientists only managed to land somebody on the Moon, not in Mars. So Jerry knew it very well that he made a mistake. So we should have to make a charitable interpretation to make a simple correction that the argument about landing on Mars to somebody is wrong.

To make the argument strong this charitable reading may be followed, which is that Jerry actually wanted to say.

The scientist was able to land somebody on the Moon.

Suppressing information in the argument is very much important in the Principle of Charity. Here we can give another example to prove it;

Example 2)

Jerry plays regularly at the roof, so Jerry doesn't care about the neighbor.

Here is a concealed premise, which is Jerry plays in the roof and not cares about the neighbor.

There is a choice for us to add a premise here. But the question arises that, what kind of premise we will add here? We may

1. Apply the evidence which we can get from the speaker's intentions from the stated context, premises, and conclusion.

2. Here we can apply the Principle of Charity:

In an argument where there are some missing parts, we may reconstruct that argument as a charitable way if possible. But we must not add any obviously false premises. We should add the most reasonable premise which will construct the argument properly. And for this, we will have to add that kind of premises which will help us to link the above stated premises with the conclusion in a logical manner.

Now here is the concealed premise:

Jerry plays regularly at the roof. [Anybody who plays regularly at the roof doesn't care about the neighbor.] Therefore Jerry, doesn't care at all about the neighbor.

By using this premise, we can say that the argument is valid, but it is a shaky argument, as the concealed premise which constructed here is false. As we know that some people care a lot about the neighbor, though they have a weakness for playing in the roof.

So, we will have to avoid adding any false premises at all.

Now here we also may give some charitable option:

Jerry plays regularly at the roof. [Most people plays regularly at the roof and don't care about their neighbor.] Therefore, it may possible that Jerry doesn't care about the neighbor.

First of all we will treat the argument as a non-deductive argument. But there is very few information available to us so that we are able to say that whether the argument is meant to be deductive or non-deductive, the more charitable thing is to take a kind of argument which tries to give a strong reason for believing the conclusion, but, the fact is that it is not that much convincing.

It is very much difficult to give any valid argument including the conclusion that Jerry doesn't care about the neighbor. Now, it will be better, if we treat this argument as a non-deductive argument.

If we treat the argument as non-deductive it will allow us to use a less suppressed premise. Such as, we may utter most people, instead of uttering of all people, as we know that some people may care about the neighbor even though they plays in the roof.

The question arises here that, is it a good argument to contain a charitable reconstruction? Or is it convincing?

By the help of this concealed premise we may come up with better justifications for our judgment, and as a result we may find that the argument is a bad argument, because we applied the principle of charity as we tried to figure out missing part of the argument.

When we want to criticize others beliefs, we generally want to find a sympathetic understanding of the new idea or ideas. The method is;

1. What we do, even though our original reaction differs we actually want to guess the new idea which are true; we then try to find the ambiguity to understand the idea which are useful and also helpful.

2. We emphasize on searching to understand the idea rather than on searching the contradictions or difficulties.

3. We usually try to understand the idea in the original believable form and try to resolve the contradictions. If we observe that there presents more than one views, we usually prefer the one that appears the most convincing.

5.3 The method of Principle of Charity

The method of Principle of Charity is nothing but a procedure theory where ideas can be critiqued after a sufficient understanding. The main thing is to set our own beliefs and pretending that our new ideas are nothing but a true and a temporary presumption.

4. In the beginning we have to listen and read to pretend that we have no personal attitudes. We will have to be open and accessible as much as we can.

5. In this way we may able to free our conditioned mind and enables to understand the new one.

6. To understand the first alliance we may start with a simple target to get the actual point.

So the Principle of Charity is nothing but the principle of rational accommodation.

Willard Van Orman Quine's description of the principle is the maxim of translation: "[A]ssertionsstartingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of languages."[1]

7. According to Donald Davidson the Principle of Charity usually attempts to make the appropriate sense and also tries to make an agreement with the help of coherence theory.

a) Coherence theory actually searches the "logical consistency in the thought of the speaker."[2] Radical interpreter believes on methodological assumptions just like the empirical scientist. Davidson identifies his Radical Interpretation by the two most important methodological aspects. 1) The Principle of Coherence and 2) The Principle of Correspondence. We all know these two theories as the Principle of Charity.

Davidson's theory of interpretation is mainly based upon Tarski's theory of truth, where first an interpreter looks for a coherent structure in the sentence of an unknown speaker. The interpreter actually observes a speaker's behavior which strongly satisfies the reason with the agreement with logical laws. When the interpreter makes this assumption,

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[1] Quine Willard Van Orman, "Word and Object" (Cambridge, Mass: The M. I. T. Press, 1960), p-59.

[2] Davidson Donald, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge (1983)," Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p-150

then he/she can draw the logical patterns of speaker's verbal behavior and can able to construct an argument by the help of the evidence which he/she perceives from observations.

An empirical hypothesis of any uttered language is all about satisfying the norms of rationality, but it is not at all about the speaker's reasons in agreement with logical laws. Having many thoughts in someone's behavior and failing to establish sufficient consistency means there is nothing to interpret.

> b) Correspondence theory also searches the same characteristics of the world by which we would respond under any parallel circumstances.

The problem of the radical interpreter is that, we never know what a speaker wants to mean, and there by the word he utters that, we also do not get any direct access about the contents of propositional attitudes of the speaker whom we interpret, which are beliefs or desires. Both these factors help us to make senses of verbal behavior. The speaker's truth utterances depend on the meaning of his/her uttered sentences and on his/her beliefs. Suppose, when a speaker utters "Gavagai!" the sentence will be true if and only if a rabbit presents in front of him, and he believes that a rabbit presents in front of him.[3]

The interpreter can solve many unknown problems by performing their own thought experiment which they face regularly. The interpreter can put themselves into their own subjects and can easily assume their position, which they believe. This may help to solve their problems. The speaker believes about their situation, and they know very well about their subject which they believe. An interpreter affirms the if-clause in The Principle of Correspondence.

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[3]Orenstien Alex, "W.V. Quine(Philosophy Now)", Princeton University Press (2002): p-134-135

The Principle of Correspondence applies exclusively on the observation of sentences of speakers. For example, there goes a rabbit! These make an immediate causal contact between the world of the speaker and the interpreter, and on the other hand, the utterances and the attitudes of speakers. There also exists a larger distance between the cause and effect of the speaker's situation and the sentence which the speaker utters as true. But we have the freedom in explaining the speaker's utterance which may be rationally true and on the other hand about the interpreter believes false.

An interpreter desires to understand the contents of the speaker's attitudes. For this reason he/she does this job by attributing those beliefs which allows the interpreter to tell the most coherent story what they believe. In this way the interpreter attributes some beliefs on the speaker through what he/she knows about his/her beliefs and values. An interpreter actually interprets the subject by their own world view, but if there are grounds for attributing a certain belief that he/she things to be false, then he/she does know it is more logical.

5.4 Some practical benefits

Implementation of Principle of Charity gives us some practical benefits also.

1) Implementation of this theory helps us better to understand others. By the help of different possible interpretations of other people's utterances, and by recognizing the best possible interpretation, we can figure out what people are trying to say.

2) By implementing this theory we can improve the ability to construct our own arguments. This is because even though it's important to know how to notice and counter. This is because by this theory we can learn the process to improve and also can develop the power of our reasoning and the abilities of argumentation.

3) This theory also encourages others to talk with us. We usually prefer to talk with that person who tries to understand what we are wanting to say.

4) By implementation of this theory people becomes more eager to listen the other person's word. As we like to listen that person who tries to give the best possible interpretation of their argument.

From the logical point of view the ordinary reasoning is usually incomplete and also very confusing. The most supportive way is that we want to talk about the act of interpretation to find out the truth and the original meaning of someone's utterance. A rational reconstruction will not be any attempt to find out an original proposed meaning. Without entirely understanding the utterances sometimes we characteristically try to reason the argument. The original reasoning gives us the content of the basic logical relationships, but the meaning of that is really indeterminate until it has been clarified to communicate the thing.

At the time of rationally interpreting any person, we attempt to interpret them by a logical point of view. Usefully compare to others the logical interpretation is just one form to interpret. We use to interpret various emotions and actions regularly. Such as, we interpret physical gestures, facial expressions, our daily experiences, poems, stories, songs, dreams etc. Now the question is that, is the literary interpretation can explain the original intended meaning? Some people think that it is possible. It's really a tough thing to defend. Because, if we want to know the basic intended meaning of any poem, then it is not possible to ask the author about the meaning. What we can do is that, we can give more significant interpretation than others, when other can produce different agreeable interpretations from different levels. We never care whether the author had some original meaning in mind. The end of the fact is that what we understand from that particular poem or what actually it means to us.

Interpreting any reason is similar in some ways, but different in others. The fact is that, at the time of accepting the logical point we never think the best skill which is to generate the multiple interpretations. Ambiguity is a logical weakness. On the other hand, at the time of discussing literature, we never admit the author's perspective as completely trustworthy. The cause is not that, all interpretations are equally interesting. But, it's because, the author who is using words in his writings may have conventional meanings, which even the author himself didn't intend them.

At the time of implementing the Principle of Charity, it's very much important to remember that what we perceive as the best possible interpretation of someone's statement may not be that the other person also believes the best interpretation of their statement. Specifically, there are some issues that may arise, and may cause to pick the incorrect interpretation for someone's statement. Because,

- The other person may not be rational.
- Our own assessment may be unsound in some way, which might cause us to choose an interpretation other than the finest possible interpretation of the original statement. This can happen, if we are irrational, or because if we are not aware of important information which the speaker has.
- We may hold valid but different viewpoints or values, which might cause to view different interpretations of the original statement.

So, when we are implementing the Principle of Charity, we would have to make sure that we are not misinterpreting the speaker's word and making up something which the speaker did not wanted to mean at all.

Like other philosophical principles, the Principles of Charity should be applied with common sense for avoiding the most possible issues which can happen as a result of its

application. It means that, it should always evaluate the situation before deciding how to interpret someone's statement, and that will assume the best possible interpretation of other people's argument.

A good rational reconstruction always ends up with compromising between the speaker's actual utterances and the reliable sense from a logical point of view. An excellent rational reconstruction never compromises the original reasoning, but sometimes reformulate of person's utterances in more logical and satisfying way. At the time of formulating this we usually follow the Principle of Charity for interpretation. This formulation of work applies only for those people who want to interpret from a logical point of view. So the Principle of Charity is nothing but interpreting the reasoning of others to make the sense from a logical point of view.

Logicians find enjoyment by pointing out that, sincerity proves nothing. Charitable interpretation means believing about a person's utterances. There is a large domain of phenomena where people are the best to judge themselves. They have some honest belief as an evidence of the truth. For example: Jessy may sincerely believe that she and Thomas will live happily ever after. She is deluded. If she says that she honestly loves Thomas, then she probably does.

So the principle of charity helps us to interpret of others beliefs and utterances. It explains charitable interpretation, and meaning of that interpretation to understand the truth or rationality. Some formulations of this principle recommends attributions of rational belief.

Chapter 6

Chapter 6

Principle of Rationality

6.1 What is the Principle of Rationality?

The question is what is the Principle of Rationality? And why we are concern about this theory. Actually this theory is a guideline of human behavior in a special circumstance which is expected from human beings. This is the principle which generally guides the behavior of each rational individual that means we want to ascribe a rule or manner and think that every individual should maintain those manners to become rational.

Rationality is being said as the quality of being rational. Rationality implies the agreement of one's beliefs with others. It has different specialized meaning in philosophy, sociology, economics, evolutionary biology, political science, psychology, and game theory.

To predict the most rational behavior one needs to make various key assumptions, and a logical formulation of the problem. The term 'Rationality' is very much relative. Rationality is measured with behavior. Like self interest converted to the point of being selfish, and if one accepts a model which benefits him by a purely selfish behavior is claimed to be rational. So the surrounding assumptions are very much needed to explain how the problem is formulated and framed.

Man Weber, the German sociologist, suggested an interpretation of social action which can help to distinguish among four different idealized types of rationality. The first one is called instrumental rationality. This one is related to the expectations about the objects

related with the environmental behavior or of the behavior of human beings. The second one is concerned about belied rationality, where the action is taken for what one might call reason fundamental to the agent. The third one is an affectual rationality, which determined by an agent's specific affect, such as feeling or emotion, about what Weber himself said that this was a kind of rationality which was on the borderline of what Weber considered "meaningfully oriented". The fourth one is oriented to traditional or conventional.

In the discipline of psychology of reasoning, psychologists and cognitivist have defended different positions on human rationality. They argued that humans are rational in principle that means humans have the competence to the rational but their performance is limited by various factors.

Abulof argues that rationality has become an "essentially contested concept". He identifies "four fronts" about the meaning of rationality:[1] The purpose or function of ascribing rationality. (descriptive / subjective)

1. The subject of rationality (what or who is rational?)

2. Cognition

3. Is rationality merely an instrument?

It is believed by some philosophers that a good rational being must be independent of emotions, personal feelings or any kind of instincts. Any kind of evaluation of analysis, may be called rational, is expected to be highly objective, logical and mechanical. If these minimum requirements are not satisfied that is if a person has been, even slightly influenced by personal emotions, feelings, instincts or culturally specific by moral codes and norms, then the analysis may be termed irrational, due to the subjective bias.

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[1]Abulof Uriel (16 July 2015). "The malpractice of 'rationality' in international relations", Rationality and Society 27 (3) : 358-384

Rationality theorist Jesus Mosterin[2] makes a parallel distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, although according to him, reason and rationality are not the same. Reason would be a psychological faculty, where as rationality is an optimizing strategy. Humans are not rational by definition, but they can think and behave in a rational way or not. It depends on whether they apply implicitly or explicitly, that is the strategy of theoretical and practical rationality to the thoughts they accept and to the actions they perform. Actually the theoretical rationality can more properly be said to regulate our acceptances than our beliefs, where the practical rationality is the strategy for living ones best possible life.

Portrayed vaguely says that, rationality means reasonableness, but not all philosophers take rationality which depends on reasons; nor all philosophers have a common understanding of reasons or of reasonableness. Some theorists take rationality to obtain in cases that lack countervailing reasons against what has rationality; they thus expressed rationality as a default status. Generally, every person has their rationality or can be regarded as reasonable. The appropriate action of rationality is practical, whereas that feature of belief is theoretical, in the language of several philosophers.

According to some philosophers rationality is instrumental. According to them, to achieve our goals, we have our rationality in virtue of doing our best, or at least doing what we appropriately think adequate. If ultimate goals are not themselves subject to assessments of rationality, then rationality is purely instrumental, in a manner associated with David Hume's position.[3] According to this view, rationality, does not require any particular substantive goals of its own but it consists rather in the proper detection of one's ultimate goals. Many decisions, theoretic and economic approaches to rationality are purely

[2]Mosterian, Jesus (2008) "Lo major possible: Recoionalided y accion human". Madrid: Alianza Editorial 2008

[3]Mintoff J, "Hume and Instrumental Reason". The Journal of Value Inquiry; The Hague Vol. 32, Iss. 4, (Dec 1, 1998): 519-538.

instrumentalist. The Aristotelian tradition and a Kantian tradition say that, the rationality is not purely instrumental. These two traditions regard rationality as essential elements.

Rationality means reasonableness. It needs justified beliefs and sensibility goals in thoughtful decisions. But there are many different views about it.

Some theorists say that technical definition of rationality, maximizes the utility. But this definition is very narrow. It considers only the judiciousness of means to reach the end. So we may call this as an Instrumental Rationality. There is also a major normative question, which is, whether rationality requires maximization of utility. The definition gives us an affirmative answer.

A traditional theory of the mind takes reason as a mental ability. It characterizes humans as rational animals as they have the faculty of reason, whereas other animals have not, because they have lack of that faculty. According to this tradition, any behavior resulting from reasoning is rational. Reasoning must be good to yield rational beliefs reliably.

Some theorists think that, being rational is to be the same as being self-interested. Though being rational differs from being self-interested. Self-interest means doing what is good for oneself. Doing what is good for others promotes their interests, not one's own. Rationality may require some self-interest but does not require exclusive attention to self-interest.

For epistemologists a justified belief is just a rational belief. But other interpretations of justification are common, because a conventional view takes the knowledge to be true, justified belief. Making a justification fit into that view of knowledge, helps to motivate for taking justified belief to differ from rational belief. As for example children believe many

true propositions without having knowledge of them because the grounds for their beliefs do not amount to justification.

Rationality is a normative concept. Principle of Rationality says how people should behave rather than how they actually behave. It is true that some fields assume that people are rational. Psychologists infer a person's beliefs and desires from the person's behavior, which may assume that behavior maximizes utility. The assumption simplifies inference of beliefs and desires. It follows from several theories, that if anyone's preferences concerning acts meet any like, transitivity, then one may infer that particular person's probability and utility assignments from that person's preferences, under the assumption that preferences concerning acts agree with their expected utilities. Richard Jeffrey presents a theorem of this sort.

6.2 The normative concept

Philosophy takes rationality to be the most important normative concept behind morality. We need to understand that, how a person should conduct her or his life requires a thorough understanding of rationality. Being a rational person one needs to be satisfactorily rational in the various aspects of anyone's life. Common Principles of Rationality focus on the beliefs and desires and also the decisions one needs. Some principles evaluate the feature of one's character and emotions. As for example, they judge, that some fears are rational and that others are irrational or that some character traits are rational and others are not. Principles of Rationality actually extend from individuals to groups.

A usual metaphysical question that one always asks for the grounds of principles of rationality is what makes the constancy of a necessity of rationality? Are the principle's grounds conventions or something else are more universal? A common answer is that, the natural properties can recognize normative properties. Uniformity helps to increase the prospects for true beliefs.

An usual practical question asks for the reasons behind in rationality. A common answer is that being rationality stands for the best hope for meeting one's goals and acquires a type of success. Decisions which maximize, expected utility are more likely to be successful than decisions which do not maximize expected utility.

Some philosophers develop principles of morality from the Principles of Rationality. For example, Kantians, hold that a rational person acts accordingly with moral principles.

The general principle states that rationality can be achieved by us. Principles of Rationality also indulge the structure of belief and inference. Holding inconsistent beliefs is a typically a sign of irrationality. Perceptual beliefs are rational when the processes producing them are reliable. Vision in good light helps for reliable judgments about the colors of any objects. Logic describes in particular detail patterns of inference which are very much rational. For example, if one believes a conditional and believes its antecedent, then believing its consequent is a rational conclusion. Rationality needs an ideal agent to believe each and every logical consequence of everyone's belief. It's criteria for real people are really less demanding.

Rationality also dominates both deductive and inductive inferences. Principle of statistical reasoning helps to express the principle of rational inductive inference. If one

knows that in a flower basket there are exactly eighty red roses and twenty black roses, then it is rational to conclude that there is eighty percent probability to draw randomly the red rose.

As for example the principle of transitivity needs preferring A to C given that one prefers A to B and also prefers B to C. The principle of coherence requires having preferences among acts that may be represented as maximizing expected utility. The definition of preference affects the force of such principles. The normal sense of preference accepts the possibility of weakness of will and acts different to preferences. However, some theorists define preferences a person's acts according to their preferences.

Some fundamental preferences are irrational. One, who has not tasted any yogurt, may be irrational to form preferences among yogurt flavors. Having a pure time preference may be irrational. So, it may be irrational to choose the smaller of two goods as because it will appear sooner than the larger good.

The principle of rational decision making is to pick up an option from the top of one's preference ranking of options. If some options are in risk, then a secondary principle says to prefer another option just in case that, it's utility is expected higher than the utility expected of the other option.

Rationality mainly evaluates free acts which an agent can fully control. Decisions are in this category. Rationality evaluates acts which an agent controls directly by comparing them with competitor and evaluates acts which an agent who controls indirectly by evaluating their mechanism. Actually an agent directly controls a decision, and so rationality evaluates it by comparing with it's competitors. The rationality of a series of acts, such as having dinner and going to a movie, depends on the rationality of its temporal components.

Game theory, expounded in classic texts by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) and R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957), addresses that, decisions which the people make in contexts where the outcome of one person's decision depends on the other people who makes the decision. Tactical reasoning looks for combinations of decisions which form an equality in the sense that each decision is very much rational. A common principle for such strategic situations recommends making a decision that is part of an equal combination of decisions.

6.3 Is Principle of Rationality acceptable?

A principle of rationality may be controversial. The common pattern for controversy is that in some cases thoughtful people fail to fulfill with this principle. Some says that in those cases people are rational and the principle is defective. Other says that the principle is fine and people are irrational.

Rational choice theory uses Principles of Rationality to explain behavior. The social and behavioral sciences and even literary interpretation are included in this theory. Rational choice theory stands on the basis of insightful analyses by using simple principles of rational behavior. Critics claim that those simple principles can not characterize human behavior. This debate turns on the Principles of Rationality at issue. Some rational choice theorists may use only principles of instrumental rationality. In that case, evaluation of basic goals is omitted. Other rational choice theorists use more comprehensive principles of rationality to broaden the theory's span.

Many philosophers admit various applications of rationality, such as restricted, technical, and substantive rationality. Herbert Simon (1982) is famous for treating these types of rationality. Principles of restricted rationality are the values for people with limited cognitive power. Rationality may need ideal agents to maximize utility. The principle to satisfaction is a principle of technical rationality because it recommends a process for making a decision and does not characterize the specific content of the decision it recommends. A decision maximizes utility depends on its content. It depends on the prospects of acting according to the decision. Spending hours to make a move in a chess game may bring the game's fun. Sometimes thorough calculation is too costly, and one should make a quick decision.

Principles of Rationality may differ in the scope of their evaluations of acts. Some principles evaluate a decision for instrumental rationality and take for granted the beliefs and desires as granted. Others evaluate the beliefs and desires along with the decision. A Principle of Rationality also applies conditions of evaluating a decision and assuming unlimited time and cognitive resources for reaching it.

Principles of conditional rationality also provide mistakes. Such as a person's act may be rational on his or her beliefs, though the beliefs are mistaken and if corrected would support a different act. Evaluating act for non conditional rationality, needs a complex assessment of the implication of the mistaken beliefs. Conditional rationality has an interesting structure of conditional probability.

Theoretical rationality treats belief formation, and practical rationality treats action. A theory of practical reasoning formulates rules of inference, leading to a conclusion that an act should be performed. It classifies reasons for acts and assesses their force.

The principle to maximize expected utility uses probability. That's why there are grounds for holding that, probability is not purely a matter of finding epistemic justification. A purely epistemic justification of the probability axioms may be required in the calculation of an option's expected utility. It may be required because of probability's role as a guide to action.

Studies of rationality are multidisciplinary because several fields have a chance in their outcomes. Progress with theories of rationality is broadly rewarding.

Chapter 7

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Understanding of human language is the most complex process in the world. Language concerns with the ability to comprehend, spoken and written words and to create communication with others. Languages are basically oral and are generated through speaking. Speaking involves with various complex cognitive, social, and biological processes.

Language is often used for the transmission of information. This is only its most ordinary function. Language also helps us to access knowledge to draw conclusions. Language is a fundamental element in our ability to think, and without it we will not able to express ourselves.

Language may conceptualize in the term of meaning, sounds, and the environmental factors which help us to understand it. The syntax of a language is the set of grammatical rules which helps to control how words are put together to understand its meaning.

Syntax is a set of rules of any language by which we use to construct sentences. Every language has its different syntax. Like, the syntax of the English language is such that sentences require a noun and a verb, and it may then modified by adjectives and adverbs. Other languages may not have this kind of syntactical feature. But they may have different syntactical features.

Words do not have fixed meanings so the interpretation always changes as a function of the context. We use contextual information that means the information of surrounding languages like facial expressions, postures, gestures, and tone of voice which helps us to interpret someone. The famous linguist Noam Chomsky believes in the natural approach to

language. He argues that, human brains hold a language acquisition device which includes a universal grammar that underlies all human language.[1]

Davidson's account is mainly the theoretical reconstruction in the ground of interpretation. On the other hand, there are two main aspects from this methodology. One concern with attributing belief and meaning to the speaker within a perceptual environment, and the other with the logical and epistemic sources of any interpreter which are very much essential to the process of getting interpretation; the thing which the interpreter himself believes also influences how he interprets others. Davidson claims that the epistemological point which is an interpreter's own beliefs and values will necessarily be required to interpret of another's utterances and behaviour.[2]

There are many advantages in Davidson's concept of meaning as truth-conditions. It gives an explanation of how language is used. It goes together with the theory of Radical Interpretation, and holism. The Principle of Charity helps to complete the notions of Semantics. The very idea that for any natural language meaning mainly depends upon a theory of truth which is not at all independent of beliefs and desires. Semantics is concerned about this. Davidson's use of the concept of truth is a steady way of providing evidence and it also satisfies a sentence, but these concepts are restricted in the semantic ground. Observation of someone's behaviour, holism and also the charitable assumption, evidence and pleasure are factors which must be completed by the approval of the propositional content which will give a definite role for any sentence in a dialogue. So, the semantics or comprehension level needs more steps in the direction of pragmatic conditions which supplies the reasons in

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[1]Chomsky, N. (1965). "Aspects of the theory of syntax". Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p-148

[2]Davidson D. "Psychology as Philosophy" Essays Anomalism, rationality, and psychophysical relations in his Causality, Interpretation & the Mind. In: Child W, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1973. p. 56–90.

communication that produces the acceptance of a speech act, and also its justification, not only its interpretation.

The fundamental problem of Radical Interpretation must say that, one will not give any meanings to a speaker's utterances without having the knowledge about the speaker's beliefs, because it is impossible to make out any beliefs without knowing about what the speaker's utterances wants to mean. So we must have to give both a theory of belief and a theory of meaning at the same time. Davidson argued that, the way to achieve this is through the application of 'Principle of Charity' or the principle of 'Rational Accommodation' which we may found in Quine's theory also. In Davidson's work this principle, admits various formulations and cannot be executed in any complete specific form, it appears in terms of the restriction to optimize an agreement between ourselves and those whom we interpret, that means, it counsels to us to interpret a speakers as holding true beliefs wherever it is probable to do. In reality the principle can be seen as a combination of two notions: one is a holistic assumption of rationality in belief or a coherence theory and second one is an assumption of causal relations between beliefs mainly the perceptual beliefs and also the objects of belief, that is the correspondence theory. This process of interpretation then depends on both aspects of the principle. Attributions of our belief and the assignments of meaning must be consistent with one another and with the speaker's overall behaviour. They have to be consistent along with the evidence which is afforded by our own knowledge of the speaker's environment.

Davidson's denies that rule-based conventions have an original role in linguistic understanding. He emphasizes about the approaching of the capacity for linguistic understanding which he says the general set of capacities for receiving on in the world. Davidson's much-discussed about the account of metaphor and related features of language. Davidson denies the idea that metaphorical language might be defined by reference to any set

of rules which may govern such meaning. Instead of that, it depends on using sentences with their standard meanings or literal in the ways which may give rise to new or unexpected insights. He also argued that, there are no such rules by which we can understand what a speaker means to say when he/she utters an ungrammatical sentence. That's why there are no such rules which can govern the grasp of metaphor.

Davidson's investigation into meaning was thinking about the form of a meaning theory. Davidson said that a meaning theory must reveal the meaning which will be compositional – that means, it will show how the meaning of a complex expression depends on the meanings of their parts. This was not at all a new idea, as Davidson argued in the beginning of his article ("Truth and Meaning,") many philosophers of language at the time, as well as some linguists, had come to this conclusion as well.[3] Now, it is very much important to look at why one needs to suppose a meaning theory to display the compositionality of meaning. The argument for this compositionality constraint is based on the learnability of language. Davidson argues that meaning will be compositional, because without it, it will be impossible to learn any language. Natural languages grasp an infinite number of non-synonymous expressions. To know any language is to know and to understand any expression of that particular language. And for Davidson, to understand any expression is to understand and specify what it means.[4] Therefore to know any language is to be able to specify the expressions in that particular language. Therefore, if meaning is not compositional, then each expression must have to be learned separately in order to know the language. As there are infinite expressions, so for assuming each expression it takes a finite amount of time to learn that. So learning any language will acquire an infinite amount of time. We would all accept that humans do learn languages, so it must be the case that meaning will be compositional.

[3]Davidson D, "Truth and Meaning,", Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p-17

[4]Davidson D, "Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation", Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p-8-9

Languages have a finite number of basic expressions and a finite set of rules, by which we can able to understand the infinite number of expressions which are non-synonymous.[5]

From this analysis, Davidson concludes that any proposed theory of meaning does not demonstrate compositionality. It also does not show that how the meanings of any complex expressions are mainly based on the meanings of their atomic parts. It also failed to explain that how meaning operates to understand an utterance. In this way we have established the compositionality constraint. After establishing the requirement of this constraint on a meaning theory, Davidson's query was how exactly one can give such a compositional account of meaning?[6] Davidson gave a fair amount of attention for addressing a certain approach to give a meaning theory which was quite popular. The idea of this approach is that meanings of expressions are things, or entities, to which expressions somehow refer.

Davidson strictly objects to this approach, and this type of objection provides the force behind his suggestion that a truth-theory may also serve as a meaning theory, if it is properly constrained. Davidson's main objection to the meanings-as-entities approaches that there is a lack of utility in constructing a compositional meaning theory. To show this, Davidson asks to consider the expression "the father of Annette."[7] Most probably the meaning of this expression is simply the father of Annette. Now the question is whether by using the meanings as entities can lead us to this conclusion? The meanings-as-entities will lead us to give answer about this question by first conveying some meaning to each of the parts of the expression, that is, "the father of," and "Annette." Suppose for this example that we have assigned, Annette as the meaning of "Annette." Finding the entity to give the

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[5] Davidson D, "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984):p- 8-9

[6] Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p- 17

[7] Davidson D, "Truth and Meaning," Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p- 17

meaning to "the father of" is a bit trickier, however, Davidson remarks, that "the answer would seem to be that the meaning of 'the father of' is such that when this expression is prefixed to a singular term the result refers to the father of the person to whom the singular term refers."[8] That means to say, the meaning of "the father of," according to this approach, would be a function that maps people to their fathers.

So, when we ask about the expression of "the father of Annette" means, the meanings of approaching of "the father of Annette" has some functions which maps any person to their fathers, and Annette.[9] Lepore and Ludwig make the perceptive observation that the approach does not succeed. What we were mainly looking is the way to understand the expression on which "the father of Annette" is based. On the meanings of its parts, are basically the function that maps people to their fathers, and Annette. But this is not enough to understand the meaning of "the father of Annette" means the father of Annette. Given only the meanings, there is no reason to plug Annette into the father function over any other person.

Now Davidson provides an alternative approach to this example.[10] Suppose if we construct a mini-theory for dealing with the expression "the father of Annette," then in our mini-theory there will be two axioms: (1) "Annette" means Annette, and (2) "the father of," when prefixed to a singular referring term x, means the father of x. Now, if it is asked for the meaning of "the father of Annette," we can give the answer by axiom (2) that is the expression means the father of "Annette," and then by the help of axiom (1), which conclude that its meaning is the father of Annette. Davidson's here wants to say that no meaning entity is needed to be assigned to "the father of" in this account. It is a very well distinction. In another aspect, the difference between the two approaches are; the meanings-as-entities

[8]Davidson D, "Truth and Meaning," Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p- 18

[9]Davidson D, "Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation", Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p-176

[10]Davidson D, "Truth and Meaning," Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): p- 18

approach, that is "the father of" mean the function that maps people to their fathers itself which is a very general statement, without the admiration of a specified input, while Davidson's approaches "the father of" means the operation of this function has a respect to a specified input. The key difference is that in the former approach, we do not have enough information which actually carries out the function though we are referring to the function itself.

On the latter approach, we are not at all referring to the function itself, but rather the meaning of the expression has two rules: one which gives the function and the other tells us about the input. This is very much crucial, because we need a theory which will be compositional, and only the latter approach is able to complete the compositionality.

One can give an objection here that Davidson is claiming the in utility of meanings as entities while making use of them at the same time. However, I think the answer actually lies in the fact that "Annette" is a proper noun. Davidson made his own explanation of this example. He argued that the "task was to give the meaning of all expressions in a certain infinite set on the basis of the meaning of the parts; it was not in the bargain also to give the meanings of the atomic parts."[11]

Davidson's only conclusion from this example is that it is very much possible to construct a theory by giving the meaning of a complex expression like "the father of Annette" without approaching to meanings as entities for all the parts of the expression. This will be acceptable when we consider the limitation of the scope to the initial project. In Radical Interpretation Davidson develops a process which gives us the details of how all the expressions of a language come to mean.

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[11]Davidson D, "Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation", Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984), p-132

Davidson's theory of Radical Interpretation has an important sense. It is not only a theory of interpretation; it is not also a guide to show how we should interpret a person. Then the question is what actually it is? The answer is that, it is basically a foundational theory of meaning and belief. It says that every word has a certain meaning. We may think that it is an odd to explain what a person means in terms or how we interpret others. Meaning will not seem to help us to give any interpretation in this way. The fact is that, Davidson's idea not says that the meaning is fixed by how someone interprets other, but rather how an ideal interpreter will follow the certain rule of interpretation, which will help to interpret others. This theory can be expressed without thinking about interpretation at all, but only thinking about the rules which Davidson wants to say to follow the interpreter. So here we can see some operating in stages. Stage 1. A certain language user can hold a true series of sentences like, S1 . . . Sn. Stage 2. We will assume that the speaker has only true beliefs. As Davidson claims that, we can also assume that if the speaker holds a true sentence, then whatever that sentence means it is very obvious that the speaker believes, we can easily assume the meanings of the sentences S1 . . . Sn must be true in Stage 3. So now we have got a list of sentences, and also a list of the true propositions that might be their meanings. The next job is to give a theory of meaning for the sentences of corresponding up the truths with the sentences. We use to do this by (i) The use of extended statements and (ii) The condition that words must be interpreted constantly throughout S1 . . . Sn. Stage 4. Now we will reach a stalemate at Stage 3; there will be a conflict between the claim which the speaker believes only truths and the requirement that the theory of meaning interpret throughout words in the same way.

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