

**FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD PEACE: FROM
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO ATAL BIHARI
VAJPAYEE (1947-2002)**

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Preface

Preface

Foreign policy and world peace are essentially grounded in values, ideas and diverse perspectives. Value neutrality is claimed but never found in the domain of foreign policy and world peace. Many factors and elements determine the foreign policy of a nation - history, economy, geographical proximity, geopolitical standpoints, ideological goal settings, normative principles, etc. Hence, these contextual inputs cannot be denied in the study of foreign policy; and we in this study opted to focus on the behavioural dimensions and selected the personality and leadership of Indian premiers as the key determinant of Indian foreign policy and its approach to peace.

Expectedly, in the formal and informal discussions on India's foreign policy and its view to world peace, many academicians, scholars, and commoners have found the roots of international events (namely- World War- I & II, Cold War, ethnic conflicts in Africa and global climate change) in the soil of national and international leadership style. Interestingly, many scholars argue that power and leadership are incompatible as explanatory drivers. In other words, it has been seen that a 'good and powerful' premier produced shoddy or weak foreign policy; similarly a 'less powerful' leader often puts together a highly effective foreign policy in terms of diplomatic needs. This dissertation is an attempt to undertake a thorough study and contextually personalised analysis of Indian foreign policy in terms of its normative goal of peace.

This research discusses India's view of world peace and how it has been practiced through the mechanism of foreign policy. The very few nations of Asia can rightfully claim to having a 'foreign policy committed to world peace'; and India is a fit case to study how power aspirations coordinate with a discursive normative goal like peace. It is interesting to see that in spite of poverty and many shortcomings, India has not flinched from its mission of promoting world peace and humanity. The thesis has engaged primarily in the analysis of the nature and contributions of Indian and Western Schools of peace at the very beginning; and then it focused on the contributions of Indian premiers (ideologically and administratively) in the field of Indian foreign policy in relation to the idea of peace.

This work is dedicated to the ideas of world peace and global humanity that I consider as my moral compass. As a student of Political Science, I am aware of the necessities of power. Yet, my study is an attempt to remind us that power needs a higher purpose for it is the normative that ultimately provides a sense of direction to policy. Ultimately, Indian foreign policy has to be assessed in the light of ideas. This study is an attempt in this direction.

Chapter-I

Introduction

Chapter-I

Introduction

What The Work Is About

Indian foreign policy can be read in many registers. However, many systematic studies are available on the normative diversions of Indian foreign policy. Of the various normative goals of Indian foreign policy, peace has always been one of the most important ones. The sources of peace in Indian foreign policy are many. While Indian foreign policy makers were deeply influenced by the ancient Indian idea of the whole world being a family, the post-independence context brought in the need for cultivating peace as a precondition for India's material development as well. India had also maintained a rich record of promoting the idea of world peace in various international platforms and contributed handsomely to UN peace keeping missions. Indian leaders have consistently talked about the need to bring peace and non-discriminatory world order together. However, the actual practice of foreign policy shows marked departures from such universal pacifist norms. Hence, there is a need to investigate both what the concept of peace has meant in Indian foreign policy, and what explains the gap between idea and practice over the year. The central theme of this proposed research rests upon India's manifold contributions to world peace and the making of a just world order from the era of Jawaharlal Nehru to that of Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1947-2002). The reason for selecting this time frame is to limit the study to a manageable time-frame.

The Importance of The Problem

This study is primarily an attempt to assess the significance of peace in Indian foreign policy. The basic scope of the research can be highlighted as follows.

Firstly, we can identify the interconnection between peace and foreign policy. This research wishes to draw out the interconnectivity of 'peace processes' and Indian foreign policy.

Secondly, this study wishes to find the relationship between the understanding of peace held by Indian Prime Ministers from Jawaharlal Nehru to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the

actual course of foreign policy making. The study wishes to document how the select Indian Prime Ministers defined the notion of peace as a goal of Indian foreign policy and applied it in practice.

Thirdly, this study is an attempt to map the valuable contributions made by India in the domain of world peace since this idea has remained a chief normative commitment of Indian foreign policy. This study wishes to discuss what India meant by ‘world peace’ and how she had sought to live up to it in practice.

Literature Review

There are not many published works that deal with the theme. Of these, one of the important title is *Indian Wisdom and International Peace* by Dr. R. N. Vyas (Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1987). It is worth reviewing the arguments of this work in some detail. The idea of world peace has been developed and nurtured by India for a long time, though the India’s Position of world peace has not yet been adequately explored. Above all, some devoted authors have tried to study the position of India in the establishment of world peace. The present work by R. N. Vyas has been rooted in broad theoretical arguments regarding the place of India. The entire book has been divided into three basic themes; the first concerns the basis of peace, while the second argument is based on the thoughts of Indian thinkers (from *Lord Shri Krishna* to *Morarji Desai*). The third theme consists of various views from the western world on world peace.

The ‘basis of peace’ has been categorically divided into three parts. In the first part (chapter-2) the ancient Indian religious and cultural texts have been discussed at length. *Vedas*, *Smritis* and *Saints* have been regarded as the principal basis of Indian civilization. The author has termed the *Upanishadic* thinking as “nation’s central thought” or India’s central idea. Hence, the classical philosophy of *Vedas*, *Upanishads*, and *Buddhism* has been identified by the author as the source of Indian civilization. The author has also pointed out that the ‘idea of the religion of humanity’ first came into existence in the west in the 18th century, and in India, this ideology had been nurtured by Sri Aurobindo. This portion also deals with the philosophical ideas of ‘infinite’ and the ‘soul-centred religion of humanity’.

The text claims that the significance of Mahabharata and its central character *Shri Krishna* is critical in the life of every Indian. The author has characterized *Sri Krishna*

beyond that of religious figure and presented him as the propagator of peace. After the discussion is over, the author has focused on Shri Aurobindo, who achieved the ‘highest synthesis of the genius’ of Europe and Asia. Aurobindo has popularized two notions, ‘internationalism’ and the ‘idea of human unity’. Aurobindo has actually proposed for a boundary free world, where every man can generate and celebrate peace, economic well-being and progress. The Gandhian idea and idea of the world peace was based on ‘truth’. For Gandhi, world peace can be attained through a ‘truthful and non-violent’ world order. Although Jawaharlal Nehru was rather different from Gandhi, he was also a propagator of a modern, secular, stable, and just world order. In this book, the author has highlighted the process of Nehruvian state policy toward the world. The author has also mentioned that Nehru had always tried to make the India free from the conflicts of great nations. Moreover, the author finds S. Radhakrishnan was an original architect and ardent supporter of parliamentary democracy and world stability and peace. To S. Radhakrishnan, the norms and values of democracy can constitute world peace. Nonetheless, Shri Morarji Desai was a complete statesman, though he was a perfect follower of M. K. Gandhi. To Desai peace was not only an effective prohibition of war, but it is also related to the achievement of a positive sense of care and respect for the other. Hence, according to the author, major Indian leaders have actively contributed to the world peace.

The western thought of world peace has been pioneered by their thinkers like Voltaire, Kant, and count Leo Tolstoy. Voltaire was a true lover of peace, and he had a conviction that ‘war is madness’. Voltaire pleaded for a ‘fatherland’ of every person where he or she would be free from coercion and violence. Kant was truly a philosopher of ‘peace’, whose 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace: A philosophical Sketch” was published in 1795. This remains one of the most ambitious treatises on global peace. Kant had pointed out that war shall be declared only “by a plebiscites of all the citizens”. Count Leo Tolstoy was the real lover of ‘humankind’, and his contribution is critical to the evolving discourses of world peace. Tolstoy has tried to dissociate from state activities. He had also made a division between patriotism and government. Tolstoy had a conviction that humanity had to be freed from every kind of violence and coercion.

Hence, this volume has tried to bring together the Indian and western tradition of peace. There are few shortcomings – first of all, this volume had not managed to show the theoretical application of peace. Secondly, the position of India has not been adequately

represented. However, this volume is a valuable contribution to peace research and useful for the analysis the India's role in world peace and stability.

In *India and the Non-Aligned World* (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd, 1983), the author, *Hari Jaisingh* has divided the different eras of Indian external relations with a particular emphasis on the Non-Alignment movement. It rightly argues, "Non-alignment has been labeled variously as a policy based on moral principles and idealism, power politics of a sort, and even as a moral". The author tells us that the term "non-alignment," according to Michel Brecher, was first used by *V. K. Krishna Menon* at the United Nations in 1953-54. In between 1947 to 1954 the term "neutrality" was used to presuppose the attitude of the nonaligned countries. The entire book discusses the broad ideology of Nehru, *Tito*, and *Nasser* and is enriched with the relevant events of peace and regional cooperation. Hence this book is a combination of historical and theoretical accounts.

The book claims that the ideology of non-alignment was very much interlinked with the ancient tradition of India. In other words, India had never tried to occupy any other nation as such. The principal architect of this ideology was Jawaharlal Nehru, who has tried to construct a state-led ideology on non-alignment. The non-aligned nations have not attempted to define the concept; rather, they were sharing a common agenda. The significance of non-alignment gradually increased after the first summit in Belgrade in 1961. Hence, Nehru, *Tito*, and *Nasser* gave leadership to a large number of third world countries and tried to promote peace in the arena of international politics. Chapter 1 and 2 of this book are dealing with the issue of non-alignment in a larger context and the author has these chapters are historical accounts besotted with a slew of significant events.

Chapter 3 and 4 of the book deals with Nehru era and "Indira era", discussing both internal and external affairs of India. Nehru was indeed a pioneer nationalist as well as the head of the newly independent nations. Nehru was the 'main architect' of India's foreign policy. In fact, Nehru remained at the center of Indian foreign policy for more than forty years and other neighbouring countries also recognized the legacy of Nehru in international affairs. Much of Nehru's foreign policy involved a strong critique of balance of power realism and its attendant alliance politics, and his declaration on September 7, 1946, that India would not align with any power block was the starting point of the policy of non-alignment, remained central to India's early non-aligned stance.

The author has noted that Nehru faced many difficulties and challenges especially in the cases of reforms, planning and significantly on the question over the membership of India in the United Nations. The bitter experience in 1962 war with China challenged some of the central premises of Nehruvian foreign policy. In chapter 4 the author has presented the complete analysis of the Indira Gandhi regime. Indira Gandhi's foreign policy was based on strong defense and the idea of a self-reliant nation. The relationships with Pakistan, China, Vietnam and Afghanistan have been explored here. Indira Gandhi's internal and external policy was highly "realistic", and it contributed to the ideology of pragmatism in Indian foreign relations.

The author also describes how India was trying to make the third world nations free from the hegemony of the discourses of the western media. The first meeting of the non-aligned nations on Non-aligned News Agencies Pool was held in New Delhi in 1976. In Colombo summit, Mrs. Gandhi gave vent to an alleged "cultural slavery" of third world nations. The book also deals with India's friendly ties with the other nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The author claims that Indian foreign policy promoting the vision of world stability and development got acceptance by these countries. Hence, India has been justifiably characterised as a peace loving nation. This volume is remarkable in many aspects. It is full of historical records and events. The problem is that it has extensively discussed the non-aligned movement and has hardly anything to say about post-cold War events.

Peace, Friendship and Cooperation by Brojendra Nath Banerjee (B. P. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1987) is another book that looks broadly on the gamut of factors regarding world peace and India's record. The author has tried to present a complete scenario of the significant events which are directly interconnected with the approach of India towards world peace. The very notion "peace" has been explained in terms of development, friendship, and cooperation. The author has tried to explore the significance of peace in national development, and the interconnection between friendship and development has been categorically disused in here. The relationship between India and Russia is also an important part of this present volume. Chapter 1 of the book deals with the issues of diplomatic relationship between India and Russia regarding support to non-alignment, the arms race and assistance in the military and strategic affairs. The author argues, "Jawaharlal Nehru roused the Indian social consciousness to recognize that exploitation of labour was inherent in under development and that under development itself was the product of colonialism". Poverty

alleviation was the primary object of India's strategy for development. The author has illustrated that between 1980 and 1983, 69 countries negotiated "high conditionality" agreements with the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, of which 67 were LDCs or less developed countries. The Cuban president called the debts of the third world countries "unpayable, politically economically and morally." India has been indebted to various international monetary organizations. As India had not supported U.S. on Afghanistan war, so the assistance from U.S. was declining day by day.

The author finds that 1920 onward India has tried to maintain a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Nehru's visit in 1927 and *Motilal Nehru's* visit in 1928 to Russia were remarkable events that set the tone. *Tagore's* visit to USSR in 1930 was also a memorable one. In the 1970s, the relationship between India and the Soviet Union became stronger than the past. Even after the world started changing, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow brought a new direction to the historical relationship between the two nations. Gorbachev visited India for four days in 1986, which was a significant landmark in Indo-Soviet bilateral relations. Hence, this volume presents a detailed account of historical events of India's relationship between various nations, mainly with the USSR. While this book is subtitled as "Peace, Friendship and cooperation", however, the idea of world peace does not figure in the text.

Research Gap

While studies are available on many aspects of Indian foreign policy, no comprehensive study of Indian Foreign Policy on peace is available till date. There is no systematic analysis of how the concept of peace is articulated and practiced in Indian foreign policy. This study is an attempt to fill this research gap. It will attempt a detailed and systematic analysis of the evolution of the idea and practice of peace in Indian foreign policy.

Research Questions

The study has accordingly articulated three central questions, which are as follows :

- A. How central is peace as a foreign policy objective in India ?
- B. What are the principle contributions of India in addressing the scope of peace in world politics ?
- C. How consistent is India's contribution to peace ?

Methodology

The proposed research is primarily based on ‘textual analysis’, which is a useful technique of analysis in social science research. Texts have always been a major source of information and evidence for not only political researchers but also for other social science researchers. Attempt shall be made to find meaning and coherence of key texts, and how these fit together in terms of content, functions, and effect. The study plans to use standard textual or discourse analysis of documents to validate arguments concerning the significance of peace as a theme in Indian foreign policy. The work will use mostly primary documents available in the public domain. The documents and records of government agencies count as the best examples of primary sources. It will also make use of secondary sources including speeches, interviews, diaries and memoirs.

Chapter Scheme

The entire research work deals with India’s foreign policy and world peace with special emphasis on Jawaharlal Nehru to Atal Bihari Vajpayee years (1947-2002). Chapter- I contains the introductory part of the thesis. The main contents of the introduction are what the research work is all about, the importance of the research problem, literature review, research gap, the research questions, research methodology and lastly the chapter scheme.

The chapter- II discusses ‘*The Idea of Peace: Western and Indian Schools*’. The main contents of the chapter- II are thoughts from the Western Schools of peace and Indian Schools of peace. The main thinkers of peace from the West discussed here are Voltaire, Kant and Count Leo Tolstoy. The second part deals with the significant Indian thinkers. The main thinkers of Indian schools included are Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. Radhakrishnan. From the Western perspective of peace, Voltaire has contributed significantly to the field of peace existing beyond the arena of religion and spirituality, and demanded civil and religious freedom for his people. Voltaire’s significant work was ‘*Philosophiques sur les Aglais*’. On the other hand, Immanuel Kant is best known for his concept of ‘perpetual peace’. Kant’s most significant works were – ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals’, and ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. Count Leo Tolstoy was also known for his ideas of peace and nonviolence. Tolstoy has suggested that government must be free from war and violence. Moving to the Indian school of peace, thinkers like Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. Radhakrishnan have urged for non-violence, peace and

freedom. Sri Aurobindo was best known for his ideals of peace, internationalism and human unity. M.K. Gandhi advocated the ideals of peace, non-violence and truth. Hence, Gandhi's interpretation of history can be described as the "non-violent interpretation of history". Last but not the least, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was an 'impressive exponent of Indian philosophy'. Like the other Indian thinkers, Radhakrishnan was an exponent of peace and democracy. He was a democrat, and according to him democracy was the most valuable principle in the modern world.

Chapter- III deals with '*Nehru's idea of peace*'. This chapter analysis issues and ideas like the national interest and its significance, the meaning of security, external security and internal security, short-term and long-term security, national development, and world order. The chapter chronicles Nehru's role in international affairs with special emphasis on the Vietnam issue, the Suez Canal issue, and the Congo crisis, the Kashmir issue, the Tibet and China issue, and the Goa issue. The most important part of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of nonalignment and Indian foreign policy. Nehruvian foreign policy was based on friendship and cooperation mostly with the independent countries of Asia and Africa. The kernel of Nehru's foreign policy were anti-imperialism and anti-racism and these saw the idea of the world peace from an Indian point of view.

The Chapter- IV is titled '*Indira Gandhi: Pragmatism and Peace*'. The main contents of this chapter are the significance of Indira Gandhi era, Indira Gandhi and domestic politics; the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 and its significance; insurgency and the Indian state: the Naxalite and *Khalistan* movements, transforming democracy : the ideas of friends, neighbours and enemies: an Indian perspective; configuration of great powers: the US and the Soviet dimensions, military intervention and the liberation movement in Bangladesh; the Afghan crisis; Indo-Sri Lanka relations, the non-alignment and Indira Gandhi's contribution; the NPT and the nuclear explosion in India; the significance of the merger of Sikkim in India, and the overall foreign policy administration of Indira Gandhi era. First, the Indira Gandhi era was remarkably different from any other era, as far as the foreign policy is concerned. For example, the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 has strengthened the Indian foreign policy. This Treaty has protected India from the external threats of Pakistan and China in the South Asian region. In case of military intervention and the liberation movement in Bangladesh, India played a key role. India not only assisted Bangladesh to get freedom from Pakistan, but also tried hard to neutralize tendencies of militarization in South Asian region. Indira Gandhi,

however, understood the need to strengthen India's military capabilities. She vehemently opposed the NPT and authorized the first nuclear explosion in India. Indira Gandhi became the first Prime Minister under whose regime India achieved the status of nation with nuclear stability. However, USA and Soviet Union jointly finalised the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968 and at that time both USA and Soviet Union tried to pressurize India for signing the treaty. Indira Gandhi very prominently resisted this pressure from the states with nuclear-weapons. As far as the non-alignment is concerned, Indira Gandhi has carried out the legacies of her father Jawaharlal Nehru; besides, she changed the basic objectives of India's non-alignment. In other words, she made India strong enough to bargain her national interest not only in South Asia, but in many platforms across the world. Undoubtedly, this element had placed her in a strong and superior position along with the other world leaders. The merger of Sikkim was a major development in Indira Gandhi regime. Her decision making in foreign policy was also unique; and she also introduced a 'paradigm shift' in India's foreign policy. She had a conviction that India had to protect her territory through the use of military troops, if necessary. Although she made India accept the goal of nuclearization, she also maintained the policy of 'no first use' of these deadly weapons. Hence, Indira Gandhi invested in the ideas of peace, democracy and diplomacy in the contemporary world, especially in South Asia, from a position of strength.

Chapter- V discusses the foreign policy trends under PM Rajiv Gandhi. The main contents of this chapter are: (I) the defense policy of Rajiv Gandhi: 1984-1989; reaching out to America; the Russian factor; the nuclear issues; the external challenges from China; engagement with Southern Africa (as far as anti-racism is concerned); the operation Brasstacks, the military intervention in Sri Lanka and its effects; the military intervention in Maldives; the Pakistan policy; and India's foreign economic policy, and the political crisis in Nepal. Rajiv Gandhi also emphasised on peace, friendship and cooperation in his foreign policy. He tried to build friendly and peaceful relations with the neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, although these efforts mostly backfired.

The most significant part of this chapter concerns an analysis of the military intervention in Sri Lanka and its effect. The very old problem of ethnic separation in Sri Lanka became particularly serious in the 1980s. In July 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an agreement with the Sri Lankan President Jayewardene, under which a significant contingent of the Indian army, named as Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), was sent to Sri

Lanka to enforce a ceasefire and disarm the LTTE forces. But no sooner the IPKF started its operations, it turned into a regular war between Indian IPKF and the Sri Lankan Tamils, although, in September 1989 – the last phase of Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister – a special ceasefire and no war agreement was signed between the Sri Lankan LTTE and Indian IPKF. However, except the Sri Lanka crisis, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was fairly successful in maintaining peace, friendship and cooperation with the neighbouring countries during his term. His foreign economic policy marked a departure from the past and he introduced a new systemic policy framework for gaining highest returns from external relations; especially from Asia and Europe. Hence, Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy was a synthesis of peace, democracy, economic liberalism and anti-racism.

Chapter- VI titled is '*Narasimha Rao: Capitalism, Democracy and Peace*'. It discusses the early life of P. V. Narasimha Rao; the making of the welfare state; the growing importance of Europe in Indian foreign policy; India's relations with Israel, Gulf and Middle East; India's South Asia policy and beyond - looking east and looking west initiatives, and nuclear armaments and peace. Foreign policy was a significant issue in the entire tenure of P. V. Narasimha Rao. As part of the "Look East" policy, Rao became the first Indian prime minister who traveled to South Korea. The change in Indian foreign policy thinking was caused by two factors. First, New Delhi's own economic crisis and isolation after the sudden end to the Cold War; and, second, India's reassessment of its postcolonial identity and achievements in a realistic and comparative perspective. In the 1950s and 1960s, the newly decolonised countries of South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia were poor economies and weak states. A large, populous and democratic state, Nehruvian India was the leader of the post-colonial world. However, Indian foreign policy towards the East Asia failed as it could not use its cultural linkages productively. A socialist economic model and antagonism with the US prevented good economic and political ties in the Southeast Asian region. During his tenure as India's Prime Minister, Rao completely altered this framework. He visited South Korea, Thailand and Singapore. Singapore was considered as the gateway of East Asia, and an important country in terms of commerce and trade. After the liberalisation in 1991, the 'Look East' policy led countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Korea to provide money, cars and other expertise to the Indian economy. Thus, Rao achieved unexpected success in his foreign policy, particularly towards Asia. Rao had also a quest for nuclear capability but he did not succeed in his ways. During this time, India reestablished friendly and warm relations with Europe, Israel, Gulf and Middle East Asia in a decisive manner. However, Narasimha Rao was successful in implementing peace, friendship and

cooperation in his tenure through liberalised as well as decentralised domestic and foreign policy.

Chapter- VII looks at PM Vajpayee's foreign policy agenda. The main contents of this chapter are his vision; foreign policy and nuclear power - the significance of Pokhran II nuclear tests; the non-military confidence building measures (Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy, Lahore declaration, the *Agra* summit, unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir, towards India's new peace proposal), composite dialogues between India and Pakistan: challenges and obstacles in the way of peace; the *Kargil* crisis; the Indo-US relations; a new phase of Indo-Russian relations, and relations with China. This chapter gives particular attention to the non-military confidence building measures initiated by India. On the occasion of the inaugural visit of the bus service from Delhi to Lahore on February 19, 1999, Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee made a historic and a very landmark visit to Pakistan. Apart from that, the Lahore Declaration was also significant in the context of peace. It was signed on February 21, 1999 by the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the conclusion of the historic Lahore summit. Furthermore the *Agra* summit and the unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir were also very significant in the context of peace not only between India and Pakistan but also in the context of encouraging peace in South Asia. Yet, the chapter also reflects on the *Kargil* War and analyzes the reasons for the failure of the confidence-building measures. The chapter finds that despite the *Kargil* debacle, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee contributed positively by way of peace building and espousing a perspective on peace and stability despite repeated acts of terrorism across the border.

Finally, in the conclusion, I have tried to answer the three research questions. To the first question on the centrality of peace as a foreign policy objective in India, I have attempted to address it by conducting a historical analysis of India's foreign policy under all the Indian Prime Ministers under the period concerned. To find answer to the second question on the principal contributions of India in addressing the scope of peace in world politics, I have discussed the contributions of the Indian Schools on the idea of world peace. This study has delved into the works of Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. Radhakrishnan, and tried to find their uniqueness in contrast to the Western tradition of peace. The third research question is centred on the consistency of India's commitment to peace. Here I have mainly addressed the traditions from the Nehru era to Vajpayee years in order to explain India's thinking, policies, and practices as a whole. Hence, the thesis attempts to relate the notions of 'world peace' to Indian foreign policy practice between 1947 and 2002.

Chapter-II

The Idea of Peace: Western and Indian Schools

Chapter-II

The Idea of Peace: Western and Indian Schools

Thoughts from the West

The idea of peace is closely related to the human nature. Peace cannot be imagined without human nature. Some thinkers find human nature prone to conflict and violence. Others, in contrast, find it largely peaceful. Expectedly perhaps, human history has seen both war and peace although many historians emphasize the former. While philosophers, moralists, and religious preachers tend to abstract peace, social scientists employ data to support their propositions. We have a bitter experience of two World Wars. Hence, many thinkers have devoted themselves to the search for peace and coexistence. In this context, the western world imagined peace not only in terms of ideological values but they have also emphasized on practical and material aspects of peace. Here we are trying to identify the notion of peace rooted in the Western and Indian schools. The Western School of peace is different from the Indian School of peace. As far as the Western school is concerned, it is primarily based on Western reason and rationality, and this rationality entails human beings as self-sufficient and rational. On the other hand, the Indian school of peace is constructed by spirituality, faith, sympathy and human imaginations. From the Western perspective, peace comes out of reason. In Indian perspective, however, peace is largely metaphysical. However, it does not mean that Indian school is heavily determined by metaphysical elements; rather it is ideational and value laden. For the Western school of thought, the ideas of Voltaire, Kant and Count Leo Tolstoy are particularly notable. For the Indian school of thought, the contributions of Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. Radhakrishnan are significant for the development of the discourse of peace in India.

The very notion of 'enlightenment' has shaped the European political thought, since its origin. Although, this thesis is primarily focusing on the idea of peace, presupposed by the Indian premiers, but it is very significant to identify the Indian and Western schools of peace before progressing on this discussion of the peace in Indian foreign policy. The rationale behind selecting Voltaire, Kant and Count Leo Tolstoy is that they have largely shaped the basic structure of the European enlightenment. Thinkers like Aurobindo, M.K. Gandhi and

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan were influenced by Voltaire, Kant and Leo Tolstoy, and these Indian thinkers have consciously and unconsciously highlighted India as a peace loving nation in the world. Inessa Medzhibovskaya (2008) has argued that Tolstoy was Russia's first modern man. She actually sees Tolstoy's modernity in the "special autonomy" of his spiritual development, especially in the individual and self-directed nature of his religious evolution. Voltaire, Kant and Leo Tolstoy were committed to modernity and they were free from religious supernaturalism. They emphasized on self-determination, through human agency and autonomy rather than through divine intervention. Tolstoy was known for his humanitarian ideas. He had a strong faith in religion. Many scholars have argued that Tolstoy's conversion was primarily a matter of conscience. Inessa Medzhibovskaya wrote, "he was Russia's first modern man, the first defender of the autonomous freedom of conscience, its first consistent and courageous point of contact, its open practice and forum" (Medzhibovskaya, 2008, p. 352). The autonomy of Tolstoy's religious consciousness is based upon its reasonableness. Tolstoy had a conviction that religious truths are universal ones that can be known through inner experience and reason, moral or practical reason in particular. There is no need of revelation, church dogma or authority. One of the most significant expositions of Tolstoy's "reasonable religion" is his 1902 essay "*What is Religion and of what does Its Essence Consist?*" Tolstoy tried to define religion as our own consciousness, as a relationship to the infinite. This conscious relationship is established by reason. Hence, to Tolstoy genuine faith is never irrational or contradictory to the reason.

If Tolstoy's epistemological premises directly follow reason and rationality, his ethical and ontological ideas sourced in humanitarian motives. Tolstoy very clearly stated that, "The soul of man is the lamp of God". Tolstoy very honestly mentioned the significant influence of Immanuel Kant over him. Tolstoy gave priority to the autonomy of individuals and moral reasoning. Tolstoy was strongly influenced by Kant's significant work called '*Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*'. Kant's importance in the development of Tolstoy's entire thought is there to be seen. Kant's central problem in the first critique is how to reconcile freedom and reason for an individual. Tolstoy has also talked about this same problem. Tolstoy's great work 'War and Peace' was essentially Kantian. Tolstoy read Kant's '*Critique of Practical Reason*' in 1887. Tolstoy's famous work *On Life and Essays on Religion* was also influenced by Kant. The core concept of this work is "reasonable consciousness". According to this idea, the task of life is to attain unity with the divine power. In Tolstoy's own words, [he was seeking] the "greater and greater attainment of what

is good by means of submission of reason” (Tolstoy, 1934). In this regard Tolstoy had embraced Kant’s “moral religion”, which emphasized morality to be the foundation of faith both in terms of theistic metaphysics and moral consciousness. Significantly, ‘morality’ is the key instrument of the theory of peace, as propounded by Tolstoy and Kant. Both Kant and Tolstoy reexamined human nature and morality multiple times.¹

Peace and morality were equally important to Kant, Tolstoy and Voltaire. According to Kant, morality is the soul capacity for self-determination according to which a man generates consciousness. To Kant the moral law is simply a “fact of reason” (Kant, 1993, p. 31). The willingness to act on it is a “metaphysical postulate” that acts or a necessary condition of morality. It is noteworthy that self-determination, autonomy, morality and practical reason are all very closely related concepts in the philosophy of Kant. Kant thought that morality is to some extent related to the notion of ‘theistic metaphysics’, and from this point of view Kant drew the metaphysical “postulates” of immortality and the existence of God, in addition to human freedom. Here, Tolstoy also thought that our pursuit and search for morality entailed a higher divine reality to which we are all connected. Both Tolstoy and Kant understood morality as a notion of self-determination and perfectibility based on reason. For Tolstoy, it is central to the meaning of “razumenie” which Medzhibovskaya (2008, pp. 201-202) identifies as Tolstoy’s great discovery of 1879 and as the pivotal point of his conversion. The term “razumenie” suggests the ‘self-determination’ by divine reason through the inner consciousness of it. Nonetheless, self-determination or autonomy is a modern concept. Terry Pinkard wrote on Kant’s philosophy: “it inserted a new idea into the vocabulary in terms of which modern Germans and Europeans spoke about lives: self-determination. After Kant, nothing would be the same again” (Pinkard, 2002, p. 15). According to Aylmer Maude, Tolstoy himself believed that, “Kant’s work is indispensable for us who live after him” (Maude, 1987, p. 14). For both Kant and Tolstoy, self-determination was the essence of morality as well as it was the condition of salvation. Kant wrote in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, that, “there is absolutely no salvation for human being except in the innermost adoption of genuine moral principles in their disposition.” Like Kant, Tolstoy understood salvation as ‘an internal process of self-determination and moral perfectibility.’ Thus, both Kant and Tolstoy gave importance to

¹Leo Tolstoy’s most important work on morality and religion are - *A confession and other Religious Writings, The Kingdom of God is Within You: Christianity Not as a Mystic Religion but as a New Theory of Live, On Life and Essays on Religion*. Immanuel Kant’s most significant works on morality and religion are - *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Critique of Practical Reason and Religion Within the Limits of reason Alone*.

morality, reason, human freedom and human peace. Much like Kant and Tolstoy, Voltaire also has contributed in the field of peace and humanity. Voltaire emphasized on the ‘Power of human reason, science and the respect for humanity’ (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). Voltaire’s morality was based on the belief of freedom of thought and respect for all individuals. Voltaire had a conviction that literature should deal with the problems of its time. Bose and Puyana pointed out, “these views made Voltaire a key figure in the philosophical movement of the eighteenth century, which was represented by writers of the famous French Encyclopedia” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). Voltaire has tried to solve the social problem with the defense of a literature and it makes Voltaire a predecessor among the writers of twentieth century, such like Jean-Paul Sartre and other French existentialists. In *Treatise on Tolerance*, written in 1763, Voltaire attempted to promote tolerance among religions, attacking religious fanaticism. The French philosopher “defends in his Treatise the freedom of religion and also criticizes the religious wars as a violent and barbaric practice” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). Hence, Kant, Tolstoy and Voltaire, all have equally emphasized upon peace, tolerance and human freedom in the world, and any discussion on peace should not become complete without mentioning their valuable ideas.

Thoughts from the West

Voltaire

The original name of Voltaire was François-Marie Arouet. He was born on November, 21, 1694 in Paris (France). To Vyas (1987) Voltaire’s father was a lawyer. Voltaire had a very weak health, but above all he led an extremely ‘struggleful’ life. From his early days, Voltaire had been an active person. He wanted to write against the cruelties of the contemporary French Government. He remained occupied with these writings. He also composed poems and tragedies which made him quite well-known. Above all, Voltaire’s significant work *Lettres philosophiques sur les Anglais* has influenced many people in France and other countries like England. Voltaire constantly demanded civil and religious freedom for his people.

Voltaire fought against tyranny and injustice. Many poor and helpless people would come to him for assistance. Voltaire became very popular and his thoughts on peace made him a significant thinker in the Western World. The most significant and most notable work of Voltaire is the *Philosophical Dictionary*. To Vyas (1987), this dictionary contains

Voltaire's thoughts about many subjects arranged in alphabetic order. According to Voltaire, war is madness. To Voltaire, "War is the greatest of all crimes and yet there is no aggressor who does not colour his crime with the pretext of justice." So, from a very early age Voltaire wrote against cruelty and war. To Voltaire, war is not a necessary event, but human beings forcefully convince each other for war. To Voltaire, men and women are not born wicked, so, man itself is not the child of the devil. It is the profession or job which makes the people wicked. In his *Philosophical Dictionary*, Voltaire calculated the actual nature of the human being. Hence, a common man and a soldier are different from each other. Voltaire had thus differentiated the common man from a soldier or a butcher. In his *Philosophical Dictionary*, Voltaire analyzed the personality factor of each profession. Hence Voltaire's presuppositions were very positive in nature. To Voltaire, peace is not uncommon to man itself but each man will possess peace with the help of just work and just profession. Justness is the central area of Voltaire's social and political thought. On the basis of justness, Voltaire has propounded the idea of 'peaceful humanity.'

Voltaire's idea of Freedom, Tolerance and Peace

Voltaire directed many of his critical writings against the philosophical pretensions of well-known philosophers like - Leibniz and Descartes. However, Voltaire was a defender of the conception of natural science that served in his mind as the antidote to fruitless philosophical investigation. In a very early stage Voltaire has tried to make distinction between science and philosophy, and he was always against the ideas of fanaticism and superstition. An analysis of Voltaire's early life will help us to understand the contribution of Voltaire in the field of world peace. First of all, he was a law student, then he became a lawyer's apprentice, and finally he appeared as a secretary to a French diplomat. Voltaire began to identify himself with philosophy and this identity stand still for the end of his life. His significant work *Letters Philosophiques*, published in 1734 when he was forty years old, was the key turning point in his life. Nonetheless, during the regency the young Voltaire was especially shaped by his contacts with the English aristocrat, freethinker, and Jacobite Lord Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke lived in exile in France during the Regency period, and Voltaire was a frequent visitor to the La Source, the Englishman's estate near Orleans. It actually served as a reunion point for a wide range of intellectuals, any many scholars believed that Voltaire was first introduced to natural philosophy tradition, and to the work of Locke and the English

Newtonian specifically, at Bolingbroke's estate. Hence from the very beginning Voltaire was keen to the enlightened philosophy of Europe in a broader sense (Cronk, 2009).

Becoming a Philosopher - It was during his English period that Voltaire's transition into a mature philosopher began. In particular, Voltaire met through Bolingbroke Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope and John Gay. These writers at that moment beginning to experiment with the use of literary forms such as the novel and theater in the creation of a new kind of critical public sphere. Later, Bolingbroke also brought out the first issue of the 'Craftsman', a political Journal that served as the public platform for the Tory, who were against the Whig oligarchy in England. The 'Craftsman' helped to create English political journalism in the grand and humanitarian style, and for the next three years Voltaire moved in Bolingbroke's circle, absorbing the culture and sharing in the public political contestation that was growing all around him. Voltaire was not living in France for a long time. When again the French officials granted Voltaire permission to re-enter Paris in 1729, he was greatly devoid of pensions and banned from the royal court at Versailles. It was very true that Voltaire was a different kind of writer and thinker. In this regard Lord Morly said that, "Voltaire left France a poet and returned to it a sage". It is also very significant to say that he was transformed from a poet into a thinker and philosopher while in England. Hence, the English years bring about a transformation in him. After his return to France, Voltaire worked very hard restore financial and political support. It is noteworthy to say that, when the other writers and intellectuals were waiting for the financial and political support from the government, Voltaire was quite free to think rationally and act freely. Actually, Voltaire was highly influenced by Emilie du Chatelet a twenty nine years old lady. She studied Greek and Latin and trained in mathematics. She actually translated Newton's *'Principia Mathematica'* in French version. It was during this period both Voltaire and Emile du Chatelet became widely known philosophical figures.

From French Newtonian to Enlightenment Philosopher- From the very beginning Voltaire has tried to create a new identify in the arena of European philosophy. At first, Newtonian science served as a vehicle for transformation within Voltaire. Actually, before the decades of 1734, a series of controversies has appeared, especially in France, about the character and the legitimacy of Newtonian science. Especially it was related to the theory of universal gravitation and the physics of gravitational laws. Now, Voltaire positioned his *'Letters Philosophiques'* as an intervention into these contradictions. Voltaire has drafted a famous

and significant letter that used an opposition between Newtown and Descartes to frame a set of fundamental differences between English and French philosophy at that time. He also tried to include other letters about the Newtonian science in the work while reconnecting the philosophies of Bacon, Locke and Newton in English philosophical complexities. Voltaire also has tried to identify the remedy for the perceived errors and illusions perpetuated on the French by Rene Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche. Voltaire's significant work - *'Elements de la philosophic de Newton's'*, was first published in 1738 and then again in 1745 in a new and definitive edition. Voltaire offered this book as a clear, accurate and complete account of Newton's philosophy suitable for the ignorant Frenchmen. By 1745, when the scholarly edition of Voltaire's *'Elements'* was published, all Frenchmen supported this from their heart. By 1750 the perception had become widespread that France had been converted from 'backward', 'erroneous Cartesianism to modern, more enlightened and powerful Newtonianism due to the heroic intellectual efforts of philosopher like Voltaire. From these perspectives, Voltaire has been interlinked with the traditional Old Regime society as a 'new kind of legitimate intellectual martyrdom. Voltaire has extensively contributed in the field of philosophical writings and polemics during the 1730s and 1704s with an equally massive stream of plays, poems, stories and narrative histories. In 1745, Voltaire was named as the Royal Historiographer of France, a title bestowed upon him as a result of his historical works of Louis XIV and the Swedish King Charles II. Voltaire's most significant and widely read book was - *'Essaissur les moeuset l'esprit des nations'* (1751), a pioneering work of universal history. Also on philosophy of science, especially Newtonian philosophy and science was *'Letters Philosophiques'* (1732). Hence, Voltaire's philosophical journey begins with French Newtonian to enlightenment philosopher (Cronk, 2009).

Voltaire and Liberty - Voltaire was not only a writer, historian and lawyer, but he was also a philosopher of humanity. Many scholars has argued that, Voltaire's 'morality was based on the belief of freedom of thought and respect for all individuals'. Hence, he was a philosopher of 'human morality and freedom' (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). Voltaire's works deals with the problems of the individuals and their struggle for existence. Bose & Puyana, (2017), have argued that he was the predecessor of the writers of twentieth century, such as Jean - Paul Sarte and other French existentialists. In his most well-known book - *"Treatise on Tolerance"* of 1763, Voltaire emphasized to promote tolerance among religions, and he attacked religious fanaticism. Bose & Puyana, (2017), have argued that Voltaire has defends in his *Treatise* the freedom of religion and also criticize the religious wars as a violent and barbaric practice. In

his significant work *“Treatise on Tolerance”*, Voltaire stated that “for a government to have the right to punish the errors of men it is necessary that their errors must take the form of crime; they do not take the form of crime unless they disturbed society; they disturb society when they engender fanaticism; hence men must avoid fanaticism in order to deserve toleration” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, pp. 29-30). Now, it is a serious matter that whether intolerance should be considered as a human right or not; Voltaire make it clear that ‘the natural’ right is that which belongs to the dignity of all human beings. Hence, the human rights should be based on this natural right, and the “great principle of both is: Do not unto others what you would that they do not unto you” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 30). Now, on the basis of that principle, one man cannot say to the another : “Believe that I believe, and what thou canst not believe, or thou shalt perish” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 30). So Voltaire reaffirms the following: “The supposed right of intolerance is absurd and barbaric “(Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 30). Therefore, Voltaire advocated in his outstanding work *“Philosophical Letters”* for the notion of the right to freedom as a real means to construct religions tolerance and a peaceful civil society. Hence Voltaire was a classical profounder of the notion of peace and liberty in the western world.

Voltaire and the Paradoxes of Fanaticism

Voltaire’s idea on freedom and peace is not new in the history of western philosophy, but they are original from the view of its applicability although philosophers are divided on his assessment. In *Voltaire and the Enlightenment*, John Gray has expressed that -- “Voltaire’s writings on philosophical questions are unoriginal to the last degree. They amount to little more than a reworking of some ideas from John Locke and Pierre Bayle” (Gray, 1998, p. 3). Although, A. J. Ayer has admires Voltaire as an eighteenth - century figure. In Ayer’s words - “Voltaire is a great symbol” (Ayer, 1986, p. 171). Sir Isaiah Berlin (1990) admires Voltaire for his ideal of a “universal civilization” struggling to free itself from regressively parochial forces. Due to that reason Isaiah Berlin rightly claims that “Voltaire is the central figure of the Enlightenment” (Berlin, 1991, p. 88).Berlin’s Voltaire has been admired by A. J. Ayer because the argument of Sir Isaiah Berlin is very close to the influential thesis of Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*. Horkheimer and Adorno have argued that the “dissolvent rationality” of the modern enlightenment, works ‘inevitably toward the complete disenchantment of the world and creates a disastrous totalitarianism’ (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972, p. 3). The centrality of this argument is that Horkheimer and Adorno does not consider

Voltaire as the central figure in the Enlightenment. Yet, Voltaire's role against the 'intolerance' has placed Voltaire as an important figure in the humanitarian evolution of mankind. Many scholars treated fanaticism as "one of those labels that have long been in use as an integral part of cultural history rather than objective classification" (Said, 1981, p. 9). Voltaire used the term fanaticism to label a disease. Voltaire suggested that all 'believers', according to Voltaire, are infected with fanaticism and should be kept under a strong watchful eye. According to Voltaire - "Once fanaticism has infected a brain the disease is almost incurable" (Voltaire, 1928). Nonetheless, Voltaire also asserted that - "fanaticism is usually confined to young people" because the young people can be more easily "inflamed by superstitions" (Voltaire, 1956, p. 527). However, Voltaire recognized that the 'interplay between enthusiasm and superstition is capable of being inflamed insofar as the common people from part of collective' (Nicholls, 2002, p. 454).

Hence, Voltaire (1928) referred to fanaticism as an "epidemic malady" that grows up through the feedback between superstition and enthusiasm." With this approach Voltaire was slightly moving towards the theme explored more systematically in the "group psychology" grew up in the circle of Gustav Le Bon and Sigmund Freud. To Voltaire in human life the belief of "soul", "salvation" and "afterlife" is equally important. Nonetheless, Voltaire has tried to overcome all of these ideals. He has always tried to emphasize on a religion that was free of superstition and fanaticism. In this regard it is significant to remember that, Nietzsche has dedicated the first edition of '*Human All-Too Human*' to Voltaire. Nietzsche's seminal idea of the "death of God" was partly inspired by the religious and social ideas of Voltaire. The ideals of Voltaire are equally significant in the context of social harmony and peace, because Voltaire was the first person who encouraged the people to be free from and bondage or shortcomings. Hence, Voltaire's notion of fanaticism is equally important in the theoretical outlook of peace and stability.

Fanaticism and the Paradoxes of Tolerance

It is very true that fanaticism and tolerance both are normative concepts. There are relevant intersections between fanaticism and tolerance. The idea of tolerance is very close to the notion of 'liberty of conscience. In fact, liberty cannot be established without tolerance. Voltaire had a conviction that the practice of tolerance might eliminate the widespread practice of religious fanaticism. One of the great philosophers of European Enlightenment, Locke, has tried to make a separation between the Church and the state. John Locke has

actually popularized the core idea in his *Letters on Toleration*: “the business of the laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth” (Locke, 1955, p. 41). Locke was also a thinker of freedom of belief of the masses, similar to Voltaire. To Voltaire, tolerance is a most valuable thing, through which a free public domain or state can be built up. It is noteworthy that Voltaire was a liberal thinker, and he has primarily emphasized the establishment of tolerance in the civil affairs. Voltaire has actually realized the danger of fanaticism and he relentlessly campaigned against it to eradicate fanaticism from its roots. However, J. J. Rousseau frames a strong objection to Voltaire’s attitude in terms of fanaticism. Rousseau has narrated in *Emile*:

“Fanaticism, though cruel and bloodthirsty, is still a great and powerful passion, which stirs the heart of man, teaching him to despise death, and giving him an enormous motive power, while the philosophical spirit, on the other hand, assaults life and enfeebles it, degrades the soul, concentrates all the passions in basest self-interest, undermining unnoticed the very foundations of a virtuous society. The philosophical spirit does not kill men, but by reducing all their affections to a secret selfishness, it is as fatal to the population as to virtue; war itself is not more destructive. Thus fanaticism, though its immediate results are more fatal than those of what is now called the philosophical spirit, is much less fatal in its after effects” (Rousseau, 1974, p. 276).

It is quiet paradoxical that, though both Voltaire and Rousseau were liberal thinkers but their ideas bifurcated on the notion of ‘fanaticism’. Significantly Voltaire’s ‘*Philosophical Dictionary*’ starts with the statement that “tolerance is the portion of humanity” because “we are full of weakness and error”, and concludes by saying “we ought mutually to tolerate one another because we are all weak, inconsequential, subject to change and error” (Voltaire, 1928). Voltaire had a conviction that people believe in ‘religious superstitions and errors because they are not rational and weak’. Voltaire thought some attributes of the individual were indeed follies, superstitions or errors, and ought to be condemned as such. However, from the entire discussion, it can be argued that Voltaire was a rational philosopher, and he has emphasized upon the freedom and peace in the society. He has tried to place the human beings above the ill effects of fanaticism and superstition. Any theory of peace is incomplete without the narrative of Voltaire on peace and humanism.

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant has been recognized as one of the most valuable thinker of the European Enlightenment era. Kant has actually adopted many ideas of Enlightenment. Kant in his work - *'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?'* has attributed that - "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed minority. This minority is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. It is self-imposed if its cause lies not in a lack of understanding, but in the lack of courage and determination to rely on one's own understanding and not another's guidance" (Goldmann, 1973, p. 3). Now, it is needless to say that, this kind of attitude had brought the Enlightenment into conflict with the traditional Christianity. Lucien Goldmann has argued that - "Any religion that depends on revelation must insist that perception and reason cannot suffice to give man the knowledge he needs in all the important questions of life; such knowledge requires correction, or at any rate needs to be supplemented by knowledge resting on the authority of revelation" (Goldmann, 1973, p. 3). However, to Kant any knowledge earn by 'revelation becomes superfluous, deceptive and sometime dangerous to human adulthood' (Goldmann, 1973, p. 4). Here Kant has asserted that, "I set the central achievement of Enlightenment - that is, of man's emergence from his self-imposed minority above all in matter of religion. I do so because our rulers take no interest in playing the guardian to their subjects in matters of art and science besides, this religious dependence is both the most damaging and the most humiliating of all" (Goldmann, 1973, p. 4). Hence, Kant declares that it is very much vital to Enlightenment not merely that men should free themselves from all kinds of authority, but also man must constitute a free public sphere where their speeches and writings will be free. It is quite self-evident that peace and freedom (all kind of freedom) are two sides of the same coin. Kant has actually presupposed that there might be some hindrances to enlightenment, but it is the duty of the individual that he/she must overcome the difficulties. It is significant that Kant's ideas of course determined by the concrete social and political situation in Germany in his time; it was also determined by the weakness of the middle class, as a result of which the German Enlightenment was necessarily much less radical than the French. The leading French thinkers could not admit the existence of such kind of difficulties in the European society. However, Kant was actually aware of that fact. Lucien Goldmann has argued that - "The divorce between thought and action seems to reflect one of the basic ideas of the French Enlightenment - the notion that the unhampered advance of knowledge and general education would suffice, without any further action, to bring about the liberation of mankind and to end

the great social evils of the day” (Goldmann, 1973, p. 5). Nonetheless, Immanuel Kant was a very conscious philosopher of Enlightenment and he had a conviction that people must overcome all difficulties and must enshrine the quality of reason. Immanuel Kant was a great philosopher of human kind and his significant ideal of ‘perpetual peace’ was very much confined to the emancipation of the all human race.

To analyze the Kantian idea of world peace, it is necessary to analyze the idea of Kantian ethics. Kant’s most significant works were ‘*Critique of Pure Reason*’, ‘*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*’ and ‘*Critique of Practical Reason*’.

In his theory of ethics, Kant put forth four fundamental categorical imperatives (Vyas, 1987)

- i) To act only on that moral principle whereby one can at the same time will that it should become a universal law
- ii) To treat human beings as an end in itself but never only as a means to an end
- iii) To act as a member of ‘Kingdom of Ends’
- iv) The principle of moral conduct is morally binding on any person if and only if that person regards it and imposes it on himself or herself

The substance of Kant’s ethics is that a human being is free and he should respect the freedom of all the other fellow human beings. Kant was vastly influenced by Rousseau. And from that point Kant’s liberal Philosophy got acceptance worldwide. Hence, Kantian idea of peace is closely associated with the notion of freedom of every man with equal right to attainment of peaceful social order in everyday life.

Kant and Perpetual Peace

Being a German philosopher, Immanuel Kant is considered as a central figure in the modern philosophy. Kant’s philosophical influence on the Western thought has been profound. Kant tried to change the framework within which philosophical inquiry has been carried out. It can be said that very little philosophy is now carried out in the style of pre-Kantian philosophy (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 27). This has actually developed by a paradigm shift of Kantian philosophy. This paradigm shift consists of several closely related innovations that have become axiomatic, in the entire arena of philosophy itself and in the social sciences and

humanities. Kant had a tremendous influence on Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Novalis during the 1780s and 1790s. This school of thinking was popularly known as the German idealism developed from the writings of Immanuel Kant. Many scholars have argued that - "The idea of perpetual peace was first suggested in the 18th century, when Charles-Irenee Castel de Saint- Pierre published his essay "*Project for Perpetual Peace*". However, the idea did not become well known until the late 18th century. The term perpetual peace became acknowledged when Kant published his 1795 essay "*Perpetual Peace: A philosophical Sketch*" (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 28). Now, it is very much significant that, perpetual peace had had a very significant influence upon modern politics. Even Kant's perpetual peace has a tremendous influence over the modern foreign policy regime. Actually, perpetual peace has been acted as foundation for peace and conflict studies, which are relatively a new field started in Europe around the 1950s and 1960s. It can also be argue that, Kant's idea of perpetual peace has helped to put the basis for the later creation of the League of Nations in 1919 after the First World War. Kant has expressed in his book '*Perpetual Peace*' that peoples or nations can be regarded as states may be judged like individual man. Now when men are living in a single state of nature is free from external laws, but they are in a single platform of 'mutual injury or lesion'. So, people needs mutual cooperation for their existence, and thus a man first entered into a constitution, or a civil constitution, in which the right of each shall be secured. Hence, it would give rise to International Federation of the Peoples. To Kant, the word 'Right' is a mighty word and it will influence the state to constitute a peaceful state. Many scholars on Kantian philosophy have expressed that, "Kant also added that the means by which states prosecute their Rights at present can never be by a form of process - as if there were on external tribunal, - but can only be by war; but even the favourable issue of war in victory will not decide a matter of Right. A Treaty of peace may, indeed, put an end to a particular war, yet not to the general condition of war, in which a pretext can always be found for new hostilities" (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 28). So, peace is very much fundamental to the development of the so called 'state' and its citizens. According to Kant every state has its own might to constitute the treaty of peace and every nation has its own right to judge of its own cause. Kant was in favour of those states those have legal constitution themselves. However, Kant was in favour of a morally just and legal, constitutional state. Whose main aim will be to generate freedom and peace. Kant has also emphasized on 'reason' which is an important part of the highest moral law of the state. Immanuel Kant condemns all kinds of war and suggests that, it is an immediate duty for all to

make a 'state of peace' within us. But it is also significant that, the state of peace cannot be established or secured without a 'compact of the nations with each other'. Bose and Puyana have argued that, "hence there must be a compact of a special kind which can be called a 'Pacific Federation' (foedus Pacificum), and which would be distinguished from a mere treaty or compact of Peace (Pactumpacis), in that the latter merely puts an end to one war, whereas the former would seek to put an end to all wars forever" (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). Hence, to Kant the unifications of nations is very much significant. Consequently, the notion of a fixed right to go to war, cannot be properly conceived as a universal element in the Right of nations. Scholar like Miguel Bose and David Fernandez Puyana has argued that - "Instead of the positive idea of a Universal Republic - if all is not to be lost - we shall have as result only the negative surrogate of a Federation of the states averting war, subsisting in an external union, and always extending itself over the world. And thus the current of those inclinations and passions of men which are antagonistic to Right and productive of war, may be checked, although there will still be a danger of their breaking out betimes" (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). And finally, in regard to the vital recognition of perpetual peace as a right, Kant has expressed that the idea of a cosmo-political right of the whole human race, is not at all overstrained mode of representing right, but is a necessary completion of the unwritten code which actually 'carries national and international right to a consummation in the public right of mankind' (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 29). Hence, perpetual peace is a unwritten form of right. So, according to Kant the whole system leads to the conclusion of a perpetual peace among the nations. To Kant men and nations together constitutes the perpetual peace and they must realize the value of it. Actually Immanuel Kant was a paradigmatic and culminating philosopher of European Enlightenment. He was the paradigmatic philosopher of the European Enlightenment in his belief that human freedom of choice and action can be exercised in accordance with pure reason, and he also expressed in his *Lectures on Ethics* that human conscience is based on the "Inner value of the world". Being a culminating philosopher of Enlightenment, he has expressed that true freedom of the will implies the possibility of choosing to do evil as well as to do good. To him everything depends upon the human morality. However many political scientists believe that the idea of 'Perpetual Peace' has been undermined by the course of history and by the modern republics together.

Kant was a liberal political thinker. He would actually think about perpetual Peace among the nations. Another of Kant's work, 'Eternal Peace', was published in 1795. Here, Kant has tried to show how peace can be established on earth. To him, as long as armies remain, the conflict shall also remain. To him, wars happen because one nation wants to plunder other nations. He suggested that war shall be declared only "by a plebiscite of all the Citizens". His opinion was always to end the wars.

Kant's perpetual peace was extremely significant and popular in nature. To Kant, the preliminary articles for perpetual peace among the states were:

1. "No treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war."
2. "No Independent States, large or small, shall come under the dominion of another State by inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation."
3. "Standing armies (miles perpetus) shall in time be totally abolished."

To Kant each State competes with each other, and that is why every State exists within a boundary of war. So, peace is most required to break down the circle of war. The major containing definitive article for perpetual peace has also been highlighted by Kant. To him, every State living side by side is not the National State, but the war between every state is very much natural. To Kant a state of peace must be constituted to stop the hostilities of the other states. To him, when each state will demand security, actual peace would be established. To Kant the two definitive articles for perpetual peace are-

"The civil constitution of every state should be Republican."

"The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states."

Hence, Kant's idea of perpetual peace is still significant in the 21st century. To Kant, only when the states are conscious about the establishment of peace is 'peace on earth' possible. Kant has not used the term 'peace' in the abstract form but instead with the great values of morality. So, morality and peace have been mixed up with each other and Kant has tried to strengthen both the moral values of nations and the peace process on the other side.

Count Leo Tolstoy

Tolstoy was a prominent thinker in the sphere of social and political thought. He has also contributed greatly in literature. Tolstoy can easily be classed as one of the best social and political thinkers of mankind. Leo Tolstoy was born on 28th August 1828. From his very childhood Tolstoy was a serious person. He could be perceived as a sage of morality, peace and love. Tolstoy expressed that “Governmental power, even if it suppresses private violence, always introduces fresh forms of violence into the lives of men and does this increasingly as it continues and grows stronger.”

Hence, Tolstoy was always against war and violence. He had advised the Government to maintain peace not violence. Tolstoy wrote- “The increase of armies arises simultaneously from two causes, each of which reciprocally evokes the other; armies are needed both against enemies at home and to maintain the position of a state against its neighbours. The one condition the other. The despotism of a Government at home increases in proportion to the increase and strengthening of its army and its external successes; and the aggressiveness of Governments grows in proportion to the increase of their internal despotism.”

For Tolstoy, the main task of governments is to free the people from violence. Government must assist the people to protect peace and to prohibit violence. To Tolstoy, “Governments were to free men from the cruelty of individual strife, to give them security in the performance of a group life. But instead of that they subject men to the same necessity of strife, merely substituting strife with other states for strife with individual neighbours, and the danger of destruction both for the individual and for the state they leave just as it was.” So, to Tolstoy peace cannot be established in the modern world only by the means of peace resolutions. But the pertinent fact is that wars must be restricted and the citizens have to be more violence-free in their attitude.

Tolstoy has tried to make the state machinery responsible for its complex character and for its complex type of activities. So, crime & violence are embedded in the nature of the state itself. So, unless and until the people dissociate themselves from evil activities and unless the state brings about the revolution, the chance to establish peace will remain doubtful. Tolstoy died on 7th November, 1910, but his thought and activity will remain alive forever. The St. Petersburg University remained closed in his honour and people from many countries still mourn in memory of Leo Tolstoy.

Reflection on War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy

Count Leo Tolstoy was a Russian philosopher as well as writer and prophet. Now, “*War and Peace*” is a novel written by Leo Tolstoy, which is regarded as a central work of world literature and it is also considered as Tolstoy’s finest literary achievements. The novel entails the history of the French invasion to Russia and the impact of the Napoleonic era on Tsarist society through the stories of five aristocratic families. The novel was first published in 1869. Tolstoy said that “*War and Peace*” is not a novel, even less is it a poem, and still less a historical chronicle” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 33). Large sections of this novel, especially the later chapters, are a philosophical reflection on the notion of peace and war. The Encyclopedia Britannica states: “It can be argued that no single English novel attains the universality of the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy’s war and Peace” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 34). Actually, Tolstoy recognizes the material and human consequences of the war and conflict on the well-being of the humanity as follows:

“After the burning of Smolensk a war began which did not follow any previous traditions of war. The burning of towns and villages, the retreats after battles, the blow dealt at Borodino and the renewed retreat, the burning of Moscow, the capture of marauders, the seizure of transports, and the guerrilla war were all departures from the rules” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 34).

Tolstoy tried to remind us the long debate among the historians on the matter of the causes which provoke wars. Tolstoy tried to aware all that, in universe the real cause of conflicts always generated from the human beings and not from any supernatural or divine force. Tolstoy wrote:

“The historians, in accord with the old habit of acknowledging divine intervention in human affairs, want to see the cause of events in the expression of the will of someone endowed with power, but that supposition is not confirmed either by reason or by experience ... Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanity we cannot regard ‘power’ as the cause of events. Power, from the standpoint of experience, is merely the relation that exists between the experience of someone’s will and the execution of that will by other. To explain the conditions of that relationship we must first establish a conception of the expression of will, referring it to man and not to the Deity” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 34).

Nevertheless, Tolstoy emphasized that war in general is always caused by the will of a man or of several men. Tolstoy further stated that -

“With the present complex forms of political and social life in Europe can any event that is not prescribed, decreed, or ordered by monarch, ministers, parliaments, or newspapers be imagined? Is there any collective action which cannot find its justification in political unity, in patriotism in the balance of power, or in civilization? So that every event that occurs inevitably coincides with some expressed wish and, receiving a justification, presents itself as the result of the will of one man or of several men” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 34).

Tolstoy tried to raise the question regarding the reasons which leads man to be directly involved in war and conflict and kill other human beings in a warlike situation. Many historians recognized that the activity of states with the other nations is very much expressed in wars, and that the increase or decrease in the power or strength of the nation depends on the success or defeat of an army. Here, Tolstoy has expressed that the final objective of war is to submit the enemy:

“All historians agree that the external activity of states and nations in their conflicts with one another is expressed in wars and that as a direct result of greater or less success in war the political strength of states and nations increases or decreases. Strange as may be the historical account of how some king or emperor, having quarreled with another, collects an army, fights his enemy’s army, gains a victory by killing three, five, or ten thousand men, and subjugates a kingdom and an entire nation of several millions, all the fact of history (as far as we know it) confirm the truth of the statement that the greater or lesser success of one army against another is the cause, or at least an essential indication, of an increase or decrease in the strength of the nation - even though it is unintelligible why the defeat of an army - a hundredth part of a nation - should oblige that whole nation to submit” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 35).

Hence the first step to create an ultimate peaceful world is to really desire peace and to reject humiliation of the enemy, similarly it is also needed to avoid war as a means to settle any type of dispute. Tolstoy has condemned all types of wars and conflicts, and he has appealed to all for peace and welfare. Tolstoy very significantly emphasized on the ‘perpetual peace’ and strongly avoided any kinds of a balance of political power. As Tolstoy expressed that -

“That abbe is very interesting but he does not see the thing in the right light.... In my opinion perpetual peace is possible but - I do not know how to express it ... not by a balance of political power ...” (Bose & Puyana, 2017, p. 35).

In Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, there is a scene in which two enemies seriously encounter face to face in the battle field, and suddenly both soldiers discover that they are the children of the same humanity. This humanistic feeling is the only way to eliminate any kind of war over the earth. To Tolstoy the feeling of war and conflict can be erase from the mind, only by the means of constructive human relations. Hence the feelings of brotherhood and humanity can do a great job for the universe.

Tolstoy on Nonviolence

Tolstoy had a great impact on the intellectual history of the twentieth century as a prophet of nonviolence. Actually, Tolstoy’s impact has been moral or personal rather than political or public. In his foreword (1909) to Tolstoy’s *A letter to Hindu: The subjection of India - Its cause and cure*, Gandhi calls Tolstoy “a great teacher whom I long looked upon as one of my guides”. Mahatma Gandhi has expressed that - Tolstoy’s life has been devoted to replacing the method of violence for removing tyranny or securing the universal reform by the method of ‘nonresistance to evil.’ Tolstoy has tried to overcome all kinds of hatred, violence and self-suffering. To Gandhi, Tolstoy’s notion of peace and non-violence was based on ‘great and divine law of love’. Tolstoy has applied it to all the problems that trouble the universal mankind.

Mahatma Gandhi has expressed these ideals in 1909 at the age of forty. For both Gandhi and Tolstoy, the idea of nonviolence was closely related to “truth”, which all mankind must follow in order to overcome the serious problems of modernity. So, both the thinkers have shared the basic image of this “truth”; hence the basics of their thoughts are quite similar. Both Gandhi and Tolstoy shared equal thoughts on a kind of anti-modernist or anti-modern-European sense of values, that is, they paid greater importance to spiritual, inner values than to a material values, preferred a simple normative life (Vegetarianism, diligence, and self-help) based on convenient urban life. They both regard any kind of violence or power as absolute evil and reject to fighting against evil power using the same means as does evil to common man. Both Tolstoy and Gandhi have fixed an aim to not only make victory over separate evil phenomenon but also to win over the entire evil. Hence, Tolstoy was not an

escapist, but was a man of all positive attributes, who was an aspiration to change of the total orientation of the world development. Now, it can be argued that both Gandhi and Tolstoy, specially Tolstoy found the sources of violence in every spheres of human life, from the level of own personal desires to the level of the current system of society (government, policy, army, etc.) and tried to appeal to all for non-violent resistance on various fronts: against the capital punishment, military service, war, practical taxation discrimination by nationality and caste, etc. It is noteworthy to say that, to use Martin Green's (1990) expression, 'both Tolstoy and Gandhi were citizens of the great empires, which covered enormous landmass'. Martin Green (1990) also expressed that, both Tolstoy and Gandhi had had "imperial" experience in their youth and manhood: Tolstoy experienced as a soldier of the empire in the Caucasus and Crimea which has reflected in *'The Cossacks, Sevastopol, the Invaders and Other Stories'* on the other hand Gandhi's imperial experience was of England, the center of the empire, his colonial emigration to the land of South Africa, and so on. Nevertheless, Tolstoy was a thinker of peace and non-violence, and he had influenced both the people of eastern world and western world. Hence, any theory of peace or approach of peace without Tolstoy will become empty and incomplete.

The philosophy of the Good and Evil in the Teaching of Leo Tolstoy

Many scholars make a comparison between Leo Tolstoy and Hannah Arendt (Klimova, 2017-2018). To Svetlana Klimova, both Tolstoy and Arendt got to the back of contradictions between "reasonableness", "morality" and a human behaviour in the state and society. Klimova has argued that the approach of Tolstoy was Christian ethics while that of Arendt was philosophic-political. Klimova (2017-2018) has expressed that, the congeniality of Tolstoy and Arendt is attributed to the fact that the ethics of Tolstoy and the policy of Arendt are built on a common theoretical background, which is the philosophical anthropology of Immanuel Kant. Both Tolstoy and Arendt have searched for the atomic individual, on the basis of Kantian ethics. Both Tolstoy and Arendt have emphasized on ideology in particular, and Tolstoy has demonstratively proved that how ideology (church culture, science, art) can construct the base of society. Tolstoy has tried to prove that the essence and entity of "good", which he also called "consciousness of life", 'was such a state of human being which was constant and independent of time'(Klimova, 2017-2018).

However, Arendt has tried to follow Socrates in a broader sense. Eventually, both the thinkers believed in the idea of the morally free individual. Tolstoy believed in Christ's

morals or ‘on the ideals of the ancient world’ and Arendt advocated the idea of the free ‘personal action of the individual’. Hence, both the thinkers have opposed the isolated life of man in the state. On the other hand, for Tolstoy and Arendt, “evil” was ‘neither a religious invention nor a metaphysical inception equal to good’. (Klimova, 2017-2018). Both Tolstoy and Arendt considered the state as an evil institution. As a political philosopher, Arendt had not characterized the state as an institute of evil which is suppressing man by evil force. Arendt was quite rational and neutral in the making of analysis of the institution of state power, perhaps she has tried to draw out the origin of state historically. For Arendt (1970) ‘state was considered as a legitimate form of relations between people’. As it has been indicated earlier that, Arendt was highly influenced by Tolstoy, and Arendt’s position was not much different from Leo Tolstoy in the analysis of state. However, it is noteworthy that, Tolstoy denied all types of state, like - democratic, authoritarian and tyrannical. Tolstoy found no positive potentials for the state system both in terms of past and future (Klimova, 2017-2018). Hence, Tolstoy’s idea of man and individual was beyond the limit of any state system as such.

Significant Indian Thinkers

The ideas constituting Indian political thought are somewhat different from those of the Western world. Here we are trying to draw out the inner meaning of the idea of peace from the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo and S. Radhakrishnan. Many scholars have argued that the Indian political thought has been neglected in the West. As Alasdair MacIntyre argued that:

“The Indian political theorist has a harder task than his western counterpart. He first of all has to be a good deal more learned, for he is required to know the history of western political thought as well as the history of Asian thought... He has to possess an array of linguistic skills that are uncharacteristic nowadays of Western political theories.

Second, he has to sustain a relationship with his Western colleagues in which he takes their concerns with a seriousness that they rarely, unless they are among the very few Western specialists in Indian politics, reciprocate. Thus, a genuine dialogue is for the most part lacking. It is we in the West who are impoverished by our failure to sustain our part in this dialogue” (MacIntyre, 1983, p. 623).

Similarly, W. H. Morris - Jones of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, raised the question of the parochialism of Western teaching of political thought. He points out that the Western scholars will find much of 'relevance' in the contribution of those Indian thinkers, mostly Mahatma Gandhi who had blended Indian and Western traditions of thought (Morris-Jones, 1972). The Indian political thinkers have particularly addressed the real problems of the world, and they dealt with multiple issues, such as - feudalism, capitalism, imperialism, fascism, communism, utilitarianism, materialism, scientism and technocracy. Thomas Pantham argued that "the Indian thinkers gave their interpretation of history, conceptions of man, visions of the good life, views on freedom, state, democracy, violence, human unity, ecological problems means - end relationship and political morality" (Pantham, 1986, p. 10). For instance, the Manifesto of Congress Working Committee drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru on the issue of India's support to Britain in World War II had raised significant questions. The Manifesto declared:

"If the war is to defend the status quo, imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then India can have nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue is democracy and a world order based on democracy, then India is intensely interested in it. The Committee are convinced that the interests of Indian democracy do not conflict with the interests of British democracy or of world democracy. But there is an inherent and ineradicable conflict between democracy for India or elsewhere and imperialism and Fascism. If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions, establish full democracy in India, and the Indian people must have the right of self-determination by framing their own constitution through a constituent Assembly without external interference, and must guide their own policy. A free democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defense against aggression and for economic cooperation. She will work for the establishment of a real world order based on freedom and democracy, utilising the world's knowledge and resources for the progress and advancement of humanity"(Pantham & Deutsch, 1986, p. 11).

From the very beginning, the Indian thinkers emphasized on world peace and democracy in a greater context. M.K. Gandhi has expressed that "Freedom today is indivisible and every attempt to retain imperialist domination in any part of the world will lead inevitably to fresh disaster" (Gandhi, 1942, pp. 220-221). Mahatma Gandhi (1942) has

complimented Jawaharlal Nehru for drafting the Manifesto of Indian National Congress in such a way as to compel India ‘to think not merely of her own freedom, but of the freedom of all the exploited nations of the world’. Mahatma Gandhi, in his writing (like his great contemporaries - Rabindranath Tagore, Aurobindo Ghosh and Jawaharlal Nehru), expressed his deep concern in the solutions of global political problems and civilization predicaments of the present time. As Norman D. Palmer has noted: ‘The concept of the essential unity of mankind and of the philosophical ties which bind East and West have never been more profoundly held or more eloquently voiced than by the seminal thinkers of modern India’. (Palmer, 1955, p. 761) Several modern Indian critiques of and alternatives to the West-centered paradigms of politics are highly based on metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, which differ sharply from those of the West. It can be argued that the mainstream classic Indian thought subscribed to a non-dialectical or non-dualistic epistemology and metaphysics, in contrast to the dualistic metaphysics and epistemology that have dominated the Western trend of thought (Mehta, 1983). V. R. Mehta has expressed that, ‘while Western thought works in terms of antagonisms, dichotomies and antinomies between spirit and matter, the individual and society, bread and culture, necessity and freedom, Indian thought has always considered such dichotomies as artificial and unreal’ (Pantham & Deutsch, 1986, p. 12). The Indian tradition has its uniqueness, which is directly opposite to the Western ones. Indian ideas and the presuppositions of peace have been influenced by the great Indian nationalistic discourse. In India nationalism created and sustained an independent identity by fusing the socio-economic properties of a separate community with its political and territorial habit. Scholar like Bidyut Chakraborty and Rajendra Kumar Pandey have argued in their book *‘Modern Indian Political Thought’* that - “The power of nationalism probably lies in the fact that belonging to a nation provides a powerful means of identifying and locating individual selves in the world through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture” (Chakrabarty & Pandey, 2009, p. xxiv). For the proponents of Indian nationalism, the concept of the “nation” was very much similar to god or mother goddess. The people of this land are free from clashes of power and division of artificial selfishness. Thus, the idea of modern India has been formulated by a greater world outlook which is missing in western ideas.

The Indian thinkers have tried to constitute their ideology of peace on the basis of Indian culture and Indian civilization. In this discussion, three Indian thinkers are significant: Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. These Indian thinkers have deeply

contributed to the ideas of war and peace. For these thinkers, peace is not merely a material requirement for the attainment of good life. Peace is an ideological requirement to create a peaceful social order. The Indian thinkers have evidently contributed both materialistically and ideologically in the field of peace.

Sri Aurobindo

Sri Aurobindo was one of the significant figures in the history of the Indian renaissance and Indian nationalism. Aurobindo's moral, intellectual and spiritual accomplishments have cast a deep influence over the mind of the Indian people - mostly the Indian intelligentsia. Since the publication of his '*The Life Divine*', the attention of some of the leading intellectuals of the world has been drawn to him. His seminal work on poetry, '*Savitri*' has created a new era in the sphere of spiritual poetry. V. P. Varma has termed him as 'the most systematic and learned of all modern Indian thinkers'. Rabindranath Tagore was very much impressed by the enlightened personality of Aurobindo, and stated that through him India would express the message to the world. Romain Rolland regarded Aurobindo as the highest synthesis of the genius of Asia and the genius of Europe. Aurobindo was a poet, metaphysician, seer, patriot, man of humanity, an apostle of peace and non-violence and a great political philosopher. In young age, Aurobindo was an extremist and a worshiper of violence. But, over time, he became a man of peace harmony and human coexistence. V. P. Varma has expressed that, 'his works attempt to represent the crystallization of the new and rising soul of India and have a spiritual message for humanity.' During his stay in England for fourteen years, Aurobindo was deeply influenced by the Greek and Latin classics. He read some of the great European readings from Homer to Goethe in the originals. As a professor at Baroda, he deeply studied Upanishads and the Gita, and came to argue that, 'these great books of ancient India did not contain intellectual dialectical metaphysics but represented the outpourings of profound and intense esoteric realizations' (Varma, 1996, p. 291). The *Vedantic* philosophy of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda influenced him particularly. As a political leader and being as a writer, he wanted to make a synthesis of the 'ancient *vedantic* and modern European political philosophy'. V. P. Varma has rightly argued that - "His '*Political Vedantism*' was not merely a restatement of the world affirming tendencies of the *upanishads* but also a concrete political philosophy for the reconstruction of the social and political life of a dependent nation" (Varma, 1996, p. 291). After taking retirement from active politics Sri Aurobindo wrote his chief works at Pondicherry. The works were - *The Life Divine*, *Essays*

on the *Gita*, *The Synthesis of Yoga*, *Savitri* and others. Sri Aurobindo was greatly influenced by *Vedantism*, Hence, the principle ideas of these books are very much indebted to the *Vedantic* ideas. However, the synthesis of Indian and European philosophy can also be traced back in Aurobindo's notion of peace and non-violence.

Sri Aurobindo was a great political thinker, philosopher and also a great revolutionary patriot. Romain Rolland regarded Sri Aurobindo as the highest synthesis of the genius of Europe and Asia. Rabindranath hailed him as a 'great exponent of the spiritual message of India' and Radhakrishnan declared him as the greatest intellectual person of his age. Hence, Sri Aurobindo was a great social and political thinker of his own time. He was a great exponent of the idea of human unity. Aurobindo considered man as a spiritual being in content. To Aurobindo, without spirituality, human society can never exist.

The Metaphysics of Sri Aurobindo and Supramental Spiritualism

V. P. Varma has argued that, "At the philosophical level Aurobindo claimed to have reconciled the divergent trends of Indian ascetic acosmic transcendental idealism and western secularistic materialism" (Varma, 1996, p. 292). The India civilization has been nurtured by the *Vedantic* sages and also by the teaching of the Buddha. The mystical philosophy or '*mayavada*' and '*nirvana*' has also developed in India. Materialism developed in Europe in the hands of Democritus and Epicurus, Hobbes, La Mettrie, Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius, Marx, Engles, Buchner, Vogt, Haeckel, Lenin and some others. Western materialism has directly or indirectly sponsored an evolutionary methodology and a negation of theistic orientation. V. P. Varma has argued that, "The type of scientific rationalism led to phenomenal increase in man's knowledge about natural and social evolution, popularized the growth of democracy and socialism, gave impetus to humanism and humanitarianism, extended social idealism, and in general, led to the triumph of man as a creative subject" (Varma, 1996, p. 292). However, Aurobindo thought that, both India and Europe in their own ways, have gone to an extreme direction. He hoped that Indian spiritualism and European secularism as well as materialism could be reconciled; he also felt that this one could be possible only by the creation of a philosophy which gives equal importance to the claims of both spirit as well as matter. According to Aurobindo, the supreme reality is a spiritual principle which is highly based on 'dynamic mutation and multiplicity'. Therefore, it is very true that diversity is as real as unity. Aurobindo, thus expressed to have created a 'metaphysical synthesis reconciling spirit and matter'. Now, Aurobindo wrote:

“We seek, indeed, a larger and completer affirmation. We perceive that in the Indian ascetic ideal the great *Vedantic* formula, ‘One without a second’, has not been read sufficiently in the light of the other formula equally imperative, ‘All this is the Brahman’. The passionate aspiration of man upward to the Divine has not been sufficiently related to the descending movement of the divine leaning downward to embrace eternally its manifestation. Its meaning in Matter has not been so well understood as its truth in the spirit. The Reality which the *Sannyasin* seeks has been grasped in its full height, but not, as by the ancient *Vedantins*, in its full extent and comprehensiveness. But in our complete affirmation we must not minimize the part of the pure spiritual impulse. As we have seen how greater materialism has served the ends of the Divine, so we must acknowledge the still greater service rendered by asceticism so life” (Ghosh, 1943, p. 30).

Although Aristotle, Leibniz and Hegel have also attempted a philosophical synthesis, but to Aurobindo their synthesis was merely intellectual. Aurobindo’s synthesis, however, can be regarded as real in terms of man’s spiritual consciousness. Aurobindo’s metaphysics was beyond the easy binary eastern and western ideas. Hence, the notion of an evolutionary progression through matter, life and mind has been traced by Aurobindo and S. Radhakrishnan to the *Taittiriya Upanishad*, (Radhakrishnan, 1920) although it has been systematically developed in the Western philosophy.

Aurobindo’s Philosophy of History and Culture

As a political philosopher, Aurobindo has tried to identify history and culture in the terms of ‘spirituality’. Aurobindo has actually emphasised on two historical movements - Indian (Bengali) nationalism and the French Revolution. Being a mystic, Aurobindo declared that ‘God was behind Indian nationalism and he or she is the real leader of the movement’. To Aurobindo, the French Revolution has occurred due to the will of God. The leaders of the French Revolution - Mirabeau, Danton, Robespierre and Napoleon - manifested in their action in the will of Kali (or, Zeit-Geist), she actually allowed them to work (Varma, 1996). Aurobindo’s idea of cyclical evolution of human cultures and civilization was highly influenced by Karl Lamprecht’s typology. The concept of the cyclical evolution can be traced back to the ancient *Vedanta* and *Puranas*. The political school of historical interpretation was championed by Leopold V. Ranke, and Lamprecht sponsored the movement of *Kulturgeschichte*. Rank stressed that ‘how it happened’, and Lamprecht spoke of - ‘how it became’ (Gooch, 1938). Lamprecht analysed five distinctive stages in the course of

Germany's political evolution. Aurobindo applied Lamprecht's typology to India. Aurobindo, (1956) in his book *The Human Cycle*, calls the Vedic age the symbolic era of Indian history. V. P. Varma has argued that, "Due to the impact of western civilization, the age of individualism, with its formulas of reason and freedom, also began to rise in the East, but Aurobindo thought that this rational age would not last long in the eastern world because the traditional subjectivism of the Orient would reassert itself" (Varma, 1996, pp. 294-295). Aurobindo thought that the subjective age would be replaced by the spiritual age when the full powers of the human spirit, which is an eternal part of the divine, must guide the evolution of man. Thus, when Lamprecht's philosophy of culture was primarily psychological, Aurobindo's philosophy of culture was both psychological and spiritual. It is noteworthy to say that Kant and Fichte have differentiated culture from civilization, and they have championed the notion of 'ethical freedom' (Eucken, 1913). Aurobindo adopted from the Western thought the philosophical and conceptual distinction between culture and civilization, but he reinterpreted it and emphasised on the framework of the *Upanishadic* philosophy. Hence, Aurobindo tried to go beyond the cultural and 'favoured the enshrinement of a supra-rational beauty and a supra-rational good.' Aurobindo had a conviction that *Vedantic* metaphysics will answer all the unsolved questions, and thus a strong and peaceful society can be established on the basis of this philosophy.

Theory of Nationalism and Human Unity

Sri Aurobindo, before his return to India, had become in 1892 a member of 'Lotus and Dagger'. After his returned to India, Aurobindo was actively involved in the social and political problems of the country. In a series of articles published in the *Indu Prakash* in 1893 Aurobindo wrote a piece entitled '*New Lamps for Old*'. In his writings Aurobindo expressed his ideas regarding the contemporary situation of India. V. P. Varma has argued that - "Aurobindo felt that the renaissance and national greatness of India could be only brought out if the popular energy was roused and to support his view he referred to the examples of Cleisthenes in Athens and Tiberius Gracchus in Rome which illustrate the potent power of people once they are made conscious of their 'ancient wrongs'. He stated that the leadership of the congress was blind of the organic laws of social and political evolution" (Varma, 1996, p. 296). Aurobindo tried to free India with extremist divine spirituality but Aurobindo accepted the philosophy of social evolution according to the law of '*swadharma*' of the individual and the community.

Aurobindo had never sanctioned the suppression of any section of Indian society. In an article in the *Bande Mataram* Aurobindo wrote:

“Nationalism is simply the passionate aspiration for the realization of the Divine Unity in the nation, a unity in which all the component individuals, however various and apparently unequal their functions as political, social or economic factors, are yet really and fundamentally one and equal. In the ideal of Nationalism which India will set before the world, there will be an essential equality between man and man, between caste and caste, between class and class, all beings as Mr. Tilak has pointed out different but equal and united parts of the Virat Purush as realized in the nation.... We are intolerant of autocracy because it is the denial in politics of this essential equality, we object to the modern distortion of the caste system it is the denial in society of the same essential equality” (Ghosh, 1907).

The synthesis of eastern and western ideas also appears in the writings of Aurobindo as a nationalist leader. His idea of passive resistance was very much familiar in European political history. The Irish Sinn Fein movement had influenced him very much. He had a conviction that, in Bengal and Ireland, nationalism, which had been extensively a political and economic phenomenon in Europe, had assumed a subjective character. For Aurobindo, science and technology have become the basis of social and political development in the West. Aurobindo emphasized on the humanity as a whole. He never bifurcated humanity from the society. In his words:

“The object of all society should be therefore, and must become, as man grows conscious of his real being, nature and destiny and not as now only a part of it, first to provide the conditions of life and growth by which individual men - not isolated men or a class or a privileged race, but all individual men according to their capacity and the race through the growth of its individuals may travel towards this divine perfection. It must be [Possible] secondly, as mankind generally more and more grows near to some figure of the Divine in life and more and more men arrive at it for the cycles are many and each cycle has its own figure of the Divine in man to express in the general of mankind, the light, the power, the beauty, the harmony, the joy of the self that has been attained and that pours itself out in a freer and nobler humanity” (Aurobindo, 1962, pp. 83-84).

In twentieth century society, people are not aware of their goals and their destinations. Aurobindo has primarily pointed out this problem. He tried to demonstrate that how previous

societies have failed to provide the suitable conditions that will enable man to freely and fully realize his 'deeper and more spiritual potentialities'. An ideal society must provide a free space to every individual for his moral and spiritual upliftments. In Aurobindo's ideal society, there will be no need for coercive legal instruments. The ideal society will transcend the dichotomies of the good and evil. The basic principle of Aurobindo's political ethics is to provide the best condition for the spiritual transformations of each individual. According to Aurobindo, spiritualisation of race is important for the proposed 'ideal of human unity'. Aurobindo has criticized the dominant social structure in the modern world, and classified the dominant types of societies into - symbolic society, typical society, conventional society and nationalistic individualistic society. Among these societies, rational individualistic society has made a great contribution in the field of equal rights of each individual. Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L Deutsch has argued that - "Aurobindo's characterization of the barbarian mentality of modern western liberal - individualistic society clearly presages contemporary western critics of 'possessive individualism' that is so deeply rooted in the West" (Macpherson, 1962). Aurobindo tried to stress upon the dignity of human community as a whole, and he was aware of the fact that, 'individualistic politics' can only generate selfishness in the society. To Aurobindo the perennial tension between the individual and the community in politics can be resolved by the following two principles: 'treat others as self' and 'help any other person in need.' Very significantly now, Kenneth L Deutsch has argued that - "Only with the realization of these two moral imperatives as the basis for the ideal of human unity will individual existence within the community be held sacred. The ideal human society will adopt, from symbolic society, the need to look beyond the immediately given to a deeper reality and to communicate this reality via symbols" (Pantham & Deutsch, 1986, p. 204). Aurobindo was a profound architect of modern humanism and modern human peace and dreamt of 'world union' and a free and peaceful human community.

Aurobindo wrote:

"...in the conditions of the world at present, even taking into consideration its most disparaging features and dangerous possibilities, there is nothing that need alter the view we have taken of the necessity and the inevitability of some kind of world union; the drive of nature and the compulsion of circumstances and the present and future need to mankind make it inevitable. The general conclusions we have arrived at will stand and the consideration of the modalities and the possible forms or lines of alternative or successive development it may

take. The ultimate result must be the formation of a World-State and the most desirable form of it would be a federation of free nationalities in which all subjection or forced inequalities and subordination of one to another would have disappeared and, though some might preserve a greater natural influence, all would have an equal status. A confederacy would give the greatest freedom to the nations constituting the World-State, but this might give too much room for fissiparous or centrifugal tendencies to operate; a federal order would then be the most desirable. All else would be determined by the course of events and by general agreement or the shape given by the ideas and necessities that may grow up in the future. A world-union of this kind would have the greatest chances of long survival or permanent existence” (Aurobindo, 1950, pp. 399-400).

Aurobindo Ghosh: Peace, Internationalism and Human Unity

To Aurobindo, the idea of human unity is very much significant to establish a peaceful world order. Internationalism and human unity is closely associated with each other. Internationalism denotes to the gathering of many states, and human unity denotes to the assimilation of many people. Here to Aurobindo a nation arises because of the circumstances; the nation actually represents the will of the particular society. Hence, the creation of the nation deeply depends on the circumstances of a particular social order. Furthermore, human unity is the precondition of international peace and internationalism. To Aurobindo, at the level of world-state, there are many advantages, like peace, economic well-being, security, social activity and progress. The social and political ideas of Aurobindo flourished through his two works- ‘*The Human Cycle*’ (1918) and ‘*The ideal of Human Unity*’ (1919). Aurobindo has essentially highlighted the greatness of Indian civilization in his work- ‘*The Ideal of Karmayogin.*’ To him, human unity is necessary because every human being has a basic impulse of creating harmony and destroying disharmony. He has never neglected the value of reason and rationality. Aurobindo has a great trust on reason; he believes that reason will unite the people. Because every human being wants to transform themselves from the character of ‘inertia’ to ‘purity’ (Mukhopadhyay, 2013). Hence, to Aurobindo, nature has its own rules and system through which human unity can be established. Natural rules of unity and solidarity of the individuals always encourage the other individuals to constitute a normal social order and a stable society.

In 1909, after getting freedom from prison, Aurobindo again emphasized the very notion of ‘human unity.’ Aurobindo has searched for the idea of humanity within the roots of

society and human nature. Without human society, human unity will no longer be possible to be established. Thus, human unity and peace are the two sides of the same coin.

Aurobindo's idea of peace is connected with the great idea of internationalism. The idea of humanity as a single race actually begins with a common life and a common general interest. The European political thought and ideas have also emphasized the commonness among the people. Internationalism is the attempt to go beyond the national idea, to go beyond the self-interest of the people and to connect with larger world order. Aurobindo has also developed this idea of internationalism and tried to constitute a new internationalism on the basis of Indian culture and civilization. The idea of internationalism was born of the 'thought of the eighteenth century' and this idea developed through the ideals of French Revolution. Aurobindo has also been influenced by great ideals of humanity and commonness. The European political thinkers have treated the excessive nationalistic ideas as dangerous and they turned towards internationalism. To Aurobindo, Indian civilization was significantly different; it was characterized by traditional values and unity among the people. Hence, to Aurobindo, humanity and unity will be established through 'sentiments, feelings, natural sympathies and mental habits of men' (Vyas, 1987).

M.K. Gandhi and his Idea of Peace

M. K. Gandhi was born on 2nd October, 1869 in *Porbandar*. Gandhi was essentially a religious man. But the religion of Gandhi was not the religion of a common man. Gandhi's faith was "religion not in the sense of subscription to dogmas or conformity to ritual, but religion in the sense of an abiding faith in the absolute values of truth, love and justice and a persistent endeavour to realize them on earth" (Vyas, 1987, p. 61). Gandhi was intensely religious, that's why he incorporated religion in politics (Vyas, 1987). But the Gandhian idea of religion was far different from religious divisions in a stable society. Gandhi was a person who believed in plurality of religion. Gandhi's view of history was unique in character and was universal in nature. Gandhi's interpretation of history can be described as the 'humanistic interpretation of history'. To Gandhi, man has made progress from uncivilized life to civilized life. Gandhi did not accept history in mechanistic sense. To him, violence was the evil of human society. The primary mission of human society, according to Gandhi, is to prohibit violence and war. Thus, Gandhi has tried to constitute a new social order where every individual should be free from disharmony and violence.

Mahatma Gandhi was not only the father of Indian nation, but also he was a prophet of 'Peace'. Gandhi was very much inspired by Socrates and Buddha. He was not only a worshiper of truth but he was also a man of peace, sympathy and human morality. Many scholars have described him as a 'philosophical anarchist'. Gandhi's *'Autobiography'* is as significant as Tolstoy's *'Confessions'* and Rousseau's *'Confessions'*. Gandhi actively emphasized his role as a citizen of the world. Nonetheless, India as well as South Africa were the laboratories where Gandhi made experiments with his formulas of truth and non-violence. In the age of mass destruction, Gandhi's thoughts and messages played an important role to establish the rule of peace and truth on earth. As V. P. Varma has argued, "It is essential to stress the significance of Gandhi's message which makes an appeal to the values of the human being in an age when the humanistic structure has been rudely and savagely attacked by the extraneous might of weapons of mass destruction. The Malthusian-Darwinian - Nietzschean emphasis on the biological victory of the strong over the weak has set the political pattern of the modern world and, hence, the modern intellectual initially finds it difficult to accept the message of Gandhi which is the quintessence of the Vedantic - Buddhistic, Stoic-Christian conception of the final victory of truth (as contrasted with the survival of the fittest). In an age full of sickening horror and secrecy and espionage carried to perfection, the gospel of truth and creative non-violence as advocated by Gandhi sounds anarchistic but at the same time it is a terribly tragic commentary on the transfer of the loyalty of the modern man from Buddha, Mahavira and Christ to Lamarck, Darwin and Haeckel" (Varma, 1996, p. 335). From 1893 to 1914 Gandhi rendered great service to the cause of racial equality in South Africa. The same techniques have been used by Mahatma Gandhi in Indian national movements. From 1915 to 1948, Mahatma Gandhi worked in India for the sake of the country's freedom. Many scholars have compared Gandhi with the Mazzini and Sun Yat-Sen. Gandhi's devotion to truth and non-violence was very much pragmatic in nature. In the following section, we will focus on the Gandhian notion of peace and human morality in relation to world peace.

Metaphysical Idealism: Impersonal Truth

Many scholars have argued that the fundamental basis of Gandhism is the conception of God or a universal omnipresent spiritual reality. Gandhi has termed it as 'an all-embracing Living Light', which could be called *Sachchidananda* or *Rama* or simply truth. Gandhi actually inherited the strong faith in the real existence of a deeper spiritual object from his family

background, especially from his spiritual mother. V. P. Varma has argued that, “The writings of Tolstoy, the studies of Buddha’s life and the Gita, and his contacts with Raychand Bhai, deepened and strengthened his moral convictions” (Varma, 1996, p. 336). Mahatma Gandhi was a metaphysical idealist but he did not belong to the *Samkarite* School. Although, he did not adhere to the concept of a unified absolute, he believed in a God who is sympathetic and responsive to the prayers of the devotee. Gandhi wrote : “I cannot recall a single instance when, at the eleventh hour, He (God) has forsaken me” (Varma, 1996, p. 336). His views on god were similar to those of the theistic interpretations of the Vedanta. To Gandhi, the spiritual truth was to be realized not by any dialectical skill or conceptual cognition but by devoted spiritual experience. It can also be experienced through pure and disciplined holy life and by the norms of ‘Ahimsa’ in one’s action and motivation. Gandhi argued, “Reason is a poor thing in the midst of temptations..... Faith that transcends reason is our only Rock of Ages” (Varma, 1996, p. 336). Hence, here we find a synthesis of *Vedantic* spiritual metaphysics and *Jain - Buddhistic - Vaishnava* ethics of non-violence. One sees a certain kind of radical individualism in Gandhian thought because maximum stress has been laid on the sanctity of personal experience of truth. It is noteworthy that the greatest religious teachers of humanity have always testified to the self-experience of some eternal values and the real existence. Gandhi did not ignore any rational arguments and practical observations. Gandhi had faith in fundamental truth, which was not born out of ‘arguments and external observations’, but out of ‘spiritual apprehension and intuition’ (Varma, 1996). Gandhi has said that he could live without food but not without prayer. To Gandhi prayer is compulsory for the *Satyagrahi*. Gandhi has expressed that - “The only weapon of the Satyagrahi is God” (Varma, 1996, p. 337). Hence, Gandhi’s idea of God is associated with the quest for absolute truth and non-violence.

Ethical Absolutism: Imperatives of Ahimsa

Mahatma Gandhi actually accepted metaphysical idealism and he also believed in supremacy of ethical values and *Sarvodaya* (the good to all individual). The philosophy of *Sarvodaya* is primarily based on the concept of the unity of existence. It manifests a perpetual fight against cruelty of human beings and animals. According to Gandhi, socialism, even the communism, is implicit in the idea of the *Sarvodaya*. The idealistic philosophy of Gandhi necessarily inculcates the values and principles of eternal truth and justice. It highlights and teaches ‘universal love’ as the only law of life. Actually, Gandhi (1937) has expressed all of these

notions in *Harijan* patrika. On Sarvodaya V. P. Varma has expressed “It refuses to be satisfied with the progress and well-being of a class or a nation but advocates the emancipation and realization of the good of all living beings” (Varma, 1996, p. 337). The Gandhian idea of ethical absolutism can be identified to the Vedic concept of the *Rita* - the doctrine which presupposes that there are ‘all-encompassing, cosmic and moral ordinances which actually govern both men and gods’. Mahatma Gandhi (1948) interpreted history in the sense of progressive vindication of the superiority of Ahimsa. Gandhi wrote that, “It is my firm faith that man is by nature going higher” (Varma, 1996, p. 337). Ahimsa is the most powerful weapon in the domain of human emancipations. It is a part of ‘supreme moral and spiritual strength’. V. P. Varma describes that, “Ahimsa means infinite love and this in its turn means infinite capacity for suffering” (Varma, 1996, p. 338). To Gandhi truth and non-violence is absolutely interlinked to each other. Gandhi wrote, “Non-violence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed” (Varma, 1996, p. 338). It is the unconditional duty of a *Satyagrahi* to make endless endeavors to realize the absolute truth through non-violence. Gandhi tried to aware us that the ideal of non-violence should not be considered as one’s weakness. Non-violence is the strongest force of human morality. To Gandhi real non-violence is a mighty force and can be used against any kind of powerful government.

The philosophical Foundations of Gandhi’s Thought - Two central features of Gandhian thought are non-violence and truth. Among these two terms, ‘non-violence’ is a relatively straightforward concept; on the other hand, ‘truth’ represents social issues in a larger context. For Gandhi, violence denotes to the human exploitation, which actually fragments the individual’s integrity. As moral beings we wish to preserve our integrity and we expect it to be respected by others. Such a moral posture suggests that individuals must be treated as ends in themselves. Gandhi saw that violence actually treats other people as means not as ends. Ronald J. Terchek has very significantly argued that, “Our opponents were seen as impediments to the good, the just, the virtuous and, therefore, could be approached violently to force them to change their own ways and accept our standards. Such a position meant that we thought we had somehow discovered the absolute truth, a position Gandhi was unwilling to accept, and that our claims of having discovered justice or equality were superior to the actual freedom and dignity of others. Such a stance was antithetical to Gandhi, who held that only in respecting the individual moral worth of ourselves and others could we achieve justice” (Pantham & Deutsch, 1986, p. 310). In this respect, Gandhi has argued that ‘means

are after all everything. As the means, so the end. There is no wall of separation between 'means and end' (Gandhi, 1924). It is very common fact that violence treats others instrumentally and degrades them very much; it also transforms the users of violence less human. The person carrying violence is at war with the world and the person believes that the world is 'at war with him and he has to live in perpetual fear of the world' (Gandhi, 1921). Ronald J. Terchek has argued, "But such violence leads to helplessness, isolation, and incompleteness and builds barriers to a full social life" (Terchek, 1975, p. 226). For Ronald J. Terchek, all violence is not personal, sometimes one individual inflicting physical coercion on others.

Major social problems like poverty, unemployment, and discrimination are recurring themes in Mahatma Gandhi's writings, which are presented as destructive to the free choice of every individual. The range of violence becomes more acute by the institutional means, which actually negate the autonomy of others. To Gandhi, we needed new institutional arrangements which promote non-violence and freedom in society. In regard to philosophical foundation of Gandhi's thought, truth is the ultimate value. To Gandhi, truth must be absolute, but knowledge is relative (Iyer, 1973). Gandhi further held that the absolutism destroyed the truth we tried to reach (Bose, 1948). Gandhi sought freedom from the negative impact of power. There is a distance between absolute truth and the negative force of power. To Gandhi, in an ideal state there cannot be any space for egoism. Gandhi held that our humanity comes from trying to improve ourselves morally and practically and from respecting the worth of other individuals, even though we cannot be completely successful in this work. To Gandhi, we should be sure of our ideal but know that we "shall ever fail to realize it, but never cease to strive for it" (Gandhi, 1934, p. 363). Furthermore, Gandhi stated "that constant striving, that ceaseless quest after the ideal," (Iyer, 1973, p. 100) represents the best reality of the human condition. Gandhi has emphasized on the usefulness of 'dialogue', because dialogue opens the possibility that others might be converted to our own personal position rather than coerced. In this regard, Gandhi expressed: "We must try patiently to convert our opponents. If we wish to evolve the spirit of democracy out of slavery, we must be scrupulously exact in our dealings with opponents.... We must concede to our opponents the freedom we claim for ourselves" (Duncan, 1951, p. 79). Gandhi's position about the relativity of knowledge gives rise to the essentiality for tolerance; it is a civic virtue which all schools of democracy have accepted. Tolerance implies a mutual understanding for the other; and if it is missing, the dialogue of the democratic process will be diminished. Gandhi, like

John Dewey, saw dialogue as a necessary instrument for both individual growth and democratic prosperity. Hence, dialogue and peace are the pre-conditions of peace and social mutual harmony which Gandhi has highly appreciated.

Freedom and Responsibility

One of the significant elements of Gandhian political philosophy is 'freedom'. Gandhi insisted that, "No society can possibly be built on the denial of individual freedom. It is contrary to the very nature of man. Just as man will not grow horns or a tail, so will he not exist as a man if he has no mind of his own" (Gandhi, 1924). To Gandhi, free choice meant that men and women should not be ruined by physical coercion, economic power, rules of the government or social position as a whole. While, the maximization of choice is based on freedom, Gandhi had a conviction that any kind of duties and responsibilities are equally significant as freedom. In that case everyone is responsible for the choice he made. The Gandhian idea of freedom departs from the major approaches in the Anglo-American liberal mainstream tradition. This tradition generally insists that individuals are the authors and architect of their own will or desires and it is a natural fact that they pursue their interests. Here freedom is defined as the absence of various restraints. Further, in the liberal tradition, the state is given authority to use coercion to enforce rights. For the Gandhian perspective, however, there are many flaws in this liberal approach to freedom. Moreover, it is very difficult to find liberalism supplying a clear understanding of which have greater priorities over others (Unger, 1965). There is a huge difference between the Gandhian thought and classical liberalism. Gandhi highlighted that individual freedom is assaulted by many force, not just by the state. Gandhi believed that, the freedom is socially located and the obstacles to freedom come from various sources. Gandhi tried to minimize the higher obstacles to freedom. He thought peace was incomplete without freedom. As far as the human needs are concerned, the liberal justification of freedom has ignored the human needs at the expense of rights. For Gandhi, every human being requires meeting certain basis needs, mainly the need for work. Gandhi had a conviction that people would gain some measure of autonomy in labour, breaking their self-dependency on the other fellow men for their very existence. To Gandhi, any kind of work gives people control over their lives and eliminates their dependency on others for basic needs. The liberal formulation of freedom is highly defective from Gandhian perspectives because it is self-maximizing and refuses to address the social basis of human life. Responsibility is also a significant topic in the Gandhi's discussion about

'obligation and disobedience' (Pantham & Deutsch, 1986, p. 315). Gandhi has expressed that people needed to be aware of the consequences of their own work. Thus, the notions of freedom and responsibility are interlinked with each other.

Gandhian ideals were based upon the principles of peace and stability. So, according to him, what is achieved through the means of violence will never act as a path towards real human progress. To Gandhi, "History teaches one that those who have, no doubt with honest motives, ousted the greedy by using brute force against them, have, in their turn, become a prey to the disease of the conquered." Hence, Gandhi completely raised his voice against the brute force, power and especially the means of state power and ruling. Thus, Gandhi actually advised that, "I do not want to take power into my hands. By abjuring power and by devoting ourselves to pure and selfless service of the voters, we can guide and influence them. It would give us far more real power than we shall have by going into the Government."

To Gandhi peace and humanism were the preconditions of a developed and free society. Gandhi has always searched for truthfulness and morality within human nature. To Gandhi, India must strive for peace, not violence. India must be a free country not by the means of war or violence. To him, if India gains her freedom by war, the state will become worse, much like the nation states of Europe. Although the 'science of war' has much developed, a nation like India must strive for 'freedom through peace'. Therefore, Gandhi's idea of peace prioritized responsibility and freedom.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was another exponent of Indian school of peace. He was an 'impressive exponent of Indian Philosophy.' He was a democrat who took democracy to be the most valuable thing in the modern world. According to him, "Essentially, a democrat is one who has that trait of humanity, the power to put himself in the second place, to believe that he may possibly be mistaken and his opponent probably right" (Vyas, 1987, p. 92). He refuses to see the ideals of nationalism as a 'natural instinct.' Rather he calls it 'an acquired artificial emotion' and also adds that "man as he is, need not be regarded as the crowning glory of evolution" (Vyas, 1987, p. 92). He argued that the next stage of evolution will not be man's psychological evolution and the evolution of mind itself. In new age people will be more interactive and awareness will be generated more among the people.

From the academic point of view, Radhakrishnan was not a social and political theorist. He was an eminent philosopher who has expressed his views primarily on social and political matters. His socio-political and socio-philosophical opinions and ideas are contained in his-*Religion and Society, Education, Politics and War, Kalki or The Future of Civilization, India and China, Is this Peace?* and *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*. Radhakrishnan was committed to the tradition of absolute spiritual idealism. V. P. Varma has argued that, “He draws sustenance from the Upanishads, Ramanuja (1055-1137), Tagore, Gandhi, Plato, Plotinus, Bergson and Bradley” (Varma, 1996, p. 401). Radhakrishnan was also deeply influenced by *Samkrara*.

Hinduism and Religious Idealism

The Hindu View of Life - S. Radhakrishnan began his intellectual career with the strong determination to expound and identify the justification of ethical life according to the perspectives of Hinduism. He has expressed that Hinduism is full with contradictions at the metaphysical plane and he has also shown that the metaphysical and mystical ideas of Hinduism are not necessarily involved in the negation of human life. V. P. Varma has argued, “Hinduism has preached an exalted philosophy of life and it is ridiculous to level the charge of ‘anaemic’ against a system of thought that can produce mighty leaders of action like Buddha, Samkara and Ramanuja and creative geniuses like Gandhi in our times” (Varma, 1996, pp. 401-402). According to Radhakrishnan, (1928) the Hinduism has emphasized upon both on ‘*sreya*’ and ‘*preya*’ - the transcendent beyond the limit and the mundane here and now. The final goal of Hinduism is not the consecration of the demands of the mundane world but that the ‘spiritual kingdom of spirit’ has to be established on the earth. Hinduism has never approved the annihilation of the alien and the incongruous parts of the Indian society. In this sense, Hinduism has become a religion of peace and human acceptance. Radhakrishnan believed in the Hindu view of life, which is actually oriented to the absolute realization of ‘free super - individuality’ (Joad, 1933). Radhakrishnan has tried to see Hinduism as a historical religion and to him Hinduism cannot be regarded as final and absolute, it is supposed to be a growing tradition. Radhakrishnan says:

“Hinduism is a movement, not a position; a process, not a result; a growing tradition, not a fixed revelation. Its past history encourages us to believe that it will be found equal to any emergency that the future may throw up, whether on the field to thought or of history” (Radhakrishnan, 1928, pp. 129-130).

The Absolute and God - Radhakrishnan accepted the reality of a super personal, unconditional, self-sufficient spiritual eternally perfect being. He has also accepted the conceptual distinction between 'God' and the 'Absolute'. The significant distinction between the impersonal absolute or the '*nirguna*' and the '*saguna*' God or *Ishvara* had been accepted in the ancient Vedanta and Upanishads also. As V. P. Varma has expressed, "But to me, to introduce the commonplace distinctions of 'higher' and 'lower' to the spiritual realms shows the pathetic attempt of the human mind to incorporate the notions of a feudal and despotic society to the being and essence of the higher"(Varma,1996, p. 402). Radhakrishnan accepted that God can be defined as absolute in the context of the values of the world. He strongly believes in the reality and authenticity of the spiritual experience. Radhakrishnan (1929) found evidence of the genuineness of spiritual experiences in the lives of *Uddalaka*, *Buddha*, *Samkara*, Socrates, Plato, Mohammed, St. Paul, Plotinus, Porphyry, Augustine, Dante, Eckhart, Spinoza, Blake, Ruysbroeck and other prophets and sages of humanity.

The World Process - Radhakrishnan has identified the world-process as meaning with luminous spiritual actualities, since it is the authentic realization of one of the infinite number of possibilities which actually constitute the 'perennial creativity of the supreme Absolute'. To Radhakrishnan, the world is the free determination of God. There is a real trend towards the ever-increasing perfection in the process of the universe. Hence, the universe cannot be ignored as an illusory hallucination. Furthermore, there is a hidden reality of God behind and within the contents of world-process. As V. P. Varma has argued that - "The world-process is the ceaseless realization of an immanent spiritual teleology, and materialism and naturalism fail to reveal its deep inner character. Even modern exponents of a philosophy of physics like Eddington and Jeans and even Einstein no longer believe in the older concept of hard, dense, rigidities. The concept of creativity, eternal objects and organism formulated by Whitehead and the theory of emergent evolution of Alexander, and Lloyd Morgan point out the gaps in a materialistic cosmology. Thompson, Oliver Lodge and Smuts also reveal the lacuna of mechanical physics" (Varma, 1996, p. 403). Although Radhakrishnan was a spiritual idealist, but Radhakrishnan would not abolish the significant reality of the world. He regards the entire world as the habitation of God. Hence, all diverse manifestations and beings are the revelations and expressions of the fundamental spirit. Thus, according to the Radhakrishnan, the entire cosmos is related to transcendental frame of reference, and we, as human beings, are a part of that frame.

Radhakrishnan was a great Philosopher and Educationist. He had a belief that for truth and a peaceful world order people will actively unite and must be able to achieve peace in a new world. Here, new world denotes to the more stable and democratic world order. To him, people must understand the fact that plurality is not a problematic factor, but they have to be free from conflict and violence. His conviction was that it is on the basis of peace that society will be more prosperous and stable.

Radhakrishnan was a follower of democracy, because democracy enriches the new life. For him (Radhakrishnan) parliamentary democracy is the best instrument that brought the best out of the ordinary people in terms of their public virtues. In Radhakrishnan's thought, the idea of 'public mind' features again and again. Democracy is derived from two Greek words, which mean people and power. But in the literal sense, it means the 'rule of the people.' The idea of the rule of the people is the central part of ancient meaning of democracy. Democracy is also based on the idea of the rule of every individual, so the aim of democratic society is to protect people's own rule and the disciplined social order.

Radhakrishnan has emphasized the rule of the people. When people naturally come together for a common purpose and constitute a 'government', the system may be termed as people's democracy. Radhakrishnan was one of India's most significant thinkers on peace and democracy. To him, when a democratic system becomes peaceful, it achieves perfection.

Philosophy of Civilization and Mankind

Like Rabindranath Tagore, Radhakrishnan believed in the importance of moral values for sustenance and existence of the civilization. Radhakrishnan has emphasized both on the values of modern civilization and spiritual humanistic ethics in a greater extent. Radhakrishnan writes:

“The world has seen a number of civilizations on which the dust of ages has settled. We assumed that whatever may be the changes and developments, the solid structure of western civilization was itself enduring and permanent, but we now see how appallingly insecure it is.... It is not safe to be immoral. Evil systems inevitably destroy themselves by their own greed and egoism. Against the rock of moral law, earth's conquerors and exploiters hurl themselves eventually to their own destruction. While yet there is time, there is not much

left, we must take steps to prevent the helpless rush of man to his doom” (Radhakrishnan, 1944, p. 35).

Radhakrishnan dreamt of a future civilization of man with a very unique universal orientation - *sarvatmabhava*. The modern world is based upon its technological and economic apparatuses. Racial chauvinism, the aggressive cult of dictatorship, and the barbaric worship of weapons and capital accumulation are its dark consequences, resulting from allegiance to narrow loyalties. He wanted this ethnocentric patriotic approach to civilization to be replaced by a humanistic approach. Universalism can be the basis of the future ideal civilization. It is very true that universalism requires something more than ‘intellectual dialectics’. Hence, the future civilization cannot, therefore, be founded upon abstract intellectual eclecticism and the rationalization of the forces of production. It requires a more comprehensive view, and more conscious analysis of one’s own civilization’s shortcomings and a greater appreciation of the values and merits of other civilizations. Giving excessive importance and values to our own civilization may produce aggressive fascism. What is essential for a universal civilization is a greater realization of the fundamental and unique spiritual and moral values of the East and the West. Radhakrishnan expressed that humanity was in problem and history is passing through a deep crisis. To him the solution to the acute problems posed by the entire civilization demanded the emergence of valuable moral and spiritual consciousness of “the world’s unborn soul” (Radhakrishnan, 1990, pp. 1-34).

Radhakrishnan (1948) expressed that the *Bhagavadgita* also lays stress on human brotherhood and interprets the concept of *lokasamgraha* as world *solidarity*. Similarly, the modern states as expressed by Radhakrishnan will be free from ‘self-glorifying’ nationalism and intolerant religious idealisms. Thus a free, peaceful and perfect civilization can be built up. Radhakrishnan sought rehabilitation of the soul through religion. As V. P. Varma has argued, “Radhakrishnan urges the cultivation of the inner spirit of repose and devoutness in place of the dogmatic sophistries of speculative dialectics of the ‘men of the book’. He would press for the application of the religious spirit of tolerance, love and genuine charity in all walks of life. Religion does not mean, as it has been supposed to be in several sectors of Indian society, the perpetuation of obsolete social conventions and irrational social tyrannies to him, religion is something intensely deep and personal” (Varma, 1996, p. 406). Radhakrishnan argued:

“Religion is not merely eccentrically, not an historical accident, not a psychological device, not an escape mechanism, not an economic lubricant induced by an indifferent world. It is an integral element of human nature, an intimation of destiny, a perception of the value of the individual, an awareness of the importance of human choice for the future of the world. It is a cleansing of man’s soul, a sense for the mystery of the universe, a feeling of tenderness and compassion for one’s fellowmen and the humbler creatures of life. To have religious men as the components of a society makes all the difference in the life of that society” (Radhakrishnan, 1944, p. 31).

Radhakrishnan was an exponent of religious humanism. Humanism in the West appeared as a deep reaction against the ‘scientific naturalism’ and ‘theological ecclesiasticism’. It pleaded for the solidarity of man. Radhakrishnan emphasized on two basic inadequacies of the Western schools of humanism. First, life has been subordinated by morality, mainly the human life. The second inadequacy of Western humanism is that it has neglected the spiritual dimension altogether. Radhakrishnan did not accept humanism in any narrow sense. V. P. Varma has argued that, “Radhakrishnan, on the contrary, believes in relating values to spiritual foundations. Thus against the humanism of Babbit and More, Radhakrishnan pleads for the restoration of the spiritual outlook. For him, the mystic religions of the East have stressed the quietist virtues which provide for social stability. He, therefore, urges the synthesis of the European humanist thought with Asian religious world-view. To him the rootless modern man requires a harmony of religion, science and humanism. That alone can give him solace as well as a more perfect social structure” (Varma, 1996, p. 407). However, Radhakrishnan was deeply influenced by the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence and *satyagraha*. He has accepted the religious basis of politics and condemned the ‘demonic doctrine of force, imperialism and aggression’. A genuine and peaceful social structure can be built only on the foundation of truth, justice and freedom. As a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, Radhakrishnan also believed in the actual application of love for the solution of any group and national tensions. V. P. Varma has argued that, “In the true Gandhian spirit, Radhakrishnan pledges his faith in the inevitable victory of the spirit of Atman over the formidable constellations of force, tyranny and aggression” (Varma, 1996, p. 408). Radhakrishnan believed in the values of democracy and has a conviction that they should be realized fully in the world. He said:

“Democracy rightly understood is the self-government of the community. To be least governed is to be best governed..... All government is a means to self-government. Democracy is said to set the general will as sovereign but the general will cannot decide technical issues as tariff reform or the Indian constitution. Democracy has succeeded in several countries simply because it is not true democracy. It is yet an ideal. When we accept it as a working principle, we mean that there are inalienable rights belonging to human personality as such, which must be respected in our dealings with all persons, whatever their sex or calling may be. Individuality is sacred and each individual should be allowed to develop his nature..... Democracy does not mean that we are all equal. Men are born unequal in physique and intellect. Men for all time will be unequal... It is also true that no social organization can give absolute equality of opportunity. For, realization of opportunity depends on the social situation in which all individual finds himself and his reactions to it. Yet, equality of opportunity is a sound social ideal.....Democracy is not a natural state but an ideal to be achieved through effort and education..... With the improvement of the intelligence of the voters and the honesty of the leaders, democracy may become more successful” (Radhakrishnan, 1949, pp. 57-59).

Moreover, as far as the philosophy of spiritual humanism is concerned, it must lead to the acceptance of the ideals of a world community. S. Radhakrishnan argued in his *‘Eastern Religions and Western Thought’* that the world to be born in the future must be a cosmopolitan in nature. The rationality of sword has to be replaced by reason, justice, mankind and collective security for all. Towards this end, the achievement of racial harmony and the development of a world culture and world consciousness were very essential. International law has to be the guiding principle for the modern nations. Radhakrishnan was an internationalist philosopher. He was also a supporter of the United Nations involved in the building of peace. In his notable work, *‘In This Peace?’* he advocated some kind of world government. Radhakrishnan (1950) wanted that a federal government should be set up which will be in charge of security matters and defense issues. But the success of political internationalism also required the growth of religious values. Radhakrishnan had a conviction that a spirit of religious idealism can only provide the foundations for social harmony and co-operation. He wrote:

“Religious idealism seems to be the most hopeful political instrument for peace which the world has ever seen. We cannot reconcile men’s conflicting interests and hopes so long as

we take our stand on duties and rights. Treaties and diplomatic understandings may restrain passion but they do not remove fear. The world must be imbued with a love of humanity. We want religious heroes who will not wait for the transformation of the whole world but assert with their lives, if necessary, the truth of the conviction, ‘one earth one family.....’ (Radhakrishnan, 1949, p. 64).

Radhakrishnan mentioned three criteria for the achievement of actual and true world peace:

- (i) Setting up social democracies,
- (ii) Elimination of imperialistic domination and colonialism, and
- (iii) International control over the exercise of sovereign power by the nation-states (Varma, 1996, p. 411).

In ‘*India and China*’ (1954), Radhakrishnan elucidated three basic principles of a just world peace: (i) race equality, (ii) a world-commonwealth, and (iii) international police. Radhakrishnan also emphasized on “an international code of justice”, which was a prime pre-requisite for world peace. Radhakrishnan popularized the notion of “a change in the heart and mind of man”. This approach was similar to that of Mahatma Gandhi. Hence, both Gandhi and Radhakrishnan conceptualized peace in a broader sense.

The Pragmatism of Indian and Western Schools of Peace

Western schools

Both the Indian School and Western School have greatly contributed to the field of peace. But the centrality of peace is still extremely idealistic in nature. In the final section, we analyze the pragmatic ideas of peace from both the Indian School and Western School’s point of views.

The Western Schools have emphasized pragmatic and idealistic aspects of peace. In the Western School, both Kant and Voltaire have emphasized the pragmatism of peace, but, first of all, they have tried to constitute an ideological background of peace. Tolstoy has also emphasized the ideological significance of peace. But the central figure remains Kant. Kantian ‘perpetual peace’ has a very pragmatic character. On the basis of ‘perpetual peace’,

Kant explained the origin of a pragmatic order of human society. Kant, Voltaire and Tolstoy have, therefore, emphasized the pragmatic order of a peaceful society.

Indian Schools

The Indian school of peace has played a much significant role in this context. Many scholars like K. M. Panikkar have argued that India has indeed shown interest in the field of international relations through implementations of its notions of peace and stability. The Indian School of thought has emphasized the long-term approach to peace and stability. Within the period of six decades, India has emerged as a 'major power', but India had never overemphasized the power approach. The power approach of India developed alongside the fundamental commitment to the approach of peace and stability approach throughout the world. Gandhi said that, "the attainment of freedom, whether for a man, a nation or the world, must be in exact proportion to the attainment of non-violence by each" (Gandhi, 1926, p. 460). Hence, the origin of peace is neither realistic nor idealistic, but it is on the basis of both these elements that peace in a particular society can be realized or established. Gandhi has primarily stressed the importance of ahimsa as "the law of our being". In fact, all the Indian thinkers have tried to focus on a common fact that every human society must commit to stability and peace. So, peace or stability is the precondition to establish a developed stable society. Indian School of thought has tried to focus on the humanitarian development of the global society and mostly emphasized the morality of the people.

Chapter-III

Nehru's Idea of Peace

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The ideas of nation and national identity have been interconnected since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the identity of nations received tremendous acceptance worldwide. First-world countries have looked forward to protecting the nation and have made arrangements to protect their own 'motherland.' Therefore, a new era of national security has appeared in the Western world. However, in the non-Western world, this tendency was influenced much later. The non-Western world has responded to this case in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Countries like India have also tried to protect the nation by means of policy, strategy and direct military implementation. So, it is important to analyse Indian national security at its first stage. India has tried to construct security for the entire land with weapons as well as diplomacy and normative instrumentalities. India has tried to secure her nation from the outside and inside. In the case of outside security, India has depended on diplomacy, military intervention and foreign policies; in the case of internal security, it has depended upon military interventions and internal security policies. Hence, India has tried to maintain its stability by means of direct diplomacy and indirect territorial policy.

However, it is quite a predominant fact to discuss elaborately the significance of national interest and its elements: security, national development and the world order. The idea of national interest signifies the ground attitude of a nation itself. A nation-state preserves the real and symbolic identity of a nation or "*jati*." Every nation-state has its own cultural significance. So, a nation-state preserves a nation and represents a cultural identity. After the Second World War, the liberation of Afro-Asian states gave birth to a number of new nation-states in Asia and Africa. India was not exceptional in this case. The national freedom struggle of India has taught our fellow nationals to unite for land and to protect it from outsiders. As a leading freedom fighter and India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized on the protection of a newly liberated nation like India. Before entering into detailed discussions of the micro and macro issues of Nehru's foreign policy, I shall focus on the theoretical understanding of the various elements of 'national interest.' The idea of national interest is not new at all; policies and principles that secure the future interests of a nation are termed, undoubtedly, as the 'national interest' of a nation. Security is one of the

most important elements of national security: it can be external and internal, short-term and long-term. National development is a significant part of national interest. National leaders usually undertake policies that are intrinsic to national development. Lastly, world order is also an important element of the notion of national interest. The nature of the world order determines the policies that must be taken up and those that shouldn't. It also explains the success and failure of a nation's foreign policy. After a theoretical discussion of national interest and its various elements, I will enter into categorical and individualistic discussions of Nehru's foreign policy.

National Interest and its significance

'National interest' gained acceptance from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The term 'national interest' means the interest of the whole nation-state. With the emergence of the nation-state, every nation started to protect its own national interests. In this case, the Indian nation is not an exception. India has also tried to protect its national interest through ideas and policies. National interest has threefold elements - security, national development, and world order. It is necessary to analyze these three elements together.

Security

The term 'security' refers to the protection of any particular land or territory. It has been divided into territorial and non-territorial security. However, the two broad categories—territorial security and non-territorial security—are interlinked. It is therefore essential to identify the meaning of security and basic elements of security in the context of the Indian nation.

The Meaning of security

National security is the most significant aspect of national interest. National security can be identified in terms of territorial integrity. The territory is the primary element of any kind of national interest. Hence, the territory and its integrity are the most significant parts of the security of any nation. India has also tried to maintain the strong integrity of the whole nation through foreign policy and diplomacy. India has never surrendered the integrity of the nation. On the other hand, several Latin American states, East European states, and Finland have, to a considerable extent, surrendered their sovereignty to the USA and the former Soviet Union.

Many countries have partially lost their territorial integrity without losing their sovereignty. For example, Czechoslovakia lost a major part of its territory to Germany in 1938. India lost some territory to China between 1959 and 1962. The two nations lost some of their territories without losing their sovereignty. Whereas in many cases, a less powerful state surrenders both its territorial integrity and sovereignty to another powerful state. Several people from western countries expressed that it was “better Red than dead” during the Cold War (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). They held that surrendering their territorial integrity and sovereignty was better than devastating warfare. These kinds of situations appeared during the Cold War era.

Of course, there are other cases where small nations did not submit their integrity and sovereignty to any nation. In India, Gandhi always urged the people not to surrender their freedom and sovereignty to any foreign nation. Thus, the Indian people have been guided by the ideals of peace and freedom. The Indian masses haven't lost their valuable homeland to another nation. However, with the emergence of the modern state, there may arise a situation of threats and domination. In the Cold War period, India became very strong and united, but many Western countries lost their homeland to other nations. India was more unified than any other country; and for this reason, it has never involved itself in territorial conflicts. In a few cases, like that of Kashmir and Tibet, India has been involved in conflicts. Nevertheless, the country's position has been very strong in the cases of territorial integrity. Since Independence, the Indian people have tried to achieve sovereignty without losing any portion of their territory. So, India's condition and position of the territory of the nation was exceptional when compared to that of other countries. India has not only maintained her sovereignty but also constituted an ideology of peaceful construction and a stable sovereignty for the whole nation.

External security and Internal Security

The notion of security has two elements: one is external security and the other is internal security. The concept of internal security points to the stability or the permanence of a particular constitution or government. Hence, the concept of internal security is associated with the concept of stability in certain types of government and constitutions. Secondly, the concept of internal security is associated with the stability, viability, or permanence of a state against anarchical force (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). Above all, a state may emerge more stable and stronger after the dissolution of a particular form of government. This happened in

France after the revolution of 1789, in Russia after the revolution of 1917, and in China after the revolution of 1948-49. On the other hand, external security denotes the maintenance of the stability of the territory from the outside. In other words, external security is based upon the external relationship of a particular nation. Thus, internal security and external security are closely interlinked and are inseparable.

Short-term and Long-term security

When a state devotes a high proportion of its resources for the purpose of military investment on a short-term basis, it can be termed as a short-term security measurement. This short-term purpose of security can also generate a long-term measurement of security. Long-term security denotes future-based arrangements of total security. A long-term security system also generates long-term protection of the nation. But the heavy military investment may also lead to a shortage of industrial and agricultural production in the economic system. So, both short-term and long-term security arrangements have to be practical and be based on the conditions of the concerned nation's political and economic system. Hence, the significance of security is interconnected with the nation's interests.

The meaning and the importance of security can be outlined as follows:

- (i) Security denotes the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the life and property of the people of a particular nation.
- (ii) Security means both external and internal security, although external security is more important than internal security.
- (iii) Short-term security may be false, but long-term security may lead to economic development and state building.
- (iv) Security also includes the ability to protect the homeland and leads to the maintenance of resistance against powerful states.

Hence, security has a plural meaning and multiple tendencies. In the context of national interest, security has a multilayered importance; without the analysis of national interest, it may be false. Hence, security and national interest are interlinked.

National Development

National development and national interest are closely interlinked. Without national development, the discussion about national development would be incomplete. National development does not, and cannot, mean the same for all states. It changes from one state to another in terms of the approach to development. There are three basic types of national development.

They can be classified as follows (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970):

Type A - State with stable infrastructure corresponding to the concept of Agraria.

Type B - State with unstable infrastructure corresponding to the transitional system.

Type C - State with stable infrastructure corresponding to the concept of Industria.

The states pertaining to Type A are very rare in the contemporary world since they are based on a stable agriculture system. Type B states are those which are not stable and whose economic development is based on a “transitional” system. Asian and African states can be identified as belonging to category B. India and China also belong to this category. Type C countries are stable enough and based on the concept of “Industria”. The Western states, Russia and Japan can be identified in this category.

The relationship between foreign policy and national development is multifarious. Type A states are less dependent in terms of foreign relations. These states can independently make discussions for their benefit. Type B states are partly dependent on other states for foreign policy applications. These are quasi-differentiated states, highly dependent on other states for foreign policy application. Type C states naturally dominate the other categories in terms of foreign policy and external affairs. These states are extremely strong in terms of economic development. Type C states dominate the other state and make decisions that favor their own citizens. Thus, national development and foreign policy are closely interconnected. National development enhances the ability of a nation to act freely and perfectly in terms of the interests of its own people.

World Order

In the context of national interest, the world order draws considerable attention. A just and peaceful world order is quite significant to the construction of a stable foreign policy. In the age of nuclear and chemical warfare, every state seeks to protect its homeland. There are generally two types of world order: stable world order and unstable world order. If the international system is not stable, then no state can construct positive foreign policy. Uneven economic development, North-South conflict, instability of the global financial system, international terrorism, and other problems of international relations can directly affect the foreign policy of a nation. So, it is necessary to analyze the world order before analyzing the foreign policy of a particular nation. Realists argue that there is a sharp difference between the interest of one state and that of another. They suggest that a balance of power is the only solution. Many scholars argue in favor of a positive international system. A peaceful foreign policy requires the assimilation of lawfulness and values. But the Realist school rejects such ideas, only emphasizing the composition and explanation of power. In the case of the world order, they (realists) suggest that a balance of power is the only solution to a conflicting world order.

Nevertheless, a balance of power is the best way to achieve a peaceful world order. Smaller states and powerful states depend on the world order or a global regulatory authority (world government). If the interests of the smaller states are stable, so are their situations. Above all, the balance-of-power system is more important than any global self-regulator and contributes to the constant stability of the world system (Bandyopadhyaya & Mukherjee, 1999). So, the three elements of national interest are quite significant in terms of reality and practice.

From an Individual to an Indian Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru involved himself in the Indian situation in 1947 as someone fully equipped in domestic and international affairs. Among the country's public figures, no one could match him in knowledge and experience regarding the domestic and outside world. The scholar Harish Kapur said, "and, what is more, there was hardly anyone of consequence in the mainstream of Indian politics who diverged from this consensual estimation" (Kapur, 2009, p. 23). Nehru was a combination of diverse elements that ranked him in the top positions among contemporary national leaders. His enlightened presence at national and international

events not only strengthened India exponentially but also enshrined in the world the terms of peace and stability. Gandhi's declaration that he considered Nehru his mentor in foreign affairs made Nehru's image more sustainable (Mansingh, 1988).

Jawaharlal Nehru hailed from a rich, liberal joint family. His father, Motilal Nehru, was a great nationalist. Motilal was quite liberal in all terms. To Motilal, westernization and nationalism were not contradictory. Rather, he expressed his gratitude and courtesy to the western education system and the British system of governance. As Harish Kapur has observed, "he was quite convinced of this appreciation, while identifying himself, at the same time, with the emerging nationalist movement, which, at the time, was appreciative of the British and what they represented in terms of ideas, governance, and education. The dimension of Motilal's westernization can be discerned by the fact that he had become mistrustful of all appeals of religious tradition, required his children to study even Sanskrit in English translation, dressed Jawaharlal in a sailor suit, encouraged the use of English nicknames for his two daughters, and decreed in 1890 that English was the only language to be spoken at home - a language his wife neither spoke nor understood" (Kapur, 2009, pp. 23-24). Thus, Jawaharlal Nehru grew up exclusively in British education and western culture. He completed his schooling in Harrow in England, his higher education at the University of Cambridge, and took his law degree from London's Inner Temple. Many scholars have argued that sending a very young boy to an English school in the United Kingdom grossly deprived Nehru of the basics of India "during the most formative period of his life" (Chaudhuri, 1987, p. 32). But eventually, Nehru remained steadfastly close to India. His westernization did not destroy his emotional and political interest in what was happening in his motherland. Nehru sympathetically supported his father's deep involvement with the nationalist movement, even though he disagreed with the politics of moderation—there were instances of heated arguments between father and son at the dinner table (Chattopadhyay, 1986). Moreover, Nehru continuously wrote letters to his father, mother, daughter, and two sisters, showing his attachment to his family and nation. Concerned about his father's health, he wrote to him in October 1906 to be careful and cautious "about yourself, this time for my sake— for dearest father it comes from my heart, and as such, I hope you will receive it" (Nanda, 1962, p. 77). Nehru was also concerned about his sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit about whom he was very sentimental; furthermore, Nehru wrote letters to his dearest daughter Indira on 29th July 1934 from Almora District Jail. Harish Kapur argued that "when Nehru finally came to the helm of Indian government affairs in 1947, he was generally perceived as

self-assured, savvy, competent, far-sighted and charismatic enough to singly focus his attention on the affairs of the world.” From a very young age, Nehru was emotionally involved in nationalist movements and international affairs. He was highly influenced by the anti-colonial ideas of Giuseppe Mazzini, Camillo Cavour, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and Italian nationalism. The Irish Sinn Fein movement against British colonialism underpinned Nehru’s initial interest in politics. Scholars have argued that “compounded later with the emergence of intellectual curiosity relating to political ideas, and with years of living and traveling in tremulous Europe, which, at the time, was the hub of ideas floating across nations of the continent, opened great possibilities for Nehru to equip himself intellectually through a long process of self-education and interaction— a process that finally unraveled itself in the publication of remarkably incisive and intelligently written reflections on historical and global developments” (Kapur, 2009, p. 25). However, Nehru fell into a very small category of highly intellectual politicians who were not only involved in Indian politics but also concerned about international affairs. Nehru cauterized his important publication, *Glimpses of World History* as “a brief and simple account of the early days of the world” (Nehru, 1989, p. vii).

Many scholars have argued since that no publication, at least in India, had acquired such a metabolic knowledge of what had happened in the past and presented it to the world in a larger context. It is a remarkable book that covers a brief history of the world, combining the author’s own nation at large. In one case, Vincenc Lesny of the Oriental Institute of Czechoslovakia wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru in 1935 to say that, having read the book, (Nehru, 1958) he was “specially struck by your comprehensive grasp of the main current events.” The other main publications of Nehru are *The Discovery of India* and *An Autobiography*, which are mainly focused on India’s past and his own life struggles. These works were written when he was imprisoned and, interestingly, give an insight into Nehru’s intellectual dimension, emotional makeup, and knowledge, as well as his growing vision of the world. However, there was nothing that can be termed as original in his perception of the world. It was a pretty standard vision that mirrored his time and space. The time was the thirties, and the space was Europe. Nehru tried to make a clear comparison between democracy and dictatorship, and between capitalism and socialism. Like many left-wing intellectuals in many parts of the world, he committed himself to the anti-fascist cause and socialism. Ideologically, Nehru began as a fabianist with “vague socialist ideas” of youth, but soon found himself attracted to the Soviet brand of socialism and Marxism (Kapur, 2009). Nehru was quite confused about

his ideology. He was fascinated by Soviet socialism, but at the same time disliked “the ruthless suppression of all contrary opinions, the wholesale regimentation, the unnecessary violence,” all of which were a part of the Soviet system (Nehru, 1988). The philosophy of Marxism, Nehru wrote in his autobiography, has “lightened up many a dark corner of my mind” and “gave me comfort and hope” (Nehru, 1988). At a mature age, Nehru became sure of Marxism and the corners it had lit during his early years. Nehru was an “impulsive intellectual” who emphasized ideas while playing and applying them. M. O. Mathai, who was his assistant for many years, observed him more closely than anyone else, and expressed of him: “Nehru’s was an imitative and absorptive mind. He had an infinite capacity to borrow ideas from others and make them his own with remarkable speed. Essentially Gandhi was an original mind, while Nehru was a second-rate one. He was all heart and less mind. This is reflected in his books also” (Mathai, n.d., p. 170). Nehru constantly played with the ideas and isms. His biographer Sarvepalli Gopal also supported this statement. It is noteworthy that Nehru not only acquired an intellectual vision but was also actively involved in meeting with international personalities, in taking a position on specific world affairs in the thirties, and in traveling to ‘tremulous’ areas to convey his solidarity with movements with which he identified himself. His participation in the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nations in 1927 was a major landmark in his international experience. It was vastly dealing with the third world countries, but apart from those representatives of a number of countries of the Middle and the Far East, North Africa, South and Central America, Italy, France and Britain. Though this was a significant manifestation of Nehru’s interest in international affairs, eventually there were other occasions: his goodwill visit to Soviet Russia in 1927, which resulted in the publication of a series of supportive articles in Indian newspapers like *The Hindu*; his open solidarity with Czechoslovakia against Hitlerian oppression; his fraternization with Republican Spain during the days of the Spanish Civil war in the thirties; and his visit to China just before the Second World War– all of them are examples of the level of interest he had acquired in international affairs. Notably, no one in the country could match him in this regard. The most important role he played was in awaring and educating the Indian masses in international affairs. Nehru held general meetings to make Indians aware of what was happening in the world, and how it affected India. Furthermore, he mobilized the members of his party to take positions and steps on international affairs. Nehru was the only one among the mainstream leaders of India who attempted to place Indian independence from a global perspective, who expressed that the “freedom of India is a part of the freedom of the world...

and that the problem of discrimination, racial or otherwise... is a part of the problem of racial and other discrimination prevalent in the world as a whole” (Rao, 1971, p. 23). Hence, Mahatma Gandhi paid tribute to and highly appreciated him when he wrote, “Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian to the core, but he being also nationalist, has made us accustomed to looking at everything in the international light instead of the parochial” (Tendulkar, 1953, p. 90). Nehru has exclusively emphasized the richness of natural resources and their strategic significance to the Indian nation in the international diplomatic roster. In one of his very first speeches after independence, he stated that “India is a great country. Great in her resources, great in manpower, great in her potential in every way. I have little doubt that a free India on every plane will play a big part on the world stage, even in the narrowest plane of material power” (Nehru, 1961, p. 13). On another occasion, he was even more explicit. He declared, “I hope, that while India will play a great part in all the material spheres, she will always lay stress on the spirit of humanity.... May the time come when this ancient land will attain its rightful place in the world and make its full swing to the phenomenon of world peace and the welfare of mankind” (Nehru, 1961, p. 13). These were not just words for the benefit of the Indian nation; Nehru genuinely believed in them. This confidence was present even after the country’s independence and continued to grow throughout his political career. Nehru believed that “India is growing to a great power”. And this great power must be strict upon ‘world peace’. Furthermore, Nehru wrote, “Everywhere, there is a feeling of respect and friendship for India, for old memories endure, and people have not forgotten that there was a time when India was the mother country to them and nourished them with rich fare from their treasure house” (Lal, n.d., p. 7). Many non-Indians were even more eloquent. There was Max Mueller, who has written excessively about India’s impact on the western world. Rene Grousset highlighted “the indelible impress” that India had left of her culture on the rest of the world; there were also philosophers like Will Durant, who expressed the impact of Indian heritage on other cultures, went further and wrote that “Mother India is in many ways the mother of us all” (Lal, n.d., p. 35). Scholars have argued that if many philosophers and scientists were probably impressed with what India embodied traditionally, others belonging to the academic, media, and political world were struck by the major steps India had taken to continue to develop political democracy in the country (Kapur, 2009). In this context, much credit and appreciation must go to Jawaharlal Nehru, for he was the one who enhanced the importance of democracy within a system and who practiced it tirelessly throughout his life. Where many third-world countries hurriedly abandoned the significance of a democratic

political system, India became the only nation that appreciated democracy and its institutions. So Nehru must be credited for his lasting contribution to the Indian system of democracy. For those who visited India after its independence, the democratic factor was perceived to be significant from a global perspective. A very well-known correspondent, Robert Trumball, wrote, “The Republic of India today is the largest democracy in the world in terms of population. As such, she may hold the balance of the future of Asia, and perhaps most of the world” (Trumball, 1957, p. 249). Moreover, Nehru was quite successful in maintaining a good neighborhood policy and a strong and capable foreign policy toward the world. He also nurtured and maintained a strong and meaningful diplomatic measure, which benefited India even after his demise.

Home and the World

Many Indian writers trusted the leadership style of Prime Minister Nehru. A well-known writer, Nirad C. Chaudhuri, remarked that Nehru’s leadership ‘is the most important moral force behind the unity of India’. To Chaudhuri, Nehru was ‘the leader not of a party, but of the people of India taken collectively, the legitimate successor to Gandhiji.’ As Nirad C. Chaudhuri expressed, “Nehru is keeping together the governmental machine and the people, and without this nexus, India would probably have been deprived of a stable government in these crucial times. He has not only ensured cooperation between the two, but most probably has also prevented actual conflicts, cultural, economic, and political. Not even Mahatmaji’s leadership, had it continued, would have been quite equal to them. If within the country, Nehru is the indispensable link between the governing middle classes and the sovereign people, he is no less the bond between India and the world. [He serves as] India’s representative to the great Western democracies, and, I must add, their representative to India. The Western nations certainly look upon him as such and expect him to guarantee India’s support for them, which is why they are so upset when Nehru takes an anti-Western or neutral line. They feel they are being let down by one of themselves” (Chaudhuri, 1953). Throughout his eventful tenure as prime minister, Nehru also served as foreign minister of the government of India. Other nationalist Congress leaders like Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel were determinedly inward-looking and rarely traveled abroad. Nehru, on the other hand, was influenced by world trends and movements. In 1927, he visited the Soviet Union, and, in the following decade, traveled widely across the continent. In the 1930s, he played an active part in supporting the Republican cause in Spain. He became a strong pillar of the progressive

left, which often sparked off on public platforms in England and France. He delivered a speech on 'Peace and Empire' at Friends House, Euston, in July 1938 against 'fascist aggression'. Nehru saw the fascist trend as simply another variant of imperialism. He had little doubt that those looking for complete freedom for all the subject peoples of the world had to oppose both fascism and imperialism (Guha, 2007). His talk was widely ranged around the burning spots of the world in his time. Nehru spoke excessively of Spain, Abyssinia, China, Palestine, and mostly, of Africa. Nehru maintained that no other people in the world had suffered and been exploited as much as the Africans. According to him, the African people deserve our special consideration. In the late summer of 1939, Nehru decided to take a trip to India's great Asian neighbor, China. He had been in friendly correspondence and had an amicable relationship with the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. He had hoped to travel by air to Chungking, where he spent three weeks traveling and then returned home via the Bhutan Road. In a radio broadcast of September 1946, he identified the United States, the Soviet Union, and China as the three countries most relevant to India's progressive future. In the following year, he spoke in the Constituent Assembly on how India would become a good friend of both the US and the USSR rather than become camp followers of any power block. He pointed out that India would lead herself (Nehru, 1961). An early expression of what came to be known as 'non-alignment' is contained in a letter written by Jawaharlal Nehru to K. P. S. Menon in January 1947. The letter prepared for his appointment as India's first ambassador to China: "Our general policy is to avoid entanglement in power politics and not to join any group of powers as against any other group. The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be suspected by each of leading toward the other. This cannot be helped" (Nanda, 1976, p. 134). However, Nehru saw Indian independence in the context of a wider Asian resurgence. An outstanding initiative in this regard was the Asian Relations conference, held in New Delhi in the last week of March 1947. Twenty-eight countries sent their respective representatives-- including India's close neighbors like Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Nepal. There were also still-colonized nations of Southeast Asia, such as Malaya, Indonesia and Vietnam, China, and Tibet (the two sent separate delegations), as well as seven Asian 'republics' of the Soviet Union and Korea. The Arab League also participated, and there was a Jewish delegation from Palestine. Nehru often visited the European countries before Independence. However, his first trip to the

United States took place two years after he assumed office as prime minister of India. Nehru's favorite work-- *Glimpses of World History*-- highlights and focuses on the USA rather than China or Russia. Americans had their prejudices about India. They politely admired Gandhi and his struggle for national independence, but their knowledge of India was non-pragmatic. Harold Isac once pointed out that in postwar America, there were four kinds of Indians. These were: (1) the *fabulous* Indians, the maharajas and magicians coupled with exotic animals; (2) the *mystical* Indians, people who were 'deep, contemplative, tranquil, profound'; (3) the *benighted* Indians, who worshipped animals and many-headed gods; and (4) the *pathetic* Indians, submerged into poverty and crippled by disease. Notably, the book best known on the Indian subcontinent in America was Katherine Mayo's *Mother India*. Though this book was full of important information, Gandhi described it as a 'drain inspector's report' (Isaac, 1972). In August 1949, Nehru spent three weeks in America and delivered a speech to audiences in the United States Congress. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by Columbia University and addressed a crowd of 10,000 at the University of California at Berkeley. Addressing the US Congress, Nehru spoke primarily of the foundation and founders of America but also counterpoised a great man from his nation: this was exclusively Gandhi, whose message of peace and truth had inspired the entire spectrum of independent India's foreign policy. He had referred to peace in diplomatic terms; but elsewhere, he spoke more directly. The American press was so impressed with the Indian prime minister that *The Chicago Sun-Times* compared him with former American president Thomas Jefferson. The *Christian Science Monitor* described him as a 'World Titan'. Many American officials were more sympathetic to Nehru. Chester Bowles was the American ambassador in New Delhi from 1951-1953. After witnessing Nehru at work in his environment, Chester Bowles was deeply impressed by his commitment to democracy and democratic procedure, as well as his profound role in the rights of minorities. During Bowles' tenure, India and the United States grew closer. The US sent its experts and equipment to assist Indian agrarian development programs. The mutual distrust between the two nations increased after 1953 when the Republicans returned to power after twenty years. At the end of 1953, William F. Knowland, the Republican leader of the Senate, specified a six-week world tour. After returning to the US, he told the *US News and World Report* that Jawaharlal Nehru represented all the nations and peoples of Asia. Senator Knowland said emphatically that "certainly Nehru does not speak for the republic of Korea, for Japan, for Free China or Formosa, for Thailand, Viet Nam, Laos or Cambodia. He certainly does not speak for

Pakistan. The only countries he might be able to speak for with some authority, or at least represent their views, would be India itself, Indonesia which is also neutralist in outlook, and perhaps Burma....” (Guha, 2007, p. 158). As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Nehru tried to maintain a strong relationship with the European superpower. In the first stages, Nehru tried hard to avoid taking sides in Cold War. But, as Nehru envisaged, non-alignment was not merely an ‘evasion’; it also had a positive outlook. His idea was to be free from any class of power which could affect the Indian masses. These kinds of Nehruvian ideas flourished in the Afro-Asian Conference, held in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955. It is noteworthy to say that Nehru played an important role in sustaining the ideas of peace, freedom, and non-alignment. Only those countries with independent governments were invited to the Bandung conference. Twenty-nine countries sent their delegations, including India and China. Four African nations were represented; the others still lay under the cage of colonial rule. Nations like Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria also came to the meeting. The meeting discussed the methods of cultural and economic cooperation and committed itself gently to the end of colonial rule. Very significantly, President Sukarno of Indonesia observed, “how can we say that colonialism is dead so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree?” (Appadurai, 1969, pp. 79-113). Accordingly, Nehru considered the Bandung conference ‘a great achievement’; it was supposed to proclaim the political emergence in world affairs of over half the world’s population. [But] it presented no unfriendly challenge or hostility to anyone... ’(Guha, 2007, p. 164). However, the Nehruvian ideals of non-alignment were seriously tested in the second half of 1956. In July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the company that managed the Suez Canal. Britain strongly condemned it and reacted by inviting international control over the canal. Britain’s strategic interests were threatened by the decision to nationalize the canal. In this situation, India’s role was significant. Nehru knew both parties very well and tried to mediate. He failed. Finally, in late October, the British, in association with France and Israel, undertook a military invasion of Egypt. This act of neocolonial aggression was condemned worldwide. Finally, under strong American pressure, the Anglo-French alliance was forced to withdraw from Egypt. Nehru strongly criticized the intervention in Egypt. But when the United Nations met to discuss a resolution calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw all its military forces from Hungarian territory without further delay, the Indian representative V. K. Krishna Menon abstained. This caused great resentment in the Western world, and the Indian government was alleged to have double standards and be biased (Reid, 1981). Though there was a lot of criticism of the

Nehruvian model of non-alignment, Nehru successfully maintained equidistance from the US and USSR blocs. For Nehru, foreign policy was a medium through which India's presence was felt in the world. After independence, Nehru personally supervised the creation of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), transferring to its cadre able officers of the ICS and solely trying to make selections from the younger generations of India. After a prolonged discussion of his vision and mission regarding home and world affairs, one can argue that Nehru tried to build a neutral (non-aligned) and humanist nation in the world, whose aim was anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and humanist idealism. In this regard, he was highly successful.

The Decision Making Process

Many scholars have argued that there were no institutionalized "formal mechanisms" around Prime Minister Nehru to shape the basic contours of foreign policy; there were many established institutions he could not ignore and political personalities he could not disregard (Manor, 1994). Even though Nehru possessed a well-informed and savvy personality, he could hardly shoulder the responsibility of foreign policy on his own. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) acted as a main source of decision-making. Though Nehru was the sole architect of India's foreign policy, he could hardly do anything without the MEA for a whole series of actions and initiatives. There was also the Indian Parliament which Nehru was very much obliged and bound by in the chain of political consensus. While the consensus widely favored what Nehru had to say, there were different and dissident voices that challenged him. There were also diplomatic setbacks that he began to face. There was also the strong presence of the Cabinet. There were many stalwarts of foreign policy in the Cabinet, but policy-making was largely left in Nehru's hands. As time passed, Nehru was involved in challenges; and was not spared. Many people raised their voices and disagreed with him. But in the decision-making process, the personalities around the decision-makers were more important than the institutions. The Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, was the most important person. He was next to Nehru in terms of hierarchy but equally powerful in his own right. Patel restrained himself from offering any fixed views on macro international affairs or issues, leaving all this to Prime Minister Nehru; however, he sometimes expressed his views on what was happening in neighboring countries. Sardar Patel was firm and strict on the Kashmir issue and strongly against referring the matter to the UN. Sardar Patel made Nehru aware of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, regarding the ongoing Burmese Civil war, was having on India, and also aware Nehru Rana dominated Nepal

because of the increasing Chinese presence. Scholars have argued that there were moments of considerable tension between Sardar Patel and Nehru on foreign policy (Kapur, 2009). Their relations became so contested that Sardar Patel, in his deteriorating health, decided to challenge Nehru's China policy in the Congress Working Committee (CWC), especially regarding the silence over the annexation of Tibet in October 1950. However, after his death, Nehru was able to act more comfortably and freely because there was no one in the government after Patel who had enough power or prestige to question Nehru on foreign affairs (Bhatia, 2000). At the bureaucratic level, there were people like Girija Shankar Bajpai, then Secretary General of the MEA. This position was the most powerful after the Foreign Minister. On behalf of the British Government, Bajpai participated in the Washington naval conference in 1921 and showed great intellectual and diplomatic qualities. At the time of the formation of the interim government, he was assigned the bureaucratic task of heading the MEA. It is, of course, difficult to estimate the level of his interaction with Nehru, but it is obvious that he had some deep influence on Nehru's foreign policy. Scholars like Harish Kapur have argued that though Bajpai did not favor Nehru's intellectual framework of foreign policy, he served India well due to the international contacts he established. While he was aware of the danger of excessive state power without some moral end, he stressed that "armed power, supported by adequate industrial power, constitutes the only safeguard against a threat to a country's independence" (Bajpai, 1953, p. 20). Bajpai also accompanied Nehru on most of his important visits to the West and went by himself to Washington in 1948, where he had been sent to indicate India's anti-communist credentials and assure his American counterparts of India's openness to the United States of America (Kapur, 2009). Sir Girija also attempted to mobilize Sardar Patel, whom he met on 25th October 1950, on the Tibet-China question. He was also very active and serious about the Kashmir issue. He often tried to defend India's position before the Kashmir Commission at the UN. Even after he retired from the Foreign Service and was functioning as the Governor of Maharashtra, Nehru requested him to continue representing India at the United Nations Kashmir Commission. Another important name was N. R. Pillai. As Bajpai's successor, N. R. Pillai was the second-highest official at the Ministry of External Affairs. He was not arrogant, knew his position in the hierarchy, and never attempted to overwhelm Nehru with his views and ideas. However, N. R. Pillai implicitly criticized him on the Hungarian question when he recommended that Nehru re-evaluate the events in Hungary (Brown, 2004). There were many personalities more important than the bureaucrats, such as K. M. Panikhar, V. K. Krishna Menon, Vijaya

Lakshmi Pandit, and Indira Gandhi. All of them were close to Nehru and were known to have played some key role in the decision-making process. Pannikar was a well-known historian who had been sent as the Ambassador to the two Chinas-- the Guomindang and Communist China. In Beijing, Pannikar earned a reputation for being too friendly with China, so much so that Sardar Patel. In this context, many Indians of his time criticized and characterized him as the “Ambassador of China”. From whatever documentation is available, it was found that Panikkar, in his communication with Nehru, eagerly tried to justify Chinese actions and advised him not to take any firm stand on Tibet. Furthermore, he advised the Indian prime minister not to protest against China and the invasion of Tibet, as that would amount to an “interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN”; hence, India’s position was automatically degenerated (Kapur, 2009). Many Indian scholars have pointed out that, “Panikkar has also been accused of having unilaterally changed a crucial word from the Indian communication to China. The note, informing the Chinese, that India had recognized Chinese “suzerainty” over Tibet was changed to “sovereignty” - undoubtedly a serious transgression by the Ambassador for which he was not even sanctioned by the Prime Minister. To avoid annoying the Chinese, Panikkar recommended not raising the border issue when agreeing on Tibet and advised Nehru to transform the important Indian mission to a simple Consulate General” (Kapur, 2009, p. 35). However, it is not important if Panikkar was pro-China, or not; rather, the most important point is that the Indian Ambassador played a crucial role in the decision-making process on the issues concerning China and Tibet. Interestingly, most of the recommendations made by Panikkar were accepted by Nehru. Krishna Menon was another important political personality who assisted Nehru in foreign affairs. Many Indian scholars like Harish Kapur (2009) have argued that he was more important than anyone, including Sardar Patel. Menon played a crucial role in many cases, especially in India’s neighborhood policy in the 1957 Geneva Conference and Indo-US relations. In this context, scholars have argued that “Menon thus had Nehru’s ears, and had, in all probability, injected numerous inputs in Nehru’s decisions on foreign policy - probably much more than the others” (Kapur, 2009, p. 37). Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was another personality involved in direct interaction with Jawaharlal Nehru on foreign policy. Lakshmi Pandit had the added advantage of being the sister of the Indian prime minister; due to this, she had uniquely participated in international affairs before and after the independence of India. She participated as the head of the Indian delegation in the annual conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in January 1945 in Hotsprings, Virginia, and attended the UN

Charter Conference in San Francisco as an Indian Observer, where she presented a memorandum to the Secretary General of the conference denouncing British imperialism in India. In 1947, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was sent as the Indian Ambassador to Moscow, Washington in 1949, London in 1954, and Madrid in 1958. G. Parthasarathy (popularly known as GP) also advised Nehru on foreign affairs. He was the Deputy Editor of *The Hindu* and was known to be discreet, shy, and a man of few words. Parthasarathy began his diplomatic career in Nehru's secretariat and assisted him in many important diplomatic responsibilities, such as the Chair of the International Control Commission in Cambodia and Vietnam and Ambassador to Indonesia, China, and the UN. As far as the decision-making process is concerned, journalist Govind Talwalkar, (2007) in one of his most influential articles, asserted that while GP argued with Nehru for an early border settlement with China, Nehru was apparently of the opinion that the Chinese had a long-term, concerted design to advance their national interests in South Asia. M. O. Mathai was another name that must be mentioned among Nehru's advisers in foreign affairs. As the Prime Minister's assistant, Mathai spent most of his professional time with Nehru and had numerous opportunities to discuss foreign affairs with him. In the analysis of Nehruvian decision-making, one must keep in mind that emotional factors were more influential than legal-rational ones.

Nehru and Tribal Trouble

Throughout the 1950s, while the government of India was seeking to establish its hold on the Valley of Kashmir, its authority and legitimacy were also challenged in the other parts of the country, mainly at the other end of the Himalayas. This was known as New Delhi's 'Naga problem', much less known than its Kashmir problem. It was as old as the Kashmir problem. The Nagas were indigenous people living in the eastern Himalayas along the Burma border. In respect of their mountain 'fastness', they have been differentiated in social and political development in the rest of India. Before independence, the British government administered them lightly and made a clear differentiation from the plainsmen. However, American Baptists active in this region since the mid-nineteenth century had successfully converted several Naga tribes to Christianity. Since then, the Naga Hills formed part of Assam, a province very diverse in terms of Indian standards and sharing borders with China, Burma, and East Pakistan. This region was divided into uplands and lowlands and inhabited by hundreds of different communities. In the plains, there were Assamese-speaking Hindus, connected by culture and faith to the greater Indian heartland. Among the important groups of

tribes in this region were the Mizos, the Khasis, the Garos, and the Jaintaias. Also in the region were two princely states, Tripura and Manipur, whose populations were divided into Hindu and tribal inhabitants. Among the tribes of northeast India, the Nagas were regarded as the most autonomous inhabitants. Their territory lay on the Indo-Burmese border, although there were almost as many Naga tribes in Burma as in India. Since Indian independence, the Nagas had been totally outside the fold of the Congress-led nationalist movement. There was no Gandhian *satyagraha*, no civil disobedience; no Gandhian leader had ever visited these hills at the time of the nationalist movement. The Naga question became significant in 1946. In January 1946, a group of 'educated Christians and English-speaking' persons formed the Naga National Council or NNC. Besides that, a journal called *The Naga Nation* was published; 250 copies were mimeographed and distributed among the Naga community (Guha, 2007). The NNC stood for the unity of all Nagas and their respective 'self-determination'. The Angami Nagas, with their glorious material tradition and record of fighting all outsiders (the British included), dreamt of a fully independent state: a government of the Nagas, for the Nagas, by the Nagas'. On the other hand, the Aos, who were more moderate, thought that they could live with dignity within India. The early meetings of the NNC witnessed a long-term debate between these two factions, which spilled over into the pages of the *Naga Nation*. The young Angamis demanded a new Naga Nation. Meanwhile, the moderate wing was looking to negotiate with the Congress Leadership. In July 1946, the NNC general secretary T. Sakhrie wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on the Naga issue and, in response, received true assurance that the Nagas would have full autonomy, but within the Indian Union. Nehru expressed that the Nagas could have their own judicial system; Sakhrie declared that the Nagas would continue their connection with India, "but as a distinctive community... We must also develop according to our own genius and taste. We shall enjoy home rule in our country but on broader issues be connected with India" (Chasie, 1999, pp. 33-36). In June 1947, a delegation of the NNC met the governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, to discuss the normative procedures by which the Nagas could join India. The two sides agreed that tribal lands would not be alienated from outsiders and that Naga religious practices would not be affected by any means. An NNC delegation went to Delhi, where they met Nehru; he repeated that they could have autonomy but not independence. They also called on Mahatma Gandhi to negotiate the matter. Gandhi told the Nagas that they could declare their independence if they wished; that no one could force them to join India. He was solely against any force or coercion toward the Nagas. Gandhiji said, "I will ask them to

shoot me first before one Naga is shot” (Phizo, 1960). He also advised here that a better proof of independence was economic self-reliance; they should grow their own food and spin their own cloth. Thus Mahatma Gandhi was in favor of the peaceful independence of the Nagas. As the Naga intelligentsia struggled to define its ‘independence’, the Constituent Assembly of India held a meeting in New Delhi. The topic of the discussion was a place for tribes in a free and democratic India. On 30th July 1947, Jaipal Singh informed the Assembly of ‘some very unhappy developments’ in the Naga hills. When the Naga delegation came to Delhi to meet Nehru and Gandhi, they also met Jaipal, a tribal himself. Notably, the ‘Adivasis’ (original inhabitants) of the central Indian tribes were somewhat different from the tribes of northeast India. The Constituent Assembly meanwhile decided to designate some 400 communities as ‘scheduled tribes’; these constituted about 7 percent of the population. There were seats reserved for them in the legislature and government departments. Schedule V of the Constitution pertained to the tribes that lived in central India; Schedule VI pertained to the tribes of northeast India. Schedule VI also enshrines tribal autonomy, the right to constitute district and regional councils, and protecting local rights in land, forests, and waterways. Jaipal Singh thought that these provisions would be effective only if the tribes could forge a separate state within the Union. In this context, the right to self-determination becomes relevant not only for the Nagas, but also for the tribes of Jharkhand, Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. In May 1947, the Adivasi Sabha of Jamshedpur wrote to Nehru, Gandhiji, and the Constituent Assembly urging the creation of a Jharkhand state out of Bihar. In February 1948, Jaipal Singh delivered the presidential address to the *All-India Adivasi Mahasabha*; here, he spoke of how, after the independence, ‘British imperialism’ had been replaced by ‘Bihari imperialism’, which was considered the greatest problem for the tribes. The *Adivasi Mahasabha* was later renamed the Jharkhand Party. Jaipal Singh and his Jharkhand Party proposed some protective measures for the tribes: autonomy within the Indian Union, safeguarding their lands by implementing laws and creating provinces in regions where the tribes were in the majority. But the Naga radicals offered another issue: an independent, sovereign state carved out of India; and distinct from it. Within the periphery of the Naga question, Angami Zapu Phizo was the most important person. Born in 1913 and educated by the Baptists, he became a Naga Poet. Phizo composed the Naga National Anthem. He had migrated to Burma and joined the Japanese side. After independence, he returned to India and joined the Naga National Council. Phizo quickly made his mark with impassioned appeals for the complete sovereignty of the Nagas, mixed with Christian idioms. Around the 1950s, he

was elected as the President of the NNC and committed the Nagas to 'full Independence' (Guha, 2007). Phizo was a man of great energy and excessive motivational powers. In 1951 he and his men toured the Naga hills to obtain thumbprints and signatures for a document affirming their support for a strong and independent Naga state. An important study showed that "99.99 percent had voted in favor of the Naga independence" (Ao, 2002, pp. 48-49). In the last week of 1951, the Prime Minister of India was in the Assamese town of Tezpur for the electoral campaign in the general election of India. Here NNC president Phizo met Nehru and demanded independence for the Nagas. Nehru called it an 'absurd' demand' and told them that 'the Nagas were as free as any Indian'. He invited Phizo and his fellow men to 'submit proposals for the extension of cultural, administrative and financial autonomy in their land'. Meanwhile, the NNC decided to boycott the general election. In the second week of February 1952, Phizo and two other NNC leaders met Nehru in Delhi. Nehru has assured them greater autonomy instead of freedom. In October 1952, Nehru spent a week touring the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). He was quite sympathetic to the life struggles of the Nagas. Six months later, he visited the Naga capital, Kohimah, in the company of Burmese Prime Minister U Nu. Phizo and the NNC were set on complete independence by any means. They were already collecting arms and trying to organize groups of 'home guards' in the Naga Villages. By the summer of 1953, front-ranking NNC leadership had gone underground. The police started checking and raiding the areas. In 1954 the situation became worse. Due to a motorcycle accident of a Naga villager in Kohimah, the situation became more conflicted; police killed one judge and an NNC member. Meanwhile, the Nagas started guerrilla warfare, and in June 1954, the Assam Rifles attacked a village believed to be sympathetic to the Naga guerrillas. In September, some rebels suddenly declared the formation of a 'federal government of Nagaland' (Guha, 2007). Killing and counter-killing occurred regularly in Naga areas. In March 1955, a battle broke out in Tuensang; when the firing stopped, more than sixty houses and several granaries were found to have been burnt down (Yonuo, 1974). Despite the civil war, some channels of peaceful negotiation were still open. In September 1955, Phizo and two colleagues went to meet and negotiate with Assam's Chief Minister. No detailed documents of the meeting are available; after the meeting concluded, the Naga leaders returned to the jungle. In January 1956, the Naga leader T. Sakhrie was dragged out of his bed, taken to the jungle, tortured barbarically, then killed. Phizo was suspected to have ordered the killing of Sakhrie, although he had denied it. In March 1956, the federal government of Nagaland made a new announcement. A national flag

was designed, and military commanders were appointed for different regions of the proposed homeland. In July 1956, there occurred a killing that hurt India's image as much as Sakhrie's murder hurt the NNC. At the same time, T. Haralu, the first allopathic doctor in the Naga hills, was brutally killed. By the middle of 1956, a full-scale war raged in the Naga hills. In a brief statement to parliament in the last week of July 1956, the home minister, Govind Ballabh Pant, admitted that the Indian Army had lost 68 men while killing 370 'hostiles' (Guha, 2007). In August 1956, there was an extended debate in Parliament (mainly in the Lok Sabha) on the situation in the Naga Hills. New Delhi was always willing to consider any suggestions to improve the working of the Sixth Schedule, which allowed tribal areas great autonomy in the management of their lands and resources. In December 1956, the Naga rebellion managed to stop. In the same year, the Indian High Commission in London claimed the 'success' of Indian Army operations in the Naga hills. The *Manchester Guardian* made their headline 'Naga Rebellion Virtually Over'.

Throughout the 1950s, there were many conflicted and civil war-like situations in India. Although the Nagaland movement occupies a dominant position in this discussion, the Jharkhand movement is likewise relevant. The main campaigning slogan of the Jharkhand movement was '*Jharkhand alag prant!*' (Jharkhand must be a separate state). Jawaharlal Nehru was fully aware of the Naga rebellion and other tribal movements. Although there were many provocations, Nehru depended on democratic principles and peaceful coexistence in the country. These domestic policies and situations affected his vision and foreign policy. It was quite true that Nehru was equally successful in stopping tribal conflicts as well, and was a globally acceptable figure of 'world peace'.

The Nehru Era and the Application of Peace in Indian Foreign Policy

Pandit Nehru was not only a successful statesman but also an Indian Foreign policy maker. He nourished independent India's foreign policy. During his tenure (1947-1964), he emphasized a stable foreign policy for the country. Indeed, Pandit Nehru was the natural architect of the foreign policy of the Indian National Congress during the freedom movement. In the interim Government of 1946-47 and afterward, he was in charge of external affairs. He made all his decisions in favor of the Modern Indian state.

Nehru had studied at Harrow and at Cambridge, where he came into contact with the ideas of Western liberalism. At Cambridge, he also learned a great deal about Fabian

Socialism. He was also influenced by the Gandhian ideology of peace and non-violence. Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1923, said, “Bolshevism and Fascism are the waves of the West today. They are alike and represent different phases of insensate violence and intolerance. The choice for us is between Lenin and Mussolini on the one side, and Gandhi on the other” (Bright, 1950, p. 4).

Hence, Nehru was influenced by the non-violent ideology of Mahatma Gandhi. In 1927, he attended the Brussels Congress of oppressed Nationalities, where he came into contact with the communists and leftwing socialists from all over the world. He made speeches at the Brussels Congress against colonialism. Nehru raised his voice against colonialism in Asia and Africa. In his report to the all-India Congress Committee on the Brussels Congress, he also spoke against the “rising imperialism of the United States” and predicted that US imperialism would be a greater danger than British imperialism. Jawaharlal Nehru visited Soviet Russia and published a book entitled ‘Soviet Russia’. The Soviet occupation of Finland and the “excessive use of violence” had pained him greatly. He was highly critical of Indian Communists for choosing isolation from the National Independence Movement.

Nehru carefully studied the Vedanta and Indian philosophy in prison in his forties. He was greatly influenced by the *Vedanta* and its declining appeal. The discovery of India, according to Nehru, was the “Contains of his philosophy of life”. Based on the Vedanta Philosophy, Pandit Nehru inspired the people about the creation of one world. He was a committed internationalist and tried to inspire the people to forge a cooperative international order or one world (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). Nehru avoided the dogmatic ideology and tried to adopt the scientific approach. He tried to construct an equilibrium between the idealist and realist approaches. The idealist version of the Gandhian philosophy had considerably influenced Pandit Nehru; so did the great notions of world peace. Nehru defined realism as an essential part of foreign policy; on the other hand, he termed idealism as the “realism of tomorrow”. Thus, he tried to create a balance between idealism and realism in the context of Indian Foreign Policy. He tried to construct the notion of a unified foreign policy and appealed to the whole nation to make the country more united and consolidated. The government of any country tries to protect the interest of the nation and its people. Similarly, its statesmen also try to manifest the well-being of the nation and its countrymen. Nehru desired not only to protect the whole nation but also to protect his countrymen in the greater

context. Nehruvian foreign policy was interlinked with the idealistic and realistic factors of foreign policy. Hence, Nehru tried to present a synthesis of idealism and realism in Indian Foreign Policy. He expressed that the interest of the Indian nation was connected with the interest of the world. In other words, he has tried to highlight peace and cooperation in the Indian context as well as in the context of the world.

Nehru and Securing Kashmir

India-Pakistan relations after 1947 were a great issue. The geopolitical configuration of Pakistan had also been a permanently important factor in Indo-Pakistan relations until the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Sardar Patel was the Home Minister and was responsible for the integration of the Indian states. Nehru was the Minister of External Affairs who took over the Kashmir issue. He tried to handle the situation with his best efforts. After India's independence in 1947, Pakistan attacked Kashmir, and from this moment onward, it became a land of great debate. Kashmir had become a part of India through the accession in October 1947. Nehru was fully aware of the geopolitical significance of Kashmir. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947, Nehru said, "We were, of course, vitally interested in the decision that the state would take Kashmir, because of her geographical position, with her frontiers with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China, and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also, Kashmir is intimately related to India. The caravan trade routes from central Asia to India pass through Kashmir state." Thus, he primarily emphasized the geopolitical significance of the state. A defense committee of the Cabinet arranged a meeting on the Kashmir issue. The Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, had brought up the 'Condition of the future reference of the people', and the defense committee accepted the suggestion. Nehru tried to legalize the accession of Kashmir based on the consent and wishes of its people. Patel was largely aloof from the Kashmir issue; historically, Nehru was primarily responsible for the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Territory. The military interference of Pakistan in Kashmir disputed the entire region. The Kashmiri Muslim leader Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, supported the accession of Kashmir by free India.

After 1949, the United Nations called for a meeting where India and Pakistan could meet each other and resolve the crisis in Kashmir. In February 1950, the UN Security Council asked both countries to withdraw their armed forces from Kashmir. As before, both sides blamed each other. India asked Pakistan to withdraw their troops first, while Pakistan

demanded that the National Conference government be removed immediately from office. India had begun to criticize Pakistan by taking the matter to United Nations. Meanwhile, the Indian Constitution came into effect in January 1950. From the very beginning, the Constitution guaranteed Kashmir a certain amount of autonomy; Article 370 specified that the President of India would consult the state government regarding subjects other than defense, foreign affairs, and communications (Gupta, 1966). It is important to point out that, from 1950 onward, a serving Prime Minister observed that “for Pakistan, Kashmir is a vital necessity; for India, it is an imperialistic adventure” (Brecher, 1953, p. 111). In the summer of 1950, the well-known British broadcaster Lionel Fielden visited the subcontinent. Fielden was a former head of All-India Radio and had many friends in India and Pakistan. He observed that the tone of the Indian press ‘tends to be a little patronizing,’ and, on the other hand, “the tone of the Pakistan Press and Pakistani leaders tend to be resentful, arrogant and sometimes aggressive” (Guha, 2007, p. 243). Fielden summarized the respective points of view: “In clinging to Kashmir, India wants to weaken Partition; in claiming it, Pakistan wants to make Partition safe”. He warned both countries that “the most important thing [about the Kashmir conflict was] the expense in armaments in which both countries are getting involved. This means that social services in both countries are crippled, and since both countries, apart from their refugees, have millions of the poorest people in the world, it is easy to see how this can lead to disaster” (Fielden, 1950). The United Nations tried hard to resolve the problem but failed to arrive at a solution. The Pakistani Prime Minister dismissed the government of Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir; in response, Nehru noted that the Pakistani press is full of religious appeal and patronized the Jihad in Kashmir. In 1950, the maps of the Government of India claimed that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir was part of the Indian territory. New Delhi claimed that in October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh had signed a document acceding to India. On 29 September 1950, Sheikh Abdullah met the American ambassador, Loy Henderson. In discussing the future of Kashmir, Abdullah told Henderson that “In his opinion, it should be independent; that overwhelming majority of the population desires that independence; that he had reason to believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders desired independence and would be willing to cooperate with leaders of National conference if there was reasonable chance such cooperation would result in independence. The Kashmiri people could not understand why the UN consistently ignored independence as a possible solution. They had a language and cultural background of their own. The Kashmiri Hindus, by custom and tradition, are widely different from Hindus in India, and the background of

Muslims is quite different from Muslims in Pakistan. The fact was that the population of Kashmir was homogeneous despite the presence of Hindu minority” (Bhattacharjee, 1994, pp. 196-197). Sheikh Abdullah went to ask the ambassador whether the US would support an independent Kashmir. Unfortunately, published records do not reveal the US response to that issue. In January 1951, Sheikh Abdullah wrote to the minister of states that, as he understood the matter, the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly would discuss “the question of accession of the State, the question of retention or abolition of the Ruler as the Constitutional Head of the State and the question of framing a constitution for the State including the question of defining the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State” (Guha, 2007, p. 245). Sheikh Abdullah had tried to construct public opinion for a free state of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole but was becoming quite unpopular among the Hindus of the entire Jammu region. In 1949, a *Praja Parishad* (People’s Party) was formed to represent the interests of the Hindus of the valley. It was led by a seventy-year-old veteran, Prem Nath Dogra. But Sheikh Abdullah dismissed it in Jammu as a bunch of ‘reactionaries’ (Puri, 1966). In October 1951, elections were held in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. The *Praja Parishad* decided to contest the election, but their candidates were mostly invalid. In protest of that, they choose to boycott the election. So all 75 seats were won by Abdullah’s National conference. All but three of their candidates remain unopposed (Patel, 1956). Sheikh Abdullah and his party were much stronger in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. At the outset, Sheikh Abdullah addressed the Constituent Assembly for a full ninety minutes. Reading from a printed English text, Sheikh Abdullah discussed the options before the people of Kashmir. The first was to join Pakistan, which was based on a ‘feudal’ theocracy. The second was to join India, with whom the state had a ‘kinship of ideals’. Finally, Abdullah emphasized the making of an Eastern Switzerland, of staying aloof from India and Pakistan but having friendly relations with both. In January 1952, shortly before Abdullah visited Jammu town, a group of Hindu students protested against the National Conference. They were first arrested and later expelled from their college. There was a strong protest against it, which culminated in a march on the secretariat, where demonstrators entered offices, broke furniture, and burnt important records. The police cracked down very hard and imposed a 72-hour curfew. Their young leader, Prem Nath Dogra, was arrested. The government in Delhi was aware but fearful of a countrywide Hindu backlash and persuaded the Kashmiri government to release the leaders. On 10 April 1952, Sheikh Abdullah made a speech in which he said that his party would accept the Indian Constitution. The venue (*Ranbirsinghpur*) of the speech was

significant; it was a town only four miles from the border with Pakistan. As many scholars have argued, “Once, Abdullah had been Nehru’s man in Kashmir. By the summer of 1952, however, it was more that Nehru was Abdullah’s man in India. The Sheikh had made it known that, in his view, only the Prime Minister stood between India and the ultimate victory of Hindu communalism” (Guha, 2007, p. 248). In July 1952, Sheikh Abdullah met Nehru in Delhi and had a round of meetings with other ministers. They made an agreement, popularly known as the Delhi Agreement, whereby Kashmiris would permanently become full citizens of India in exchange for an autonomy far greater than that enjoyed by other states in India. The new state flag (devised by the National Conference) would be flown alongside the national flag. Besides that, Sheikh pressed for greater power in Kashmir. In a long speech in the state’s Constituent Assembly, he argued that the state could only decide what powers to give away to the Union, or what jurisdiction the Supreme Court would have in Kashmir. Further, he told *Yuvraj* Karan Singh, the formal head of the state, that if he did not fall into line, he could choose the way of his father, the deposed Hari Singh. The young Prince said the Sheikh to make detachment from the ‘reactionary elements’ of the state, and to feel the happiness and sorrow of the common man. Meanwhile, the Hindus of Jammu restarted agitation with an interesting slogan: *‘Ek Desh mein Do Vidhan, Do Pradhan, Do Nishan - nahi chalenga, nahi chalenga’* (Two Constitutions, Two Heads of State, Two Flags - these in one State we shall not allow, not allow). The situation became so hostile that the jails of Jammu began to fill with the volunteers of the *Praja Parishad*. The Hindus of Jammu started to detach from the ruling family, Maharaja Hari Singh in particular. At one time, the state of Kashmir had been controlled by the Dogras of Jammu, who were mostly Hindu; now it was controlled by the National Conference, whose leaders were mostly Muslim (Park, 1952). Between 1950-52, as the rest of India became acquainted with the new Constitution and faced its first elections, Jammu and Kashmir were marked by uncertainty on two fronts. There were unresolved relations between the state and the Union and a growing conflict between the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley and the Hindu-dominated Jammu region. Many politicians, such as Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee tried to unite the Hindu people, mainly the Dogras of Jammu. Dr. Mookerjee had left Nehru’s Cabinet and become the founder-president of the *Bhartiya Jana Sangh*. His new party fared poorly at the general election of 1952-- only three of its members were elected to Parliament. In the autumn of 1952, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee visited Jammu and made many speeches supporting Hindus and *Praja Parishad*. In November 1952, the state government moved to Jammu due to heavy snowfall in the

winter. Throughout the winter of 1952/3, the *Praja Parishad* and the state government remained within the periphery of conflict. In January, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookherjee wrote a long letter to Jawaharlal Nehru in support of the *Praja Parishad* and their 'patriotic' struggle to 'merge completely with India' (Guha, 2007). Mookherjee asked Nehru and Abdullah to release the arrested Praja Parishad leaders and convene a conference to discuss the future of Kashmir and resolve the issue. Notably, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had always encouraged, and somehow pressurized Nehru to go to war with Pakistan. It was then summer; tourist season began in the valley. In late April 1953, the American politician Adlai Stevenson visited the Valley. He had come to Kashmir to sail on the famous Dal lake and see the snow but eventually met Sheikh Abdullah. The content of these conversations (they met twice) was not revealed by either side, but a few Indians assumed it was about the independence of Kashmir. On 8th May 1953, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee went from Jammu on a train, to Srinagar. The state government issued orders prohibiting him from entering Kashmir. He violated that order and was arrested. He was taken to Srinagar Jail. In early June 1953, he fell ill; he had pain in one of his legs accompanied by a fever. On 22 June 1953, he had a massive heart attack and died the following day (Madhok, 1969). On 24 June, an Indian Air Force plane flew Dr. Mookerjee's body back to his hometown, Calcutta. In the 1950s, as in the 1940s, the Valley of Kashmir was troubled and unsettled. The Maharaja of Kashmir was primarily responsible for the conflict in the 1940s. He refused to accede to either Pakistan or India while there was still time. The ambiguous attitudes of Sheikh Abdullah and S. P. Mookerjee were also responsible for the troubles of the 1950s. They were neither satisfied with any fixed matter nor did they play a progressive role in the constitutional democracy of India. Many Indian scholars have expressed that "The developments of 1952-3 had raised sharp questions about India's moral claim to the Valley. Six years had elapsed since the invasion 1947-enough time for the world to forget it, and to remember only that the Valley was Muslim and so was Pakistan. Besides, the Kashmiri leader so long paraded as Indian's own had now been put into jail by the Indian government" (Guha, 2007, p. 259). It is noteworthy to say that a British writer and intellectual, Philip Spratt, had proposed a radically different solution. He said that "India must abandon its claims to the Valley and allow the Sheikh his dream of independence. It should withdraw its armies and write off its loans to the government of Jammu and Kashmir" (Guha, 2007, p. 259). Spratt has also expressed that "Let Kashmir go ahead, alone and adventurously in her explorations of a secular state". He believed that Indian policy was based on a 'mistaken

belief' of one-nation theory and a grasping attitude towards the 'beautiful and strategic valley of Srinagar'. However, after a long discussion, it can be argued that since 1940, Kashmir has become a burning issue for India's relations with Pakistan; Spratt's solution can hardly be applied. Due to its geopolitical location, Kashmir is still a territory of relevance in Indian land.

War and Peace in India-China Relations

As the Burmese independence activist and revolutionary Aung San has stated, "A divided India augurs ill not only for the Indian people but also for all Asia and world peace". This is true for India and its conflicted territory. The India-China conflict and a full scale-war heavily affected Nehru's foreign policy in particular. On the last day of March 1959, the Buddhist monk Dalai Lama crossed the McMahon Line (India's border with China) into the territory of the Republic of India. One reliable source claimed that there were half a million Chinese troops in Tibet; and in their wake, they had come perhaps ten times as many Han settlers (Patterson, 1959). In 1958 the Khampas of eastern Tibet made an armed uprising against the occupiers. After some initial measures, the revolt was put down by the Chinese. The Dalai Lama spent his first day on Indian soil at a famous Buddhist monastery at Tawang. Then he visited the Assam town Tezpur, where Indian officials 'debriefed' him. After three weeks he was taken to New Delhi to meet the Prime Minister of India. The Dalai Lama earnestly told Nehru that any reforms in Tibet should be undertaken by Tibetans themselves in keeping with their religion and traditions. He was hopeful about Tibet's independence with India's help. In response, Nehru said that India could not start a war with China for Tibet's freedom. In this context, the Dalai Lama was looking for cooperation and assistance from the west, but the Americans and Europeans had no real sympathy or kindness for his people or his cause; instead, they wanted to exploit Tibet in their Cold War with the Soviet Union (Guha, 2007). From the very beginning, Nehru wanted to solve the Tibetan problem through a peaceful settlement rather than resorting to war with China. It is now noteworthy to say that India-China relations have had multiple parameters and the 1962 war was one of them. It is necessary to judge Indo-China relations from the very beginning.

Nehru's policy towards China was based on the synthesis of idealism and realism. He tried to aim for stability in the policy towards China. China has emerged as a great superpower in the global context. Pandit Nehru was able to view the communist revolution in China from a broad historical perspective. China emerged in the global context not only as a

strong political power but also as an economic power. India was unable to defend both Pakistan and China. Nehru was aware of the fact that any military action in China to defend Tibet in 1950 would constitute a great disaster for India. So, India did not have the power to defend China in the Tibet region. For the Indian army, it was difficult to cross the High Himalayas to move to Tibet and to fight in the Chinese-Tibetan frontier. Nehru tried to extend friendship and cooperate with China because both countries were trying to construct economically and politically stable nations. So, Nehru was completely aware of the cooperation and friendship between India and China. The long-term cooperation between India and China was necessary not only for the two countries but also for the interest of world politics. Both India and China emphasized economic development. Nehru's policy was based on non-confrontation. Hence the possibility of confrontation was delayed and most probably avoided. Nehru tried to project his own idealism into contemporary Chinese politics and foreign policy. He regarded the Chinese communist revolution as a nationalist movement in a broader sense. So he tried to construct a policy that would make an equilibrium.

Mao Zedong and his followers refused to accept the independence of India and harshly criticized Nehru and Nehruvian foreign policy. At the time, communist China was actively supporting the communist movement in India. However, China declared that all treaties and agreements signed by previous Chinese governments were invalid. The Chinese government published maps showing large areas of Indian territory as part of China. It declared that Tibet was not a part of the Indian territory but of Chinese territory as claimed by China. But from the very beginning, Nehru was convinced that China had no hostile intentions toward India. So Nehru's foreign policy was based on the norms of friendship and cooperation. Indian foreign policy in the 1950s was primarily based on the principles of friendship, peace, and negotiation.

Nehru believed that with the *Panchsheel* Agreement of 1954 with China, peace could be established between the two countries; however, peace could be established with other Asian countries and the rest of the world, not with China. India-China relations were vastly based upon the idealism of Nehru. In other words, at that stage, Nehru was greatly idealistic about India-China relations. He overlooked China's politico-military threats. With the 1954 treaty, India got the right to continue trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok. Indeed, there was scope for China to stop all kinds of Indo-Tibetan trade. India was in a disadvantageous position with respect to the Indo-Tibetan frontier. China was trying to

strengthen its demand in the Tibetan region. Nehru argued that India didn't need to earn Chinese recognition regarding the Indo-Tibetan frontier. He was trying to secure the demands of India in the Indo-Tibetan frontier.

In 1947, the Tibetan government sent a telegram to the Government of India. At the time, India was trying to continue its relationship with the Tibetan region. After coming to power, the Chinese Communist government declared that it would reopen the treaties signed by all previous Chinese governments. The Chinese government continued to publish old Chinese maps which showed a wide area of India as Chinese territory. However, Nehru tried to maintain peace and stability in the Tibetan region. Nehru wrote letters to Chou En-lai in 1959 saying, "India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China, and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region, I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years and, I thought, settled" (MEA, 1959, p. 49).

Nehru argued that India had gained nothing from the Indo-Tibetan frontier in 1950 or 1954. China had not recognized the McMahon Line, India's relations with Sikkim and Bhutan, or the borders between them and Tibet. It did not recognize the traditional frontier in Ladakh. China had firmly entrenched itself in Tibet, both politically and militarily, and was trying to capture the Tibetan region with the help of its strong military power. At the end of 1959, Nehru expressed doubts regarding the promptness of the policy pursued by them from 1950 to 1954. Many scholars have argued that the Chinese aggression in Tibet was "unprovoked aggression." India was trying to solve the problem peacefully, but Chinese aggression in the region destroyed any scope of peaceful settlement of the Tibet issue. India tried to draw the attention of the world regarding the security problem in Tibet. In 1954, India surrendered all the levers of control to China, following which China tried to impose sovereignty over Chinese Tibet. India recognized complete Chinese sovereignty over the "Tibet region of China" in 1954. So, the decisions taken by India were primarily based on unrealistic politics and programs. The military troops were less inefficient than the troops of China. Short-term strategic thinking was absent in the China policy during the Nehru era. It is

clear from the past records that there was no serious thinking to build mountain troops until 1960. Poor and inefficient land forces were sent up to the high mountains in 1962 to fight against China. Thus, Indian troops were easily defeated by the Chinese. India fought the 1962 war with improper military forces because the government failed to raise mountain and guerilla troops; there was also a shortage of developed roads and other means of communication. At the time, Indian economic resources were limited, but by the fifties, the country's defense expenditure had increased roughly more than threefold. The total defense potential had been completely ignored. Both Nehru and Krishna Menon tried to implement a political policy against China rather than the military policy. The Chinese picket in the Indian territory was backed by a huge military buildup across the whole frontier. But when the Indian territory was backed by the whole frontier, Indian pickets had no such support at all. Pandit Nehru declared that the Indian troops had been ordered to evict Chinese forces from Indian territory, but the capabilities of the Indian armed forces were limited from all corners. Nehru's China policy in the fifties and early sixties was the result of his idealistic assessment of China's policy towards India. The Chinese occupation of Tibet and other portions of India automatically constructed a new foreign and defense policy against China. In conclusion, there was a huge imbalance between the idealism and the realism of Nehru's China policy. Nehru's short-term China policy actually 'harmed' the national interest. Nonetheless, the Indian defeat in the 1962 border war subsequently raised the question of India's efficiency in Border Wars.

Nehru and the Goa Issue

In his Goa policy, Nehru took his political idealism to a more realist standpoint. He not only followed a policy of negotiation for the freedom of Goa from 1947 onwards but also firmly committed India to a more peaceful policy without any aggression. India's policy towards Goa, as Nehru said in 1954, was:

1. That we may not abandon or permit any degradation of our identification with the cause of our compatriots under Portuguese rule;
2. Equally, we may not adopt, advocate or deliberately bring about situations of violence (Nehru, 1961, p. 108).

The Portuguese government had started to augment its military strength; however, the Government of India never thought about military intervention in Goa. It was painful for India, but it nevertheless tried to reinforce peace in the issue of Goa. From 1947 to 1960, Nehru repeatedly emphasized the policy of strict non-violence concerning Goa. In December 1961, Goa was freed from the Portuguese regime by the Indian armed forces. But it raised questions about the military intervention in the state. The Indian policy on Goa was based on “waiting and exercising some patience”. India was trying to make an honorable settlement over the Goa problem. In the initial stages, military action was indeed quite necessary, but Nehru was firmly committed to the peace policy. The Government of India tried its best to liberate Goa from the Portuguese regime. From 1955 onwards, batches of Indian *Satyagrahis* tried to cross into Goa, but many of them were shot down by the Portuguese Government. There was a freedom struggle inside Goa, so its condition was highly anarchical. Furthermore, African nationalist leaders fighting against the Portuguese regime in Africa were putting pressure on Nehru to take strong action in Goa, because they believed that the regime in Goa helped the Portuguese government to suppress African nationalism. From the mid-fifties, some collaboration had started between Pakistan and the Portuguese authorities in Goa. This posed a new threat to the security of the Indian state. Furthermore, Portugal’s membership of NATO, in particular, the 1955 Dulles-Cunha statement regarding NATO’s responsibility for ‘overseas Portuguese possessions’, indicated Goa’s possible military and political involvement in the Cold War. The inflexibility and intransigence of the Portuguese regime during the colonization period, the attitude of the French, and their peaceful withdrawal from their colonies in India changed Nehru completely. He realized that the idealistic approach he adopted toward the Goa question would not prove beneficial for India. In 1961, the Portuguese authorities in Goa provoked India through military action. All these factors changed Nehru’s position as a Prime Minister who then modified his position according to the situation.

Although India was not interested in military action in Goa, the provocation from the Portuguese regime forced India to take real military action. Nehru did not personally decide on the exact date and nature of action in Goa; he was hesitant to take action at the last moment. But Nehru approved the line of action, and finally changed his decision and policy of adopting only peaceful methods in Goa.

In 1955, Nehru evaluated colonial problems like that of Goa. He also revisited the Portuguese colony of Macao off the Chinese coast. The colony problem had not been solved and would take a long time. Most importantly, the military action in Goa in 1961 represented a major shift in Nehru's foreign policy in general. Nehru was too idealistic and depended on peaceful foreign policy. The Goa factor was the ultimate consequence of Nehru's idealism. He constantly fought colonialism and foreign oppression on Indian soil. From the idealist point of view, he was against military intervention in Goa. Nehru argued that in Goa "something has been lost in terms of our philosophy of peaceful solution to all such problems" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 244). Although the peaceful policy in Goa was necessary at the initial stage, the military action in 1961 was no less imperative. Without the military action in Goa, Goa would not have been free from the Portuguese regime. So, from the Nehruvian point of view, there was a synthesis between idealism and realism in Goa.

Jawaharlal Nehru and India's Role in Non-alignment

Jawaharlal Nehru was undoubtedly a popular figure in terms of world affairs and peace not only in India but also outside it. Many scholars have argued that "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India, was not only a great revered leader of the Indian people, but largely the architect of India's destiny during the seventeen years he was its undisputed leader and Prime Minister" (Anand, 2016, p. 89). One of his biographers has rightly pointed out that Nehru "played a decisive role in the history of the twentieth century as a leader of the Indian people, as a representative of the new mood of Asia, and as a spokesman of the international conscience" (Sarvepalli, 1976, p. 5). Furthermore, Nehru's political biographer, Michael Brecher asserted that "few statesmen in the twentieth century have attained the status of Jawaharlal Nehru. As the pre-eminent figure in India's era of transition, he bears comparison with Roosevelt and Churchill, Lenin and Mao, men who towered above their colleagues and guided their people through a period of national crisis. Only Gandhi inspired greater faith and adoration among the masses. Only Stalin, perhaps, had greater power. Like these outstanding men of the age, he has also imposed his personality on a wider canvas. He is for many a symbol of Asia's political awakening and the outstanding spokesman of 'the middle way' in a world of ideological crusade. His name conjures up a host of associations, some praiseworthy, some critical...Yet friends and foes alike recognize him as a leading actor on the stage of contemporary history" (Brecher, 1959, p. 595). Nehru was a lawyer by training, not by profession. As Foreign Minister of India and

chief spokesman of the newly independent Asian countries, he influenced the development of international law in pragmatic terms. There is no doubt about Nehru's tremendous influence on the formulation and implementation of India's foreign policy. In Brecher's words— "In no other state does one man dominate foreign policy as does Nehru in India. Indeed so overwhelming is his influence that India's policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of Pandit Nehru. And justifiably so, for Nehru is the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and voice of his country's policy towards the outside world" (Brecher, 1959, p. 564). The central theme of this segment is comprised of Nehru's foreign policy toward the world and his prominent notion of non-alignment. Nehru was well-trained in the Indian ethos by his political guru, Mahatma Gandhi; similarly, Nehru was well-equipped to play a significant role in the re-awakening of India and Asia and taking their rightful, non-aligned position in international relations.

Nehru's Perception of India- The end of the Second World War largely brought an end to colonialism in the world at large. Colonialism, in another sense, was marked by the 'Europeanization' of the non-European parts of the world. Europe was devastated and fragmented due to the two World Wars. So, a 'divided, warring, and weakened Europe' could not manage to dominate Asia permanently. The European powers which had successfully dominated the world for three hundred years had been pushed aside and were no longer at the center of the world stage. Out of the ruins of the world of 1939-1945 emerged the United States and the Soviet Union with enough strength to dominate the world and divide it into favorable 'blocks'. Nonetheless, after the collapse of colonialism, there emerged numerous independent countries in Asia and Africa. In this context, India under the dynamic and progressive leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru played a significant role in the liberation of Asia and Africa. Many scholars have argued that Nehru was "the most articulate spokesman for a deep-seated urge to reassert Asia's rightful place in the world community" (Brecher, 1959, p. 593). Nehru was aware of his role and position in India and sincerely highlighted his perception of India in emerging Asia. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly of India on 8 March 1949, Nehru said, "when we talk of Asia, remember that India, not because of any ambition of hers, but because of the force of circumstances, because of geography, because of history and because of so many other things, inevitably has to play a very important part in Asia. And not only that; India becomes a kind of meeting ground for various trends and forces and a meeting ground between what might roughly be called the East and the West" (Nehru, 1949, pp. 232-233). So, it is very clear from Nehru's speeches not only that India

played a significant role in Asia but that her history has been governed by geographical factors and other factors. In one of his speeches during the 1949 American tour, Nehru said, "India's pivotal position between Western Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East made it the crossroads of that part of the world. India is the central point of the Asian picture...India's role of leadership may not be so welcome to others although it may satisfy our vanity. We cannot escape the various responsibilities that arise out of our geography and history." From the very beginning, Nehru has glorified the role of India in terms of global leadership and world peace.

Nehru Calls Asian Relations Conference- Even before India's independence, Nehru called the Asian Relations Conference to prove that the 'imperialism' of Europe was over and all kinds of dominations dismantled; the narrow walls have fallen and we can look again at one another and meet our old friends as before. In this Conference, Nehru urged for unity among the Asian nations that were in the iron cage of colonialism and imperialism. As Nehru insisted that "In this atomic age, Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part. There is today conflict in many countries, and all of us in Asia are full of our own troubles. Nevertheless, the whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful, and the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace" (Nehru, 1949, p. 302). Nehru further stressed that India and Asia must help and assist one another to achieve the political freedom they deserve. Here Nehru stated that "We of Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to their rightful place in the human family. The freedom that we envisage is not to be confined to this notion or that of a particular people but must spread out over the whole human race" (Nehru, 1949, p. 303). Nehru tried to constitute a country where people would bother about their own freedom and concern themselves with the international community as well. Acting as a representative of the newly independent Asian countries, he also acted as a propagator of anti-colonialism and freedom in many parts of the world. The end of colonialism all over the world was his principal goal because he and the country deemed colonialism as a permanent form of aggression and intolerance under the circumstances of international law, which would no longer be tolerated. Hence, Nehru was an idealist who not only united India against the evils of colonialism but also united the colonized countries of Asia and Africa against imperialism, colonialism, and unfreedom.

Racialism Decried- As far as racialism is concerned, Nehru and India strongly opposed racialism and colonialism which are complementary to each other. The western world and its civilization have presented themselves as a 'superior race' to rule and civilize the so-called 'inferior races'-- the Asiatics and the Africans (Thomas, 1927). After the end of the Second World War, the situation started to change, and the world community pledged not to support racialism anymore. Unfortunately, racialism continued even after the independence of Asian and African states like South Africa and Rhodesia. Nehru strongly condemned this practice in unmistakable terms, especially the treatment given to Indians and black people as 'second-class citizens' in South Africa. Nehru said - "It is a matter which concerns us all. It is not merely a question of Indians or South Africans, but it is a matter of vital significance to the world. If that is to continue in the world, then there is bound to be conflict and conflict on a big scale, because it is a continuous challenge to the self-respect of a vast number of people in the world and they will not put up with it. The matter is thus before the United Nations and I hope the United Nations will help in its solution...There cannot be a shadow of a doubt that if such a policy is continued, it will breed conflict. And that conflict will not be confined to particular areas in South Africa or elsewhere; it will affect peoples in vast continents" (Nehru, 1949, p. 265). Jawaharlal Nehru expressed that the doctrine of 'master race' and racialism dominating others can no longer be tolerated and can only lead to vast social conflicts. In the UN General Assembly on 3rd November 1948, he said, "Obviously there are large regions of the world which have suffered from this question of racial inequality. We also feel that there is no part of the world where it can be tolerated in the future, except perhaps because of superior force. If racial inequality is practiced if it is a menace to world peace, and if it violates the United Nations Charter, to tolerate it is obviously to sow the seed of conflict" (Nehru, 1949, p. 319). From the very beginning, Nehru and his modern India were very much concerned about the ill effects of racialism which has dominated the world for a long time.

Nehru Pleads for Peace and Condemns Nuclear Weapons and Tests- Jawaharlal Nehru deeply respects international law and peace collectively. Similarly, he had proposed keeping international peace and security in the text of the Indian Constitution. The Constitution of India, in Part IV relating to the Directive Principles of State Policy, (considered 'as a commandment to the Union of India' (Rao, 1993), provides in Article 51:

The State shall endeavor to -

- (a) Promote international peace and security;
- (b) maintain just and honorable relations between nations;
- (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and
- (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.

Nehru tried to maintain these principles in his domestic policies and foreign policy. Although Nehru was not a pacifist, (India had to use force several times for the protection of its interests) he believed in peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes and desired to avoid war as far as possible. Nehru made it very clear that “The objectives of our foreign policy are the preservation of world peace and enlargement of human freedom. Two tragic wars have demonstrated the futility of warfare. Victory without the will to peace achieves no lasting result and victor and the vanquished alike suffer from deep and grievous wounds and a common fear of the future.” Nehru was particularly against war in the atomic age, which could result in unimaginable destruction. In this context, Nehru said, “This age we live in has been called the atomic age. Vast new sources of energy are being tapped but instead of thinking of them in terms of service and betterment of mankind, men’s thoughts turn to destructive purposes. Destruction by these new and terrible weapons of war can only lead to unparalleled disaster for all concerned and yet people talk lightly of war and bend their energies to prepare for it. A very distinguished American said the other day that the use of atom bomb might well be likened to setting a house on fire in order to rid it of some insects and termites” (Nehru, 1953, p. 120). Furthermore, Nehru appealed to the leaders of America and Russia to stop all kinds of nuclear test explosions to show the world that they were determined to end the disaster and were willing for a disarmed world. Nehru was a true architect of world peace and disarmament. Nehru’s idea of peace and world brotherhood has been best reflected in his idea of non-alignment.

Power Blocs and India’s Policy of Non-alignment- Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized India’s role in the non-alignment movement. In the non-alignment movement, India’s position was extremely significant. India’s role was vital for the successful implementation of the movement. Nehru argued that India not only occupied the most significant position in

Asia but also acted as a meeting ground between the East and the West. India's vast size was also significant in bringing together the movement of non-alignment. Being a big territory full of natural resources, the Indian nation was inspired not to join any kind of alignment. India was never the camp follower of any other country or group of countries. Nehru understood that some smaller states in Europe were seeking military alliances with bigger states, but being a big state there was no reason to join any alliance or group of nations.

The economic development of India greatly influenced its foreign policy. In the ultimate analysis, foreign policy was the outcome of economic policy. Nehru primarily emphasized the establishment of world peace. He also tried to oppose the polarization of international relations, the Cold War, and military alliances. He tried to avoid all kinds of war and conflict. He also stressed India's primary interest in economic development. Nehru followed his conciliatory policies towards China and Pakistan. To him, the most important prerequisite for economic development was peace at the borders. He tried to maintain peace on the borders for the successful development of India. The policy of non-alignment helped India collect foreign aid and economic assistance. Nehru tried to maintain the policy of equilibrium and equidistance from all foreign nations. Nehru realized that the policy of nonalignment was necessary for the economic development of India. The non-alignment movement was closely associated with the domestic factors of the nation. Nehru expressed in *India's Foreign Policy*, "The internal policy and the foreign policy of a country affect each other. They should, broadly, be in line with each other, and have to be integrated. By and large, there has been in India an attempt at this integration." Nehru primarily emphasized both external and internal policies in India.

Non-alignment helped the process of state-building in India with the stabilization of the diverse political forces in the country. The non-alignment movement also helped the process of rapid economic development in the country. Furthermore, Nehru's policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union and China greatly contributed not only in the field of foreign policy but also in the field of domestic policy. It is quite significant that in the timeframe of 1949-1950, both the Soviet Union and China were hostile to the Government of India. In the Nehru era, the policy of non-alignment nourished Indian Foreign Policy and strengthened the domestic policies of the Indian state. India managed to play a significant role in the situations of the diplomacy of big powers, the possibility of nuclear warfare, the emergence of Asia and Africa, and the rise of Pakistan and communist China. India had

managed to become neutral in these situations. In the given situation, the policy of non-alignment was the most rational foreign policy strategy to avoid war and nuclear conflict— it strengthened the role of the United Nations, prompted the solidarity of the Afro-Asian countries, and opened up a new area of world affairs (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). India was trying to lead world affairs through the new policies of non-alignment and non-conflict in the contemporary situation. Although India was not enriched with the required economic and military strength, it led the world towards a new sphere of non-alignment. Nehru rightly expressed in 1960, “So far as India is concerned, placed as she was historically and geographically, it would have been quite astonishingly foolish to fall into this business of the Cold War, either on grounds of principle or on grounds of expediency” (Nehru, 1961, p. 83). Nehru was the only Indian political thinker who strengthened the ‘metaphysical trend’ of modern Indian thinking in international relations. He was influenced by the idealistic tradition of the Indian National Movement. Nehru had a basic approach to world affairs in general; Indian Foreign Policy in particular was completely influenced by the Gandhian tradition. The vision and political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi influenced Nehru to a great extent, and he constantly applied this political vision and knowledge in the non-alignment movement.

After the Second World War, the world was divided into two power blocks, one was led by the United States and another was by the Soviet Union. The two blocs claimed to be “driven by the needs of self-defense, by noble intentions, by fear of ignoble aggression of the other”; the two super antagonists, even as they talked of peace, were engaged in the preparation for war (Mills, 1960). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, both the USA and USSR concluded numerous collective ‘self-defense’ alliances, relying on their ideological allies rather than on the United Nations’ ‘collective security’ system. More interestingly, they not only acquired the most ‘fearful weapons’, but also engaged in frightening each other extensively. Similar to all past wars, small, newly independent states, and international law could do nothing except helplessly watch the new ‘Cold War’ loom large. It is noteworthy to say that, Jawaharlal Nehru, even at the great risk of annoying the two superpowers, refused to leave and surrender India’s newly won independence, join one of the power blocs, and become their ‘camp follower’ in the hope of some unforeseeable fortune. Nehru was very specific in this context and argued that the policy of alignment would be bad and harmful. He asserted: “I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the great

powers and becoming practically satellites of those powers because they cannot help it. The power opposed to them is so great and they have nowhere to turn. But I do not think that consideration applies to India” (Nehru, 1949, pp. 214-215). Insisting that India need not be afraid of the great powers, Nehru said, “our policy is not a passive and negative policy”. Non-alignment did not mean ‘neutrality’ because neutrality has little meaning, except in times of war. In Nehru’s view, the purpose of the policy was to “... help as best as it (India) can to maintain world peace and also avoid, as far as possible, entanglements in world conflicts. Whether that is possible or not is another question; how far our influence can make a difference to world force is still another question. I do not pretend to say that India, as she is, can make a vital difference in world affairs” (Nehru, 1953, p. 144). Although there was political and economic weakness, an ‘uncommitted India’ could still play a necessary and important role in making bridges between the two blocs. Thus India would not only serve its own vital interests but also serve the interests of all states. By keeping herself from any kind of alignment, India was trying to maintain peace on one hand, and, on the other, it was trying to avoid any kind of warfare in the world. Very ‘essentially’, Nehru has further claimed and clarified, non-alignment ‘is freedom of action, which is part of independence’. It is noteworthy to say that he was not against the value of great powers but that he primarily favored small and non-aligned countries in the world. Nehru further clarified that ‘non-alignment is freedom of action which is a part of independence’. Hence, he easily united the small and independent states of Asia and Africa and became a role model of peace, freedom, and cooperation. It is also significant that Nehru was strongly opposed to Western-sponsored alliances like SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955)– by including Pakistan as a member of both the treaties, they brought the Cold War very close to India, thereby endangering India’s security. However, Nehru emphasized the importance of peaceful settlements of international disputes. Along with China, in a treaty on Tibet signed in 1954, he formulated five principles of peaceful coexistence or ‘*Panchsheel*, ’as they were called. Nehru formulated these principles to strengthen the notion of non-alignment. Based on Article 2 of the United Nations charter, the principles as envisaged by Nehru were laid down in the bilateral treaty are:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;

4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful coexistence.

If these principles were followed by the states then, he believed, “a great deal of the trouble of the present-day world would disappear” (Nehru, 1957, pp. 262-263). In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, on December 20, 1956, Nehru clearly stated that “We have, as we know, all kinds of military alliances. I am quite sure that at the moment, as we stand today, all these pacts and military alliances are completely out of place. They are unnecessary even from the point of view of those people who think they benefit from them. I may admit for the sake of argument that they were necessary at an earlier stage when conditions were different, but in the circumstances of today, I do submit that these pacts and alliances do not add to the strength of any nation. They only create hostility, leading to a piling up of armaments and making disarmament more and more difficult”. So, Nehru was conscious of the trajectories of military alliances and wanted that all modern states act in terms of peace and disarmament. Similarly in a speech at an Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 22 April 1955, Nehru said, “I want the countries here to realize it and not to think in terms of any limitation. Today, a war, however limited it may be, is bound to lead to a big war. Even if tactical atomic weapons, as they are called, are used, the next step would be the use of the big atomic bomb. You cannot stop these things. In a country’s life-and-death struggle, it is not going to stop short of this. It is not going to decide on our or anybody else’s resolutions but it would engage in war, ruin, and annihilation of others before it allows itself to be annihilated. Annihilation will result not only in the countries engaged in war but owing in the radioactive waves which go thousands and thousands of miles it will destroy everything. That is the position. It is not an academic position; it is not a position of discussing ideologies; nor is it a position of discussing history. It is looking at the world as it is today”. Hence, Nehru was very much aware of the disasters and ruins of atomic war—again, his enlightened role in non-alignment is validated. As discussed earlier, India has acted more or less as a spokesman for the world’s newly independent countries. But in the Cold War tension, both the USA and USSR used their veto powers to stop the entry of new states to the United Nations. Nehru believed in the universal membership of the United Nations. In 1955, during the visit to India of Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin of the Soviet Union, Nehru raised the question of the Soviet veto of the admission of 18 countries to the United Nations. Recognizing India’s importance and Nehru’s bright role in the world, the

Soviet leaders agreed to withdraw the Soviet veto and permit the entry of all new states except Mongolia and Japan. Consequently, many new Asian and African states joined the world organization (Anand, 2016). This was the success of Nehru's foreign policy and policy of non-alignment. The non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa formed an important consortium within the United Nations, called the 'Group of 77'. Hence, without making any coalitions or alignment, Nehru and India were successful in uniting the new states for a better and more peaceful world.

Conclusion

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the concepts of anti-imperialism and anti-racism. The kernel of his foreign policy was anti-imperialism and anti-racism. The two principles were the basic determinants of Nehruvian non-alignment. Nehru always criticized imperialism in the West and deeply trusted Asian friendship through not only 'military alliances,' but also common policies towards Asia and Africa in general. Nehru criticized the Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe many times. He was quite sympathetic to China and criticized Western imperialism in China. Nehru was also sympathetic toward the communist revolution in China. His foreign policies were based on the concept of 'Asianism'. The most significant aspect of his foreign policy was 'ideological independence'. Through Non-alignment, Nehru tried to become ideologically independent. He never tried to construe the policy of Non-alignment as "Nehru's Policy". He remained ideologically independent and tried to stand by the Asian and African countries. Non-alignment was determined by the basic elements of India's foreign policy and Nehru tried to construct the rationality of the non-alignment movement. In this sense, he was responsible for the successful implementation of the movement; Indian Foreign Policy in the Nehru era was strong and nonaligned. Several scholars have argued that Indian Foreign Policy was as potent as that of the Western nations. India was completely neutral in the Nehru era, and the entire foreign policy was based on the economic development of the Indian state. Nonetheless, Nehru was a pioneer of both state policy and foreign policy of India since its independence.

Chapter-IV

Indira Gandhi: Pragmatism and Peace

Chapter-IV

Indira Gandhi: Pragmatism and Peace

The name of Indira Gandhi undoubtedly stands out as one of the most illustrious of Prime Ministers independent India has witnessed. Born and nurtured in luxury she was exempt from socio-economic insecurities throughout her life. However, the realities of her early and personal life concocted hardships and insecurities of a different kind, which later went to shape her political career as well. The prolonged illness of her mother and the political activism of her father marked her childhood with loneliness. Completing her education in *Santiniketan* and Geneva, she however failed to secure a seat at Oxford. Her unsuccessful marriage gave rise to further loneliness and frustration in her life. Of her two sons – the elder, *Rajiv Gandhi*, after completing his education in Cambridge, settled down as a pilot in the Indian Airlines. Her younger son, *Sanjay Gandhi*, however, was not too successful in his career.

This is not to overlook the legacy of the Nehru family she presided over, carried, and nurtured with pride. Furthermore, she was greatly influenced by the Nehruvian legacy as well, as evident from her political career, especially in the initial years. Despite this, she felt the need to bridge the wide gap between her public and personal life, in the light of her own personal hardships noted above.

Being the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru and the granddaughter of *Motilal Nehru*, she came in close contact with numerous luminaries from all over the world. She was to a large extent influenced and shaped by her father in her political orientation and understanding of the political realities of contemporary times. After she became the Prime Minister, she was seen as Nehru's political heir as well. For her, Nehru's death meant the loss of her friend, philosopher, and guide – was a major setback for her, despite which she continued to hold on to his image and teachings for a greater part of her political career.

Indira Gandhi was more actively involved in foreign affairs than her immediate predecessor. As Nehru's daughter, Gandhi had a very rare privilege to see and explore the outside world. At their luxurious house in Allahabad, she was surrounded by books and grew

up in a rich intellectual atmosphere. It is very interesting to note that she was carrying the legacies of her father and grandfather which were deeply rooted in 20th century West. Many scholars have argued that her own extended sojourn in the West further contributed to the enhancement of her understanding of the same. Contemporary Europe was marked by intense turmoil in the light of the Spanish Civil War, the call for Nazism and Fascism and Soviet-led popular mass movements (Kapur, 2009). However, she inculcated various positive Western virtues that she later applied in the Indian political context. In a letter to Nehru from Europe she praised the European Socialistic tradition and made a serious attack on British imperialism. It is noteworthy that, Indira Gandhi had openly declared in one of her letters to Nehru that Fascism “seems to be spreading like flames” (Frank, 2001, p. 119). In another letter, she tried to justify the Soviet decision to sign the Soviet–German pact. Gandhi asserted that “Munich, England and France proved definitely on which side they stood. Russia’s policy of collective security having failed, she retired into her pre-Litvinov isolation, and her chief preoccupation was bound to be how to keep herself out of the impending European war” (Gandhi, 2004, p. xvii). This was a standard argument among the European intellectuals and had gained popularity among the Indians in Europe because it highlighted British responsibility not only in Europe but in colonial India as well. The official hostess to dignified guests and foreign delegates at the Prime Minister’s residence and a travel partner in her father’s official visits abroad, she had the rare opportunity to garner additional knowledge on diplomacy, power, international events, and actors, unlike her Indian political contemporaries. Thus, from a very young age, she was well-versed in world affairs and the stances of global leaders. Her stay in London brought her in contact with a set of radicals through *Krishna Menon* – including *Feroze Gandhi* (her future husband), *P. N. Haksar* (her future Secretary) a student at the London School of Economics; a journalist like *Nikhil Chakravarty* (student at Oxford) and *Mohan Kumarmanglam* (a student at Cambridge). All of them were proponents of Marxist thought and were well-known among Indian intellectuals residing in Europe in the 1930s and remained so even after the independence of India in 1947. It is noteworthy that, when at the pinnacle of power, Gandhi continued to be guided by the ideas of her father and surrounded herself with a “Kitchen Cabinet” largely composed of left-wing intellectuals. The group comprised of leftists and committed Marxists like – *Romesh Thapar*, *I.K. Gujral*, *Nandini Sathpathy*, *Pitambar Pant*, *Dinesh Singh*, *C. Subramaniam*, etc (Kapur, 2009). However, they were not involved so much in the theoretical realm of contending ideas and tried to detach themselves from the ‘nitty-gritty’ of power

politics, unlike the London circle. Gandhi could hardly keep herself aloof from politics given the larger political environment she lived in; this aided her to make the Congress Party quite strong than the earlier leaders. Her personality was strong enough to defend the numerous challenges and controversies that abound her in the later parts of her life and career. In the following sections, we will try to explore the novelty of her personality and the uniqueness of her leadership style, especially in terms of foreign policy and her contributions to world peace.

Character and Personality

Indira Gandhi's character and personality were a marked contrast to her father, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. She owned a character and possessed a personality that enshrined the countless complexities of her entire life (Thapar, 1991). Being born and brought up in a joint family and despite being surrounded by relatives, she chose a lonely life with a father, often away either in prison or highly involved in politics. She further did not have a close affinity with her famous aunt, *Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit*. In her early days, Gandhi can be said to have been overwhelmed by politics, books and an intellectual father and an enlightened grandfather. However, she failed to take after her ancestral intellectuality induced by an advanced educational tradition completely. It is noteworthy to say that Nehru's efforts to obtain entry for her into Oxford completely failed (Kapur, 2009). In other words, she did not qualify for this renowned institution. The same was noticeable in the case of her sons, Rajiv and Sanjay who too did not excel in higher education. And yet, as a part of a powerful, affluent, and political family, they had all the facilities and all the opportunities to make their life prosperous. Indira Gandhi's character was thus initially different from the members of her family. She married *Feroze Gandhi* against the wishes and desires of her father but soon alienated herself from him by taking over the responsibilities of looking after Nehru (Kapur, 2009). She expressed to Dorothy Norman in 1954-55, "I am in the midst of a domestic crisis... I have been and am deeply unhappy in my domestic life" (Frank, 2001, p. 119). On the other hand, Gandhi was optimistic about her son Rajiv, who was interested in quiet and comfortable marital life in the fixed company of an Italian wife and two children. On the other side *Sanjay*, was highly ambitious in all terms, especially politically. In many cases, Sanjay was noted to be quite contrary to his surrounding especially his mother, Indira Gandhi. *Sanjay's* wife *Maneka Gandhi* was utterly fearless and sometimes noted to have openly defied her mother-in-law and announced her diverse political ambitions (Kapur,

2009). This throws light on Gandhi's family life infested with complexities and ambiguities. Her insecurities were further aggravated by her mother's death and the innumerable situations of serious illnesses she herself suffered from, including tuberculosis. Hence, in this light, it can be argued that no other prime minister of India had to suffer so much in their personal life as Indira Gandhi.

The course of her political career and premiership was shrouded with diverse difficulties, problems and controversies. The first challenge was the absence of Pandit Nehru as a mentor around her, post her appointment as the Indian Prime Minister. Very interestingly, as *Raj Thapar* has observed, "in the first year, Indira was shaky. It was then that we noticed her reluctance to trust people, particularly those in the government," and thus *Thapar* discovered that Indira Gandhi "never wanted to reveal her hand or her mind on anything" (Thapar, 1991, p. 267). Gandhi's self-confidence and resilience have been reflected throughout her tenure. *M. O. Mathai*, who knew her very well, had expressed that – "She will play a different type of politics – the politics of manoeuvre, manipulation and deception" with "no loyalty to anyone except to herself" (Mathai, 1978). Gandhi can therefore be painted as an exceptional, self-sufficient political personality, always relying above all, on her own abilities. *Satish Gujral*, a well-known artist, was critical of Gandhi and arrived at the conclusion that she was – "an embittered woman concealing vengeful and arrogant traits" (Gujral, 1997, p. 178). It is noteworthy that, Gandhi had a great distrust of others that no important decisions were taken collectively. She did not even show much trust in her advisers as well. Her occasional falling silent completely during meetings, impeded the understanding of her actual desire or willingness. This led many to term her the "Dumb Doll" during the first few months of her mandate. It can be argued that while Nehru was unsuspecting and non-aggressive, his beloved daughter, the first female Prime Minister of India, exhibited traits of suspicion and aggressiveness. But it is interesting to note that despite the negative traits of her character, she had successfully projected herself as a national leader of modern India. It is a noticeable fact that after the inauguration of her mandate, Indira Gandhi changed herself: she started speaking well publicly, manifested greater confidence in herself and acquired a remarkable capacity of making herself acceptable to all, especially the common people. All of these were the important traits of 'efficacious governance'. Another important element of her character was the trait of acquisition of power. She needed to enhance her position on the canvas of Indian politics by catering to the dual elements, on the one hand of being a charismatic leader and on the other the embodiment of power (Kapur, 2009). This duality can

also be seen in her foreign policy and in her external affairs mechanisms. However, Indira Gandhi always maintained some degree of distance from others and shy out from her unknown circle. With these traits and qualities, she managed to become the most popular and influential statesman in South Asia. The world will remember her as a peace-loving and humanist Prime Minister of India.

Perception of International Events

The Indira Gandhi era was extremely significant in the arena of Indian Foreign Policy. The doors of the *Teen Murti House* – the official residence of Nehru – were always open to national and international luminaries and delegates, to whom Gandhi served as hostess. She saw the relationship with her father as a mutual necessity, but she did not follow her father blindly and always tried to strike a balance between herself and the image of her father.

During her schooling days in Switzerland, Nehru wrote to her a series of long letters containing the Marxist interpretation of world history. Thus, Nehru tried to forge interconnections between the leftist ideas and philosophies in England during her student days. Gandhi came in contact with *Bhupesh Gupta*, *Mohan Kumaramangalam* and *Feroze Gandhi* and other Indians like *V.K. Krishna Menon* who was privy to political leaders and labour intellectuals like Harold Laski, Ernest Bevin, Fenner Brockway and Reginald Sorensen. Agatha Harrison took great care of her. Indira Gandhi was influenced by the Labour Party wing and attended some Labour Party rallies. She also raised some funds for the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War and engaged in several voluntary actions for the China Aid Committee during the Sino-Japanese war.

The personality of Indira Gandhi had been shaped in her younger days. The idea of socialism had cast a major influence on her. She tried to implement the same for her own political survival and the “consolidation of her own political power”. With the help of leftist rhetoric, she managed to maintain a strong relationship with the most extreme of the leftist forces in the country. During the split of Congress in 1969, Gandhi managed to maintain stability both within and beyond Congress. Additionally, her foreign policy was pro-Soviet and anti-American in the first phase of her premiership. She thus combined socialist principles and values with her foreign policy and even tried to justify the internal emergency imposed on every Indian. She tried to survive personally in the internal conflict of modern India and recaptured power in 1980 after her defeat in the 1977 Parliamentary elections. It is

well known that, during her premiership, many business houses doubled their capital, disparities of income increased significantly; multinational corporations extended their business activities throughout the country and political corruption increased rapidly. During Indira Gandhi's premiership, the relationship between India and US was at its best. It is well-known that the CIA and Indian Intelligence Bureau had jointly planted a nuclear device on Mount Nanda Devi in 1967 for spying on the Chinese nuclear programme (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970).

During her premiership, Indira Gandhi considerably enumerated her thoughts and strategies about India's foreign relations and the international order. She had a high regard for foreign affairs and relations. Having spent her initial years in Europe, she had experienced the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany, the Civil War in Spain, the failure of the League of Nations, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and the beginning of the Second World War. Further, during her school life in Switzerland, Nehru's letters had given her a broad understanding of the main events of world history. All of these added to her repertoire of understanding of the dynamics of contemporary world affairs. Her connections in England too added to it.

Following her return to India in 1941, she travelled to various nations with Nehru meeting leading statesmen and the heads of the states and governments, after Nehru became the Prime Minister. Her international visits were most frequent in the decades of the fifties and sixties. In 1953, she visited the Soviet Union where she came in contact with the Soviet statesmen and leaders. Indira Gandhi was very interested in foreign and international affairs, especially of Asian and African nations. She had thus already accumulated a strong experience in international negotiations much before her premiership. There were five Foreign Ministers including herself whom she changed frequently due to domestic political compulsions, and personal political complexities. During her tenure, the Foreign Ministers had very little role to play in the making or implementation of foreign policy. After 1971, the Cabinet Ministers played a relatively unimportant role regarding foreign affairs. It can thus be highlighted that during her tenure, Gandhi maintained superiority in all aspects, centralising control of government offices and foreign affairs in her own hands.

While the aspect of her deep-rooted knowledge of world affairs has been discussed earlier, it is not easy to suggest that she had developed a structured perception of the outside world. She was neither attracted to long-range theories of international relations nor by any

abstract conceptualisation of international forces and events despite her involvement in Marxist circles (Kapur, 2009). She did not consider theoretical understanding to be of much relevance for political behaviour. On the basis of documentary evidence, it can be argued that like many Indians of her age, she considered herself as an anti-imperialist socialist, attracted to the Socialist bloc, mostly the Soviet Union and thus she sketched herself as a representative of a victimised nation dominated by a capitalist world. Fascination with the Soviet Union continued even after the Second World War. She returned from her trips between 1953 and 1955 (accompanying Pandit Nehru) with an appreciation of the Soviet Union and was highly impressed by Soviet cultural and economic standards. Gandhi had noticed how a victimised USSR in the 1930s was replaced by a fresh set of cultural ideas and economic systems. However, it has been found that there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Indira Gandhi had any broader outlook on foreign policy framework than what Nehru had originally constituted, like- a greater outlook of non-alignment, an idea of balanced and calculative equidistance from two superpowers, interactive participation in the international system and the idea of mediation in conflicted situations (Kapur, 2009). Nehru had tried to establish and follow a normative goal but its implementation has limits. But the most important element of Indira Gandhi's character was pragmatism, both as a person and leader. A comparison between the Nehruvian record of relations with India's neighbours and the Indira Gandhi era, reveals the contested relations with Pakistan and China, and a serious erosion of understanding with Nepal, Burma, and Sri Lanka in the Nehruvian era. In other words, Nehru was an idealist while his daughter was a realist, always trying to gain power and was successful in making India a powerful centre of South Asian politics. Thus, Gandhi was quite successful in steering Indian foreign policy in her own way and also acquired an incomparable knowledge of the world around which she applied to Indian foreign policy. It is worth mentioning that though Gandhi was not successful in domestic affairs, she was highly successful in external affairs and foreign policy. Indira Gandhi had an "incomparable mastery" over Indian foreign policy.

Indira Gandhi and Domestic Politics

In this segment, I will focus on the domestic politics of the Indira Gandhi regime. The main purpose of this segment is to draw out the domestic factors and events responsible for the rise and fall of the Indira Gandhi era. Indira Gandhi rose to the leadership of the Indian National Congress in the most difficult of situations. A charismatic leader with a capacity to appeal to

large sections, her organizational techniques were quite different from her predecessors. While the *Shastri* era was quite effective in terms of the White Revolution (a national campaign to increase the production of milk) and Green Revolution, a successful Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the popular patriotic cry “*Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan*” (Hail to the soldier; Hail to the farmer) therein, it ended quite abruptly with his sudden death, one day after the official conclusion of the war with the signing of the Tashkent Agreement on 10 January 1966. He was awarded however awarded the *Bharat Ratna* for his contributions. Continuing the legacies of the *Shastri* era and Gandhi was aware of the fact that the whole nation is in a crisis situation and only a strong leader could bring about stability. Many scholars have argued that – “Indira Gandhi came to power because she appeared to have a set of paradoxical political qualifications, most significantly, of indistinctness and ambiguity” (Kaviraj, 1986, p. 1697). At the time of her accession, she was girded with quite a few weaknesses and was not strongly associated with the policy line of the Indian National Congress, especially after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru (Frankel, 1978). However, she was closely associated with a Congress Party privilege group which supported her candidacy too. *Sudipta Kaviraj* has argued that – “Sometimes Indira Gandhi’s regime is analysed by observers in terms of a “Caesarist” model from Gramsci, but the initial conditions of her rule were anything but Caesarist. Her was not a classically Bonapartist position in terms of Marxist theory, for the Caesarist elite is dominant over class and group interests when these contending groups are too closely balanced. Indeed, her position was of a kind of Caesarism in reverse because her government seemed to be equally vulnerable to diverse forms of pressure” (Kaviraj, 1986, p. 1697). There were apparent differences between the Nehru-led Congress and the Indira-led congress from organisational perspectives. As far as Indian politics is concerned, the Nehru era was marked by a coalition of many classes (it is a Marxist claim) or groups. The main actors of this coalition were – the bourgeoisie, the landed and rich peasantry, and the professional elites. These actors played a mediative role between the state and the people; nonetheless, they at the same time performed an increasingly greater role in the state-led bureaucratic apparatus aiming at development (mainly economic development). All these had a significant impact during both the Nehruvian era and the post-Nehruvian era. From the very beginning, Gandhi faced constraints and hindrances from within and without her party. She thus felt the need of restructuring the Congress Party and transform it from an elite-dominated to a mass organization. She successfully implemented the same following her victory in the 4th general election. Being cornered within the party, she tried to invoke a

strategy of 'national coalition'. Similarly, to face the 'internal opposition' being targeted at her, she inculcated a strategy of a wider coalition with the near left, such as groups like the CSF (Congress Socialist Forum) which played a crucial role (Kaviraj, 1986). However, in the decade of 1970s, the Indira Gandhi government was in deep trouble, facing an unprecedented political crisis. This was precipitated by twin factors - first, the electoral promises raised people's expectations and led to 'real performative paradoxes' (Kaviraj, 1986). Second, the economic trends and tendencies went against the Indira Gandhi government. Thus, although the official statistics showed a relatively minor crisis in food production mainly in 1972-73 and a comprehensive per capita availability of food, there was a serious crisis that led to worsening political turmoil. Furthermore, between 1971 and 1974, the Indian economy was riddled with serious inflationary tendencies during which the wholesale prices of rice, wheat and pulses soared sharply, having an obvious consequential effect on contemporary politics. Similarly, the food shortages in Gujarat set off political turmoil in December 1973. Thus, the decade of 1970 has been marked as a decade of economic crisis and political turmoil. Very interestingly, political trends in the decade of 1970s showed some unprecedented tendencies. Since the mid-fifties, there was a decline in the Socialist base in North India while left-radical parties were leading mass movements in other regions of the country. Regional movements were quite weak and fragmented in terms of mass support. Further, leftist politics had suffered a setback in the mid-sixties partly due to the nationalist backlash after the war with China, and partly because of the internal division within the party. However, post-1967, there was a noticeable resurgence of leftist parties as an opposition to the government in various forms. In this context, we can mention the radical leftism and Naxalite insurgencies in many parts of the country. This juncture was marked by the rise of various new mass movements, including the mass movement in South India (rise of the Dravidian movement), the identity-based movements and most importantly the JP Movement in Northern India. These posed a serious challenge to the Gandhi regime. A synthesis of left-wing and right-wing politics in the country and the anti-government agitations beyond the electoral framework forced Indira Gandhi to take up a 'hostile' attitude. Undoubtedly, the movement under Jai Prakash Narayan's leadership became the first and the most serious challenge to the Congress government in North India, and by the first half of 1975, the Gandhi government faced its most serious crisis (Kaviraj, 1986). With trouble beginning in Gujarat and subsequently spreading over to Bihar and several other parts of Northern India, the Indira Gandhi government announced a National Emergency in light of these internal disturbances. The

proclamation of Emergency had been signed by then-president *Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed* on June 25, 1975. The Emergency was in effect from 25th June 1975 until its complete withdrawal on 21st March 1977. The main aim of the 21-month-long Emergency in the country was to control “internal disturbance”, as a result of which the fundamental constitutional rights were abandoned and the freedom of speech and the press were withdrawn. The Gandhi government justified the imposition of the Emergency, first, by underlining the alleged danger posed to India’s internal security and democracy by the movement led by *Jayaprakash Narayan*. Second, by emphasising the need for rapid economic development and upliftment of the downtrodden section of Indian society. Third, by arguing against external intervention having the potential to weaken and even dismantle the country. The Emergency regime however inflicted deep wounds in the body of Indian democracy and ultimately led to the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in the 1977 general elections. Nonetheless, was her return to power with a massive victory just within three years of her ousting. Hence, it can be argued that Mrs. Gandhi possessed a charismatic leadership style and efficiency, based on which she ruled India and influenced the great leaders of the world, at one and the same time.

Insurgency and the Indian State: The Naxalite and Khalistan Movements

The Gandhi regime was dotted with various socio-political movements, amongst which, the Naxalite and *Khalistan* movements deserve a special mention. However, before indulging in a detailed discussion of the same, it is prudent to take a cursory account of some broad Indian security issues, that, in the due course will help to gain a better insight into the two movements in particular. President’s Rule had been imposed frequently – on 10 instances – during the tenures of Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and *Lal Bahadur Shastri* between 1947 and 1966. Very interestingly however, during the premiership of Mrs. Gandhi (from 1966-77 and from 1980-84), the total number of President’s Rule impositions went up to 41 (Tharu, 2007). Nonetheless, despite her frequent and unprecedented use of President’s Rule in India, she was categorically in office (for 187 months) longer than any other Prime Minister except Nehru (for 201 months) (Tharu, 2007). The states of emergency proclamations have been implemented three times since independence. The first was during the 1962 border war with China. The second was issued in 1971 during India’s intervention in the Liberation Movement in East Pakistan, which later became Bangladesh. The third emergency was imposed in 1975 due to the alleged threat of ‘internal disturbances’

manufactured by the opposition. Interestingly, the latter emergencies were imposed during the Indira Gandhi era. It is noteworthy that, the Indian state has manufactured and proclaimed many defensive and anti-terrorist acts which were internal instead of external. While India had always blamed Pakistan for fomenting political and social unrest in Punjab and Kashmir, it is to be borne in mind that India's 'extraordinary repressive' acts were initiated well before unprecedented terrorism was to make its mark. Thus, the passage of the Preventive Detention Act in 1950 and its retention till 1970 can be seen in this light. Similarly, in West Bengal, the Prevention of Violent Activities Act was imposed in 1970 to demolish the Naxalite armed revolutionaries who sought the removal of socio-economic inequalities through armed revolution. Similarly, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971) was imposed during the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. The Naxalite Movement initially perceived as a tribal rebellion spread out in many parts of India and was active in 125 districts in 12 states of the country with roughly estimated armed cadres of about 18000. It was not just a law-and-order problem rather was a pitfall of the failed strategy of repressive police action by the state governments. The Union Home Ministry (MHA) acting as the central government's nodal agency on law and order also makes policies on social conflicts and social unrest. It is noteworthy, that in 1969, with the emergence of the Naxalite movement, the Research and Policy (R & P) Division of MHA released a pioneering study of the 'Causes and Nature of Current Agrarian Unrest', where it cautioned against the possibility of the 'green revolution' turning into a 'red revolution' in the absence of appropriate land reform initiatives taken to ensure greater social justice (MHA, 1969). This study was discussed in Parliament and at the very outset, the state governments were asked to implement land reform measures at the earliest. The study revealed that while the new technocracy with regard to the development of the rural economy had increased productivity on one hand, on the other, it was leading to disparity, instability, and unrest (Tharu, 2007). In practice, various administrative shortcomings related to agrarian reforms were noticeable that included the lack of qualifications of civil servants for affecting proper tenancy reforms, over-burdening of responsibilities on civil servants, lack of coordination between the state agency of land reforms and the agricultural and cooperative departments, lack of updated and corroborated land records, illiteracy of the tenants, the divergent role of the landlords, complex interest of the village population and social division between tenants and landlords. Nonetheless, the situation in these Naxalite rebellion-affected states was a marked contrast with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir or the North Eastern states. During the Gandhi era, states categorised

as 'terrorist-affected' were subjected to indiscriminate and strong police action, lacking any initiative of studying the specific causes of discontent or disorder. The Naxalites were mostly Maoists. Various political parties often entered into agreements with the Maoists during the elections, to ensure the latter's support. Post a successful electoral victory, such Maoist-aided, now-ruling parties, kept their side of the bargain by influencing the police to 'go slow' against the Maoists (Tharu, 2007). This stands out as a major paradox of Indian democracy, where, on the one hand, the state was directly involved in controlling and containing Maoism, and on the other, mainstream politicians were actively linked with Maoists to secure their political fortune. Hence, the domain of political fortune 'jeopardised' the future of Indian democracy. In the spring of 1967, a land dispute broke out in *Naxalbari*, in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, where India's borders touched Nepal on the west and Pakistan on the east, along with having a close territorial affinity with a 'semi-independent kingdom' of Bhutan and Sikkim (Guha, 2007). The economy of these Himalayan foothill regions was mostly dominated by tea plantations mostly owned by British companies. The history of 'land scarcity' and conflicts over land catapulted the *Naxalbari* unrest. The plantation workers sought their working plots as their own and indigenous sharecroppers sought relief from landlords. In the *Naxalbari* area, the rural economically backward sections were united and mobilised by the *Krishak Samiti* (Peasant's Organisation) bearing allegiance to the CPI(M) (Guha, 2007). Led by a middle-class radical communist *Kanu Sanyal* having a good number of peasant followers the *Krishak Samiti* organised a series of demonstrations against the landlords starting in late March of 1967. It started as a peasant movement based on tenancy rights and later turned into a mass movement against all forms of inequality. The protest movements took a violent turn following intervention from police forces. In the late summer of 1967, more than 1500 policemen were shifted to Naxalbari to handle the situation. Suddenly *Kanu Sanyal* and his fellow leaders were arrested and taken to jail, while others took refuge in the forests (Franda, 1971). However, the Naxalbari movement soon achieved an iconic status among the Indian revolutionaries, famously referred to as the Naxalbari upsurge. Soon the term 'Naxalite' became a symbol of revolution. Furthermore, on one hand, the term 'Naxalite' has been attached to revolutionary romance and enchantment and on the other, it has generated a new political spectrum (Ray, 1992). It is noteworthy to say that, in the last week of June 1967 Radio Peking (the official broadcaster of Communist China) announced that the Chinese Communist Party wholeheartedly supported the armed struggle in Naxalbari and they were impressed by the Indian revolutionaries as they were following

the teachings of Mao Tse-tung. However, as far as the Maoist upsurge is concerned, Naxalbari was just the beginning. Another Maoist upsurge was gathering momentum in Andhra Pradesh. The Andhra 'Naxalites' were active in two regions: *Telangana* and *Srikakulam* (Guha, 2007). In these districts, the major communist insurgencies took place between 1946 and 1949. In *Srikakulam*, the armed struggles took place under the leadership of a school teacher named *Vempatapu Satyanarayana*. In *Telangana*, the struggle was led by *Tarimala Nagi Reddy*. Hence, the Naxalite struggle was a reality in many states, being the most challenging and problematic in the state of West Bengal. It is important to note that Naxalites became united and formed a new party-CPI(ML). However, in mid-1970 the movement was fragmented due to the repression by police forces and clashes with parliamentary communists [such as CPI(M) vs. CPI(ML)]. It can be argued that, although Indira Gandhi was influenced by Socialist principles, she was less sympathetic to the Naxalites and wanted to restrict their movement completely. Nonetheless, the Naxalite movement deeply affected the domestic policies of the Indira Gandhi regime.

Contemporaneous with the Naxalite movement was a much more serious agitation for greater autonomy in the state of Punjab. The weightage of the Punjab agitation was compounded further as the state shared a considerable border with Pakistan, a country with which India had fought several wars. Furthermore, the majority community of the state of Punjab were not Hindus but Sikhs. This attributed a special character to Punjab in terms of both religion and language that went a long way to concretise the foundation of Punjab agitation. Many scholars argued that the Punjab agitation was manufactured with prolonged care and was an instance of artificially managed disorder. However, there, maybe disagreements on the nature and trends of the Punjab crisis; but this does not cast a shade of doubt on the fact that the main political force in the state was that of the *Akalis*. The Punjab agitation was deeply rooted in an ethno cultural background. The entirety of the Sikh state was ruled by *Maharaja Ranjit Singh* in the first half of the nineteenth century. Punjab being rich in resources the resident Sikhs were quite strong in terms of the economy. Nevertheless, the Sikh community had suffered much due to the communal riots and mostly owing to the partition of India in 1947. It had taken nearly twenty years of relentless struggle to coerce New Delhi to constitute a Sikh-majority province within the periphery of India. The new state of Punjab was formed in 1966, but being a major Sikh political party, the *Akali Dal*, was unable to rule the state authoritatively (Guha, 2007). It is noteworthy to say that, in 1967 and 1969 the *Akalis* had constituted an unstable coalition with the 'aggressive Hindu' party like

the *Jana Sangh*, whereas in 1971 its old rival, the Indian National Congress, was able to achieve power in Punjab basing on their own power and capacity (Wallace & Chopra, 1981). In October 1973, the working committee of the Akali Dal passed the '*Anandpur Sahib Resolution*' which proposed to the Government of India to hand over Chandigarh to Punjab; to bring all the other Punjabi-speaking areas of the adjacent states within the fold of the state of Punjab; and to increase the representation of Sikhs in the Indian army. The preamble of the *Anandpur Sahib Resolution* reflected the *Akali Dal's* hopes and aspirations for a Sikh Nation. The political ideology of *Akali Dal* was based on Sikh brotherhood (*Khalsa*) and Sikh unity. However, 1973 was not the best time to make these demands to the centre, as Indira Gandhi had just led a successful war effort (Indo-Pak) and the centre was more powerful than ever before. The power and status of the centre were further increased at the time of emergency when a good number of Akalis were cast into jail. The situation however changed in a few years. In 1977 the emergency was lifted and an election was called for, and the Indian National Congress suffered its first-ever defeat. The *Akalis* were now in power in Punjab and re-raised the demands of the *Anandpur Sahib* resolution with new ideas. The *Akalis* claimed a greater share of the water of the rivers passing through Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. Along with economic demands they also voiced in favour of cultural demands including a call for legal recognition of Amritsar as a 'Holy City' (Jeffrey, 1994). In April 1978 the *Nirankari Sikhs* (those who believed in a living Guru) arranged a mass convention in the city of Amritsar. *Akalis* were in power and they criticised the *Nirankaris* for polluting the Holy city (Guha, 2007). The leader of the opposition to the *Nirankaris*, *Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale* was a source of inspiration for the Sikhs and had a deep knowledge of the Sikh scriptures. There is a widely held belief that *Bhindranwale* was aided by Sanjay Gandhi and the Union Home Minister Zail Singh (who himself a former Chief Minister of Punjab) to resist the power of *Akalis* (Guha, 2007). However, a considerable number of Sikhs including the *Jats* of a peasant background and lower caste Sikhs became followers of *Bhindranwale*. In April 1978, clashes between the followers of *Bhindranwale* and *Nirankaris* cost the lives of fifteen people. The Sikh pride surfaced again in 1980 when the *Akalis* having dismantled the Congress returned to power in Punjab. In June of the same year, several Sikh students assembled at the Golden Temple and proclaimed the formation of an independent Sikh Republic (Guha, 2007). A new leader of the *Akalis*, *Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal*, lodged himself in the Golden Temple from where he had announced 'street protests' on the issues like the handing over to Chandigarh etc. *Bhindranwale* was operating the protests from other

parts of the temple and possessed an armed squire (gunmen). Throughout the 1980s the politics of agitation co-existed with the politics of assassination. In April 1980, a *Nirankari* leader, Baba *Gurcharan Singh* was shot dead in the heart of the Indian capital; it was suspected that *Bhindranwale* was behind the killing. Following this, on September 1981, well-known editor *Lala Jagat Narain*, who was manifestly against Sikh extremism – was murdered. Throughout 1982 a series of talks and negotiations between the centre and the *Akalis* however no agreement could be reached. The main issues of contention included the area of Punjab being relegated to Haryana in exchange for Chandigarh and the sharing of river water. It is interesting to note that, *Bhindranwale* described the Sikhs as a ‘separate qaum’ meaning a community but at the same time also translatable as a ‘nation’ (Guha, 2007). On 5th October 1983, terrorists stopped a bus on a highway in Punjab, segregated the Hindu passengers and shot them. The next day President’s Rule was imposed in the entire state of Punjab and *Bhindranwale* took shelter in the *Akal Takht* (a building in the Golden Temple). *Bhindranwale* had never demanded in favour of *Khalistan*, but at the same time said, he will not refuse it either if offered to him. He was convinced that, if the few Jews could resist thousands of Arabs, then the Sikhs must do the same with the Hindus (Guha, 2007). The attacks on Hindu civilians became very frequent in the entire state of Punjab. After much ‘reluctance,’ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided in favour of a military operation in the Golden Temple. Major General *R. S. Brar* was asked to plan and lead the proposed operation known as ‘Operation Blue star’. The operation was carried out between June 1 and June 8, 1984, costing many lives and complete destruction of the Golden Temple complex. However, Major General *Brar* was asked to finish the operation within 48 hours with minimum losses of life and with no damage to Golden Temple (Brar, 1987). Following this incident, the Sikh community lost their faith in Indira Gandhi and the same year saw the assassination of India’s 10th Prime Minister at the hands of her own Sikh bodyguards. This assassination generated anti-Sikh riots in the country, where 3000 people were killed mainly in Delhi. Hence, Naxalite Movement and Sikh insurgency (*Khalistan Movement*) had deeply left their impact on Indira Gandhi’s domestic policies.

Transforming Democracy

Indira Gandhi’s journey as a Prime Minister started amidst controversies and criticism. There were many critics within and without the Congress Party and the decade of the 1970s was a tense time for her. Following the Bangladesh war, the refugee crisis became a matter of major

concern. Furthermore, popular unrest was spreading within a staggering and slow-growing economy. In this segment, I will focus on the problems and solutions for Indian democracy in the Indira Gandhi era. In terms of energy, the Arab-Israel War of 1973 affected the Indian economy and India's oil import expenditure negatively. By 1974 Indian budgetary deficit was soaring – equal to double the amount of annual foreign aid (Gupte, 2009). Similarly, the underground nuclear explosion on 18th May 1974 in the deserts of Rajasthan, although made for peaceful purposes, was severely criticised by the West and marked a setback for Mrs. Gandhi. However, Indira Gandhi dismissed such criticisms as irrelevant and non-useful. But in India itself, Gandhi and the Congress were coming under severe attacks. Especially in Bihar and Gujarat, thousands of students, and workers organized protest marches against inflation and political corruption. *Jaya Prakash Narayan* (an outstanding veteran of the freedom struggle) led a popular mass movement in Bihar against the Congress party, where he rallied in favour of a “total revolution” in India and became widely known as JP (Gupte, 2009). It is noteworthy to say that, *Jaya Prakash Narayan* joined hands with *Morarji Desai* to form the *Janata Morcha* or People's Front, a strong alliance of non-Congress parties, in this front he also included the Maoist Communists and Left-wing Socialists, the right-wing *Swatantra Party*, the extreme right-wing *Anand Marg* and the *Jan Sangh*, a Hindu militant party (Gupte, 2009). In Bombay, there were nearly 13000 strikes that occurred between October 1973 and June 1974. By mid-1974 railway workers' leader, George Fernandez was arrested and a million of railway workers went on strike to protest the arrest. Mrs. Gandhi however, crushed the railway union and the protest by using paramilitary forces. However, there was another factor that sharply worked against Indira Gandhi, especially in the 1970s. This was none other than her own promise to eradicate poverty from all spheres of Indian society. Now, as far as the Indian economy is concerned, Mrs. Gandhi's government had initiated a centralised control on the same. She believed in far greater and more extensive control of the economy than what was witnessed in the Nehruvian era. She thus undertook radical land reforms; several industries, especially the coal mines sector, were nationalised in 1973; the banking sector was also nationalised; corporate and individual taxes were increased etc. Indira Gandhi expressed in an interview with a Bombay-based magazine, *Blitz*, “If anybody tries to say that poverty can go in my lifetime or during my tenure as Prime Minister, it just cannot. It has very deep roots” (Karanjia, 1973). In this situation, political opponents started to criticise Mrs. Gandhi regarding her 1971 campaign pledge, ‘*Garibihatao*’ and they pointed out that, getting rid of poverty was simply beyond the

capacity of the then Prime Minister. Another significant issue of the Indira Gandhi era was controlling India's growing population. In this context Mrs. Gandhi's younger son, Sanjay Gandhi assisted his mother and he had a conviction that every Indian should limit their respective families to two children, they should not accept dowries, the illiterates must be made literate, and the slums must be cleaned and they must plant one tree every year (Gupte, 2009). These were the desirable objectives. Experts at the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) informed Sanjay Gandhi about the alarming rate at which the world's population was increasing. Between 1950 and 1980 the total population of the world doubled. Both Sanjay and Indira Gandhi were aware of the government's uneven and unstable record of population control in India. In the early 1950s, India was the first Third World country to formally announce family planning as a matter of national policy. Following this, a population planning committee was established in 1952. "Rapid expansion of population eroded the gains of development", Indira Gandhi had exclaimed to the Asian Parliamentarians, who had assembled in New Delhi in February 1984. The burden of the population mostly fell on the poor and underprivileged to a great degree. According to a World Health Organisation Report, 150 million children under the age of five, especially in Third World countries were affected by malnutrition in 1986 because of the inadequacy of proper food (WHO Annual Reports, 1988). As per government estimates, in India (especially in the Indira Gandhi regime) nearly 40 per cent of the population was unable to afford sufficient food to ensure their adequate nutritional intake (Gupte, 2009). The rapidly growing population was a greater issue in the transformation of Indian democracy in the Indira Gandhi era. It is interesting to note that, in March 1977, James Michaels, editor of Forbes, visited India. To the extent that the emergency is concerned, he had publicly defended Mrs. Gandhi and her imposition of a National Emergency. He however had visited India to observe the parliamentary elections that had been postponed by Indira Gandhi since 1976. Hence, the five years between 1975 and 1980 saw the rise, fall and resurgence of Indira Gandhi. The first rise was enhanced by dictatorial power and the second rise was induced by democratic power in 1980 (Gupte, 2009). In the following years from 1977 to 1980, Indira Gandhi fought three battles; one was against the government that was committed to destroying her politically, the second battle was to win the affection of the people again, and the third battle was with herself whether fight or quit. It was thus a dramatic era and transformed (and matured) the Indian democracy to a large extent.

Friends, Neighbours and Enemies: An Indian Perspective

1971 can be seen both as a marker of the end of an era and the beginning of another. As far as Indira Gandhi's foreign policy is concerned, India achieved an international reputation and prestige as well as she was successful in recognising her friends, neighbours, and enemies in the same year 1971. The Bangladesh War of 1971 made it amply clear to every Indian that Pakistan would always remain its permanent enemy, but that India must be careful about Pakistan and her strategic behaviour in South Asia. Eminent novelist and biographer *Nayantara Sahgal* expressed that – “The efficient conduct of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 was both balm and stimulant to a nation humiliated by the Chinese in 1962 and, in the hope of peace, persuaded into an indeterminate conclusion with Pakistan in the war of 1965”. It is very interesting to note that, in July 1972, Indira Gandhi met Pakistani President *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* at the Indian hill resort in *Simla* to discuss various aspects of bilateral relations between the two countries. The meeting ended with an agreement famously known as the ‘*Simla Agreement*’. This agreement led to the exchange of prisoners of war and to the recognition of the newly liberated Bangladesh by Pakistan (Gupte, 2009). After the summit was over, the Pakistani President highly appreciated Indira Gandhi for her leadership quality. Nevertheless, the Pakistani President, accompanied by *Benazir Bhutto*, who became the Prime Minister of Pakistan subsequently, said to Indira Gandhi – “Believe me, we are interested in peace. We want to turn the corner. We want to make a new beginning. We are dealing with a difficult situation with many past prejudices. We should forget the past bitterness and hostility, and strive to achieve peace with honour” (Gupte, 2009, p. 416). However, Indira Gandhi later was recorded by Indian journalists to comment that while many Pakistani leaders resorted to the usage of such phrases of seeking peace in the long run always violated their promises. Mrs. Gandhi was also aware that before the commencement of the *Simla Summit*, President *Bhutto* had threatened a ‘thousand-year war’ with India. Indira Gandhi knew very well that, the question of peace between the two nations would be determined by how Pakistan addressed the question of developing its democratic leadership and stable political institutions. In other words, common people had to be given the opportunity to choose their leaders freely. It is significant to point out that, President *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* was overthrown by Pakistani Army General *Zia ul-Haq*, and *Bhutto* was imprisoned for a long time before being hanged to death on 4th April 1979. Now, as far as the geopolitical intentions of Pakistan were concerned, Indira Gandhi had a very negative conception regarding General *Zia*. The Pakistani General (or dictator) was believed to have

told many of his associates that when Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in the 1979 election, came as a 'big shock' to him (Gupte, 2009). Indira Gandhi and *Zia ul-Haq* came across each other for the first time in April 1980 in Harare, where a good number of world leaders had gathered to celebrate Zimbabwe's independence. However, Indira Gandhi never believed General *Zia* enough to discuss bilateral issues, as she harboured a deep mistrust of the activities of Pakistan. Before her death, Indira Gandhi told one of her closest mentors, Ralph Buultjens that she believed that the US will continue to promote Pakistan as a 'counterweight' to India on the subcontinent. She was quite worried and conscious about the fact that Pakistan had developed a strong bilateral relationship with Washington than India had managed to achieve. Turning our attention to another part of the world, especially the Middle East presents more interesting and eventful insights. The question of Muslim support was of great significance to Mrs. Gandhi and was related to India's political position concerning the region of the Middle East. Thousands of Indians migrated to the oil-rich countries of *Arabia* for attaining a better standard of living. Furthermore, Indian construction companies obtained a number of contracts in the Middle East, especially under Mrs. Gandhi's premiership. It is noteworthy to say that, as far as the dispute with Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir is concerned, the support of Arab nations was highly important for Mrs. Gandhi. She was of the opinion that, especially in the 1970s, the long-term problems concerning Palestine, the Occupied Territories, Lebanon and the Gulf had inequitable characteristics. She felt that there had been a persistent lack of political will to improvise necessary political action in the region (Gupte, 2009). She was also aware of the fact that this region was infested with fundamentalist radicals of different faiths who were generating subversive agitation that could erode the authority and sovereignty of nation-states in that region. In this context, it can be argued that on the one hand, Mrs. Gandhi could not have anticipated the birth and the rise of most dominating terrorist groups like AL Qaeda; on the other, she often expressed to her friends like Professor Buultjens that in the near future, the Palestine Liberation Movement would transform into a general jihad against the West very soon (Gupte, 2009). Indira Gandhi believed that for a successful peace process in that region, both Israel and Palestine Liberation Organisations must take into account their respective people's practical opinions. Mrs. Gandhi was fascinated by the outstanding diversity of established faiths in the Middle East; these being *Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Sikhism* and *Hinduism*. But in the Middle East (in particular), Mrs. Gandhi felt that the promotion of peace and harmony was impossible politically or sociologically unless there was a favourable environment.

However, the environment continued to remain complicated with violence and animosity. There was no sign of a solution to this crisis, it became worse in Palestine, Lebanon, and the Gulf. Nonetheless, this era had seen another serious war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. Finally, the peace talks on the Middle East took place in October-November 1991 in Madrid. Israel's attitude towards Palestine, especially the people of Palestine was one of denial. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir asserted that – "Palestine did not exist; therefore, there were no Palestinian people; and thus, there is no problem". Indira Gandhi's response was: "We cannot deny to the people of Palestine their inalienable right to the homeland from which they were exiled" (Gandhi, 1970). The denial of Palestinian reality by Israel was so deep that, Mrs. Meir usually referred to Palestine as 'Southern Syria'. However, the assessment of Indira Gandhi's Middle East policies highlights that the Indian political investment in the Arab cause gained little return – as far as the Kashmir issue was concerned. For instance, the Arab states not only supported Pakistan openly during the wars of 1965 and 1971, but some of them also sent weapons and military advisers to aid Pakistani war efforts (Gupte, 2009). So, during Indira Gandhi's premiership, India befriended many nations all over the world as well as suffered politically due to the enmity of many other countries.

Configuration of Great Powers: The US Dimension

One of the first significant changes Indira Gandhi introduced in her foreign policy was to completely exclude *Lal Bahadur Shastri's* objectives and principles for building bridges between India and the US. It was not in pursuance of a particular principle or ideological strand; rather she wanted to introduce an element of stimulation in the Indo-US relations. The US administration showed a memorable tendency and attitude that none of the previous administrations had ventured to assert. Nevertheless, considering these persisting situations, Indira Gandhi's first trip abroad was to the US. Her trip to the US was significant in the broader context of Indo-US relations as well. The domestic situation became very complicated and unprecedented, especially when India was at the doorstep of a major food crisis. It was only the US which was in a position to supply and cater to the massive Indian need for food grains, as compared to any other nation. Infact since the *Shastri* era the US was coming closer to India, and in this context, the role of American ambassador and diplomat Chester Bowles was very crucial (Kapur, 2009). Chester Bowles was an influential diplomat in American foreign policy during the Cold War years when he strongly argued that economic aid (rather than military aid) to the Third World was the best weapon to combat

communism and the most important task for the US was to construct a more peaceful world order. So, Chester Bowles played a key role in fostering Indo-US diplomatic relations, especially after the Nehruvian era. Indira Gandhi during her visit to the US received a warm and cordial welcome from President Lyndon Johnson personally. President Johnson could not negate the appeal of Mrs. Gandhi and he expressed to some officials that, the US has no harm from Indira Gandhi. At the very outset, President Johnson immediately promised 3 million tons of food and 9 million dollars of aid to India (Frank, 2001). But it was a verbal promise which had to be passed through the US administrative channels. It is noteworthy to say that, Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the US was successful economically and strategically, but on the other hand the US administration was pressurising India to favour them (US) in order to secure their interest. They (US) had resorted to a similar initiative during the Lal Bahadur Shastri era and found a wonderful scope during Mrs. Gandhi's regime thus. The US had manifold objectives, including - (a) to encourage India to move away from its desired heavy industry programme to a simplified objective of consumerism and agricultural enhancement; (b) to establish a fixed and excessive equilibrium in foreign policy to make a shift away from pro-Soviet (or Soviet directed) foreign policy; (c) to influence and direct India to adopt a more neutral position on the Vietnam crisis in which the US was highly involved; and (d) to devalue and exclude the Indian currency so that India could become an export-oriented and more bounded to the international capitalist system (Kapur, 2009). Subject to acceptance of the above-mentioned changes, the US agreed to give massive food aid, allocate 900 million dollars in non-project aid, and negotiate additional loans from World Bank. This clearly shows that US President Lyndon Johnson was more interested in forcing India to radically change its policies than any of his predecessors. During his visit to India as Vice-President he had sensed an intellectual affinity between India and the US and had recommended President Kennedy exploit India in terms of this affinity and reliability (Evans & Novak, 1967). However, during the Johnson era, Indo-US relations became more flexible and both nations looked out for friendship and negotiations. But the US strategy and intention could not materialise. As Indira Gandhi had alleged that after 1979, President Johnson bargained with India's appeal for assistance and even pushed India to change her policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990). A similar incident took place during the Vietnam crisis when President Johnson ignored India's request for assistance after Mrs. Gandhi's refusal to change India's friendly negotiation with North Vietnam. Indira Gandhi was irritated by the US pressure on the Vietnam issue and was not interested at all to

introduce fundamental changes in India's economic and foreign policies. Now, as far as the Indian economy is concerned, India only went along with the US demand for the devaluation of the Indian rupee. There was mounted pressure on India, especially from the US, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and India's own close advisers. The country was in serious need of US aid and Indira Gandhi surrendered to the demand for the devaluation of the Indian rupee (Kapur, 2009). Hence, the Indo-US relations during the Indira Gandhi era were significant in terms of the Indian quest for world peace, and India's neutrality had been protected by the efficient leadership of Indira Gandhi.

The Soviet Dimension

The Soviet Union was one of the superpowers dominating the international arena during the tenure of Mrs. Gandhi's premiership. Undoubtedly, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was an undefeated power in the 1960s and 1970s and Indira Gandhi was well aware of this reality. Under Mrs. Gandhi's premiership, India moved very close to the Soviet Union, as compared to the tenures of the preceding incumbents of the office. Mrs. Gandhi's grand success as a leader of the nation largely rests largely and quite undeniably on the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. I will return to this point subsequently. Russia gifted India a greater amount of freedom and respect throughout the world. It further promised to use its veto power in the UN and made it clear in the UN Security Council that if Pakistan or China attacked India then they will respond to the same and defend the attack with airlift or military equipment (Kapur, 2009). In sum, it was as Kissinger held "the strongest endorsement yet by the Kremlin of the Indian strategy" to confront Pakistan (Kissinger, 1979, p. 874). Soviet Russia went beyond the operative clause of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and agreed that both countries will mutually remove the threats and should take appropriate measures to ensure peace and security in their respective territories (Jain, 1971). Furthermore, Moscow was thinking in terms of establishing an Indo-Soviet intelligence network - a network which would become the largest network in the world outside of the Soviet entity. By the 1970s, the KGB was everywhere in the world and admitted spies like Oleg Kalugin in the Soviet intelligence service. Russia was thus ready to assist India both militarily and from the standpoint of Soviet intelligentsia. In this situation, Indira Gandhi played a key role. Ideologically Mrs. Gandhi was not pro-Soviet; rather she was an independent Indian leader. Many scholars argued that like her father, Mrs. Gandhi was attracted to the 'Soviet system', and it does not signify that she was a Socialist. The circumstances and situations of the

seventies enhanced the political and diplomatic emergence of “pro-Sovietism” and it determined the outcome of the Bangladesh Liberation Movement when Mrs. Gandhi clearly and undoubtedly needed Soviet support to withstand the US and Chinese pressure (Kapur, 2009). On the other hand, Indo-US relations worsened during the tenure of Richard Nixon, who succeeded President Lyndon Johnson. It was a turning point in Indo-US relations since its origin when for the first time the US tried to forge an alliance with India for prohibiting Chinese Communism. Further, although the US and Pakistan were much closer to each other during the Cold War period, the role and importance of India were not completely overlooked. Nevertheless, the role of India was not glorified also; the Indo-US relations during the Nixon era were determined by Sino-Russian relations in the subcontinent. The Indian political parties and the public, in general, were known for their anti-Americanism and anti-Capitalism, which largely acted as a setback to Indo-US relations. In this situation, the first choice for Mrs. Gandhi was Soviet Russia, which acted as a protector of India’s interests in the world. Nevertheless, within the first two years of her mandate as Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi was convinced that President Nixon and his US were firmly anti-Indian. It has been noted that Indira Gandhi usually, refused and declined Nixon’s invitation for dinner, along with other Afro-Asian leaders without showing any definite reason. Undoubtedly it was an unusual act in light of diplomatic protocol as well as in foreign policy. Many scholars have termed Indira Gandhi an anti-American Indian Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi’s anti-Americanism was further extended by her suspicion that the CIA (an American intelligence agency) was actively trying to destabilise her government in India. This belief was furnished and bolstered by a secret Soviet intelligence report. More than seventy intelligence reports were uncovered by Mrs. Gandhi before the press condemning the CIA and the US. The seriousness with which she treated the issue is reflected in the questions she raised to Henry Kissinger. She also wrote to Sri Lankan Prime Minister *Sirimavo Bandaranaike* to warn her of the CIA’s hostile activities by enclosing KGB’s intelligence reports and Indian press reports (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 2005). Indo-US relations were thus primarily determined by Soviet Russia’s extension of negotiations and friendship towards India. The decade of the sixties and seventies was marked by competition between the US and USSR in terms of extending their respective spheres of influence, especially in the Third World. While the US was trying to capture the markets of the newly independent countries, the USSR was trying to spread its socialist principles and policies among the other nations. In this context, Mrs.

Gandhi chose neither side but negotiated with the Soviet Union. Hence, Indira Gandhi had rationally chosen Russia to secure India militarily and economically (also culturally).

I now turn to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. The said treaty was cast amidst a specific background. India's dependency on the Soviet Union was based on their mutual friendship and cooperation. After the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962, the Sino-Pakistan axis and cooperation started developing. The conflict between the US and China in the late sixties and early seventies extended the rivalry and threatened the security of India. The liberation movement of Bangladesh started in early 1971, and the Pakistani army was incapable of controlling the situation in March 1971, the Pakistani army was defeated in the Liberation War. The resistance movement had started to impact India and induced an unbearable strain on the Indian economy. Due to the military actions in East Pakistan, the external security of India, especially the state of West Bengal, was threatened to a large degree. On the other hand, USA and Pakistan were strong allies. The US had assisted West Pakistan with military aid but at the last moment, East Pakistan had been rescued from the aggression of West Pakistan. In this situation, India assisted the Liberation Army in East Pakistan. The US government made it clear to the Indian government that if China attacked both India and Bangladesh, the US government would not oppose this kind of attack. However, this did not happen, and Bangladesh (East Pakistan) achieved freedom from the army rule of West Pakistan. The role of India was quite progressive and humanitarian in this context. In light of India's external threat, Mrs. Gandhi tried to change the Indian diplomatic strategy. In the year of 1969, the Soviet Union declared a bilateral treaty with a particular Soviet commitment to Indian security. Although Indira Gandhi had declined the proposal, due to the adverse public reaction in India, and owing to the possibility of damaging India's long-term relations with countries like the US and China, she secretly sent her confidante *D. P. Dhar* to negotiate the treaty. The final draft of the treaty was modified at the insistence of Mrs. Gandhi.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi not only tried to protect India's military policy but also strongly preserve the Indian policy of nonalignment. The treaty greatly affected Sino-Indian and Indo-US relations. The Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet was not aware of the treaty, but Mrs. Gandhi informed them of the day it was signed. Hence, the Indo-Soviet treaty was finalized on 9th August 1971. This treaty was completely a matter of surprise to the senior staff and ambassadors of the Indian embassy. Ambassadors like *Lakshmi Kant Jha* and *M. Rasgotra* did not attempt to hide the news, but they were completely surprised by this treaty.

Mrs. Gandhi made a public announcement of the signing of the treaty, and the Indians were enthusiastic regarding the same. The Indo-Soviet Treaty did not violate India's policy of nonalignment nor did it hamper India's long-term interest in peace. The treaty was historically and strategically necessary for both India and the Soviet Union. In the context of great international threats and provocations, Nehru had never signed any treaty like the Indo-Soviet treaty. But then, Nehru dealt with security problems according to the situation. On the other hand, Indira Gandhi, interested as she was in international treaties and pacts, signed the treaty without any kind of hesitation. Nevertheless, she also emphasized India's pivotal role in international peace and stability.

Military Intervention and the Liberation Movement in Bangladesh

The decade of the 1970s was both eventful as it was uncertain, and the domain of Indian foreign policy was not an exception in this regard. The Bangladesh Liberation Movement and India's direct intervention in it signify the beginning of a new era in Indian foreign policy. India intervened in Bangladesh with two basic goals establishing peace and stability in Bangladesh, and containing the Pakistani fundamentalist and reactionary power in the entire South Asian region. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's successful military intervention in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971 strengthened her self-confidence and determination which she needed in the conduct of foreign relations. The massive pressure of refugee influx from East Pakistan, West Pakistani repressive measures against the popular democratic government of *Mujibur Rahaman* in East Pakistan and the former's air strikes on Indian military base camps forced Mrs. Gandhi to intervene militarily. This intervention clearly shows Mrs. Gandhi's quest for peace and harmony with her neighbours. Nevertheless, this intervention not only withstood the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan but it resulted in the establishment of an independent Bangladesh. This however would not have been possible without the organizational capacity of the Indian military and the assistance of RAW. However, to resist US and China strategically, Mrs. Gandhi made a treaty with USSR under which the latter would come to assist India as a third-party intervention (Kapur, 2009). The Chinese and US threats became useless in the face of the organised Indian army and India succeeded in every sphere defeating the Pakistani forces and securing their surrender. Since independence, it was the first time that India had achieved a massive military victory over Pakistan. The victory in Bangladesh War also ensured India's diplomatic victory in 1972 with the signing of the *Simla Agreement*. The *Simla Agreement*

signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and Pakistani President *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* on 2nd July 1972 can be seen as a peace treaty between the two nations. This treaty emphasised: respect for each other's territorial sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for each mutual unity, political independence, sovereign equality, and abjuring hostile propaganda. However, it is a matter of inexplicable mystery that, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not use the advantage of Pakistan's defeat to force President Bhutto to agree to the legitimacy of the autonomy of Indian Kashmir from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Kapur, 2009). Pakistan-occupied Kashmir has always been a matter of great concern for India. Mrs. Gandhi while aware of the fact interestingly eluded the *Simla Agreement*. This was of predominant significance for both India and Pakistan. It is mention worthy that *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* was an anti-Indian leader and never missed a single chance to counter India, given that fact it is also important that Indira Gandhi successfully concluded the *Simla Agreement* with Pakistan. *G. Parthasarathy*, one of the Prime Minister's close associates has expressed that, *P. N. Haksar* had influenced Mrs. Gandhi in the manifestations of the *Simla Agreement*. It can thus be stated that Mrs. Gandhi's Kashmir strategy was a pitfall of *P. N. Haksar's* influential thesis that Pakistan would become a military state as Germany had become after World War I (Kapur, 2009). However, in the *Simla Agreement* India had shared a greater amount of concession with Pakistan, and Kashmir was a part of that.

Now, I will focus extensively on the role of India in the Liberation Movement in Bangladesh which clearly indicated the strength of the personality of Mrs. Gandhi. The Indian military intervention in Bangladesh commenced in mid-1971. Due to economic and strategic necessity, Indian combat forces assisted the Bangladeshi inhabitants who were victims of the situation. Postmid-1971, the Border Security Force (BSF) and RAW got seriously involved in the Bangladesh war. The army generals were prepared for any kind of military action in Bangladesh and settled on the strategy to move forward only in the winter season when the Himalayan passes would remain snowbound. That could prevent China from extending any kind of military assistance to West Pakistan. This strategy was effective and India successfully withheld the military actions of West Pakistan in Bangladesh. A plan of quick military action was prepared. Mrs. Gandhi tried to influence the global diplomatic order and win sympathy for India's position. In September, she visited the Soviet Union and met leaders such as Kosygin.

In October and November, she visited Belgium, Austria, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and the United States. Except for the US, her visits to other nations were quite successful and she was able to draw attention and sympathy towards India's position. She also sent some of her Cabinet ministers to other parts of the world like West Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia. Mrs. Gandhi tried to not only win on military grounds but also win strategically in the war in Bangladesh.

West Pakistan made a strategically pre-planned air strike on 3rd December, with a view to internationalising the Bangladesh crisis and diverting the Indian army to the western front. The Indian army, however, rapidly entered several fronts in accordance with a planned military action in Bangladesh. Against this backdrop, the Soviet Union vetoed the American resolution in the Security Council that condemned the Indian position and demanded the withdrawal of Indian armed forces from then East Pakistan. A US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, moved into the Bay of Bengal from the South Pacific thus threatening Indian security (Bandyopadhyay, 1970).

Mrs. Gandhi however ignored the threat and advised the army chiefs to aim for quick victory on several fronts. *D. P. Dhar* was immediately sent to Moscow, to seek full Soviet support against both the Chinese military attack and intervention in the Sinkiang. The Soviet navy was also ordered to follow the Enterprise. In this context, when the US was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council, it successfully made a resolution in the General Assembly calling for the immediate withdrawal of troops, because the war was nearly over. In this situation, Soviet Deputy Premier Kuznetsov came to Delhi on 12th December and remained there till the end of the war. The West Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, over 90,000 soldiers, surrendered on 16th December. Indira Gandhi prevented the internationalization of the Bangladesh issue and announced a unified cease-fire on the western front; however, the larger section of Indian people was greatly disappointed.

The defeat of West Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh would not have been possible without the Indian military intervention. The Indian army was successful in the protection and creation of Bangladesh. National security was also preserved by the Indian Army not only in Bangladesh but also on Indian soil itself. Indian National Security was thus secured and improved by the Indian Army. The contrast between the positions of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi is quite apparent in this regard. With the rivalry with Pakistan, Nehru had never tried to move militarily, but Mrs. Gandhi tried to establish peace in Bangladesh with the

intervention of the Indian Armed Forces. The Nehruvian foreign policy was quite opposite to the foreign policy of Mrs. Gandhi. In the case of military interventions in Bangladesh, Nehru would have preferred a diplomatic solution to the Bangladesh crisis. Furthermore, Nehru would have never agreed to a massive involvement of the RAW in the resistance movement in Bangladesh. In contrast, Mrs. Gandhi opted for the military-based resistance movement in Bangladesh and she gained immense success at the same time.

The ramifications of the victory of Bangladesh were indeed remarkable. As far as the Indian image was concerned, India had emerged as South Asia's "pre-eminent" regional power. Though there was no such formal recognition of India's position, the South Asian countries have not denied the 'power and superiority' of India, even Pakistan was in that row. India was also conscious of her own power and capability and was in such a position that no one could intervene in her area without her consent. It can be argued that a Monroe Doctrine has been established in South Asia; just as it had occurred in Latin America, where the external powers have been dominated or were kept out by the dominant power (Kapur, 2009). Despite Mrs. Gandhi's sober, polite, and cool-headed aura, she wanted to retain this newfound Indian strength and power. Another significant ramification was the emergence of bilateralism with Pakistan. Pakistan's consent to solve future problems bilaterally, albeit with reluctance, can be accredited to the Indian victory. This new trend of bilateralism became widely popular in the 1970s. In fact, it has changed Indian diplomatic behaviour and altered the diplomatic principles between all the South Asian neighbours. India also had successfully exercised its predominance in other South Asian countries as well. The first case was Sri Lanka, where Mrs. Gandhi started an unobtrusive initiative of training the Tamil Tigers of the Sri Lankan Island, who were demanding expanded authority and self-respect for their north-eastern areas from the central government. Thus, by these measures, Indira Gandhi in fact challenged the authority of the Sri Lankan Government. But later the Sri Lankan Tamils changed their demands from autonomy of their claimed areas to independence of their areas. The radical wing of Sri Lankan Tamils became disastrous for both Sri Lankan Government and Indian Government collectively. Both countries suffered from a serious crisis costing various lives and property and leading to the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Another major issue was the merger of Sikkim, as the twenty-second state, to the Indian Union in April 1975. With Nepal in the West, Tibet in the North, Bhutan in the East and West Bengal in the South, Sikkim occupied a position of immense strategic importance. Defeating the Chinese pressure in that region, Indira Gandhi efficiently included

Sikkim in India (by forcible incorporation) and it can be seen as another triumph for Indian democracy. India's new policy of bilateral diplomacy had also touched Nepal; in other words, Nepal was another of Mrs. Gandhi's targets and played a very crucial role in India-Chinese relations. India (in the Indira Gandhi era) had manifestly attempted to attract Nepal in favour of its own interest. But, *King Birendra* of Nepal at a meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee in the mid-1970s invited all the regional countries to benefit from Nepal's unused and abundant resources, and evoked the idea of South Asian regional cooperation; Bangladesh's military ruler *Zia ur-Rahaman* along with Mrs. Gandhi viewed it as a deviation from bilateralism and termed it as a "gag" by the small South Asian countries (Kapur, 2009). Finally, when India's closest neighbours Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka actualised the idea of South Asian regional cooperation, Mrs. Gandhi characterised it as the scheme of the "gang of four" and claimed it to be a deep strategy to embarrass India. On the other side, Bhutan remained a friendly neighbour of India harbouring a deep faith in bilateralism. It is important to note that, Bhutan was expelling a large section of Nepalese people from Southern Bhutan and India did not intervene in the matter, as it was the former's domestic matter. Hence, the success of the Bangladesh War strengthened India's national interests and aided the country to enjoy the status of a superpower in the South Asian region for a long time.

The Afghan Dimension

Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, shortly after the Soviet troops had moved into Afghanistan and captured it. It bore a deep impact on Mrs. Gandhi's foreign policy. In fact, India faced a similar dilemma when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, India expressed its full support in favour of self-determination, and withdrawal of foreign troops, and strongly opposed the violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of any country. In the case of the Afghanistan crisis, India tried to maintain her policy of non-alignment. The Indian stand was a very interesting one, but India abstained from the condemnation of the Soviet Union. In 1968, both India and Pakistan had a close bond with the Soviet Union and abstained from a US-sponsored UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990). Indira Gandhi and her popular government have been widely criticised for being pro-Soviet; it had also put India's non-alignment and India's national interests into question. Mrs. Gandhi's foreign policy had thus been seriously affected by the invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It was a widely held

conception that India was in a position to influence the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan and bring about a solution. India was notable to conceal its ties with the Soviet Union in reality attracting criticism from many Western countries as well as non-aligned countries, but the Indo-Soviet relations had undoubtedly influenced India's policy towards Afghanistan. No such country in the world had ever given India the political and military support which the Soviet Union undoubtedly has. Although India restrained from condemning the Soviet Union, she had not hidden her displeasure over the continuous presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and urged for its withdrawal. It is mentioning worthy that, India made this proposal to withdraw, to the Soviet leader Andrei Gromyko, when he visited Delhi in 1980 (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990). Indira Gandhi had spoken to him very sharply and confidently and it had been reflected in her foreign policy very prominently. Nevertheless, the desired solution to the Afghan problem was dependent on the Super Powers: the US and the Soviet Union. This argument was made by Diego Cordovez, an Ecuadorean diplomat who acted as United Nations under-secretary general, who negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the 1980s. It is also a known fact that Diego Cordovez had managed to bring both sides close to drawing an agreement at the Geneva talks in 1982, but the US pressurised Pakistan to recede from that position. Scholars like Selig S. Harrison have argued that Pakistan's overall attitude toward the Afghan crisis would continue to be controlled by its growing dependence on US aid (both economic and military). The US was not keen to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan as their presence was a strategic way to humiliate the Soviet Union. The Afghans wanted to follow the Soviet Union rather than the US, and the Soviet Union wanted to establish a friendly government in Kabul. In this context, India, the Islamic Conference, and the United Nations could do nothing apart from playing the role of a bystander. *Surjit Mansingh* in her book "India's Search for Power" opines that the Indian Premier held that the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan did not pose a security threat to India and she was also convinced that the Soviet Union surely did not have any designs on the other countries of South Asia. Hence, Indira Gandhi very efficiently combined bilateralism with peace during the Afghan crisis.

Indira Gandhi and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations

The Indo-Sri Lankan relations suffered from unprecedented deterioration, especially in the decade of the 1980s. It was a combined effect of foreign relations and domestic problems in both countries that complicated the possible arrival of a solution. It was a situation where

democracy-induced problems surfaced due to electoral considerations and norms playing a decisive role. Mrs. Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene were not able to bring forth an immediate solution, but rather ignored the crisis. Sri Lanka was trying to gain international support for the principle of non-interference in their domestic matters, and there was an anti-Indian tendency which further added to the complexity of the situation. Sri Lankan President *Junius Richard Jayewardene* took time to consolidate its military strength and hoped to train his military forces with foreign help and was confidently in favour of any kind of military operation against the Tamil rebellions. He thus was in search of a military solution. India, on the other hand, did not prefer to intervene militarily nor she could allow the Tamil minority to demolish Sri Lanka. For Indira Gandhi, Sri Lanka was a beneficial neighbour in terms of geopolitical and economic values. Nevertheless, the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship was a contested one, owing to various facts. The status of Indians in Sri Lanka had been a matter of consideration for both countries. In a debate on foreign affairs in the *Lok Sabha*, Nehru had assured that the issue of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka had to be solved in a friendly and peaceful way. The problem of Indian Tamils, the plantation workers of Indian origin in Sri Lanka is not a novelty in the relations between the two countries; rather is a continuation since the colonial era. The citizenship status of the migrant workers remained unchanged until 1964, before the signing of the *Srimavo-Shastri* pact between India and Sri Lanka respectively. India urged Sri Lanka to treat these workers as Sri Lankan citizens, on the basis of their domicile in Sri Lanka. Mrs. Indira Gandhi continued and followed the *Shastri* tradition in a separate way. Indira Gandhi's Sri Lankan policy was a result of India's own interest in external affairs. One of the most significant issues which determined the basic principles of the relationship between the two countries was that of the Tamils of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. The majority of Sinhalese treated the Tamilians of Indian origins as "aliens" and hence they could not be equated with the former. The granting of political rights to the Tamils and the difference between Sinhalese and Tamilians on the issue of language were condensed to be the main causes of conflict between the two groups. The two communities were fragmented, based on social, religious, historical, economic and ideological distinctiveness. The 1981 census revealed that, though the Tamils were generally the minority, in eight out of the twenty-four districts, the Sinhalese were in a minority status (Naik, 2017). Of these eight districts, the Sri Lankan Tamils had an absolute majority in five districts, such as - *Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and Mullaithivu*. But since the late 1950s tension arose between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Economic discrimination was

among the prime causes of this tension. Violence erupted between two communities in 1956, 1958 and in 1977. In 1977 the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) demanded a separate homeland for the Tamils, known as *Tamil Eelam*. An extremist group of Tamils also surfaced as Tamil Tigers. Indian premier Indira Gandhi sent a special envoy, *G. Parthasarathy* thrice to Colombo between August 1983 and January 1984 to prepare the ground for reaching a round table solution. The TULF leader *Mr. Amrithalingam* came to India and held discussions with Mrs. Gandhi, the government leaders, and special envoys. India exercised her powers of persuasion with the Tamil leaders to commence the process of political talk and understanding with Colombo; India also persuaded Sri Lankan Government to not impose unnecessary preconditions. However, Sri Lankan Government recognised the Tamil problem as a problem of terrorism which could only be solved by counter-terrorism initiatives. The *Kachchativu* problem was another issue on which a serious controversy fomented between India and Sri Lanka. The question of ownership of the *Kachchativu* Island condensed as a matter of dispute between India and Sri Lanka. The crisis came to be resolved only with the signing of an agreement between *Mrs. Bandaranaike* and Mrs. Gandhi in June 1974. The island, about 3/4 of a square mile, was situated in Palk Bay which constituted the water of India and Sri Lanka; and was recognised as an uninhabited Island. Both Sri Lanka and India did not have any permanent presence there. During the colonial period, both countries claimed their full sovereignty over the Island. The dispute was finally settled in June 1974 when both Sri Lanka and India signed a comprehensive agreement and demarcated a boundary between the two countries in Palk Bay. According to this agreement, the uninhabited Island of *Kachchativu* became a part of the territory of Sri Lanka. Now the boundary falls one mile off the West coast of the uninhabited Island of *Kachchativu*; and there were mutually satisfactory provisions made on navigation, pilgrimage, fishing and mineral extractions. The *Kachchativu* agreement was signed by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi on 26th July 1974 and by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister *Mrs. Bandaranaike* in Colombo on 28th June 1974 (Naik, 2017). The pact has been appreciated globally and had been seen as a historical step towards institutionalising the friendly ties between the two nations. This treaty acted as a setback to the “mischievous propaganda of Pakistan that India always secures her national interest in relations to the smaller neighbours”. With the *Kachchativu* agreement in June 1974, the two countries successfully demarcated their boundary from Palk Strait to Adam’s Bridge. As far as the Tamil crisis was concerned, it persisted even after the death of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. However, Mrs. Gandhi

built a new bridge between India and Sri Lanka aided by the principles of bilateralism and peace.

The Significance of the Merger of Sikkim in India

The merger of Sikkim was one of the most significant incidents during the regime of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. In accordance with the treaty of 1950, the Indian National Army was permanently stationed in Sikkim, the latter's significance was a well-accepted fact throughout the rest of the country. The geopolitical significance of Sikkim influenced Mrs. Gandhi to a large extent. The internal development plans of Sikkim were a part of India's Five-Year Plans. The communication system and other aspects of its internal administration were also looked upon by the Government of India. Other aspects including the external affairs of Sikkim were wholly controlled and maintained by the Government of India. Although there were differences between the status of Sikkim and other Indian states, the similarities between the two were equally striking. Nonetheless, Sikkim remained a legally semi-sovereign state having a special treaty relationship with the Indian state. India never tried to impose any kind of domination over the sovereign state of Sikkim but rather shared a friendly relationship with the state and since 1950, India had continually strived to maintain a sustainable and peaceful relationship with the state of Sikkim.

However, after the fifth general election of the Sikkim Council in 1973, a political crisis ensued in Sikkim. Many political parties started demanding political reforms in the semi-sovereign state. The *Sikkim Janata Congress* demanded radical reforms and decentralization of power in Sikkim. Similar radical political reforms were called for by other political parties too. However, these demands for reforms were resisted by the *Chhogyal*, leading to the complete collapse of the Sikkimese administration. Nonetheless, with the request of the *Chhogyal*, the Indian Army undertook the entire responsibility of maintenance of law and order in Sikkim. Two days later, the entire administrative power was taken over by the Indian political officer at the insistence of the *Chhogyal*. India was trying to make a comprehensive solution to the Sikkim problem. In the state of Sikkim, there was a tripartite agreement among the *Chhogyal*, the three major Sikkimese political parties, and the Government of India. The agreement allowed democratic elections to the Assembly of Sikkim in accordance with the principle of universal adult franchise in the state. The *Chhogyal* held the official post as a purely constitutional head but did not possess any

substantive powers. Hence, the *Chhogyal* was unsuccessful in maintaining its role as the constitutional head of the state of Sikkim.

An alliance was forged between the *Sikkim Janata Congress* and the *Sikkim National Congress*. However, the Sikkim Congress refrained from joining this alliance between the two other major Sikkimese parties and won an overwhelming victory in the election. This election was held in April 1974 and was entirely supervised by the representatives of the Election Commission of India. The new Assembly passed new resolutions and transferred most of the powers to the office of the *Chhogyal* itself and the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers possessed many substantive powers. With the emergence of a new legislative assembly, the *Chhogyal* became a mere constitutional head. But the new legislation was obstructed and violated by the *Chhogyal* himself, who further violated the tripartite agreement of 1973. The new government of Sikkim requested the Government of India to make the state of Sikkim an “Associate State” of India. In this particular stage, the *Chhogyal* reluctantly signed a bill, which made it a constitutional monarch. Following this, the Constitution of India was amended, in September 1974 transforming the state of Sikkim as an “Associate State” and making provisions for its representation in the Indian parliament. In reacting to the same, *Chhogyal* attempted to internationalise the domestic problems of Sikkim by means of direct interactions with foreign nations.

This led the Assembly of Sikkim to pass a new resolution and requested the Government of India to make Sikkim a regular and constituent State of India. This resolution was also endorsed by the people of Sikkim through a new referendum (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). Thus, the institutional power and position of the *Chhogyal* were abolished simultaneously and, on 16 May 1975, Sikkim was transformed into an Indian State.

The merger of Sikkim with India undoubtedly improved the national security of India. With the merger, the position and status of Indira Gandhi improved. In fact, the merger of Sikkim added a new feather to her cap. The entire process of the constitutional change of the status of Sikkim had taken place under the control of the Indian administration with the elections and the referendum being organized by Indian officials. It created doubts in the minds of the people regarding the extension of “popular support” towards the merger. The Sikkimese Assembly consisted of 32 legislative seats and the voting for these seats was not difficult to manipulate. This type of political corruption was very strong at the time. It was widely believed during Sikkim’s merger, the Indian intelligence agency, the RAW was

involved in the political operation in Sikkim. It was further believed that a large amount of money had been spent at the time of the merger of Sikkim. The *Janata* Prime Minister *Morarji Desai* expressed that, after the search of the related files of the merger, he supported the fundamental principle of the merger, but was strongly opposed to the procedures and methods adopted by the Government of India. Many scholars of Indian Foreign Policy have argued that the methods and principles resorted to by Mrs. Gandhi as a Prime Minister would have been approved by neither Pandit Nehru nor *Shastri*. The role and function of Indira Gandhi were thus debatable and sometimes became controversial in this respect.

Indira Gandhi tried to strengthen the foreign policy of India with the help of the Indian administrative wing. The Indira Gandhi era will be remembered for the pragmatic application of peace in India. In this era, India came to be viewed in a new light internationally, with respect to its international credibility and status. Mrs. Gandhi's regime, therefore in many ways glorified India. Especially through Indian Foreign Policy, she tried to maintain international peace and order. It can thus be stated that Mrs. Gandhi and her foreign policy contributed to the field of world peace, harmony, and stability.

Non-Alignment: Indira Gandhi's Contribution

The idea of non-alignment, a brainchild of Jawaharlal Nehru bequeathed by him for a peaceful world order. The roots of non-alignment can be found in India's freedom movement and were given a concrete shape during the initial years of independence. The dominant ideals of the Indian National Movement – peace and non-violence – can be traced back to the ideas of *Ashoka* and *Buddha*. It cast a great impact on Gandhiji who in turn influenced the first rank leaders of the freedom movement, including Jawaharlal Nehru. The idea of non-alignment today is strongly associated with world peace and is a very natural viewpoint in the development of modern nuclear weapons. India has time and again attempted to highlight that a war would demolish all chances of its socio-economic advancement and progress. The most distinctive feature of Nehruvian non-alignment was freedom of thought and action in international affairs. It is noteworthy that, many newly independent states have followed the path of Nehru's India and remained independent during the crisis-ridden period of the Cold War. However, Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi vastly differed in their application of the principle of non-alignment. At the very beginning of her tenure, Indira Gandhi faced new problems with regard to non-alignment; including the tension of the Cold War and Chinese aggression on the Indian borders. The guiding principles of Nehruvian non-alignment included complete

disarmament, total decolonisation, abolition of racism and economic exploitation. As far as India's security was concerned, the pressures from China and Pakistan remained a dominant factor inducing Mrs. Gandhi to bring about changes in her policy of non-alignment. She did not refrain from taking military assistance from other nations to strengthen India's military capability. This was not in violation of India's commitment to non-alignment as countries like - Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya and Afghanistan took military aid without violating the basic norms of non-alignment. Nehru's well-known radio broadcast on 7th September 1946, enshrined the principle of national interest in an international order based on peace, cooperation, and justice; nonetheless, this speech had a pivotal role to play in India's appeal to non-alignment and world peace. Similarly, Indira Gandhi's first radio broadcast as Prime Minister was equally important in this regard. On 26th January 1966, Mrs. Gandhi went on record asserting that, "in keeping with our heritage, we have followed a policy of peace and friendship with all nations, yet reserved to ourselves the right to an independent opinion. The principles which have guided our foreign policy are in keeping with the best traditions of our country and are wholly consistent with our national interest, honour and dignity. They continue to remain valid" (Gandhi, 1971). Non-alignment thus has been seen as a principle with diverse meanings in India and abroad, but for Mrs. Gandhi, non-alignment was meaningless without its main components of autonomy and self-reliance. To Mrs. Gandhi, non-alignment was rooted in the notion of harmony, as laid down by her father and other founders of the movement. At the very outset, Mrs. Gandhi had unambiguously made it clear that non-alignment was akin to non-bloc in character. It meant, that she had a conviction that India should look at international problems based on the merits of each case rather than judging them on the grounds of ideological preconditions. She wanted to raise the nation (India) above all the bloc prejudices, either Western or Eastern. But interestingly she held the view that the non-bloc character of non-alignment did not mean the idea of equidistance from all blocs, it rather meant that there should be a kind of plurality amongst the members of the non-alignment movement. In other words, each member of the movement should possess a fair degree of autonomy in determining its position vis-à-vis bloc. Hence, Mrs. Gandhi wanted to bring about plurality and diversity in the non-alignment movement. Nevertheless, she was quite sensitive to the criticism of her stands on non-alignment; especially during her premiership, she was charged with favouritism towards the Soviet Union. This was based on the constantly evolving and strengthening of the friendship between India and the USSR, during her premiership. In reply to this allegation Mrs. Gandhi very clearly explained that

India had never followed any country, big or small, powerful or powerless; instead had tried to maintain friendly relations with a number of countries and the Soviet Union was such a nation, to which India remained indebted to in many ways. Furthermore, she was strongly against the idea of following any nation, but rather was a strong believer in aiding India to stand in glory in her own right. It is however to be borne in mind that the Soviet Union was supporting the positions taken by the non-aligned countries and the developing countries of Asia and Africa. Mrs. Gandhi's policy of non-alignment can be traced back to her foreign visits and meetings with foreign leaders of Asia and Africa. In July 1966, she visited President Nasser in Cairo and President Tito in Brioni, Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that, in November 1966 Presidents Tito and Nasser visited India to hold a meeting with Indira Gandhi. In the earlier years Nehru, Nasser and Tito had met in Brioni on the 18th and 19th of July 1956 and the three architects of the non-alignment movement later met in Cairo on the 18th and 19th of November 1961 again. As a consequence of the July 1966 meeting, it was decided to hold a tripartite meeting (at the summit level) in New Delhi. Here Mrs. Gandhi had a unique chance of taking a long leap towards achieving the status of a world leader in the coming years. India had tremendously benefitted from the New Delhi conference, and India's post-Nehru era foreign policy was marked and guided by the principles of bilateralism and multilateralism. Now, as far as the USA's domination was concerned, the tripartite grouping of leaders had criticised the United States and its allies for their brutal domination in Vietnam. India's food situation at this very moment was critical but Mrs. Gandhi could not afford a compromise; thus, she came to be recognised as a world leader. In the post-Second World War period, the US pursued a one-point programme in international relations; the main objective of which was to contain the growth of communism. Hence, there was a crisis in policy-making; a new trend became institutionalised. In other words, there was an intellectual bipolarity between democracy and communism (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990). The US undoubtedly emerged as the most dominant power in the aftermath Second World War, and very interestingly there were no implications of India's nationalism and independence in the shaping of US foreign policy. On the other hand, the most valuable instrument of India's foreign policy was non-alignment which was directly opposite to the foreign policy pursued by the US. Moreover, during Mrs. Gandhi's premiership, there was a sharp distinction between American and Indian policies in West Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Central America, and Africa, and other international problems towards which the non-aligned movement was working. Mrs. Gandhi's role in supporting the people of the non-

aligned world was remarkable. In 1977 when she was voted out of power, there ensued a leadership crisis in the non-aligned world. At the 6th Non-aligned Summit in Havana held in 1979, her absence had been deeply felt by many. In 1980, when Mrs. Gandhi returned to power, India's role became significant again. People, especially in the regions of West Asia, Indo-China and Southern Africa looked to Mrs. Gandhi for her guidance and support (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990). However, Indira Gandhi took the Chairmanship of the movement from March 1983 to October 1984. Her statesmanship and dynamism gave strong support to the workings of the non-alignment movement. Mrs. Gandhi being a strong and fearless leader not only championed the principle of non-alignment in the world but made India proud in the manifestation of world peace and harmony.

The NPT and the Nuclear Explosion in India

India's attempt to transform into a nuclear power is a significant issue in the field of the analysis of foreign policy in India. After independence, India was not only trying to strengthen itself economically but also to achieve nuclear power. After the first decade of Indian independence, India declared many programmes for the development and utilization of nuclear power which would be used for purely peaceful economic purposes. (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). Prime Ministers like Jawaharlal Nehru and *Lal Bahadur Shastri* had categorically announced that India will never manufacture any kind of nuclear weapons. Nehru's vision was a peaceful world order and disarmament. Although Indira Gandhi was committed to the disarmament programme, in reality, her attitude became "ambivalent" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). She wanted to build a strong and stable India in terms of nuclear weapons. She had emphasized the prestige value, but not the deterrent value of a successful nuclear explosion. Mrs. Gandhi thus became the first Prime Minister during whose regime India achieved the status of a nation of nuclear power.

An owner of a strong personality, Mrs. Gandhi never bowed down to any imposition against her will. Much before the first nuclear explosion conducted by India in Pokhran, the US and Soviet Union jointly finalised the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and at that time both USA and the Soviet Union tried to pressurise India into signing the treaty. Mrs. Gandhi very prominently resisted this pressure from the western countries. Sighting the discriminatory character of the said treaty, she strongly opposed the same, being backed by the wholehearted support of the entire Indian nation. The western countries were suspecting that India will promote a military nuclear programme for her own purpose. India exploded

her first nuclear device in May 1974 with many people explaining it as a fulfilment of their own apprehension.

However, Mrs. Gandhi and her government tried to characterize and publicize the nuclear programme as a test in the direction of peaceful nuclear programming. The entire purpose of India's nuclear test was to develop nuclear energy and not to use it as a military weapon. But many foreign governments had pointed out that the difference between a nuclear device and a nuclear weapon was semantic rather than technical. The necessity and advantage of a nuclear explosion for any country are highly controversial. The possible economic uses of the nuclear explosion in India were one of the most important factors. India was trying to become a dominant power in the entire South Asian region, and in this context, the rivalry with Pakistan also stands out to be significant. In the global context, ownership of nuclear capability is always a matter of pride. Following the nuclear explosion, India achieved the status of a nuclear-powered nation. Soon after the Indian explosion, Kissinger and the US administration declared that the US respected India as a major power in South Asia. The US also tried to highlight the "more natural and equal relationship" that could be constituted between USA and India. It is also noteworthy that after the Bangladesh War, factionalism had evolved within the Congress and furthermore, there was deterioration in the economic matters of the country.

The conditions of economic production were degrading. The facilitating conditions of heavy industries were receding too, hampering the image and popularity of Mrs. Gandhi massively. Amidst this domestic environment, the nuclear explosion worked as a "great image-booster and image-maker" for not only Indira Gandhi but also for the Indian National Congress. The status of a nuclear-powered nation constituted a new image for India, internally and externally. While Jawaharlal Nehru was always opposed to nuclear explosion anywhere in the world and rather in favour of a nuclear-free world, *Lal Bahadur Shastri* on the other hand had always tried to invite the superpowers "to hold a protective nuclear umbrella over India" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p.263). Above all, the role of Mrs. Gandhi in the context of the achievement of nuclear power was far different from the earlier Prime Ministers. The nuclear programme of India was independent of any kind of international pressure and neither did Mrs. Gandhi ever try to urge the world to use nuclear power towards peaceful means. She tried to become pragmatic in this context. A renowned foreign scholar in analysing Mrs. Gandhi's opinion observed that "... the Gandhism which prevails in India

today is not that of the Mahatma, but rather that of Indira Gandhi, who has been Minister for Atomic Energy as well as Prime Minister ever since 1966. The political style of Gandhi may be said to combine the modernizing ideas of her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, but without his Hamlet-like hesitancy. Her decisiveness in practice, her skill in crisis management, is more reminiscent of *Sardar Patel* who was tough, realistic, not given to gratuitous explanations and justifications, though without his touch of Hindu chauvinism” (Lyon, 1974). Thus, while the personality of Mrs. Gandhi influenced many, she further tried to recombine her pragmatic character with the foreign policy of the Indian nation. She attempted to strengthen the Indian Foreign Policy, Indian Nuclear Policy, and Indian Defence Policy. Despite international pressure on the Indian Nuclear Programme, under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, a strong and stable nuclear programme was started. Therefore, she can be termed successful in the manifestation of a strong and stable nuclear policy for India. The other states of Asia and Africa were highly influenced by the achievement of India and the nuclear policy subsequently contributed to strengthening the defence and the foreign policy of modern India

The Foreign Policy Administration of the Indira Gandhi Era

I now turn to explicate the Foreign Policy administration of the Gandhi regime, significant in giving a final shape to this discussion. The most significant characteristic feature of Mrs. Gandhi’s foreign policy administration was the very frequent replacement of foreign officials and Foreign Ministers. This can be seen to highlight Mrs. Gandhi’s unease to allow any Foreign Minister to become incredibly effective or powerful. She always had several options in her hand and frequently changed the Foreign Ministers according to her will.

Adopting an authoritarian political style, she tried to exercise her strong power and control over the implementation and formulation of foreign policy. *T. N. Kaul*, a Foreign Secretary, had expressed to a biographer of Mrs. Gandhi in 1971:”Gandhi talks less, but she is as actively interested in foreign affairs as her father. Decisions on foreign policy are definitely hers, though matters are of course discussed in the Political Affairs Committee (the inner circle) of the Cabinet. The existence of a separate Minister for External Affairs relieves her of the burden of administrative details, but the initiative in foreign policy rests with her” (Masani, 1978, p. 238). This can be thus read as a case in point underlining Mrs. Gandhi’s inherent self-dependence and remarkable decision-making power.

Similarly, another civil servant, an expert on defence and foreign policy commented in 1975: “The Ministers do not stay long enough in any one portfolio to acquire the expertise to be in a position to take the initiative in policy formulation. These frequent shifts in portfolios have generated a generally accepted view that nothing more is expected of Ministers than to act as political checks on the bureaucracies... It is no secret (though the present Prime Minister is not the Minister for External Affairs as Nehru was) that Smt. Indira Gandhi exercises continuous control over foreign Policy” (Subrahmanyam, 1975). Thus, highlighting the contrast between Mrs. Gandhi and her beloved father.

It was common for Mrs. Gandhi to take any decision autonomously. She thus transformed Indian Foreign Policy with her decision-making power. Many scholars of Indian Foreign Policy have argued that she imposed her command and control over the foreign and security policy of modern India.

Smt. Indira Gandhi tried to control every sphere of the Indian foreign policy administration. Her dominance of the foreign policy administration was the most remarkable feature of the Indira Gandhi era. Hence, the power and position of Mrs. Gandhi deeply influenced foreign policy. The Indian Foreign Policy of the Indira Gandhi era also contributed to the field of world peace. The legacy of the Nehruvian notion of world peace was equally present in the thinking and conduct of Mrs. Gandhi’s foreign policy. She built a friendly and harmonious relationship with the smaller nations of Asia and Africa. Hence, with her glorious and charismatic leadership, she gradually transformed into the ‘great leader of modern Asia’. Her continuous efforts in the making of world peace enshrined the global role of modern India.

The most significant fact of Mrs. Gandhi’s premiership was her marked failure to rely on the Foreign Ministers of India for the making of Indian Foreign Policy. She did not rely on the officers of foreign relations except in the first phase of her premiership and was suspicious of the bureaucracy of foreign affairs. However, she tried to capture the whole bureaucracy within a very short time. She harboured a similar mistrust for all kinds of political leaders around her and also held a sense of insecurity regarding the bureaucracy. Her emphasis on the need for a “committed bureaucracy” was a reflection of this sense of insecurity. Psychologically, a strong and rigid person, she never was able to trust the bureaucratic relationship in foreign affairs. In achieving her political ambition of controlling every branch of political administration she relied on the people of her own community and

similarly inducted the bureaucrats from her own Kashmiri-Brahmin community. She thus tried to control the bureaucracy with her own choices and had a strong faith in her own 'community bureaucracy' while trying to nurture the bureaucracy with her own control and supervision.

Indira Gandhi relied heavily upon her own Kashmiri Pandit community of bureaucrats. *P. N. Haksar*, a Kashmiri Brahmin, was such a person. He was also a former member of the Communist Party of India. Simultaneously, he became a senior member of the Indian Foreign Service.

P. N. Haksar was recruited in his early years, to the Indian Foreign Service without going through a competitive examination. On the basis of his own personal capacity, he was appointed as the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister and he joined his office next to the Prime Minister in the South Block. Within a very short time, he became the most influential person not only in the Ministry of External Affairs but also in the Government of India in a larger context. It was a matter of fact that *P. N. Haksar* had a deep influence on the entire government. It was believed that *Haksar's* influence was not less than that of any cabinet minister and he managed to influence the Prime Minister too, in a larger context.

In the Ministry of External Affairs, *Haksar* successfully controlled all administrative matters. Needless to say, *Haksar's* words were the law in the Ministry of External Affairs. Mrs. Gandhi trusted the judgement of *P. N. Haksar*, who in turn assured her of the successful maintenance of the Indian Foreign Policy and world peace.

Another influential person in the Ministry of External Affairs was *D. P. Dhar*. He was a Kashmiri Brahmin and owed personal loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi and her family. Indira Gandhi appointed *D. P. Dhar* as the chairman of the Policy Planning and Review Committee of The Ministry of External Affairs. He was temporarily appointed at the time of the Bangladesh crisis but managed to influence the Prime Minister to a large extent. In this respect, *K. Subrahmanyam* has stated, "In retrospect, it is obvious that it was only a device to give *Shri Dhar* a role analogous to a chief of staff to the Prime Minister in matters concerned with Bangladesh crisis" (Subrahmanyam, 1975). *D. P. Dhar* played a fundamental role in the matters concerning the Bangladesh crisis. *D. P. Dhar* and *P. N. Haksar* both performed very essential foreign policy functions with special emphasis on the negotiations of the *Simla Agreement*. After a few days, *D. P. Dhar* was inducted into the Cabinet by Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi. As the days passed, *P. N. Haksar* lost the most favoured position due to his unnecessary advice concerning *Sanjay Gandhi* and his *Maruti Factory*. *Haksar* retired from service in the normal course of time. *P. N. Haksar* had a strong influence over foreign affairs, especially in matters concerning India's contribution to world peace while the Foreign Ministers *M. C. Chagla* and *Dinesh Singh* had no control over him. The activities of *P. N. Haksar* in the field of foreign policy administration were often unknown to both *Chagla* and *Singh*. Foreign Minister *Swaran Singh's* position regarding the relationship with *D. P. Dhar* was quite similar. After the retirement of *P. N. Haksar*, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appointed a new Kashmiri Brahmin who was very close to her family. *P. N. Dhar* was appointed as the Principal Private Secretary of Indira Gandhi. Another new name in the field of foreign policy administration was *G. Parthasarathi*. He was an old family associate of Indira Gandhi and had also been recruited to Indian Foreign Service, like *P. N. Haksar*, without going through a competitive examination. Gandhi also appointed him as the chairman of the policy planning and Review Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs in the year 1975.

G. Parthasarathi was silently loyal to Mrs. Gandhi and he spent his maximum time in negotiation with the National Conference leader *Sheikh Abdulla* regarding the internal and external issues of Kashmir. He kept busy with hard jobs for the Prime Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs. Sometimes, *Parthasarathi* avoided Foreign Minister *Y. B. Chavan* and directly negotiated with the Prime Minister. It is attention-worthy that the son of *G. Parthasarathi* was appointed as the Scientific Adviser in the regime of Indira Gandhi. A person who played a significant role personally in the making and implementation of foreign policy under the direct control of Indira Gandhi was *Mohammed Yunus*, the son of *Abdul Ghafoor Khan*.

Mohammed Yunus had been an old associate of the Nehru family since the 'Allahabad days' and was also a retired member of the Indian Foreign Service. He too was recruited without going through the process of a competitive examination (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). He influenced Mrs. Gandhi in the successful application of Indian Foreign Policy. On behalf of Indira Gandhi, *Mohammed Yunus* visited several foreign nations during the time of the National Emergency. He was appointed as the "Personal Envoy" of the Prime Minister and assisted her in constructing a strong and successful foreign policy. He also acted as the chief of the Nonaligned News Agencies Pool. During the time of the National Emergency, he not

only completely dominated the Ministry of External Affairs and its administration but also controlled other branches of administrative departments. Thus, akin to other administrators *Mohammed Yunus* deeply influenced the other branches of the administration and was also successful in influencing the Prime Minister in the construction of world Peace.

Conclusion

It is necessary to delineate the position of Indira Gandhi in the maintenance of world peace. The personality and political stance of Mrs. Gandhi astonished the administrators of foreign nations. She managed to draw the attention of foreign nations towards world peace. Like Jawaharlal Nehru, she tried to forge close ties with the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. In South Asia, many nation-states appreciated Mrs. Gandhi for her leadership style and her positive approach towards world peace. During her tenure, her status was enshrined in the phrase "Indira is India". But many scholars have argued that, apart from the positive attributes of her character, she was personally insecure, mistrusted her fellow people, and invoked an authoritarian political style. For these reasons, Indira Gandhi was psychologically incapable of controlling and operating the administrative branches of Indian Foreign Policy. She was severely dependent and relied upon the few people in whom she was surrounded and had faith. Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi was a successful administrator, and successfully constituted a foreign policy of peace through the means of progressive foreign relations. Hence, under her premiership, India achieved the status of a peace-loving nation in the world.

Chapter-V

Rajiv Gandhi: Peace and Democracy

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Rajiv Gandhi stands out in history as a successful Prime Minister and politician, a strong leader, an admirer of science and technology, and above all, an ardent supporter of peace and democracy. He piloted India's foreign policy in an era marked by rapid transformation and international change and shared concerns for the overall development of India on the one hand, and the world on the other, especially on issues including, global nuclear peace, environmental stability, technological innovations for human progress, fiscal and monetary crisis and recognized the contradiction between Cold War and science and technology, that remained hitherto unspoken of (Sen Gupta, 1990). Rajiv Gandhi sought to project himself as an active supporter of states seeking liberation and accordingly maintained his utmost commitment to the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. He further highlighted India's deep historical as well as cultural links with her immediate South Asian neighbours. Rajiv Gandhi accepted few existing differences between India and some of its immediate neighbours as valid - like Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; but at the same time expressed that these nations could work together to fulfil their common aims. He was convinced that regional development and economic sustenance could be achieved through peace, friendship, and cooperation and reaffirmed his confidence and faith in the principles of the United Nations and, undertook a pledge to continue the resistance against colonialism. Further, to actualize the common regional development of South Asia he expressed the hope to settle disputes with China and Pakistan with the active support of Soviet Russia; Rajiv Gandhi, therefore chose the path traversed by the former Prime Ministers and emphasized India's wide-ranging relationship with the Soviet Union based upon mutual cooperation, friendship, and support as per the needs of the time. He was convinced of the positive and progressive role, played by India in the achievement of 'detente' between the East and the West since the beginning of the Cold War. As far as the USA is concerned, he had spoken in favour of a multifaced relationship based on economic, cultural, and technological assistance with the people of America. He also tried to strengthen the political, social, and economic relations with the countries of South-East and South-West Asia, the Far East and the Pacific, the Arab World, Latin America, the Caribbean, and

Western and Eastern Europe. To him, the nuclear threat remained the most challenging factor facing the contemporary world, against which he raised his voice and undertook a relentless crusade. Rajiv Gandhi's foreign economic policy is of no less importance can be argued that he shared an overwhelming concern about the global economic crisis and took a progressive role promoting a dialogue between the North and South and constructing a just world economic order (Gupta, 1987). The era of Rajiv Gandhi had been marked by both continuity and change in India's foreign affairs that had commenced from the colonial era and the most dominant principles of Indian foreign policy during this period included - peace, democracy, national unity, political independence, economic salvation, secularism, egalitarianism, and socialism and the like. Nevertheless, Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy remained very much embedded in India's domestic matters and the above-mentioned ideological principles. In other words, he prioritized India's domestic problems in constituting a useful foreign policy. It is interesting to note that, Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy pronouncements have been marked by a general approach to the restructuring of India's foreign relations embodying a perceptible journey from "policy moves" to "policy objectives". The most outstanding feature of his foreign policy was his personal "shuttle diplomacy" denoting the visits made by him during his premiership to the different parts of the world to persuade, understand, convene, argue, disseminate, influence, and sympathize with world affairs, thus shaping his diplomatic stands. During these grand trips, Rajiv Gandhi dealt with major world issues such as - racism, disarmament, atomic power, new economic world order, North-South and South-South dialogue, polarization, the U.N. system, the ILO, and the like. However, Rajiv Gandhi's leadership style and diplomacy were unique in so far as it was mostly shaped by the world public opinion as expressed in the UN forums, NAM, and the Commonwealth conferences representing a large portion of humanity.

Rajiv Gandhi was undoubtedly an unparalleled political person, a great leader, and a legendary Prime Minister of modern India. The foreign policy of India faced several new challenges during the Indira-Rajiv era. It is however deemed prudent to explore the early life of Rajiv Gandhi, before entering a detailed deliberation of the Rajiv era and its foreign policy. Akin to their mother Indira Gandhi, Rajiv, and Sanjay too had experienced a 'disturbed and alienated' childhood. Indira Gandhi's marriage and family life with Feroze Gandhi underwent a rift shortly after the birth of their two sons, who were reared under and according to the strong political standards of their grandfather. Rajiv Gandhi grew up in an atmosphere of high economic and social security but remained extremely lonely in the

absence of parental care and affection owing to the busy schedule of their mother. After the completion of their primary education in The Doon School, both Rajiv and Sanjay travelled to England for their higher education. While Sanjay Gandhi failed to make progress concerning her education, Rajiv Gandhi went on to attend college in England but remained unsuccessful in his academic life there. On his return to India, he was trained as a commercial pilot and was first employed as a co-pilot and a pilot in Indian Airlines. Rajiv Gandhi flew an Avro aircraft between Delhi and Jaipur. It is significant to note that he lived private life until the death of his younger brother Sanjay Gandhi in 1983.

Rajiv Gandhi, subsequently entered politics to assist his mother, Indira Gandhi, and not to the surprise of many, soon was appointed as the General Secretary of the Congress. It must be noted that the said post was generally reserved for a senior and experienced Congress leader. After the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi immediately shifted into the zenith of power and was appointed the Prime Minister of India on 31st October 1984. Though he had not yet been elected as a leader of the Congress (I) parliamentary party; the party met on a particular day and elected him as the leader. The parliamentary elections were held in November 1984, and the Congress (I) won the elections with a huge majority giving Rajiv Gandhi a legitimate mandate for the next 5 years. Although he lacked experience concerning the workings of the government, and neither was he highly educated nor a bearer of higher professional accomplishment, he became the Indian Prime Minister (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970).

It can be noted that given Mr. Gandhi's disturbed childhood coupled with educational failure and lack of administrative knowledge, it was only natural that he would grow up with an inferiority complex. Moreover, the tragic assassination of his mother and the condition of the Congress party forced him to become an 'inexperienced' Prime Minister of India. Pranab Mukherjee, who was a member of Indira Gandhi's cabinet, recalled that on their flight from Calcutta to Delhi on 31st October 1984, Rajiv Gandhi had asked him whether he (Rajiv), in Mukherjee's view, could measure up to the responsibilities associated with the office of the Prime Minister (Jain, 1989). This question is significant from the viewpoint of not only Pranab Mukherjee but also from other angles. Many scholars have argued that Rajiv Gandhi was not completely confident of being capable enough to hold the position of Prime Minister following the death of his mother. By norms of social psychology, a person with an inferiority complex seeks unexpected compensation for his insufficiency by cultivating an

autocratic personality. Rajiv Gandhi's autocratic personality transformed him into a more rigid political person. His autocratic personality came to the fore during his days as the General Secretary of the Congress in the early 1980s, especially following the death of his younger brother Sanjay Gandhi (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). On the one hand, an occupant of one of the highest positions of power, the Prime Minister, and on the other hand, an authoritarian supreme of Congress (I), Rajiv Gandhi had so far tried to sketch a new picture of both the nation and the Congress. We shall try to identify the images of world peace sketched by him through the instrument of Indian Foreign Policy. We shall briefly discuss below the various phases and instances of foreign policy in the Rajiv Gandhi era.

Rajiv Gandhi and the Victory of Congress (I)

The early 1990s is regarded as a watershed moment in India's Foreign Policy. This was the juncture marked by the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union, an incident that had completely astonished the world. The liberalization of the Indian economy and the freeing of the home market directly affected India's engagement with the greater world. There was thus a marked shift in the scope and purpose of the Indian Foreign Policy. The period of the mid-1980s remains significant owing to the special events that occurred during the tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The Rajiv era to a greater or lesser extent served as a link between the events of the pre-1980s and the early 1990s. Since then, the orientation of the Indian Foreign Policy had begun to undergo a transformation leading many researchers to note that there had been an 'attitudinal' shift in the approach adopted by the Indian Foreign Policy.

In this segment, we aim to identify the electoral victory of Congress (I) and its impact on the image of Rajiv Gandhi. The shift in the Indian Foreign Policy under Rajiv Gandhi was a result of a conjunction of internal and external factors. Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as the Prime Minister of India after the assassination of his mother Indira Gandhi on 31st October 1984. In the mid-term elections, held in December 1984, Rajiv Gandhi's party, the Congress (I) had very gloriously managed to achieve an unprecedented victory in India. In this election, the voter turnout was 64.1 percent, and the Congress (I) Party won 48.1 percent of the votes. Congress (I) had managed to secure 415 seats out of 517 seats. This victory had broken the past records of the Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras. This also gave Rajiv Gandhi an unassailable majority in the Indian parliament and, subsequently, aided him to dominate in the as well. At the age of just 41, he became the youngest Prime Minister of the country and

simultaneously ruled his party. Furthermore, Rajiv Gandhi was to a large extent forced to join the field of national politics at a very young age following the death of his younger brother Sanjay Gandhi and his mother Indira Gandhi. Under these circumstances, he garnered a deep political legacy which propelled him to introduce a new pattern of political activism and power into the Party. The Congress garnered a lot of criticism in terms of corruption among national leaders during its centenary year, 1985 (Malone, 2015). Rajiv Gandhi enshrined his political image as a Prime Minister, and this image began to be strengthened by his important decisions in the international sphere. Rajiv Gandhi's moves were very clear in this context, and he tried to interlink regional, domestic, and global imperatives. Soon after he had assumed office, the international scene began to change. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev achieved political power in the Soviet Union. Rajiv Gandhi and his advisers agreed to Gorbachev's willingness to work together with India. In his famous Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev talked about the internal economic and political reconstruction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Many scholars have argued that given this situation, the neutral and nonaligned image of India had come under international pressure. The situation was such that India neither excluded herself from the special relationship with Moscow nor did she enhance herself to build closer relationships with the US. However, at the same time, India would also have to forge a stronger relationship with the United States and China (Malone, 2015). Her regional politics were greatly influenced due to these external relationships. Gorbachev's decision to pull Soviet military troops out of Afghanistan constituted a new kind of international crisis in this region. On the other hand, Pakistan had begun to influence the supporters of the secessionist movement in the Indian Punjab. However, India was abreast of the internal problems in the Punjab region. Pakistan had greatly benefited from the US military and financial assistance for the Afghan jihad and from conventional and nuclear weapon cooperation with China. In South Asia, another nation facing serious problems was Sri Lanka. Somehow, the situation in Sri Lanka was much worse because the security forces of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militants were locked in a civil war. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government had begun negotiations with the United States and other external players to ban India from adopting a pro-Tamil stance. The Indian state of Tamil Nadu was close to the external crisis in Sri Lanka. However, considering domestic problems, the country needed to interfere in the internal and external problems in its neighbourhood. During the early days of his office, the Rajiv Gandhi government was trapped between the problems in Punjab, Assam, Mizoram, and Kashmir. Quite essentially, he recognized the importance of foreign

policy with special emphasis on domestic objectives. In one of his speeches, he expressed his keen interest in 'building for an India of the twenty-first century' (Gandhi, 1984). Rajiv Gandhi wanted to transform India by the means of modernization of technology, particularly information technology, and with the help of these modern technologies, he envisioned a transformation of the Indian economy and society. This project of modernization affected the external relationship of India. It was also made necessary to maintain a wide trade relationship with the outside world. The export of Indian goods became a major factor and concern for the Indian industry. As Rajiv Gandhi observed, 'A rapidly growing modernizing economy will need a growing volume of imports and an expanding flow of technology. We can only pay for the inflow if we can pay more than we are doing now' (Kapur, 1994, p. 70). The government of India took several steps to relax the impotent restrictions and encourage the export of Indian goods. David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan have argued that the importance of India's external engagements underwent a change owing to the internal transformation induced by the Indian foreign policy and the change it underwent following the 1990s and after.

The Defense Policy of Rajiv Gandhi: 1984-1989

There appeared a massive change in the defence policy outlook of India with the commencement of Rajiv Gandhi's premiership in 1984. There were several geo-political, strategic, and economic factors accounting for this change. The success in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War had established India as a major power in the South Asian region. This emergent position of India had attracted the attention of the entire world. With the beginning of the Rajiv Gandhi era, a new defence approach had appeared at the forefront reflecting a growing idea of India's emergence as a superior power (Sen Gupta, 1986). The so-called ideologically defined role of the Indian defence forces as a protector of the Indian borders had been reconstructed. The Indian defence policy was redefined to give prominence to action rather than verbal statements of the Indian defence ministry in favour of joining defence establishments with the major western powers, including the United States. This professional approach to defence planning kept India much ahead in comparison with the other developing nations (Thomas, 1986). However, the Indian defence policy was a synthesis of flexibility and ambivalence under the Rajiv Gandhi era, emphasizing an independent doctrine of regional security. The essence of this doctrine was strong Indian opposition to any kind of external intervention in the domestic affairs of any South Asian

nation, especially by those powers whose goals were identified as inimical to Indian interests. It has thus been assumed that no South Asian government should accept external assistance, rather if any South Asian nation was in urgent need of assistance, it should approach India. This was termed the 'Rajiv Doctrine' which was visible in India's policy towards Sri Lanka and Maldives during the Rajiv era. India used this policy in the late 1980s to directly assert its power over smaller neighbours like - Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, India is also noted to have used its ultimate power (or superior power) – political, military, and economic, to achieve favourable outcomes in South Asia (Verma, 2012). It is noteworthy to say that various factors influenced India's defence policy during the Rajiv Gandhi era. The most significant of them is the geo-political strategic factor comprising several elements. The Ministry of Defense, for years, had called for an error-free security environment in which Pakistan and China remained the joint threats to India and the superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean continued. Indo-US relations in this context did not gain momentum although, Indo-Soviet relations ascended to a better position. Another important dimension of India's security scenario was China. During the Rajiv Gandhi era, there was a sign of improvement in the Sino-Indian relationship; the main area of contention was the border issue where China showed no leverage. China was increasing its pressure on the Indian borders, especially focusing on the Western side, to gain an advantageous and coercive position on the Indian parts of the border from the Chinese side. The Sino-Indian relations thus can be characterized to have been strained, marked by China's continuing willingness to dominate India through border wars. Nevertheless, China's suspicion of India's increasing economic, political, and military strength in South Asia, left it with no other options except to increase military pressure on the Indian borders. The China-Pakistan military assistance was another matter of concern to India's security issues. China-Pakistan joint military activities in the Latah region as well as the Karakorum Highway became the main irritants in the crisis. China was the biggest arms supplier to Pakistan; and this China-Pakistan conspiracy against India generated a deep reaction in the neighbouring states of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Nepal was following China against India to gain maximum returns, and Islamabad remained the most important factor between the tripartite relationship of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, on the other hand, Bhutan was negotiating with China, whereas Sri Lanka was looking towards the United States (MEA, 1985-86). Pakistan was a major source of threat to Indian security and its deep involvement in Punjab and similarly, its role in terrorist activities in Punjab and Kashmir had strained the Indo-Pak relations during the Rajiv Gandhi era.

Pakistan's nuclear capacity to build weapons in a short time further posed a real threat to India's security. On the other hand, the induction of foreign security and the working of the intelligence organization in Sri Lanka; especially the unilateral manifestation and declaration of the surveillance zone around the Sri Lankan northern and eastern coast was another security threat to India (Azam, 1989). Indian security in the Rajiv Gandhi era had also been affected by the tripartite relationship between India, China, and Soviet Russia. According to the Ministry of Defense, the growing friendship between China and Russia had a deep impact on India's external and security calculations (MEA, 1985-86). India had assumed that the Sino-Soviet friendship might enable China to redeploy its forces from the Sino-Soviet border to Indian Tibet which can damage India's security environment. Hence, the regional environment was not in India's favour. The territorial bickering or conflicts were still determining the bilateral relations; for example, the Siachen Glacier dispute between India and Pakistan in the mid-80s acted as a source of conflict between the two neighbours. In the Rajiv Gandhi era, there was another shift in India's security concept; the security forces were much more active in the maintenance of law and order and the political integrity of the country than ever before. For instance, the Indian military from 1987 to 1989 was called thirty-six times mostly to maintain law and order in the country. The economic growth and military modernization program of India had led to her being equated with the western superpowers while astonishing the world. In the 1980s Indian middle class comprised around 150 million people, most of them earning the average European wage. It is a surprising fact that this group alone paid a tax bracket, which was considerably larger than that of France (Verma, 2012). It is mentioned that India's economic growth and capability enabled her defence forces to undergo systematic and pragmatic growth from 1982-1983. However, another significant factor in India's security concept was the Indian Ocean where India occupied a geo-politically unique position. The Indian Ocean was surrounded by the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. We cannot ignore India's vital interests in the region, especially the threats emanating from the presence of the world's major powers. In the 1980s, the great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and the rejection of the concept of a 'zone of peace' by the industrialized major powers; their naval presence in the Indian Ocean as well as their linkage with regional powers was neither fruitful nor beneficiary to India. Hence, the absence of western acceptance of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace had been an essential factor in India's quest to become a major maritime power. Laying the foundation of a naval base in Karnataka, which was described as the biggest as well as one of the most

sophisticated in South Asia, Rajiv Gandhi expressed that - "If we have to remain independent, we must look to the South and the Indian Ocean for safety and security" (Nugent, 1991, p. 29). It is noteworthy to say that, the commissioning of the military ship, Seventh Enterprise in 1971 by the United States during the Indo-Pak war shows the fragility of security conditions and the need for strengthening the security in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the U. S. defence forces and the U. S. CENTOM forces gathered at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. However, India under Rajiv Gandhi witnessed an unprecedented improvement in and modernization of the three wings of the defence forces, namely- the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Thus, during the Rajiv Gandhi era, we see a grand shift from security deficiency to security stability in India. During the 1980s, India became the world's major importer of defence and security equipment. Hence, according to strategic analysis, Rajiv Gandhi constituted a new activist foreign policy to establish India as the greatest military power in the world. During this time, India purchased a 2nd aircraft carrier-VIRAAT from Britain and purchased FH 70 howitzers from Sweden (Verma, 2012). India joined the club of non-nuclear powers and became the first to operate a nuclear-powered submarine with the lease of the vessel from the Soviet Union, a commendable measure is important to note that, there were some major achievements in electronic warfare and counter-electronic and Radio Local Systems (RLS) of communication equipment (Bobbs, 1988). Hence, this defence acceleration continued throughout the Rajiv Gandhi era, and gave rise to the "Rajiv Doctrine". Nevertheless, this doctrine had been manifested by the sending of Indian forces to its closest neighbours, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. These two military operations revealed a confident willingness to fight battles beyond the homeland and subsequently questioned the rationale of Indian military interventions abroad. As far as Naval security is concerned, there was a major change that occurred in the Rajiv Gandhi era. The Indian Navy had graduated from the "Brown water fleet" and became a capable and efficient blue water navy, developing powerful striking capability over a wide area of the Indian Ocean. India had further realized the need to reconstruct the security measures, especially in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and had decided to protect its water resources in a systematic way. Since 1985, the submarine division of the Indian Navy underwent a pragmatic change; the four stages of submarine security were converted to the latest technology and "art weaponry system". India took on the lease, the INS CHAKRA from the Soviet Union, which was nuclear-powered and could carry nuclear weapons. Thus, India became one of the five major naval powers capable of striking long-range aircraft. Rajiv Gandhi explained this achievement

at the induction of INS-CHAKRA - “if we are to keep the destiny of India in our hands, we must have full control of the waters around us and the thousands of kilometers of shoreline which stretch along the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and upon the Indian Ocean” (Gandhi, 1985). The induction of HMS and HERMES to the Indian Navy was also a part and parcel of the blue water Navy policy of Rajiv Gandhi. It is interesting to note that, while the great powers were in a process of reducing their naval forces in the strategically significant Indian Ocean; the already stable Indian Navy was exercising its presence. The Indian Ocean had thus turned into a fulcrum of the military balance among the nations of South Asia. The then Defense Minister Mr. K. C. Pant justified the need for a blue water navy during the induction ceremony of TUIUZN, by pointing out the massive presence of extra “regional navies” in the Indian Ocean and the consequent pressure in that area. The blue water navy was highly essential for not only sea commerce but also to protect the sovereignty of the nation. Indian defence analyst Ravi Rikhye expressed that - “Navies are a symbol of power. We want to be world-class power. So we must have a world-class navy” (Nugent, 1990, p. 20). Rikhye also urged for a coastal navy to protect territorial sovereignty. Turning to the Air Force, it can be highlighted that since 1984 Rajiv Gandhi had upgraded the Indian Air Force systematically. A rapid modernization of the Indian Air Force can be seen in just about two years, with many new aircraft being acquired by India, including - Soviet Mig-9, Fulcrum Multirole Combat aircraft, Anglo-French Jaguar deep strike bomber, French Mirage 2000 air fighter and MIG 23 BN flogger H Multirole aircraft. It is mention worthy that, to defend against possible attacks from Pakistan and China, the Rajiv Gandhi government emphasized the improvement and modernization of firearms, especially missiles. While Mrs. Gandhi had already commenced the missile modernization program in 1983, its success was cherished during the latter half of Rajiv Gandhi’s premiership. India successfully tested surface-to-surface missiles, including Prithivi in February 1988. India already possessed missiles like *Trishul* and *Akash*. During this time India tested Agni – an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBH) with a range of 1500 miles – which placed India in the club of IRBH manufacturers especially China, France, the US, the Soviet Union, and Israel. Since the Nehru era India followed the philosophy of self-reliance, and neither Indira Gandhi nor Rajiv Gandhi changed this fundamental principle of India’s defence strategy.

To the extent that the nuclear policy of Rajiv Gandhi is concerned, it was somehow ‘ambivalent’ and followed by the policy of all the previous Prime Ministers of India. Rajiv Gandhi’s nuclear policy was based on two strategies – on the one hand, his government was

trying to promote sophisticated fighter aircraft and missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads; on the other hand, India was uniting the other nations for nuclear disarmament. In this context, Rajiv Gandhi's presence in the U.N. special session on disarmament in June 1988 was very important. Rajiv Gandhi applied the two notions to remain at the forefront of the world campaign for nuclear disarmament without sacrificing India's sovereign right in exercising the option of developing nuclear weapons needed to prohibit the nuclear threats from Pakistan (Nugent, 1991). India perceived that Pakistan sought to use her nuclear program to create pressure on her and offset the Indian conventional military superiority. India knew Pakistan's nuclear quest is a strategy to increase Pakistani bargaining power with the Kashmir question. Notwithstanding this, India had further perceived that by the end of the decade, she might face a nuclear Pakistan as well as a more nuclear-capable China. Hence, India adopted an open-option policy on nuclear efficiency and the NPT regime in a highly stratified international system. In this context, Rajiv Gandhi expressed on 3 December 1987, "We have co-existed with the Chinese bomb for twenty years, but about the Pakistani bomb, I don't know and cannot be sure that we will be able to coexist with it" (Singh, 1989, p. 799). It is important to mention that India perceived a nuclear war in a near future in South Asia, and accordingly shaped her strategy. The then Defense Minister K.C. Pant, expressed that India was making considerable changes in her nuclear policy in response to her sole rival Pakistan's new nuclear development. During this juncture, India's active defence publicity coincided with Army General Krishna Swami Sundarji's tenure as the Chief of the Army Staff during 1986-1988. It was he, who coined the term "coercive diplomacy", connoting the use of force without war; resulting in India being on the brink of war several times (Verma, 2012). The Operation Brasstacks crisis is the best example of "coercive diplomacy". General Sundarji was involved in three of the most crucial low-intensity conflicts from the Indian side, namely operation Blue Star, operation *Pawan* and, tackling both Pakistan and China at the same time. However, The Hindustan Times reported on 30 April 1988, that General K. S. Sundarji's period of twenty-six months in office will be remembered in the history of India as the most "turbulent peacetime". Hence, the Rajiv Gandhi era witnessed and brought about some major changes in India's defence policy.

Reaching out to America

It is hardly a surprising fact that Rajiv Gandhi prioritized fine-tuning relations with superpowers like America. From the very beginning, Rajiv Gandhi wanted to repair and

reconstruct the relationship with the United States of America. The recently developing relationship between Pakistan and the United States in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well as the appeal to obtain US support to receive the needed assistance from the international financial institutions had led Indira Gandhi's administration to interact with the Reagan administration. Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States in July 1982, long overdue, had affected the US-India relationship in a greater context. Rajiv Gandhi continued and extended this trend. He realized the importance and significance of the United States of America in the access and development of modern technology, especially information technology. There is strong evidence that, by the early 1980s, the United States of America had outrun the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in information technology and defence technology.

A month after Rajiv Gandhi's assumption of the Prime Minister's office, New Delhi was dealing with higher negotiations with Washington on a Memorandum of Understanding on technological issues. The MOU was finally signed on May 1985, before Rajiv Gandhi visited Washington. In the same month, the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ikle, visited New Delhi to extend co-operations on the issues related to the security of the two countries. In his interaction with the Indian officials, Fred Ikle, observed that it was India's own rest to avoid greater Soviet intervention in South Asia. Especially in Afghanistan, India had tried to avoid the political and military intervention of Soviet Russia. He also expressed his opinion regarding the possibility of the United States negotiating with India on the development of its Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). In a significant meeting with Ronald Reagan, Rajiv Gandhi sought to assure the US regarding the Soviet presence in Afghanistan given India's friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and the political presence of the Soviet Union in South Asia.

At the same time, when Rajiv Gandhi raised the problems related to the American military assistance to Pakistan, Reagan promised 'to ease those strains' (NSA, 1985). Rajiv Gandhi was further invited to address a joint session of the US Congress, a privilege never extended to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Replying to US President Reagan, Rajiv Gandhi made his interest in seeking an extended relationship with the United States clear. Without referring to the US assistance to Pakistan, he emphasized India's 'apprehensions at the growing militarization of the region around India, which is increasing our burdens'. 'India

today is poised for greater growth', Rajiv Gandhi said, 'we must necessarily acquire the most advance knowledge wherever it is generated' (Gandhi, 1985, pp. 328-329).

While India was looking for the overall development of the country, the Reagan administration, especially the Pentagon, was ready to sell arms to India. The Indian administration was however more interested in 'joint development and production' than the acquirement of the American system of arms and ammunition. India's agenda was rather to secure American participation in the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) system. Furthermore, India wanted the American administration to sanction the transfer of the General Electric 404 jet engines. Nonetheless, India also wanted to import the Cray supercomputer, XMP-24 from the United States of America, which the Indian administration insisted upon for meteorological purposes. However, the Americans hesitated at the request of the Indian administration. The Americans were rather strict on their non-proliferation lobby and were aware of the real fact that the machine's computation system could be applied for designing nuclear weapons and could also be applied for the manufacture of ballistic missiles as well as other security applications. Following this year, in a very important meeting, President Reagan assured Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that while he wanted to approve the sale of the concerned technologies, the American bureaucracy objected to the technical assistance to India. In this situation, in 1987, the American administration approved the sale of the supercomputer, Cray XMP-14 to the Indian administration. Alongside, the United States of America was further ready to cooperate with India on the issues of LCA. However, there was disappointment in store for India due to continuing difficulties on various other issues. On the one hand, India was disillusioned with the continued supply of US arms to Pakistan as well as with the fact that the Reagan administration was watching over Pakistan's continuous development of nuclear power. On the other hand, India was insisting upon limited involvement of the United States of America in the affairs of its immediate neighbours including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal. America was emphasizing India's dominant presence in South Asia and ensured the administration's continued support for countries like Pakistan. Moreover, India and the United States took different positions on other international issues like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.

India and the United States of America maintained a 'minimal realistic and positive orientation' status until the end of Rajiv Gandhi's term in 1989 (Dixit, 2003). Although there were delays and disappointments in the relationship between India and the USA, the frosty

atmosphere of the 1970s was done away with for the time being. For instance, Rajiv Gandhi met the representative of pro-Israel American groups on several instances and was sympathetic towards the demands for full diplomatic recognition of Israel. As an example of track two diplomacy, New Delhi also showed its willingness to move towards the normalization of ties between India and Israel. India upgraded the status of the consular mission of Israel in Mumbai, and, hosted the Israeli tennis team for a Davis Cup match in 1987. This type of cooperative policy continued even after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, through 1991, and beyond. It is not an exaggeration to assert that the background conditions for improving the external relations with the United States of America were set during the Rajiv Gandhi era.

The Russian Factor

India-Russia relations have their own story and long-standing background. On 13th March 1985, Rajiv Gandhi reached Moscow to attend the funeral program of the 'deceased Soviet supremo', Konstantin Cherenkov. The Indian Prime Minister was introduced to the visiting dignitaries including the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and also the new general secretary of Soviet Russia, Mikhail Gorbachev. These interactions were symbolic and equally significant for the future Indo-Soviet relationship. In May 1985, Rajiv Gandhi returned from Moscow after having succeeded in his first summit with Gorbachev. This visit was incredibly successful from the Indian point of view. The Russian leadership was quite impressed with Rajiv Gandhi's critical and diplomatic stand on the American support to Pakistan in the Afghanistan war as well as for the deployment of missiles in Europe. Rajiv Gandhi wanted to preserve the neutral and nonaligned character of India even after the end of the Cold War. Hence, Rajiv Gandhi assured the Russian leader, Gorbachev, that whilst India was interested in obtaining high technology from the United States, India would 'never sacrifice their principles for this end'. Indian leaders, especially Rajiv Gandhi, were satisfied in favour of getting larger external assistance from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Rajiv Gandhi's approach to the Soviet Union was constituted by three major considerations. First, there was a strategic relationship with Moscow which served as a balancing factor for India in terms of direct negotiation with countries like China, Pakistan, and the United States of America. India wanted Soviet Russia to take important external steps in directions that would be of benefit to India. She was especially looking towards Gorbachev's decisions on external affairs. Secondly, the Indo-Soviet relationship was very

much crucial to Indian security, because Soviet Russia remained the main supplier of military equipment to India. Thirdly, was the issue of trade and commerce. The ties with the Soviet Union concerning commerce, and economy remained significant for India. The Soviet Union's market was important for the export of Indian goods, and on the other hand, India imported crucial energy items and industrial goods from the Soviet Union. All of these issues were in favour of India in terms of trade and commerce. It also helped India to restructure its own internal and external security policies.

The meetings of Rajiv Gandhi in 1984 and 1986 were very significant in terms of economic and military cooperation. Soviet Russia had offered a new line of credit, which was near about 2.5 billion rubles, which was far more than the past three decades. The Soviet Union further cooperated with India in terms of the energy and technical sectors, such as the Tehri hydroelectric power plant, the Jharia coal mines, and oil exploration in West Bengal. India also secured military instruments including MIG-29 aircraft, transporters, helicopters, submarines, and destroyers. Moreover, India was permitted to manufacture the MIG-27 fighter aircraft, the T-72 battle tank, and the BMP-2 armoured personal carrier. Therefore, in the initial phase, the Soviet Union was linked concerning economic ties with India, but in the future, this deteriorated sharply while the military relationship remained strong.

In the larger strategic context, the relationship between India and Soviet Russia degraded during these years. Two issues remained problematic for both nations. Gorbachev had proposed collective security in particularly Asia, which was first expressed in the Vladivostok speech. However, Rajiv Gandhi did not respond clearly to this, implying his disinterest regarding the collective security system in Asia. When Gorbachev highlighted this issue during his visit to New Delhi in 1986, Rajiv Gandhi only listened but did not make any concrete commitment. Rajiv Gandhi's denial to respond to the proposal of Gorbachev eventually led to a negative view of India's foreign policy: 'In India, we are faced with a great power policy... India wants everyone to "rotate" around it: Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, etc. In other words, it wants to have a "patrimony" with vassals in the region. That's why it is not reacting well to our initiatives about naval disarmament in the Indian Ocean (Radchenko, 2011, p. 187). Secondly, a more significant issue was India's concerns about Soviet Russia's policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan. India was worried about Moscow's decisions regarding the removal of the Soviet troops from the land of Afghanistan without the establishment of a stable and sustainable government. Rajiv Gandhi

told Gorbachev in July 1987 that, 'If Afghanistan becomes a fundamentalist country or if the Americans have a strong influence there, like in Pakistan, Afghanistan will not be a truly independent country, and this will create problems for us' (REEAD, 1987). Furthermore, Gorbachev had emphatically observed that '[t]he Indians are concerned that a normalization of the situation in Afghanistan will result in Pakistan directing its subversive activities against India... But this position takes only India's interests into account 100 percent while the interests of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union are a mere 20 percent' (REEAD, 1987). By early 1988, it was clear that Soviet Russia will withdraw its troops under the circumstances of a weak agreement with the involvement of Pakistan. In a meeting with Gorbachev in February 1988, the Indian Defense Minister K.C. Pant pointed out that the arms, especially the stinger missiles supplied by the United States of America, could be misused, and could fall into the hands of Pakistani terrorists. Furthermore, he argued that Moscow should intervene in the scrapping of these demands. Soviet Russia argued that, if they demanded the scrapping of weapons, then the USA would demand the removal of the Soviet arms from Afghanistan. In this situation, Gorbachev argued that the whole situation will dismantle the influence of Soviet Russia over Afghanistan and over Najib itself, which Soviet Russia always disliked. India was further genuinely concerned about the significant role of Pakistan and the United States of America in the maintenance of peace and stability in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of support by Soviet Russia. India had also to think about the Soviet support for nuclear non-proliferation. After the end of Rajiv Gandhi's term as Prime Minister, it was clear that relations with Soviet Russia would need to be re-established.

The Nuclear Weaponization

Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to transform the Soviet Union's relations with China and the United States of America did not only pose challenges for India but also provided an open space for the possibility of a fresh foreign policy. Rajiv Gandhi moved onto the two fronts. First, is the significant question of nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Rajiv Gandhi started his Premiership with a new aspiration for nuclear weaponization in India and remained sceptical about the unity and integrity of the country. These issues set a new stage for a very complicated relationship between India's nuclear willingness and the scientific bureaucratic establishment. At the same time, it was clear that Pakistan was also preparing its nuclear weapons program with the active support of China and the benign negligence of the United States of America. Around late 1985, Rajiv Gandhi formed a small group of experts to

estimate the total cost of a nuclear program although he had no intention to move towards the weaponization and the operationalization of India's nuclear weapons project. Having said that, he did not however prevent the nuclear establishment program from working quietly to enhance India's willingness towards undertaking a program for strong nuclear weaponization. Within this period, India was pressurized by the USA to adopt a policy of mutual control with a country like Pakistan. The idea of mutual inspections of each other's nuclear programs was also included but India was unwilling to accept this idea. Similarly, India was reluctant to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Meanwhile, the government of India moved towards the treaties of arms control between the superpowers. Very significantly, at the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, but both the premiers failed to reach an agreement. In this situation, India faced some problems concerning safeguarding her interest. Now, in this given context, Rajiv Gandhi advocated the policy of global nuclear disarmament as a solution to the problem of proliferation. This can be explained as an admixture of both idealism and realpolitik. In January 1985, he hosted a six-nation summit on nuclear disarmament action. Speaking at the summit, Rajiv Gandhi warned regarding the danger of 'horizontal proliferation' (i.e., by countries like India) while highlighting on the other hand, that 'vertical proliferation' was riskier and more dangerous, but this the other nations had adopted (Gandhi, 1985). A year later, Rajiv Gandhi met Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva in search of hope amidst this situation, however, no concrete result came out from this meeting. Rajiv Gandhi expressed that the immediate requirement was the 'halt of all nuclear testing' (Gandhi, 1986, p. 232). Following the Reykjavik Summit, Rajiv Gandhi observed that 'there was a clear demonstration that, given political will, far-reaching agreement on nuclear disarmament measures could be achieved' (Gandhi, 1987, p. 361). This year, Rajiv Gandhi approached Gorbachev to issue a joint declaration ensuring the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi delivered speeches at the United Nations regarding complete nuclear disarmament This was guided by a well-thought-out 'action plan, and this plan emphasized the series of phases, verifiable and non-discriminatory steps' to gain the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the next twenty-two years. Although the plan was based upon what we might call 'utopian visions', it was significant for its practicality and realistic values. It is significant to note that the 'Action Plan' helped to create an alternative discourse that not only enabled India to restrict the nuclear option but also avoid the subsequent pressures to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This action plan was thus very

significant from the Indian point of view. India was very successful in facing the calls for 'global zero' and was successful in accepting the challenges from the West. For many years, the Rajiv Gandhi Action plan was applied and resorted to by the Government of India.

The External Challenges from China

The Indian foreign policy started to change following the end of the Cold War, as it and its neighbourhood policy was challenged and dominated by its close rival, China. The rapprochement with China had thus signalled a new phase in the development of Indian foreign policy. Gorbachev, in his landmark speech in Vladivostok, had essentially emphasized the collective security system in Asia including China to a greater extent. Gorbachev's policy marked a sharp departure from the earlier Soviet proposals, such as the Brezhnev Plan for Asian security, which was also aimed at containing China. Gorbachev however moved towards a tension-free Soviet-China relationship. India's knowledge of these facts and circumstances led to speedy changes in the Indo-Soviet relationship. In the given situation, Rajiv Gandhi and his foreign policy advisors started to think of the possibility of an improved relationship with China. India was thus emphasizing a proper rapprochement with a neighbour like China. First, New Delhi realized that the continued tensions with China were causing hindrances to Indian foreign policy. Since 1982, India and China held eight rounds of talks with each other on their boundary disputes. Further, owing to the economic reforms in China from the early 1980s, the socio-economic gap between the two countries was widening. India had been further suffering due to the militarization of its mutual borders with China, for a considerable length of time. Additionally, it was becoming difficult for India to maintain its internal fiscal commitments. The tension with Pakistan and India's intervention in Sri Lanka further led to huge internal problems in India. The country was also trying to look for a solution for the disputed *Sumdorong Chu Valley* and the disputed border in Arunachal Pradesh.

The presence of the Chinese troops very close to the Indian border in the summer of 1986, led the Indian army chief, General K. S. Sundarji, to order some Indian forces to take a position within the Chinese position of armies. When the Indian army failed to elicit any response from Beijing, the entire brigade of the Indian army was airlifted to a location very close to the valley of *Sumdorong Chu*. In this situation, China responded very quickly. In December 1986, India granted complete statehood to Arunachal Pradesh and was demanding complete sovereignty of this region. However, the Chinese response was very strong and a

new series of the crisis started to appear. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent the Foreign Minister to Beijing in May 1987 and a new way of the solution was coming to the forefront. The *Sumdorong Chu* phase influenced both countries to maintain a stable border scenario in this area. Rajiv Gandhi and other Indian officials were also thinking about the renewal of friendship ties with China. Guided by the agenda of a possible visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China, India opened a new channel of communication with Beijing in mid-1987. India took a dramatic move in this regard in considering the first Prime Ministerial visit to Beijing in 34 years. However, the Congress Party was facing new challenges from the opposition due to this dramatic move. The sources of opposition were many, such as the memory of the humiliating defeat in 1962, and the experience of Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee's sudden visit in 1979, and the pro-Tibetan lobbies hinted at India's new spirit. China had extended the invitation to Rajiv Gandhi, but he reached out to all the political leaders and was determined to proceed in any situation. In this regard, extensive preparations were undertaken to ensure the glorifying role of the Prime Minister. For instance, a joint statement planned to be issued on account of the said visit was negotiated six weeks before Rajiv Gandhi reached Beijing.

In this situation, the visit to China in December 1988 brought more success to New Delhi than one could have envisioned. Rajiv Gandhi, in a marathon meeting with Premier Li Peng, emphasized the need to construct three working groups to deal with the boundary issue, issues related to science and technology. The Chinese premier had accepted all the issues and ideas. On 21 December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi met Deng Xiaoping who expressed that China would focus, in the coming decades, on economic development and hence highlighted that both India and China needed a peaceful external environment. Rajiv Gandhi also expressed that after the Cold War period, India had also been focusing on the modernization of its economy. After his successful trip to Beijing, Rajiv Gandhi, and the Indian officials were claiming a breakthrough. He expressed, 'I see it as a new beginning'. This visit not only was a break from the records but also created a 'new paradigm for India's ties with China.' There was a strong commitment in the attitudes of both countries to working together not only on disputed border issues but also on 'several other fronts'. Rajiv Gandhi's visit set forth a new paradigm, as far as the China policy was concerned and it was no less than an innovative spirit for the Indian foreign policy towards world peace.

Engagement in Southern Africa

India had, since its independence, consistently and eagerly supported the cause of African independence. It is especially interesting to note that, Rajiv Gandhi was the first Indian Prime Minister who played a commendable role in Southern Africa. Africa became an international agenda in the mid-eighties and Rajiv Gandhi got involved in the matter. Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, the front-ranking states of Southern Africa were at the centre of international politics and were prominently featured at the ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned countries of which Rajiv Gandhi was the Chairman. His voice reflected the standpoint of India as a peace-loving and progressive nation. He spoke on three issues of concern in the said region - racism in South Africa, the political fate of the front-ranking states in their confrontation with the 'white-dominated South Africa, and the independence of Namibia. On these three issues, he played a decisive role, a role that no Indian Prime Minister had ever played before. It is interesting to note that, although the manifold of African issues was repeatedly discussed internationally, Rajiv Gandhi had been actively involved with all of them in three distinct fields - in the Commonwealth on racism, in the Non-Aligned conferences on the AFRICA FUND (Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism, and Apartheid), and in the UN on the fate of Namibia. The apartheid issue had emerged within the Commonwealth as a serious question and had garnered special importance in the Commonwealth meetings for a few reasons: the first was the case of South Africa, which was a member of it for many years. The second was that the Commonwealth had an African legacy and component, some of which were the so-called frontline states bearing the painful wounds of South African retaliations and were heavily dependent on South Africa economically. The third was the nature of the impact the Commonwealth's decision should have on the country nationally or internationally (Kapur, 2009). However, many African states were against South Africa and had urged Great Britain to impose economic sanctions on the country which the latter denied. There is no doubt about the fact that South Africa would have suffered a great deal had the sanctions (economic) been imposed. In this light, India's position was critical to Britain and South Africa. India was the first country to raise the apartheid issue at the forum of the United Nations in the 1940s and 1950s when most of Africa was under colonial rule. In the Rajiv Gandhi era, we can witness a tryst from the Indian part to highlight African issues and to occupy centre stage in international politics on this question. India's international position and status were also dependent on the fate of Nelson Mandela and the future of the African National Congress (ANC). In this situation,

India had to omit the dependency on the Indians in Africa as it had done in the past. Rajiv Gandhi had a deep respect and courtesy for Nelson Mandela, and he wholeheartedly supported his liberation movement. In an address to the UN Special Committee on Apartheid in New York on 22 October 1985, Rajiv Gandhi expressed his thoughts with a tribute to the great African leader Nelson Mandela in the following words - “We have gathered here to pledge our support to Nelson Mandela and the hundreds of thousands of men, women and children of South Africa, who, through their suffering are upholding our collective cause. Their victory will be our victory” (Kapur, 2009, p. 230). However, on the of sanctions against South Africa, Rajiv Gandhi took a negotiatory role at the Nassau Commonwealth Summit in October 1985 where the issue was being discussed. Most participants were in favour of the sanctions on South Africa except for Great Britain and Sri Lanka who argued that sanctions will become counterproductive. In this context Rajiv Gandhi took to diplomatic strategy by making all the countries agree to give South Africa a period of six months to initiate anti-apartheid measures and campaigns or else she would face strong economic sanctions. As a concession to Margaret Thatcher (the then British Prime Minister), Rajiv Gandhi proposed the word “economic measures” instead of “sanctions”. Regarding apartheid, two additional decisions were taken at Nassau Summit. One was to form a committee of seven member states including - India, Zambia, Australia, the Bahamas, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Zimbabwe to start a political dialogue with South Africa. Second, to make or appoint a group of eminent leaders of the Commonwealth (Eminent Persons Group-EPG) to study the causes and consequences of the apartheid regime. The EPG conducted a total of twenty-one meetings with the South African ministers and officials, and met three times in Pollsmoor prison (Cape Town, South Africa). However, The Commonwealth Report finally published a devastating picture of the apartheid in South Africa. The seven member states of the Commonwealth met again on August 1986 to examine the report submitted by the eminent leaders of the Commonwealth and to finalize the actions against South Africa. Margaret Thatcher still stood steadfastly on her point and refused to accept the Nassau accord on sanctions. It was here that Rajiv Gandhi played a decisive role to prevent the conflict with Britain. Finally, this dispute was settled by another compromise with the apartheid; it was decided that the majority opinion will be followed without changing Britain’s opposition. Hence, Rajiv Gandhi played a balancing role; on the one hand, he attacked the British Government to make a compromise with the basic principles of economic gain, and on the other hand, he championed the importance of the commonwealth (Kapur, 2009). Very

interestingly, India stood beside the frontline states of Southern Africa. Within the periphery of the non-aligned movement, an AFRICA FUND was established to aid in the provision of financial and economic assistance to the Southern African nations. Southern Africa was heavily dependent on South Africa and was bearing the burden of military attacks and repression of the former. The funds were mostly used in assisting the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress, but the main objective was to ensure economic and technical cooperation with the downtrodden states of Africa. In the words of Rajiv Gandhi it was "perhaps the first concrete manifestation of a united effort based on effective South-South cooperation" (Rasgotra, 1991, p. 223). The role of India was prominently visible since Rajiv Gandhi was appointed as the Chairman of the nine-nation fund committee which respectively included Zambia, Algeria, Congo, Argentina, Peru, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, and India. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sincerely worked for its success and was able to raise 476 million dollars in cash, and kind and valuable technical assistance by 1989 (Kapur, 2009). Nevertheless, India also stood beside Namibia for its independence; Rajiv Gandhi very intelligently placed this issue on the UN platform and at the coordinated bureau of the non-aligned countries. Hence, Rajiv Gandhi was successful on three major issues – First, South Africa moved away from racism, second, the frontline African states won their independence and third, Namibia became a sovereign state.

Operation Brasstacks

Operation Brasstacks was a year-long military exercise conducted between 1986 and 1987 by the Indian Armed Forces. The exercise included an India-Pakistan war-like situation codenamed the Trident. In this situation, around November 1986, India deployed its armed forces very actively. These armed forces had the 'potentiality of cutting Pakistan in half'. This was purely a military exercise. However, Pakistan felt threatened and responded very quickly by ordering its armed forces to take a position in such a way that they were poised against the Indian state of Punjab, which at that particular time was reeling under extreme political separatism. In this situation, Pakistan went on to threaten India with a nuclear attack. The Indian Ambassador to Pakistan, S. K. Singh, was summoned to the Pakistani Foreign department one midnight. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorahi (who had just returned from an emergency meeting with General Zia) informed S. K. Singh that he had a message for India from President Zia. From various international sectors, it was asserted

that India had grossly violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, although Pakistan was “capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on it.” When asked whether this implied any possible attack on Bombay or not, Zain Noorani said, “it might be so”. This statement has been validated by the Kargil Review Committee Report.

This type of military confrontation between India and Pakistan had started owing to the lack of a proper channel of communication between these two states before Operation Brasstacks started. Furthermore, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was also the Defense Minister at the time, handled the entire decision regarding the operation. This military operation was simultaneously controlled by a few of Rajiv Gandhi’s trusted advisors, including the Minister of State for Defense, and the Chief of Army Staff, General K. Sundarji. That the military operation was organized without consultation with any higher decision-making bodies including the CCPA was highly criticized. Rajiv Gandhi had further not even properly consulted the Ministry of External Affairs. War was finally avoided with Pakistan through diplomatic efforts, but Operation Brasstacks underlined ‘Rajiv Gandhi’s great personal type of authoritarianism coupled with his political immaturity’.

The Military Intervention in Sri Lanka and its Effects

The longstanding issue of ethnic separatism in Sri Lanka became particularly serious in the decade of the 1980s. A serious civil war was raging between the armed Tamil militants in the northern part of the country and the Sri Lankan armed forces. Although measures were taken by the government of Sri Lanka, the cases of genocide continued to be reported relentlessly. Even the larger sections of the Indian press and several opposition parties and the Members of Parliament failed to keep themselves from being associated with the extreme situation in Sri Lanka. There was a persistent demand from the Indian civil society in favour of an active policy on the part of the Government of India in the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The priority was to establish peace and stability in the region.

In July 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an agreement with Sri Lankan President Jayewardene, under which a large portion of the Indian army, named the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), was sent to Sri Lanka to enforce a ceasefire, and disarm the LTTE forces. Unfortunately, the peace-keeping operation and ceasefire soon turned into a regular war between the Indian IPKF and the Sri Lankan LTTE leading to a massive loss of life on both sides. The IPKF was instructed to avoid the use of military forces and violence as

far as possible, leading to great demoralization of the officers of the IPKF. The battle between the Indian IPKF and the Sri Lankan Tamils continued for two years while the Sri Lankan government remained inactive and continued to be a passive onlooker of the conflict, without forwarding any permanent solution to the problem of ethnic Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka. Subsequently, in September 1989, the last phase of Rajiv Gandhi's term as Prime Minister, a special ceasefire and no-war agreement was signed between the Sri Lankan LTTE and the Indian IPKF to the effect that neither side would attack each other with heavy arms. With the National Front Government coming to power in India under the premiership of V. P. Singh in December 1989, the Indian IPKF was completely withdrawn from Sri Lanka. However, the war and fighting broke out subsequently in Sri Lanka between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army and continued for a long time. The problem of ethnic Tamil separatism remained unsolved in Sri Lanka and continued to seriously affect not only Sri Lanka and India but also the entire subcontinent.

It is deemed prudent to discuss Rajiv Gandhi's decision to send the IPKF to Sri Lanka. Although the said decision was not in keeping with the ethics of international law and order, India was 'involved in intervention by the invitation' of Sri Lanka. Many scholars have argued that this incident had several unique characteristics which were 'unprecedented in diplomatic history.' In the first stage, India primarily involved itself militarily in a larger context in a small neighboring country like Sri Lanka. Additionally, India also got involved in diplomatic politics in Sri Lanka without measuring the greater impact on its own internal and external politics.

Secondly, the task of the IPKF was to control the people of Indian origin, meaning the Tamils in Sri Lanka, who had raised their voices against the 'perceived negative discrimination, oppression, and political violence by the Sri Lankan government.' Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya has argued that it was 'not only against the long-term national interest of India, but also it was contrary to the diplomatic practice of states in the modern world.' Not only that, every state in the modern world used its diplomacy to protect and secure the interests of the population, while also using them as an ingredient of its foreign policy. The government of India had not favored the demand of the ethnic Tamils of Sri Lanka for a democratic reconstruction of Sri Lanka itself. The Indian government had thus failed to convince the people of Sri Lanka in favor of its foreign policy of India. The Government of India rather became an agent of the Sri Lankan government and suppressed

the voices of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, the Indian government assisted the Sri Lankan government to generate policies 'against perceived injustice and oppression on the part of the Sri Lankan government.' There were, of course, disturbing, and deflated reports of the involvement and intervention of foreign intelligence and security agencies in the Sri Lankan conflict. On 8 April 1986, Rajiv Gandhi stated in the Lok Sabha that Israel and Pakistan were 'working together' in Sri Lanka against the interest of India (The Telegraph, 1986). After the IPKF had been sent to Sri Lanka, Rajiv Gandhi again justified his actions by stating that the security measures of India had been jeopardized due to the involvement of Israeli and Pakistani Intelligence agencies and security officers in the Sri Lankan conflict (Gandhi, 1987). Nonetheless, it remained a significant fact that India had forcefully intervened in the Sri Lankan civil war in favor of the Sri Lankan government and was against the people of Indian origin (mainly Tamils). This was considered an extraordinary act that 'violated the basic principles of diplomacy'. Many scholars have argued that it can be explained as Rajiv Gandhi's desire to 'assert his power and authority both in India and Sri Lanka.' However, the sending of the IPKF to Sri Lanka was not only a 'symbolic expression of his own r' but also a 'projection of India's power in the neighbouring regions. Hence, it can be unequivocally stated that no other Prime Minister in the contemporary world would have 'undertaken such an irrational and fruitless military adventure in the neighbouring region.' Even former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had never opted for an action of this kind and never applied her 'power' against the favours of the Indian Foreign Policy, even though the Sri Lankan Tamil issue had been a longstanding one.

The Military Intervention in Maldives

The neighbouring countries came to occupy a predominant position as a major agents of garnering peace and stability, within the arena of Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy. Maldives was one of the most significant countries among the nations of South-East Asia. In the decade of the 1980s, countries like Maldives had cast a strong impact on Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy. He visited Maldives in 1985 seeking to build a personal relationship with President Abdul Gayoom. In November 1987, an armed revolt planned by the former President of Maldives with the help of the Sri Lankan Tamil military group occurred. In such a situation, President Gayoom earnestly appealed to the Indian Prime Minister for military assistance leading India to send a small contingent of troops to Maldives within a few hours at the behest of the Indian Air Force. Simultaneously, the Indian navy was also alerted. The rebels

fled and tried to escape from the island state when the Indian Air Force aircraft carrying the Indian soldiers landed. They (the rebels) were soon stopped by the Indian navy and were returned to Maldives immediately. This incident highlighted not only a military involvement by the Government of India in the domestic politics of a small neighbouring country like Maldives but also a projection of power by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in the periphery of India's immediate neighbourhood. Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya has argued that "The military action in the Maldives bore the clear imprint of Rajiv Gandhi's personality as shaped by his childhood alienation, academic failure, professional inadequacy, and sudden installation in the highest political office." Hence, Rajiv Gandhi can be said to have tried to apply his political power and state-sponsored military force in every sphere of his foreign policy.

The Pakistan Policy of Rajiv Gandhi Era

Rajiv Gandhi's policy towards Pakistan sharply indicated his desire to prove that he could achieve 'everything' in the context of Indian foreign policy without any compromise in terms of being mindful of the benefit of any other country and to this Pakistan was not an exceptional case. After Benazir Bhutto won the elections in November 1988 in Pakistan, Rajiv Gandhi made full use of the political opportunity to clearly state his superiority in terms of leadership and diplomatic skills. He visited Pakistan in the following month, on 31 December 1988, to attend the Fourth Summit of SAARC and at the same time, he used this platform to hold discussions on various external issues with his Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Bhutto. In this meeting, three bilateral agreements were signed between India and Pakistan which included 'an agreement prohibiting attack against each other's nuclear installations and facilities, an agreement on cultural co-operation, and an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation of income from international air transports.' The agreement, particularly on the nuclear installations, had been very prominently proposed by Rajiv Gandhi to President Zia-Ul-Haque in December 1985 in Delhi. However, it could not be implemented owing to the latter's sudden death in an air crash.

The agreement between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto was followed by several official dialogues between India and Pakistan in the first half of 1989, which finally culminated in Rajiv Gandhi's enthusiastic visit to Pakistan in July 1989. It was the first bilateral visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan after a wide gap of about thirty years, also intending to signify the extraordinary diplomatic capability of the Indian Prime Minister

Rajiv Gandhi. During this visit, new bilateral relations were established between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had earnestly tried to persuade Rajiv Gandhi to change India's position on Kashmir. However, Mr. Gandhi could not reverse India's policy on Kashmir without acknowledging the serious political consequences for himself and his party. Given this situation, the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan soon deteriorated leading Pakistan to harden its attitude towards Kashmir. In 1989, in an interview published in a magazine called *The Herald*, Rajiv Gandhi, while commenting on the historic Simla Agreement expressed, "We are committed to the development of friendship and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. I believe that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto shares this commitment. Both of us agree that the Simla Agreement provides an excellent framework not only for the resolution of differences between the two countries but also for the strengthening of friendship and cooperation. We have agreed to work together and remove the suspicions and misgivings that have characterized our relations in the recent past and to build bridges of friendship, understanding the cooperation" (*Herald Magazine*, 1989). Benazir Bhutto subsequently declared that the Government of Pakistan must continue the support, what may be called the '*jihad*', of the Kashmiri people, and spoke of a year-long war against India. Many scholars have thus argued against Rajiv Gandhi's attempt to demonstrate his superior power of decision-making. Further suggesting that his diplomatic skill remained unsuccessful owing to the deteriorating external relations between India and Pakistan. One must note that his successor, V. P. Singh's Government's foreign policy in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations was characterized by further 'animosity, mutual suspicion and conflict'. This conflicted relationship between India and Pakistan has deeply affected their economy. This is especially important in the case of Pakistan which has been continuously submerged in deep poverty and hunger.

The Political Crisis in Nepal

The external relations with Nepal, one of the closest neighbours of India, got prominence during the premiership of Rajiv Gandhi. India's crisis with Nepal was the outcome of a series of steps taken by *King Birendra* that was seen by New Delhi as constituting a dangerous threat to its interests. Since the 1970s, *King Birendra* had cherished the idea that Nepal was equally close to both the great powers of Asia, namely India, and China, leading him to propound the idea of 'Nepal as a Zone of Peace'. This however eventually went against the basic principles of the Indo-Nepal treaty of 1950, intended to enhance the close relationship

between the two countries. By the mid-1980s Nepal had taken a serious decision against the interest of India and was sending its military personnel to train in Pakistan and China. In 1988, Nepal also imported many heavy arms, including anti-aircraft guns, from India's rival, China. King *Birendra* had also tried to dilute the important provisions of the 1950 accord and had resolved that the Indian workers in Nepal should possess a compulsory work permit. On 23 March 1989, the transit and trade agreements between India and Nepal lapsed but New Delhi undertook a speedy initiative to make a fresh extension. In this situation, India reduced the number of transit points for Nepal from 22 to 2. This move also served to alienate India from Nepal in many ways. On the other hand, Nepal's gross domestic product dropped by 2.2 percent in the year 1989-90. It can be seen as the outcome of India's coercive policy towards Nepal. While on the one hand, Nepal tried to reinforce the perceptions of the immediate neighbouring countries about India's hegemonic behaviour in the region. On the other hand, Nepal tried to prohibit the pro-democracy groups within the periphery of the country, which desired closer ties with India. All these issues directly laid the foundation leading to a domestic change in Nepal. Hence, India's relationship with Nepal also transformed the Rajiv Gandhi era. However, this era will be remembered for a long time for its legendary developments in the direction of a strong neighbourhood policy, efficient military policy, stable nuclear policy, and a peaceful coexistence supporting foreign policy towards the world.

Rajiv Era and India's Foreign Economic Policy

The foundational principles of Indian foreign relations were based on bargaining and diversification of foreign aid and commerce, an idea nurtured by the motto that India would be able to build a strong self-reliant economy to pursue the policy of peace and non-alignment. The economy of the non-aligned countries assumed of attracting financial aid from both the superpowers; at the same time not surrendering their political independence. This predominant model of bargaining and diversification was gradually weakened as the world economy, and India as a part of it, moved towards capitalism (Chisti, 1985). In this context, it is not a matter of astonishment that India has followed this capitalist path of development. Former Prime Ministers like - Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi were quite reluctant to accept the relationship between foreign policy and foreign economic policy. It was during the Rajiv Gandhi era, that for the first-time close relations between budget and foreign policy were being reassessed. In this phase we see a new economic policy coming to the forefront. Indian foreign policy has been significantly shaped by the need to maximize

economic growth while sacrificing political and economic independence as little as possible. To solve the domestic problems of achieving rapid economic growth, the Government of India emphasized the interrelation between foreign policy interests and trade to make an internal investment for rapid industrial expansion. To achieve these objectives, India emphasized the development of contacts outside its common region or beyond the Asian region. In the decade of 1980s, the Indian economic policy underwent many significant changes, such as opening the doors for inward industrial investments and joint economic ventures. To fulfil these objectives India greatly extended its contacts with the European Community along with her most important trading partners the Soviet Union and the United States (Bradnock, 1991). Nevertheless, India's foreign economic policy has been guided by the nation's economic and political goals; the importance of economic matters in foreign policy especially during the Rajiv Gandhi era can be gauged by the fact that during the Nepal crisis in 1988-89, India used the economic pressure, in terms of the economic blockade to solve the crisis. As far as the trade policy of Rajiv Gandhi is concerned, many promotional measures were adopted during 1984-1989; in fact, in June 1986 a cabinet committee was newly set up by the Prime Minister to create a new direction and give dynamism to the country's export efforts and to inspire the countries industrial sector. With the expansion of export sectors, many measures came to be undertaken including direct cash assistance to increase the export. The other measures included –

- (1) The liberalization of policies in sectors like - lather manufacture, readymade garments, diamond cutting, etc. where indigenous machinery and equipment were unavoidable.
- (2) Tax exemption on exported goods.
- (3) Sustainable export promotion in backward areas.

In the areas of export enhancement, two other important steps taken included ensuring of the availability of export credit at a concessional rate of interest and the supply of raw materials to the industry at international prices under the International Price Reimbursement scheme- IPRS (Verma, 2012). As far as the exchange rate is concerned, in the decade of 1970s the Government of India decided to link the rate of exchange of its Rupee to that of the British Pound; later, it linked the value of the rupee to a set of other currencies. Rajiv Gandhi also undertook this policy, among others during his tenure. He was a pragmatic policy maker and during his tenure, the Indian Government decided to liberalize foreign trade, which

primarily indicated the beginning of a new era in international economic policymaking. It further emphasized the need and implementation of import liberalization, a growth strategy to maximize export, increase economic growth, and boost the country's economic efficiency. This new strategy was rooted in large-scale imports of technology and machinery as well as capital goods from other countries. This new shift in the economy underlined the need for India to carry forward a more open and outward-looking approach based on stagnant terms and conditions of economic matters (Dholakia, 1988). However, the world trade scenario was not completely satisfactory, as it was reeling under the pressures of the exchange rate, increased rate of debt burdens of the developing economies, increasing barriers for international trade, and emerging trends of trading bloc measures at the global level. The performance of India's export can be evaluated in terms of its import requirements; interestingly from the mid-1980s to early 1990, the rate of Indian export exceeded by 19% as compared to the previous rate of 10%. The unfavourable balance of trade in India was the consequence of this. Taking note of the export and import ratio highlights the complex trend of the global economy. Between 1986-90, India's export increased by 17%, but at the same time, imports increased in 1987-88 by 9%, by 10% in 1988-89, and by 11% in 1989-90. Interestingly all developing countries showed trends of decline in their import trade from 4.6% in 1955 to 1.7% in 1984. Hence, India's export growth was not satisfactory in terms of its needs and also differed substantially from the trade performances of the other developing countries. However, since the 1980s India has made a systematic attempt to bring about a structural change in commodity trade and trading partnerships. The number of manufactured goods in total export remarkably increased from 45% in 1960-61 to 75% in 1989-90. It is interesting to note that, in the decade of the 1980s, traditional items like - jute, cotton, and textiles declined from about 54% in total export; on the other hand, non-traditional products like - gems and jewellery, readymade garments, and especially leather, having less government support, showed better export performance. These non-traditional products were based on simpler technology and had high demands in the market at the same time. As far as India's broad foreign trade is concerned, until the third five-year plan the uniform trade regions were - European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Economic and Social Council for Asia-Pacific (ESCAP), and North America. The scenario changed substantially in the seventh five-year plan period, while the Economic and Social Council for Asia-Pacific (ESCAP) region occupied first position with a trade share of 23.7%, the European Economic Community (EEC) stood second with 22.2% share; North America and East Europe occupied

20.4% and 19.9% shares in trade with India. Another important area in India's international trade scenario was the oil factor. Since 1971 India's cost of oil imports was changing dramatically, especially necessitating her to adjust to the rapid changes in world trade and commerce. An Economic Survey of the Ministry of Finance (Economic Division, Government of India) shows that, though India increased its oil production, India's oil imports still cost over the amount of Rs. 4,050 crores in 1987-88 which was 18% of the total import bill. Nevertheless, India's economic interest in the Gulf states increased dramatically due to the oil factor. India's oil dependency was well known to the Gulf states; throughout the 1980s India imported oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and especially from the Soviet Union at a comparatively cheap rate. Hence, India's economic demands and needs have determined her foreign policy as well as trade policy and she attempted to strike good terms with a wide range of Middle Eastern Islamic countries. During the Rajiv Gandhi era, India was one of the important recipients of foreign aid. The major sources of these include - (a) the developed market economy, (2) socialist countries, and (3) multilateral agencies like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA). However, in the mid-1980s, there was a decline in the relative importance of foreign aid to the Indian economy. Interestingly the contribution of non-aid foreign savings grew slowly but steadily through the decade of the 1980s. Hence, India's economic policy in the Rajiv Gandhi era was strong enough to enable and strengthen India's bargaining power in world politics.

Religious Conflicts in Rajiv Gandhi Era

The Rajiv Gandhi era was not immune from communalism and sectarian politics. The former rampantly affected the life of the common gentry in many parts of the country, especially in Assam and Punjab; and it was a result of massive political exploitation of religion by the political parties, for serving their political ends. In their quest for power, some politicians allied themselves with unlawful activities provoking communal conflicts, as witnessed in *Bhiwandi*, near Bombay in May 1984. The Indian army remained engaged in managing these situations, especially the emergency operations, as the local police proved incapable to maintain the law and order in the regions otherwise. The Christians have largely been spared of any serious attack except on certain occasions in the *Kanya Kumari* district. The major communal fire erupted with the breakdown of the tribal belt in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. In May 1986, a Ranchi-based newspaper *Nish-Kalanka* by Fr. John Lakra reported an alleged

RSS conspiracy to eliminate the Christians from the tribal regions of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh (Aguiar, 2011). The RSS was not ready to accept the Christian community to be Indians and denied the contributions of Christians in the fields of education and culture. In Ranchi, the Jesuit authorities claimed that the tribal Christians were being kidnapped and forcefully converted to Hinduism, which was never the religion of the *Adivasis*. The major tribal belt had experienced Hindu revivalist activities, and according to the dominant Hindu leaders, over 75000 Christians were reconverted to Hinduism. One month later, a similar incident took place in the *Phulbani* district of Orissa, which according to Express News Service (29 April 1987) made a deep impact on Indian politics and society. Between January and April 1987, 15 churches were attacked and many Christian priests were humiliated. Furious mobs set fire to the Catholic Church and bombed various convents in many parts of the country. Anti-Christian slogans reigned supreme; 'India is for the Hindus, be a Hindu otherwise leave India', and 'foreign padres leave India', were the most dominant cries of the fundamentalists, especially the RSS. In Madhya Pradesh, on 24 June 1987, a group of anti-socials destroyed the 'catholic sisters' convent which had been connected with the local population for eight years garnering excellent results. On 21 July 1987, Father Thomas Thirutiyl of the Chiurgoon mission in Jagdalpur Diocese was arrested for converting a tribal to Christianity in exchange for Rs. 10000 and other benefits. Several cases came up in the districts of *Raigarh*, *Ambikapur*, and other places. Communalism was at its peak and on 7 August 1987, Bishop Paschal Topno, SJ of Ambikapur Diocese was arrested under the Anti-Conversion Act. He was later released on bail by the court. It is noteworthy to say that, between April and June 1987, in the whole country 147 persons were killed, 30 injured and 2.5 crore worth of property was destroyed due to communalism. The vicious cycle of communal violence enhanced the scope for further violence, which could only have led to the disintegration of the country unless efforts to break this cycle were made. In Arunachal Pradesh, Christians were excessively harassed and their human rights were grossly discriminated against and violated. With the enactment of the Arunachal Freedom of Religion Act, 1988, Christian missionaries were contraband to enter the state, Christian churches were not allowed to be built and the Christian priests were not allowed to enter the state during the Christmas and Easter to conduct the rituals of Mass and hear confessions. So, it was a gross violation of the right to freedom of worship and was against the spirit of a truly secular nation. The Government undertook such restrictions to avoid communal tensions; when Bishop Thomas Menampampil of Dibrugarh applied for an inner line permit in 1987 to

enter the state for Christmas Eve, he was officially informed that his presence would create tension in the region (Aguiar, 2011). Hence, strong tension can be noted to have been brewing in the region and the measures taken by the government were not sufficient to curb them. In most of the tribal areas, there was competition and antagonism between the Christian line and the Hindu faith; similarly, the conversion of indigenous tribes into Christianity or Hinduism further gave birth to new controversies and conflicts. According to an estimate, in Arunachal Pradesh, the number of Christians rose from 5000 in 1977 to 60000 in 1978 a total population of 850000. Most of the converted tribals were poor and came from backward areas. The Christian missionaries provided them with medicines, food grains, and money to the needy. The Christian missionaries set up churches, schools, and hospitals, especially in the remotest areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. The churches allowed the tribes to maintain their local culture, their original names, and customs. Nevertheless, the education spread by the Christian missionaries was completely based on religious faith and belief. However, during the Rajiv Gandhi era, the process of conversion was at its peak and communal clashes were very common in many parts of the country.

Alongside, Muslim identity and rights of the Muslim women were the burning issues, which not only attracted the political parties but also social and political activities. The hindrances in the way of achieving women's equality and justice were still dominant during the mid-1980s. The Shah Bano case is a glaring example of the said controversial issue. In April 1985 the Supreme Court made a momentous judgment that the maintenance should be granted to Shah Bano by her husband, who had divorced her. Shah Bano was a seventy-three-year-old Muslim woman who urged her ex-husband (who divorce her) for maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Code and this maintenance had been awarded by the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Her ex-husband challenged the verdict in the Supreme Court, arguing that he had been guided by the rules and regulations of Muslim personal law in repaying her dowry and in maintaining her for the period of *iddat* (approximately three months of the period following the divorce), and thus he was not liable to pay maintenance to Shah Bano. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the lower court's verdict and tried to resolve the conflict between the CrPC and Muslim personal law respectively. The Hon'ble Supreme Court took a historic stand and gave a humanitarian judgment; it highlighted that a Muslim woman unable to maintain herself has been entitled to protection under section 125 of the Criminal Protection Code, which requires the husband having proper means, to pay maintenance to wives or ex-wives who are truly unable to support themselves. Hence, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment was primarily based on the understanding that Muslim Personal Law, which limited the husband's responsibility to provide maintenance during the period of *iddat*, does not deal with a situation of distress, the principal concern of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Hasan, 1993). The Shah Bano judgment cast a deep impact on Indian politics and led to widespread controversy (Hasan, 1989). The conservative Muslims completely denounced the judgment and urged in favour of protecting Islamic Law. Many of them considered it as an assault on the *Shariat*; according to them, there is no such provision of maintenance in the matter of divorce. They come out to the streets in protest and accused the Supreme Court of trespassing into a field of personal religious practice. The conservatives presented a troubling aspect of the judgment and raised the issue of the denial of the Muslim personal law; furthermore, the *ulemas* highly condemned the judgment as an attempt to undermine the *Shariat*. Nevertheless, the conservatives made their reaction more pronounced in opposing the reference to Article 44 of the Indian Constitution, which enshrines that "the State shall endeavour to secure for citizens a uniform civil code." For many Indians, especially Muslims, it was a contravention of the convention of composite nationalism and secularism that enhanced the consolidation of the different communities in India (Hasan, 1988). However, the Muslim conservatives especially the *Jamiyat al-Ulema* strongly opposed the Uniform Civil Code; they argued that it would undermine the struggle for the search and safeguard of a Muslim's self-identity, it is only the personal law for Muslims that can safeguard its preservation. The strong opposition against the judgment was spearheaded by the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board and supported by many Muslim politicians in centrist parties, such as Indian National Congress and the Janata Dal. This religion-based movement galvanized the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala by maximizing the symbolic vocabulary of protecting minority identity and reminding the Indian state that it should be committed to the protection of the rights of minorities (Telegraph, 1986). Nevertheless, in response to the controversy of the Shah Bano case, the Rajiv Gandhi government introduced the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Bill which was passed in the Indian Parliament in 1986. This Bill relegated Muslim women to the status of second-class citizenship, by denying them the option to redress the matters under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and granted the arguments of the All-India Personal Law Board that a woman's natal family should maintain her after divorce and her husband should be no longer responsible for it. It is noteworthy to say that, it had left a deep impact on Indian society; especially the women who came forward in a strong campaign against it. The front-ranking women's organizations in

this direction were the All-India Democratic Women's Association, the National Federation of Indian Women, the *Mahila Dakshata Samiti*, etc. It cannot be thus denied that there were both anti-Shah Bano campaigns as well as pro-Shah Bano campaigns. It can however be mentioned that in the arena of domestic politics, Rajiv Gandhi was a popular face but at the same time in India, he had to deal with various religious anxieties and antagonism.

The Foreign Policy Administration of Rajiv Gandhi Era

Quite unsurprisingly, Rajiv Gandhi was extremely keen to preserve his power. That is why he had frequently reshuffled the cabinet as well as the Foreign Ministers without any valid reason in the course of his five-year tenure as Prime Minister. He had six Ministers of External Affairs during his five years tenure. There was no justifiable reason behind these frequent changes. It was nothing more than a demonstration of Rajiv Gandhi's power and authority. He also hired and fired the Indian Foreign Secretaries in a very statist manner, and changed these secretaries without any valid reasons, except for validating his power. The uncertain dismissal of Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateswaran in January 1987 proved to be the expression of authority and the domination of all institutional rules and procedures. In December 1987, Mr. Venkateswaran visited Islamabad where he had announced as a Chairman of SAARC, that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi will visit different SAARC nations including Islamabad. On 21st January 1987, Rajiv Gandhi expressed to the Pakistani correspondent at a press conference that he had no plans to visit Pakistan shortly. When the correspondent referred to Venkateswaran's statement, Rajiv Gandhi said that "You will be talking to a new Foreign Secretary soon." The same day he resigned from his service by expressing his desire for premature retirement from the Indian Foreign Service, on 22 January 1987. The Daily Patriot observed in an editorial: "The External Affairs Ministry has witnessed in the period a series of changes of an intriguing frequency as a whole and incompletely explained in quite a few cases. We have had three cabinet-rank Ministers holding the portfolio since Mr. B. R. Bhagat took over from the Prime Minister in September 1985, followed by Mr. Shib Sankar and by Mr. N. D. Tewari, and two Ministers of State Mr. Khurshid Alam Khan and Mr. K. R. Narayanan before Mr. Natwar Singh and Mr. Edwardo Falerio. At another level, the resignation of Mr. G. Parthasarathi from the Planning Advisory Committee of the Cabinet, where he served after he had left the policy Planning Committee dealing with External Affairs, preceded Mr. Venkateswaran's plea for voluntary retirement from service. The manner of departure had been publicly perceived as mysterious at least in

the cases of Mr. Bhagat and Mr. Parthasarathi before the fact was revealed by the Prime Minister at a press conference about the removal of Mr. Venkateswaran” (The Patriot, 1987).

In an uncertain move, the Indian Foreign Service Association met on 23 January 1987 and adopted a resolution against the tyrannical actions of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, although Natwar Singh, who was an ex-IFS officer and the Minister of State for External Affairs under the Rajiv Gandhi regime, had cautioned the IFS Association against any such move. The resolution said that Venkateswaran “has been a source of pride for the Indian Foreign Service, epitomizing as he does the finest tradition of the Civil Service-integrity, intellectual honesty, the courage of conviction, diligence, dedication and inspiring leadership – which is combined with considerable charm and wit. Regrettably, a successful carrier spanning 36 years should have ended in such a manner”. According to various reports, the original draft resolution was very much stronger, and it was constituted by the senior officers present at the meeting (The Hindu, 1986). J. N. Dixit, the former Foreign Secretary, had observed regarding Rajiv Gandhi’s style of foreign policy that “This tried phase of evolution was also characterized more directly by the Prime Minister’s Office through other channels. Senior officers from our intelligence agencies and the Prime Minister’s office were utilized by Rajiv Gandhi to deal with several sensitive matters, especially when he felt that going through formal constitutional channels may not bring about the desired results. A certain erosion of the institutional strength of the Foreign Secretary’s post has taken place” (Dixit, 1997).

Conclusion

The present chapter has attempted to study the continuity and change in India’s foreign policy during the Rajiv Gandhi era (1984-1989). The most important segment of this chapter is Rajiv Gandhi’s defence policy which witnessed major changes during his premiership. India formulated a strategic shift from defensive military preparations to a more vibrant offensive mechanism from 1984 onwards. Secondly, in this phase, India evolved a new security doctrine which came to be popularly known as ‘the Rajiv Doctrine’. According to it India unequivocally opposed any kind of external interference in the domestic affairs of other South Asian countries. In other words, any South Asian nation, if in need of external assistance, should seek it from India, instead of taking assistance from other countries. The countries denying this principle should be deemed to be anti-India. Thirdly, we see a spectacular development in the direction of militarization and technological modernization

and a new era of missile development that had begun from this time. It is noteworthy to say that, from the Nehruvian era to the Indira Gandhi era, India was a major global importer of military equipment and arms; however, since the Rajiv Gandhi era, India also posed itself as an exporter of defence materials. And, at the same time, India also formulated a separate defence budget where we see a substantial increase in defence expenditure signalling a new India. Regarding the defence policy and posture during the premiership of Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989), India showed an aggressive stand which was also reflected in the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka through IPKF as well as her military involvement in the Maldives. During this time, India's relations with the great powers had also shifted from dependence to partnership. The country was thus maintaining her policy of 'non-alignment' even during the Rajiv era. Nevertheless, the Indo-Soviet friendship became more prominent during this time, especially with Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union which was subsequently returned by Gorbachev's Indian visit. As far as Sino-Indian relations are concerned, for the first time India recognized the importance of bilateral talks at the political level without relying upon military interventions. It was marked by negotiations, understanding, and pragmatic policy perceptions in both countries. However, the uniqueness of the Rajiv Gandhi era rests on – the 'Rajiv Doctrine', India's neighbourhood policy and India's support for anti-racism in Africa, and finally India's appeal for world peace. Apparently, this might read as a significant deviation from the path of peace. Yet, like his predecessors, Rajiv Gandhi could only formulate policies within given structural and historical limits. His commitment to peace was definitely showcased by his comprehensive approach to complete global disarmament, although, the plan was too ambitious, utopian, and out of sync with given material realities of world politics and India's capabilities. However, it did convey India's consistent commitment to the discursive ideas of peace and non-alignment in a democratic world. India had by then traveled along the realpolitik needs of national security and found itself constrained by global distribution of power. It could no longer neglect military needs, especially when its domestic security was critically affected by terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir, Punjab, and several northeastern states. To use India's defensive security measures as evidence of a compromise of its time tested commitment to peace would, therefore, be both harsh and inaccurate. Major powers never absolutize peace. They can only find peace in relation to other powers and their complex interactions. Rajiv Gandhi had not changed the direction of Indian foreign policy in any radical way. He remained anchored to the longstanding paradigm of India's non-alignment and defensive security practices.

Chapter-VI

Narasimha Rao: Capitalism, Democracy and Peace

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Pamulapati Venkata Narasimha Rao was born on 28th June, 1921 in undivided British India. His family lived in *Vangara*, a rice field in the district of *Karimnagar*, now in the state of *Telangana*. Living on the edge of many linguistic cultures, villagers were able to speak *Telugu*, *Hindi*, *Marathi*, *Kannada* and even some *Oriya*. In the land of *Nizam*, the most powerful language was Urdu, while the language of courtly life was Persian. Narasimha Rao could speak ten Indian languages, an ability he had inherited at birth. His parents were Brahmins; Narasimha's father *Sitarama Rao* owned acres of dry land. The only other Brahmin family in the village was related to Narasimha's family in three ways: blood, a common wall, and a daily routine. Rao was born in a village in the periphery of the princely state of Hyderabad whose peculiar politics and oddness in mainstream Indian nationalism had influenced young Narasimha quite significantly. Land ownership pattern was also significant in this case. The formal ownership of land was in the name of the *jagirdars*. However, the actual power over the tenant and tiller was with *deshmukhs* or *doras*, a kind of village agents. Many *doras* were *Hindus* from the *Reddy*, *Velama*, and Brahmin castes. The *Reddys* dealt with village administration while the Brahmins were engaged in revenue collection. Narasimha Rao's ancestors were also *doras*, and they were, as such, embedded in this structure of exploitation (Sitapati, 2016). From 1921, pan-Indian nationalism began to challenge these injustices and exploitation. Mahatma Gandhi had just declared a call for 'non-cooperation' against the British, and had tried to transform the Congress from a debating club of the Indian elite into a mass movement. In this situation, the *Nizam* was so afraid that he banned all kinds of political meetings and restricted the entry of outsiders into his state without prior permission. This was the political situation at the exact moment of Narasimha Rao's birth – there was a new wave in both nationalism and political oppression.

Narasimha Rao's induction as Prime Minister was purely accidental. None expected it, including him. It was decided that Rao would retire from politics due to the considerable decline in his influence in the Congress Party to the extent that he was not even offered a parliamentary seat to contest in the elections. Having surrendered himself to the service of the

Nehru-Gandhi family during his active political career, he was aware that there was no hope left to return to politics. He was constantly humiliated and downsized. Although Indira Gandhi had seen and judged him sympathetically, Rajiv Gandhi had simply ignored him. In this situation, his belongings, especially his books, had already been sent to Warangal in Andhra Pradesh, his home state, where he had decided to . He had already said goodbye to fellow party men in Delhi and was on his way to home when Rajiv was assassinated. Although there were many heavyweight personalities in the Congress party struggling to succeed Rajiv Gandhi, *Sonia Gandhi* (wife of Rajiv Gandhi) turned to Rao whom she trusted as a loyal well-wisher of the Gandhi family and the party. It was thus cleared up within the Congress Party that P. V. Narasimha Rao was to be the real successor of Rajiv Gandhi. Narasimha Rao completed his five years term and gave a strong leadership to the nation, given the fact that the preceding two Prime Ministers, V. P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar, had a short-tenured administration under which our foreign policy could not gain momentum. It is noteworthy to say that Rao neither possessed Nehru's vision, nor the determination of Indira Gandhi, but his knowledge in international politics ranked him at a higher position. Some have termed him as 'greatest ever Prime Minister of India' (Kapur, 2009).

The Early Life of P. V. Narasimha Rao

At the age of four, Narasimha Rao was given away for adoption to their Brahmin neighbours. They had no children of their own and were afraid of the *Nizam* who could seize their heirless lands. However, his birth parents continued to nurture him and he would run around between both houses. Rao never forgot either of the two families and always treated them as one. When Rao's biological father lay dying fourteen years later, he remained with his wealthier first family. The separation of seven-year-old Rao from his family would haunt him for the rest of his life. In 1931, when he was only ten years old, Narasimha Rao was married. His wife, *Satyamma*, was related to his adoptive mother and had eight children. They remained in *Vangara* to take care of the family land. *Satyamma* had very little interest in Rao's political career. Within the age of ten, Narasimha Rao had experienced adoption, separation and marriage – all of which he accepted without exercising his free choice.

In 1937, Narasimha Rao completed his higher secondary education. He stood first in the entire state of Hyderabad. It was an achievement for Rao that encouraged him to study further rather than cultivating his family land. The year of 1937 was a time of political unrest in the state of Hyderabad. The elections were held that year in British India and the Congress came

to power in Madras and Bombay presidencies. Both presidencies shared boundaries with Hyderabad, and *Marathi*, *Telugu*, and *Kannada* associations began to unite and organise to protect their linguistic group within the state. In 1938, the state Congress organised a *Satyagraha* on the same day as the *Arya Samaj* and *Hindu Mahasabha* launched their own protest movements. Narasimha Rao was quite enthusiastic about the *Satyagraha* of 1938. The seventeen-year-old Rao sang '*Vande Mataram*' with other students in his college in *Warangal*. The *Nizam's* officials ordered them to stop, since the song was significantly associated with the banned Congress party. Three hundred students, including Narasimha Rao, were expelled by the principal. The expelled students managed to complete their education and obtain their degrees elsewhere. The chancellor of *Nagpur* University, a nationalist, agreed to accept the brightest students of the bunch. Rao was, of course, one of them. Rao was quite fluent in *Marathi*; forty-six years later it would be strongly beneficial for him in winning the election in *Ramtek, Maharashtra*. When he finished his degree, he moved to *Pune* to study astronomy. Here, Narasimha Rao read the works of the Hindu nationalist *V. D. Savarkar* and also subscribed to the communist weekly *New Age*, where *P. C. Joshi* was implementing the theories of Karl Marx in the specific situation of the Indian peasantry. Narasimha Rao had also read the works of the moderate *Gopal Krishna Gokhale* as well as the radical *Bal Gangadhar Tilak*. In 1938, he joined a session of the Indian National Congress in *Haripura*, *Gujarat*. The session was extremely significant for Rao because it marked the event of an emboldened Congress becoming united on the issue of '*Purna Swaraj*' or complete independence. The Congress 'Left', headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, wanted to act towards attaining complete independence and organise protests in the princely states. But the 'moderate' Mahatma Gandhi was worried that this type of political programme might stretch the Congress party. Narasimha Rao returned from *Haripura* with a strong and close memory of Jawaharlal Nehru. He became enthusiastic after listening to Jawaharlal Nehru's speech.

In 1940, Rao's wife *Satyamma* gave birth to their first child, *Ranga*. They would have seven other children: two sons and five daughters. *Satyamma* could barely read and write. She wished to remain in the village and look after Rao's children and lands. Until her death in 1970, *Satyamma* remained quite close to their family. She left Rao free to pursue his political aspirations. Meanwhile, Rao graduated from *Pune* with a first class and decided to pursue his career in law. He had also considered pursuing astronomy in England and wanted to go to the UK to settle as an academic at Oxford or Cambridge. However, there was pressure to return

to his family business, join his wife, and look after his lands in the village. These options posed contradictions in Rao's career, causing him to pursue a law degree in *Nagpur*. After Rao stood first in the law exam, he abruptly returned to Hyderabad to start legal practice as a junior to *Burgula Ramakrishna Rao*, a Brahmin lawyer and the future Chief Minister of Hyderabad. With the end of World War II, the British were keen to leave India positively. But while India became independent in August 1947, the negotiations between the state of Hyderabad and Union of India remained unresolved. The Indian National Congress wanted to remove the *Nizam* and integrate Hyderabad into democratic and secular India. In *Telangana*, an armed revolt was organised against the landlords, which transformed into a communist rebellion. The man who led the movement was *Swami Ramananda Tirtha*, a *Hindu sadhu*, known to be half-saint and half-politician, a person who Mahatma Gandhi himself preferred nationally. *Tirtha* was the president of the Hyderabad State Congress and attempted to convert the protest into a mass movement. *Tirtha* was also a mentor to the future chief ministers of three states: *Virendra Patil* of Karnataka, *S. B. Chavan* of Maharashtra, and *Narasimha Rao* of Andhra Pradesh. *His* influence over Rao was so significant that the latter became very interested in constituting the land reforms in the 1970s. In the struggle against the *Nizam* rule between August 1947 and September 1948, *Narasimha Rao* worked under *Ramananda Tirtha*, who was a pioneer in deploying the method of both Gandhian resistance, as well as violent struggle. In September 1948, the Home Minister of Free India, *Vallabhbhai Patel*, sent in troops to annex Hyderabad in the Indian Union. This 'armed action' ended the 224-year rule of the *Nizam*. It also increased retaliatory violence against the Muslim states. After September 1948, those who had fought against the *Nizam* were searching for a new career. Nevertheless, *Narasimha Rao* quite confidently decided to remain in politics and thereby in the Indian National Congress. By 1948, the Indian National Congress had transformed itself from an organisation of the freedom movement to a national-level political party. As far as Hyderabad was concerned, landed castes such as the *Reddys* and *Velamas* began to compete with the Brahmins for power within the party. There was also political rivalry amongst the Brahmins, and between Rao's former employer, the 'moderate' *Burgula Ramakrishna Rao*, and the 'radical' *Ramananda Tirtha* and his supporters. *Narasimha Rao* had to choose between the master and the mentor. Being academically smart, he chose both and cultivated a relationship with each bloc without alienating the other. As a reward, Rao was made president of the *Karimnagar* District Congress and given a ticket to contest in the first elections of free India.

The Making of the Welfare State

At the beginning of his term, Narasimha Rao was deeply submerged in domestic matters, which he had to devote much of his time and energy to. The main domestic ‘disputes’ were – demolition of the *Babri Masjid*, bank scams, the *Kashmir* and *Bombay* blasts, the sugar scandal, electoral reverse, corruption and manipulation scandals, and so on and so forth (Kapur, 2009). As far as the Indian economy was concerned, it had already faced many challenges and was living with a deficit. When Narasimha Rao took office in 1991, India was on the way of collapsing. In fact it (the Indian economy) had come much closer to defaulting. In this situation, many people had begun to wonder if India could maintain a normal economic procedure; so much so that Narasimha Rao himself wondered and was looking for a right man who could uplift the Indian economy. Nevertheless, there were many international challenges that were unavoidable for India. The most important event was the complete disappearance of the Soviet Union from the international arena where we saw the long term political uncertainty that Russia (erstwhile Soviet Union) had been subjected to, come to a final end with the disappearance of Gorbachev, and by the induction of Boris Yeltsin at the helm of Russian Federation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and their communism turned into the greatest event of the twentieth century; the communist countries of Eastern Europe were transforming into another political system, and was obviously geared towards the –US and European Union. Moreover, the dissolution of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany was a historic moment in history. Now, India was taking time to adjust, and there was mixed reaction in the country. As far as India’s dependency on Russia was concerned, Gorbachev was friendly to India, but Yeltsin was critical of India. The Indo-US relations were not in a position that complemented the Indo-USSR relations as well. Given this situation, Narasimha Rao’s economic decisions (mainly domestic) were widely embedded in his diplomatic decisions.

P. V. Narasimha Rao was a pioneer of the construction of the Indian economy in the form of pro-market and liberalisation policies. Rao was extremely committed to the latter and cheered pro-market ideologies, even when they threatened his government. Several Indians referred to him as the next Margaret Thatcher who would encourage business, shrink the public sector and cut the welfare spending. The Left accused him with the same conclusion. In February 1992, when political scientist James Manor spent a week with Narasimha Rao, he asked the Prime Minister regarding his ideological inclinations.

Rao replied that his model was not that of Margaret Thatcher but of Willy Brandt. Willy Brandt was a Nobel Prize winner and Germany's first 'social democratic' chancellor. In the Indian context, forty-four years after independence, more than 36 percent of all Indians were still classified as poor, 47 percent as illiterate and 26 percent as undernourished (Sitapati, 2016). These were the actual statistics during the period of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991. Now, it is quite significant to judge whether Rao was more Brandt than Thatcher.

Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh spent their first year improving India's public finances by mainly conserving the Rupees. In return for the fresh loans, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded that Rao should reduce existing subsidies. For Rao and Singh, it was courageous to reduce the subsidies. Subsidies accounted for 11 percent in the central government expenditure 1990-91 onwards. Not only did Rao limit subsidies in the early month of his premiership, but he also changed the welfare schemes for health, education, farmers, and students. Rao and Singh tried to avoid schemes related to the policies of taxation. Instead, they were trying to constitute a scheme which would directly benefit the poor. One of the consequences of Rao's liberalisation policies were the expansion of middle class and corporate incomes as well as the rationalisation of tax policies. This led to higher collection of revenue from direct taxation. It was a progressive change, ensuring that the rich and the middle class now contributed more to tax revenue compared to the poor. When Rao became Prime Minister in 1991, the central government income had increased up to 302 billion rupees. The total income of the central government increased up to 22 percent at the time of Rao's departure from his post. Between 1986 and 1991, the central government revenue simultaneously rose at a higher percentage than the preceding years due to Rajiv Gandhi's deficit-led growth. Rao used the increased revenues to fund schemes on education, health, food and social security. Several scholars expressed that Rao might have been a neophyte in the case of the economy; in the case of welfare schemes, he was a walking encyclopaedia. In the middle of 1992, Rao visited South Korea, where he noticed how economic growth and the improvements in well-being had taken place side-by-side. Rao told the diplomat *Prabhakar Menon* that India had to undertake the same action. He knew that economic growth would take a long time to 'trickle down' to the people. Therefore, he decided to not channel the increased revenue from economic growth and instead help the poorer section of India in a straight manner. Rao had also kept his eyes on the cycle of state elections held every year, each of which would be an example of referendum for his national

government. He also kept the industry ministry for himself which showed how seriously he took industrial reform. Similarly, he also decided to serve as the rural development minister, which signified his strong commitment to rural welfare. Rao's initial rural development secretary was *S. R. Sankaran* who, after his retirement, shared his meagre pension with SC/ST students. He was succeeded by another socialist called *B. N. Yugandhar*. *Yugandhar* was described by Andhra politicians as 'Pro poor [with] strong left leanings' (Sukumar, 2014). *K. R. Venugopal* was the other leftist official who had been approached by Rao regarding work on food and employment security. Rao was thus, quite pragmatic regarding India's economic transformation.

The primary way in which India provided subsidy to the poor was through affordable food. In India, availability of food grain had been solved through the contribution of the Green Revolution. From 1991, government food go downs were full with rice and wheat. But there were few problems in the public distribution system (PDS). Rao knew very well that the PDS money was being misused by the corrupt middlemen and bureaucrats. The rich farmers were connected with political parties, while the government procured rice, wheat and other grains from these rich farmers. Subsequently, Rao decided to increase the procurement price which the government had to pay. Political scientist Rob Jenkins sees here a general strategy of the Rao government: maintaining the process of continuity while radically altering the PDS system (Jenkins, 1999). Nonetheless, Rao tried to replace the public distribution system with a more sophisticated form of food subsidy: the Renewed Public Distribution System, or RPDS (Jenkins, 1999). The RPDS would focus on the poorest parts of India where the wheat and rice would be sold at a price even lower than that in the normal 'ration' shop. The scheme was successfully monitored directly by the Prime Minister's officials. Rao was especially concerned with the implementation of RPDS in states with on-going elections. The RPDS did not win Narasimha Rao any particular election. It also did very little for the poor. A survey shows that not a single consumer had ever received subsidised food grains from the ration shop (Aiyar, 1997). Several Congress politicians argued that the RPDS was not successful. Rao's failure ensured that the food grains did not reach the hungry people equally. Money was not the main constraint: in absolute terms, food subsidy doubled during Rao's years (Jenkins, 1999). The problem was, in part, the design of the RPDS. Moreover, *K. R. Venugopal* wanted the government to universalise the PDS among all the districts while the PDS had actually been targeting only the genuinely deserving. The main reason for the failure of the RPDS was that it did not reform the corrupt lower-level bureaucracy, such as

the storage officials. Rao tried to reform the public sector firms, but he was not entirely successful.

Another welfare measure that Rao emphasised strongly on were employment guarantee schemes. Rao's private secretary, *Ramu Damodar*, had expressed that Rao spoke a lot about employment guarantee schemes. There had been a lot of past schemes where the government had guaranteed a job to a poor person, but these had been confined to isolated states such as Maharashtra. However, Rao made it a national-level scheme. He announced 100 days of assured employment in 1700 RPDS blocks in the country and dedicated a lengthy paragraph to it in his 1993 Independence Day speech (Rao, 1993). Rao constructed the first national employment scheme; he was the precursor to the more famous NREGA, which was passed in 2005. Unlike NREGA however, in Rao's scheme, there had been no form of redress for those who were denied employment. Similar to the RPDS, Rao's employment schemes had little impact on the lives of the poor. In this situation, there was a tussle between the fiscally cautious officials in the finance ministry and the socialist bureaucrats. *K. R. Venugopal* submitted his resignation in 1993. But Rao accepted it two years later. To prove that he supported his socialist bureaucrats personally, Narasimha Rao decided to 'trespass' and make an appearance in the engagement ceremony of *Venugopal's* daughter, *Anupama Priyadarshini*, in 1992. *Anupama* was marrying the son of *B. N. Yugandhar* who was one of Rao's left-leaning officials. The groom's name was *Satya Nadella*, the global head of Microsoft.

While Rao's efforts in employment guarantee and food security initiatives were less than effective, his initiatives in education were more successful. He had a devotion for education that was both Brahminical as well as socialist. The most significant change that the Prime Minister brought to education was in its central expenditure, which had been just 951 crore rupees in 1990. In 1995, it rose to 2042 crores (Rao, 1993). Rao also tried to cultivate bureaucrats like *Anil Bordia* and brought experts on schooling from the states to the centre. He tried to turn education into prestige-posting. When Rao had been Education Minister, he had first operationalized Rajiv Gandhi's idea of the *Navodaya* boarding schools for poor children. Therefore, as Prime Minister, he expanded the number of such schools. Hence, Rao's liberalisation policies allowed each state to receive direct funding from the World Bank and other foreign institutions for primary education. Rao strengthened the school education policies under his tenure. Central government schemes such as the *Sarva Shiksha*

Abhiyan poured money into the schools. This improved the quality of facilities as well as enrolment rates. In the administrative areas where Rao was unsuccessful, the later administration was also unsuccessful. By the late 2000s, while student and teacher-enrolment figures were officially high, only one-third of the students actually attended school and teacher absenteeism became constant. This is the reason studies show that poor parents preferred to send their children to private schools (Sitapati, 2016). In Rao's era, the education policy refused to acknowledge the 'private exit' by the poor. In the case of economic sectors such as banks, mobile phone companies and the airlines, Rao empowered consumers to choose better private options over the government ones. But in the case of education, Rao made little attempt to open up schooling to the private sector. As a result, a new *Licence Raj* endured in education with its ill effects.

It was to Rao's credit that India's public finances were improved; ensuring higher revenue, which in turn improved the scale of welfare schemes. The government investment spent on education, health, food and rural development increased during Rao's tenure. The health budget in 1996 was double that of 1990. Food subsidy was also increased in rupees. Budgetary allocation for six major social protection programmes was increased on a large scale. The direct impact of growth reduced the levels of ill health, illiteracy and poverty in India (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013). Poverty among the Scheduled Castes and Tribes also reduced, while the reform increased income levels among the people. Tax reforms ensured that the poorer section paid less towards government revenue compared to the middle class and the rich. The claim that 'neo-liberal' growth made Indians worse off has not been proved by data. Critics such as economists Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze however, argue that India has a long way to go. The most important fact is that, while social protection schemes (such as employment guarantee) improved, preventive schemes (such as health and education) were less impressive. This significant difference is because the development schemes were controlled by the state and district officials rather than the central government. As a result, the implementation of central schemes varied between the regions and the states. States with efficient local bureaucracies and political will, such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala, converted increased funding into people's well-being, while Uttar Pradesh and other poorly managed states continued to implement the same schemes poorly. Hence, the variation within India shows that the problem is not only at the Prime Ministerial level but also at that of the regions and the state. Rao understood the fact that decentralisation and micro-level planning is highly required to prevent corruption and regional problems (Rao, 1993). The 73rd and the 74th

amendments to the constitution were also significant as they generated the devolving power of village-level *panchayats*. There was an attempt to create what Rao called 'a bypass model', where money directly reached the poor. But decentralisation enhanced power of both, the local people as well as the local politicians, which led to the inequalities between the regions. Nonetheless, the years of Rao will remain an example of decline in the public recruitment process, and history will judge Narasimha Rao and his regime. The scarcity of the bureaucrats in the government machinery furthermore increased corruption in the government sectors. However, what is clear is that Rao was an exceptional Prime Minister who tried to develop the country from within. According to German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Rao was India's first social democratic leader, who realised that growth and redistribution were not in conflict and were in fact necessary for the total development of India.

Dreaming Europe: Growing Importance of Europe in Indian Foreign Policy

Narasimha Rao's first major destination was Europe. After economic liberalisation, India emerged as a new power in the international arena. Rao assessed the situation and initially signed a five year partnership and development agreement with the EU in December 1993. There, we saw a proposal of fixed annual ministerial meetings where both the signatories had opened the doors towards broad political dialogue. It was a partnership agreement covering a wide-range of issues like – commerce, economy, tourism, scientific exposures, etc. The EU was trying to come closer to India by upgrading economic negotiations and the external relationship. As far as India was concerned, it was trying to redesign its economy with a fresh new strategy to adapt itself to the requirements of the European Union. India, first of all, decided to export seven products to the EU, namely – garments, leather products, floor coverings, tea, diamonds, cotton fabrics, and pears, including precious stones. These sectors had a comparative advantage. The leather industry is the best example where the EU and East European countries showed real industrial interest. The Punjab, Haryana and Delhi (PHD) chamber of commerce and Industry was actively involved in leather exports; and here, the EU suggested India to follow any one EU country that would give a standard style, design and technology to India and that will enable both the partners (India and EU) towards investment and development. Germany imported 35 percent of India's leather exports to the EU; India had in this case, tried to upgrade the trading strategies in Germany and was looking to consolidate and expand its market. So, we could see a new quest made by Narasimha Rao

government to enhance India's export market besides to make a new tie with Europe on diplomatic understandings. Engineering was another area in which both India and the EU had a trusted relationship. Indian companies undertook a strategy to manufacture the engineering components which were expensive to make in Europe and thus would be high in demand in Europe. Indian companies like *Larsen and Tubro*, *Secalls India*, *Shivananda Steel*, and *Mukund Iron and Steel* were already involved in this, while others like *Escorts and Telco* were making automobile spare parts for the European manufacturers (Kapur, 2009). As far as the giant industries were concerned, *Suzuki* motors of Japan which already had an exposure in India had allowed its Indian partner, *Maruti*, to reach into European markets for selling small cars. On the other hand *Tata* was already investing in Portugal and was looking for a larger investment in Europe. So, we can see a strong economic presence of India in Europe and this process was accelerated under the Narasimha Rao government where 161 joint ventures were under construction. It is noteworthy to say that, since the 1980s the Indo-EU trade partnership has increased rapidly and the EU-India partnership was set up in late 1980s, under which bi-annual meetings were organised between EU and other small scale enterprises. India's exports to the EU had been doubled since 1992; from Rs. 182 billion it had jumped up to Rs. 381 billion during 1998-1999, at the same time, India's import from the EU accelerated from Rs. 2000 billion to 435 billion during the same period (Kapur, 2009). However, the most important programme was the European Union Economic cross cultural programme, launched on 26 November 1996, that became the foundational programme of the EU in India. As far as foreign policy was concerned, Narasimha Rao's first foreign visit was in Germany; being a Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Germany with the message of friendship, a "good will visit", which was mainly based on the inauguration of the Festivals of India. Firstly, Germany was an important and perhaps promising trading partner of India; secondly, India was losing its privileged partnership with the globally alienated Soviet Union, so India's post-cold war diplomacy was moving towards Germany. Besides, the newly reunited Germany was getting tremendous importance in world politics, due to its location at the heart of Europe with a population of 80 million. On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Germany was really interested in a strategic partnership with a democratic republic like India. The German chancellor, Helmut Kohl assured Narasimha Rao during his September 1991 visit to India that despite the new responsibilities and burdens of Germany regarding its unification and developments in Europe, Germany must stand with its commitments to make the India-Germany strategic partnership more fruitful. During the 1990s, we saw a

widespread development of multilateralism in international affairs besides a new economic multilateralism that was surging at a high level. It is noteworthy to say that Europe was turned into a meeting point where both political and economic multiculturalism had mixed up, and a new cosmopolitan social-political state policy was emerging. Nonetheless, Narasimha Rao's India had involved in this tradition both politically and economically.

India's Relations With Israel, Gulf and Middle East Asia

Another important phase of Narasimha Rao's foreign policy rested on the changing relationship with the Middle East Asian countries, especially with Israel. Narasimha Rao was the first among the Indian Premiers to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The fear of Middle East retaliation, especially from the Arab world, had paralysed Indian courage and free decision – making. The classical Nehruvian doctrine of solidarity with the Middle East was still present until Narasimha Rao came to power, even after the growing importance of Israel in world politics. India first realised it when China and other European countries (including Russia) established relations with Israel not to speak with Egypt, who was Israel's prime opponent. The Palestinian leader Arafat's visit to Delhi during the 1990s to convince India to play a more active role in Israel-Palestine relations changed India's vision of the Middle East. Arafat urged India to arrange some fruitful measures for the Palestinians, and reminded all that India had more leverage in persuading Israel, more than that of Egypt and Jordan. However, India's internal politics was directly opposite to Narasimha Rao's aspiration and vision of the Middle East Asia policy. Since the beginning of the Narasimha Rao era, we saw the revival of Hinduist mainstream politics, especially through BJP (a strong Hinduist political party), whose concern in the field of foreign policy was quite orthodox in nature. The Hindu nationalist parties were highly critical of the growing trends in Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, development of relations with Israel had generated some degree of equilibrium in India's association with the West. In case of India's Gulf and Middle East policy, no such premiers had any indigenous interest in designing a preferable policy towards them. As Saddam Hussain was not in a superior position in the Gulf region, by losing its position, India moved towards a diplomatic direction with Israel. Narasimha Rao had no alternative but to ignore the growing energy needs which were coming from the Middle East Asian region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was truly essential to meet India's energy needs, so much so that 98 percent of energy was exported from Saudi Arabia. Besides that, thousands of Indian workers were recruited in many sectors in Saudi Arabia. Especially, the

new trends of Globalisation of the Indian economy needed capital and more markets, which were undoubtedly present in the Middle Eastern region. So, we could see a new trend of economic diplomacy towards the oil merchants in the 1990s. The third meeting of the Indo-Saudi Joint Commission was held in November 1991, where the main agenda was oil diplomacy. It was a landmark meeting for both India and Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis proposed nearly fifty projects, including projects concerning engineering, plastic, food processing, and iron and steel sectors (Kapur, 2009). Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates' president visited India in April 1992, where an agreement was signed to abolish double taxation on income and both sides agreed that the Indo-UAE commission should meet twice in a year to expand bilateral economic negotiations and transactions. As far as Iran was concerned, the Prime Minister's visit to Iran in September 1993 had been initialised for the first time in history since the Iranian Islamic Revolution; and had been characterised by the Iranian leader, Hashemi Rafsanjani as "a turning point in bilateral relations" (Kapur, 2009). The significant manifestation of this turning point was that Iran invited India to attend the Tehran Conference on Afghanistan in October 1996 in spite of Pakistan's strong objection. Iran was highly crucial for India's growing energy needs; especially the Indo-Iranian gas pipeline project which was one of the most effective issues (mainly economic) for India. However, this dream has been abandoned since as India realised the chances of pipeline's disruption in case of a military conflict with Pakistan as it has to traverse Pakistan territory. It is noteworthy to say that Narasimha Rao's India extended warm and friendly relations with the Gulf and Middle East and the economic benefits also assisted Narasimha Rao to project India as a progressive and peace loving nation.

India's South Asia Policy

Narasimha Rao's South Asia policy was interesting and remarkable in the sense of perfection. In other words, he tried to measure the tension areas where India must concentrate. We will primarily focus on Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in a categorical way. As far as Pakistan is concerned, Narasimha Rao met his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif for seven times and signed a number of Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) which included advance notifications on military exercises, fixed and stable bilateral dialogue at all levels, advancement on mutual withdrawal of troops from *Siachen*, and demarcation of the *Sir Creek* boundary between India and Pakistan. But, the two countries were strict on their past rivalry especially Pakistan, who was actively involved in Kashmiri and Punjabi separationists who

were encouraging the expansion of Islamic and other religions fundamentalists within India and from outside India. Narasimha Rao was desperately seeking a diplomatic solution which was a key feature of his foreign policy, but the prolific emergence of *Hindu* nationalism seriously hampered his vision by destroying the 16th century mosque in *Ayodhya* in December 1992. The destruction of the *Babri Masjid* (Mosque) further regenerated the *Hindu*-Muslim riots in a decisive manner. All these internal issues have highly affected India's foreign policy which was famous and known to be secular and humanitarian. So, here we could see a tough and hard struggle on the part of Narasimha Rao to counter the religious extremists within and outside India. Sri Lanka was more problematic to India. A section of the Indian public and especially Sri Lankans (*Tamils*) were critical of the role of India in the *Tamil* question. The legacy of Rajiv Gandhi and the memory of the past were driving the *Lankan* and Indian *Tamils* into crisis. Narasimha Rao could hardly do anything new. Actually Narasimha Rao's foreign policy towards Sri Lanka was a re-interpretation of the past. The Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, *Harold Hearth*, came to India in July 1991 where the two countries followed the policy designed by their former premiers, like – the 1987 agreement must be continued in Indo-Sri Lankan relations; firstly, India must follow the policy of territorial integrity of the island and must carefully develop her regional powers of the *Tamils* inhabited north-eastern regions, secondly, appropriate measures must be taken for the two hundred thousand Sri Lankan *Tamil* refugees staying at refugee camps in India and they must be returned safely to the Lankan island; thirdly and lastly, the expanding cases of terrorist violence must be stopped (Kapur, 2009). Nevertheless, the Indian Prime Minister was not in a position to implement these policies and there was a full scale external influence on the Sri Lankan islands where India had no control, besides helplessly watching the situation. Relations with Bangladesh were not so good either. We could not find any major breakthrough in the bilateral interactions with Bangladesh except an agreement that had been signed on the distribution of common (mainly river) water resources. The migration of *Chakma* refugees from the *Chittagong* tracts was seriously a problematic issue for Bangladesh, leading to the *Logang Massacre* that took place in *Logang*, a village in the *Khagrachari District* along the border with India on April 10, 1992. The Bangladeshi civilians, border guards and army together attacked the *Jumma* people with deadly weapons. Due to it, over 400 people died. It is recorded that more than 2000 people escaped to Tripura, a state in North East India. However, Narasimha Rao's government refused to register them as immigrants and denied their refugee status. Rao's bilateral diplomacy towards South Asian

nations was following the path of his predecessors. Historically, Bangladesh had a deep trust in India since its independence; but the religious extremism in Bangladesh and its growing trends somehow pushed India into complexities to undertake a proactive Bangladesh policy especially in the *Begum Khalida Zia* regime. Nevertheless, Narasimha Rao was one who tried to establish a new phenomenon of regional cooperation; and SAARC was the most useful forum. In a speech at SAARC's 7th summit in *Dhaka* on 10 April 1993, Narasimha Rao called upon the other members to generate regional cooperation, economic groupings, and trading blocs in other regions of the world. He also expressed that SAARC will not only be restricted to the political sphere but must also be expanded into the cultural, scientific, technological and academic as well as journalistic world. The successive and fruitful conclusion of the South Asia Preferential Trade Arrangement of April 1993 was the first and constructive landmark event in this direction. Therefore, India's South Asia policy of the Narasimha Rao era was pragmatic as well as value laden in nature.

Foreign Policy and Neighbourhood: Looking East and Looking West

Foreign policy was a considerably significant issue in the entire tenure of P. V. Narasimha Rao. The world was a stage for which Rao tried to write his own script. After the passing of one decade of India's independence, the world had been divided into two rival camps: the US and the Soviet Union. India was neutral in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US, but the Soviet Union was ready to supply armaments, ideology, as well as a veto at the UN. However, when Rao became Prime Minister, the revolutionary and transformative forces of the Soviet Union were trying to enhance a new relationship with India and tear at India's safety net in the world. There was another problem of the balance of payments crisis which essentially required loans and investments from the United States. Even India's neighbourhood seemed quite uncertain. The Indo-China relation is quite significant in this context. China was threatening India in terms of economic and military power. India's strong enemy, Pakistan, was engaged in sponsoring terrorism in the Kashmir Valley as well as alleging human rights abuse globally. The countries of East Asia, whom Jawaharlal Nehru had termed as 'Coca Cola governments' (Datta-Ray, 2009, P. 78) had entered into the arena of the First World and dismantled India's pretensions of Third World leadership. Moreover, the Middle-Eastern countries were shifting westward, leaving India in no man's land. The idealism and liberal internationalism that had empowered the Nehruvian foreign policy was no longer in position with India's dominant role at the world stage. Hence, India's foreign

relations were in need of liberalisation and up gradation. Unlike in the case of the economy, Narasimha Rao was well-versed in the knowledge of international affairs. He had been Foreign Minister in the 1980s under both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. Rao knew several languages, three among them being foreign: Spanish, Persian, and of course, English. Rao's personal library brimmed with books pertaining to international relations, mostly including those by Henry Kissinger, as well as essays of Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski (Sitapati, 2016).

He advised his grandson *Shravan* that before one travels to any country, they must read about it thoroughly. Rao realised that the foreign policy needed a new orientation with a new thinking. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had constructed healthy relations with countries such as the US, Israel, and China, and there was no reorientation in policy. Narasimha Rao tried to construct his foreign policy on the basis of these blueprints.

Prime Minister Rao's first month in External Affairs was immensely decisive, similar to his economic management. He appointed J. N. Dixit, a South-Asia expert, as Foreign Secretary. However, in 1995, the diplomat *Salman Haidar* became Foreign Secretary; Rao had high expectations from him. The Foreign Minister was *Madhav Singh Solanki*, a politically busy person. There was a traditional approach to Indian diplomacy where the bureaucrats from IFS were posted as ambassadors to other countries. However, the IFS officers were trained on the basis of a Nehruvian past which was ill-suited to a changing world. Rao wanted to begin with a new approach. He considered sending *Dilip Kumar* to the Soviet Union as an ambassador and, similarly, cricketer *Tiger Pataudi* to London, music conductor *Zubin Mehta* to the US and businessman *Russi Mody* to Germany. *J. N. Dixit* opposed the proposal and Rao listened to him, except that *Zubin Mehta* was able to book an appointment with Jack Welch (CEO of General Electric) positively. Rao had emphasised economic diplomacy from the first day. Due to that fact, Rao's first overseas visit to Germany was the economic engine of Europe. Rao also met with Indologists, which was quite significant in terms of Rao's opinions. Two decades earlier, during his visit to the University of Wisconsin in the US, Rao had been astonished to see the vast number of Western scholars on India. Rao always took his cook *Rajaiah* with him. *Rajaiah* would cook a simple meal of rice, *dal*, curry, *chutney* and *sambar* for Rao in his hotel room. Rao's German visit took place amidst a few problems in the Soviet Union. In 1991, Soviet reformist Mikhail Gorbachev was attacked in his own country. Rao had a telephonic conversation with

Gorbachev on 23rd August 1991, where he assured Gorbachev that India was always with the Soviet Union and the Soviet people. However, Rao had misjudged the ‘will of Soviet people’. In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dismantled. Therefore, India’s defence deals were now spread between several nations, Russia to Belarus, and Belarus to Ukraine. The Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union narrated it with the classic statement, suggesting that since everything had changed, the deals would also change, and that India was learning the changing circumstances (Gupta, 1991). The end of the Soviet Union made it perfectly clear that India needed to renew its relationship with the remaining superpower of the world: the USA. India needed to focus on America and decide to reconstruct new relations with America through the Middle East.

India had historically supported Palestine’s deep quest for nationhood and refused a full diplomatic relationship with Israel. There were three reasons behind it: the need for Arab oil, the sentiment of the Muslim people of India, and an anti-colonial ideology that strongly opposed white settlements on brown land. In 1986, Rajiv Gandhi had asked the Indian diplomat *Ronen Sen* to list a series of steps ensuring full diplomatic relations with Israel. But due to several reasons, the reform in foreign policy lost momentum. In 1991, Prime Minister Rao realized that the road to Washington D.C., ran through *Tel Aviv*. Rao became successful in December 1991, the same month that the Soviet Union was dissolved. The United States wanted an earlier resolution in the United Nations, and to equating Zionism with racism, be annihilated. Rao could understand the significance of the vote. He took advice from the retired diplomats whom he called ‘Old Warhorses’. They all tried to establish the fact that India should establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Rao instructed his diplomats to vote in favour of the resolutions. The United States noticed the full event. In the same month (December, 1991), Narasimha Rao invited the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat, to a state visit in India. Rao had sensed that the position of Arafat had become weaker in world politics. His support from Saddam Hussein was isolated even within the Middle East. Narasimha Rao prepared in advance for the visit of Arafat. He prepared four drafts of speeches welcoming Arafat. When Arafat finally arrived in January 1992, Rao welcomed him with a warm hug. The photograph of a smiling Rao embracing Arafat dressed in a olive green military suit and black-and-white *Keffiyeh* was captured all over the Indian press. However, in person, Rao told Arafat that India could only put pressure on the Israelis if it had an ambassador in *Tel Aviv*. Arafat agreed to Rao’s proposal. On 29th January 1992, India announced full diplomatic relations with the Middle

Eastern superpower Israel. The Middle Eastern newspaper *Jerusalem Post* announced, 'India joins the World' (Gupta, 2013).

Following this, Rao moved towards the domestic issues. On 22nd March 1992, he attended the Parliament and used Nehru to justify his decision, adopting the same method that he had undertaken for his liberalisation policies. In order to balance his decision on Israel, Rao decided for an official visit to Iran (Dixit, 1997). India needed Iranian help in combating Pakistan in Kashmir and wiping the doubts from the Muslim mind due to the demolition of *Babri Masjid*. Ties between Israel and India however have strengthened significantly since Narasimha Rao's time. In 2012, the defence on tracts between the two countries reached nine billion dollars a year (Sitapati, 2016). Moreover, India no longer automatically votes against Israel in the UN. Additionally, this friendship has been able to flower without hampering India's relationship with Iranian and Arab countries. Narasimha Rao was also successful in continuing his policies in different countries.

With economic liberalisation in India, foreign capital was now officially allowed. But there was a need to change the rule. It required economic diplomacy. It had never been attempted earlier in India. Indian diplomats were used to either negotiating regarding Third World solidarity in the UN or requesting the West for wheat and dollar loans. The diplomats had little experience in selling the economy to the private investors abroad. After a few months, Rao took control and sent a note to the Indian missions, asking them to promote India as an investment-seeking country. On his foreign visits, including those in Germany and Iran, Rao took with him a number of businessmen. The most significant example of Rao's economic diplomacy is his visits to the World Economic Forum in Davos. As far as economic diplomacy is concerned, these visits were the first by an Indian Prime Minister. Davos is famous for hosting major business houses around the world. However, in and after Rao's tenure, international trade accounted for more than 40 percent of Indian GDP. Rao was not interested in a personal legacy. He expressed that, when it came to the integration of the Indian economy to the global market, he would judge by results.

In 1993, Narasimha Rao decided to travel 3500 kilometres across the border. The boundary with China had been demarcated by the British in 1914, and India considered that line to be non-negotiable. The Chinese had never accepted the establishment of the British line, and this difference of opinion had led to border conflict in 1962. India had been defeated in the war and the relations between the two countries became conflicted. When Prime

Minister Rajiv Gandhi tried to reconcile the conflicted relations and visited China in 1988, his Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao had accompanied him. Rajiv Gandhi had established three working groups with the Chinese for the following: the boundary dispute, technology, and the economy. The director of the intelligence bureau at the time, M. K. Narayanan, proposed a major change. Narasimha Rao had been a part of the Indian delegation to Beijing in 1988. As Foreign Minister before the early 1980s, he had watched Deng badmouth Mao Zedong before moving towards the market. But Rajiv Gandhi had decided not to take either his Foreign Minister or his Foreign Secretary with him to meet Deng. In December 1991, soon after Rao became Prime Minister, Chinese premier Li Peng visited India. In preparation for the visit, a former Indian ambassador to China had sent Narasimha Rao a 'personal note' on India-China relations. The note narrated the personality of Li Peng, ending with the indication that 'Multiparty Democracy', political pluralism, human rights of a Western kind, social permissiveness among the youth, etc. were all anathema to him' (Sitapati, 2016). Rao was not at all astonished; rather, he underlined the sentence. In the note, the former ambassador recommended that India and China could cooperate for South Asian prosperity and could opt for joint Sino-Indian projects in Nepal and Bangladesh. Two years after Li Peng's visit, in September 1993, Rao travelled to China and spoke to President Ziang Zemin about civilizational links between the two countries. As the diplomat *Prabhakar Menon* pointed out, Rao felt that India and China were bound by deeper philosophical ties which were beyond buying and selling. The highlight of the visit was the signing of the 'Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along...India-China Border Areas'. The Pact created a developed mechanism to resolve the dispute, especially when there was a reduction in troop movement on the border, which had been designed to defuse tensions. To Rao it was a classic agreement. Faced with a border dispute that became antagonistic, Rao isolated it from other aspects of the Indo-China relations. Therefore, it can be stated that trade relations developed when border disputes were solved. It was thus, a diplomatic triumph for the Rao government. However, personal failures were also present. Rao wanted to meet Deng, which had been denied by Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. Deng had then retired from active politics. He had disagreed to meet with the visiting Indian Prime Minister. There was a rumour that Deng would have agreed to meet someone from the Nehru-Gandhi family. However, Rao did not mind. His Air India took off from the Beijing airport on 9th September 1993. It headed east to South Korea. Diplomat *Salman Haidar* was in charge of the trip. *Haidar* was the person who had coined the term 'Look East' (Sitapati, 2016). Rao became the first Indian Prime Minister

who travelled to Korea. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the newly decolonized countries of South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia were poor and weak states. Having turned into a large and democratic state, Nehruvian India was the leader of the post-colonial world. Indian foreign policy towards East Asia had been an amalgamation of both unfamiliarity and cultural plurality. In 1967, when the countries of East Asia had come together to form ASEAN, they had been excited to invite India to join them but India had refused. By the 1980s however, these 'Coca Cola Governments' had developed their economy in terms of per capita income, education and health standards, and were able to project global influence. Narasimha Rao's daughter *Vani* travelled with him to Korea as First Lady. They were astonished to witness the educational development of South Korea. On 10 September 1993, at a banquet hosted by the Korean President in Seoul, Rao played the role of the 'travelling salesman'; he met with Korean families: the head of the car Seoul and within a short period again, in Delhi. Rao also visited Bangkok in the same year and met with a number of leaders, including Buddhist monks and corporate persons. He even had a two-hour meeting session with the King of the country. The King was extremely influential in Thai politics. Rao visited another Asian country in 1994; Singapore was considered the gateway of East Asia and an important country in terms of commerce and trade. Rao began the visit according to routine and delivered a typical speech with *Lee Kuan Yew* in the audience. When asked about the Indian economy, Rao pointed to *Montek Singh Ahluwalia* and *Lee Kuan Yew* and said that there were several Oxbridge intellectuals on stage who were better qualified to answer. The most memorable moment was when the Pakistani High Commissioner, present in the audience, asked Rao a difficult question on Kashmir. Rao did not respond with a direct answer but told the High Commissioner that he was wrong and that the High Commissioner of Singapore would give him a perfect answer. *Lee Kuan Yew*, as the then leader of Singapore, expressed that he was delighted and impressed by a foreign leader such as Rao. Eventually, all credit goes to his successor *Goh Chok Tong* for the strong Indo-Singapore relations (Baru, 2015). Therefore, this was the beginning of India's 'Look East' policy. *Goh* therefore, played a critical role in terms of Indo-Singapore relations. When India started to liberalise in 1991, the US and Europe were mostly expected to provide the much-needed capital for industrialisation. But Rao's 'Look East' policy led countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Korea to provide money, cars, and other assets to the Indian economy. Till 2015, Singapore had been the top destination for foreign direct investment in a country like India. It was not only the capital which Rao found in East Asia but also an alternative

economic model. East Asian growth was based upon not only the free-market policies but also on what the Princeton political scientist *Atul Kohli* called ‘state-direct capitalism’, referring to a government that assists major business houses to achieve growth and development (Kohli, 2004). Rao, who had been a strong believer in the redemptive power of the state for a long time in his career, was unconvincingly attracted to certain aspects of the model. On a visit to Indonesia, Rao sent his secretary, *P. V. R. K. Prasad*, to have a vegetarian lunch with *Mohan Lal Mittal*, father of steel baron *Lakshmi Mittal*. This way, India constructed new roads of friendship and cooperation with the countries of East Asia. Of all the foreign policy hurdles Rao faced, the toughest was unquestionably posed by Pakistan. He was not accustomed to foreign policy measures with Pakistan. Rao had met his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, six times in his first two years in the premiership. He had even met the Pakistani President and conversed in pure *Urdu*. Little was achieved even though Rao was the finest *Urdu* speaker in all of the *Nizam’s* Hyderabad. *Siachen*, a freezing glacier along the Line of Control, is the world’s most significant battlefield. However, it has little military value. However, the trust between the two countries is so low that, between 1984 and 2014, 2700 Indian and Pakistani troops died trying to protect the glacier. India paid the heavier cost, around a million dollars a day for the glacier. Many have argued that his amount could have been used instead to provide clean water and electricity to half of the country. Between 2nd and 6th November 1992, the sixth round of talks on the *Siachen* glacier was held in New Delhi. The Indian side was led by *N. N. Vohra*, the Defence Secretary, who also eventually became Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. In the draft agreement, Pakistan agreed to India’s demand to mark the existing positions, which was also in favour of India. Through the negotiations, Narasimha Rao’s office on *Raisina Hill* was crowded with olive-green military uniforms and dark lounge suites. But Rao decided to solely walk away, being aware that any concessions to Pakistan could be exploited by the opposition, BJP. Therefore, he was quite conscious regarding the negotiations with Pakistan. There had been several attempts to reach a successful deal with regards to *Siachen*, but the success was limited. However, India continued to use money and personnel on *Siachen*.

In 1999, Pakistan did to another part of Kashmir what they had done to *Siachen*, and what Rao had been afraid that they would. Pakistani troops took control of the *Kargil Mountains* on the Indian side of the Line of Control. India was bound to go to war to obtain back the last territory. Rao believed that Pakistan could not be trusted anymore. Matters with Pakistan were the same again two years later. Pakistan tried to dismantle the Kashmir state

election in 1987 by mainly training militants, sending them across the border. The increase in terrorist violence and the incidents of human rights abuse by the Indian Army gave Pakistan the scope of excuse to corner India in various international fora. In the spring of 1994, Pakistan initiated a resolution on Kashmir at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Rao decided to send a high-level delegation to Geneva, his Minister of State for External Affairs, *Salman Khurshid*, and the BJP's Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Before the vote of March 1994, the Indian Foreign Secretary *Krishnan Srinivasan* estimated that seven countries would side with India and four with Pakistan. Running a minority government, Rao was afraid since the loss in Geneva would result in his loss in Delhi. But *Srinivasan's* estimate turned out to be accurate. Due to the fear that they would lose, Pakistan withdrew its resolution. The magazine *India Today* printed its cover where Atal Bihari Vajpayee was seen hugging *Salman Khurshid*. When Atal Bihari and *Salman Khurshid* returned to the Delhi airport, they were greeted by a cheering crowd. At the end of March 1994, a summit of the G-15 developing countries was held in Hyderabad House. It was the *Nizam's* Delhi Palace which had become the state guesthouse of the Prime Minister. More than a dozen heads of states and foreign ministers expressed their ideas regarding ways of the world. Rao had also invited Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his close friend and political rival, to express gratitude for the Geneva success.

Two months later, in May 1994, Narasimha Rao visited the US. He had first travelled to the US in 1974. This time he visited the US to visit his daughter *Saraswati*. At the time, India and the US were on opposite sides due to the Cold War divide. India was close to the Soviet Union, while the US was close to Pakistan. In the 1980s, India's foreign policy had begun progressing with infant steps towards that of the US. Now, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was determined to step forward. In anticipation of Rao's visit, the New York Times proudly described Rao as 'Deng Xiaoping of India' (Sitapati, 2016). Rao flew to Washington, D.C. in an Air India flight, and took along Srinath *Reddy*, an AIIMS cardiologist. Rao became a nervous student when he visited the US. He would write and rewrite and correct his speeches on the plane. He was eager to impress the US. This was different from other foreign visits. Rao scheduled a fifteen-minute meeting with US President Bill Clinton. He was worried since Clinton was infamous for his low attention and was not a good listener. Rao played a didactic intellectual role, giving Clinton a large philosophical monologue. Clinton was strangely quiet after the talk was over. Rao was also quite keen to meet with the CEOs of the top American companies. He asked the Indian embassy in Washington to fix

appointments. But the embassy did not have the contacts. Therefore, Rao turned to a man with even more connections in the US than his own official diplomats. The *trantrik Chandraswami* had a network of American devotees, from CEOs to the common people. Rao's secretary, *P. V. R. K. Prasad* remembers *Chandraswami*'s impressive role in arranging the meetings, and Rao was successful in his corporate meetings with these businessmen in the United States. As a young man, Rao had a dream of an academic career at Oxford. During his earlier visits to the US, he would actually live that dream within himself, touring universities and debating with the academic Ralph Buultjens at New York University and *Velcheru Narayana Rao* at the University of Wisconsin. Now, as a Prime Minister, Rao spoke at Harvard University. He asked America to go beyond limitations of any kind. Rao returned to India to a cool reception. The media complained that Rao had returned without any achievements. Rao's focus on trade and commerce made it clear that Rao expected a long-term relationship, indicative in his invitation to Bill Clinton to become the chief guest for the next Republic Day parade in Delhi. In the Rao era, the relationship between the US and India became stronger.

Two months after his visit to the US, Rao travelled to Russia. The diplomats had organised the visit soon after the successful visit to the US. The agenda of the visit was defence. Narasimha Rao took this visit very seriously. He appointed *Ronen Sen*, a relatively junior diplomat, as ambassador to Russia. *Ronen Sen* had worked before in Moscow at a lower rank. *Sen* had a background in defence and had worked at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). He had also been involved in the early stages of India's nuclear programme. *Ronen Sen* was very close to Rao, and were often engaged in long discussions on Russian writers, such as the Romantic poet Alexander Pushkin who was Rao's favourite. *Sen* made Rao aware of India's diplomatic problems with contemporary Russia. By 1994, Rao had visited Moscow and had been able to sign new agreements with Russia. The former head of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), *Dr. V. S. Arunachalam*, accompanied Rao to Moscow. Rao and *Arunachalam* discussed many issues related to India's defence strategies. Rao emphasised defence ties and sent a deeper message to his officials. He tried to emphasise India's long-term historical friendship with Russia, and was willing to stand by Russia in the unfortunate period. Rao was trying to maintain balance with the US and Russia and had never forgotten the influential power of the Soviet Union. He was eager to construct diplomatic negotiations with the new countries of Eastern Europe. As of 2015,

India was one of the few countries with strong diplomatic links with the US, Russia and Eastern Europe.

Rao was quite successful in the context of diplomatic relations with the US, Israel, and East Asia. The border agreement with China revealed a Prime Minister who prioritised common interest rather than domestic disputes. The foreign relations with Pakistan also proved the ability of Prime Minister Rao in crisis management. Indian foreign policy since the Rao era has started to shift from Nehruvian idealism to a more 'realist' and 'pragmatic' pursuit of national self-interest. India emphasised itself as a rising power that must shape its external environment rather than a non-aligned country seeking a more strategic autonomy with the international system. These realist policies and strategies were first visible in the 1980s. Similar to the reforms in the economy, it was Narasimha Rao who translated them into actual policy. However, Rao did not advertise these policies and strategies as anything new. Rao was a politically weak Prime Minister and tried to defend his strategies as mere extensions of Nehruvian idealism (Sitapati, 2016). He met the strategic affairs expert *C. Raja Mohan* on several occasions, and conveyed to him that he did not want his foreign policy to be seen as a break from the past. He tried to ensure that in making new friends, India did not abandon or lose the old friends. He had more deep knowledge in international relations than any other diplomat and was more aware of international affairs than any other Indian politician. He also had a strong connection with many international scholars, such as Ralph Bultjens from New York University. He inherited independent knowledge in international affairs like his foreign diplomats. Hence, Rao was both successful in reform of the Indian economy and in realist foreign policy accordingly. Rao's foreign travels were remarkable for the cultivation of both businessmen and Indologists. It showed that Rao was a pioneer in economic diplomacy as well as cultural diplomacy. In the beginning of the Rao era, there was a crisis in Indian foreign policy. In the Rao era, India became powerful in foreign policy applications and started to make economic alliances with global powers. The one thing which remained unresolved however, was the implementation of India's pursuit of nuclear weapons. With the end of the Soviet era, there was a renewed pressure on India to cap its nuclear programme. In quest of Western support for his economic reforms, Rao could not disregard this pressure. The national security compulsions did not allow him to abandon nuclear weapons, especially when the closest neighbours were already capable of it. Nevertheless, Narasimha Rao was the torchbearer of Nehruvian foreign policy and was highly successful in implementing it.

Nuclear Armamentation and Peace

Narasimha Rao had wanted to test nuclear weapons in December 1995. America was trying to prohibit the nuclear armamentation of India. Atal Bihari Vajpayee fulfilled his promise by ordering five nuclear tests beneath the white sands of Rajasthan. But many scholars raised the question, “How closely is Rao involved with India’s nuclear programme?” We will try to answer this question through the analysis of Rao’s quest for nuclear armamentation within his tenure. It can be stated that there were secrets pertaining to India’s nuclear programme, and Rao kept the secrets within him.

A credible nuclear deterrent needs many ingredients, the first being nuclear technology to build atomic bombs and missiles and aircrafts to deliver it to the enemy. In India, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was tasked with preparing nuclear technology. On the other hand, the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) was tasked with missile building. In the early years, India’s nuclear program focused on using nuclear energy from uranium and plutonium for civilian electricity instead of military weapons. This research was organized in secrecy, with the AEC and DRDO reporting only to the Prime Minister at the end of the day. There was a lack of transparency. The Princeton physicist *M. V. Ramana* argues that the civil nuclear energy programme was wasteful and unable to fulfil India’s electricity needs (Ramana, 2013). However, it created indigenous capability to refine the plutonium, which was an essential ingredient for an atomic bomb into ‘weapons-grade’. Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister in 1991; he was one of the few politicians who knew of the existence of the nuclear weapons programme in India. Rao became Prime Minister at a time when India’s policy of strategic ambivalence on nuclear capability was under serious threat. Pakistan was pursuing their own weapon with the help of China. The DRDO chief *V. S. Arunachalam* estimated in 1991 that Pakistan had the capability to produce ten atomic bombs. On the other hand, BJP was exerting pressure on the Rao government to opt for a strong and complete nuclear armamentation. It put huge pressure on the Rao administration, who was running a minority government. Nonetheless, the changes in the global disarmament regime were posing limitations on the way of India’s nuclear quest. In January 1992, the UN Security Council identified the threat that the proliferation of nuclear weapons contributed to international peace and security. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 had allowed the US, China, Russia, UK, and France to retain their weapons; but other countries (including India) were banned from processing any kind of nuclear weapon. India had resisted NPT for

decades, alleging that it legitimised ‘nuclear partiality’. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the US renewed its efforts to limit the progress of nuclear weapons, which was a threat to the US’ unipolar hegemony. Narasimha Rao could not disregard this American pressure to cap India’s nuclear programme. Rao’s economic reforms forced India to work together with the US. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened India’s global alliances. Therefore, Rao became leader at a time when India was very close to testing nuclear weapons while also being threatened internationally. The Prime Minister needed to be both ferocious as well as neighbourly. Many scholars have argued that Rao needed to be half a lion. Rao’s appointment diary shows that a few days after he became Prime Minister, he met with *Arunachalam* (Sitapati, 2016). However, there was an active quest for India’s nuclear test. *Arunachalam* told Rao that the nuclear bomb was ready for testing. But India was facing a financial crisis and Rao stated that India must wait for the economy to improve. Rao also understood the fact that while India had the technology to detonate the bomb, its delivery system had not yet been developed. In reality, India was far from being a nuclear-capable and nuclear-weapon state in 1991 (Chengappa, 2000). There was a shortage in terms of time and funds for the successful implementation of India’s nuclear capability. A few days later, Narasimha Rao talked to his Cabinet Secretary, who also became the chairman of the nuclear weapons committee. *Naresh Chandra* approached Manmohan Singh, the contemporary Finance Minister. It was a time of devaluation of the Indian rupee, and Manmohan Singh was busy preparing the 24th July 1991 budget. Singh had earlier acted as the finance member of AEC and had an opinion on the commission’s financial discipline. *Chandra* asked Singh for the additional funds under a special budget category. As the nuclear programme proceeded, *Chandra* took ‘black’ flights out of Delhi to the various ‘black’ nuclear sites to inspect the progress of the nuclear programme. He was directed to give an independent report to Rao, leading *Chandra* to scale down long shafts to inspect soils of weapon-grade plutonium. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rao, along with Manmohan Singh, was focused on economic growth. Rao decided that India would pursue nuclear deterrence without antagonising the rest of the world. Very interestingly, an opinion poll of the time showed that 50 percent of people preferred for India to sign the NPT but 81 percent preferred for India to develop nuclear weapons for defence purposes (Sitapati, 2016). In 1992, *Arunachalam* decided to leave the DRDO for an academic position in the US. *Arunachalam* was succeeded as Head of DRDO by A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. Kalam was a Tamil Muslim from *Rameswaram* with a respect and fondness for Carnatic music. Neither did

Kalam have a Ph.D. nor was he a well-known nuclear physicist. But he understood the rockets and it was easy to work with him. His childlike enthusiasm made him a preferable person in the arena of India's nuclear technology. There was soon a change in the structure of the AEC, with the long-time head, *P. K. Iyengar*, being replaced by *R. Chidambaram*. *R. Chidambaram* was an excellent nuclear scientist. He was excited to work with Abdul Kalam on delivery technology. While Chidambaram worked on the production of small nuclear weapons as well as hydrogen bombs, the DRDO under Kalam made progress on building ballistic missiles that could carry the warheads. Rao was constantly consulted by the nuclear experts. In February 1993, the *Prithvi-1* missile was successfully test launched (Sitapati, 2016). It was actually designed to carry a nuclear load to *Islamabad* and other Pakistani cities. According to *Ronen Sen*, India had also previously tested nuclear technology. But in 1993, India tested its own ability to deliver the weapons. This was the day that India became a nuclear power in the world. After the *Prithvi-1* tests, there were another series of tests, known as the Agni missile tests of February 1994 (Chengappa, 2000). The *Agni missile* had a longer range than *Prithvi-1*. India was now confident that it could deliver the nuclear weapons to countries like Pakistan and China. The year 1994 was also when India tested a delivery system of a different kind. India had also bought Mirage-2000 planes from France in mid-1980 when Rao was the Defence Minister. In May 1994, twenty years after India's first nuclear test, a Mirage plane was fitted with a bomb. This was a nuclear weapon, full in the core with explosive charge inside, but there was no plutonium. The plane flew away to *Balasore* (India's missile test site) in Orissa and successfully dropped the bomb on a pre-designated target. From then onwards, India could launch nuclear weapons by missile or other air-based devices. The DRDO prepared to propagate the *Prithvi missile* within units of the Indian Army. In this situation, the US protested. Rao delayed the deployment (nuclear) until after his visit to the US in May 1994. He was keen to deal in economic matters only with the US. But US President Bill Clinton brought up the issue of India's nuclear programme and demanded that India must sign the NPT. Rao argued with the official statement: 'India would not sign any agreement that ensures that some countries can keep their weapons.' After one month, Rao ordered *Prithvi missiles* for the deployment into the Indian Army. However, India's global isolation continued on nuclear matters. In May 1995, over India's strong objection, the NPT was extended for a long period. Discussions had also begun, especially on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which aimed at preventing all countries from the practice of nuclear tests. The NPT and CTBT were opposite to each

other; the CTBT was specifically egalitarian which did not ensure any privileges for the five nuclear states. But these five nuclear states had conducted nearly 2000 nuclear tests. Moreover, these states were confident about the reliability of their deterrent. The real objective of the treaty was to prevent India and other countries from nuclear testing and becoming nuclear-weapon states. India was worried about the nuclear tests of neighbouring states such as China and Pakistan. There was also an intelligence report claiming that China was providing Pakistan with nuclear-capable rockets. Prime Minister Rao had so far tried to balance India's pursuit of nuclear weapons without antagonising the West. On 18th September 1995, four months after the extension of the NPT, Bill Clinton sent a letter to Rao, arguing in favour of the NPT. But Rao refused to respond to this US pressure. A month later, Rao travelled to Cartagena in Columbia to attend a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. There, Rao complained of a nuclear oligarchy dictating terms to others. Immediately on his return to New Delhi, Rao sent a telling note to *Naresh Chandra, R Chidambaram, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam*, and other members of the nuclear weapons committee. Rao asked the committee to work on the assumption that their activities would be under surveillance of American satellites. The evidence of this fact had been confirmed by multiple sources. A few weeks later, in November, the DAE and DRDO sent a note to the Prime Minister. It was for the "Prime Minister's concern only" and on the highest possible security level. The note was based on the resumption of India's nuclear tests. It made a clear recommendation that India conduct two or three tests in *Pokhran* between December 1995 and February 1996. It also ended by listing a process by which Rao's obvious approval would be sought at four different stages: T-30 (thirty days prior to testing), T-7 (seven days prior to testing), T-3 (three days prior to testing) and finally T-1 (one day prior to testing). At T-7, the bomb would be placed in an L-shaped shaft at *Pokhran* test venue (Sitapati, 2016). It was suspected that seven days later, India would be a nuclear-weapon state. Rao spoke with several people and experts in India. Rao's appointment diary indicates that Rao spoke in person with Abdul Kalam. He also spoke to *Ronen Sen*, the contemporary ambassador to Moscow and previously Rajiv Gandhi's confidante on these particular nuclear issues. The diplomat *Probhakar Menon* was at the time a joint secretary in the PMO. Narasimha Rao, via his principal secretary *Amar Nath Varma*, asked *Menon* and other diplomats like *Sujata Mehta* to provide a top-secret assessment on what the international response on a test would be (Sitapati, 2016). Rao even asked the finance ministry, through his cabinet secretary, what the economic consequences of nuclear tests would be. Everyone responded from recollection that the international reaction would be

very negative. On the other hand, the Indian economy which had recovered from the crisis situation still needed to be improved and strengthened. At the end of 'T-21' in November, *Naresh Chandra* was ordered by the Rao government to fly to Delhi. *Chandra* had retired from bureaucracy and was appointed Governor of Gujarat. But he remained in the nuclear energy commission due to his importance in the nuclear programme. An encrypted red phone was arranged for him in *Gandhinagar* so that Abdul Kalam or Narasimha Rao could reach him immediately. In early December 1995, *Naresh Chandra* made an official visit to a plasma physics institute in North India. *K. Santhanam* and Abdul Kalam were also present there. The three met coincidentally and moved to a room that had luckily been soundproofed. In this protected room, they discussed, in loud voices, the details of preparations under way in *Pokhran*. The tests were based on conventional atomic or nuclear fission bomb. On the other side, *R. Chidambaram* and his team at the AEC were working on a hydrogen bomb, a more powerful device that could demolish an entire city, which still needed time for completion. On 30th November, 1995, Abdul Kalam wrote to Prime Minister Rao and vastly criticised the international non-proliferation regime, particularly the CTBT. Abdul Kalam suggested to Rao that while India was testing nuclear weapons, other nations such as China and France were also testing. Therefore, it was Kalam's opinion that India from then onwards could declare itself a nuclear-weapon state and could also sign the CTBT in that capacity. On 12th December, *Naresh Chandra* rushed to *Delhi*. Rao had also given his consent regarding T-7 and the nuclear bomb being placed into an L-shaped hole by a division of the army. The army division had been trained to constantly dig about the area so that on the particular day, satellites would not pick up anything different in it. Therefore, India was preparing to become a nuclear-weapon state but without damaging international peace and stability. The US administration and American intelligence experts suspected that India was preparing for another nuclear test after 1974. A few days after the leaked story of nuclear tests, the American ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, sought Rao's principal secretary, *Amar Nath Varma*. Wisner walked into the PMO carrying photographs taken from the US spy satellites (Sitapati, 2016). *Amar Nath Varma* told Frank Wisner that he had no idea what he was talking about. But the American's reaction was not positive. On 19 December 1995, the day for which the nuclear tests had been originally scheduled, the Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee was asked by Narasimha Rao to make a statement of denial. The Americans were not satisfied at all. The same day, the American President Bill Clinton sent a message to New Delhi on this matter. He wanted to speak to Prime Minister Rao. Rao was trying to prepare on

his own with his closest confidante on nuclear matters to determine the probable questions of Clinton. The call arrived at Rao's office in the morning in the PMO on 21st December. The US President presented evidence of India's nuclear testing, but Narasimha Rao denied the American allegation towards India. But it is quite evident that Rao was trying to make it clear that India must achieve nuclear capability.

In reality, the nuclear tests should have been conducted positively on 19th December. It is known that Rao stopped it at T-3 or T-1. Nonetheless, there was huge American pressure over India. On 25 December 1995, a secret letter was delivered to Rao, asking him to delay the testing for at least four weeks. A serious matter went on to suggest that by early February 1996, India should conduct two to three nuclear tests. Therefore, India was trying its best. But Rao ordered the bomb to be removed from the L-shaped shaft. On 14 January 1996, Abdul Kalam wrote to Rao requesting him to abort the on-going CTBT negotiations and testing of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The note was constructed in consultation with the other members of the secret nuclear committee. At 11 a.m. on 19 January 1996, according to Rao's appointment diary, he met with the principal secretaries, as well as his foreign, atomic energy and defence secretaries consecutively to consider India's stand on CTBT (Sitapati, 2016). A month later, Rao asked the Finance Minister to prepare another analysis of the economic costs of a nuclear test in India. In late March, Rao received a second urgent call from Bill Clinton. The US President once again urged Rao to call off the testing. It is not clear to all what Clinton exactly said to Rao. But Clinton's call signalled evidence to suggest that Rao was actively considering the testing of nuclear weapons in March 1996. National elections were scheduled for May 1996 and Rao was busy in election campaigning. On 8 May at 9 p.m., Abdul Kalam was asked to meet immediately with the Prime Minister. Rao asked Kalam to be ready with the Department of Atomic Energy for the nuclear test. Rao was travelling to *Tirupati*. He told Kalam that the wait for his authorisation was over and that they must go ahead with the test, DRDO-DAE was asked by the Prime Minister to be ready for the action. Two days later, the result for the national elections was announced. Kalam thought that Rao would order him not to test because the result of the election was quite different from what he had anticipated (Jain, 2013). BJP's Atal Bihari Vajpayee took over as Prime Minister of India on 16 May 1996. Narasimha Rao, Abdul Kalam and *R. Chidambaram* went to meet the new Prime Minister of India for the completion and continuation of India's nuclear programme. Immediately after occupying the chair of India's Prime Minister, Vajpayee ordered the nuclear tests and subsequently cancelled that order when it was clear

that his government would not last. In 1998, back as Prime Minister for the second time, Vajpayee was able to get the nuclear weapons tested.

It is quite clear that Narasimha Rao gave the 'T-30' order to test nuclear weapons in late November 1995. Rao involved a good number of people who were involved for assessing the consequences of the tests. He knew that American satellites were involved in the activities of *Pokhran*. The US was able to collect the evidence of the nuclear tests in *Pokhran*. Due to US pressure, Rao was forced to cancel the tests. It is also an important fact that India did not have a hydrogen or thermonuclear device in December 1995. Between April and May 1996, Rao tried to consider testing again. He withdrew the efforts when he realized that he had lost the national elections. Now, as far as Rao's intentions are concerned, three theories fit the known facts.

First of all, Rao had decided to test nuclear weapons in December 1995. Due to spying and surveillance by American satellites, Rao decided to postpone the nuclear testing. This explanation has been favoured by the nuclear expert George Perkovich in his book on India's nuclear programme (Perkovich, 2001). This theory, however, does not explain why Rao decided to test again only a few months later. The pressures and sanctions of America could not have significantly varied between December 1995 and April 1996.

The second theory is that Rao had never intended to test in December 1995 and the Americans were mistaken. In fact, Rao had never cleared the test and it has been pointed out by *Raj Chengappa* in his book *'Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power'*.

The third theory suggests that Rao knew the fact that he could not test both the conventional atomic bomb in December 1995 and the hydrogen bomb separately in April 1996. Rao had unintentionally leaked the information regarding the test, by telling several people about it, and ordered observable digging in the soil of *Pokhran*. When the Americans found out, Rao ordered the tests to end.

In doing so, Rao made India's nuclear capacity quite clear while the CTBT negotiations were in progress. Hence, Rao's scientists took enough time to develop the hydrogen bomb. By April 1996, the hydrogen bomb was ready and Rao genuinely wished to test it, but he lost the mandate of the people. Rao was dependent on three people: *A. P. J.*

Abdul Kalam, R. Chidambaram and Naresh Chandra, Chidambaram and Chandra were both awarded the *Padma Vibhushan*, India's second highest civilian honour by the government succeeding that of Rao. Kalam was awarded the *Bharat Ratna* and made President of India.

Rao was actively involved in India's nuclear programme in his tenure. This was a new trait that he also exhibited in the economy, welfare schemes and foreign policy. Several bureaucrats in Rao's time regarded him highly. They assessed him as a rare politician who understood the importance of technology in building national policy. Abdul Kalam has assessed Rao as a patriotic statesman who believed that the nation is much bigger than the political system. When India finally tested nuclear weapons in 1998, there were still Western sanctions. According to Rao, it did not harm India in any way but established India's long-term security. Interestingly, the subsequent prime ministers have also followed Rao in refusing to sign the CTBT and NPT. In 2005, US President George W. Bush decided to make an exception in the sphere of the international non-proliferation regime. Under the Indo-US nuclear deal, India would separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, placing only its civilian facilities under global security. The US was committed to helping India in civil nuclear energy. The deal made India an exceptional country which did not become part of the NPT framework, and India was still allowed to conduct nuclear commerce with the world. Due to this deal, India has been acknowledged as a nuclear-weapons state as well as an emerging economic power.

In 1998, nuclear tests approved by Vajpayee with the help of Narasimha Rao forced the West to accept that India would never withdraw its nuclear programme. The West categorised India in the same line as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. But the economic power of post-1999 India – for which Rao was assigned the symbol of the lion – astonished the world. Therefore, the West could not afford to alienate India. The amalgamation of economic might and a strong nuclear programme led to a new status for India. Hence, Narasimha Rao is the 'true father' of the 1998 nuclear tests. He is also the founder of a new fresh vision for India. Rao emphasised a new self-image, which was at odds with Nehruvian idealism. Rao also stressed upon economic muscle alongside a conventional military and large nuclear programme. However, Rao's policies faced considerable criticism. Nevertheless, Narasimha Rao was a true architect of Indian economic reform and realistic foreign policies with an appeal for world peace and an uncompromising nuclear policy in the modern world.

The Decision Making Process of P. V. Narasimha Rao

Decision making was a struggle for Narasimha Rao due to his indecisiveness and ‘uncertain’ political future as a Prime Minister. Here, two facts are highly important – first, Narasimha Rao was leading a minority government, and second, his government was involved in controversial acts of manipulations and dishonesty. Foreign affairs, however, was a different side and was less problematic than general administrative decisions. Since the beginning of his mandate, Narasimha Rao had felt the need for a serious diplomatic restructuring of India’s foreign policy especially in the aftermath of the Soviet disappearance from the global arena. The Narasimha Rao government was more engaged in South East Asian neighbours than the others, but the Indian Prime Minister was also quite free to apply his diplomatic skills openly to the world at large. Narasimha Rao was engaged in a more decentralised decision making and the whole restructuring of foreign policy required the expertise of diverse institutions and a wide range of diplomatically sound people, leading to foreign policy becoming more balanced than ever before. The main features of Narasimha Rao’s foreign policy were – routine, macro, and visible. It is noteworthy to say that Narasimha Rao was looking for a balance in the institutionalisation of foreign policy while he secured his role as a supreme instructor of foreign affairs. He gave a new directional orientation to India’s foreign policy and diplomacy which was based on a detailed account of dates and statistics. Narasimha Rao’s foreign policy was highly embedded in foreign economic policy and increased globalisation and marketisation of the Indian economy. The then Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, had a deep knowledge on Indian economy and global financial trends, causing Narasimha Rao to fully trust him to make his proposed economic reforms in India. Narasimha Rao also faced an equal standard of challenges from internal political opposition to his proposed economic and foreign policies. It is noteworthy to say that economic dimensions were more important for foreign policy issues. At the beginning of Narasimha Rao’s mandate, the Finance Minister Manmohan Singh was sent to Japan to seek Japanese economic help, but the Japanese Government showed no interest. The most crucial and desperate decision to sell Indian gold to rescue the Indian economy from foreign exchange bankruptcy was a matter in which Manmohan Singh took a decisive role. The British government agreed to buy Indian gold, but on the condition that the gold must be physically transported to England, showing the trust that British authorities had on India (Kapur, 2009). For Narasimha Rao, Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit was more essential than foreign ministers. J. N. Dixit had sound knowledge in diplomatic matters and he possessed considerable

prestige among other Indian diplomats. P. V. Narasimha Rao went beyond his administrative and governmental boundaries while taking decisions on external affairs. The most unique characteristic of Rao was that he always claimed that he was the “Prime Minister of consensus” (Datta Ray, 2004); which ranked him as an exceptional Prime Minister among all. At the same time, he had earned the support and advice from different personalities of his time. Hence, Narasimha Rao’s foreign policy had manifold objectives but peace and democracy were the first that he cherished whole-heartedly. Of all the Prime Ministers India had, he was one of the very few who was gentle, reformist, less-secretive, less-authoritarian and a real humanist in his decision making process.

Conclusion

P. V. Narasimha Rao held the political leadership of the National Congress, and later the Indian premiership, purely by accident. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi made way for an opportunity for him to become the Indian Prime Minister in one of the most turbulent times in Indian, as well as global politics. After Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, he became the most successful Prime Minister whose intelligence and manoeuvrability kept him in power for a full tenure. He has also served as a foreign minister under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi respectively. It is interesting to note that he had a charismatic personality without the legacy of the Gandhi-Nehru family, had deep knowledge of and control over multiple languages, and had a strong affinity with a myriad of global leaders. History will remember him (as well as Manmohan Singh) for his contribution to the Indian economy. The economic reform was thus a result of the Rao-Singh (Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh) model, which not only strengthened the Indian economy but also re-shaped the Indian foreign policy by adding regional political-economic policies or principles. Narasimha Rao made a departure from the previous foreign policy mechanisms which were excessively involved in Pakistan and China. Instead, Rao moved towards South-East Asia and the European Union. The idea of peace in Narasimha Rao’s foreign policy consisted of India’s democratic values and a decentralised world view of diplomacy. Hence, Narasimha Rao’s India has championed the notion of democratic diplomacy and democratic economic reform in the world.

Chapter-VII

Vajpayee on Peace: Ideas and Practices

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Vajpayee on Peace: Ideas and Practices

The name of Atal Bihari Vajpayee is a name symbolising excellence, prominence, humanity and great leadership that remains widely acclaimed the world over. His first mandate as the Prime Minister – between 16 May and 28 May 1996 – was too short (13 days) to ascertain the foreign policy implications of this tenure. As a leader of a weak coalition government, headed by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), he was primarily engaged in the domestic politics of India. Vajpayee faced the daunting task of opening larger windows to the outside world and but at the same time, he could not leave any mark on his vision of India. Being highly influenced by the former Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, Vajpayee had set forth to complete several unfinished tasks, including most notably the second nuclear test for India. A government of thirteen days could not take this initiative; besides, it was also important to conceal it from the western superpowers, especially from the close watch of the USA. India undoubtedly needed considerable time to organise the whole nuclear programme. Observers like *Janardan Thakur* have characterised him as a magnificent person, an outstanding Prime Minister who reigned in the hearts of the nation and credited him with changing the trajectory of Indian democracy. Atal Bihari Vajpayee returned to power in March 1998, this time securing a strong mandate. His tenure started on 19 March 1998 and ended on 22 May 2004. It was not an easy task for the BJP headed by Vajpayee to form a democratic government, amidst the “power-hungry” politics of India. A coalition government was formed with 14 different parties, popularly known as National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and Vajpayee the leader of the coalition, became the Prime Minister of India. Even though within the helm of NDA, the coalition was itself marked by internal politics, however, Vajpayee still had the largest political party in the *Lok Sabha* to secure his tenure as well as political dignity. Hence, given this situation, Prime Minister Vajpayee undertook all necessary responsibilities and initiatives in terms of India and Indian foreign policy. Many scholars have argued that Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s life is essentially political (Kapur, 2009). Born in a middle-class family in Gwalior (Madhya Pradesh); he inherited various socio-political ideas from his father, an educational professional. Vajpayee graduated in Political Science and enrolled himself in the students’ movement as a young leader, and was arrested during Mahatma Gandhi’s 1942 Quit

India movement at the age of sixteen. These are the three major attributes of his early political life. He had a profound interest in national politics and nationalist movement. But what distinguished Vajpayee from other Indian leaders including the Hindu nationalist was – he was an ardent follower of the *Arya Samaj* and an active member of a well-known Hindu organization, the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS). At the age of 21, Vajpayee enrolled as a full-time worker of the RSS in 1947. He had thus forged connections with mainstream militant Hinduism, at a very young age. Vajpayee's entire political life revolved around patriotism and *Hinduist* ideas and he held an incomputable conviction that India was primarily a Hindu country. Nevertheless, Vajpayee had consciously avoided Hindu fundamentalism which was based on the political discourse of India's glorified past and glorified Hindu tradition and the Hindu way of life. Nevertheless, in sum, *Hindutva* (Hindu way of life) – defined by the veteran journalist *Girilal Jain* as “self-renewal and self-assertion by Hindus” – became Vajpayee's main source of faith (Jain, 1994, p. V). What is remarkable about Vajpayee's early political life is his consistency and courage in upholding these ideas despite them segregating him from mainstream Indian politics and at the same time alienating him from the intellectual influences that originated essentially from the left. It is primarily to Vajpayee's credit that with considerable effort, hard work and dedication he had been able to elevate his ideas from marginal status to the centre of Indian politics, which further led him to one of the highest offices in the country: that of the Prime Minister of India. It was thus a journey from marginality to centrality in politics which not only strengthened Atal Bihari Vajpayee's position in the country but also strengthened India's position in the world. One cannot ignore the ideological cycle, which began with Nehru's ideological orientation and ended with Vajpayee's monolithic Hinduism and monolithic nationalism. In other words, Nehru's idealistic principles are traceable in Vajpayee's presupposition of nationalism and especially world peace. Contemporary Indian politics can be characterised by many factors –

1. Terming of the Nehruvian brand of secularism as the secularism of minorities;
2. The identity of Hindus and their sufferings being sketched in the minds of the Indian masses;
3. Intellectualism was no longer dominated by the leftists or the secular right-wing intellectuals or the “Nehruites” as it had been experienced since independence;
4. There emerged a new way of looking at history and Indian politics. India was looking towards the ‘today’, by not undermining the ‘yesterday’ leading some intellectuals to clearly declare – “times have changed” (Shourie, 1998, p. xii). The geopolitical factor was equally important. Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ was surging in India's north-western neighbourhood – Pakistan,

Afghanistan, the Gulf region and among the newly independent Muslim Central Asian states. This factor tremendously strengthened Vajpayee's political emergence as a Hindu idealist leader of modern India. However, the most unique feature of Vajpayee's character was – his high level of tolerance, simplicity, and courage to protect India from outsiders and his courtesy to the Indian pluralist system and regard for the Indian pattern of governance.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was one of the most successful contemporary Indian Prime Ministers in terms of integrating peace, democracy, and development. He had been an active member of the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), the most well-known Hindu nationalist organization, since his early days. He was also a member of the *Hindu Mahasabha* as well as the *Jana Sangh* and the BJP in chronological order. The Hindu organization, *Jana Sangh* had broken away from the dominant organization of the *Hindu Mahasabha* and subsequently changed its name to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Therefore, there was the transition from the erstwhile *Jana Sangh* to the current BJP. However, throughout Vajpayee's tenure, his actions have deviated from his commitment to the so-called Hindu nationalist ideology and practices. However, before becoming Foreign Minister in the *Janata* Government in 1977 and Prime Minister of India in 1998 (apart from his Premiership for 13 days in 1996), Vajpayee had achieved a tremendous reputation as an excellent Hindi public speaker and as well as a good parliamentarian as a whole. He was also known to be a gentleman and a liberal person among the *Jana Sangh* and the BJP leaders. Nonetheless, many political analysts have analysed this as a mere political tactic on the part of *Sangh Parivar* comprising of the BJP, VHP, *Bajrang Dal*, etc. It was a pro-liberal mask to hide his true fundamentalist face. In any case, his public views on Pakistan, Indian Muslims, and the demolition of the *Babri Masjid* in 1992 were somehow less fundamentalist than those of any other BJP leaders. Nevertheless, until December 2000, he supported the construction of the *Ram* Temple on the site of the demolished *Babri Masjid* at *Ayodhya*, describing it as a “national aspiration” of the people of India. It is thus clear that Vajpayee was wholeheartedly committed to the election manifesto of the BJP of the 13th *Lok Sabha* Election, which included the abrogation of Article 370 regarding the special economic and political status of Kashmir, the introduction of a uniform civil code and the completion of the construction of *Ram* Temple in the land of *Ayodhya*.

Above all, the ‘short-lived liberalism’ of Vajpayee was constituted by himself, but it is important to be mindful of the fact that he was pressurised by the 24-party coalition led by him for a long time. The major security and foreign policy decisions taken by him during the

tenure of the BJP-led NDA governments were clearly influenced by the ‘ideology and policies’ of the BJP. Nonetheless, the legacy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee cannot be supplemented by the dominant ideologies and policies of the *Hindutva*-led BJP or similar types of other political parties.

Several scholars have argued that Vajpayee revealed his true colours during the incident of the Gujarat riots which killed thousands of Muslims and caused several thousand to be homeless in March-April 2000. On 12th April 2002, Vajpayee launched a serious attack on Islam and particularly Muslims, not only in India but also in the countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, while accusing them of endless religious violence. He termed all Muslims as “natural aggressors” and the Islamic religion as “aggressive”. At the same time, he tried to identify the Hindu religion as a secular religion. The Gujarat riots and their aftermath had already seriously hampered India’s international image as a secular democratic republic. The anti-Muslim speeches of Atal Bihari Vajpayee excited and nurtured the Hindu fundamentalist ideology for a while, significantly lowering India’s international status and position. However, it is equally important to rise above these criticisms and witness Vajpayee as a progressive and nation-oriented leader who served the country for a long period. He was a true founder of peace and security in the South Asian region and the status of India was glorified as a peace-loving and peace-making nation during his tenure.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Visionary

It is prudent to first take a glance at the visions and imaginations harboured by Atal Bihari Vajpayee with regard to India and the world, before undertaking a detailed investigation of his foreign policy. Vajpayee’s international involvements, such as in the NAM, OIC, and OIFP etc, are one of the best indicators of the visions he upheld. In a NAM summit in Durban, held between the 2nd and 4th of September 1998, Vajpayee undertook a modest and assertive role. Oman, one of the friendly states of the Gulf region, with Vajpayee’s active negotiation, assisted India at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), during the discussion of the Kashmir issue. Under Vajpayee’s strong leadership, India undertook two large joint ventures with Oman: Oman-India Fertiliser Project (OIFP) and the Bharat-Oman Refinery Project. Interestingly, Oman also signed a twenty-year contract, for the yearly supply of 1.2 million tons of liquefied natural gas to India. Friendship and cooperation were thus a part of Vajpayee’s visions which were reflected in India’s relations with the Gulf States. As far as the Durban NAM summit is concerned, India can be characterised to have

played a pro-active role during its course; on the raising of the Kashmir issue, Vajpayee, in his address to the summit, strongly rejected any third-party role in the Kashmir dispute, clearly asserting Jammu and Kashmir to be an integral part of India and highlighted the real problem to be stemming from cross-border terrorism and thus stood in favour of concerted action against terrorism. Furthermore, Vajpayee was in favour of convening of an international summit to formulate a joint global response against terrorism. Meanwhile, Indian politics had started to change and Atal Bihari Vajpayee also faced tremendous challenges from within the larger *Sangh Parivar*, especially from the *Swadeshi Jagran Manch* (SJM) which vehemently criticized the centre's economic policies as 'anti-people and anti-swadeshi.' The government was subjected to further criticism, for following the National Agenda of Governance rather than the BJP's own manifesto. Despite several obstacles, Vajpayee is credited with efficient management and smooth conduct of the government. In the arena of domestic politics Vajpayee had consolidated his position beyond the non-Hindi belt as well. Safeguarded by this turn in domestic politics, Vajpayee set out for the most important foreign trip of his tenure. He headed the Indian team to New York to attend the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), an occasion that was significant with regard to multiple issues and engagements. This UNGA meeting provided the perfect platform to make the world understand that Vajpayee's New India is efficiently going through with the nuclear tests (Sinha, 2020). Vajpayee delivered two valuable speeches, one at the UNGA and the other at the Asia Society, where he addressed the respective US strategic communities. It is noteworthy to say that, the UNGA speech had been delivered in Hindi; however, his speech at the Asia Society got tremendous attention. Vajpayee here managed to drop his intellectual bombshell when he said that India and the US were natural allies. This was followed by various meetings with leaders ranging from Nawaz Sharif to Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as with important US advocacy groups like the B'nai B'rith and especially with the Indian diaspora. It is noteworthy to say that, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was assisted and accompanied by an outstanding support team- Jaswant Singh, Brajesh Mishra, and Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath. For Vajpayee, Paris was the next stop, where he attended productive meetings with the then Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and with President Jacques Chirac, followed by a supper invitation at the Elysée Palace. France had been extremely supportive in the immediate aftermath of India's nuclear tests and silently assisted India by limiting the western sanctions on her. Vajpayee also met a group of French Ideologists and scholars and was really astonished by their scholastic endeavour that did not

include the use of the English language. India faced several sanctions due to her denial of western regulations on nuclear tests; and it affected Indian initiatives like – non-resident Indians (NRIs) and the Resurgent India Bonds (RIB). The government desperately needed these types of resurgence schemes for the upliftment of the Indian economy. It is not easy to understand the long range of duties and responsibilities of a Prime Minister, Vajpayee was similarly, actively involved in a manifold of responsibilities. Atal Bihari Vajpayee had to face the bloodshed and insurgencies in Assam that seriously threatened the peace and stability of the state. Assam is a big state geographically as well as politically and acts as a gatekeeper to the other states in the region. Vajpayee was made aware of the situation in the state by the state's governor, Lt Gen S. K. Sinha, right at the beginning of his tenure. Here we see a number of insurgencies by armed insurgents especially the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and by the *Bodo* groups who had cross-border sanctuaries in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, etc. The Bhutanese government finally agreed to take action against the insurgencies; in December 1998, the Bhutan Army started operations with the help of the Indian Armed Forces against ULFA and *Bodo* rebels in the north eastern hills and forests of southern Bhutan. Nevertheless, Bangladesh had also started pressurising the insurgent camps in its territory. Vajpayee's visions regarding any serious crisis facing India whether internal or external were attached with kindness, humanity and peace. In other words, he was a true Indian or *Bharatiya*, whose India was based on humanist ideals or embedded in the values of classical India. Vajpayee had a dream of *Bharatbarsia Samaj*.

Foreign Policy and Nuclear Power: The Significance of Pokhran II Nuclear Tests in the Vajpayee Era

Vajpayee's first and finest foreign policy act was his dramatic decision to formulate and implement a series of nuclear explosions between the 11th and 13th of May 1998. The explosions were conducted in an air of high secrecy, so much so that no country (especially the west) had been able to detect the preparation measures of the operations; even the US spy satellite monitoring system could not manage to detect the operations. This was a dream project for Vajpayee and he was confident of the ability of the Indian technical team to give fruition to the same. He had been involved in the unfinished works of India's two great premiers-Indira Gandhi and P. V. Narasimha Rao. In fact, Vajpayee had started the work exactly where Narasimha Rao had ended. It is mentioned worthy that, there were differences between the Indian and foreign experts regarding the technical perfectibility of the nuclear

explosion; the real fact is that India was going to declare that it was now undoubtedly a nuclear power. These tests were highly appreciated and completely approved by the Indians. The pride Indians shared is noted from the fact that eighty per cent of them appreciated and supported the tests. These tests placed Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in a high position. In the initial stage, Europe and the US admired the fact that India had developed the capacity of conducting tests of such magnitude, but on the other end Pakistan and China had hypocritically attacked India while it was determinedly becoming a nuclear power. It is noteworthy that, while the three neighbours were on the path of becoming a nuclear power – China was most advanced, India in the middle, and Pakistan third, the fact is that the region had been invaded by nuclearization. The most talked about nuclear game was now visible in the relationships between the three neighbours. China being the most developed among the three, had the capacity of striking India without deterrence. India had to protect herself in this nuclear game with the Chinese, by producing more nuclear warheads and arms especially missiles capable of perfectly targeting the Chinese territories. The relations with Pakistan in this regard were worse, and before the onset of nuclearization, India was far more superior in conventional arms and undoubtedly possessed the capacity to defeat Pakistan militarily. Nevertheless, after 1998, when Pakistan became a strong nuclear power, India lost its superiority and capacity to effectively defeat Pakistan due to the new status of Pakistan as a nuclear-capable state (Kapur, 2009). However, the nuclear capacity had secured a superior status for India in the South Asian nuclear game and India possessed it for a long time. In the next part, I shall focus on the historical background of the Pokhran II nuclear test in the Vajpayee era.

The legacy of nuclear tests in India has its own historic background directly linked with Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru had said in 1946: “India will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). The Pokhran II nuclear tests conducted by the Government of India in May 1998 under the Premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, however, did not constitute either a departure from or an innovation with regard to the nuclear policy of earlier governments. The first nuclear explosion at Pokhran had been conducted during the premiership of Mrs Indira Gandhi. It was termed the Pokhran I nuclear tests. Since then, the Government of India had kept the nuclear question open and had refused to sign either the NPT or the CTBT. It has been recorded by the Kargil Review Committee Report that India had followed the policy of nuclear weaponization since 1983

(Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). On 27th May 1998, during the second session of the Twelfth Lok Sabha, Atal Bihari Vajpayee presented a paper to the house which was titled “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy”. Here, Vajpayee argued, “In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, freedom of thought and action.

We rejected the cold war paradigm and chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. Our leaders also realised that a nuclear-weapon-free world would enhance not only India’s security but also the security of all nations. That is why disarmament was and continues to be a major plank of our foreign policy.” Vajpayee further asserted, that India always looked forward to and showed leadership in calling for an end to nuclear proliferation. He pointed out while addressing the *Lok Sabha* on 2nd April 1954, that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had clearly stated, “nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction.” Nehru had called for the complete prohibition of all kinds of testing of nuclear weapons.

Expressing the proper reason behind the refusal to sign the NPT, Vajpayee stated- “In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries. India put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was not accepted. In the 1960s, our security concerns were dependent on other nations. The country sought security guarantees but the countries we turned to were unable to extend to us the expected assurances. As a result, we make it clear that we would not be able to sign the NPT” (Lok Sabha Debates, 1998).

Rajiv Gandhi had advised several times in favour of keeping the nuclear option open. It was necessary for the benefit of the entire Indian nation. Although no such active programme for the proper development of nuclear weapons had been adopted, few short-term preparations were being undertaken in the direction of manufacturing a set of nuclear arsenals and their deployment as per necessity. The Kargil Review Committee Report shows that Indira Gandhi had ordered a nuclear explosion in 1983, which was abandoned under the tremendous pressure of the USA. Following that, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao ordered a nuclear explosion in 1995, which was also aborted under similar US pressure. In both situations, the US had gained prior information about the proposed tests. In 1996 Atal Bihari

Vajpayee, during the course of his 13 days premiership, had planned to carry out a nuclear explosion. The plans were however cancelled after his government fell (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). What Vajpayee aimed to achieve immediately after coming to power in 1998 was to establish India's nuclear capability prominently and to project India as a nuclear power in the arena of international relations. It had been decided by the Vajpayee government that nuclear weapons should be kept in stock for future recourse, but the timing of the explosions can be attributed to Vajpayee himself. However, credit for being able to evade the satellite surveillance by the CIA belongs to the Indian scientists associated with the nuclear explosions.

The Pokhran II explosions did not violate international law or any kind of specific international agreement, since India was a signatory of neither the NPT nor the CTBT. It was a question of both political expediency and diplomatic strategy. Nonetheless, it led to adverse international reactions and sanctions upon the Indian nation during the entire period. From one perspective, Pokhran II can be viewed as a total defiance of the existing nuclear powers and a symbol of 'counter-hegemonic resistance' from the view of Indian defence and nuclear policy. All of this can be credited to the Vajpayee government. From the standpoint of the Indian diplomatic initiative, the Vajpayee era was significant in the direction of the radical improvement of Indo-US relations. It represented the opening up of the country, almost unconditionally, to foreign transnational corporations, while stating that it was not India's main objective to pose counter-hegemonic resistance through the Pokhran II nuclear explosions.

Vajpayee asserted in the Parliament, "India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek: nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of humankind. Our strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons of self-defence, but to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race" (Lok Sabha Debates, 1998). It is indeed true that, since Independence, India has never been involved in the arms race. Pokhran II nuclear tests were mainly an application of the BJP Government's programme of boosting India's security capability and making India a major political power in Asia and beyond. Therefore, it was the projection and presentation of India's military power through strong propaganda by the Government of India. It is true that

the Government of India was trying to display India's power base to send a signal to her immediate neighbours like Pakistan as well as to project India's military power to the world. At the same time, it was also can be seen as an attempt to foreshadow the *Hindutva* ideology and Hindu national power and strength in the contemporary world. It is true that, in ordering the Pokhran II nuclear explosions, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was being obedient to the BJP ideology and the Hindu nationalist cause in Indian politics and external relations.

The Vajpayee Regime and Non-Military Confidence-Building Measure

The year 1998 was crucial for the whole nation, as it marked the emergence of India as a nuclear power after the successful completion of the nuclear experiments. Furthermore, the entry of India into the club of nuclear states aggravated the existing tensions between India and Pakistan. The peace and security of the Indian subcontinent primarily depended on how India and Pakistan dealt with their conflictual relationship. Since the development of nuclear power in India and Pakistan, the South Asian region stood on the brink of a potential nuclear threat. The heightened nuclearization further complicated this hostile relationship. Many scholars have argued that the nuclear developments turned the South Asian region into a more volatile subcontinent and the relations between India and Pakistan become more critical and complicated. Amidst the climate of tension, suspicion and potential nuclear explosions, both India and Pakistan realised the need for steps to reach a middle ground and establish mutual cooperation. In this given situation, Premiership was granted to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and he prominently led India in world affairs. Although Vajpayee had been highly responsible for Pokhran II nuclear experiments, from 1999 onwards, the government implemented a bunch of peace initiatives or, in other words, non-military confidence-building measures. The following part will lay emphasis on these same.

Delhi-Lahore Bus Diplomacy- The Delhi-Lahore bus service was a passenger bus service between India and Pakistan connecting the Indian capital city of Delhi and the city of Lahore in Pakistan. It had been a hopeful start towards a new peaceful trajectory between the two nations. Many scholars have argued that the bus service between India and Pakistan, initiated to enhance communication was first agreed upon during the significant meeting held between the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in New York in September 1998, (Kumar, 1999). On the inauguration of the said service on February 19, 1999, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee had undertaken a historical and landmark visit to Pakistan. Vajpayee was the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Pakistan

following Rajeev Gandhi in 1989. However, Jawaharlal Nehru had been the first ever Prime Minister to have visited Lahore in 1951 (Maggsi, 1999).

The Lahore bus diplomacy contributed to containing the tension between India and Pakistan that had arisen due to the nuclear experiments initiated by both countries in 1998. It further facilitated the reconciliation of the segregated families of both India and Pakistan and economic and cultural connectivity across the borders. Economic and cultural cooperation strengthened the relationship between the people of the two conflictual and hostile nations. The commencement of the Delhi-Lahore bus service and Vajpayee's visit reinforced mutual cultural understanding. Many eminent persons from the fields of film, art, culture, and sports accompanied Vajpayee, such as *Shatrughan Sinha, Mallika Sarabhai, Arun Shourie, Satish Gujral, Javed Akhtar, Kuldip Nayar* and *Kapil Dev*. Through bus diplomacy, the bilateral peace terms had been achieved and the trust between India and Pakistan had been reconstituted. It had additionally also contributed to enhanced trade, commerce and economy and this journey continued even in the unwanted circumstances of the Kargil outbreak. However, the Government of India decided to halt the service as a part of diplomatic measures in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Parliament in Delhi. On July 11, 2003, the bus service was resumed by the Government of India as a peace initiative adopted by Vajpayee. In accordance with the optimistic vision, Vajpayee did not see war as an option, mutual cooperation seemed to be the finest means to retain peace between India and Pakistan. The Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy can be considered a sign of the desired friendship and negotiations between the two countries. The bus service and the required development in the field of cooperation and composite dialogues constituted a new era in the relationship between India and Pakistan. In the given situation, the role of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was quite significant as he was the key architect of peace between the two nations.

India's bilateral relations with larger parts of South Asia (excluding Pakistan) were a continuation of policies already constituted by the previous governments. However, the difference lay in the fact that Vajpayee was more open in his declarations and was stricter in his attitude towards India-South Asia relations. Vajpayee had strongly defended Bhutan against infiltration by militants from India's north-east region, made it clear to Bangladesh that his government will not support the Bangladeshi infiltrations into Indian territory, and at the same time made it clear to the Sri Lankan government that India will not intervene in the Jaffna crisis. Nevertheless, from the very beginning of his tenure as Prime Minister, the focal

point of Vajpayee's diplomatic endeavour was Pakistan, so much so that it appeared in certain instances to be greater than that of his predecessors. Pakistan was quite doubtful of the new BJP-led Indian government, which in their understanding had never recognised the partition of 1947 and the consequent establishment of the state of Pakistan. There was thus an emergence of a perception of a security threat emanating from and being felt by both sides. The situation had become more serious in South Asia when these two neighbours effectively garnered nuclear power and gradually took a serious turn, so much so that the US leadership had convinced itself that South Asia had now become the most dangerous place on earth. Nevertheless, in Vajpayee's estimation, there was the on-going expansion of Islamic fundamentalism which can only be restricted through the cooperation between the secular forces and it was highly embodied by Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. As an Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee made it clear at the beginning of his mandate that, it was time to renew the dialogue and interactions at the higher political levels between the two countries and this represented the Indian tradition of consensus to which he was committed (Sondhi & Nanda, 1999, p. 113). The dialogue process between the two countries took place at different levels, the most dramatic incident of which was Vajpayee's landmark visit to Lahore in February 1999 on an inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore-Delhi bus service. The visit had been reported in Pakistan's leading newspaper, *The News*, as synonymous with the fall of the Berlin wall. Besides, it was the first visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan in the last ten years. 21st February 1999, marked a historic moment when the two, now nuclear power nations signed three agreements at a time. The three agreements were namely – The Lahore Declaration, The Joint Statement, and the Memorandum of Understanding which had already been agreed upon by I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif. The novelty of this signing included a bunch of nuclear agreements that were signed as well, such as – (a) to “engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines,” (b) to aware each other in advance especially on the ballistic missile flight tests, (c) to take cooperative measures in the reduction of “the risks of accidental and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons,” and (d) to mutually abide “by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting nuclear tests” (Kapur, 2009, p. 376). The agreements having been signed in a formal way, the suspicion which had hitherto marked the relations between these nations, become stagnant. However, with the rigid attitude and fixed positions of the two countries remaining unchanged no such agreement could be reached with regard to the Kashmir issue. Nevertheless, the relations between the two nations further soured following the attack on the

Indian Parliament on 13th December 2001 – an attack that led to a 90-minute gun battle in which 7 police personnel were killed and many on-duty policemen and civilians were seriously injured. The planning of the attack was so intricate that both the Indian intelligence and security forces were unaware of any preliminary information regarding the same. Tensions escalated, so much so that the top Indian diplomats were retracted; and subsequently, the countries withdrew themselves from the South Asian summit meeting scheduled to be held on 4th January 2001. The Indo-Pak relations thus detracted from where they had initially been marked by tensions, threats, misunderstanding and conflicts, etc. However, relations were subsequently resumed, the ice thawed and the Indo-Pakistan dialogue was reopened following a meeting in Islamabad between Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In this entire case, Vajpayee's contribution is commendable.

Lahore Declaration-The Lahore Declaration, a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on February 21, 1999, by the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the conclusion of the historic Lahore summit, was the first major bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan since the *Simla Agreement* of 1972. However, the Pokhran II nuclear tests generated a negative international opinion of India. The US and its allies, including countries like Japan, imposed huge economic sanctions on the country. The blatant nuclear proliferation was the main concern for all the countries. There was a possibility of a nuclear war in the region of South Asia, particularly in the context of the Kashmir dispute. The UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1172, dated 6th June 1998, condemned the nuclear explosions by the two rival states. There was a special and specific reference to Kashmir in the UN Security Council resolution. The Security Council urged both India and Pakistan to continue negotiations on all security issues and reach mutually acceptable solutions that addressed the root cause of all conflicts, including the Kashmir issue. The resolution also urged both India and Pakistan to sign the NPT and CTBT immediately and unconditionally. The P5 (The permanent members of the UN Security Council) Foreign Ministers urged both India and Pakistan, on 24th September 1998, to hold discussions to address their serious bilateral disputes to implement “comprehensively and without delay all the provisions of Resolution No. 1172” (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 279). The P5 Foreign Ministers also expressed their will “to assist India and Pakistan in a manner acceptable to both sides in promoting reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful resolution of their differences, including Kashmir”

(Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 279). However, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) sided with Pakistan and explained that the Pakistani nuclear tests were a response to those of India.

There was tremendous international pressure on both India and Pakistan to resume progressive dialogue on all outstanding security concerns, including Kashmir. A scholar has argued, that “moreover, after having demonstrated his commitment to the qualitative enhancement of India’s military strength through the Pokhran II tests, there was now an opportunity for Vajpayee to project a liberal image for himself for the benefit of both domestic public opinion and the international community” (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 280).

The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Sharif met on 29th July in Colombo and again on 23rd September in New York. A joint statement was issued after the bilateral meeting on 23rd September which emphasised the need for a “peaceful settlement of the outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir” and for creating “an environment for durable peace and security” (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 280). The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad in October to consolidate this declaration, and their discussions included disputed matters of the Jammu and Kashmir region. The bilateral talk was held again in the month of November which included a wide range of security issues as well as discussions on socio-economic cooperation between the two nations. The prime moment arrived when, in February 1999, Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus at the invitation of Nawaz Sharif. There, the Lahore Declaration was signed by the two Prime Ministers on 21st February 1999. Both nations agreed to intensify their will and efforts to solve all outstanding disputed issues, including that of Jammu and Kashmir and condemned all forms of terrorism. The Lahore Declaration also reiterated the basic commitment of both nations to the *Simla* Agreement in letter and spirit. The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met again in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on 22nd March 1999, and reconstituted their firm commitment to the Lahore Declaration. However, with Pakistan not deviating from its one-point agenda in Kashmir the significance of the Lahore Declaration in terms of India-Pakistan relations and nuclear equations in the region, remained limited. Moreover, there was a lack of composite and integrated dialogue inclusive of the Jammu and Kashmir issue. There was thus no progress in the relationship between the two countries, including their diplomatic position on the significant Kashmir question.

The Pokhran II nuclear explosions and the significant Lahore Declaration clearly signify Vajpayee's distinctive personality traits. He fulfilled his commitment to the BJP ideology by ordering nuclear explosions in Pokhran. Then, in order to evade the creation of antagonism with the Western powers, particularly the US, and to construct a liberal image within his country and abroad, he visited Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration which was a matter of great fanfare. However, Vajpayee never deviated from the BJP's stand on Jammu and Kashmir.

The Agra Summit- Following the nuclear explosions by both India and Pakistan in 1998, there was huge pragmatic pressure on both states to start a new bilateral dialogue on all significant disputes between them, including the Kashmir dispute. The pressure increased tremendously in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict. The US played a significant role in the context of the disputed relationship between India and Pakistan. During the initial months of 2001, a group of senior Indian and Pakistani diplomats visited Washington separately and discussed bilateral issues with their counterparts in the US State department. As a result of these circumstances, the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee invited the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, the contemporary head of the military regime of Pakistan, to visit India in May 2001, for the summit talks, and the latter accepted the invitation. General Musharraf's visit to India took place between the 14th and 16th of July. The final Vajpayee-Musharraf summit took place on the 16th of July in Agra. The Indian media, highly encouraged by the Vajpayee government, organised 'hyper-publicity' for the Agra Summit and created an atmosphere of high expectation and enthusiasm in the whole country. However, there was a sharp disagreement between the two countries and two governments on all serious matters, so the summit gained nothing and ended in almost total failure.

Vajpayee had wished to discuss the whole range of issues concerning India– Pakistan relations, including the cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, India-Pakistan trade issues, cultural exchange, visa regulations, confidence-building measures, and, most importantly, the overarching Kashmir issue. However, General Musharraf, who had appointed himself President of Pakistan on the eve of his India visit, had steadfastly refused to discuss all the important issues except the "core issue" of Kashmir. Hence, the important issues from the Indian point of view were ignored. General Musharraf had further rejected India's major concern of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and explained the terrorist activities in Kashmir as the "freedom struggle" of the indigenous people of the region. The disagreement between

India and Pakistan was so acute that even a joint communiqué was not issued at the end of the fruitless summit and the Pakistani delegation, headed by General Musharraf, left Agra in disappointment shortly after midnight. However, the Pakistani President used the electronic media in Agra to make an aggressive international projection of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and returned to Pakistan as something of a national hero despite his fruitless political legitimacy as a military ruler. Prime Minister Vajpayee and his advisers, on the other hand, were criticized for being ill-treated by the Pakistani President, both in terms of diplomacy and media management.

The negative outcome of the Agra Summit was not exactly unexpected. As a matter of fact, in the given situation, the Indo-Pakistan rivalry was nearly inevitable, ideologically, and practically. The state of Pakistan was composed of a military dictatorship, a fundamentalist education system and a politically powerful theocracy and was also based on the ISI and a fruitless, unrealistic leadership. The whole country had submerged into servile bureaucracy and an equally servile media. It was so strong that without any kind of propaganda of anti-India rhetoric or liberation of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would submerge into deep fundamentalism (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). For Atal Bihari Vajpayee also, it would have been impossible to neglect the Hindu fundamentalist ideology within his own party and its historical rivalry with Pakistan. It was very difficult for Vajpayee to make any decision on Kashmir, in order to placate the US, despite the pro-capitalist and pro-American gestures and direction of the foreign policy of the Vajpayee regime. Hence, there was no reason for both India and Pakistan to expect the Agra Summit to be fruitful and successful in terms of the foreign policy perspective. It should be noted however, that both Atal Bihari Vajpayee and General Musharraf gained some type of mileage and achieved a new milestone in their respective domestic politics from the summit. General Musharraf, who had been disregarded by all political parties in Pakistan on the eve of the summit, gained national as well as international political legitimacy and leadership after the Agra Summit. In India, on the other hand, Vajpayee succeeded in satisfying both the USA and his own political party regarding the Agra Summit. Vajpayee was trying to create an impression of satisfactory performance in international relations amidst almost a total failure in all spheres both on the international and domestic levels.

There is evidence to show that the Agra Summit had been organised by both India and Pakistan exclusively succumbing to the relentless pressures from the US diplomatic clout and

other external loci. Vajpayee's heartiest invitation to General Musharraf had been preceded by a high-level tripartite consultation in the US. Before his visit to India, General Musharraf had declared that Vajpayee had invited him under US pressure, although he withdrew his statement later, presumably under the advice of the US. Further, the date of the Agra Summit had been announced by the US State Department before India or Pakistan. There was an agenda which included international drug trafficking, which was more of an American concern than an Indo-Pakistani one. The American media reported after the summit that none of the three draft declarations had been agreed upon by both parties. Only one draft had been proposed by both India and Pakistan. Furthermore, it was speculated that the third draft was of US origin (Mulkani, 2001). From the point of view of the making of India's foreign policy, the organization of the Agra Summit was clearly conditioned by Hindu nationalism and pro-Americanism which was the fundamental characteristic of the style of leadership of Prime Minister Vajpayee and his BJP party advisers. Vajpayee had his own will about the dialogue process with General Musharraf, but it had been foredoomed due to his apparent surrender to the US strategy in South Asia. On the other hand, his unwillingness to compromise with the Pakistani demands during the Agra Summit was finally dictated by his ideological and political commitments.

Unilateral Ceasefire in Kashmir- Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, announced the reversal policy with regards to Pakistan after the two-year deadlock situation following the failure of the Agra Summit and the terrorist attack came to an end followed by India's special peace initiative in 2003. The political situation between India and Pakistan after the Agra Summit was catapulting towards a conflictual, warlike situation. The Indian armed forces were alerted to be prepared for any extreme situation on short notice. However, the crisis was weakened after the US intervention, especially when American President George W. Bush sent his Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Armitage to India and Pakistan. Many scholars have argued that Richard Armitage was successful in acquiring the commitment from General Musharraf that Pakistan would stop cross-border infiltration permanently, which was the primary concern for India. In response to that, India showed readiness for the partial withdrawal of its forces from the border areas and the Arabian Sea. The situation was such that "The High Commissioners would be assigned again, over-flight would be permitted, road and rail communication would be revived, cricket would be allowed and dialogue would be resumed" (Gul, 2007, p. 57). As a part of the peace initiative, India tried to take a conscious effort and adopt a 'step by step' approach towards Pakistan to bring their

external relations back to normal. A prominent scholar has pointed out, that “in consonance with this spirit, Prime Minister Vajpayee extended a hand of friendship to Pakistan at a public rally in Srinagar on 18 April 2003” (Shukla, 2008, p. 904). On 28th April 2003, Vajpayee had a conversation with his Pakistani counterpart *Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali*, where they discussed the importance of a conducive atmosphere between India and Pakistan before taking up a discussion of any significant and critical issue. Vajpayee further suggested that economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and human communication would construct a favourable platform for India and Pakistan to discuss conflictual issues. A scholar has pointed out, “this led to the Lahore-Delhi bus service, high-level exchanges at the level of parliamentarians, businessmen, media, artists, writers, judges, peace activist, sporting contacts and others; free medical treatment to 20 Pakistani children; release of prisoners and fishermen on both sides and increase of the strength of High Commissioners” (Shukla, 2008, p. 905). This multilevel engagement would transform into mutual trust and confidence measures and generate a positive response from the people of India and Pakistan. From the very outset, the Indian administration was cautious about the people of both India and Pakistan having a friendly and stable relationship. Thus, the peace initiative taken by India reflected India’s responsibility towards the wishes and enthusiasm of the common people.

On 22nd October 2003, India declared further steps to encourage communication in bilateral sporting encounters such as cricket, permission for the senior citizens to cross *Wagha* on foot and organize visa camps in different cities to benefit the people, increasing the Delhi-Lahore bus services, establishment of the link between the coast guard and authorities, refraining from arresting of boatmen and fishermen on the other side of the sea, provision of free medical treatment to a second group of 20 Pakistani children, resumption of passengers’ shipping service between Mumbai and Karachi, the commencement of bus service between *Srinagar* and *Muzaffarbad*, a bus or rail link between *Munabao* in India and *Khokrapur* in Pakistan and the increase in the jurisdiction of the respective high commissioners (Shukla, 2008).

On 23rd November 2003, Pakistan responded positively to the Indian peace initiative and gave a ceasefire order to its armed forces along the Line of Control during the festival of Ramadan. On 19th November 2003, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that Indian troops would stop all kinds of actions against the Kashmiri separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir during the Islamic month of Ramadan. While the military remained always alert of

any attack, the combat operations were suspended as of 28th October 2003. In the background of the ceasefire, the Indian government maintained cultural and political contacts with various stakeholders. Backchannel communication between the members of the National Security Advisory Board and the representative of the Kashmiri dissident group continued despite the failure of the effort at a dialogue earlier in July. As part of further development in external relations, the Pakistani President showed an optimistic stand towards India's approach to placating relations by inviting the Indian Foreign Secretaries for mutual conversation in September 2003. On 19th November 2003, Vajpayee announced a ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir and ordered the Indian armed forces to stop all kinds of offensive actions in the board areas. Later, on 2nd December 2003, Pakistan further declared that its armed forces would exercise "maximum restraint" along the border areas of the two countries. The attitude of the Indian government was very positive; it tried hard even during unfavourable conditions to maintain peace in the India-Pakistan border region. Vajpayee expressed his willingness to extend the ceasefire beyond Ramadan if it brings any positive outcome for the two countries, on 4th December 2003. The ceasefire was subsequently extended thrice by the Indian government to encourage further negotiations. However, even though it was a political decision, the ceasefire agreement created an impact of cultural goodwill on the people of both countries. The decision of the Government of India to stop military actions during the holy month of Ramadan had a great impact on Muslims. The people of both countries appreciated the decisions with great hopes that the ceasefire would solve the border-related issues albeit not immediately. Hence, the ceasefire agreement was successful both politically and culturally towards maintaining the stability of India-Pakistan relations.

Towards India's New Peace Proposal- In this section, we will focus on India's new peace proposal in terms of military and non-military actions. India was trying to reunite and expand contacts between the two nations after five decades of endless conflict. In this situation, the Indian Prime Minister was quite concerned about the new peace proposal between the two countries. As part of India's peace initiatives, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf responded to the Indian proposal of 12 confidence-building measures. Both India and Pakistan agreed to each other's proposal and made some important suggestions and changes respectively. A meeting was held between the two presidents on the side-line of the SAARC summit in Islamabad on 6th January 2004. The two leaders agreed to proceed further with the process of normalization and were concerned about composite dialogue. The foreign

secretaries held two rounds of talks on December 27 and 28, 2004, respectively and all the past differences between India and Pakistan were transformed into constituting warm relations.

India proposed numerous CBMs (confidence-building measures) which are given below:

1. Resumption of talks to restore civil aviation links;
2. Resumption of rail links following aviation links;
3. Issuance of visas in cities outside the two countries' national capitals to shorten travel formalities;
4. Permission to individuals aged at least 65 years to cross into India on foot. Previously only groups could walk across, while individuals had to board the bus;
5. Initiation of more buses in New Delhi-Lahore routes than now operate;
6. Establishment of links between two countries' coastguards, before and after the fishing season;
7. Preventing arrest of each other's fishermen within certain sea areas;
8. Provision of free medical treatment to 20 Pakistani children in India;
9. Increase of the staff of their respective embassies;
10. A ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi;
11. Provision of new bus/railway services, one between *Srinagar* and *Muzaffarbad*, the other between *Khakrapur* in *Sindh* and *Munabao* in *Rajasthan* (Gul, 2008).

The proposed confidence-building measures (CBMs) were furnished by humanitarian and people-centric approaches. The re-opening of transportation facilities at the borders for the common people above 65 years of age and the easing of visa restrictions was marked as a major political breakthrough having a significant impact on the conflictual relationship between India and Pakistan. It contributed to the long-term relations between the people. The significant feature of the CBMs was that they emphasized the emotions of the common people, facilitating trans-border relationships. It enabled the movement of the people across

the borders of India and Pakistan by the way of trust and cooperation which they had achieved. The CBMs realized the interests of the people of India and Pakistan and resumed sports between the two countries, especially cricket – the common point of interest of both the Indian and the Pakistani population, and contributed to a phase of unity for the diversified nations.

Composite Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Challenges and Obstacles in the Way of Peace

India-Pakistan relations, since their inception as sovereign states, had been passing through testing times, to which the Vajpayee era was not an exception. These two neighbouring ‘nuclear’ states have failed to resolve issues that pose to be real obstacles in the path of normalizing mutual relations. Both countries, steadfastly holding on to their respective positions, failed to cash upon any of the opportunities of building trust and amicable relations that crossed their path. The result was harsh for both countries; families lost their loved ones on the border and battlefields and civilians have submerged in hatred and communal mistrust. Both sides continue to blame each other for the failure of talks which has further affected the cultural, economic and sports ties. The intensity of the rivalry was so much so that sports events between the two countries usually turned into battles of national pride and national courage, this is noticeable, especially in the case of cricket and hockey tournaments. However, the situation changed with a decision to go beyond their conventional forms of understanding and negotiation in 1997, when India and Pakistan agreed to a “Composite Dialogue” instead of issue-based negotiations. This new path of understanding has met with both failures and achievements. It is noteworthy to say that, instead of learning from the past, these two neighbours try to move on; their initiatives were based on bold decisions but their disputes remain unresolved. The China factor has further complicated Indo-Pakistan understanding, the responsibility of which can be completely attributed to Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy was never in a strong position, thus pushing the country to rely more on China as an economic partner in every sphere; but the actions of China have irritated India and the Indian leadership openly criticized Chinese investment in Pakistan. India was suspicious of the Pakistan-China economic agreements and consider it a threat to the Indian economy and territorial security. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his government were not exceptions to this, although Vajpayee undertook many significant initiatives. Since 1997 India and Pakistan were engaged in issue-based dialogues and discussions. Since 1950 India

and Pakistan achieved a number of successes, including – the Nehru-Liaqat pact, signed between India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan in 1950, the Indus Water Treaty under the aegis of World Bank was signed in 1960, the two countries further made an agreement to exchange information regarding nuclear weapons in 1988 and on the Kashmir dispute issue-based discussions were held in 1954, 1963 and 1972 (Akhtar, 2015). Nevertheless, India wanted satisfactory measures from Pakistan especially on terrorism before taking up other issues, although Nawaz Sharif clarified that Pakistan was in favour of a dialogue that is comprehensive even if not "composite" (Akhtar, 2015). While India was focusing on a single issue like terrorism, it enhanced the scope of rethinking Pakistan's single issue, Kashmir (Pal, 2014). It had led to the thawing of the ice and made reaching a sense of compromise possible in that while India agreed to introduce Kashmir in the agenda for talks, Pakistan agreed too to include terrorism. In fact, these two issues were the major irritants in the Indo-Pak bilateral relations. It is mention worthy that the first round of composite dialogue was held in 1998, which however collapsed shortly, due to the war in the Kargil sector in 1999. In the same year, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif undertook a positive initiative to enhance the relationship with India and to establish peace between the two nations. He invited Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore, where the two leaders signed the famous Lahore Declaration. The declaration emphasized the peaceful settlement of all bilateral conflicts, but at the same time there were many antagonistic forces in Pakistan, especially the military; and soon after a new conflict had arisen, namely the Kargil War. Later, serious disputes between the army and civilian leadership unfurled, resulting in a military uprising. Contrary to their controversial image, the Pakistani Army tried to improve relations with India whenever they got back to power. Pakistan's Army was now trying to shift away from providing direct 'support' to the insurgents since the days of Pakistan-backed armed insurgency in Kashmir in 1989 (Hussain, 2007). India and Pakistan shared a conflictual relationship since their birth with the partition of India in 1947 (Wolpert, 2010). Undoubtedly partition-related violence and cruelties still dominated the memories of the people of both countries. Another important aspect of Indo-Pak relations was the question of identity rather than territory. Pakistan feared the re-absorption of the separate Islamic Pakistani identity within a greater national identity of India and not merely a military defeat by the latter. It is prudent to be mindful of the fact that, Pakistan did not just fear physical threats from India, but psychological ones too; this fear is rooted to an extent that it influences every aspect of Pakistan's national security and foreign

policies (Pande, 2011). Apart from these historical and sentimental reasons, there are many rational-theoretical reasons as well, which have essentially hindered the two neighbours from resolving their bilateral conflicts. From a theoretical standpoint, inter-state negotiations pass through four stages (Misra, 2010) –

1. Ripeness of the Dispute: In the absence of ripeness (where there is an existing stalemate), negotiations can only generate disappointments for both sides, which may cause further disputes.
2. Pre-negotiation: Pre-negotiations have two basic purposes – defining the problem and making a commitment for negotiations. Finally, it creates a third stage for the parties – arranging for the negotiations.
3. Negotiation: In this case, the disputed parties negotiate and discuss all possible aspects of the disputes on the basis of the information gathered in the previous stage of pre-negotiation.
4. Agreement: After the successful negotiations the parties will finally reach at the fourth stage, i.e., the signing of the agreement. Nevertheless, the negotiations may also end without reaching a successful agreement; in this situation, the parties will wait for future developments.

From these theoretical analyses, it can be stated that negotiators from India and Pakistan though have arrived at the last stage of negotiation but could not move further to complete the process or failed due to hindrances caused by rigid stakeholders. Nevertheless, there are also deep-seated problems traceable in their (both India and Pakistan) methods of engagement as well.

The Kargil Crisis, with Special Emphasis on Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the Vajpayee era was deeply influenced and impacted by the outbreak of the Kargil crisis. Large-scale Pakistani intrusions were identified by the Indian army and intelligence agencies in May 1999. This was followed by swift military measures by the Indian forces, which led to the eviction of the intruders from the Indian side of the Line of Control by the month of July 1999. There was strong evidence in favour of the fact that the majority of the intruders consisted of mostly Pakistani soldiers. The Indian forces restricted

Pakistan's military operations on the Indian side of the Line of Control and took the further precaution to avoid the escalation of the limited military operation into a general war. After the initial stage of uncertainty, international opinion also turned against Pakistan. The then US President Bill Clinton put pressure on Nawaz Sharif to withdraw all Pakistani intruders beyond the Line of Control. A joint US-Pakistan communique was signed by Nawaz Sharif in Washington, where they agreed upon such withdrawal. At any cost, the Pakistani army was convincingly defeated by the Indian forces. On 16th July 1999, Pakistan announced the withdrawal of its forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. Operation Vijay, as it was called, was claimed to be a great achievement both for the Indian armed forces and for the Vajpayee Government. It was thus a great moment for both having achieved this victory.

It is prudent to be mindful that Pakistan had prepared for the military operation in the Kargil region as far back as the 1980s, although it had not been put into the application then. From 1987 onwards, Pakistan achieved nuclear capability and started to build its anti-Indian strategy on the assumption that nuclear deterrence would prevent India from responding to the type of Pakistani armed operation as witnessed in Kargil, with counter-warfare. In the early 1990s, Pakistan was attempting to consider the possibility of internationalising the Kashmir issue with urgency, in order to use fundamentalist Islamic forces in its domestic politics through a Kargil-type military operation. General Musharraf, with the direct approval of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, launched the Kargil operation as early as February 1999. The original Pakistani armed forces were in occupation of the principal mountain ridges on the Indian side of the Line of Control by April 1999. However, the total failure of political assessment as well as the Indian intelligence was responsible for India's unpreparedness for the Pakistani intrusions in Kargil. Nevertheless, it turned into a diplomatic success for Vajpayee, who could not avoid his responsibility as the Indian Prime Minister. It should be remembered that when Vajpayee was in Lahore (Pakistan), signing the Lahore Declaration, with the Indian media generating an officially sponsored positivity, the Pakistani troops had already infiltrated Kargil and had been occupying military positions inside the Indian territory. When the Foreign Ministers of the two states (India and Pakistan) met in Colombo in March to reaffirm the spirit of the Lahore Declaration, the Pakistani troops were in suitable military positions, deep within the Indian territory of Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan was trying to capture a major part of the Indian territory with the help of its powerful military. Prime Minister Vajpayee and his small group of decision-makers had been completely deceived by their Pakistani counterparts on the Kargil issue. Although the Lahore process cannot be

directly linked with the absence of political and military surveillance vis-à-vis the Kargil issue, a direct link between the two has not been ruled out by the Kargil Review Committee which stated- “The Committee has not come across any assessment at the operational level that would justify the conclusion that the Lahore summit had caused the Indian decision-makers to lower their guard. This has been confirmed by the discussions the Committee had with a number of concerned officials. Nonetheless, there was euphoria in some political quarters, among leaders in and out of office, though some others saw serious pitfalls in the Lahore process” (Kargil Review Committee Report, 1999). Hence, the Kargil incident highly influenced both the Prime Minister and the entire foreign policy administration for a long time.

Vajpayee Era and India’s Relations with the US

The Indo-US relations can be regarded as a significant element of Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s foreign policy regime. The previously noted, ideology of the BJP, was completely in tune with the capitalist economic system. However, it is also significant to remember that the BJP’s political ideology was far different from the Western liberal and secular democracy. Therefore, Vajpayee, as the Prime Minister of the BJP Coalition Government in 1998 and the BJP-led NDA Government since 1999, followed a widespread policy of reform and liberalisation designed to remove all vestiges of the public sector in India, which would open India’s domestic doors to private foreign investment. The BJP was an ideological contrast to all forms of socialism, thus seen as a strategic enemy of the socialist states and a natural ally to all the capitalist states including the USA. In light of this ideological stance, it was natural for Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a BJP Prime Minister, to work exclusively for a qualitative and nonlinear improvement of Indo-US relations in all areas. The process of dismantling the public sector and returning to capitalism in India, as well as the continual development of a pro-American foreign policy, became distinctive characteristics of the Vajpayee government. The US, on its own part, welcomed the opening of the Indian economy to foreign private capital. Particularly, the US multinational companies eagerly grabbed this opportunity to capture the larger part of the Indian market, where the middle-class population was larger than the entire population of the US. The Indo-US alliance was initiated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and was marked by President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000. Moreover, Vajpayee’s visit to the US in September 2000 made the Indo-US relationship stronger. However, apart from enabling the US multinational corporations to enter the Indian economy,

and transition the Indian economy into capitalism, Vajpayee's new diplomacy did not entail any immediate, concrete gain for India. The economic sanctions imposed by the US on India after the Pokhran II explosion remained in the same place and the US pressure on India for signing the NPT and the CTBT continued.

Significantly, the US did not support India's demand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. There were widespread allegations, both inside and outside the Indian Parliament, because of Vajpayee's decision to allow the PMO, particularly the strategic policy group created by him within it, to be used by big Indian business houses and a few Western governments for controlling India's domestic as well as foreign economic policy and trying to convert India into a "banana republic" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p.286). This situation marked a basic contradiction between the *swadeshi* ideology of the *Sangh Parivar* and its commitment to the economic ideology of India's liberalisation and globalisation. Pro-Americanism and capitalist globalisation dominated the *swadeshi* ideology under the premiership of Vajpayee. This is the actual reason for the occasional criticism of Vajpayee by the RSS which was strongly committed to *swadeshi* or national economic self-reliance. In the context of Vajpayee's personality and his commitment to the BJP's ideology, it seemed very unlikely that globalisation and the US hegemony would have been replaced by *swadeshi* in the near future.

During his visit to the US, in September 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee was able to project the extreme Hindu nationalist ideology of the BJP to the US administration and the larger part of the US population. He procured the services of a Hindu priest from a Hindu temple in the US and prayed with Vedic mantras before his address to the joint session of the US Congress. This was unprecedented in the history of the US Congress. Very significantly, at a meeting organised by the Indo-American community on Station Island in New York on 10th September 2000, Vajpayee declared that he would remain a *Swayamsevak* (RSS member and active volunteer) all his life, irrespective of whether he was the Prime Minister of India. Responding to the demands of the BJP's active supporters, who had spoken before him demanding the construction of the *Ram Temple* at *Ayodhya* and the abrogation of Article 370 regarding the Kashmir issue, Vajpayee declared, "We will create an India of our dreams if the people give us a two-thirds majority" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 287). Nonetheless, the primary aim of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was to construct an Indian nation which will be dependent on the two-thirds majority of the population.

With the new US nuclear doctrine requiring the abandonment of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the announcement of the national missile defence system in April 2001, the Foreign Minister of the Vajpayee government immediately declared India's strong support in its favour. India was the first state to unconditionally support this new US nuclear doctrine. However, within a few days, Russia, China, and the European Union expressed serious reactions towards it. This action unconvincingly represented a turning point in India's foreign policy and constituted an unmistakable mark on India's newly acquired trust in the US. It was criticised by the opposition and other political parties in India. This situation could be explained only in the terms of the pronounced ideological and strategic pro-Americanism of the foreign policy of the Vajpayee government. In an editorial appropriately titled "Yes, Mr. Bush", the *Hindustan Times* commented on this turnaround in Indian foreign policy: "The uncritical Indian response to George W. Bush's proposal on a missile shield has underlined the distance which New Delhi has travelled in the last few years. While formulating India's response to the missile shield the decision makers might have kept in mind the fact that keeping the US in good humour cannot be the cornerstone of our foreign policy... In the midst of the widespread misgivings that have been expressed [even by strategic allies of the USA]. India's strangely submissive attitude stands out all the more prominently" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 287). Very significantly, an article titled "America Rules, okay?" stated, "Before Pokhran II India's attitude towards the 'discriminatory' nuclear order was to stay away from it... But now it has gone over to the other extreme of hailing the NMD to curry favour with the US... Because of the Vajpayee government's craven stance, India will be seen to have demeaned itself as never before" (Ganguly, 2001).

For a couple of months in 2001, India was trying earnestly to develop a "strategic partnership" with the US. In April that year (2001), *Jaswant Singh*, Foreign Minister as well as Defence Minister, held discussions with the US Deputy Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Washington. This meeting was followed by the visit of General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, USA, to New Delhi in July 2001. The Indian ambassador to the US *Lalit Mansingh*, held serious discussions with the top branch of the US command for the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas in Hawaii in August 2001. In these months, wide-ranging discussions on defence and security took place at the highest bureaucratic levels between the two states. Admiral Dennis Blair, the top commander of the US forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and General William Bogart visited India in the latter half of

2001 to continue the “strategic partnership” dialogue which was indicative of the decisive pro-American turn of India’s foreign and defence policies under the Vajpayee government.

India’s policy towards “America’s new war”, the “first war of the twentieth century” against terrorism, also appeared to have been a continuation of the nearly blind pro-Americanism of the Vajpayee government. Suddenly, the US declared its undefined war against unidentified terrorists and states, engaging them immediately after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11th September 2001. The Indian Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and Cabinet Minister declared their strong support for this American war against terrorism and offered the use of India’s air space, air force bases, intelligence, and logistical support to the US. Admiral *Vishnu Bhagawat*, Former Chief of Naval Staff, rightly expressed that Foreign Minister *Jaswant Singh* had almost implored the US to use the Indian Air Force bases and logistical support. The US administration had suspected Osama Bin Laden and Afghanistan, without any strong evidence, to have been involved in the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. But the US did not respond positively towards the Indo-American partnership in the “war against terrorism” for at least two reasons.

First, unlike Pakistan, India did not share a common border with Afghanistan, and hence India’s participation in the “war against terrorism” would be of limited use to the US. Secondly, the involvement of Pakistan was necessary as a frontline state to win the war against Afghanistan and the Taliban regime; therefore, this naturally limited India’s involvement in this case. Nonetheless, as a reward for the Indian and Pakistani support of the US “war against terrorism”, the Bush administration completely lifted the sanctions imposed earlier for their nuclear explosions of 1998 on 22nd September 2001. The reason given by American President Bush was that the sanctions were not consistent with the “natural security interests” of the US. It is important to be mindful of the fact that while the sanctions had only a marginal impact on the Indian economy, Pakistan suffered a heavy economic backlash from the sanctions and benefited more from this announcement of President Bush. Pakistan’s tottering economy received an immediate lifeline through the rescheduling of its debt by the USA and the Club of Paris. Moreover, in this situation, the path was clear for an economic transformation at the behest of the IMF and the World Bank.

The Vajpayee government hoped to gain strategic support and assistance for combating Pakistan and ending the Pakistan-aided terrorism in Kashmir from the US

administration, but it later appeared that India was living in a fool's paradise. The US was not ready to assist India strategically or militarily. It was difficult to expect that the US would antagonise Pakistan which was its traditional strategic partner in South and West Asia or agree to reduce its actual and potential power in order to befriend India, with which it had a historically difficult and conflicted relationship. Pakistan had always worked as a strategic partner of the US in West Asia, along with Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and its strategic significance for the US had increased greatly during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. Even after the end of the cold war, Pakistan remained its significant geostrategic partner in the West Asian region. The "war against terrorism" highlighted and further emphasised Pakistan's importance as a strategic ally of the US. In this said geopolitical context, it was only the Hindu nationalist and West-oriented foreign policy of the Vajpayee government that expressed unsolicited and nearly blind support to the US-sponsored "war against terrorism" in the West Asian region. There were no such rational policy options to support the concerted global action against terrorism everywhere in the world under the strong leadership of the UN. Instead, there was a private and undefined war of coalition led by the US against unidentified enemies across the world. Since the early 1950s, India had tried to neutralise the global grand strategies of the US and Soviet Union through its own global grand strategy of resistance, namely nonalignment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US started to pursue its global grand strategy more prominently than ever before. It was a prime necessity for India, in the context of the changing international scenario, to develop a new counter-global grand strategy of its own in order to safeguard its sovereignty and security. It was also necessary for India to reconstruct its foreign policy in the light of the new unipolar international system. There was a need for a rational choice to be made in the direction of organizing and actualising a Third World movement for the democratisation of the UN. Under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India appeared to have become wholly subservient to the global grand strategy of the US. It can be stated that perhaps nothing illustrates a major change in Indian foreign policy better than the Vajpayee Government's passive acquiescence to the Israeli military occupation of Palestine, whose cause India had supported earlier. India had passively supported the virtual imprisonment and humiliation of the undisputed leader Yasser Arafat following a close negotiation with the US in April 2002 (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). The discussion above can be summed up by highlighting that the Vajpayee era was never very successful in terms of Indo-US relations. Rather there was a serious deterioration of the Indo-US alliance during the premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The US President Bill Clinton was not so kind to India and the US Congress too denounced India on several occasions, so much so that Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee undertook repressive actions against India and made an unusual statement that the Indian action now “clearly constitute (d) an emerging threat to the territory of the US” (Kapur, 2009). Nevertheless, the Indians were expecting a healthy relationship with the Americans and thus prepared themselves for it. The US business groups and the US Congress were quite sympathetic to Vajpayee’s India, especially with regard to the continuing sanctions imposed upon India due to her denial of the western stance on nuclear tests. Atal Bihari Vajpayee personally sent letters to the 177 heads of American states and especially to President Clinton, where he clearly indicated the Chinese installation of nuclear weapons on Indian borders and Pakistan’s increasing nuclear threats to India (Kapur, 2009). The Indians thus presupposed their nuclear doctrine which in the eyes of the US was a doctrine of warmongers. It (nuclear doctrine) developed a policy of enhancement and deployment of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles, and sea-based weapons capable of nuclear power. India could not satisfy Washington regarding her policy of “minimum credible deterrence” which is in stark contrast to the “mutual assured destruction”. Indian furthermore disagreed with Washington’s strategic evaluation that the Indian subcontinent had become the most dangerous place in the world; the Clinton administration was further going to allow China to act as a mediator between India and Pakistan. The US frustration with regard to India’s inclusion in CTBT led them to offer a World Bank loan of 210 million dollars for the construction of several power plants in Andhra Pradesh; but in turn, India was expected to hold her patience and wait for further erosion of support on sanctions in the US Congress and the G-7. This unique decision on foreign policy has made Atal Bihari Vajpayee a legendary leader of India and his ideas have also influenced other South Asian nations. Interestingly this new India had been perfectly sketched by Strobe Talbot in a pioneering work - *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb*. It is noteworthy to highlight the two major ramifications of Indian nuclearization on the US policies and strategies. The first was the erosion of support for US sanctions. On 13 July 1998, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs formally requested the US congress to withdraw all kinds of sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan. A second ramification included the US accord to discuss the matters of security informally and watchfully. However, in September 1997, the then US President Clinton in a meeting with the then Prime Minister *I.K. Gujral* agreed to launch a comprehensive and sustained dialogue between India and the US,

especially on the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation; but on the other hand, Vajpayee raised the whole issue of security. In March 2000, the US President visited India and Vajpayee returned the visit in September 2000 which certainly changed and improved the relations between the two nations. It is to be mentioned that these visits have hardly borne any beneficial effect on Indo-US relations. It can thus be noted that India was trying to construct a new peace policy mindful of her previous constructive role in world peace.

Interrogating Russia: A New Phase of Indo-Russian Relations

The Vajpayee era witnessed a new Russia which was a complete departure from the earlier Soviet Union. From the very outset, India held a lesser interest in the new Russian Federation under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. The Indian diplomatic focus had rather shifted to the USA and Western Europe, but nevertheless, India aimed to commence a new journey of friendship with the Russian Federation highlighting her previous amicable relationship with the USSR. In the Vajpayee era, Indo-Russian relations were confined to the arms trade and maintaining minimal economic relations with the Russian Federation. During the late 1990s, India had grown severely dependent on Moscow for her arms requirements and the markets of both countries were useful for their mutual economic sustainability. Economic interest and arms security transcended as the main sectors on which Vajpayee and Yeltsin generated a commendable tie. However, with time the Yeltsin administration grew more critical of India and the Russian leader ceased to support India on the Kashmir dispute and strongly criticised New Delhi for not signing the CTBT. The Russian criticism was so strong that, they condemned India for nuclear tests, supported Pakistan-sponsored UN resolution of making South Asia a nuclear free-zone, and began to rethink Russian plans of exporting the Russian-made VVER-1000 nuclear power warheads (reactors) to India (Kapur, 2009). The situation worsened when India discovered that Yeltsin was taking a critical position on various issues under the pressure from US President Clinton. It was also suspected that the US President approached the Russian President to withdraw from the Indo-Russian ballistic missile deal and attack the Indian administration, particularly on the issue of nuclear tests. Russian President Yeltsin had also accepted a proposal of the US President Clinton that, the two countries, along with China, should cooperate to constitute a “joint approach” to resolve the problem of India and Pakistan (Kapur, 2009). Russia and USA can be said to have aimed to persuade the two South Asian rivals namely India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and resume the peace process in Kashmir. With the downfall of the Yeltsin regime and the emergence of

Vladimir Putin as the new President of the Russian Federation, Russian foreign policy rapidly started to change in favour of India. In December 2002, Russian President Putin officially visited India and a series of agreements were signed, including the Delhi Declaration on further consolidation of strategic partnership, the Joint Declaration on Strengthening and Expanding Scientific, Economic and Technological Cooperation and the agreement on combating terrorism. This new trend of negotiations was continued during Vajpayee's visit to Russia in 2003. Hence, Indo-Russian relations had once again gained momentum though not at the same level as witnessed during the Soviet era.

Relations with China

Atal Bihari Vajpayee exhibited a rather conservationist stance in his policy towards China, unlike in the avenues of his state policy. During his tenure, China continued to remain a major adversary of India. The Chinese occupation of Tibet; its strategic partnership with Pakistan; the Chinese anti-Indian stance in world affairs and India's humiliating defeat in the 1962 military conflict had concocted a gloomy picture of the country in the mind of Vajpayee. His landmark visit to Beijing in 1979, as Morarji Desai's Foreign Minister, had remained formal and inexpressive. Vajpayee's decisions to conduct nuclear tests have primarily affected India-China relations in an adverse manner. In his deliberation with US President Clinton on nuclear issues, he clearly attributed them to the threats emanating from China and Pakistan. Additionally, the adverse remarks made by the Defence Minister, George Fernandes highlighting that 'China was India's principal threat', further problematized the Sino-Indian relations. The two countries however tried to get rid of their long rivalry and period of tensions; while realising that the zone of South Asia should be free from conflicts and hatred. Besides both India and China were trying to enhance the process of normalisation as was inaugurated by Indira Gandhi. As a part of this process, China mapped the Line of Actual Control of the middle sector of the Indo-China border and worked towards its implementation, which had been long overdue. The economic relations had also strengthened with India-China trade going up to 4 billion dollars and raising hopes of it soon reaching the 10 billion mark. The normalisation had further been strengthened by the mutual visits of dignitaries. The said visits were initiated in May 2000 by the Indian President K.R. Narayanan whom the Chinese government considered a "friend of China", a designation given only to those very close to the latter. The Chinese had in fact conferred on him the status from the days when he visited China as an Ambassador of Indira Gandhi. The two

Chinese premiers, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji visited India in January 2001 and January 2002 respectively and their visits further aided the process of normalization and mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes' week-long visit in April 2003, at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart General Cao Gangchuan was productive for both countries. It is worth mentioning that, the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee held between 22 and 27 June 2003, was an important one in this direction as it led to several agreements including – an agreement to set up the Joint Study Group (JSG) composed of officials and economists. They further agreed that the two neighbours would determine *Chengdu* in Sikkim and *Renqinggang* in Tibet as the Indian and Chinese venues for the expansion of border trade. It is remarkable that despite the myriad of differences the relations between India and China gradually improved with these visits.

The Foreign Policy Administration of the Vajpayee Era

Atal Bihari Vajpayee harboured great experience in foreign policy administration since his days as the Minister of External Affairs in the Morarji Desai Cabinet for more than two years during 1977-1979. However, since 1998, post his becoming the Prime Minister with majority support in the *Lok Sabha*, he had the complete authority to exercise his own power in foreign policy administration. He used this authority to neutralize the democratic institutions of decision-making in foreign policy, including the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs), NSC (National Security Council), CCPA (Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs) and the Cabinet itself. There was a concentration of power of decision-making in the hands of two of his close party men and personal confidants, *Jaswant Singh* and *Brajesh Mishra*.

Jaswant Singh served as the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission before being appointed as the Minister for External Affairs in the NDA Government in 1999. He had lost in the election to the *Lok Sabha* and could not become a member of either house of Parliament. However, he played a leading role in post-Pokhran diplomacy in the response to Prime Minister Vajpayee. In particular, he held a series of meetings with the US Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State in complete secrecy. Neither Parliament nor the MEA was taken into confidence on the matter and agenda of these series of talks. The leftist parties in the Parliament alleged that *Jaswant Singh* had secretly committed India to sign the CTBT. After the talks ended, Madeline Albright, US Secretary of State, announced publicly that India had agreed to sign the CTBT. However, *Singh* denied this. It is doubtful whether *Jaswant Singh* played a decisive role in the post-Pokhran Indian diplomacy. Above all, he

had no official responsibility for the foreign policy of India. In the entire process, *Singh* had effectively avoided the MEA, the Foreign Secretary of India and the other democratic institutions that were entirely responsible for decision-making in the Indian foreign policy arena.

Brajesh Mishra was appointed by Vajpayee as both Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and the National Security Adviser and was allowed by him to positively formulate and implement India's foreign and security policies. Not only did *Mishra* visit several foreign states including France, the UK, and South Africa on diplomatic missions, but he also appeared as the principal spokesperson of India's post-Pokhran foreign and security policy before the national and international media. In this situation, the official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Foreign Secretary, CCS, NSC, CCPA and the Cabinet were side-lined and kept in the dark. The *Asian Age* highlighted this undemocratic personalisation of decision-making in the realm of Indian foreign policy when it stated in September 1998, "Backroom diplomacy has come to dominate India's Foreign Policy after the Pokhran blasts, with all key negotiations being handled now by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. *Mr. Jaswant Singh*, and *Mr. Brajesh Mishra*, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, who have emerged as the government's de facto Foreign Ministers" (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 292).

The same trend continued after October 1999. Vajpayee regained Premiership and *Jaswant Singh* became Minister for External Affairs for the first time. Suddenly, the democratic institutions of decision-making in foreign policy were further downgraded. Even the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, was kept in darkness in the decision-making process regarding foreign and security policies (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). Even the NSC (National Security Council) was not allowed to meet. *K. Subrahmanyam*, Chairman of the National Security Advisory Committee, commented on 29th October 2000 that the Prime Minister of India and his immediate advisers were responsible for the "casual approach" to the domain of national security in particular. It was also expressed that the NSC should remain only on paper. *K. Subrahmanyam* further criticized the joint functioning of the Principal Secretary with the Prime Minister and the National Security Adviser in the same person (*Asian Age*, 2000).

Nevertheless, the same trend of personalized rather than institutionalized decision-making remained dominant in the domain of Indian foreign policy. For instance, the MEA

and the Foreign Secretary were hardly visible before, during or in the aftermath of the Agra Summit of July 2001. It can also be stated that there was neither a well-structured agenda nor any strong diplomatic preparation for the summit with the active involvement of the MEA, which was otherwise a normal practice in the conduct of Indian diplomacy. *Brajesh Mishra*, *Jaswant Singh* and other BJP activists and confidants of the Prime Minister dominated the entire summit, but the Foreign Secretary was completely absent from the picture. The MEA was engaged only in the rare and cursory briefing of the media by its official spokesperson.

The outcome of the summit could have been more positive, with at least a joint communique being issued at the end of it, if the Foreign Secretary and the other concerned officials of the MEA had been actively involved in the preparations for the summit. Nonetheless, on the occasion of the “war against terrorism” in the last few months of 2001, it went against the line advocated by *Brajesh Mishra* who had structured India’s international diplomacy, especially in Russia, West Europe and the US. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary and the MEA played a marginal role. It appears that the Vajpayee government wanted to keep the ideology and the strategy of its foreign policy under the strong control of the confidants of the BJP, and in this situation, the institutional process of democratic decision-making of foreign policy was grossly side-lined.

There is only one explanation of such concentration of decision-making powers in the two personal spheres of the Prime Minister and the deliberate downgrading of the democratic institutions of decision-making. Prime Minister Vajpayee was determined to not allow any dilution in the sphere of the foreign policy vision of the BJP, including the presentation of the Hindu nationalist ideology and its power, the purposeful commitment to the capitalist ideology and the unfinished pursuit of pro-Americanism. Within the structural sphere of the 23-party coalition government, the decisional inputs from the MEA, CCS, NSC, CCPA and the Cabinet would certainly have cast some form of influence on Vajpayee. With regard to the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, Vajpayee was under some pressure from the RSS to remove him from the defence portfolio, as he did not belong to the BJP, was not a Hindu, had a socialist background and did not necessarily toe the American line. While the compulsions of the coalition politics prevented Vajpayee from denying the defence portfolio to George Fernandes, he strongly responded to the RSS pressure by keeping him out of the decision-making process in the foreign policy arena until Fernandes resigned as Defence Minister in

April 2001 after the *Tehelka* tape corruption case (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). The judicial inquiry was onto him, but he was side-lined in the making of the Indian foreign policy.

Brajesh Mishra was the only adviser for both foreign policy and national security, through whom the Vajpayee government was trying to implement its Hindu nationalism and pro-American foreign policy. There was another adviser in the MEA, *Arun Singh*, who was once Minister of State for Defence in the Rajiv Gandhi government, and had subsequently offered his loyalty and services to the BJP-led Vajpayee government and was inducted into power as an Officer on Special Duty during the Kargil war. *Arun Singh* was subsequently made an Adviser in the MEA with the rank of a Minister of State, again with endless power and functions and doubtful constitutional status. He also became a close confidant of the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of India and exercised considerable influence over decision-making in foreign policy during the Vajpayee era. He was reported to be the “Big Boss without excessive constitutional sanction but with limited access to state secrets” in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). The two Ministers of State for External Affairs, *U. V. Krishnamaraju* and *Omar Abdullah*, were primarily obliged to take orders from *Arun Singh* who played a key role in the decision-making process regarding important foreign policy issues since his induction into the MEA as an adviser. In an uproar in the Parliament in August 2001 against his unconstitutional status, Foreign Minister *Jaswant Singh* replied that *Arun Singh* had been cleared by the intelligence security of India and had signed the Official Secrets Act (Hindustan Times, 2000).

Nonetheless, another significant example of the attempt of the Vajpayee government to push for a Hindu nationalist and pro-American agenda in Indian foreign policy was the appointment of *B. K. Agnihotri* as the Adviser at the Indian Embassy in Washington with the personal rank of Ambassador to the USA. This extraordinary appointment was made in August 2001 amidst strong opposition, not only from the opposition parties in the Parliament but also from the MEA itself. *B. K. Agnihotri* was a strong *sarsanghchalak* (organizer and leader) of the RSS in the US as well as an active member of the friends of BJP in the country itself. His unusual and unprecedented appointment led to grave consequences for the future of Indian foreign policy and administration. It not only led to the induction of two ambassadors in the same country with an undefined mutual relationship and segregation of power, but it also clearly and definitely intended to reinforce the Hindu nationalist and pro-American foreign policy initiatives of the Vajpayee government.

The Vajpayee government appointed numerous advisers with doubtful and limited constitutional sanctions. As Former Foreign Secretary, *J. N. Dixit*, argued, “The BJP-led coalition government seems to be in need of a lot of personnel in addition to the institutional manpower resources available to it to function efficiently. The External Affairs Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the Finance Ministry and even the Prime Minister’s office has a larger number of advisers compared to the previous governments of India over the last 50 years” (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 294). Now, so far as the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence were concerned, these administrative advisers had been inducted primarily to push the Hindu nationalist and pro-American foreign and security policies of the Vajpayee government by way of side-lining the institutionalised and democratic process of decision making, which was significantly related to political ideology itself.

Following the terrorist attack in the US on 11th September 2001, and the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th December 2001, the NSC and the MEA were separated from each other and excluded from the decision-making process in the arena of Indian foreign policy. The other security organisations met on a few occasions especially to decide on the deployment of the Indian armed forces near the Line of Control in Kashmir and other places near the Indo-Pak border and pursue a policy of endless antagonism with Pakistan in line with the Hindu nationalist ideology of the BJP. Above all, the normal institutional process of decision-making in Indian foreign policy continued to be side-lined. The MEA had lost its democratic and legitimate role in the making of the Indian foreign policy and continued to be used for safeguarding the interests of the BJP while trying to promote the BJP ideology abroad. For example, the MEA made a diplomatic announcement against the Government of Pakistan against the latter’s strong criticism of Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s anti-Muslim speech on 12th April 2002 in Goa, which he had delivered purely (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970) in his capacity as a party leader at an important meeting of the BJP’s National Executive Committee (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970). However, rising above these negative characteristics, it can be stated that Atal Bihari Vajpayee was a great leader of modern India. He was quite successful in uplifting himself beyond the clutches of Hindu nationalism. Moreover, he succeeded in maintaining peace and stability not only in the South Asian region but also the world over. Nevertheless, the decision-making processes of the Vajpayee era had indeed become diffused and decentralised. Atal Bihari Vajpayee made foreign policy making more ‘institutionalised’ by appointing a Foreign Minister, by restructuring the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office); the most important of which was the

establishment of a three-tier National Security Council (NSC) composed of a strong inner Council, headed by the Prime Minister, a Secretariat led by experienced bureaucrats and a strong Advisory Board. The scope of foreign policy making was thus enormous and Vajpayee has used these institutions very efficiently. The Prime Minister has acted as a decision-maker and policy maker; thereby making the decision-making process more sophisticated and progressive (as far as Vajpayee's idea of world peace is concerned) than the earlier Indian premiers. Besides, there were obvious political pressures both from his party, the BJP and extreme right-wing organization, the RSS, which he could not 'ignore.' Vajpayee was nevertheless, aware of the fact that he had to project himself as a moderate leader, which according to him was the prerequisite for his survival as a Prime Minister. As far as Vajpayee's affinity is concerned, his Principal Secretary and National Security Adviser *Brajesh Mishra* were very close to him and all diplomatic matters usually passed through his office before they arrived at his table of Vajpayee. The second person was *Jaswant Singh*, the Foreign Minister of Vajpayee's administration. *Mr. Singh* played a key role to clarify the Indian and American positions separately in the aftermath of India's nuclear explosion. The third person was the Foreign Secretary of the Vajpayee era, *Lalit Mansingh*, who regularly interacted with the Prime Minister on many technical matters of foreign policy. The uniqueness of his (Vajpayee's) foreign policy was to pass the concerned matters to the cabinet Subcommittee, especially when they were 'delicate'. For instance, when the USA was pressurising Vajpayee to collaborate in Iraq, Vajpayee referred it to the Cabinet Sub Committee, whose response was negative, obviously underlining his own decision (Kapur, 2009). It is noteworthy that, the Vajpayee era marked the beginning of a new Indian foreign policy, where on the one hand we can trace the presence of indigenous values while on the other a resemblance to the characteristics of the West as well.

Conclusion

Atal Bihari Vajpayee's operational policies as Prime Minister were wholly based on his vision of India and in this, he followed the footsteps of his predecessors. He was a modern man with classical values, which led many to rank him at par with Jawaharlal Nehru. India's domestic politics and the communal legacy of his party went to affect his thought process and policies, but his inner strength acted as a shield against any of these influencing him to a great extent. His majestic personality attracted many contemporary foreign premiers and continued to do so after his death. He never compromised with sectarian politics, casteism, superstition

and communalism. He was a man of peace and humanism and earned high respect from his opposition. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to understand him owing to the absence of a systematic articulation of his beliefs. There is no such scholastic endeavour to study his life and his politics or his foreign policy in a categorical manner. Nevertheless, N. M. Ghatate's pioneering work – *Four Decades in Parliament* and *Decisive Days* has analysed the ideas of Vajpayee in a wide manner. These works are based on Vajpayee's speeches in Parliament and presented by the author thematically and systematically. Looking beyond foreign policy leads attention to his approaches to economic reforms. The first of which was the inauguration of the National Highways Development Project (NHDP) and the second was to introduce changes in the telecommunications services, making them available for all. As far as Vajpayee's world views are concerned, he was a liberal Indian but held beliefs that were different from the classical ideas of Western Liberalism as defined by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. Western secularism arose in reaction to the church's domination over a social life, but in India secularism meant equal respect for all faiths. This very difference comes out clearly from Vajpayee's writings, speeches, and actions. The *Ramcharitmanas* of Goswami Tulsidas had a profound impact on him, and he usually referred to them as his main source of inspiration. However, Indian epics, folklore, patriotic legends and heroic tales dominated his reading list. Especially, Jaishankar Prasad's *Kamayani*, Mahadevi Verma's novels, Sachchidananda Vatsyayan's *Shekhar: Ek Jeevani* and Jaganath Prasad's *Pratap Pratigya* had been the most favourite readings of Vajpayee. However, Vajpayee was truly faithful to the Indian culture and heritage and had a conviction that politics destroyed mental peace, affection, and compassion. He has tried to attach love and humanity through devotional politics which can only be found in Indian ancient traditions. Undoubtedly his foreign policy has also been embedded in these traditions.

Conclusion

Conclusion

The concluding part of the thesis will try to draw out the overall assessment of the discussion. In each chapter, there is an investigation regarding India's role in world peace that has been executed through its foreign policy. The study sets out to investigate which regime in India had constituted what type of foreign policy in the broader context of world peace. In the first chapter, there is an overall analysis of the ideas of peace constituted by both Indian and Western schools of thought. In the Indian context, three pioneers of peace - M. K. Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghosh and Dr. Radhakrishnan have been pivotal in this discussion. On the other hand, the key thinkers of Western school include- Voltaire, Immanuel Kant and Count Leo Tolstoy. Alongside the many differences between the two schools of thought, they both unite in the emphasis upon the 'value of peace in the human world'. From the second chapter onward, these ideas are located in the broader context of India's foreign policy. Each chapter focusses on a particular Prime Minister's regime and an examination of its foreign policy. The chapter on Jawaharlal Nehru has focused on India's appeal to the world regarding disarmament and non-alignment. Nehru tried to constitute a non-aligned foreign policy with visible components of peace and stability. The following chapter on Indira Gandhi looks at the ideas of pragmatism along with the internal and external stability of India. Indira Gandhi's foreign policy was very much pragmatic in nature and was a departure from the Nehruvian model of an 'idealist foreign policy.' The chapter on Rajiv Gandhi has tried to delineate a foreign policy where peace and democracy will exist with equally importance. In the chapter on Narasimha Rao, multiple issues have been raised, such as the interconnections between capitalism, democracy, and peace. From the beginning of his tenure Narasimha Rao has tried to strengthen the external security of India, without violating the principle of peace. P. V. Narasimha Rao was exceptional in the manifestations of foreign policy; and it is essential to note that he has equally used the three principles- capitalism, democracy and peace to make a grand policy on world peace. And finally, in the chapter on Vajpayee, India's new approach towards external relations and its success has been categorically raised. In conclusion, we try to fall back to the initial research questions raised and what answers have we gathered.

The research questions are –

- 1. How central is peace as a foreign policy objective in India ?**
- 2. What are the principle contributions of India in addressing the scope of peace in world politics ?**
- 3. How consistent is India's commitment to peace ?**

Research Question-1

- 1. How central is peace as a foreign policy objective in India?**

The idea of peace as a central question has been longitudinally analysed through the different eras of India's foreign policy. In addressing this question, we have focused on the significant eras (from Jawaharlal Nehru to Atal Bihari Vajpayee) of the last 75 years of the Indian state. Each and every era is primarily based on certain value-based principles. Peace is one of the significant principles, which is consistently present across the timeline that has been examined. First, we will begin with the Nehru era. In the Nehru era, there is an inherent link between foreign policy and peace. Peace was a central issue in the foreign policy objectives. In his external affairs with different countries, Nehru has emphasised upon tolerance, peace and brotherhood. In the issues concerning Kashmir Tibet and Goa, Nehru has taken different strategies but never derailed from the principle of peace and brotherhood. During this phase, India was taking a leading and pioneering role in the nonalignment movement in the world. In the Cold War era, India has never been derailed from the standpoint of non-alignment and nonviolence. India's foreign policy was guided by principles of peace, especially in the issues of Vietnam crisis, Suez Canal issue, Hungary issue and Congo crisis. Hence, Nehru was first prime minister of India who has enshrined India as a peace-loving nation through its post-independence foreign policy.

In the Indira Gandhi era, peace was a central issue in the foreign policy objectives. From the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971, we can identify India's quest for international peace and cooperation. The foreign policy towards Bangladesh at the time of liberation movement also proves India's strong inclination for peace and stability in the neighbourhood. Not only Bangladesh, but Indira Gandhi's also foreign policy in South Asia mainly constitutes a strong

appeal for peace and harmony. Hence, the foreign policy in the Indira Gandhi era has never been derailed from the principle of peace and cooperation.

Similarly, foreign policy during Rajiv Gandhi's era was very much interconnected with the notions of peace, democracy, and cooperation. During this phase, both America and Russia were friendly states to India. India was in search for a strong nuclear weaponisation, but it did not want to violate global peace. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi gave speeches at the United Nations regarding complete nuclear disarmament. However, India was threatened from China on many occasions, but it did not go to a war with Beijing. Although Rajiv Gandhi's policy towards Sri Lanka was quite controversial; but nevertheless, India always tried to maintain peace as a component in its policy. In his tenure, Rajiv Gandhi has successfully maintained peace, friendship and cooperation in the South Asian region and in the wider world. Besides, this era will be remembered for the progressive role played by Rajiv Gandhi against race-hatred and race-violence in Southern Africa.

The Narasimha Rao era was also significant in terms of peace and global cooperation. Narasimha Rao achieved premiership when the global order was transforming rapidly. The world was transforming from bipolarity to unipolarity, especially in the context of the end of the Cold War. The Narasimha Rao era was significant for a strong commitment towards global peace and security. In this phase, India managed to avoid the trap and provocation of global power conflict among the western nations. India abided with the ideology of a peaceful world order. In the context of domestic politics, Narasimha Rao was very much keen to constitute a welfarist Indian state. Domestically and internationally, Narasimha Rao was trying to reinterpret the Nehruvian legacies in the newer contexts. While Nehru was an idealist, Narasimha Rao was a statesman of realistic policies with idealist roots. Peace and global stability were central themes in Narasimha Rao's foreign policy. In the context of world peace, India was successful in managing the Western world and non-Western world in forging a cooperative and peaceful foreign policy towards each other. In his neighbourhood policy, Rao inherited a new policy, such as the 'look east'. The Narasimha Rao era was significant in terms of 'look east' and 'look west policy'. Hence, he was quite successful in maintaining peaceful foreign policy not only towards the neighbours but beyond as well. In case of nuclear weapons, Narasimha Rao was a statesman of peaceful nuclear armamentation for India and the world too. India has never used the nuclear power to blackmail the other nations. It is noteworthy to say that, like Jawaharlal Nehru, P. V.

Narasimha Rao was also a social and economic reformer; and his main objective was to make India economically strong enough to hold a policy of world peace in a conflicted world. Hence, in Narasimha Rao era, the idea of peace was a central theme in India's foreign policy.

The Atal Bihari Vajpayee era was also marked by peace, cooperation, and friendly neighbourhood relations. The foreign policy in the Vajpayee era was very much interlinked with the policy of peace and cooperation, especially with the neighbouring countries like Pakistan and China. In the Vajpayee era, Pokhran II nuclear tests were conducted and the aim of the nuclear tests were to protect India from external threats. It was not to threaten any country, neither to dismantle the world order. The main objective of the Pokhran II nuclear tests was to make a counterbalance against the hegemony of China and Pakistan in the South Asian region. The 1988 Pokhran II nuclear tests was the extension work of the earlier Narasimha Rao government. Pokhran II tests can be viewed as a total defiance of the existing nuclear regime and a symbol of 'counter hegemonic resistance' from the India. Nonetheless, the Vajpayee era was very much successful to constitute peace and cooperation with the neighbours. This era was also marked by – Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy, Lahore declaration, and the Agra summit, unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir and India's new peace proposal toward Pakistan. On the inaugural visit of the bus service from Delhi to Lahore on February 19, 1999, the Indian Prime Minister made a historic visit to Pakistan. During the Vajpayee era, the India's relationship with the neighbours mostly improved. No such state in the South Asian region has been so much inclined towards a peaceful foreign policy like India. Despite the fact that India has economically developed in an unprecedented way, it never uses any weapons or military power to coerce its neighbours. In this context, peace was a central theme in the India's foreign policy for more than seven decades (especially from Jawaharlal Nehru to A. B. Vajpayee era).

Now we will focus on the second research question –

Research Question-2

2. What are the principle contributions of India in addressing the scope of peace in world politics?

In addressing this research question, it is significant to identify the contribution of Indian philosophers in the context of peace in world politics. The Indian thinkers have tried to

constitute their ideology of peace based on Indian culture and Indian civilization. In this entire discussion three Indian thinkers are significant, namely - Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. However, many Indian thinkers have furthered the idea of peace and stability to make the modern world more stable. The above mentioned Indian thinkers have deeply contributed in the arena of war and peace, questioning the role of the nation-state. First, we will focus on the idea of Aurobindo, and then will focus on the thoughts of M. K. Gandhi, followed by S. Radhakrishnan. Aurobindo's idea of peace is highly linked with the greater ideals of internationalism. Romain Rolland regarded Aurobindo as the highest synthesis of the genius of Europe and Asia. To Aurobindo, Indian civilisation was far different; it is fully enriched with traditions and unity among the people. So, to Aurobindo, the human ideas are coming from the synthesis of sentiments and feelings, and no such unity can be possible without the application of 'feelings' and 'natural sympathies. Hence, to Aurobindo Ghosh humanity was equal to peace; the natural peace will be possible through the unity of thoughts and sentiments. For Gandhi, peace was the way of truth. The Gandhian movements and thoughts have been always guided by peace and non-violence. For Gandhi, peace was equivalent to truth. Truthfulness was equal to the notion of peacefulness. There is no halfway between truth and non-violence, untruth, and violence. Contemporary Indian understanding of peace has been primarily dominated by M. K. Gandhi. The self-identify of India became synonymous with the identity of Gandhian principles of peace. To Gandhi, India must strive for the peace, and not violence. To Gandhi, India must act as a path finder of peace in world politics consistently.

Radhakrishnan was another exponent of the Indian philosophy of peace. He was also a democrat; according to him democracy is the most valuable thing in the modern world. Radhakrishnan was of the opinion that the next stage of evolution will not be man's physical evolution but will be man's psychological evolution and the evolution of mind itself. To him, in the new age people will be more interactive and aware. He had a belief that truth will actively unite people and it will be able to achieve peace in a new world. Radhakrishnan had a conviction that on the basis of peace, the society will be more beautiful and stable. For Radhakrishnan, parliamentary democracy is the best instrument for the unity and uniformity of public mind. Radhakrishnan emphasised upon the rule of the people. He was the most significant thinker of peace and democracy in his times. To him when a democratic system becomes peaceful, that democratic order will be regarded as a peaceful democratic order. It is noteworthy to say that he primarily emphasised on the psychological processes of peace and

its manifestations in Eastern societies (mostly India) and Western societies. Hence, the three thinkers (Sri Aurobindo, M. K. Gandhi and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan) have identified a new directions of peace which are metaphysical, value laden, socio-psychological and hetero-social (applicable for all societies across the world). As a result, India has contributed in terms of peace, democracy and mankind in a new form in contemporary world politics. The Indian understanding and interpretation of peace has deeply contributed in constructing and reconstructing peace and humanity at the global level in modern age.

Finally, we turn to the third research question.

3. How consistent is India's commitment to peace?

To track down the consistency of India's commitment to peace, a longitudinal approach of different eras have been comparatively studied. In first part we will focus on Jawaharlal Nehru era to Rajiv Gandhi era. And in second part we will focus on the era of P. V. Narasimha Rao to Atal Bihari Vajpayee era. Now we can focus on the Nehru era, an era which has lay the foundation of Indis's foreign policy and its dominant objectives as a peace loving nation in the world. The Nehru era was classified into various themes, such as – the Kashmir issue, the Tibet and China issue, the Goa issue and the role of India in non-alignment. And in international context India has actively contributed in the field of Vietnam issue, Suez Canal issue, Hungary issue and Congo crisis. Nehru era has been marked by its deep contribution in the field of peace through non-alignment movement. Non-alignment has turn into an official foreign policy objective of Nehru's India, and it has united the downtrodden nations in the world. Nehru has tried to resolve the serious problems with the neighbours such as Pakistan and China without any departure from his idealism and non-aligned ethics. So, the Nehru era has laid the foundation of India's official foreign policy with a fixed objective of non-alignment and a system of legal-rational decision making processes and institutions; and it was highly useful in the manifestations of peace in the world. Now, we will see that whether these Nehruvian principles were present in Indira Gandhi era or not. The Indira Gandhi era, has been highly marked by Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 and military intervention and the liberation movement in Bangladesh. The Indira Gandhi era was also significant in terms of the NPT and the nuclear explosion in India and the merger of Sikkim in India. Indira Gandhi's contribution in the consistency of peace lies on the fact that, Indira Gandhi has tried to make India more strong and stable, and not only that, she has also tried to constitute a peaceful and stable relationship with the neighbouring countries in the South

Asian region. Indira Gandhi has achieved global support during the Liberation movement in Bangladesh. Though Indira Gandhi has opted for military based resistance movement in Bangladesh but she was not interested in the application of force and coercion in all cases. Hence to make Bangladesh free and peaceful, Indira Gandhi has achieved the reputation of peace loving statesman of India. Hence, India's quest for peace and stability was still continued from Nehru era to Indira Gandhi era. It is noteworthy to say that, Nehru's idea of peace was idealistic and value laden but Indira Gandhi was more pragmatic; so we can see a metabolic shift in India's foreign policy- a shift from Nehruvian democratic idealism to Indira Gandhi's militaristic and gigantic pragmatism. Now, we will focus on the Rajiv Gandhi era, and will try to draw out the consistency of India towards peace. Actually, India's commitment and consistency towards peace was still present in the Rajiv Gandhi era but in a different way and different style. The legacies of Nehru and Indira Gandhi era (as far as peace is concerned) were efficiently carried out by Rajiv Gandhi in a turbulent time. The Rajiv Gandhi era was marked by the friendly relationship between two super powers, such as America and Russia. Though there were external challenges from China; but Rajiv Gandhi has efficiently overcome it. Nonetheless, Rajiv Gandhi era was also marked by – India's military operation in Brasstacks, the military intervention in Sri Lanka, the military intervention in Maldives, Rajiv Gandhi's policy towards Pakistan and India's involvement in the political crisis in Nepal. India's commitment towards peace and stability can be best draw out through the India's decision to the military intervention in Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi has tried to resolve the conflicted situation in the neighbouring country like Sri Lanka by the use of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) against LTTE rebellions. But the situation became dismantled, and the antagonism between Tamils and non-Tamils became more violent in all forms; and it has laid a significant impact in world politics. From Sri Lanka crisis, India gained nothing rather India lost a premier like Rajiv Gandhi. So, Rajiv Gandhi's Sri Lanka policy has been declined from all perspectives, and India's leadership in the world peace has been seriously questioned. However, in other segments, like- Indo-U.S and Indo-Russian relations, India's Pakistan policy, India's foreign economic policy and India's role against race-hatred in Southern Africa (Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) were really fruitful to India's commitment of peace. Hence, except the Sri Lanka question, Rajiv Gandhi was successful in other spheres and the main characteristics of his foreign policy were- foreign economic interdependence and superiority of state over the foreign decision making. It was actually the last but not the least phase of Nehru-Gandhi family tradition in

Indian national politics; and undoubtedly Rajiv Gandhi has managed to raise India as a peace loving nation in the world affairs leaving the case of Sri Lankan LTTE crisis.

In second part discussed the period from P. V. Narasimha Rao to Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The consistency of peace in Narasimha Rao era can be found through a conceptual analysis of his tenure. The Narasimha Rao era has been classified into various themes, such as- the early life of P.V. Narasimha Rao, the making of welfare state, dreaming Europe: growing importance of Europe in Indian foreign policy, India's relations with Israel, Gulf and Middle East Asia, India's South Asia Policy, foreign policy and neighbourhood : looking east and looking west, nuclear armamentation and peace and the decision making process of P. V. Narasimha Rao. In his early life Narasimha Rao was a nationalist, freedom fighter and patriot. Rao was always against the domination of colonial British rule. Narasimha Rao was also fought against the rule of the Nizam and their feudal oppression. In making of the welfare state, P. V. Narasimha Rao was a pioneer to transform the Indian economy into the mode of pro-market and liberalisation policies. Many Indian called him as the next Margaret Thatcher, who would encourage business, shrink the public sector and cut the welfare spending. Nonetheless, if we focus on the foreign policy and neighbourhood, then we can identify that from the first day Narasimha Rao has tried to construct a friendly and stable relationship with the neighbours, mainly in South Asia. On the other hand Indian foreign policy towards the East Asia had been an amalgamation of both unfamiliarity and cultural plurality. In 1967, when the countries of East Asia grouped together to form ASEAN, and they were highly interested to invite India to join. Narasimha Rao considered South-East Asia as 'crucial diplomatic objective' to India's foreign policy and he gave importance to Myanmar, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. On the other hand, Narasimha Rao visited many western countries and form a friendly relations with them. It is essential to note that, in Narasimha Rao era India had strongly quest for a second nuclear explosion; but it could not fulfilled. During his tenure, there was tremendous pressure on India from the Western world regarding India's quest for a nuclear deterrent state. However, Narasimha Rao's economic reforms have assist India to build a gigantic foreign policy model of a future super power in the world politics. Furthermore, the economic diplomacy (oil) towards Gulf and Middle East Asia has also benefitted India from energy needs and India's attention towards Israel and Iran make a sharp departure from the earlier foreign policy objectives of Indian premiers. It is noteworthy to say that, India accepted the growing importance of Israel without dismantling the traditional relations with Iran and Arab states. So, Narasimha Rao's

foreign policy was an amalgamation of traditional outlook and present requirements; in other words he changed the foreign policy objectives to restructure India's vision on world peace. Nevertheless, he was a Prime Minister of globalization and he usually assessed himself as a 'Prime Minister of consensus'. The main characteristics of Narasimha Rao's foreign policy are- routine, macro and visible. Hence, from all perspectives, the Narasimha Rao era was strict on the ideals of peace and cooperation in the world by the use of the principles of democracy and economic sustainability in India's foreign policy. Interestingly, these ideals were still present in the era of Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

India's commitment to peace was also consistent in Atal Bihari Vajpayee era. Actually, the Vajpayee era was marked by the significance of Pokhran-II nuclear tests, the A. B. Vajpayee regime and non-military confidence building measures, composite dialogues between India and Pakistan: challenges and obstacles in the way of peace, Kargil crisis with special emphasis on foreign policy, the Indo-US relations, interrogating Russia: a new phase of Indo-Russian relations, relations with China: a new appraisal, and the foreign policy administration of Vajpayee era. The Vajpayee era was very much successful in terms of many factors; especially the Pokhran-II nuclear tests are concerned. Atal Bihari Vajpayee has completed the unfinished works of P. V. Narasimha Rao. The Pokhran-II nuclear tests conducted by the government of India in May 1998 under the premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, however it was a matter of great success for the Vajpayee era. But, till the first nuclear explosion at Pokhran in the era of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India had applied the policy of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. Many provocations have come from the side of neighbours, especially Pakistan and China. But India has never crossed the limit of the 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. The most significant success of Vajpayee era was the Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy. On the occasion of the inaugural visit of the bus service from Delhi to Lahore on February 19, 1999, the Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee made a historic and a landmark visit to Pakistan. The Lahore bus diplomacy had contributed to prohibit the tension between India and Pakistan arisen due to the nuclear experiments initiated by both the countries in 1998. Nonetheless, the Lahore Declaration was signed on February 21, 1999 between the two countries. It was the first major bilateral agreement between the India and Pakistan since the Simla agreement in 1972 primarily. In Vajpayee era a new peace proposal was announced between two rival nations India and Pakistan. Hence, India was very much consistent towards the India's commitment to peace in Vajpayee era. The A. B. Vajpayee era was very much successful to maintain peace, friendship and cooperation with the

neighbouring countries in South Asia in particular. However, since the Nehru era India was very much committed towards the international peace and stability, but A. B. Vajpayee has implemented those policies which had never been imagined by any of the Indian premiers. Vajpayee was an exceptional Indian premier, who had not only visions but had also objective mind to implement those. The most valuable element of Vajpayee's foreign policy was the ideals of *Bharatbarsia Samaj* (indigenous Indian society). A. B. Vajpayee essentially tried to give the message that arms are only needed to secure the motherland from external threats; but when the matter is resolved then one must go for non-military confidence building measures (what he did with Pakistan). So, arms is an instrument for the protection of the human capital of a nation; but every nation must use dialogues to establish a peaceful world order. In the ever changing circumstances of global politics India has earned the status and reputation of a nation of peace and stability not only in South Asia but also in the world. Hence, the different foreign policy eras in India is quiet useful to draw out the role of India in global peace and cooperation.

While this research showcased many instances where India used force or invested heavily in building its weapons, these were invariably occasioned by manifest threats from unfriendly neighbouring states, mainly Pakistan and China. In addition, Pakistan's aid and abetment of terrorism in India across the borders left New Delhi with little options but to shore up its defensive and offensive capacities. China's rise has similarly forced India to concentrate on hard power capabilities since the border dispute, China's maritime ambitions, and the China-Pakistan strategic alliance require hard measures. But India has never flinched from the path of diplomacy and peace. Even the most critical commentators have not found instances where India has been the principal aggressor, although, communication and signal failures have often complicated matters. The overall orientation of India's foreign policy also remains committed to autonomy and creating a just world order. While classical nonalignment was no longer relevant after the end of the Cold War, India has not signed into any overt military alliance. Despite remarkable security challenges affecting India's peaceful rise, the refusal to be a military ally with the US or the West is at least partly read in the long held tradition of peace that cautions against alliance formation. This is partly justified in the language of autonomy and partly by invoking the arguments of peace and democracy.

India has also constructively contributed to institution building in many domains of collective action, from international political economy to global governance to the

environmental issues. In this critical domain, India has urged for dignified dialogue based on equality and the due recognition of difference. India has also played a vital role in developing soft power resources and the power of ideas although this dissertation has not analyzed this area in details. The moot point, however, is that India's commitment of peace is beyond doubt, her understanding of peace is very much in the Indian tradition, and despite major security challenges, India has not given up on its traditional role as a classic bridging power. India's traditional argument has been to resist global liberalism or any other ideology since plurality gives peace the best chance. This is partly the result of India's domestic trials and tribulations, the failings of its social order, but an outstanding success so far democratic participation and empowerment are concerned. India's approach to social justice has been through reconciliation and peace building, although her record is not free of blemishes.

In a continuation of sorts, the same approach marks India's foreign policy thinking at large. Hence, the argument that India's foreign policy is a mix of idealism and realism is beside the point. All foreign policies tradeoff between realpolitik needs and normative goals. This thesis finds a continuity across different regimes, personalities, decisional structures, power distribution, and economic realities in the overarching ideas of the need to commit India to the path of peace. Hence, instances of military action, preparedness, growing defence expenditure, cannot be taken as credible renunciation of the broader commitment. In the final analysis, Indian foreign policy has remained committed to diplomacy and peace in the face of enormous provocations. Without a strong tradition in the ideas of peace this consistency cannot be explained.

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