

**'Pacification' of Bengal Presidency: Small Wars, Legitimacy, and Colonial State,
1760-1800**

For the partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Abbreviation

EIC	East India Company
<i>CPC</i>	<i>Calendar of Persian Correspondence</i>
<i>MAS</i>	<i>Modern Asian Studies</i>
<i>FWIHC</i>	<i>Fort William-India House Correspondence</i>
COIN	Counterinsurgency
<i>PIHC</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Indian History Congress</i>
<i>JAIS</i>	<i>Journal of Adivasi and Indigenous Studies</i>
<i>IESHR</i>	<i>Indian Economic and Social History Review</i>
<i>JAS</i>	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>

Glossary

<i>Abwab marammathai qila</i>	Cess for fortification.
<i>Akhbarat</i>	Official correspondence in between provincial and central authorities at Mughal times.
<i>Akhbarnawis</i>	Official with the duty of collecting and transmitting <i>akhbarat</i> .
<i>Amir-i-Chakla</i>	Mughal official of a chakla or a district level province
<i>Banjara</i>	Nomadic people indulged mostly into grain trade
<i>Bellum hostile</i>	War limited by code of conducts and ethical limitations.
<i>Bellum romanum</i>	Literal meaning, Roman War; All-out war without restraint practiced by the Romans against their enemies whom they usually designate as barbarians.
<i>Chauth</i>	One fourth of the produce collected as tax by the Marathas.
<i>Choukidary</i>	A kind of tax collected as the remuneration of village watchmen.
<i>Chowkidar</i>	village watchmen
<i>Cordon sanitaire</i>	A guarded line to prevent anyone from leaving an area under quarantine.
<i>Dak Harcurrah</i>	Men employed for moving postal correspondence.
<i>Dakhil</i>	Executive position
<i>Damin-i-Koh</i>	Forested hilly area of Rajmahal Hills

<i>Dewan</i>	Chief Treasury official.
<i>Dustak</i>	Permit of exemption from paying tax.
<i>Faker</i>	Muslim warrior ascetic of particular order.
<i>Firman</i>	A Mughal sovereign's edict.
<i>Ghatwal</i>	Native officials employed in guarding <i>ghats</i> or other passages.
<i>Ghatwali</i>	Tax free land given to the Ghatwals for their service.
<i>Gosain</i>	Warrior ascetics following the cult of Lord Shiva among the Dashnami order.
<i>Guerre mortelle</i>	Literal meaning, war to the death; War of annihilation without any code of conduct.
<i>Habildar</i>	A soldier or police officer corresponding to the post of sergeant.
<i>Hoodadar</i>	Local native notables employed for the local supervision over the city watchmen.
<i>Ijradari</i>	A system of revenue collection where the right to collect tax for a time was auctioned.
<i>Jagir</i>	A type of feudal land grant started by the Mughals.
<i>Jama</i>	Assessed Revenue
<i>Jamadar</i>	Native military official commanding platoon size or lesser assemblage troops.
<i>Khalisa</i>	Revenue yielding land administered directly by the Imperial Revenue Department.
<i>Madad-i-mash</i>	Revenue free land given to the learned persons.
<i>Mahazar</i>	Manifesto
<i>Makasardars</i>	Village official of the Maratha administration

<i>Mansab</i>	Post or rank
<i>Mansabdar</i>	Mughal official having a <i>mansab</i> grant.
<i>Manzi</i>	Local leader of Santhal or Paharia tribal groups.
<i>Mawas</i>	Rebellious territory.
<i>Naib-subahdar</i>	Junior official of a Subhadar
<i>Nawab</i>	Ruler of successor states
<i>Nishan</i>	Royal order or decree of a Mughal governor.
<i>Paikan</i>	Revenue free land given to the pikes.
<i>Parwanas</i>	Permit
<i>Peon</i>	Low ranking soldier mostly employed for guard duties.
<i>Peshkar</i>	Lower official handling documents
<i>Peshkashi</i>	Tax presented as a gift
<i>Pike</i>	Native retainers of the zamindars.
<i>Poligars</i>	Feudal chiefs of Madras presidency
<i>Rahadari</i>	A transit duty or toll paid to secure safe passage.
<i>Razzia</i>	Raiding method of warfare among nomadic tribes.
<i>Sahukar</i>	Moneylender
<i>Sannyasi</i>	Warrior ascetic of any holy order
<i>Sardar</i>	Tribal leader; leader of clan.
<i>Sebundy</i>	Revenue police with the quarterly payment.
<i>Shroff</i>	Banker or Money changer

<i>Sikka</i>	Coins of Mughal and Early Colonial times
<i>\Sohei</i>	Japanese Buddhist warrior monks.
<i>Subadar</i>	The Chief native officer of a company of sepoys in British army.
<i>Subhadar</i>	Mughal governor of province.
<i>Taluq</i>	A group of several villages organized for revenue purpose.
<i>Thanadar</i>	Official of a <i>thanah</i> establishment.
<i>Thanah</i>	Military outpost
<i>Trace italienne</i>	Star shaped fortification of early modern Europe.
<i>Yin and yang</i>	Chinese philosophical concept of contrary but complementary entity.
<i>Zamindar</i>	Hereditary landowner.

Introduction

‘That wherever arms of any kind are found that the house and all houses belonging to the proprietors or his tenants shall be immediately burnt to ashes; and that as some arms have been found underground, that if any shall be discovered for the future the adjacent houses and fields shall be immediately laid waste and destroyed.’

Letter of a British infantryman from Culloden¹

‘The Spaniards looted and burned villages; they kidnapped hundreds of men, women, and children and shipped them to Europe to be sold as slaves.... The Englishmen used subtler methods. To ensure peace long enough to establish a settlement at Jamestown, they put a golden crown upon the head of Wahunsonacook, dubbed him King Powhatan, and convinced him that he should put his people to work supplying the white settlers with food.’

Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*²

The omnipresence of violence is habitually shrouded by the differentiation of cultural identities. Despite of having cultural variation in exercise, the state-society interaction has its undividable relation with violence throughout different phases and areas of human civilization. Slow civilizing procedure of the humanity which constitutes a tendency of manifesting justified violence as a tool to reach order against chaos of illegitimate violence of the society, reflects this transition of human time itself. This thesis seeks to enunciate the term ‘pacification’ as a worthy pervasive phrase for this civilisational process. According to Norbert Elias there is a *longue*

duree history of pacification, where legitimate violence had been monopolized firstly by males, then by warrior elites and after that by the modern state.³ Apart from this big history of ‘pacification’ of human civilizations the term generally implicates the process of monopolization of violence by the state. Elias describes this process as the centralization of legitimate violence by the modern state from the warrior classes. As this whole phenomenon of monopolization of arms by state happened in the early modern times, it went on often converging and diverging to the parallel expansion of colonization. The modern European states monopolized violence within their territory as well as pacified the colonized east at the same time. So Elias’ civilizing process of monopolization paralleled with the civilizing process of global conquest.

Most of the pre modern non-state societies had used varied methods of sacrifice to ritual conflict to continue this process with respect to the temporality of their proto-political nature. During the Shang period of China, sacrifice of war captives was seen not only as the ‘elimination of military threats but also ontological security in general’. War along with sacrifice in Shang society ‘constituted its order’.⁴ Completion of this bloody consolidation by the Shang dynasty galvanized their successor to claim for the ‘conquest of all under heaven’. All these conquests and consolidations ended with Qin Shi Huang’s triumphant exploits ultimately yielded a ‘nearly 400 year Han *pax sinica*’.⁵ The accomplishment of *pax sinica* was preceded by the concept of *Tian-xia* or ‘all-under-heaven’.⁶ Just like the case of Chinese empire building the actual consolidation had always been heralded by a panoptic worldview. In the time of colonization differential worldviews had influenced the methodical difference of pacification. The excerpts quoted above represent these parallel processes. The pacification of the Jacobite rebels by the British state reflects contrasting discrepancy compared to the attitude of the British colonial authority to the native Amerindians at Jamestown. On the other hand Spanish conquistadors’

exercise of violence over the colonized resembles very much to the British atrocities at Culloden. This ambiguity in definition changing with the context, period and territory reflects the ability of the term 'pacification' to grasp the transitory nature of state-society relation.

The British colonization of India and the formation of colonial state from the late 17th- early 18th century congregate into the process of 'pacification'; a course of politico-military development with a long term cultural impact. This thesis tries to focus on the narrower definition of the term; pacification as a politico-military process and its relation to colonial state formation. In 18th century period the transition from regional states towards the Company state, corresponding with the shifting interest of power holders altered the process of state making in India altogether. The martial poise of the Europeans in mid-18th century's replaced their previous cautious attitude. In this new progression of colonial conquest, British supremacy possibly changed its outlook towards its subject and vice versa. This initial colonial state- indigenous society bargain had proved to be an amalgamation of conflict and cooperation. Indian society prior to the British colonization seems to have a general martial character, whose significant amount of male population was armed. The Mughal state's decentralized character undermined its claim over the monopoly of violence. The interaction with early Europeans shows that the Western gaze was surprised by the bellicose character of the society. West had acquired a considerable control over the means of violence by the 18th century. The contrast between societies made the western travellers to narrate the East as chaotic. While travelling by the summer of 1632, Peter Mundy saw "labourers with their guns, swords, and bucklers lying by them whilst they ploughed the ground".⁷ This was a recurrent scene even up to the late 18th and early 19th century. After the Battle of Assaye, Arthur Wellesley's letter to Lord Lake mentions about the brutal fate of the retreating Maratha soldiers in the hand of violent villagers in the vicinity of Delhi. Such a

turbulent countryside reflects character of the pre-colonial state apparatus as well as its interactive relation with the society. Mughal state as seen by some of the historians as a 'patchwork quilt' rather than any 'wall to wall mattress' showing the weakness of the state apparatus to exercise strict control over the society.⁸ The turbulent country side mirrors the nature of that state, weak according to the Western scale of state capacity. In her study of Ottoman state formation, Karan Berkey points out this non-western version of societal control had other tools like bargain, patronage etc which never tried to exercise strict control.⁹ Mughal hegemonic presence was somewhat similar to the Ottoman state's presence as the most powerful bargaining patron, if not as the monopoliser.

Did the Company state's continuous conquest replace the loosely defined position of the traditional patron-client state-society relation? C.A. Bayly, P.J. Marshal and other adherents of continuity thesis has argued that the company state was a continuity of the Mughal or its successor states' polity. The fusion of military and commercial character sprouting out form the late 17th and early 18th century was 'what Indian local rulers had been doing for the last century', which the Europeans had achieved 'on a larger and more ominous scale'.¹⁰ This continuity of polity had seen by Bayly as continuity of limitation. As Company's rule 'widely came to be seen as a dismal failure long before the Great Rebellion of 1857 blew up its foundations' Bayly continues to push on the conciliatory side of the new rulers.¹¹ He argued that the new rulers 'tried to associate themselves with indigenious lawgivers and centres of religious authorities'.¹² So there was a continuity of ritual theatricality from the Mughal hegemon towards the Company state. Bayly has seen Company's pacification as fluid assortment of political arrangements like assimilating turbulent communities and elements through tributes and recruitment rather than subdue through punitive military actions.¹³

This view point of a weak, conciliatory Company state undermines the role of violence in the colonial process of pacification. Critique of these 'older images of the British as a benevolent ruling society' comes with the recent development of the New Imperial history.¹⁴ Historians like D.R. Oram, Stuart Macintyre, Donald Denoon, Marivic Wyndham have started to focus on the recovery of a violent past connecting colonial state and its pacificatory violence. This new group argues that as the Empire 'was not established on virgin territory' colonizers had repressed and driven out indigenous population in a global scale.¹⁵ The pattern which had been continued in the 17th and 18th century became 'more purposive in the larger Empire in the 19th century'.¹⁶ In case of India David Washbrook countering Bayly's concept of assimilation with the traditional continuity, argued that the British conquerors used the tradition of 'oriental despotism' to their advantage, organising a 'military offensive against civil society'.¹⁷ This new critique's emphasis on the importance of violent method of pacification reinforces the debate of British enigma of holding on to the subcontinent.

Dirk Kolff's thesis mentions about the presence of the 'Military Labour Market', a great pool of bellicose war bands, volatile and violent. At such a situation it's impossible for any state to create monopoly over the means of violence. To mention the magnitude of the military labour market, Kolff mentions about Abul Fazal's account of foot soldiers, whose enormous numerical value presents itself not as an army list, rather as 'a census of the military labour market'.¹⁸ Just like any pre modern state the line between the 'lawful' and 'unlawful' bearer of arms was blurred in pre-colonial India and the group of men with multiple identities; peasant-rebel-bandit, played the role of potential recruits for the army. Peter Mundy's accounts shows that the hired swords and guns were needed for the safe travel. The presence of villages studded with forts to contest states claim to protection-extraction process reflects the highly

contested character of sovereignty. Kolff opines that the presence of such a huge quantity of armed men, that government was supposed to rule over, 'were its rivals rather than subjects.'¹⁹ Along with Kolff, historians like J.F.Richards mentions that the Mughal officials most of the time remained preoccupied in these pacificatory duties.²⁰ The standard order for every Mughal officials was to prevent the Smiths from manufacturing firearms, a pre-colonial attempt of disarming the populace.²¹ In spite of all these efforts, the Mughal intention of control over violence failed. Later due to the destabilized condition of the empire and economic prosperity of the regional areas in the 18th century, recalcitrant villages had remilitarized and refortified in a large scale ever than before. Dirk Kolff's thesis points out that the Colonial state successfully monopolized its control over violence, because it brought the 'most radical change' in the state-society relationship which was 'demilitarization of its politics, conflict management and its peasantry...partly achieved in 1818, perhaps only in 1858'.²² Though Kolff's thesis mentions about disarmament, he has not provided any detailed study of that process but rather inferred that the final extinction of the native rulers as sovereign heads extinguished the demand for armed men.

By the end of 18th century EIC successfully claimed the position of a sovereign. Company's rise to power enabled them to claim the position of a sole recruiter of the martial manpower. Company gave ascendance to the legitimate category of *sepoys*; 'whose martial qualities were to be expressed only in service to colonial rule, not in rebellion or resistance.'²³ The introduction of various army reforms as showed by Seema Alavi, Reymond Callahan reveals the growth of state control over the sepoys. Seema Alavi's has criticized Kolff's claim of demilitarization as to her opinion the coming of EIC made the market more volatile by introducing high caste status and well payment. The outbreak of 1857's rebellion exposed the futility of permanence and control

EIC imagined after 1817. She further argues that Kolff failed to trace out the evolution of armed peasantry in Awadh and Banaras, who also had succeeded in separating them from the village society, a necessary step of monopolization of violence. She mentions that with the extinction of big native powers, little *zamindars* and local rajas quickly had created a sub-military culture and rose up as ‘peasant subcontractors’ of potential recruits using various religious symbols. Throughout 1820s and 1830s, the presence of these men remained as a threat to the company state and that’s why the claiming of monopoly over violence was neglected. Failure of the Company to be the sole monopoliser of protection before the potential threats to a pre-colonial peasant life, stopped officials to disarm the peasantry, while armed village assemblages of peasants was a thing they always have wanted to stop but could not due its lack of police force.²⁴ Though these horns of dilemma illustrate the Company state’s limitation of claiming monopoly over violence, it does not prove the lack of any effort of monopolization of the means of violence by the state. Seema Alavi in her discussion regarding the ‘invalid *thanahs*’ mentioned about their role of peacekeeping against the jungle raids and criminal activities and their influence as spearheads of Company supremacy into far off areas. Radhika Singha shows that carrying of arms was prohibited by the local authority within the city of Banaras after 1809’s riot. This reflects that in spite of limitation of the state, EIC in local level had been striving for creating its monopoly over arms in the early 19th century, which had started even before the Kolff’s periodization.²⁵ While most of the historians have accepted the early 19th century period after the completion of *Pindari* war as the starting point of demilitarization, none of their works delve into the early colonial pacificatory process of post-conflict consolidation. G.J. Bryant, one of very few currently working on this theme, provided a coherent narrative of early colonial pacification in India but unfortunately none of them thought of focusing on the concept of ‘pacification’ itself

as process with definitive characteristics.²⁶ This potential historiographical gap is the main inquisitive locomotive of this research.

How did the colonial state conduct its post-conquest consolidation of the society in the early phase of subjugation? Was there any definite doctrine of ‘pacification’ for the Company state in the early phase when its imperial notions and sovereign positions were incoherent? How did colonial pacification process differentiate itself from the pre-colonial approaches? These are the central questions that my thesis seeks to answer. The thesis enquires into the early hesitant approaches of the nascent Company state to constitute control over their newly conquered and indirectly dominated territories, with reference to its varied modalities of interaction with the indigenous rulers and societies. Prior to the 19th century success against the Marathas, East India Company was in a position of contested sovereignty and due to the looming threat of Maratha victory from the western frontier provided them little time to consolidate. This thesis tries to find out the interrelation in between incoherent pacificatory measures and indeterminate state of empire and in which way the former mirrors the nature of informal empire.

The Thesis is comprised of three core chapters along with introduction and conclusion. The Introduction will present the research objectives, methodology and the limitations of the historiography on the subject. My first core chapter deals with these theoretical models as well as the comparative analysis of the components of discussion; state, pacification, empire, sovereignty. This chapter starts with engaging into the grand debate of bellocentric state formation and tries to argue that it’s not only external interstate war but also internal wars of ‘pacification’ influences state making. This chapter further elaborates the changing nature of the Empire and argues that varied developmental phases of imperial sovereign position influences its executive nature like pacificatory duties. In this chapter, the term ‘pacification’ has been

presented as a connoted phrase reflecting definitive nature of colonial, politico-military phenomenon, different from the modern definitions of counterinsurgency. My second chapter under the chronological span of 1720 to 1770 deals with the pacificatory approaches under pre-colonial rulers of Bengal like Murshid Quli and Alivardi, the early pacification in Bengal after *dewani* grant along with its grand strategic considerations, the thing which was a dependent variable and had constrained pacificatory works. Apart from showing the transition from pre-colonial to colonial, this chapter argues that the comparative success of the pre-colonial rulers was the base for later successes in pacification by the Company state. In the third chapter, which deals with the time frame of 1770 to 1800, a differentiation of pacificatory practices in directly and indirectly ruled areas were analyzed under the scale of civil-military relationship. Different civil-military association and diplomatic necessities were seen as the variables influencing the methods and outcomes of pacification, which illustrates that pacification or internal warfare is a politico-military affair rather than solely a military matter. The conclusion enumerates the transformation of the Company state towards a more stable scenario after the completion of Maratha-British struggle by the end of 1818. This watershed in colonial statecraft, providing some doctrinal coherence to the state apparatus' policy of pacification, is evaluated in the conclusion to compare with the late 18th century period in retrospect.

Notes:

¹ Quoted in John Prebble, *Culloden* (1988 reprint, London: Penguin Books, 1961) pp. 192-193.

² Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (2007 reprint, New York: Picador, 1971) p. 2.

- ³ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners, and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmond Jephcott. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
- ⁴ Roderick Campbell, 'Transformations of Violence: On Humanity and Inhumanity in Early China', in Roderick Campbell ed. *Violence and Civilization: Studies of Social Violence in History and Prehistory* (Oxford/Oakville: Oxbow Books, 2014), p. 100.
- ⁵ Campbell, 'Transformations of Violence', in Campbell ed. *Violence and Civilization*, p. 112.
- ⁶ Tingyang Zhao, 'Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven'(Tian-xia, 天下), *Social Identities*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), pp. 29-41.
- ⁷ Dirk. H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-1850* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 6.
- ⁸ Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The State in Mughal India, 1526-1750* (Delhi: OUP, 1998).
- ⁹ Karan Berkey, *Bandits, and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithica/London: Cornell University press, 1994).
- ¹⁰ C.A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (2003 reprint, Cambridge: CUP, 1988) p. 5.
- ¹¹ Bayly, *Indian Society*, p. 106.
- ¹² Bayly, *Indian Society*, p. 114.
- ¹³ Bayly, *Indian Society*, p. 107.
- ¹⁴ Richard Gott, 'Shoot them to be sure', in Stephen Howe ed. *The New Imperial Histories Reader* (2010 reprint, Oxon: Routledge, 2010) p. 107.
- ¹⁵ Gott, 'Shoot them', in Howe, ed., *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, p. 107.
- ¹⁶ Gott, 'Shoot them', in Howe ed. *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, p. 107.
- ¹⁷ Gott, 'Shoot them', in Howe ed. *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, p. 108.
- ¹⁸ Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, p. 3.
- ¹⁹ Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, p. 7.
- ²⁰ John.F. Richards, 'Warriors and the State in Early Modern India'. *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol.47, No. 3, Between the Flux and Facts of Indian History: Papers in Honor of Dirk Kolff (2004), pp. 70-90.

²¹ Richards, John.F. *The New Cambridge History of India, 1,5: The Mughal Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 397.

²² Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, p. 30.

²³ John.F. Richards, 'Warriors and the State', p. 398.

²⁴ Seema Alavi, *The sepoy and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India 1770-1830* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 72-73.

²⁵ Singha, Radhika, *A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. X.

²⁶ G.J. Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013); G. J. Bryant, 'Pacification in the Early British Raj, 1755-85', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1985), pp. 3-19.

Chapter 1

Empire, Sovereignty, and 'Pacification': Concepts and Theories

The concepts which are used to define prior phenomenon are rarely static in nature; instead they are created, metamorphosed and contentiously redefined by the present. This ironic problematic persists mostly in the historical rethinking of the past polities. Concepts like 'war', 'state', 'sovereignty', 'governance' etc are doomed to go round and round in this perennial gyro of revision and revaluation until they were contextualized to their historical past. This chapter argues that without commiserative flexibility towards changing times, models will be obsolete to their historical use. In the early colonial period, it was a time of acculturation and inconsistency; it will be a more pertinent method to accept the porous character of the definite boundaries of those models. Early colonialism also reflects the Western edema of these concepts, not fitting in the non-western world and proto-modern attempts of consolidation. So, the anxiety of the early empire in these transitional times, slowly forming into high empire becomes the part of this chapter. This chapter also argues that Tillyan theory of the state, often thought obsolete is useful even for the reconsideration of colonial state making, if used as a flexible model along with its viable critiques and correctives. All these variegated contours of the discussion find its congruence in the redefinition of the colonial 'small war' as 'pacification', a new kind of imperial peace through force.

‘Father and King of All’: War meets State

“War is both father and king of all, some he has shown forth as gods and others as men, some he has made slaves and others free.”

Heraclitus¹

‘Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, more willingly than to others.’

Hobbes²

For ages, the totality of any explanation has always amazed and often lured the thinkers. All these exegeses have one thing in common; one episteme that binds everything in the centre; one scale to explain entirety. The dichotomy of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ is one of those epistemai which have been being used again and again to explain the dynamics and stability of human collective self. This archetype of thinking which sees war as a destructively creative human enterprise dates back to classical times. Just like Hellenistic Greece, a ‘landscape marked by war’³ had given birth to soldiers like Euhippos, Antikretis, it was also the cradle of thinkers like Heraclitus. Heraclitus had contemplated ‘war’ as a point of genesis of human society in a time when the state as a manifestation of corporative social identity is yet to come. Contextually it was war and wartime unities had provided Heraclitus the incorporeal cognizance of state in a pre-state or proto-state period. The Heraclitusian sense of ubiquitousness of war as famously written by him and quoted above has remained in the Western thinking process, persisting as a form of archaic knowledge, more quoted than thought. Perpetuity of that thought can be traced even after two millennia in Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, when the modern state as a conception rather a concept, was just burgeoning. It was possibly the first union of war and state in the conventional political thought. In the

modern times, warfare as an important dimension for explaining human development as well as its comparatively new political identity called 'state' continues to be a dominant genera in social science.

State as a concept is a latecomer in the course of human sciences compared to the notion of war. Despite this lack of archaic lineage, state gradually became the analytical consummation of 'war'. Proto-state organizations, often seen as economic interest based 'war-making alliances' are said to be transforming gradually into legal communities like 'state'.⁴ This nexus between 'war' and 'state' has been debated for long by a constellation of thinkers: German relational thinkers like Hegel, Clausewitz, Schmitt, Elias; German political realists like Frederich List, Oppenheimer, Weber, Otto Hintz; Geopolitical theorists like Haushofer, Mahan; Militarist social Darwinist like Gumpowitz, Spencer; Classical historical sociologists like Montesquieu, Marx, Durkheim.⁵ Recent development in the historical sociology, mostly during the late '80s and early '90s, selectively accepted this earlier scholarship. Up to 1965, the dominant analysis of the war-state reciprocities was classically Weberian, 'with little grounding in the actual historical research'.⁶ This classical school was challenged due to the 'historical turn' in sociology, which was characterized by the rethinking of state-formation question through '*longue duree*', politico-economic, comparative lenses.⁷ This move towards 'powerful imageries of history' fermented within Marxist-Weberian conceptions, is known as the second wave.⁸ Charles Tilly's '*Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*' can be cited as one of the key works of this trend. Tilly said that the discussion of state-formation is impossible 'without taking history seriously into account'.⁹ Tilly along with Theda Skocpal and Michel Mann, the celebrated trinity of this second wave, despite of their divergent pathways, ultimately converged into the scholastic entity of Neo-Weberian school.¹⁰

This second wave in the post-'90s turns into the 'dominant orthodoxy',¹¹ which in contrast to the third wave postmodernist school followed a 'top-down' and 'outside-in' track of explanation.¹² The central point of argument of this school, often known as 'bellicist' argument, is that the laws of state-formation are historically predatory in nature. The Tillyan analysis shows 'predatory rulers' as 'self-interested maximizers of a materialist bent' who have clashed to survive 'in a state of anarchy'.¹³ According to this analysis, every conflict is 'a war to the death and a zero-sum game' where one contestant's annihilation leads to another's payout.¹⁴ Tilly's pioneering work shows for first time historically that in the last millennium Europe's 'hundreds of small principalities' nibbled and later turned into 'two dozens of political units'.¹⁵ In this gradual process, it is the 'military revolution'¹⁶ or 'military revolutions'¹⁷ that had destabilized the earlier 'balance of power' and unleashed the military-fiscal hunt. This constant drive for war unlocked the drive for resources to feed the ever insatiable hunger of war-making; feeding the Mars became the new challenge for the state. The demand to extract resources leads to the erection of efficient extractive tools like bureaucracy, taxation systems etc. Such smaller organizations lead to bigger, compound organizational forms ultimately leading to the evolution of modern state. In a long story short, 'predatory rulers are selfish genes, sovereign states are their host organisms, and total wars are the selection mechanism'.¹⁸ This basic theoretical construction of Tillyan state formation theory is viewed from an often oversimplified perspective of the famous Tillyan dictum that 'war makes state and states make war'.¹⁹ The initial amazement with this distorted view of Tillyan premises was followed by an ardent criticism by the Third wave sociologists.

Before entering into the labyrinth of criticism as well as correctives, a short but comprehensive discussion of the Tillyan thesis as well as its subtle differences from other preceptors like Weber, Norbert Elias etc is in order. According to Tilly, the state is 'a distinct organization that controls

the principle concentrated means of coercion within a well-defined territory, and in some respects exercises the priority over all other organizations operating within the same territory'.²⁰ In European case three different types of polities; 'tribute taking empires', 'polities with fragmented sovereignty', 'national states' were present, and among them, the ones whose 'organizational and technical innovations in warfare' made them enable them to claim resources, rose up as winners.²¹ According to Tilly, it is the centralizing national states that eventually became able 'to defeat tribute-taking entities or to integrate them into state structures'.²² However, the Tillyan dictum is often misinterpreted; it did not suggest that the centralization of the modern state is an exclusively coercive process. Rather, Tilly proposed three different trajectories through which modern state was formed: coercion intensive, capital intensive and capitalized coercion intensive. Karen Barkey in her writing on Ottoman state consolidation gives a comprehensive analysis of these three trajectories, distinct in nature based on organization of state and resource structure of the society. When the state operates within an agrarian population-based area, coercive apparatus to extract surplus gets prominence and increased taxation becomes the way of resource extraction. In case of the second trajectory, in a capital-rich area state will engage with the merchant class to provide protection in exchange of their capital. The third one is a mixed type where both trajectories were partially followed.²³ So basically state is 'a mechanism of protection and extraction facilitating the transition of the protection rackets of former warlords into state like institutions'.²⁴ So historically the reciprocal need for protection by the subjects and need of resources by the state consolidated the organism and pacified the violent forces. The explanatory rhetoric of *Leviathan* has expressed that, by conducting 'peace or war' with prudence the sovereign, the great 'Leviathan' as the resultant of 'covenant of every man with every man', protects the subject from the war of 'every man, against every man'.²⁵ While

Tilly focuses on the protective function of the Hobbesian state against 'war of every man against every man', Max Weber emphasized on the 'covenant of every man with every man' as the prerequisite of the state. Max Weber's state is an organization which 'successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order'²⁶. Tilly's view on that is a little vague, mentioning legitimacy as an act of confirmation from other authorities'²⁷. Weber, on the other hand, uses 'legitimacy' as a normative function for state capacity as 'stable systems of political authority cannot rest on a monopoly of coercion alone.'²⁸ Weber's concept of legitimacy embodies traditional legitimacy like kinship ties, established beliefs etc. and rational legitimacy, for example; legality of the impersonal rules of political authority.²⁹ Norbert Elias, on the other hand, mentions that the state's structural components and societal normative practices reciprocally and conjugally normalize state practices into legal norms.³⁰ So where as Tilly thinks of the drive for war as an independent variable and growth of state structure as a by-product, Weber takes 'ideational factors' as the other important wing of modern state formation. Elias stands somewhere in the middle. So, modern theorists and historians of state formation who wrote mostly after the 'cultural turn' tend to use Tillyan 'bellicist'/'bellocentrist' model in respect of the accumulation and exercise of 'symbolic' power.³¹ After all, the state is not just a military, political, and economic accomplishment, but a 'symbolic accomplishment' too.³² In recent writings, Dietrich Jung has suggested a corrective to this problem by reading Tillyan thesis in respect of other sociological concepts like the Weberian idea of 'legitimacy'.³³

The main criticism of this Neo-Weberian 'bellicist'³⁴ model of state formation is a postcolonial one. Tilly's concept about Asiatic countries particularly China describes it as an Empire, lacking the fragmentary dynamics of 15th century Europe which drove it towards the predatory contest.

China, 'a waxing empire' had many enemies but no rivals, 'the great land of rebellions and civil war, but not of war among multiple states'.³⁵ In spite of the fact that European 'anarchy' had much in common with Imperial China, the later was always dominated by one single centre; 'Empire was long China's natural condition.'³⁶ Though all imperial polities have bellocentrist components, according to Tilly it's only the European empires which 'came increasingly to resemble national states'³⁷. To Tilly, the political entity of an empire characterizes 'low accumulation of coercive means with high accumulation of the available means'³⁸. Empires used to conciliate with local power bases. Their relationship was based on 'extracting rents and gifts' without penetration, transformation of the basis of power or creation of distinct officer corps³⁹. The system resembles a patron-client relationship. But regarding the question of distinctive components which caused the divergence of the fate of Asian and European empires, Tilly's answer is pretty conventional and Eurocentric. Tilly says that the colonization by the 15th century enabled European empires to ship away from the predatory empire building to different continents and due to this attachment of huge colonies to 'fragile home bases', European states transformed.⁴⁰ As colonies provided the means needed for 'the fashioning of relatively powerful, centralized, and homogenized national states within the continent', modern state making became possible.⁴¹ Peter Perdue criticized this approach as keeping the progressive dynamics of state formation within Europe and a denial of multiple pathways to modernity.⁴² Trotting along the path of his predecessors like Hobsbawm, Landes, Wallerstein and above all Marx, Tillyan conception falls into the vortex of Eurocentric bias. Peter Halden has given a corrective towards this Tillyan dilemma regarding 'empire' and 'national state'. He mentions one intermediary stage of 'realm' which can be helpful to explain the state formation beyond the edema of conformist

political models. So 'realm' is a political community, which was historically present in the case of England, France, and the Holy Roman Empire prior to their rise as modern states.⁴³

Another line of criticism of Tilly questions his conception of war itself. According to Tilly state formation is a process which moves from an internal to an external one and it's the external predatory war between states which furnished the modern states. Before this modern predatory warfare, 'we see rulers and would be rulers struggle to tame the populations within the territories they nominally control'; it is a war to 'fight off armed rivals within those territories' and to 'build up their own monopolies of force'⁴⁴. Vivek Swaroop Sharma questions this Tillyan concept of state maker 'war', which is the 'external' war beyond boundaries. Like Tilly's 'external' and 'internal' war concept, Sharma says about the persistence of similar concepts in West Europe: '*bellum romanum*' or '*guerre mortelle*' or 'total war' and '*bellum hostile*' or 'limited war'.⁴⁵ Sharma equates '*bellum romanum*' with Tillyan 'external war' and says that 'limited war' had been more important for the state making in Europe. As state-making is not just a process of winning over external competitors, but a way of state-society bargaining process where 'violence is a language used as a part of a negotiation between groups'.⁴⁶ Societal group's attempt of resistance as a mode of defiance against the continuous growth of centrality, due to its pacifying tendencies bound to be less intense, if not less cruel. Sharma argued that apart from 'heretics', 'rebels', 'infidels', internal enemies were treated with punitive actions but those were never a war of annihilation. Even the war against 'heretics' resembles more with ethnic cleansing, not war, while the war of annihilation against the infidel Turks was more of a religious propaganda than a political practice. Some of the proponents of the bellicist model like Mann criticized Tilly's concept that internal war is sequential to external war. According to him, despite the modern state's incessant striving for monopoly over the tools of violence, monopolization is never

complete and that's why 'internal war' is never-ending. The state is continuously being built while having a synergistic relation with incessant internal war; A Sisyphean task whose unswerving process in itself ceaselessly fabricates the dynamic identity of the state. So for many Tilly's model of states move towards external war, after successful completion of internal war is a myth.

From early 90's when Tilly had argued about a *longue duree* study of European state formation and it has been much criticized and corrected. Does the Tillyan thesis turn into an obsolete model for state formation studies? Victoria Hui is optimistic about its applicability as Tilly himself was not rigid about his model. Tilly was not in favour of some 'single standard process of state formation'.⁴⁷ According to him, the Western state formation model is 'simply one among many paths.'⁴⁸ Unlike Kenneth Waltz and his theory of 'balance of power', Tilly does not intend to provide any universal law but some useful modular tools for conceptualizing the process of modern state formation and in this he is quite successful. That's why despite Tilly's scepticism about Chinese Empires, his ideal type is being used in the study of Qing Empire by historians like Peter Perdue and Alice Miller.⁴⁹ According to them, Tilly's method not only states the trajectories of imperial state formation but also provides potential pathways of imperial state failure. If Tillyan model is seen along with the correctives and supplementary models, it will be a good conceptual tool to look into the symbiotic relationship between state's sovereign standing and state apparatuses: both coercive and symbolic both. The fall of Mughal tributary empire and the consecutive rise of military-fiscal realms as successor states created a highly competitive situation in Indian subcontinent by the start of 18th century. This situation partly resembles with the age of predatory conflict in Europe. The only difference is its less protracted character in a chronological sense. Tilly opined that the overseas empires were never able to form 'state

structure to the same extent as land war at home'. But subscribing to the optimism of the historians of Chinese state formation it can be concluded that Tillyan conceptual tools can be employed in the study of colonial state formation and empire building process as well.⁵⁰

Cradle of Empire: Company's Colony, a 'Strange Absurdity'

On June 22, 1897, during the celebration of Diamond Jubilee Day of Queen Victoria, the vulnerable streets of London witnessed the spectacle of Empire, the 'brassiest show on earth'.⁵¹ It was a time when British Empire reached such a territorial extent which was unprecedented in history. The occasion was the expression of that moment, 'an Imperial moment, a Roman moment' for the British nation.⁵² The symbolism of this late Victorian Empire was strong and deliberative. The Queen telegraphed to every nook and corners of the empire, to her every subject, congratulating for the help in this earthly endeavour. The Queen said, 'I thank my beloved people, May God bless them.'⁵³ Empire was seen as a journey where 'barbarians' had slowly turned into 'people' of the Queen, a sign of gradual conquest and consolidation by imperial civility. Empire's extension was a contradiction for its own cohesive presence, but by the late Victorian times it was the 'feverish enthusiasm' which dictated and propelled imperial project forward was something as described by the imperial artist Constable, 'beyond the truth'. Empire was both a crisis as well as a pride. But long before this illusory belief on the permanence of such a grand empire, long before 'the long Nineteenth Century', was there any British Empire? Was there any 'Empire' before 'Imperialism'? The traditional concept of imperialism will say that there was none. From Seeley to Hobson, all thinkers of imperialism said unanimously that imperialism, especially in the British case, started with the Late Victorian

'enthusiasm', preceded by a mid-Victorian 'indifference'.⁵⁴ So empire was a late 19th-century phenomenon. In this whole trend of traditional definitions, Indian Empire provides 'the most glaring gap' as it is during this so-called 'period of indifference' Indian scenario was filled with wars, conquests, and expansion.⁵⁵ Thus the experience of Empire preceded imperialism. Does it mean 'India' was a premature baby in the hordes of other British colonies? In the 18th century, the period of this study, the British Empire was not the empire as we see it later on. It was not 'an Empire of rule' of the 19th or 20th century, but it was an 'informal empire'.⁵⁶ India is also excluded from Seeley's concept of 'empire as an extension of British state', where the South Asian Empire is a curious kind of 'inorganic quasi-state', a clutter which should be dealt separately.⁵⁷ So, the Indian Empire was always been thought as an anomaly for the British, though not unimportant. On the contrary after the 'decisive swing' to the East, from the Atlantic towards the Indian Ocean, India became the 'jewel in the crown'.⁵⁸ Even following Hegel's illustration of British 'self-esteem' it can be said that Indian Empire gradually became a part of British national identity at that time. Hegel says that if any Englishman is asked 'he will say of himself and his fellow citizens that it is they who rule the East Indies and the ocean of the world'.⁵⁹ Possession of the East Indies was a matter of national pride, especially for a nation in making. Robinson and Gallagher in their pursuit of repairing this traditional paradox of empire's definition suggest that economic expansion is neither necessary nor direct exponent of imperialism. So for a better understanding of the British Empire, we have to perceive it with its cloak of 'political lien' over the areas of 'informal paramountcy' as well as 'outright political possession'.⁶⁰ It is only then that the empire with its nascent imperial conceptions can be found evolving in the early colonial outposts, till it grows into the 'vast empire on which the Sun never sets'.⁶¹ The Indian Empire is the only one which has slowly developed from an informal to

formal empire. This process can provide the glimpses of changing nature of imperial state capacity, both coercive and symbolic.

Though not like the grandiose sprouting of the Late Victorian era, the 1760s was a changing time for the British state. The imagery of the Empire was still not as pageant as 1897, but 'it was conventional to speak and write of a single British Empire'.⁶² British metropole was gradually being persuaded by the imperial fervour. On the other hand, British commercial companies which had been operating in India for a long time made a bond with the local network system. Much of this bond was based on personal relation achieved through private trade. Though as Marshall says, the decisive political dislocation featuring colonialism was more an 'evolution' rather than 'revolution', emanating originally after 1820's rather than 1760's, both 'continuity' and 'change' theorists accept that the Company was not 'simply another Indian state'.⁶³ Local networks and personal relationships along with difference from the natives were the features of early British in India. It was a time when indigenous components of continuity collaborated, conflicted and coexisted with the elements of imported institutions. In that age of porous cultural, commercial, and political boundaries came the defining moment for empire.

The late 1750s to early 1760s was a time when Company was in a dilemma. The EIC was still unsure about the Fort William's perception concerning the gravity of the situation. The battle of Plassey was more a successful coup rather than a battle, where Company's position was like a trump card used by the winning side. The dread of their arms made Company a power providing viable military assistance. From Plassey to Boxer the development was more multidimensional than it seems. Just after the Plassey, Shah Alam II had insisted the Company for the takeover of 'Suba Bengal'. On the other hand, Clive had been requesting the Court of Directors not to take the risk due to lack of forces and the potentiality of hostility in the territories. Company officials

also shared this cautious attitude of Clive regarding the grant of Dewani as they had feared it will ignite tension between the Nawab of Bengal and the Company. Shitab Ray, a prominent collaborator of the Company, warned Major Carnac, Governor of Calcutta not to 'meddle in this business'.⁶⁴ The company was precautious too. In answer to Mir Casim's anxiety of possible hostility regarding *Dewani*, Carnac wrote that Company would 'never deviate from the treaty'.⁶⁵ It was only after the Battle of Buxer Clive approved for the receipt of the grant of *Dewani* as for him 'times are since altered'.⁶⁶ However, the times had been altering long since; Company's reluctance reflects the former vigilant noninterventionist nature of the early Company officials.

The changing scenario of the world politics of the 17th and 18th century shows an interesting coexistence of two apparently different political entities- the absolutist state and powerful non state actors. While in Britain non-state authorities were gradually reduced and steadily outlawed within the country from the time of the Tudors, beyond the state's territoriality non-state actors became the only components for extending state capacity. Empire was a contradiction, 'a crisis for modern theories of sovereignty', which grew gradually with the parallel development of state capacity and colonies. An empire ran by non-state actors like a commercial company was the finest instance of all anomalies. These contradictions were always botched with the dominance of national interest over national legitimacy until Company had served the purpose in the predatory circumstances at the age of conquest. Until the non-state actors were ready to act as the agents of state's interest, they were provided with state's consent, favours, and sometimes aegis of protection. Empire was not some territorial possessions but the appearance of 'power and dominant interests outside Britain'.⁶⁷ While the imperial contradictions were lingering on the colonies as questions of sovereign authorities, in the homeland it had been creating anomalies with its own past. Long before the rise of British imperial identity, Elizabethian Britain had self-

styled themselves as an assailant to the Spanish empire. Later on, the romanticism of defeating the Spanish armada slowly developed into British superiority in shipping and afterward into the concepts like 'empire of the seas', whose heroes were people like Francis Drake, guardians of an empire of free trade and privateering.⁶⁸ This empire of the seas had a natural contempt for territorial possessions but the developments of the 18th century were changing it from inside. One of the principle causes was 'unmitigated evil' of Asiatic expansion.⁶⁹ Expansionist colonialism is an unruly beast as it is insatiable. 'Empire generated its own extension'; partly for economic reason and partly for strategic causes but never had a coherent one.⁷⁰ The imperial logic is mostly instantaneous; 'one valley led to the next, each river to its headwaters, and every sea to the other shore'.⁷¹ From the empire which was 'Protestant, commercial, maritime and free' and 'separated by a *cordon sanitaire* from the imperial diseases'⁷², Britain moved to create a 'new Rome' due to this contingent nature of expansionist logic. Again this development was not unanimously championed but imperial triumphalism was always contradicted with cautions against the territorial empire. But growing vested interest pushed away from the old conventions. Spanish threat had gone, but 'empire of free trade' had too many enemies to sheath the swords for then. Dutch threats had made them pursue the policy of castellation from the late 17th century, while by 1740s resisting the French capacity to wage war even in the colonial waters caused the final armament in the colonies. A decisive victory against the French was not achieved until the Seven Years War. The Seven Years War 'was the watershed' from when the Empire became more important than ever before.⁷³ Contempt for territorial empire had gone. By this time heroes like Drake were submerging into the imperial oblivion, while empire discovered its new champions like Clive. Empire always had its enemies and end of one conflict always

made its path to the next. Just like the incessant construction of state, empire was also being built relentlessly, both physically and ideologically till its demise.

The colonial possessions were having a different kind of problem, problem of authority. In the diplomatic term it was a question of sovereignty. While British state was not ready to share it within the territorial boundaries; beyond it, non-state actors were the potential shareholders of sovereign authority. It was a matter of conflict and conciliation not only between the Crown and the Company but also in between the Crown and the Parliament; the Company at Leadenhall Street and the one in the colonies, which makes the theme complex and influenced by different institutions. In the case of East India Company it was a culmination of private shareholder's profiteering motive and Crown's fiscal motive beyond Parliament's control. The company was empowered by a Royal Charter, which provided it legal aegis to commence foreign trade, jurisdictional control over British subjects in the foreign lands, and to initiate diplomatic talks with native powers.⁷⁴ Edmund Burke was right to observe EIC not simply as a 'Company formed for the extension of the British commerce', but the power and sovereign authority of the British state 'sent into the East'.⁷⁵ The same justifications used for legitimizing the so-called 'empire of the seas' proved to be handy for Company. At first, it was a resistance against Spanish coercion in the seas; later it became the task of keeping the French at bay in the colonial waters and soon it turned towards the rationale of self-defence against 'rampaging natives' and other threats.⁷⁶ All mercantile companies were non-state actors of violence, but they necessarily were under the state. Rahul Govind in his recent writing argued that Company's conquests were legitimized through 'a specific branch of war and peacemaking authority of the King'.⁷⁷ In the case of these functions King as a virtual stature was the immediate authority. There were variations of state control. The French East India Company was burdened with state regulations, while English East

India Company was under the protective aegis of the state, if not burdened with its authority. Originally European statehood in its age of conquest had been experiencing a new kind of change; extraterritoriality of non-state conquest parallel to comparatively limited state capacity. As the state was interested to extend the sways of its dominions, it intended to exploit the non-state capacities to wage war, pacify territories, and govern colonies. So, it seems to be a paradox that lines in between state and non-state realms of authorities were 'blurred' extraterritorially, while they were so clearly demarcated within the territory.⁷⁸ Company's attempt to acquire a sovereign position at least in the colonies was never complete and always goaded by the King's virtual control. Company's history is studded with these events of anxious conflict among which the cases of Keigwins's rebellion and Winter's rebellion are pretty noteworthy. Keigwin⁷⁹ and Winter⁸⁰, both of them justified their actions against the corporate authority of the Company, by resorting to the name of the King.

In the case of pre-colonial polity in India, sovereignty was a 'network of fragmented and layered forms of regional political power' only having one umbrella hegemon, the Mughals.⁸¹ So the Company's story that the fall of the Mughals caused an anarchic situation, potential to instigate a civil war, necessitating British expansion, is a perception idealized by the late 17th-century narratives.⁸² First of all, 18th-century politics was not merely a continuation of Mughal politics, but it was a significant break initialized by the rise of different regional powers. The company was a new player in this necessarily 'Asian commercial and political system'⁸³, and their foundation was instituted 'not on Indian collapse but on the emergence of a new order in eighteenth-century India'.⁸⁴ So Company's acceptance of the Mughal hegemony was obvious, because the '*farmans*' or '*nishans*', which they were granted initially from the Mughal governors and later on from the Emperors were valuable for them to operate in the native lands. Company's

supremacy at the seas and Mughal disinterest regarding the navy had rarely challenged the Company's legitimacy at the salt waters.

Great things of human histories were achieved at fringes, doorways of difference. Humankind had learned to fish in the confluence of hot and cold waters; great seat of knowledge Alexandria was situated at the meeting point of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, a meeting point of different cultures. Similarly curious but a 'strange absurdity'⁸⁵ like Company's 'corporate'⁸⁶ sovereignty was acquired in one another doorway, the fringe of British legitimacy and the coast of Mughal sovereignty. So the developments of the 18th century from a global perspective are signifying a changing time when the non-state actors were pushed to the fringes, the extraterritorial colonial outposts to keep the monopolistic legitimacy strong within the boundaries of the state. The company is the outcome of this transitioning time of Europe, only to be nibbled up gradually with the growth of state capacity by the end of 18th century. Company's possessions were causing unintended consequences in the 'balance-of-power calculations among European states', which caused throughout the 19th century the gradual 'abandonment of the fiction that non-state actors could govern entire subcontinents'.⁸⁷ As the grant of sovereignty left the Company to act independently, they often expressed independence from the state policies; it was a challenge to the emergent sovereignty of the nascent state in the British Isles. The British state's response was pretty decisive. In 1766, a committee of the House of Commons was set up to investigate Company's endeavours in the East Indies. By 1784, Pitt's India Bill was the official beginning of the encroachment by the Parliament, denying any proprietary right of EIC over the conquered territories. Rajat Kanta Ray said that the 'creation of modern colonial state inaugurated by Pitt and Dundas' has started only with the India Act of 1784.⁸⁸ The company long since had justified military armament on the basis of need for commercial security. In the later

phase, it justified its retention of the commercial monopolies to pay the immense investment risk for conquest and garrisoning. This circular logic was only viable to delay the process of revocation of monopoly, but not to defend any kind of sovereign right, or even any proprietary right. It was in 1813 'the government for the first time formally claimed sovereignty over the company's territories'.⁸⁹ On the colonial side of the coin, the company was a new contestant in the arena of post-Mughal polity who was still unable to import its 'new colonial order, involving distinctly British modes of government'.⁹⁰ A supporter of continuity and collaboration theory shows the mobilization of assets and support from the 'commercial men, scribal families, and local gentries' at the earlier part of the century towards regional chiefs and in the later part towards the Company as a justification for continuity.⁹¹ Bayly says that the European aspirations were same as the Indian local rulers while it is only Company, who succeeded in achieving them 'on a larger and more ominous scale'.⁹² Among the regional powers whoever succeeded in producing a 'clear surplus out of its revenue resources', could have attracted the *sahukars* and *shroffs* 'to transfer money to the theatres of war'.⁹³ The company was pretty successful in presenting 'assured surplus from the land tax of Bengal' as collateral to achieve confidence and secure large contract loans from the *sahukars*.⁹⁴ The fiscal capacity of the Company had a very little edge compared to other regional states like the Marathas but the difference was in yield. While comparatively chaotic Maratha confederacy was a less favoured choice, the Company gained a reputation for non-interference and being 'kind to those who are wealthy'.⁹⁵ With the rise of contractual revenue farmers, old kinship tie based *mansabdar* system was waning out and a new commercialized polity has been being built. Along with this sight of change, while the kingship was being commercialized, the outer crust of political rhetoric remained the same.⁹⁶ From this perspective, the Company will seem like any other country power operating under the

nominal hegemony of the Mughals, rather than trying to operate in the western norms. Robert Travers and Jon Wilson, inspired by Bayly's continuity thesis, have tried to locate the understanding of the colonial sovereignty within the customs of the colonies. It is true that Company had appropriated many of the ritualistic attributes of native polity, but the core of its legitimacy was an extension of the British state's authority. The interesting thing about doorways is that it's neither in, nor out; neither black nor white, but grey. So, Company had decisive attributes of changing polity lurking within, even when it had been operating in an Asiatic polity in Asiatic mode.

From the beginning, EIC was a political organization by nature and had operational control over the subjects under their authority. They had a sovereign authority over the seas as well as on the city enclaves from which they operated their trade. Following Dutch examples and after a long struggle they have successfully fortified their settlements, provided protection to their subjects; both native and European, exercised jurisdictional and governmental power and most importantly collected revenue from the territories under their authority. The company had minted its own coins, a necessary appendix to all Sovereign Governments.⁹⁷ The company continued to mint coin in the name of the Mughal emperor, though they had started to infuse their own symbolic sovereign existence in the inscriptions of the *sikkas* slowly.⁹⁸ All these attributes were thought as the symbols of sovereignty not only by the British but also by its collaborators and competitors. The company had become 'Company Bahadur', but not totally a country power. The company had overlapping sanctions from Crown, Mughals, and locals, the three pillars of sovereign authority. Crown's charter bolstered by the Crown's fiscal interest, protected Company from the Parliamentary critiques. Mughal sovereignty empowered them with the Asiatic legitimacy while local treaties helped them in acquiring operational efficiency in regional

commercial as well as the political arena. All these being intermixed with the company's corporative authority created a curious mixture sovereignty which helped them to exist, expand and slowly exert.⁹⁹ Their existence and lease of sovereign prerogatives were essentially temporary, waiting to be resumption by the state.

Sovereignty as a theme of high politics came into the forefront from the mid-18th century. Rather than being an 'absolute, timeless, and invariable attribute of the state', it seemed to change over time. The history of EIC as the confluence among Asiatic shared sovereignty, Western monopolistic sovereignty, and non-state corporate sovereignty, provides the vestiges of colonial state formation. Despite of the existence of multiple sovereign entities, Company had failed to formulate his own kind of authority. The statist attributes like war and peacemaking were an extension of King's prerogative. From an undefined, fractured, contested position Company had tried to acquire a monopoly of legitimate violence, in which it was partially successful. But the success was short-lived if not imaginary, only to be traumatized in 1857.

From Pacifier to Counterinsurgent: A Journey of Colonial State

“I, Bernal Diaz del Castillo... tell you the story of myself and my comrades; all true conquerors, who served His Majesty in the discovery, conquest, pacification, and settlement of the provinces of New Spain.”

Bernal Diaz, *The Conquest of New Spain*¹⁰⁰ (1516-21)

“We will be back in Fallujah. It will be at the time and the place of our choosing. We will hunt down the criminals. We will kill them or we will capture them. And we will pacify Fallujah.”

Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt¹⁰¹ (2004)

As per as Tilly's concept of 'internal war' is concerned, above mentioned excerpt from the writings of Bernal Diaz, the last surviving member of Spanish conquistadors reveals that post-conflict struggle as a prerequisite for settlement as well as a necessary aftermath of conquest. Does it change much after centuries? Bernal Diaz and his comrades in the early days of Hispanic conquest, indulged in a different kind of war against culturally different adversaries, had been experiencing the same like Mark Kimmitt and his modern Blackwater operatives who had pacified the insurgents of Fallujah in Iraq during the starting of summer, 2004. Though Diaz and Kimmitt are separated along the scale of space and time, both were experiencing analogous hostility, trauma and a motive for triumph. Does it mean Diaz's story would have been useful for Kimmitt before his exploits in Iraq? Have the components of this kind of war remained identical while historical contexts and driving motives transformed? These questions are related to the broader debate of military history; if it is possible to seek the roots of the modern day's conflicts in the earlier wars. In one extreme, there are 'New War' theorists like Mary Kaldor, to whom contemporary internal wars are 'different both from classical inter-state wars and classical civil wars'.¹⁰² On the other extreme, there are scholars like Douglas Porch who argues that modern conceptualization of counterinsurgency is a kind of rebranding of the 'rough methods of conquest and exploitive government as an extension of "soft power" that benefitted the government' in a changed environment of intensified democracy.¹⁰³ Does 'New War' point out a decisive change, obsolescing 'Old War' or is it just another 'rebranding' of the older rough

methods? Well, the debate is too nascent to hit the dead end. But with respect to the question that if the study of older battles is as yet valuable for contemporary ones, even the sternest partisan of 'New War' school will acknowledge that numerous features of this so-called 'New War' take after to the wars of early modern times.¹⁰⁴ So, conflicts like counterinsurgency will always be developing specific measures to counter particular insurgency 'tailored to the environment',¹⁰⁵ but to know them properly one Kimmitt will always have to study the exploits of another Diaz.

War has been classified according to its nature into two broad categories; conventional and unconventional. War against insurgencies or rebellions has been viewed from the perspective of the second category, where the causes of nonconformity depend on the insurgents' affinity of not playing by the rules of their opponent.¹⁰⁶ All these conflicts hold one factor in familiar and that is the lopsidedness in the belligerents' capacity to wage war. Owing to this nature of irregularity, these conflicts are categorized as asymmetric wars. These overarching categories seem to have a problem due to the growth of newer terminologies, a byproduct of the concept of 'new war'. These elusive military jargons do not end with these only.* The post-WWII era has seen the end of 'Total War', while military experts coined another nomenclature for protracted battles; 'Limited War'. James Cable showed that the post-nuclear era trauma in political arena made various superpowers to adopt a policy of limited war, limited by humanitarian, political, geographical constraints.¹⁰⁷ Interesting thing is that 'limited war' blurs the difference between conventional and unconventional war. Both Russo-Finnish 'winter' war and Pol Pot's Khemar Ruz actions can be classified as modern 'limited war'. These limited tendencies of new warfare are often equated with the characteristics of protracted 'small wars'. Along with this new found interest in 'New War', the concept of 'Low-Intensity Conflict' has emerged in the stage of debate. Though the New War scholars denounced it as a cold war era term only applicable for the

guerrilla war or terrorism, it remains to be one of the largely discussed issues of the current day's military studies. Like other typologies, 'low-intensity conflict' is also full of complexities and ambiguities. John Schlicht in his article defined 'low-intensity warfare' not necessarily as another category of small war as it can exist 'as a substratum of conventional war'.¹⁰⁸ He also mentions that 'low-intensity conflict' is not necessarily a combative method, but it can provide necessary help during 'peacetime contingency operations through intelligence operations, humanitarian assistance, evaluation of non-combatants, surges in security assistance, rescue and recovery operations and other forms of support'.¹⁰⁹ But regarding the historicity of 'low-intensity warfare' Schlicht's designations are a little indefinite. He mentions that during the Indian Wars, the Pacification of the Philippines American army had followed 'low-intensity conflict' doctrine while dubiously he characterizes it as a method which employs combative techniques as the last resort.¹¹⁰ We are aware of the punitive actions followed by the colonists against the Indian aboriginals which contradicts Schlicht's claim. While most of the scholars used all these terms interchangeably, this study argues that there are grains of difference in between earlier and contemporary unconventional conflicts as well as elements of continuities if we scale it from the perspective of changing state capacity. Rather than indulging into this theoretical havoc of new jargons, I wish to stick to the earlier overarching terms like 'irregular', 'unconventional', 'small', 'counterinsurgency' warfare to keep the *longue duree* interlinks unharmed and bring in a more all encompassing terminology to grasp the immensity of the subject.

'Counterinsurgency' is the most clichéd but exasperatingly indefinite typology in military history, an 'umbrella term' as said by Kilcullen.¹¹¹ This obscurity is visible in the scholars' approach to the definition. While defining counterinsurgency, Kilcullen has found it more copious in numbers if judged against conventional conflicts.¹¹² On the other hand, David Galula

mentions that while conventional wars occurred frequently through the ages, 'no more than a score of revolutionary wars have occurred, most of them since 1945'.¹¹³ For Kilcullen, it's an unremitting affair which is as old as the conventional conflict, while Galula found it as a modern occurrence, rather than a derivative of earlier small wars. Douglas Porch supports Galula's point that as counterinsurgency is interlinked with modern democracy and the modern concept of legitimacy 'anchored in the consent of the governed', it's a modern concept.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, Porch does not refute methodological continuities between historical unconventional wars and modern counterinsurgencies. Lexicographically it's a war by the state to dismantle insurgents' intention of destabilizing state power. In this sense, the term 'counterinsurgency' is a very statist definition for unconventional conflicts and it mostly depends on the definition of 'insurgency'. So the concept of counterinsurgency is composed of three facets: nature, causes of insurgency, and methods of curtailing them.¹¹⁵ Mostly paraphrasing Clausewitz, Galula defined insurgency as a 'protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order'.¹¹⁶ The only difference is that these unconventional conflicts are not traditionally Clausewitzian; not 'continuation of politics by other means' in the same way as conventional warfare. In case of conventional war where the politics end in the form of diplomacy, it continues in the form of war. Unconventional wars have no clear-cut boundaries in between diplomatic politics and military politics due to its protracted character.¹¹⁷ Regarding the concept of 'insurgency', there are some differences between the official 'handbook' type studies on counterinsurgencies and historical works on them. Neither it's true that there is no consensus regarding the definition of 'insurgency' among military historians nor military officials nor field manual studies are utterly scornful about historical studies. Rather contrary to this most of field manuals think that the

guidance provided to the soldiers 'must be grounded in historical studies'.¹¹⁸ The only difference is that their concept of historical insurgency and counterinsurgency as a significant point starts only in the 20th century, while military historians are more interested to find out historical roots of modern-day counterinsurgency.

What is insurgency then according to official field manuals? In this age of terrorism, it is obvious to be confused regarding them. According to *FM 3-24* counterinsurgency manual, before WWI, insurgencies are mostly 'conservative' due to their limited concerns like 'defending hearth, home, and monarchies'.¹¹⁹ After WWI it had taken 'revolutionary' turn, for example, the Bolshevik Revolution and after WWII, it had turned into a 'nationalist/anti-colonial' struggle like Polish resistance. David Gompert in his book provides a comprehensive analysis of insurgency natures and their types. To him, insurgencies are mostly organized movements against ruling authority 'by a combination of force and popular appeal', fuelled by political, ethnic, economic or religious grievances. In the age of Globalization insurgencies had reached a multinational grasp from their previous limitation within the national boundaries. Gompert's taxonomy of insurgencies has four types; local, local-international, global-local, and global. Colombian 'drug wars' can be mentioned as the example of the first type where the scope, participants, and effects are strictly localized. In the case of local-international types the insurgencies were localized according to its scope while having external bits of help in terms of money, arms, fighters, media, and propaganda etc like in case of the Vietnam War. The global-local type insurgencies are those which start as a local one with external assistance but transforms into a wider regional or global struggle. In the case of Afghanistan where the Pashtun tribal insurgency turns into a wider jihadist struggle, is a classic case of the global-local insurgency. Global insurgencies have a tendency of targeting the world order; capitalist, neo-liberal etc. Pre-Bolshevik movements and

post-Cuba Latin American struggle of Che Guevara can be classified into this category.¹²⁰ But these categories are not watertight compartments but there is a steady transition from one category to other or infusion of characters of multiple categories. For example, the Haqqani nexus from 1980s to 1990s shows a steady transition from local to regional to global stature while balancing all the characteristics as one.¹²¹ As field manuals mostly focus on the applied side of these studies, they have gone so far to single out potential disturbances long before they turn into an 'insurgency'. They call it 'proto-insurgency'.¹²² Byman defines that when some small terrorist group achieves components like 'politically relevant identity', linkage with popular cause, dominance over rival organizations, control over an area of respite beyond state control; they can be termed as modern insurgents.

For the historians, modern days COIN is a derivative of the age-old irregular warfare, like Rome's campaigns in Germania or France's peninsular campaigns against patricians. In this case, they have characteristically converged and diverged 'insurgency' with other modes of struggle, like guerrilla warfare, subversive warfare, terrorism etc. Just like Thomas R. Mockaities differentiates 'insurgency' from 'guerrilla warfare' on the basis of the former's having definite objective regarding alternative governmental authority, while tactically they are identical. He further elaborates insurgency having a potential for hybridization in between subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.¹²³ Subversive warfare as seen by many is said to have a potentiality to go parallel with insurgency and sometimes to turn into a coup. Galula for instance strictly separated 'revolution', 'plot' and 'insurgency'. Adverse to his concept of the insurgency, a 'methodically, step by step' approach to achieve 'specific intermediate objectives', he defines 'revolution' as a 'sudden, brief, spontaneous, unplanned' affaire and 'plot' as a 'clandestine action' to overthrow authority swiftly.¹²⁴ The same thing can be said in case of terrorism and

insurgency. Beckett, Max Boot, etc mentions that 'terrorism' differs from 'insurgency' as the former never plans to take over state apparatus or to the held territory.¹²⁵ But subscribing to Byman's concept of 'proto-insurgency' it can be said that terrorism can be part of insurgent's or a proto-insurgents strategic approach. However, these strict differentiations which have been coined by military historians previously are becoming obsolete with the rise of contemporary warfare. Due to the impact of globalization even local guerrillas are having specific, persistent objectives. 'Political organizations and propaganda have become important in the last two centuries for the practitioners of irregular warfare'.¹²⁶ For example the *Lashkar-e-Taiba's* three-day 'terrorist spectacular' during the attack of November, 2008 against local, foreign, and symbolic targets shows the terrorist organisations are appreciating 'the value (and attention) gained by hitting hybrid targets'.¹²⁷ Guerrilla warfare, insurgency etc all definitions are losing their distinct components and gradually merging into the symbiotic definition. At present, asking the question what is insurgency is in itself becoming inoperative as 'insurgency' and 'counterinsurgency', both are 'at heart an adaptation battle' and our knowledge about them 'is never static, always evolving'.¹²⁸ So, rather than 'what', our question should be 'how' insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have been historically evolved, transformed and even reincarnated. To have such a comprehensive historical view, we have to look for broader term with all-encompassing definition rather than the ones used in defence studies or strategic studies.

There is an influential, if not dominant trend which describes insurgencies as primitive social rebellion in a larger context. Mostly influenced by the Marxist revolutionary paradigm most of the partisan of this viewpoint that poverty is the root cause of the insurgency. According to this concept, insurgencies can't be understood from the coloured lenses of organized politics as these comparisons usually misinterpret consciousness as an organization. Usually, they focus on pre-

political insurgencies, a time without the attributes like conscious leadership, well-defined aims, proper programmes which are necessary characters of organized movements. Hobsbawm's concept of the pre-political insurgency is not accepted by Ranajit Guha as to him, the colonial situation was not a pre-political one. Guha has mentioned about six elements of consciousness of the insurgents' activity. Both for Hobsbawm and Guha, the insurgency is a culmination of smaller acts of defiance and that defiance is often expressed through 'unconnected' crimes, mostly banditry.¹²⁹ Guha says that these 'unconnected crimes' are designated by the ambiguous documentation of the colonial state. As all the official dialects of the colonial state are embedded in the discourse of power, all official documents are prose of counterinsurgency. Guha's concept of ambiguity in archives and Hobsbawm's concept of bandits as primitive social revolutionaries influenced romanticized view about primitive rebels. From the concept of critique of the dominant archival dialect, it had changed into the methodological inversion of documents. As a result, all bandits in colonial documents were read as social revolutionaries in primitive form. But all bandits were nothing like a social revolutionary, and most of them are not even essentially against the state. Karen Barkey in her book differentiated in between class-based movements, which 'threaten structural arrangement in society' and banditry, which 'attempts to benefit from the existing structural arrangements in society'.¹³⁰ These structural arrangements based opportunities were mostly supplied either by the state or by the nobles and bandits mostly acts as an opportunist, ready to sell swords to the highest bidder. In the case of Europe Braudel says that they are the lords who aided banditry and terrestrial piracy, as these ways seemed to them useful in countering authority of the state. So, most of the bandits were not like Robin Hood, and even the myth of Robin Hood who converted himself as a royal archer supports the opportunist character of the bandits.¹³¹ In the case of early modern times with the slow growth of

difference between state/non-state actors of violence bandits as the public enemy rose up, while their use by state authorities also continued. So the study of quelling of banditry as a part of counterinsurgency can be a pertinent scale for analyzing state capacity.

The history of irregular warfare is as old as the concept of war itself, while for some scholars it is conventional war which seems to be a 'recent invention' compared to the other.¹³² Ancient shreds of evidence of irregular can be found even before the classical ages and it's only from the Greco-Roman times that ancient art of warfare was belittled, stigmatized and gradually pushed behind the shadows. With the growth of agricultural societies warfare slowly has moved towards standing army based regular warfare and by the time of the age of reason regular warfare became the only championed one. The violence of irregular conflict gradually became criminalized if not died out. How did this transformation happen? Martin Van Creveld said that in the early modern times with the growth of a more powerful state the rules of wars have changed a lot. As state by itself evolved from theological practices of legitimacy towards a secular one, its concept about a war started to change. Authority started to distinguish war from 'crime', 'it was defined as something waged by sovereign states and by them alone'.¹³³ So soldiers were made and demarcated with particular attributes and symbolic marks like uniforms for a successful separation from society. The society gave birth to two legitimate social identities towards war: 'lawful bearer of arms' and 'pacifists'.¹³⁴ This 'lawful bearer of arms' not only symbolized the state's capacity but also state's perceived and often idealized vision of coherent presence against the societal other. Michel Foucault has given some interesting picture, showing how the state's coherent identity embodies itself within the 'docile body' of soldiers;

"By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made... the machine required can be constructed... a calculated constraint runs slowly through

each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times. Recruits become accustomed to ‘holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders;... *La Mettrie's L'Homme-machine* is both a materialist reduction of the soul and a general theory of dressage, at the center of which reigns the notion of ‘docility’, which joins the analyzable body to the manipulable body.”¹³⁵

The essence of this new age, an age of coherence and manipulable laws, had also reflected in the concept of war itself. If Kant is the father figure of the ideas of this age, Clausewitz is the poster boy of these new ideas of war. Kant's reflections on politics show in spite of his championing of revolutionary concepts, he was basically a product of his times who believe in constraints and laws. Kant believed that ‘man is an animal... although as a rational creature, he desires a law’.¹³⁶ By which he meant that everybody's freedom could be equalized with some necessary disciplinary limits. In this sense, Clausewitz was the Kant of warfare philosophy. For Clausewitz who was also a product of early nineteenth-century Prussian army, had grown contempt for humane, animalistic nature of survival in warfare, which he called ‘real war’ and gradually cherished the disciplined, conventional, regimental side of modern warfare or the ‘just war’.¹³⁷ Just like Kant’s love for coherent laws, Clausewitz ‘was struggling to advance a universal theory of what war ought to be, rather than what it actually was and had been’.¹³⁸ It does not mean that European warfare in the late Eighteenth- early Nineteenth century had not experienced irregular warfare; the only difference was that these warfare techniques and their practitioners were continuously regimentalised by various states. European arenas had witnessed the rise of most efficient irregular light units like Hussars, Dragoons, Highlanders, and Cossacks. Clausewitz himself confronted the last of these units in the Russian campaign of Napoleon during the

winters of 1812 and it looks like his disdain for irregulars originated from that. Though Clausewitz was aware of irregular small wars, in his terms ‘*Volkskrieg*’ (people’s war) or ‘*Kleinkrieg*’ (little war), those are either viewed from a statist perspective, one weak state’s weapon against the stronger one or with ‘half an eye’.¹³⁹ Whatever the ‘real war’ was, Europe had developed new rules for war where ‘state interest’ became the ‘dominant legitimation for war’ and in this new scenario ‘claims of just cause by non-state actors could no longer be perused through violent means’.¹⁴⁰ While state contentiously justified its coercion-extraction-protection logic for claiming legitimate authority, brigands, privateers, highwaymen etc were criminalized more strictly leading to the removal of the privatized protection logic. For Clausewitz as well as his successors of bellicist state theorists, and even for Tilly, war became a statist and external affair, while non-state actors were delegitimized and gradually pushed to the fringes both socially and territorially.

While Europe was being enlightened by Kant's state and Clausewitz's war, away from the Western ‘civilized’ world western armies had been experiencing a different culture of war. In Europe war had become a conflict among sovereigns but in the East, the concept of the sovereign is not as absolute as European monarchies. For example in India, grandiose Mughals had theoretical despotic authority over its subject, but what it really had, was some symbolic legitimacy and operational hegemony; just as stated in Mujaffar Alam's dictum, ‘a "patchwork quilt" rather than a "wall to wall carpet”’.¹⁴¹ Same can be argued in case of Ottoman empires, where the authority used to share the attributes of a sovereign entity with ‘bandit chiefs’ to quell peasant rebellions.¹⁴² European kind of sovereignty due to its base on monopolistic legitimacy, and in the Clausewitzian universe there is no concept of ‘shared sovereignty’. This problem was encountered by the colonists, flag-bearers of West in the Eastern domain. The small warriors of

the colonies found Clausewitz irrelevant in their battlefields; to them, it was 'a mere theoretical gimmick of interstate war'.¹⁴³ The problem is better stated by Marshal de Castellane that while in Europe 'once master of two or three large cities, the entire country is yours' but outside Europe continuous subjugation is the only way to keep the areas comparatively tranquil.¹⁴⁴ In the pre-modern Asiatic states also while the wars were fought to capture cities, vast tracts of uncontrollable, prone-to-rebellion areas were usually left with loose and nominal docility. In the middle ages, Indian polity was based on capturing and recapturing of strategic forts while adjoining territories or '*mawas*' were rarely tempered with. During the time of Sultanate, forts had purposes like defending conquered territories against indigenous powers, keeping the line of control and further potential for further conquests open and last but not the least serving as a recruitment and market ground.¹⁴⁵ The surrounding '*mawas*' were often left for indigenous control until the comparative growth of state capacity in Mughal times. Just like a Tillyan tributary empire, Mughal state's hunger for more resources pushed it towards further penetration into the rural area. Here we can compare the trajectories of Mughal and Ottoman states' drive for centralization based on this coercion-extraction logic. Mostly from the time of Akbar, Mughal state tried some kind of control in extraction process by professing Todarmal's system. To implement the system centrally controlled musketeers or *Dakhil* musketeers were stationed in every locality under the command of an *Amir-i-Chakla*.¹⁴⁶ Along with revenue duties and ordering of rebel villages, these musketeers proved to be handy against raiding insurgents when they gradually learned to load and fire while mounted. Musketeers, 'comparatively economical instruments' were usually kept away from the hold of the nobles.¹⁴⁷ With the growth of rebellion throughout the empire in the 17th century and the starting of the Deccan expedition, the numbers of *Dakhil* matchlock men increased shows the growth of punitive expeditions. The muskets

‘made a noteworthy contribution’ in the comparative centralization of empire but it ‘came to be used also by the defiant sections of the hereditary chiefs and the peasantry’.¹⁴⁸ Punitive actions usually resulted in forcible slavery, increased during the 17th century. Rebel villages often for non-payment of revenue, ‘most convenient pretext’ for ‘being the charge of rebellion’ were raided, reduced of the male population, and rest were sold as slaves.¹⁴⁹ But scarcely these actions had borne fruit cause in spite of Mughal tries of banning the local smiths from gunsmithing, the villages were rearmed again and again.¹⁵⁰ Where punitive actions ceased to be a better option, these Asiatic empires had tried co-option methods often with the enemies of state authority. Unlike the Mughals, Ottoman Empire's try of centralization was obstructed not by large-scale insurgencies, but by local bandit chiefs. But Ottomans had patronized those bandits to coerce rebel peasants, refractory chiefs and frequently against other bandits. Emperors like Ahmed I, ‘was willing and able to control and manipulate these bandits’ and such ‘deals, bargains, and patronage attests not to its weakness but to its strength’.¹⁵¹ They were keen on playing the refractory peasants, even bandit chiefs one against another.¹⁵² Even Mughals are same in their case of using bandit chiefs against one another in exchange of rewards. Richards and Rao in their study of Mughal bandits in the early 18th century show that the lack of efficient supports from centre compelled the Mughal governors to make alliances with local armed Telegu chiefs occasionally bandits. In one instance bandit chief Riza Khan was used by governor Rustam Dill Khan to curtail another chief called Papara.¹⁵³ Russian pattern of state formation also follows the same bargaining trajectory along with coercion. Cossacks, the most hated creatures of the Clausewitzian universe, were dealt with both rewards and swords. While the Cossacks of the upper Don or the civilized Cossacks were progressively included into the army, the ones from the lower Don were punished repeatedly. In cases of these empires, sovereign authority was

defined by their position as the sole authority to struck a bargain and provide a reward, rather than to monopolize means of violence. Here lays the difference between these Asiatic empires and European empires which turned into absolutist states like Tudor England, Bourbons France, who had dismantled local strongholds, demilitarized countryside, outlawed non-state actors of violence successfully. Aware of this difference most of the colonial commanders had grown up a concern that the art of war against these illusive irregular foes could not be furnished along with the western line. Charles Callwell, a British artillery officer turned military theorist, often praised as the Clausewitz of colonial battlefield used the term 'small war' to designate this distinctness. According to him the regular western armies when finding themselves against irregular forces 'the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of modern regular warfare'.¹⁵⁴ Small wars have 'no particular connection with the scale'.¹⁵⁵ It includes 'the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions, and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.'¹⁵⁶ The last two types clearly indicate the colonial nature of the whole concept of 'small war'. If Callwell's concept of 'small war' is the colonial predecessor of the modern COIN, then it can be seen that in his definition Callwell persistently supported the difference in between the colonial men and barbarians. While sustaining it he boils down 'mastery of small unit tactics, the acquisition of tactical Intel..., and a capacity to drink endless glasses of tea with tribal sheiks as they exact their price for cooperation.'¹⁵⁷

Hereby I wish to address the combative and non-combative operations and approaches by the state in a colonial set up to ensure tranquillity, as pacification. Lexicographical meaning will point it as an 'action or process of securing the cooperation or surrender of a population through

military force or other forms of coercion'. The term derives from the Latin word *pacificus*, meaning peacekeeping. Pacification is an old derivative of peace building, if not purely peacekeeping. This term has been used on various occasions to point out different kinds of coercive actions impinged with conciliatory means. The term pacification was first used in the Edict of Nantes (1598), where it meant a regulation or order enacted by a sovereign or state to put an end to conflict and restlessness.¹⁵⁸ In the case of empire building, the term was first used by Philip II of Spain, who declared in July 1573 that further conquest by Spain will be termed as 'pacification'. It was not just an alternative for conquest but new kind of means like 'cooperation with the lords and nobles', 'gathering information about the various tribes, languages, and divisions of the Indians', 'friendship with them through trade and barter', to pacify and indoctrinate Indians.¹⁵⁹ Philip's doctrine pretty much reflects the modern 'hearts and minds' approach in counterinsurgency. Ages later Gallieni suggests it from Algerian battlefields, as a combined method of using politics and military against enemies. During the Vietnam wars, the term returns as a substitute for counterinsurgency. Like many other counterinsurgency nomenclatures, we can say subscribing to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lee Bullard's comment that pacification is yet to be discovered from the experiences as it is still 'a thing of vague outline'.¹⁶⁰

Recent trends in political theory, the term 'pacification' reincarnated as a broader expression compared to its earlier connotations. A group of political theorists, known as radical philosophers like Mark Neocleous, George Rigakos etc opined that 'for tactical purposes critical theory really needs to re-appropriate the term "pacification"'.¹⁶¹ For them the term 'pacification' expresses 'a far more "productive" dimension'; more than the general perception which equates it 'with the actions of colonizing powers', connects it with 'counter-insurgency tactics', and understands 'as the military crushing of resistance'. 'Pacification' is 'more the fabrication of

order, of which the crushing of resistance is but one part'.¹⁶² In this fabrication of new social order 'insurgency would not and could not occur' and 'in which capitalist accumulation might flourish'.¹⁶³ This particular view of radical political philosophers defines the term from a broader politico-economic paradigm, differentiating it from the general sense of military pacification.

For our purpose the term pacification is used to differentiate it from other purely military processes, to address the umbrella-like entirety as well as the undeterminable character of colonial 'small' wars. So from my point of view, Michael P.M. Finch's definition of pacification is acceptable. Finch writes: 'Pacification was the military-political process by which a colonial possession was consolidated following the official end of the conquest'.¹⁶⁴ Though Finch uses this term in the historical context of late-Nineteenth century imperial drive for conquest backed by industrialization, as mentioned previously in case of India imperial conquest-pacification predates 'the golden or rather the iron age of gunboat diplomacy'¹⁶⁵ of late Victorian empire. So the use of this operational definition will not be problematic as far as we remain attentive to the difference of intensity in the method. The difference is obvious cause in the age of maxim-guns and breach loading rifles the decisive superiority was achievable more easily, swiftly and with lesser manpower. For example in the Battle of Omdurman, Kitchener's army easily uprooted numerically superior Dervish army. In another case when General Lugard's army moved against Tiv town Housa-Fulani in Sudan, 'the Tiv fought back most gamely but were powerless against maxim guns'.¹⁶⁶ In the Indian scene nearly before a century and more when the superiority of arms had not been so dreadful, the methods followed were of more conciliatory paths. Put aside the scale of intensity if we focus on the basic components of pacification as an umbrella term, we will see it as a method using all means; 'a judicious mixture of force and persuasion, of severity and moderation'.¹⁶⁷ The British 'small war' school led by Callwell viewed 'pacification' within

the larger rubric, where it is defined as suppression of insurrection and lawlessness. Callwell's successors Charles Gwynn and H. J. Simson also defined pacification both from the perspective of colonial policing and suppression of insurrection. Charles Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* provides a picture of non-combative techniques employed during the pacification of Burma; pertinent to suggest the differences in between purely military methods and pacificatory methods. Just like mentioning martial laws, a vital tool of pacification Gwynn shows how civil administration functions along with the military. In some cases Gwynn is more in support of civil controlled peacekeeping rather than dual control, giving primacy to policing.¹⁶⁸ But in the early phases of colonization 'pacification' was more coercive sometimes than later days policing and peacekeeping due to the initial inconsistencies.¹⁶⁹ Late Eighteenth-Century onwards India was a spectacular case of pacificatory minor operations due to commercial and economic penetration of the Company. 'Hunting down and dispersing bands of plunderers (often the discharged, and unpaid, soldiery of an Indian ruler), coercing refractory local chieftains, and 'revenue work' made continual demands upon the Company forces'.¹⁷⁰ The official documents will show a steady transformation in the usage of the pacification. The term rarely came up as a word with proper connotation prior to 19th century. This transformation towards coherence was an imperial occurrence. British pacification of Yunan province in China reflects 'pacification' as a protracted fight against rebels. Prior to the successful subjugation of Yunan war taxes were collected irregular forces were recruited, showing the presence of proper pacificatory strategy.¹⁷¹ The evidences from Burma in 1888 reflect the same kind of consistency in pacificatory policy. The pacification of the 'Bos' bandits shows Victorian Empire had acquired a sense of imperial coherence. Pacification of Sagaing district was characterized by special operations under civil-military joint action, organised intelligence department, consistent try of alienating decoits from

the populace by collective fine system etc. But the most important character was the colonial state's attempt of routine disarmament, a systematic approach of control.¹⁷² Then it was used interchangeably with tranquilization, maintaining order, etc. From the 19th century the term started to appear in the colonial archives more often in the correspondences. In case of Rajasthan during the early half of 19th century, the term occurred as a mode of conciliatory policing approach to stop border dispute in between to legally sovereign, indirectly ruled principalities of Sirohi and Marwar. One aspect of this type of politico-military consolidation work would continue throughout the empire after the 18th century and mostly to the end of 19th century. Throughout the long 19th century the empire would gain more methodical and ideological coherence and the term would return again and again but in a methodical tune ever than before. It is not at all sole application of force or absorptions of potential opponents, because the army's capability of achieving peace has its own limitations.¹⁷³ The term in the early British times conveys rather a coloured view about the newly acquired territories. As Indian society was thought to be torn by endemic warfare with inherently hostile neighbours, the British state was 'in a constant state of preparation for war'.¹⁷⁴ So the company had been self-fashioning itself as a sovereign authority, securing peace in an inherently hostile area. In the early phases, even the British had made pacts for help with the potential refractory elements to play one against one. While sovereignty in a changing imperial structure had transformed slowly towards a decisive end from 18th to 19th century, the state's intention of creating a tranquil state under the aegis of imperial peace became stronger. In this journey from a non-state company governed 'informal empire' to empire under the crown the changing definition of sovereignty reflected in the 'internal' pacification wars. So a symbiotic study of both is necessary for the proper understanding of the imperial statehood.

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Chapter 2

‘Pacification’ in Pre-Colonial and Early Colonial Bengal, 1720-1770

The elusive 18th century in India had seen parallel and contradictory developments. The waning out Mughal grandeur evoked the sense of figurative darkness at the centre, while little regional beacons of prosperity bloomed at the fringes. When Delhi was being sacked by Nader Shah after the battle of Karnal in 1739, Nawab Sarfaraj Khan had a considerably secured position. It was a twilight zone between the passing empire and the aspiring ones. Colonial elements constituted only a fraction of this metamorphosis, ‘stimulated, modified or aborted existing patterns of change’. The Bengal province was the cradle of this coalescence, union of pre-colonial and early colonial factors ultimately shaping the contours of hybrid colonial entity. Though the term ‘pacification’ previously has been defined as a colonial phenomena, considering the sense of continuity its usage is also passed on to the pre-colonial circumstances. This chapter argues that the considerable pacification achieved by the pre-colonial predecessors of EIC facilitated the later to have an easier start from their costal enclaves of Calcutta, compared to Bombay or Madras.

Masinissas of Bengal: the Times of Murshid Quli and Alivardi.

February, 1687, Hugli and Balasor; Job Charnock had been initiating his operations as ample demonstration of power, believing that it would create crisis for the Mughals and force them to come to terms. Charnock’s men had rummaged through Hugli, Thana forts, Balasor, and finally seized Hijili. Shah-n- shah Aurangzeb was busy with his plans towards Deccan more specifically Hyderabad. “He did not hear of the proceedings of the English till the beginning of the March, and then contented himself with calling for the map and ascertaining where such obscure places as Hugli and Balasor were situated.”¹ Even Shayista Khan was not much concerned with the British exploits, which seemed to him that could be pushed back to the shore easily. By the end of the 17th century Mughal Empire had bigger fishes to fry and the trifles of peripheral marshlands like Hijili were the least things to be worried about. Thus the start of the 18th century had different meanings to different belligerent parties.

Charnock's amphibious offensive in Hugli had its own past; British dream for the completion of a long cherished objective of erecting fortified settlements of trade. In the Indian political arena of 17th and 18th century forts had been reemerging as sturdy pieces of politico-martial dominance. Britishers like other Europeans entered into this positional game with different type of aims to fulfil compared to the mainland powers. The fledgling Maratha state defended its existence by extensive fortification. The very essence of the Maratha state was forts.² This trend of castellation was not confined to the Marathas alone, but Rohilla and Bangash Afghans in the age of regional state formation had been also fortifying to a large extent. Parallel with the gradual growth in the local political individuality of the Afghan chiefdoms, these newborn principalities acquired sophistication in defence; a steady move from bamboo thickets to stone walls. Employment of European freelance engineers like Antoine Polier as well as exaction of cesses like *abwab marammathai qila* by the Afghan chiefs shows the seriousness of these strategic approaches.³ Mughal Empire had ruled the plains with their cavalry while gunpowder arms 'did permit them to breach the walls of fortresses' though it's proficiency was not that pivotal to claim total victory over hill forts like Chittor, Ranthambhor or Asirgarh.⁴ It was a matter of perception also. Fortresses were not always seen as rally points for rebels by the Mughals, but rather 'seen as obstacles to local revolts'.⁵ On the other hand the Tudor state had steadily defortified the feudal strongholds, which were seen as the spearheads of defiance. In England the tendency of dismantling fortification as a statist approach of control can be traced back to the time of Henry II, whose '*quo warranto*' inquiry into the castles and demolition of the forts without any proper 'castellar right' in the 12th century can be mentioned as one of the earliest attempts of 'peace through force'.⁶ European absolutist states like France had started defortification since the end of 16th century while for the Holy Roman Empire the decastelation surge started from the latter half of the 17th century.⁷ Even the Mughal perception did not remain stagnant. By the end of 17th century when 'forts and other strong holds were increasingly turned into centres of local development and autonomy'; incapability to stop local fortification became a predicament for the Mughals.⁸ While this resurgence of fortification had been ruling the Indian mainland, the forts along shoreline had been seeing a different kind of development.

In Indian case fortresses were not the pivots of martial assets like the European *trace italienne* or Vauban's star-shaped fortifications, rather they served mostly as administrative centres.⁹ They have either functioned as the reserve depots or treasure holds, manned by local infantry militia or

a decorative expression of ‘the symbolic greatness of the chieftain’s power’.¹⁰ These forts are sturdy as much as necessary to bear the fire from clumsy Mughal siege crafts, but these would have been futile before modern European batteries. The enigma of tall and massive curtain walls of enormous fortifications instead of building them to the ground level to meet the artillery fire shows both the inadequacy of cannons to breach the walls as well as dependency on diplomacy and bribery for a successful method.¹¹ So rather than being a growth of military innovation, this trend of castellation was a sign of growing regionalization against the Mughal centrality, and indirectly Britishers were indulged into this tendency.

The trend of castellation followed by the English was more of a trend set by the preceding European merchants, like the Portuguese or the Dutch. Initially Almeida, the first Portuguese viceroy found force rather than fort as the necessary tool for the maintenance of trade, because ‘the greater the number of fortresses you hold, the weaker will be your power’.¹² Almeida’s dilettante faith on diplomacy of force was bound to fail, and experiences of these failures taught later viceroys like Albuquerque to have fortresses and administer territories. Thomas Roe, the first official English ambassador to the Mughal court shared the same amateurism like Almeida. In his letters from the court of Emperor Jahangir he forbade to commit ‘an error to affect garrisons and land-wars in India’.¹³ On the other hand Dutch successors of the *Estado da India* had successfully subscribed to the idea of fortified territories. Eventually the early Britishers were astonished with the great volume of forts managed by the Dutch for the maintenance of the Dutch sea borne empire. It’s nearly two hundred forts maintained by the revenue of the adjoining areas kept the Dutch supremacy in the 17th century, which was perceived as a point of success by the English Company causing anxiety for Lindenhal Street.¹⁴ Along with this competitiveness among the European Companies, the ambiguous attitude of the native polities towards them encouraged the idea of fortified settlement. In case of English East India Company, after a few failed attempts to have a formal trade agreement with the Mughals, Thomas Roe was sent by King James I due to the insistence of the Company to accomplish the job, ‘the only way of getting the Company’s affairs to be taken seriously’.¹⁵ But even Roe failed to get anything more than a *firman*, despite the fact that his representation of the affair was perceived as a triumphant meeting among equals.¹⁶ On the other hand Jahangir in his memoirs had not even mentioned about the reception of Roe’s embassy in the court. This minimalist response in diplomacy along with unsecured position amidst hostile competitors and native powers made the English to strive

for 'fortified peace'. William Hodges to Charnock, all had been harping on the same purpose of having a fortified territory which got its local thrust after the rebellion of Sobha Singh.

Sobha Singh's rebellion had a bifold effect; while it made the Mughal authority to send efficient man to the ground to check the tumultuous contents; diverse_peripheral characters like the East India Company had found the necessary validation for fortification. Sobha Singh, zamindar of Chetwa-Barda and a sub-*ijaradar*, according to a contemporary French letter revolted in June 1695, on the pretext of a quarrel over a portion of land with his superior Krishnaram Ray, zamindar and chief *ijaradar* of Burdwan and part of Hugli area.¹⁷ But for the observers it was something more planned than any petty quarrel between two landlords. The intensity of the revolt proves that it was something more than a mere revolt. While Mughal court politics delayed the imperial initiative to pacify the rebels, European companies had started to take precautions like fortifying the factories. To secure the European assistance Mughal governor offered *parwanas* to fortify factories, which the Companies accepted but repudiated any chance of helping the Mughal forces. Sobha Singh, who had settled down in the country to continue his parallel government unexpectedly died, leaving the rebel army leaderless. Sobha Singh's demise had changed the course of the rebellion when Maha Singh took the lead of the rebel force. With further conquering he went up to the mouth of Hugli and 'established *chowkies* on the river between Hugli to the mouth of the sea'.¹⁸ British ship *Diamond* was kept at the point of Sutanuti to keep the rebel forces at bay.¹⁹ The Dutch due to their previous enmity with the rebel force, who had arrived pretty close to their factory, attacked their newly captured fort at Hugli and successfully banished them. The next attack of Maha Singh's men near Gobindapur, the British territory was checked by a local zamindar, Sabarna Choudhury and the British Company. The interesting thing is that the Britishers had used their flags to demarcate their possession.²⁰ Dutch response to the rebellion was not as neutral as the Britishers and was subjected to vehement antagonism. Later on they had tried to work out a liaison in between companies to face these native attacks in concert but it failed. Maha Singh's forces after their defeat in Hugli, successfully ransacked Murshidabad and even encamped near Rajmahal. Their ranks were swelled by opportunistic local zamindars. Rebels started to fortify Murshidabad and there was a rumour that from Murshidabad they would launch their attacks against Dacca, the seat of Mughal governor Ibrahim Khan. Rebels were afraid to meet the Mughal army on the other side of the Bhagirathi, while the dominant motive of the lower command of the rebel force was to plunder

rather than consolidate. Rahim Khan, prominent of the Afghan mercenaries in the rebel force steadily undermined Maha Singh and became the 'Shah'. But his victory was short lived and only to be ruined with the start of Mughal offensive; Zabardast Khan's army had been waiting at Murshidabad while Muhammad Yusuf Khan attacked Rajmahal. Zabardast Khan's steady attack pushed the rebels back and like motley, disorderly crowd the rebel force was dispersed. Prince Azimuddin, the new governor of Bengal *subha* attacked Chandrakona, the seat of rebel leader. After the suppression of the rebellion, the *zamindari* of Chetwa-Barda was passed on to Sobha Singh's brother Himmat Singh.

Sobha Singh's rebellion was a frightening event for the European merchants who had started to link it with the overall demise of the Mughals and as the eruption of anarchic forces. For more than one whole year the entire eastern bank of Bhagirathi was under the rebel hands; looting and ravaging the countryside and above all disrupting the trade, production for the Europeans as well as natives. For example the destruction of mulberry plants near Muksudabad area disrupted the silk production for upcoming years. Murshid Quli Khan who came to Bengal this time as Mughal *dewan* became the *subhadar*, a position which became an amalgamation of both *dewan* and *subhadar*. He had successfully subdued the Dheer raj's rebellion, destroyed the rebels of Rohtasgarh and posted a military camp at Sylhet to check the raids of Jayantiya raj. In spite of Ajimushan's decisive march towards Chandrakona to stop the rebels previously have failed to secure Chetwa-Barda. Murshid Quli had to send army to check them. The new faujdar of Purnia, Saif Khan was appointed in between 1704 and 1707, by the request of Murshid Quli. Saif Khan successfully stopped the raids of Chawakar tribes, crushed the rebellious rajas of Birnagar and Morang.²¹In the north the Cooch kingdom was peaceful this time and their blood relations like the Raikats of Baikunthapur had set up a stable foothold on Jalpaiguri.²² The most formidable defiance faced by Murshid Quli was two *zamindari* revolts; one by Raja Udaynarayan of Rajshahi and the other by Raja Sitaram of Bhusana. Now the case of Sitaram is pretty curious because he was not strictly a rebel in the traditional Mughal sense, but an 'enterprising zamindar' whose drive for extension had its 'support of the authorities eager to extend cultivation'.²³ Now this kind of local expansionism was not unusual in Mughal times especially when the empire had been experiencing turmoil. Just like in the case of Sobha Singh's rebellion the year 1695 was an opportune time; Aurangzeb was occupied with the Marathas in Deccan, Maratha army had seized the port of Surat, and Prince Akbar was rumoured to be returning back in India with much

support. Similarly from the late 17th century Sitaram also had an apt moment to thrive because of the ongoing rebellion of Sobha Singh. Murshid Quli during his second tenure as *Dewan* of Bengal was preoccupied with his scuffle with the *faujdar* of Hugli, Zai-al-din Khan. By 1712, he had to face Farrukh Siyar's army. He was not in a position to look into the matters of the province until 1713, when new Emperor Farrukh Siyar had confirmed his Dewani as well as additional duties. Sitaram in this situation like any other enterprising *zamindar* of 17th century had nibbled up neighbouring *zamindari* areas like Pupapat, Paktani, Rukunpor, Kochuberia etc. Compared to Sobha Singh's rebellion, Sitaram's revolt was a modest one but Murshid Quli was in a desperate need of resource accrual and that's why ready 'to stamp out any other *zamindar* who was trying to be too big'.²⁴ Sitaram was possibly executed around 1714 when Murshid Quli had been trying to formulate his famous rent-roll of 1722. Sitaram was too powerful to be fitted into the scheme Murshid Quli had designed and his execution was necessary for the creation of a dependent, tranquil, new ruling class. Sitaram was the last of the adventurous landowners rising in the lower Ganges delta, after whom all the landowning classes remained peaceful, docile and dependent on the Murshidabad nawabi. The new *zamindars*, the *Chakladars* like Raghunandan, formerly a *peshkar* of Natore and later on the founder of *zamindari* of Rajshahi were totally dependent on Murshid Quli due to their origin. Even by caste these new *zamindars* derived from non martial lineage, had very little amount of retainers related through kinship ties. Just like the new *zamindari* of Burdwan, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Nadia etc were mostly of Khatri, Bramhin or Kayastha lineage.²⁵ Only a few of the old *zamindari* continued to linger among whom very few had the martial qualities like Sobha Singh or Sitaram. Those who remained as potential contenders were Pathan Rajas of Beerbhum and Rajput raja of Hill Tipperah.²⁶ Among the others, Rajput rajas of Bishnupur and Pachet were reduced to petty *zamindari* so they remained as shadow of their past glory. The raja of Tipperah was reduced by the deputy *dewan* of Dacca, Murshid Quli II and it's only the Beerbhum raj who had survived until the rise of British paramountcy over Bengal. Though a few think that 1722's settlement was 'an inadequate response' to the demand of external-internal security, compared to other successor states its Bengal under Murshid Quli was relatively tranquil.²⁷

Prior to Murshid Quli, local, indigenous, landholders with relatively small landholdings called *zamindars* used to exercise unusual supremacy as revenue collector and peacekeeper compared to other Mughal provinces. Most of the arable lands had been parcelled out as *jagirs* and most of

the increase in the revenues had filled the coffers of the *zamindars*.²⁸ The late 17th century had started to see a crisis of centralized forces that were continuously mobilized towards Deccan, the new centre of conflict for the late Mughal Empire. While the rise of predatory raids by the Marathas and Telegu elites kept the southern frontier of the empire as an open wound, centralized controls in other provinces started to decline due to the southward mobilization of men and money.²⁹ Bengal *mansabdars* in this period of turmoil more and more started to depend on the local powers mostly these *zamindars* as ‘they had to contend with the other forces inside the province without help from the outside’.³⁰ While administrative help from outside was diminishing, the Deccan wars caused imperial machinery’s need for supplementary fund initiating a drastic need of increase in revenue. Murshid Quli’s coming to Bengal was a sign of this imperial drive for maximization of revenue. In his sweeping approach of increasing revenue (nearly 20 percent in 22 years) he transferred strong *mansabdars* to Orrisa while trying to increase the *khalisa* land³¹, coerced *zamindars* to pay their debt in full while conciliated with particular landlords with bigger landholding. Thirteen bigger *zamindars* now known as *chakladars* under the favourable support from Murshid Quli’s government nibbled up the lesser *zamindars* one by one. Bigger *zamindari*s like Rajshahi, Burdwan, Dinajpur, Nadia rose up to the prominence during the reign of Murshid Quli in the early decades of the 18th century. This drive for revenue maximization caused by imperial crisis, indirectly changed and resettled the ruling elite in such a way that by the start of 1730’s ‘the government of Bengal began to look more like government by cooperation of the dominant forces in Bengal’.³² Murshid Quli had very little amount of force to keep the province in control and that’s why sooner or later he had to conciliate with the *zamindars*.³³ This whole conciliation was done without any ‘chaos, decadence, or even, perhaps, a decline in administrative efficiency’.³⁴

While Bengal was seeing an era of stability under Murshid Quli, English had been achieving new altitude of control over their territory. English Company now became the ‘*zamindar*’ in Bengal, a status which had synonymity with their position at Cuddalore. Mughals granted the Company three villages for the maintenance of the Fort William in 1698. Just like Fort St David was founded on the lands near Cuddalore area which were transferred by the Marathas in 1690. While for the Mughals it was just another *firman*, without any claim of sovereignty invested on the Company, for the Company ‘*zamindari*’ was something more than just a right to accumulate King’s share. The perception of the event was different just like the case of Thomas Roe’s

embassy. For Holwell it was a ‘double capacity’: collector of revenues as well as the Judge with ‘the power of the lash, fine, and imprisonment’.³⁵ The city of Calcutta had been turning into a place of insular sovereignty, a state within a state. The city behind its walls through which they had tried to secure them from native political upheavals had created ambience for social ordering. Just like during the Miao uprising (1795-1797) and the ‘White Lotus’ Rebellion (1796-1820) Chinese provinces were going through anarchic situation, while imperial pacification officials like *Fu Nai* designed ‘border-wide system of some 1000 military and civilian manned fortifications: “watch towers for observation, cannon towers to block the enemy, forts to gather families into a home”’.³⁶ The Chinese officials deliberately used fortified walls to structure ‘an agenda of social correction and imperial ‘health’ by creating ‘a different kind of quarantine: one in which the ‘good’ (rather than rebellious) were to be sealed within walls’.³⁷ Now the Fort William was not aimed at any kind of deliberate social ordering but it was a strategic security base for a few merchants. With the growth of population as well as achievement of sovereignty, from the Crown as well as native powers, habitual social ordering continued to build up. This had formed the basis of a consensual concept of peaceful society.

The symbolic expression of sovereign position had been being articulated within the fort for long time, a development again too minute for the Governor of Bengal. Just like Fort St. George, British flag was hoisted at Fort William as a sign of King’s sovereign presence on the sixth of October, 1702.³⁸ Now flag hoisting has its own significance in European perspective. Unlike the Mughals, where *nishan* was type of symbolic expression of nobility, kinship and clan relation, European states had been articulating flags as a sign of national identity. In 1698, along with the new charter for the united Company, ‘it also got a new flag—the Union Jack replaced the Cross of St. George in the canton’.³⁹ The Company’s motto also underwent a radical change; From ‘*deo ducante nil nocet*’ (God leads Nothing hurts) to ‘*auspicio regis et senates angliae*’ (the auspices of the king of England, and the senate) reflects the journey of the Company under the aegis of the Kingly prerogative and Parliamentary command.⁴⁰ Corporate companies having their chartered legitimacy always used the symbolic visual of a flag, a sign of monopolistic sovereignty, unknown to the Indians. But Indian unfamiliarity to that fact of sovereign position did not continue for long, but soon interpreted it as a symbol of security. In 1773, Hastings saw that ‘almost every trading boats and storehouse flew the English flag without warrant’ to finagle the tax-*chawkies*. In response to this Hastings had to abolish the system of tax-*chawkies*.⁴¹ Viewed in

reverse it can be deduced that British union jack was seen as a representation of authority, security and supremacy by the natives.

The Fort William had been being known as a sign of security. During the turbulent times of Sobha Singh's rebellion Raja Ramkissen of Nadia had sent nearly eight thousand rupees as deposit 'thinking it more secure in the hands' of the Company officials.⁴² The example of Gobindaram Mittra, 'the Black *Zamindar*', deputy collector of Calcutta from 1720 to 1756 can be cited to show that the Company's sovereign position as the holder of the lash or the club had been assimilating in the native consensus of Calcutta and its neighbourhood. Gobindaram and prior to him other deputy collectors were the new revenue extracting retinue of the Company. Gobindaram and his club wielding *paiks* exacted money from the natives and the dread of their coercion gave birth to the Bengali proverb *Gobindaram er chari* or Gobindaram's club, a sign of coercive sovereign as peacekeeper.⁴³ This obsession with security had paved the path to the consent of the governed; British *zamindari* was the initial steps towards that 'night-watchman' colonial state. This kind of minimalist statehood—a character of British statehood within the city had attracted money, manpower and consent.⁴⁴ The mercantile activities in Calcutta had attracted a huge amount of economic activities within the city causing a substantial increase in revenue; 'while the *jama* imposed on it remained practically constant because of the Company's influence on Mughal administration'.⁴⁵ The trend which has started with Ramkissen of Nadia, later on continued to be a standard cash flow and by second half of the 18th century conjugated with the 'assured surplus from the land tax' Calcutta became 'a great money market'.⁴⁶

After Murshid Quli the drive for maintenance of law and order continued. In the reign of Sujauddin, Murshid Quli II became Dacca's deputy *dewan*. During this time the fortified base of Chitagong was under attack by the Arracanese pirates and the later send a big detachment to restore Chitagong and a nearby *thanah* at Feni.⁴⁷ In his reign substantial parts of Tipara were conquered along with the sturdy forts like Mirzapur, Chandigarh, Ghazigarh and the capital Udaipur, which later on served as a strong, strategically guarded frontier against the Kuki and Jayantiya tribes.⁴⁸ Just like the Mughal tradition of occasional campaigns to quell bandit gangs continued. Rustam Jang, who was also sent to Dacca along with Murshid Quli II had successfully captured two infamous bandit brothers, Ghani and Shakur.⁴⁹ The trend of continued

pacification which was started by Murshid Quli seems to continue without any formidable break until Alivardi Khan uprooted Sarfaraz Khan, the last of the Murshid Quli's dynasty.

Alivardi Khan had defeated Sarfaraz Khan in 10th April, 1740 and made his claim over the Bengal Subha decisively with his next victory over Rustam Jang in 3rd May, 1741 in the Battle of Phulwari. Alivardi's usurpation with the assistance of Afghan mercenaries not only had overwhelmed the tranquillity achieved by the post-1722 settlement, but also endangered Bengal with a new smouldering threat. Rustam Jang, the defeated *Naib-subahdar* was in asylum of Nizam-ul-Mulk and in intention of regaining Orissa back sought and attained help from Maratha Chief, Raghuji Bhonsale in May, 1741. In August 1741, Baqar Ali, son-in-law of Rustam Jang along with the Maratha army captured Orissa briefly, but Alivardi's timely reinforcement had driven away the invaders.⁵⁰ However his homecoming march was disrupted by Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar's entrance into Manbhum territory. Once they were pushed back, they waited in the jungles of Chottonagpur until Raghuji himself came with reinforcement. Alivardi was in a dilemma because he had comparatively modest armed forces to stand against such a great combined attack, while Emperor's order to *subhadar* of Oudh, Safdar Jang to help Alivardi was seen by him as a possibility of his own displacement. It was in this time that the Peswa who had hostility with Raghuji was asked for help and he had marched towards Bengal. Peswa's reinforcement of 75000 cavalry continued to plunder the countryside just like Raghuji's army. After all squeezing up money and a promise of *chauth* for the *subha* from Alivardi, Peswa marched on Raghuji, who after a defeat marched back to Nagpur. The way in which both have traversed back to West was the trail of Maratha squall over the western bank of Bhagirathi. Beerbhum, Bardwan, Bankura and Manbhum were most adversely effected. After the Peswa-Raghuji conciliation Bhaskar Ram was sent to Bengal again by the end of 1743. This time he and his generals were treacherously murdered during their negotiation with Alivardi in March 1744, which made the Maratha army to return back to Nagpur. This was a great setback for the Bhonsle ambitions in Bengal. Marathas returned again when they had tried to extricate Alivardi during the Afghan revolt.

First Afghan revolt led by Mustafa Khan was the next potential disturbance which had plunged the western part of the *subha* into mayhem. Mustafa Khan, later titled as Babar Jang demanded for the deputy governorship of Bihar. When denied he planned a palace revolution by uniting all

the Afghan chiefs. It is said that he had drawn up some *mahazar* or manifesto for the Afghan chiefs to unite and expel Alivardi from the throne.⁵¹ Fortunately for Alivardi other Afghan chiefs showed minute concern in Mustafa Khan's plan, while chiefs like Umar Khan fervently opposed it. Mustafa Khan marched to west, captured the fort of Munger and marched on towards Azimabad (Patna). Haibat Jung had erected defensive trenches and in 14th March 1745 had faced Mustafa Khan. After a long drawn fight due to the consistent fire from the Bahila musketeers under Jaswant Nagar, Mustafa Khan was compelled to withdraw.⁵² Mustafa encamped there and later on returned to Chunar while Alivardi's force came to aid Haibat Jung. This time the coming of Raghuji made Alivardi retreat to Bengal, while Mustafa Khan died in his last attempt to capture Azimabad.⁵³ Raghuji retreating from his second campaign rescued the fleeing Afghan army under Gulam Murtada Khan, son of deceased Mustafa Khan and incorporated them in his army.⁵⁴ Afghans rebelled again under Sardar Khan and Samshir Khan who were discharged from their posts and ordered to return to Tirhut, their home. These men later on along with Bahelia chiefs and Murad Sher Khan had killed Haibat Jang, governor of Patna. They captured the city which became the rally point for the Afghans from all over Bihar and adjoining areas. Alivardi marched against them and faced an army of nearly two lakhs of horse and foot at Sarai Rani.⁵⁵ In this pitched battle all the Afghan chiefs were slaughtered and Maratha-Afghan nexus became futile once and for all. The remnants of the Afghans had joined the service under Raja of Beerbhum.⁵⁶ This local raja would be a significant turbulent element later on. Thus from 1741 to 1748 Bengal had seen one of the most turbulent times in the 18th century and due to this situation Alivardi had failed to eradicate the refractory *zamindars* from his service. Afghan mercenaries due to the persistent problem of the Marathas continued to pressurize Alivardi about their demands which ended in 1748. Now the Afghan revolt has been seen by the contemporary writers as 'originated from the fact that Raghu Bhonsla... took resort to fraud and deception' while they have overlooked the fact that Afghans in Bengal had a long tradition of serving rebel rajas as mercenary and often taking over the rein of pillaging from the employers.⁵⁷ The case of Sobha Shing's rebellion was a practical example of this trend where mercenary leader Rahim Khan had took over the leadership from Sobha Singh's kinsmen in the later half. Alivardi's usurpation was met with the same situation while his Afghan generals tried to usurp against their master. Raghuji was a later intriguer into the familiar plot of the 18th century politics. What was newly compared to Murshid Quli's reign is the coming of an independent, potential actor from

the western India which continued to influence the polity directly or indirectly, until the end of the century. This continued Maratha scare would be keeping the Britishers cautious about their policies.

Alivardi prior to 1741 as the governor of Bihar *subha* efficiently accomplished the job of disciplining the recalcitrant contents. He had pacified Rajmahal as *faujdar* in between 1727-1732. As the deputy governor of Bihar he had devastated the defiant *zamindars* of Bhojpur territory and compelled them to pay large arrears of revenue in 1734. Next year he sent Abdul Karim Khan to lay a siege to the fort of Raja of Bettia and desolated his neighbouring villages for booty. The same method was followed against the Raja of Bhunra or Phoolwareh, where the Raja was pursued to the outskirts of Dhawalgiri hills. These raids by the governor was a typical Mughal method of punishing the recalcitrant contents where these punishing forays were done to maintain the revenue stream regular and curbing the *zamindars* from being too much potent. Alivardi also sent an army to curtail the rebellious Raja Sundar Singh of Tikari, who after some skirmishing attacks were finally subdued. While all these approaches were common in the 17th-18th century India, after his attack on Bhunra Alivardi had done something which was entirely dissimilar from the other routine punishing raids. Alivardi tried to curb the influence of the *banjara* tribes, influential grain traders with substantial martial strength and hold over the areas like Oudh, Gorakhpur, Ghazipur, Bettia and Bhuanra.⁵⁸ These men were pursued by Abdul Karim Khan up to the end of Mughal territory, near the hills of Makwani and then they were captured. Nearly 20000 captives were marched back to Patna while nearly half of the number were executed or died along the way.⁵⁹ The sequential pattern of the disciplinary raids in between 1734 to 1740 not only shows a governor's efficient and energetic response but also something bigger; a try of keeping control over the arid and humid wasteland which was a depository for mobile resources like cattle, cash and recruits.⁶⁰ It is obvious that the *zamindars* of Ghazipur, Bettia and Bhuanra which were subdued had patron-client relationship with the *banjaras*, controller of substantial amount of logistical cattle, cash earned from grain trade as well as substantial martial strength. So to break down the nexus and keep these peripheral 'inner frontiers'⁶¹ under control, the expulsion of the *banjaras* was necessary. So these partly expansionary, partly punitive actions were commenced during the rule of Sarfaraj Khan but these can be seen as Alivardi's successful control over the 'silent frontier'⁶², whose resources mostly

the mercenary manpower helped him to survive the Maratha raids as well as keep the western frontier a comparative tranquillity.

The East India Company had been looking into the matter for long and since the rebellion of Sobha Singh there was a sense of caution in their approach. Every time the situation became unfavourable, strengthening the ramparts and deepening the entrenchment were the noticeable responses from the men at Fort William. Starting from 1689, when fortifying Sutanuti revealed the opportunity of Company ship's movement 'within the command of their guns'⁶³, to the year of 1706, when regularization of town buildings 'so that the fort guns may be brought to bear on the several streets'⁶⁴; the men at Fort William were always alert about strengthening the security. During the turbulent times of Maratha onslaught in the western parts those men came up with another solution; the 'Marhatta Ditch'.⁶⁵ The sight of Maratha cavalry laying 'waste from Balasore to Rajmehal', worked as a negative reinforcement for the men at Fort William.⁶⁶ Positioning of artillery batteries had already been done; digging of an enormous ditch was the 'after thought' to secure their toehold. The Christian populations of the city were defended under a more secure palisade fence⁶⁷. Increasing Maratha ravaging and flight of the common people towards the comparatively safe Company territories, all these served as catalysts for the growing insulation. Insulated territoriality, an unfamiliar practice for the natives, had been practiced by the Company for long within their factories. The Maratha scare throughout the forties had increased this drive for insulation more within city territory and even the natives within the city were gradually became habituated to this.

In ancient Numidia, Masinissa helped Rome to defeat Carthage and thus eventually rallied all the itinerant Numidians under his realm. But only after hundred years, the Jagaranthine War caused their ruin in the hand of their former ally, Rome. In that sense Masinissa had created Numidia as a prosperous land, which later on served as the 'bread basket' for Roman Empire. Murshid Quli and Alivardi just served as another Masinissa for the British Empire. Only difference is Masinnisa was empowered by Rome as an ally against Carthage, while neither Murshid Quli nor Alivardi had served under Company. Despite of this difference in status quo both of them had made the base for their ascending imperial successors. While Murshid Quli made the Gangetic delta free from adventurous landlords, Alivardi more or less successfully pacified the western frontier by stopping the Marathas as well as by quelling potential Afghan freebooters. During

this whole time span Company had enough time to consolidate its position, power and legitimacy at Calcutta. So when the opportune moment arrived and British paramountcy preceded one step further after the Battle of Plassey, Bengal was a comparatively pacified zone where the new sovereigns experienced lesser resistance.

From ‘Miserable Skirmish’ to Empire: The Grand Strategic Picture, 1757-1773

The Battle of Plassey, ‘the most miserable skirmish ever’ later on proved itself to be the most decisive turning point for the British.⁶⁸ That important skirmish was mentioned or glorified later by British official cum historians but initially it seemed to be not that crucial event. British expulsion from Calcutta was a fresh wound till then and holding on to so called victory with such a little army only expressed the transiency of the achievement. Even the British general view was that ‘the Battle of Plassey did only restore us to the same situation we were in before the capture of Calcutta;’ as the *Subha* was back to his earlier situation, ‘the English returned to their commercial character’ with a ‘small acquisition of territory’ only to ‘defray the military expenses of their garrisons’.⁶⁹ G.J.Bryant classified the phase from 1744 to 1761, as a phase of ‘evolutionary and interactive political development’ whose general aim had been ‘to restore the political status quo ante’.⁷⁰ During the time of Alivardi’s death, Company’s military strength was scanty not even strong enough to stand against a grave siege. Even the Fort William, the long cherished stand for Company sovereignty, had no more than five hundred and fourteen men to man the defences when Sirj-u-Doullah’s forces had sieged Calcutta.⁷¹ The Fort William in the middle of 18th century had not in a position to indulge in independent diplomatic bargains or military expedition like its cousin at Madras. For any kind of decisions Fort William had to depend on the dispatches from Madras.

The victory at Plassey was not hard owned, but significant for a peripheral player; the Company rose up to the position of a cherished player of the game. Indigenous players of the plot had thought the English company as a piece rather a player and that's why afterward all their attempts to replace English company with others failed. Alivardi was a usurper too, but ruthless enough to cut off the ladder through which he had rose up to the position of a *Nawab*. Afghan chiefs, the mercenary leaders mostly coming from the North-Western parts of Bihar like Tirhut, Dwarbhanga who had soften the path previously for Alivardi's victory as well as saved it from initial Maratha plunders, were taken out one by one long before their ascendance as any potential threat. But neither Mir Jafar was wise and tactful like Alivardi, nor the Company officials were a bunch of unruly, plunder loving mercenaries like the Afghan freebooters. After the Battle of Giria, Afghans became valuable servants of Alivardi, while Plassey had made Mir Jafar aware that 'he was on the throne because Clive had put him there.'⁷² This sense strengthened their position as principal political arbitrator, as well as the long treasured idea of dread of British arms. This 'perceived omnipotence of the arms made British officials to strive for limited but bold political objectives' though they were directed to 'reap opportunities as much as possible'.⁷³ The illustration of the galloping hordes of native soldiers, charging and dying before the organized, constant firing, 'rock like' infantry columns, in an 18th century water color painting shows the 'eloquent pictorial representation of this perception of difference'.⁷⁴ One can relate this 'dread for British arms' to either the Indian perception about the early Europeans or European travelers' conception about themselves. Just like Niccolao Manucci was taken into the Mughal service along with many other Europeans in the artillery service with extravagant payment of eighty rupees for 'only to take aim'.⁷⁵ This native perception about the European majestic ability to wield firearms was complimented with their own perception of superiority

against native forces. Barnier and Tavernier had often mused about the superiority of European martial prowess compared to natives.⁷⁶ The same perception would be present long after in the times of Malcolm who said, “that empire is held solely by opinion; or, in other words, by that respect... and that confidence in our truth, reliance on our faith, and dread of our arms, which is impressed on every nation in India’.⁷⁷ Whatever the time of origin, that mere skirmish of 1757 had fueled this dread of the British arms. The changed nature of *Nawabi* court and political parlances was the sign of this change.

The Plassey was the entrance for the Britishers towards a new kind of problem, the problem of indulging into the native politics; a thing from which they had kept their aloofness since the rebellion of Sobha Singh. This interrelationship had a different meaning for their native allies on the throne of the *Nawabi*. British superiority in arms was seen as a trump, a political tool to keep the lead over other native enemies. British military assistance was put forward to get economic favours, while the new *nawabs* were in a desperate need for military helping hands. This nexus had created preliminary opportunities of experiences for the British about the campaigns against refractory *zamindars*, the initial steps for pacificatory campaigns. But the initial experience was against the French. A small French troop under the command of Jean Law, composed of 175 Europeans and 100 Sepoys had been on the run after the defeat of Siraj at Plassey. Sir Eyre Coote was in pursuit of these men which give a glimpse of the post conflict punitive actions. Two companies of European infantry and three companies of Madras Sepoys were sent in this chase.⁷⁸ Pacification has always been a hunt with scarce confrontation, which had its own repercussions like tiresome marches, hostile environment and often in case of India, hostile population. In his pursuit finally Coote reached Patna, only to discover himself left far behind by the French, while amidst semi-hostile native population and mutinous European soldiers. Ram

Narain the governor of Patna was far from happy due to the arrival of English troops, and his men were accused to beat and wound some of Coote's men.⁷⁹ Apart from these desertion of logistical workers and native troops were common due to long fatigues marches, often kept in arrears. Coote's campaign failed to achieve its primary objective when the French had reached Benares and set up a defence in a ruined fort, while the turbulent rajas had started to gather men ascertaining the assemblage of British troops. Raja of Benares, Nawab of Ghazipore had collected respectively four thousand and three thousand of men at arms, while there was a clear indication that the Nawab of Awadh was helping Law consistently even after Coote lettered him not to provide passage to the enemy.⁸⁰ Even when returning back to Patna, the army had encountered a possible confrontation from Raja Dunsee Ram of Chupra, assembling an army of three thousand horses, one and a half thousand foot and four guns. There are rumours that many more native rajas were assembling under Dunsee Ram. However Coote's firm threat of attack had unnerved the Raja, who apologized and dismissed his troops later.⁸¹ This campaign of Coote along four hundred miles of hostile territory for nearly two and a half months is a classic example of post-conflict pacificatory works of the early British state. The show of force, rather than confrontation had often fulfilled the objective for the Britishers. During this time they had been working as the legitimate military allies of the Bengal Nawab, who on the other hand did not, had the strength but the sovereign position to legitimize British campaigns. The people who had commanded a small fortified portion, soon found a large tract to operate, subjugate and pacify under a *de jure* ruler; this change in function in point of fact was the 'revolutionary' part of the so called 'Bengal Revolution'.

By the start of 1759 the news of *Shahzada* Ali Gauhar's approach towards Bengal and Suja-ud-Daullah's providence of support had created confusion for a newly bred state.⁸² Plassey was the

start after which Britishers were dragged into the greater whirlwind of native politics. As Mir Jafar was dependent on the superior British arms, it was more or less a British contractual commitment to stop the lingering threat on the western frontier. Now this is not new for Nawabi government of Bengal, as during the attack of Durani Afghans Siraj-ud-Dullah himself asked for martial help from the British in exchange of an amount nearly one *lakh* a month.⁸³ The only difference is Siraj was in a position to bargain in between the French and the British, among whom he had his personal inclination towards the French commander Jean Law. He was following his grandfather's tactics of playing the companies against each other as he did not have the position to oust both. Native rulers' in the early modern world for long had played companies against each other. Just like the Persian rulers of Ormuz indulged into parley with the British fleet captain that in exchange of services like 'guarding the sea against Portugal and other enemies' the English would be delivered with 'the fortress of Ormuz, with half the revenues of the custom house and the city'.⁸⁴ After the commencement of Murshid Quli's system the new ruling classes transformed a lot. It's now a conglomeration of big *zamindars* like the *zamindar* of Rajshahi, commercial magnate like Jagat Seth, and later stake holders like European commercial companies. The significant event of casting out of the French was a great break through for the English Company as it became the sole ally in the military assistance cantered relation.

With the attack of Ali Ghauhar, British and new *Nawabi* force had taken the field against the upcoming menace. Caillaud, the commander of the troops along with the cavalry arm led by Shahjada Miran 'set out to chastise the zamindars who had afforded him (Ali Gauhar) help during his raid into Bengal'.⁸⁵ The remarkable thing about this attack is that the earlier refractory *zamindars* towards British-Mir Jafar nexus had turned in favour of the new *Nawabi*. Dhanusi Ram or Dhunsi Ram who had been obstructing Coot's army a few months ago due to the covert

order of Raja Ramnarayn, now was ready to check the combined army of the Prince, French and the Marathas. Raja Ramnarayan, accused as an ill element by Coote previously, had been defending the fort of Patna against that combined force.⁸⁶ Ramnarayn's letter mentioned that 'though the prince had no money, yet people were daily flocking round him in the hope of getting *Mansabs*, Jagirs and handsome allowences'.⁸⁷ Khande Rao and Sheo Bhatt both of these Maratha sardars had already mobilized large scale Maratha cavalry in the siege of Patna.⁸⁸ Raja Ramnarayn was defeated in the Battle of Massumpur while the imperialist forces had a defeat in the Battle of Sherpur in the hand of Major Caillaud.⁸⁹ While Captain Knox and Shitab Rai's army had been inflicting defeat on the Mughal forces, Caillaud's continued raids had made the circumstances worse for Prince and his associates.⁹⁰ Captain Cochrain's detachment as well as Major Carnac had played significant role in their engagement with various factions of the Imperialist troops. In the approach of chastising Pahalwan Singh's army on the bank of the Karamnasa, Clive's forces had helped Mir Jafar's troops.⁹¹ But these precautionary punitive actions had to stop because of Miran's untimely death. Raja Ramnarayn, the governor of Bihar was the security policy for Clive, who wanted to exercise a little more influence on the Nawab for a favorable commercial as well as administrative ambience.⁹² Miran's death led to the succession problem ultimately ending with the accession of Mir Kasim Ali Khan.

Vansittart was in favour of empowering Mir Kasim, the new Nawab rather than creating another stooge like Mir Jafar. Due to Vansittart's aim of exercising equality, Company provided various concessions to the new Nawab. The residence from durbar had withdrawn and no intervention in internal policies of the Nawab was promised.⁹³ The initial impact was dismissal and eventual murder of Ramnarayn, the counterweight of Clive. Vansittart originally tried to do away with the tiresome pacification duties and focus on garrisoning the fort of Patna, for which a

comparatively strong *Nawabi* would have been necessary.⁹⁴ Vansittart's policy of empowering the new *Nawab* was soon dismayed while there was a change in the council. Military officials like Carnac and Clive, chief factors like Ellis started to show their disregard for Mir Kasim's sovereign position.⁹⁵ During this situation of confusion, the Company was prepared neither to take the full responsibility of the administration nor to leave it to its new enterprising Nawab Mir Kasim. Originally there was no unanimity among the men in Council. While people like Vansittart, Hastings continued their attempts of cultivating a stable relationship, people like Carnac, Coote, Ellis driven by interest groups defiantly started to undermine Mir Kasim's legitimacy. As an instance of conciliation during the dispute regarding private trade Hastings and Vansittart tried to struck a new agreement of *dustak* in exchange of recognition of absolute sovereign authority of the Nawab.⁹⁶ But the men at council didn't want to conciliate. William Ellis' self-inflicted disaster of attacking the city of Patna in 1763 had done the necessary damage for destroying the possibility for peace.⁹⁷ Vansittart was the Directors' sentinel who was sent to check the 'unruly Bengallers' but was not armed with necessary constitutional powers.⁹⁸ Vansittart, 'a rich but no doubt disappointed man' returned to England in 1764, while his policy was promptly reversed after him.⁹⁹ His policy of undermining the militarism championed by Carnac and Coote, would seem to be valuable for the Company in the later reign of Clive.

Vansittart was accompanied by Clive for his second term, another valuable period of British rule when the *dewani* was granted to the Company. The Mughal Emperor was ready to give away the *Diwani* grant long before 1765. In case of 1759's proposal, Clive had declined from grabbing such a high office for want of 'a sufficient force to support properly so considerable an employ'.¹⁰⁰ The disinterested stand was maintained against the same proposals of 1761 and was not accepted until the Battle of Buxer. Clive's reign was followed by Harry Verelst and Cartier,

who were there to do little. Lord Verelst, formerly served as district collector of Chittagong, Burdwan, and Midnapore had planned to expand the stability of these areas like the other parts of the Bengal subha.¹⁰¹ He had tried to put some supervisors in each districts or provinces, who would 'stand between him and the hand of oppression' by making quick decisions and supplying the lawful due of British administration.¹⁰² After Clive's second term from Verelst to Hastings, all the men at highest rank of Bengal province had tried to maintain the boundary. After 1765 when a strategic treaty was concluded with the Nawab of Awadh, the most turbulent frontier was set up deep into the upcountry. Verelst had urged for more sturdy garrisons even up to Allahabad to check any potential onslaught from the Afghans from the North-West.

The new attitude of the Company officials towards the native politics had fermented a grand strategy among the officials which made 'the Directors increasingly uneasy and queried in political circles of Westminster'.¹⁰³ Clive, the hero of Plassey himself had been trying to check this unbalanced growth in military expanses by stabilizing Company's relation with the client princes. But once the floodgates were opened, it was hard to stop the stream. For the client princes the proven supremacy of British arms were necessary for their own state making, while the Company officials had seen financial gains in these military assistance services. In such a situation Director's plan of stable equilibrium, while the Company armies returning to its commercial duties, seemed to be quixotic. The Company was solely neither the sovereign nor the merchant; The Empire of business was turning into the business of empire.¹⁰⁴ Still there was equivocal pursuit for stability and profit made the period up to 1773 as a phase of hesitant approaches.

Pacification in the ‘Period of Hesitation’: Bengal’s Western Frontier, 1757-1773.

The beginning of British possession in India had a particular pattern in common. All the initial tracts of lands came under their custody as assignments of revenue collection. In the Deccan, Muhammad Ali, ‘the client prince’ had allocated Tinnevely district to the British for revenue collection, which proved to be a new experience for the Company.¹⁰⁵ Tinnevely, the southernmost district of Carnatic had a long history of insubordination; nearly out of control of the authority throughout the reign of the earlier rulers, only came under a limited control during the time of Muhammad Ali.¹⁰⁶ But this limited control was wrecked by frequent revolt men like Yousuf Khan who was employed by the authority to curb revolts.¹⁰⁷ Muhammad Ali in his try of being assiduous state-builder and strengthening legitimacy by using British martial strength, lend out a place like Tinnevely, ‘a host of *poligars* kept the central government control to a minimum’.¹⁰⁸ His military ally, the British army at Madras ‘entered a new phase of military education— the pacification of resentful civilian population and its local military leaders in order to raise revenue for the Nawab.’¹⁰⁹ This ‘frustrating’, cost-intensive model of revenue policing by the military officials with the least idea about customs had neither made revenue return regular, nor had served to strengthen the *Nawab*’s authority. These campaigns by nature were limited until the completion of the Anglo-French war but continued to go on with more intensity after 1761. In case of Bengal the Battle of Plassey was decisive at least in one sense; the French vision of ascendancy over Bengal turned into delusion when the force of Jean Law was chased out of the frontier. For the Company army this kind of chase repeated again during the time of Ali Ghouhar’s invasion was enlightening as well as frustrating. But this knowledge got its foremost ordeal by the closing months of 1760’s.

Post Plassey settlements had brought some provinces under British possession when ‘a *sunnud* was passed...to possess the zamindari of the lands to the southward of Calcutta’ which is 24-Pargunnahs and later on when ‘the Nabob designs to mortgage and assign over to the Company’ the areas of Burdwan, Mednapur, and Chittagong.¹¹⁰ But just like the case of Tinnevely those areas were still not under proper control. Burdwan was a dependent *zamindari* from the time of Murshid Quli but after the Battle of Plassey it had cultivated recalcitrance. Mednapur on the other hand was an amalgam of petty tribal *zamindaries* under various *rajas* known as *Bhumrajas*. These chiefs had a long tradition of insubordination. Apart from that the most important fact is that both of these areas were on the western frontier side of the province, devastated only decades ago by Maratha inroads. The jungle areas were crisscrossed with Maratha passages through which light cavalry brigades trespassed into Bengal; places where the threat of their return still had been lingering. Just like the *poligars* in Deccan, Company had some major initial setbacks in these provinces. Since 1758, Nuddea and Burdwan was in Company possession but due to easy accessibility and good terms Raja Tilakchand was left to rule by his own.¹¹¹ This is where during a routine revenue collection Hugh Watts had experienced ‘some unpleasant experiences’. His letter to Governor says that Raja Tilokchand’s forces tried to confine Izaradars, seize the collected revenue, and a *jemadar* named Suk Lal had killed one of the Company sepoy.¹¹² During Watts’ attempt of arresting Suk Lal *jemadar*, his forces were surrounded by nearly 800 men with whom Officer Brown and his soldiers clashed and nearly fifty of Company sepoy died.¹¹³ He further mentions about the swelling number of enemies who were ‘Rajah’s unpaid discontented forces with other malcontents’ who were known for disturbing the peace of the province.¹¹⁴ Now this is the typical example of day to day pacificatory campaign which would be the part of internal administration of early colonial possession.

The situation of Watts' contingent of sepoys led to the dispatch of a party of 130 European soldiers along with 300 sepoys led by Lt. Nollikins but there were strict emphasis on the conciliatory preferences rather than to engage into conflict.¹¹⁵ Though it seems that no conflict happened due to the timely payment of unpaid revenue by the Rajha and his praise of Vansittart, the smoldering problem remains to linger underneath.¹¹⁶ Originally the Rajah often had tried for nonpayment of revenue and categorically taken refuge in the jungles of the vicinities, but like all the native zamindars he was struck by the incident where the former zamindars of 24-Parghunns were dispossessed of their property.¹¹⁷ The show of power had often worked pretty properly in Bengal compared to Deccan where siege of petty forts for days was a common matter for these day to day pacification campaigns. Burdwan raj had fifteen thousand of retainers under his command, mostly *paiks* which was thought to be motley collected to challenge the possible dispossession from the *zamindari*, but this tendency of collecting retainers had been going for long. Neighboring Beerbhunm raja, especially after the fall of the Afghan chiefs attracted most of the fugitive troopers from their service. On the other hand for being close to the 'inner frontier' of military labour market Bahella matchlock men were easily employed in service, and the matrimonial alliances with the Afghan families of Bihar made him a strong adversary. The presence of such a mighty neighbour made Burdwan to recruit paiks from long ago. Whatever the cause had been it seems that the circumstances of 1760s made Tilokchand very much anxious for which he had recruited a group of Fakirs, mercenary ascetics too.¹¹⁸

Mir Kasim, the new Nawab was like Muhammad Ali, anxious to increase state fiscal capacity for the strengthening of authority and legitimacy. As the turbulent Rajas of Burdwan and Beerbhunm were known for their irregularity in the payment of revenue, he had tried to use British arms to chastise their insubordination. Burdwan had been ceded to the Company just like Tinnevely in

Carnatic. Beerbhun raj had a long record of noncompliance from the time of Sarfaraj to Siraj-u-Daullah and that's why when the news of the conference in between Tilokchand and Ashad-uj-Jamman for the agreement 'to act in conjunction' came to Mir Kasim, he anxiously reported it to the Company.¹¹⁹

As mentioned earlier, Murshid Quli's system had created a proper stratified ruling class dependent on the *Nawabi* itself, but the Raja of Beerbhun was not one of them. Located in the frontier terrains of Bengal province his position was more like a warden of the marches. Murshid Quli's titular Rajas had very little resemblance with Beerbhun Raj, Badi-uz-Zaman, whose military strength made Murshid Quli to maintain cordial relation with him. Problems started in the time of Sujauddin's reign when the Raja had denied paying any extra revenue than the *peshkashi* demand. Dinajpur and Beerbhun were still pretty much away from the core of the province, not assessed and taken under control. On the other hand while the central control was limited, Badi-uz-Zaman had put strong frontier guards on the forests and hills. Sarfaraj and Alivardi's joint attack made the raja conciliatory and submissive but briefly. Alivardi's usurpation against Sarfaraj gave him the opportunity to help the usurper and reclaim a prominent position again. It's not only Alivardi but his new found allies from Bihar, Namdar Khan and Kamgar Khan of Narhat-Samai provided Badi-uz-Zaman a substantial control over the frontier of Bengal and Bihar. Kamgar Khan of Samai had the confidence of Alivardi and that's why using that linkage Asad-uz-Zaman, the heir of Badi-uz-Zaman and nephew of Kamgar Khan had increased his martial strength to exercise dauntless supremacy of the frontier. The Afghan cavalry troops taking refuge under Beerbhun raj's supervision and the steady supply of Bahella musketeers had made his martial eminence high enough to persuade Clive to write to him for help just before the Battle of Plassey.¹²⁰ Mir Kasim, after getting the throne focused on the

chastisement of Asad-uz-Zaman and Kamgar Khan, with the British help before the rapture with the Company.¹²¹

On the other side of the frontier at that time, Shahzada Ali Ghaur along with Kamgar Khan had been consolidating for a second invasion of Bengal and the obvious route towards Murshidabad was through Beerbhum, ruled by the loyal nephew of Kamgar. But Major Carnac's timely victory had saved the day.¹²² It's not the end of dilemmas but rather the potential threat of Sujaud-Doullah¹²³ and Sheo Bhat¹²⁴, the Maratha commander made Mir Kasim to resolve that the punishment of Asad-uz-Zaman was indispensable need. Captain White had already defeated Raja of Burdwan by the end of 1760 after a brief engagement and had captured ten guns under his possession. While Sheo Bhat and his troops appeared in the vicinity, Mir Kasim feared for a potential nexus in between the Rajas of Burdwan and Beerbhum along with Sheo Bhat's troops. After the subjugation of the Burdwan Raja, Captain White's army marched to help Captain York, who was stalemated in the broken terrain by the guerrilla warfare by the Raja of Beerbhum. At last by the end of January, 1761 Asad-uz-Zaman was also made docile by these combined forces.

Midnapore was the other portion of the western frontier of Bengal province, ravaged by the Maratha troops from the other bank of the Subarnarekha River even after the post-1751 settlement in between Alivardi and the Marathas.¹²⁵ Ramram Singh, the *zamindar* of Midnapore revolted during the time of Mir Jafar 'from whom considerable arrears of revenue were due'.¹²⁶

These acts of insubordination in the ceded districts along with the invasion of Ali Ghaur as well as Sheo Bhat's troops had made the situation problematic. The first residents of Midnapur; Johnston, Burdett, Beaumont, Graham and Watts all have tried to maximize the revenue yield successively, causing excessive pressure for the jungle *zamindars* 'already impoverished by almost annual Maratha inroads'.¹²⁷ These early residents were both factors as well as revenue

collectors, wielding more power than later collectors. Although they had functioned in diverse ways, the principal duties of these men were ‘sage and tranquil settlement of the revenues, or the expulsion from the district of gangs of robbers and dacoits; to the destruction of a hostile French armament, or a skilful negotiation with the Marathas’.¹²⁸ Real expeditions’ against the *Bhum zamindars* started after 1767, when Ensign Fergusson’s detachments of two or four companies of sepoys were sent ‘to adjust revenue with the *Zamindars* and accept their subordination’.¹²⁹ The method of punitive expeditions was to ‘proceed against in a hostile manner...and endeavor to expel them (refractory zamindars) from their dominions’.¹³⁰ These harsh methods were advocated intending the weakening of ‘obstinate’ *zamindars*, who ‘by giving the personal property and possession of people up to plunder...and by destroying as much as possible their refuge and strongholds’.¹³¹ While the higher authorities like Verlest, then Governor General disapproved the punitive methods as there was always been fear of depopulation of the countries by the flight of the inhabitants.¹³² This was the initial dilemma for the Britishers. The semi-independent frontier rajas were consistently creating disturbances aiming not to pay revenue, while any kind of strict punitive action to disposes them caused migration of subjects to other areas. This was the earlier forms of passive resistance of the peasantry against growing pressure of revenue maximization. This resulted in later on while a fixation of *raiyyat-zamindar* relation would be tried ‘for their own good’, *raiyyats* will be resisting these approaches of pinning to the soil.¹³³ Even within this problematic of impasse Fergusson continued his expedition; some responded with submission while others chose to evade the sepoys by taking refuge in wilderness. The first noteworthy confrontation was launched by the nexus of Damodar Singh, a freebooter of Amiyanagar or Ambikanagar and the *zamindar* of Ghatshila. Ghatshila *paiks* had barricaded all the passes to keep the troops away. Fergusson along with Mogul Ray, Jambunie

zamindar marched against the hostile raja and in spite of harassing attacks they succeeded in banishing the Raja. After a few turbulent days the raja was captured and kept under custody with an allowance of thirty rupees, while his near relation Jagernat Dhal was put to the vacated seat of the raja.¹³⁴ Vansittart, the next resident of Mednapore had tried to impose more control on the *zamindars* but due to Fergusson's cautious forbidding made him to keep more or less liberal posture intact. Jagernat Dhal, the new *zamindar* of Ghatshila due to the growing pressure of maximized revenue settlements was bound to revolt. Jagernat Dhal was disposed but the pursuing detachment failed to capture him, installed in his place. This fugitive raja had returned soon, as a rally point for other disgruntled *zamindars* and put up resistance just like the previous ones. Captain Morgan's army in pursuit of the rebel had been often harassed by the rebel retainers. In his description, Morgan said that 'enemies lurked in small bands "like a parcel of wasp", and would never come near him but sting him with their arrows and then fly off'.¹³⁵ After some time of harassing attacks and counter-raids by the Morgan's detachment it seemed that a conciliatory move would be better. On the commencement of rainy season rebels now intended to return to peaceful cultivation surrendered, while the rebel Jagernat Dhal moved to the Maratha territory. By the end of 1768, Narahari Choudhuri, the refractory *zamindar* of Balarampur area was subdued by the Resident Edward Babar.¹³⁶ These kinds of *zamindari* without any tribal lineage during the time of British pressure for revenue maximization, confronted rebellion of local tribal peasantry. So, the communities like Ghorui had revolted in 1768 and 1773, against Balarampur *zamindari* only to be massacred in large numbers.¹³⁷ So the revenue maximization drive by early British administrators had created pressure on the comparatively infertile jungle provinces, for which tribal communities started to create disturbances often as an ally of tribal zamindars and sometimes even against the zamindars.

By 1769, the Midnapore seemed to be peaceful and revenue settlements were established with nearly all the petty *zamindars*, but to the astonishment for the resident Vansittart it's the demobilized paiks who had raised the banner of rebellion now. Captain Forbes through Ghatshila and Captain Nun through Barabhum approached towards the enemy. Bang Singh and Subla Singh, the rebel leaders were sent to gallows to make the punishment exemplary.¹³⁸ Nun's detachment in his approach towards Ambikanagar was ambushed, which caused to the death of a sergeant, a subadar, and twenty sepoy. These protracted punitive activities by the Midnapore residency had caused a drain of resources. In the frontier region this type of governmental approach seemed to be futile as these tiresome revenue duties had left Resident Vansittart unable to check the Maratha raids, while the proximity of the Maratha occupied Orissa provided them a substantial refuge for the rebels. The lack of substantial reinforcement for the Company army engaged in the punitive duties was another cause of failure. During one of these cases the Company troops had to abdicate from pursuit for lack of boats to cross the Subarnarakha. In the later phase as all the old tribal *zamindaries* would be gradually replaced by new non-residential zamindars, the disturbances committed by the agriculturist retainers would found these new men as their enemy. So, the resistance under older tribal rulers will be turned into criminal disturbances in the later interpretations.

The early pacificatory actions by the Company troops in the ceded districts like Bardwan, Midnapore had more importance due to the regions' closer proximity to the Maratha country. Marathas were a strong opponent and will remain like that until the end of the century, by when they will be controlling nearly seventy-five percent of the country.¹³⁹ The Britishers had still to confront the Marathas on open battle in the Battle of Aras on 18th May 1775 which will be dragged on to another century. So prior to that joust for supremacy over the subcontinent, during

this period the frontier of those ceded districts was the bulwark for the Company against the probable Maratha raids. The Awadh was still to be made an extraction ground for resources and that's why revenue from these areas was extracted with intensity to feed the ever increasing infrastructure. The curious thing is that the parts of the western frontier which remained bound to create problems for Bengals' new de facto rulers, as it had been continuously doing in the time of Murshid Quli and Alivardi. Murshid Quli's western front was secured due to the presence of efficient Mughal *faujdar*s like Saif Khan who had successfully controlled the resources of that inner frontier. Alivardi usurped to get the throne of Murshidabad by utilizing the military assets from that inner frontier region of north-western Bihar, but he confronted that problem of pacifying the turbulent edge of the province during the Afghan revolts. The continued Maratha raids were the new element to the impending chaos. Alivardi's efficient attempts had partially pacified the problems by chastising Afghans, weakening the Marathas but culturally he had never thought of chastising these little wardens of the marches. Company's early governance found those little *zamindars* too overbearing and impeding for their financial and administrative plans, which had some grand strategic tit bits. As for the Company, other greater *zamindari*s were either already made dependent to the regional centre or already chastised by preceding rulers. The only exceptions were the Beerbhum raj whose army had a defeat while fighting on the side of Burdwan raj and little jungle zamindari of Midnapore area against whom protracted punishing expeditions were sent. Returning to Ascoli's denomination for the period in between 1760 to 1773 as a 'period of hesitation', it can be said that the early pacificatory approaches by the Company had their own limitations. Their position of supremacy was still not protruding like the times of Warren Hastings; their grand strategic schemes were too overbearing for their capacity; their sovereign status was still not properly defined. In that 'period of hesitation' the

pacification duties fulfilled by the Company army were categorically the job of the military assistance.

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Chapter 3

Indistinct Doctrine: Varied Modalities of ‘Pacification’ by the Company State, 1770-1800

War and politics have some ordinal relationship, with minute aloofness within to differentiate their objective composition. For Clausewitz war and politics, if not necessarily, can coexist autonomously because war is primarily about fighting, while politics is essentially same kind of ‘interaction of opposite’ just without violence.¹ On the other hand for Sun Tzu, the emaciated margin in between war and politics is porous and transient.² For a Napoleonic war veteran like Clausewitz, politics seemed to be the aim which determines the war plan, rather than being the handmaiden of war itself, where as for Sun Tzu, a Chinese bureaucrat, war and politics seemed to be an inseparable coalescence, just like the *yin* and *yang*. The war of pacification seems to follow the line of Sun Tzu, rather than Clausewitz’s. Colonial wars which mostly fall ‘under the strategic rubric of pacification’, differ ‘from military conquest as traditionally practiced and understood’³ and thus all the colonial wars seem to be more political than military. While politics becomes the main guidepost, war seems to follow the lead of bureaucrats rather than generals, making the whole operation regulated and protracted by non-martial matters. From this viewpoint, if wars of colonial pacifications were analyzed following Clausewitz’s aphorism, politics rather than being the final piece of the ‘paradoxical trinity’ will be the uncontrollable, uncertain element of war itself. This importance of politics determining not only the motive but also its entire operational methods and outcome, makes wars of pacification as a part of the larger rubric of diplomacy, civil-military relation, sovereignty etc.

The prominent counterinsurgency doctrines of French and British school have mentioned about integrity in between political, social, economic, and military measure. For Hubert Lyautey, French official posted in Morocco, 'colonial' seems to be 'a special being no longer civilian or military, but simply colonial'.⁴ This composite nature of 'colonial' pacification' was supported by the British too, for whom pacificatory war 'must be politically led and cross-government in approach'.⁵ But the main difference between the French and British ways of pacification is that the later is less methodical and more flexible compared to the former. British pacificatory doctrines had very little methodological integrity and based on informal experiences and differential policies.⁶ This kind of doctrinal flexibility was pretty prominent in early colonial phase in India, which had made early British pacification under the banner of the East India Company a cluttered business. This chapter argues that utter inexplicit character of Company state had caused the doctrinal inconsistencies in case of pacificatory jobs.

Indirect Peace: Politico-Military Relation in Awadh-Benares

While Bengal was the consolidation ground for the British imperialism, Awadh was the extraction ground since the Battle of Buxer. Throughout the late 18th century, Awadh would have been an area of steady British encroachment under the grab of indirect authoritative control; but in the local level it had been very much problematic affair to conduct efficiently, particularly in case of quelling disturbances. Disturbances and chaos had always been the rhetoric for the Britishers to encroach more and more into different sovereign territory but in the procedure of pacifying those local disturbances particularly outside their direct jurisdiction British local authorities had encountered turbulences. This kind of hindrances had caused problem for a successful pacification throughout the second half of the 18th century. This proved to be

devastating during the end of the century when the whole paradigm of circumlocutory dominance was shattered by Wazir Ally's rebellion.

Delhi was occupied in 1771 by the Marathas. It had a great impact on the subcontinent, because the Mughal emperor who was a virtual prisoner of the emerging Maratha power posed a great threat for the British. This virtual supremacy of the Marathas would continue to linger as a threat to British legitimacy until the march of Lord Lake into Delhi in 1803, causing an end to Daulat Rao Sindhia's viceroyalty and the beginning of Delhi Residency system. In the Battle of Buxer (1764) the 'Red Phoenix' rose but only to be humbled down in their Bengal enclave by the turn of 1771.⁷ When Sujaudoullah, the Nawab of Awadh was defeated he was the most powerful person for whom the Buxer might seem to be a final showdown for the British overhaul to empire. Mahadji Sindhia was still not a threat and Hyder Ali still struggled for his foothold in the far South. Maratha threat was real but Company had responded to it firmly. Clive's firm order to Robert Barker, the Commander in Chief to hold Kara and Allahabad against the potential Maratha incursion and after him, Warren Hastings' vehement opposition of any kind of tributary payment 'to supply the pageantry of a mock king' who had turned into a 'tool of the only enemies', was the sign that these powers would be clashing for an ultimate struggle to dominate the Indian subcontinent.⁸

This sudden change in the scenario had made Anglo-Awadh relation recommenced with further magnitude. Awadh had been turning into a drain for military resources as detachments had to be sent anytime Maratha scare occurred in the frontiers. In spite of the sum of thirty thousand per month provided by the Awadh according to Moon, 'they did not cover the extra charges'.⁹ The military section always had fear of future treachery and potential Maratha-Awadh coalition, which was disbelieved by Hastings. Hastings' incredulity for military official's observation was

a part of a persistent tradition of civil dominance over military faction in Company's internal politics. He had been striving for a relation commanded under the civil servants of the Company. This might be seen as the inception point of 'indirect rule' in Awadh. Sujaudoullah on the other hand had successfully lifted the 'free trade' clause imposed on it by 1768.¹⁰ While Hastings was trying to remodel the whole alliance as productive and cost-effective, Nawab successfully used this new found good will to expand and refashion the army by lifting the army reduction clause. After the treaty of 1773, Sujaudoullah achieves a position of mutual beneficiary, and used that relation to extend its dominion into the Rohilla territory.

In the reign of Asaf-ud-daulah, things became more intense when British influence was primarily established in Awadh through the deployment of a permanent Resident in Awadh court. This had started the slow but steady encroachment into the internal politics of Awadh. To keep Awadh away from Maratha influence, diplomatic segregation was devised. First step was the banning of Europeans in any kind of service without the consent of the Company by the Treaty of 1775.¹¹ Correspondences of the Nawab with other indigenous rulers were regulated.¹² Ability to indulge in diplomatic alliance was curtailed, making Awadh a dependency of Company. Such a dependency as a buffer against the flux of North Indian politics had been a necessity for long in the British eye and it would be serving as a 'cost-free barrier to the restless "country" powers further into Hindusthan'.¹³ Awadh 'with its sprawling boundaries stretching from Rohilakhand by the way of Kanpur to Allahabad in the south, rising upwards to Azamgarh and Gorakhpur, held the crucial Jamuna frontier'.¹⁴ Strategic frontier of Awadh was gradually penetrated by British trading, revenue farming, and subsidy based intrusion because from the time of Hastings the policy of profiteering from Awadh became lucrative, a moment when people like Claude Martin turned out to be influential in court politics.

‘The politico-strategic argument’ put forward by imperial scholars, shows that Awadh’s role as a bulwark to the Maratha threat was the primary motivation for policy making.¹⁵ The same argument was widespread during the time of Wellesley as Zaman Shah’s invasion was on the verge. Just like the Maratha spectre, the Afghan bogey was behind the fear of a potential Afghan-Rohilla link up.¹⁶ This trend was altered later by Eric Stokes, P.J. Marshall Etc. Stokes argued that the strategic frontier of Awadh slowly transformed into the economic frontier of the empire during the late 18th and early 19th century. Banaras under the nominal dominance of Awadh became the other point of politico-military problem regarding sovereignty and authority. Awadh-Banaras relationship depended on a ‘balancing of relative weaknesses’ where the Nawab ‘could not afford the complete chaos which would result from the crushing of the raja’ and on the part of the later, there was always ‘the need for legitimacy’ which emanated from Mughal Emperor through the Nawab of Awadh.¹⁷ Another influencing variable was the ‘little kingdoms’ or the rajadoms, *jagirs* and *taluqs*. The whole system was depended on volatile kinship relations, often uniting as well as feuding among themselves. Jonathan Duncan, Resident in Banaras in between 1788-95 stated that each of these petty landholders had been ‘in the habit of turning his house into a stronghold’, while the raja aimed for ‘the downgrading of the brotherhoods’.¹⁸ Such a tusk was literally impossible by destroying little forts of these lineages, which was fruitlessly attempted by the Banaras rajas and later on by the Britishers. So Banaras which came under British direct control after 1775, originally carried on the loosely knit web of politico-lineal structure to capricious to be toughen or slacken. Just like a ‘theatre state’ rather than the display of power, it’s the power of display which had interwoven it into subsistence, where the Mughal state’s distant hegemony over Awadh mirrored in the tripartite complementation of Awadh-Banaras-rajadoms in the sublevel. British intrusion had bound to tear up the whole fabric of

theatricality of the system, although Warren Hastings was adoptive to this rituality. It was Hastings who had forced Suja-ud-daula to tie a turban and present a sword according to rituals to confer upon Chait Singh the *zamindari* and the honours of the late raja Balwant Singh, 'symbolizing his acceptance of Chait Singh as his subordinate.'¹⁹

The difference of attitude came after the campaigns against Sindhia during the Anglo-Maratha war, a campaign which had literally drained the coffers.²⁰ The result was Hastings' demand of special sum from Chait Singh which were harshly demanded, increased and further extended into other demands like maintenance of an extra cavalry brigade of 2000. It is said that the feud in between Chait Singh and Avasan Singh, a zamindar uprooted by Chait Singh had instigated Hastings to take harsh measures. When conciliation had been intended by Chait Singh who was ready to meet Hastings at Baksar, the later went to Banaras to put the Raja under arrest. This incident had burst into rebellion when Chait Singh's army had cut down the small group of escorts and Hastings fled to the Chunar garrison. Flight of Hastings had a great political impact resulting into the tempering of the politico-lineal fabric, causing a further outburst of rebellions by other zamindars.

Chait Singh was dependent on the British by the Anglo-Awadh agreement of 1775. But Banaras raj was accustomed to a negotiable and even-handed dependency which Hastings had been diminishing. Chait Singh's predecessors had a tendency of retreating into the jungles with treasures before advancing troops, while Nawab's nominal legitimacy rarely helped in dislodging the raja. The kinship fabric was such a delicate equilibrium that tempering with it could have led to the opening of the Pandora's Box. Hastings' approach had successfully done so. Hastings had shifted towards the policy of indirect control over Awadh, while in case of Banaras tried to exercise more financial encroachment as it had entered into the legal sovereign control of the

Company by 1775. This concept of legal control seemed to be proved as obsolete due to its temperance with the tripartite equilibrium of Awadh-Banaras-rajadom relation. But on the other hand, with the outbreak of the rebellion as the preventive measures were concerned political primacy and indirect rule policy seemed to return causing problems for pacification campaigns. During the rebellion, Resident Nathaniel Middleton's letter to Fort William shows that the British authority's indirect hegemony often arrives at the brink of desolation whenever local notaries and power factions showed utmost non-cooperative attitude. Middleton's report contains the excerpts from the journal of Colonel Hannay, who had been ordered by 'the Nabob Vizir to march with his force' to assist the Governor General. Hannay mentions that 'the whole country on the East side of the Gogra was in arms and rebellion'. He further said that his own detachments were deserting rampantly and left him with only one company. 'The forts of Gurruckpore, Bilma and Dumreeagung', which were little garrisons controlled by the native *amils*, were captured by the local *zamindars*. The '*dak harcurrahs* were stopped so that all communication of intelligence from his other detachments under Major McDonald, Captain Williams and Lieutenant Gordon were cut off and the town of Fyzabad 'has more the appearance of belonging to Cheyt Singh than the Vizir.²¹ So the lack of control by the Nawab Vizir had left the Company forces under divergent authorities of the Vizir and the Company in a quagmire of institutional hindrance. They had to keep correspondence with Lucknow, who could have provide no help against the rebel but the army officials always had to be careful about the preservation of the nominal sovereignty of the Nawab.

Now, Awadh's internal politics had been diverged in between the Nawab Asafudoullah and Begams of Awadh; who had substantial jagirs and wealth to control the local politics. Colonel Hanney's forces were prevented from entering bazaar of Fyzabad by the servants of the Begams,

while Shake Chaun, a rebel *zamindar* 'with near 1000 horse and foot' had marched from Fyzabad towards Banaras. Under these circumstances Colonel Hanney had no authority to supersede Begams' authority to stop Shake Chaun. Hanny had no other option than sending his agent Hoolass Roy 'to enquire into the reasons of his people being prevented from going into the town' or 'why her servants attempted to prevent Hanney's men getting boats to transport the companies, guns and horse from Amora'.²²

Local *faujdar*s of the area in between Khyrabad to Fyzabad, who were under the authority of Nawab, fought in the side of the rebel and often created problem for the British detachments just like the retainers of the Begams of Awadh. Little chiefs like Ghinoo Rai, Ajeetmull, Zalem Singh had become refractory and continued to raise men for Cheyt Singh and while a British detachment had moved towards them, the local *faujdar* had stopped them on the way.²³ So, in a province where native authority's control had weakened, local elements' refractory capabilities increased and caused problems for the pacificatory forces, who in their turn already chocked by legal and institutional edema.

The rebellion had been quelled and in spite of the Maratha support, Cheyt Singh had to flee under the protection of Sindhia.²⁴ But ending of the rebellion does not show the success of the pacificatory policy but the efficiency of the political means. Resident and its political agents had created a parallel court, which was successful enough to encroach into the higher court politics but had little impact on local matters. Financial burdens as well as weakening of the provincial authority had disturbed the socio-political web and unleashed chaos. On one hand growing disturbances had been used by the diplomatic section as a political rhetoric for the demand for further control, while on the other, the need of maintaining diplomatic status quo handicapped

military authorities. This complicated dilemma had resulted into a strenuous civil-military relationship in the indirectly ruled provinces.

Now, while diplomacy became the primary approach towards indirect hegemony, peace building in the indirectly ruled areas had changed its tools. Just like the Residence of Banaras continued to keep vigilance on any kind of disobedience from the local elements. Surveillance was indirect and often through native mediation, but this kind of indirect observance had been prolific. Resident of Banaras in one of his directive to the local official Mirza Muhammad Sadek asked to bring the Chowkidars of Kennua, Bisowera, Cogawann, Borapoor by the public badge-peon which had turned into one appealing event.²⁵ The order had been passed due to the news of illegal exaction of *rahadari* duty, collection of which had been made illicit by the Residency. These can be mentioned as the slow encroachment in the local level, where the petty rural zamindars exacted tax from the merchants using the routes through the villages. In this case, Mirza Sadek answered that the alleged *Chowkidars* were related to Bulwant Singh, a 'man of the village Berohee as exceedingly refractory' and it was this *zamindar* that had been exacting money from the merchants.²⁶ For taking action against that refractory element one Peon named Ali Bakhsh was sent but he was driven back violently by the son and kinsmen of Bulwant Singh. Bulwant Singh following the tradition had taken shelter into the jungle of the nearby hill. The Resident instead of sending troops against the refractory *zamindar* which according to him could have caused undue 'effusion of blood', asked Captain Austin to 'dispatch one of the sepoy to the escort, disguised as a faker into Bulwant's village to gain intelligence'. Now, this kind of caution was a characteristic of indirectly ruled province where the Resident was supposed to manage such matters with as less coercion as much possible. This policy of emphasising on

intelligence reports to quell disturbances with minimum was seen as British characteristics of counterinsurgency even in later days.²⁷

Ram Singh, *jamadar* of sepoy along with another sepoy, Sheo Dyal Singh in the disguise of *fakers* had enquired and found out that Bulwant Singh, afraid of some marching sepoy through the village had fled and had taken shelter in one revoluted. At night, Bulwant Singh along with his kinsmen returned in the village discussing about the prohibition regarding *rahadari* collection, which they claimed to be their unalienable right. After this Bulwant and his henchmen planned to remain silent until the Resident move away from Mirzapur.²⁸ This tactics was very much related to the earlier negotiation based tradition where potential coercion of higher authorities were met with retreat into jungle shelters and further negotiation of the terms. Here Bulwant Singh was not sure of the Resident's intension for negotiation and plans for negotiating with the local Raja once the Resident would move away. A Brahmin who had been sent to the local Raja in secret returned and explained that the Raja had expressed no intension of providing any writ of consent regarding *rahadary*. After listening to this Bulwant Singh decided that whenever the Resident would leave the town, they would act accordingly.²⁹ Bulwant had seemed to gather a multitude of local retainers and kinship relations, which seemed to be nor less than 'some four to five hundred people'. Ram Singh further reported that Bulwant Singh's house seemed to be guarded by the retainers of the Amil Mirza Sadek, which had been denied by the later. So the situation was severe because apprehending Bulwant without bloodshed, which the Resident had desired seemed to be impossible and it's the Amil's retainers looked like helping Bulwant to escape all the time. Where the Resident tried to follow the rule of minimum coercion, the pre-modern system of resistance-negotiation often made it impossible, jeopardising the basic rule of indirect rule.

The concept of indirect rule as a tool of British paramountcy reflects a policy of ‘controlling a regional state through “advice” given to the local prince or chief’, a mode of expanding imperial sway ‘without the economic and political costs of direct annexation’.³⁰ This mode of hegemony through indirect diplomacy made the arena ready for the political agents rather than military officials. Primacy of civil officials under Residents made problems for the military officials in such a way that even in the case of countering minute disturbances the military arm had to wait for the Resident or the Wazir’s approval. In one such instance, civil-military divide came up as a matter of hindrance for commencing basic law and order initiative. All of this began when Colonel John Cumming had mentioned about frequent robberies committed by the native inhabitants and *zamindars* in the army barrack of Farrockabad to some Khaja Ainuddin, a native official. It was reported that the *dak hircarrahs* were sent to investigate and they had returned with the news that people of the village of Bunniary under the *taluk* of Seewa *zamindar* had stolen those goods from the barrack. Cumming’s detachment was sent against these *zamindars* that had burnt those goods and fled in the fear of the Company troops. But the incidence was reported by Khaja Ainuddin, the native official as that it had been the *zamindars* who were helping the sepoys to relinquish the plundered goods. He further reported that the *zamindars* were falsely accused by the soldiers and further requested Resident Bristow to give orders so that ‘no military detachment from the camp of Farrockabad may be sent in future to enter the mofussil’. Justifying his pre-emptive military strike Cumming said in his defence that as the local *zamindars*’ retainers attempted to ‘defend the stolen goods by force’ he had to sent a battalion to counter. Cumming further accused Khaja Ainuddin and his brother fujdar Khaja Kerim Ally as the main culprits behind the frequent robberies in the camp. In reply to Cumming’s letter to the Nawab, the Nawab Wazir said that the pre-emptive military strike ‘was

done without a reference' to him and that's why it 'was improper'. Cumming was further directed by Wazir's counsel, to 'obtain previous sanction to all proceedings through the channel of the Resident Mr. Bristow'.³¹ The interesting thing is that the letter which had accompanied the previous letter containing Nawab's answer to Cumming was Resident Bristow's letter. In that letter Bristow also had accused Cumming for a 'direct breach of instruction' and warned that 'the style adopted' in his letter 'might give offence to his Excellency'.³² From here the whole correspondence had taken the form of bureaucratic rivalry where the military faction wrestled with the civil one. Cumming's reply to Bristow explains the rage of military officials towards the new group of political officials. Cumming after denying all the accusation made by the Khaja, mentioned to the Resident that while his predecessor was in office 'in cases of this kind his reply was that, "we must protect ourselves and make use of our own force to punish the robbers and murderers'. Cumming's accusation against Bristow is clear from this. It evokes the rage of military officials against civil officials like Bristow. Cumming reminded Bristow that though the office of a resident provided 'great power and influence' but as the servant of the Company the position of a commanding officer was superior to Resident which might induce Bristow to treat Cumming with some delicacy.³³ The whole incident attracted Governor General in Council's mediation where Cumming was instructed to do according to Bristow's instruction.³⁴ This incident exemplify the common disregard for military officials which had burdened the later to go for any anti-banditry campaign and thus sabotaging the possibility of any kind of punitive actions in the indirectly ruled areas. Bryant said that the Company 'firmly supported the principle of civil supremacy in its Indian governments, but found it difficult to find a formula to realise this without compromising military effectiveness'.³⁵ Decline of military effectiveness in indirectly ruled areas were synonymous with ineffectiveness in peacekeeping activities.

Pursuance of Progressive Occupation: Western Frontier of Bengal, 1775-1800

While the indirectly ruled areas were kept under a steady surveillance through the residence system, if not a strict policy of pacification, in directly ruled areas the British system in their approach of quelling occasional rebellions continuously followed authoritative outlook. In case of direct pacification, the British counterinsurgency in the Rajmahal areas is particularly important due to its long duration through which it had experienced differential approach towards pacificatory approach. Rajmahal had been the gateway between the directly and indirectly ruled provinces of the Company. The main overland path connecting the Bengal presidency with the Upper provinces passed through this area.³⁶ So the rebellion of the Paharia tribes was a matter of great nuisance not only for the frontier *zamindars* but also their British successors in those regions. Paharias or the hill people were known for their occasional raids on the plains mostly during the harvest times. From the Mughal times the frontier *zamindars* as well as the warden of the marches continued to quarantine these raids through the setting up of a string of blockhouses manned by the men of the local rajas like the Pathan raja of Birbhum.³⁷ The cycle of raids and occasional killing of the raiders continued until the coming of the British officials who had thought of uprooting these menace once and for all. Before the British the higher administrative authorities had little contacts with the hill people like Paharias, 'who desired only the seclusion of his rocky home'.³⁸ The limited antagonism between the frontier *zamindars* and the Paharias had long been in a stalemate situation.

British interaction with the Paharias can be seen as the breakdown of the pre modern stalemate frontier policy and the way it has been encountered can be seen as one of the earliest direct pacification of the frontiers. This direct confrontation which later on followed a conciliatory path clearly demarcates itself from the indirect peace building in protectorate areas like Awadh. Rajmahal's position as the chief land route made it a matter of great politico-military significance for the British and due to this importance for shake of grand strategic purposes , a passive Rajmahal was necessary. Its strategic importance had long been accepted from the time of the Mughals who had set up the Teliaghari fort to keep a watchful presence over the main routes as well as the Shikaragali pass.

The campaigns of the Paharia territories during the 1770s had its methodological similarities with the French method of swift and brutal pacification called *Razzia*; a necessary precursor of modern counterinsurgency. *Razzia* as a counterinsurgency modus operandi shows the strict way of pacifying rebel forces mirroring a strong state wielding the tools and techniques of repressive state apparatus. *Razzia*, a pre Islamic Bedouin method of tribal raids, adopted and institutionalized by the French colonial forces in the 1830s.³⁹ The main methodological character of *Razzia* was 'to attack with overwhelming force against unprepared herdsmen or settlements'.⁴⁰ During the Algerian campaigns, Thomas Robert Bugeaud anticipating a religiously driven incursion by the Arabs ordered his subordinates to 'burn corps, cut down fruit trees' as 'they (rebels) shall be ruined for a long time'.⁴¹ The starkest representation of violent counterinsurgency methods like murder, imprisonment and looting were rampantly used in the Bugeaud's system of pacification. Most of the village raids comprised of encirclement and killing of most of the male population followed by burning of cottages and granaries, as well as large scale imprisonment irrespective of age and gender. The elders, women, and children often

died due to the hardships of the desert under imprisonment. But these *Razzias* were more than some ‘organized thefts’ and after Bugeaud turned out to be one of the most interesting mode of warfare for the 19th century colonial powers. The French position on Algeria was along the costal enclaves from which they had pushed into further interior for greater colonial penetration. As Algerian population was semi-nomadic that’s why Bugeaud, a man trained under the late Napoleonic military afterglow, found western military tactics and ethics as obsolete in the non-western battlegrounds. This is where Bugeaud’s concept of *Razzia* explains the difference in between eastern and western modes of warfare; a theoretical scale of analyzing colonial pacification. He had seen the European battlefields through the lenses of a Napoleonic general, where the war had been a clash of great armies, but in Africa, ‘the force is diffuse, it’s everywhere.’⁴² So war’s main Clausewitzian centre of gravity according to Bugeaud is ‘interest’, political, economic and all, which were difficult to seize in the African theatres. The French army at African ground seemed like ‘in a position of a bull attacked by a multitude of wasps’.⁴³ That’s why in the non-western battlefield, it’s not the occupation of cities but the capture of the livestocks and grains were the only sizable interest.

This kind of brutal counterinsurgency strategy was even championed in the western world, not only by the military generals but also by the intellectuals of liberal ethos like Alexis de Tocqueville. According to Tocqueville, burning of granaries which is not applicable in Europe is necessary in case of Africa because;

‘We wage war on governments and not on population.’⁴⁴

If Tocqueville can be seen as the representative of the western ethos then his acceptance of the brutality of counterinsurgency as a necessary evil of war is a sign of the acceptance that there is

an unbridgeable difference between the East and the West. Tocqueville had even said that *razzia* as a humane form of warfare sanctioned by the social context in which the campaign was being set up, is a better option compared to the artillery bombardment on besieged cities which were sanctioned by international laws.⁴⁵ Tocqueville's stand was indefinite like many other intellectuals distressingly scrambled for a piece of moral ground in their support towards wars of pacification. He 'dreaded a war of pacification that would unleash uncontrolled human destructiveness' but also 'unambiguously supported Bugeaud's methods of warfare'.⁴⁶

This kind of differentiation of the enemy population led to the dehumanization of the non-western tribes which was not only a matter of French counterinsurgency strategy, but followed by the Britishers also. But like Tocqueville British officials were confused and always believed in the thin line in between efficient and excessive brutality in pacifying population. British officials of Rajmahal in the initial period had followed the same approach towards the unruly Paharia tribes. Like the French, British officials had seen the Paharia tribes as savages and non-political entities and due to that dehumanization; brutal pacification became an obvious method. British power had been trying to exercise an effective control over these areas since 1769 due to the fear of Maratha invasion, which still loomed on the other side of Awadh. European observers like Bishop Heber mentioned that the Muslim *zamindars* prior to the British officials had killed these Paharia people 'like mad dogs or tigers, whenever they got them, within gunshots'.⁴⁷ British expansion in the post-Plassey regime caused the dislodging of pre-colonial officials employed as the frontier guards like the *ghatwals*. The consecutive raids by the Paharias increased and 'added their quota to the general confusion'.⁴⁸ The famine of 1770 was on the verge while the British possession of Rajmahal was ongoing. The hill people survived through the famine due to their tactics of survival. The famine had made the *zamindari* check posts

deserted and when the hill men saw the check posts unmanned poured into the lands. The famine struck population had seen the most brutal depredations in the hands of these people. This time the hill men were charged with the spirit of revenge for the previous treacherous murder of their kinsmen and they ‘wantonly burned the whole village and slaughtered women and children like cattle in cold blood’.⁴⁹ This was the water shade in the long cycle of protracted chaos in between the inner frontier of the plains and the hills along the western border.

The British encounter of the Paharia problem came as the attacks on the dak runners through the main connecting pathway of Rajmahal hills. The Paharias, who had ascended to carnage throughout the lowlands, were ‘no respectors of persons’ and those ‘dak runners of the far off power which to them as yet was but a name were legitimate and often desirable prey’.⁵⁰ The result was the continued robbing of government’s dispatches. The strict British action was the raising of the corps of light infantry under Captain Brook to subdue and pacify these marauding hill men in 1772.⁵¹

Now it can be asked that why looting of dak runners became so much important for the British officials, who had sent a full contingent of pacificatory forces to quell the Paharias. The question of legitimacy is related with the whole matter. The British Empire from its nascent period was intoxicated with the very thing of administrative documentation and exchange of orders and official correspondence in written form. Mughal state system also had a system of *akhbarat* or governmental correspondence but it was totally different from the British one. Imperial dak was a sign of power, legitimacy and control, ‘differentiating it from other regional and *zamindari daks*’.⁵² According to C.A. Bayly, the ‘very penetration of British intelligence gathering systems and the effectiveness of the *harkara* establishment’ had ‘helped the British to gain the military upper hand in the first place’.⁵³ The *dak harkara*’s penetration into the unknown was the earlier

legitimising exploration of British imperialism, which ended by the second decades of the 19th century with the growth of surveys, opening contours of imperial knowledge which had ‘a new territorial, truly three dimensional form’.⁵⁴ So the postal systems or the *dak harkaras* worked in two ways; it had taken the colonial presence to the deeper heart of the subcontinent and alternatively it had secured utmost knowledge about the unknown interiors of the country which proved to be handy for future conquests.⁵⁵ During the British times the dak became more institutionalized and on the other hand indigenous powers had seen these dak runners as the politico-military scouts sent for reconnaissance. During the period of contesting sovereignty in between the Maratha and East India Company, Company’s growing control over information system was seen by the Maratha information official or the akhbar nawis as a mode of encroachment and surveillance into the Maratha state affairs and its legitimacy. Peshwa’s official had advised him to order his *makasardars* or village officials, ‘not to allow the dak of the English couriers to be posted anywhere’ and to ‘slay them whenever found’.⁵⁶ Dak was essentially the British assertion towards the more increased and intense informational control and due to that efficiency in the careful conveyance of the correspondence had become one of the chief concerns of the efficient rule. British rule from the early colonial times had exercised one elaborate policy of indirect rule through residents and due to that efficient channelizing of correspondence in between residents or the Court of Directors was important.

So, attack on such an important networking system of the Empire on which its political and diplomatic strategies were depended had to be countered and defended. Brook had stormed the hill fort of the Paharia chiefs at Tiur and cannons were used to break the resistance.⁵⁷ Captain Brook’s Light Infantry corps seemed to fail in achieving any kind of persistent victory, due to the mobility and mastery of skirmishing warfare from the side of the Paharias. The rough terrains

had made advance nearly impossible and ‘most modern firearms and weapons of warfare were of little use’.⁵⁸ It’s also said that the arrows used by the Paharias were ‘often poisoned, and the men in the light infantry regarded them with a deadly fear’.⁵⁹ It’s during this time of Paharia-British confrontation followed the same tactics of *razzia*; comprised of brutal village burning, crop destroying etc.

In the year 1777-78, Captain James Brown became the head of the Paharia campaign. His letter to the Commander-in-Chief encloses some extracts from the journal of an ensign employed in the pacificatory raids. Ensign Ford’s journal provides some instances of day to day pacification campaigns of the light infantry corps. As per the journal entry, a detachment marched from the village Saunnr in the zila Colgong and after reaching in the proximity of the rebel village one company under the leadership of Ensign Funningham entered into the jungles ‘with the setting of the moon’. Ensign Ford further states that the principle aim of this campaign was to attack the Paresh Budda Hill or the Pareshnath Hill, where the rebel Paharia leader Mangu was supposed to be. The whole detachment started ‘to ascend the remarkably steep hill of Poresh Budda’ at 6’o clock morning. Approaching the village one native Sergeant along with thirty rank and files was sent to assault. After some scanty resistance most of the rebels were rounded up. It was reported ‘in the attack six hill people, among who were Mangu, his son and father were killed and fifteen taken prisoner’. Apart from this murder and imprisonment in that village the soldiers had found ‘a quantity of corn, which was brunt’.

Fords journal further states that after this initial attack on the main rebel village, the departed sergeant had returned on 3 o’ clock. After burning the final village in the vicinity according to his count further ‘seventeen people were killed and ten were taken prisoners’. Ensign Funningham’s exploits counted as three killed and twenty in custody. Apart from these attacks

on the main rebel villages, Ensign Ford reports that a *habildar*'s party had been sent to 'burn adjacent villages' while a *jamadar*'s party was ordered 'to proceed to the low country'. On the 15th Ensign Ford further reported that, two detachments; one led by a *subadar* with forty sepoy and the other led by a sergeant with thirty marched on different tracts and returned by 1 o' clock afternoon. According to their reports 'twelve large villages and sixty granaries of corn' were destroyed. Ford's journal mentioned that the whole duty was tedious and 'the sepoy had undergone through violent fatigue'.⁶⁰

Now, as compared to *razzia*, these pacification campaigns against the Paharia tribes had some limitations but also had methodological similarities. Night raids, use of flying light columns, looting and destroying of food and habitat etc all were the parts of these counterinsurgency approaches. But according to the scale of effectiveness these punitive campaigns against the Paharias had little success. French in Algeria were in a strong position and had sufficiently mobilized money and manpower in those campaigns, where as East India Company at that moment was not in a position to supply these resources, was akin to follow conciliatory methods. James Brown, the new head of the light infantry soon realized that 'conciliation and not conquest must be looked to if peace was to be brought to this sorely tried district'.⁶¹ Brown's policy of conciliation comprised of providing allowance to the Paharia *sardars* in order to keep tranquillity, resurrecting *ghatwal choukies* under direct British supervision to create a formidable ring fence, setting up of invalid *thanahs* along the foothills to use the invalided soldiers' assistance in the maintenance of law and order.⁶² Brown's plans were further elaborated by his successor Augustus Cleveland. McPherson wrote, 'When the later achievements of Mr. Cleveland are considered, it should not be forgotten that Captain Brooke was the pioneer of civilization in the jungletery'.⁶³

The coming of Augustas Cleveland, an exponent of British paternalism, as the collector and magistrate of Bhagalpur was seen as the radical shift in the policy towards the Paharias. His approach was radically benevolent, was 'characterised by an unusual kindness, emanating as if from the father towards his children'.⁶⁴ After the disappearance of Browne from the scene Paharias became restive once again and in this time local rulers Raja Rup Narayan Deo of Chandawa, Rajput Rajas of Kharagpur, Rani Sarbeswari of Sultangunj etc was in consort of them.⁶⁵ Cleveland in his attempt of breaking this problematic nexus followed a policy of fraternizing with the Paharia rank and files and to commence that fruitfully he had extended Browne's policy of allowance. The Paharia *sardars*, *manzis* etc were made governmental pensioners and as reported by the end of year 1780 nearly forty seven chiefs were brought under the pension scheme.⁶⁶ But these successful conciliations were done in a radically different way. William Hodges in his diaries mentioned that Cleveland ventured into the hills 'alone and unarmed, where he convened some of the principle Chiefs; and after the fullest assurance of his most peaceable intentions and good will towards them, he invited them to visit him in his residence'.⁶⁷ His second important scheme was the establishment of the Hill Assembly for the administration of civil and criminal justice.⁶⁸ In the Hill assembly which was first met in the year of 1782, hill chiefs were incorporated as superintending officers and thus British rule of law was furthered with the incorporation of the local tribal consent. Cleveland had constructed the idea of Damin-i-Koh, as a rent free area where the Paharias can live without external encroachment.⁶⁹ He had tried for sedentarisation of the Paharias by supplying seeds and agricultural implements but this scheme remained unfulfilled. Cleveland had set up educational institutions too, which shows the all round developmental plan envisaged by him.⁷⁰

This instance of British pacification in the Rajmahal hills shows a slow transformation from the military centric approaches comparable to the brutal *razzias*, towards the more benevolent approach of conciliation. In the 21st century modern counterinsurgency doctrines it has been emphasised that ‘success would not be determined by military might alone but instead by winning the hearts and minds of the people’.⁷¹ In the case of the Paharia pacification the second phase resembles much with the modern ‘hearts and mind’ approach, which was most probably adopted due to cost effectiveness and long term success. This instance can be linked with the broader paradigm of differences between British and French ways of pacification. It’s not only the variables like financial strength or condition of sovereignty but also other deeper cultural tropes like religion which has shaped the military ethos of pacification. It will not be too much to say that the British ideas of counterinsurgency had been influenced by deep Protestant ethics like ‘chivalry, individual sensibilities’, while Catholic France’s pacification was swayed by its violent cultural past.⁷² Brook, Browne and Cleveland were the three scales of official mentalities in the pacification campaigns that could be found throughout the late 18th century British Empire in India.

Another area of focus of this late 18th century pacificatory campaigns were the south-western parts of Bengal; a place of menace long since the time of Maratha invasion. These areas were contentiously coming under strong jurisdiction and control from the 1770’s and it had lost its earlier vigour of protest. In the sector of land revenue the farming out system had caused enough confusion along with the famine which bred further lawlessness.⁷³ In one hand, dispossession by the British authority had made a motley mass of demobilized pikes, retainers rooming loose and on the other hand, Warren Hasting’s effort of controlling the whole internal security machine with a scarce quantity of *faujdar*s and sepoy contentiously failed. Jungle *zamindar*s became

restless and refractory, often aided by the Raja of Mayurbhanj caused enough depredations. Throughout the 1770's wandering *sannyasis* had looted and plundered in the frontier areas. In this time various petty *zamindaries* like the Raja of Amiyanagar, Sardar of Dhadki etc under the leadership of Subla Singh revolted against the new *ijaradari* settlement. In 1771, Lieutenant Goodyear and later on in 1772, Captain Carter, Lieutenant Gall and Lieutenant Young were employed to conduct punitive actions against these disturbances.⁷⁴ The resident's approach was conciliatory at first and from his fortified position of Doomjure continued negotiations with the rebel chiefs through the mediation of another *zamindar* of Silada, named Magovin. After a short period the British detachment had driven away the rebels and the loyal Ghatshila raja captured the deserted *zamindari*. Such occasional disturbances would be sprouting into rebellion throughout 1770's and 1780's, always quelled temporarily due to punitive measures but never led to any substantial results.⁷⁵ Among these numerous disturbances Jagganath Dhal's rebellion had some noteworthy characters. Jagganath Dhal remained a menace for long and due to the proximity of the Subarnarakha, the Anglo-Maratha line of demarcation, often took shelter in the Maratha territory. In these confrontations the rebel pike leaders and refractory *zamindars* had created hindrances in the British forces' movement by destroying roads, chocking narrow paths with tree trunks and obviously continuing harassing warfare. Every time when defeated they had accepted settlement and with the weakening of the number of troops posted. British counterinsurgency plans were fortification minded and against the most menacing rebel leader Jagganath Dhal, a fortified *thanah* had been created at Hooldypooker. But after a long protracted struggle, at last Jagannath Dhal was reinstated to its *zamindari* in 1777. Its impact was pretty negative as the refractory leaders became more and more rebellious while Company officials turned out to be more and more conciliatory.⁷⁶ The next was Jadu Singh, *zamindar* of Bogri,

who became rebellious. Jadu Singh's rebellion became contagious causing sporadic disturbances among the adjoining *zamindars*.

It is only after 1790, well-to-do agriculturists had started to resist the rebels to save their corps. During this time due to the uprising in the time of Rani Shiromani, authorities tried for all round disarmament.⁷⁷ In June, 1792, selling of fire arms to the pikes was prohibited. After the administrative consolidation of 1793, depredations and robberies decreased, but the rebels rose up again in 1799.

Dichotomy of Coercion and Co-option: Pacification of Armed Wandering Castes

All pre-modern social orders have very little occupational stagnancy. People used to change their livelihood or maintain multiple employments according to their survival strategy. Consistency in any particular livelihood pattern is rather a modern innovation. Particularly in the times of political discrepancy or the growth of decentralized ambience produces more evidences of rapid occupational mobility or multiplicity. Being a mercenary, particularly in time of political irregularity was one of the prominent patterns of livelihood which often draws a motley crowd mostly from agriculturist population of pre-modern societies. Now a mercenary can play the role of a trader, a bandit or all of them at the same time. But for the makers of modern statecraft once the peaceful societal situation starts to emerge, these sections of population gradually turn into a liability. These populations which often constitute various non-state organizations or communities in pre-modern societies, clash with modernizing state apparatus and generally are pacified through a combined use of statist coercion and conciliatory state-society bargain. So, most of the transitory periods in between pre modern quasi state to modernising state throughout the world, elucidate various stages of coercion-conciliation coalescence.

Just like in case of early modern Japan, in late phase of *Sengoku Jidai* or the ‘Age of Warring States’, Toyotomi Hideyoshi in his try of pacifying the comparatively unified Japan in 1588 started the famous ‘sword hunt’ or *Katanagari* to disarm the highly militarized populace.⁷⁸ Though various non-state organizations like the Buddhist monasteries armed themselves for security purpose, long societal militarization of *Sengoku Jidai* turned these armed Buddhist monks into one of the elite forces of late-medieval Japan. One of the heroic triads of that period Tokugawa Ieyasu had used Jodo sect warrior monks against the Ikko Ikki warrior monks in the Battle of Azukizaka in 1564. Before Hidoyoshi, Oda Nobunaga conducted years of war against the warrior Buddhist monks or *Sohei*. It took nearly eleven years for Nobunaga to win the sturdy monastery cum fortress of Nagashima, occupied by the most notorious *sohei* clan, *Ikka Ikki*. After the long siege of Nagashima, both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi continued their expeditions to subjugate other *sohei* clans like Enryakuji, Negoroji.⁷⁹ So the militarised monks of Japan like many of their armed populace, which had been a beneficial recruitment ground in the time of turbulent war, had become an encumbering liability for the post-Sengoku state. The Shogunate policy of curtailing the *sohei* can be compared with the strategy of Philip IV, the king of France against the Templars. Knight Templars, raised due to the need of Crusade by the papal bull *Omne datum optimum* in 1139 AD, had become the most wealthy and powerful community in Europe, especially in France. Templars’ special position of being ‘responsible not to the king directly but to the papacy’ along with their financial and military strength made king Philip IV to anticipate ‘a threat to his concept of the Capetian kingdom’.⁸⁰ So for him it had been easy enough to dismantle the organization by the use of sham trial and the accusation of heresy. Both *sohei* and Templars rose up to prominence due to the need of shock troops in their respective periods. While *Naginata* wielding *sohei* hordes were proving their worth in Japan, heavily

armoured Templar fanatics had proven their might in the subsequent battles of Crusades. India had been going through the same situation in the post-Mughal period of regional kingdoms.

Fanaticism-fuelled religious warriors and their introduction as shock troops was one of the distinctive features of the 18th century India.⁸¹ five thousand Naga monks under Balanand Gosain were hired by the Jats in their conflict against the Mughal chieftain Najaf Quli, in the Battle of Barsana.⁸² Shah Shuja of Awadh in his confrontation with the British army in the Battle of Buxar had deployed five thousand Naga and *Gosain, faquirs* 'who constituted a suicide corps'.⁸³ Just like the period of Crusades in West or Sengoku Jidai in Japan, the period of regional kingdoms in 18th century India provided an opportunity for various wandering classes to choose arms as the means of livelihood. With the growth of Company power these groups of fanatic monks turned to be a problem for their claim to sovereignty. Just like Hideyoshi, Hastings had tried to control and pacify these monks who had been a nuisance for the conduction of efficient revenue management and from this time policing of the society for legitimizing their rule continued. But questions can be raised that how far this slow decay of these wondering men at arms had been caused by the state's contentious monopolization of arms or the disappearance of the demand for more recruits had made them obsolete. Company state had been doing the second part successfully by eliminating the rulers one by one, which was not always been a deliberate act. The decline of patrons and employers caused the obvious criminalisation of these mercenaries whose methods of warfare made them hard for assimilating within the Company forces.

European experiences of warlike monks in India can be traced back to the time of Bernier, but it was mostly from the middle of 18th century the martial sides had been interacting as oppositions. In May, 1764 British musket balls had been cutting through the charging ascetics in the Battle of Patna, proving the futility of melee charge against the continued volley fire.⁸⁴ But the same

people were formidable in case of skirmishing and hit-and-run tactics. During James Rennel's survey works in the North India in 1766, he and his retainers were attacked near Koach Behar and Rennel had escaped narrowly. The whole 1770s, substantial portion of Northern and Eastern portions of Bengal had seen the eruption of the Sannyasi and Faquir upheavals. In 1778, British forces were encountered at Bundelkhand by these monks while by the end of the century British conquest of Bundelkhand had been helped by these warrior monks under Anup Giri or Himmat Bahadur. So, British interaction with the wandering warrior monks was always been ephemeral, changing with the change of transitory political alliances of late 18th century India. The curious case of Himmat Bahadur, a perfect instance of shifting allegiances, elucidates the essence of that time. Himmat Bahadur or Anup Giri as one of the prominent warrior monk of the Gosains rose to prominence under Shuja-ud-Daula's service in between 1750s to 1760s and served as a religious mercenary consecutively under adventurers like Najaf Khan, Ali Bahadur etc.⁸⁵ Even serving under Mahadji Shinde's army, shifted his allegiance by the start of 19th century and by the end of 1804 died while helping the British to pacify the then conquered area of Bundelkhand.⁸⁶ British policy makers also settled them into such a situation where their flexibility had served them fine to cope up with the natives and that's why often people like Anup Giri had found employment under the Company state. Though this kind of employment was exceptional, Anup Giri had not been the only religious recruit under British arms. In the time of Warren Hastings, a warrior ascetic leader called Puran Giri had been asked to work as a guide in the Tibetan missions. Puran Giri accompanied George Bogle in 1773, and later on in 1783 helped Samuel Turner in the same pursuit, finally becoming the official representative at the Tibetan court in 1785.⁸⁷ Native princes of Awadh, Benares, Nepal from their side used these ascetics like Puran Puri, Ajib Giri, Uday

Puri as diplomatic mediator in their relation to the Company.⁸⁸ These examples contrast with the British attitude towards the wandering ascetics in Bengal.

The British flexible treatment to these armed community had both the components of coercion and co-option. In 1770s, the Sannyashi Rebellion showed a perfect example of the British practice of coercive apparatus against these wandering warrior ascetics. In 1773, Warren Hastings would issue a declaration prohibiting the usual entrance of the *sannyashis*, although punitive actions would have started from the middle of 1760s.⁸⁹ James Rennel took part in one of such expeditions and narrowly survived with some harsh wounds from a confrontation with 700 hostile ascetics.⁹⁰ It is in the time of Warren Hastings, conflict with the wandering classes became a perceptible reality cause it were Warren Hastings and Lord Clive, a very few among the lot had been trying to draw ‘a broader grand strategic conclusion’ out of the politico-military developments after 1765.⁹¹ Dacoits or the hereditary professional robbers as well as these armed monks were the main problematic for the materialization of these plans. In the era of dual government the *nizamat* had continuously became underfunded, while drive of maximization of profit as well as accumulation of the surplus by the Company officials, *amils* and local *zamindars* made the social situation turbulent.⁹² So, the peacekeeping became a military priority. Now, while Hastings continued ‘to raid dacoit villages’ and ‘enacted the most draconian measures’ like gallows, enslavement etc, robbery remained a persistent problem only to be temporarily checked. The period had shown a slow transition from highway robbery towards individual urban robbery, which had transformed the whole paradigm of security-sovereignty reciprocal relationship which will be discussed later. Now in this changing tide, predatory robbers and armed ascetics turned out to be obsolete elements within directly ruled territories of Bengal. Just like the armed ascetics, *banjaras* or grain transporters with martial ability were also

checked within this period. During the time of Alivardi, lots of *banjaras* with refractory character were pursued and punished severely but they were still present during the early colonial times. Reginald Heber's account had referred to the martial abilities of the *banjaras*, having bows and arrows and even the children and females of this nomadic community were seen to be armed too⁹³. But their unrestrictive attitudes were rarely gone unnoticed but for their efficiency in supplying armies with food made the earlier authorities indulgent, but not the British. The Company Army did not need any supply assistance and that's why these nomadic people had experienced 'harassment from zealous, hostile, and ever-present police officials.'⁹⁴

Two parallel developments had made the way for Company-Ascetic confrontation unavoidable; the swelling of the ascetic ranks due to the dispossession of the armed retainers and the exportation of the concept of disarmed populace from the west. This exportation of western concept and its clash with the east can be seen from a broader perspective than a mere clash of martial culture. Norbert Elias in his study of the development of organized violence and its monopolization under state between medieval and early modern period in Europe characterized this new concept of physical violence 'confined to barracks' except extreme cases like 'in times of war or social upheaval'.⁹⁵ But Elias' concept of legitimate forces' retreat 'in the margin of social life' had a different connotation when contextualized in colonial landscape.⁹⁶ In Indian society while this concept of a disarmed populace had still not been introduced, Company officials like Hastings aimed for 'a total disarmament of population'. Hastings remained confined with his plan of disarming the armed bands of mendicants, Company state's intention of creating order and control became visible through these nascent attempts. Hastings' view was shared even by the lower officials too by the end of the 18th century. Disarmament of the populace as a concept of governance for that time was practically impracticable if not

theoretically impractical. British power would be strong enough to pursue for an all-round disarmament by the end of its conquest of Punjab in 1849 and not before that.⁹⁷

Claims of Indistinct Sovereignty: Strategic, Indirect, and Legal

State's attempt of controlling the society through constant defensive surveillance is a part of the pacification process. A state is not always in the run to subdue insurgencies; which shows the contentious failure of the state legitimacy. When the state's initiative drags itself into the vortex of counterinsurgency campaigns, state's legal position gets contested, if not potentially threatened. So state's role as the sole pacifier involves an amalgam of policing the society which is a concoction of loyal, neutral, and hostile population, and conducting counterinsurgency against impending threats to tranquillity.

History of various empires shows the problematic return of this dilemma again and again. On the other side these circumstantial quandaries led to the formulation of distinctive medley methods; building of tactical enclaves of security is one of those age old methods, combining policing and counterinsurgency. From antiquity, in the case of Rome's strategic frontiers the use of *Lime*, a strategic border consisted of military paths, walls, tactical fortifications can be cited as one of the military state's marvellous devices of social control. *Limes Britannicas* or the grandest strategic frontier of Roman Britain shows the antiquity of statist intention of strategically delimiting hostile tribes to enter into loyal populace.

During the era of global empires, it's the British Empire which had adopted extensive initiative of social control by creating strategic enclaves comprised of little fortresses and fences. Most fascinating case of British imperial strategic enclaves was in Africa during the time of the Boar Wars, where Kitchner's method of blockhouse lines to create 'cages that trapped a population imbued with animalistic qualities' was considerably successful.⁹⁸ Trapping the Boar commandos while combing them out by the frequent exploits of the flying columns was initially an exemplary pursuit; 'became standard and bureaucratic' while Kitchner, the father of this plan was promoted to the position of commander-in-chief.⁹⁹ Not only in Africa, but in the British colonies in New Zealand also had seen tremendous quantity of fortification like earthwork redoubts, wooden stockades, and blockhouses to stop the hostile Maori population. These fortifications were such a victory that it 'greatly eased the security situation in the neighbourhood of New Plymouth' and particularly the blockhouses 'encouraged farmers back to their land'.¹⁰⁰ British Empire in the late Victorian age seemed to secure their colonial fringes with the strings of these fortifications just like the Imperial Rome in Britannica and Germania. This small fortified lines or blockhouses were even used by the Chinese Guomindang govt. against Mao's Red Army. The whole plan was conceived by the German advisers of Chiang Kai-shek, like Hans Von Seeckt and it had proved to be formidable device to check the highly mobile Red army.¹⁰¹ This approach during the Fifth campaign became so useful that Mao had accepted his failure and had gone for the Long March, while in later days the strategists of the Communist forces like Otto Braun, Lin Biao for protecting Jiangxi province proposed to use differential blockhouse strategy.¹⁰²

Apart from this blockhouse security strategy, British Empire's strategic garrison within the population was another policy of social control and it had been followed in different ways.

Before entering into the detailed plan of constructing tactical garrison by the British, we should look into some comparable adoption of this plan in other counterinsurgency campaigns. The plan of making strategic hamlet to differentiate loyal and hostile population became very popular during the Vietnam War. Originally the plan was adopted from Malaya counterinsurgency campaigns, where General Harold Briggs and his successor Gerald Templer had practiced controlling of 'five hundred thousand squatters and six hundred thousand labourers into "secure" villages'.¹⁰³ Vietnam's program employed a "clear, hold, build" strategy in which 'troops "separated" insurgents from villages, secured the village, and developed the area'; these "oil spots" were envisaged as the spearheads of counterinsurgency 'which would gradually spread throughout the country'.¹⁰⁴ The earlier large scale transportation under President Diem's 'agrovillage' program was later replaced by strategic hamlet system, where limited populations were sent to comparatively smaller settlements.

British system of social control in India had a similar type of strategic village program, which had been substantially successful in the early colonial times, known as the invalid thanah settlements. This particular type could be found in both the directly and indirectly ruled provinces though the larger concentration could be found in the indirectly ruled areas like Awadh or in case of inner frontiers in between direct possession and indirectly ruled areas. The system came into existence in 1778, when Captain James Brown suggested the use of invalided sepoys as the potential policing force and recruiting agents. With the Supreme Council's approval, this plan was adopted at Bhagalpur against the turbulent hill people.¹⁰⁵ By the second decade of 19th century there were twenty-two invalid villages. The same approach was followed in other districts of Monghyr, Shahbad, Saran, Champaran, Tirhut, Benares, Hapur, Kumaon etc. The sepoys retired due to martial wound or age or personal reasons after ten to twelve years of

service had been given *jagir* lands in lieu of policing service provided by them in the adjoining areas. The whole process was a British insinuation within the pre-existing administrative skeleton. Pre-colonial system of *paikan* or *ghatwali* land grants were close to the system of invalid *thanah*, cause the lands were granted in exchange of supporting the patron in military and policing activities. So, the Company had been substituting the old patron-client relationships with their own. Seema Alvi had mentioned that the *madad-i-mash* grants provided by the Mughals were similar to this and just like the Mughals the Company had used them to create their own legitimacy. The invalid *thana* holders were under the jurisdiction of the Company and that's why in the indirectly controlled areas they had become the spearheads of contesting native legitimacy in both the military and judicial ground. This led to the day to day violent conflict in between the *zamindars* under native sovereign and *thanah* holders under Company sovereignty. While the later had been using their special judicial position to confront the *zamindars*, the local landowners had used their traditional position to confront them.¹⁰⁶ In such an instance, Captain Robert Green lettered Lieutenant Colonel William Scott about the frequent complaints from the *sepoys* regarding their occasional conflict with the *zamindar* of Burna. Cap. Green stated the *zamindar's* 'unvaried efforts to harass and oppress' the invalid *sepoys* not only composed of 'endless law suits' but also 'open acts of violence'.¹⁰⁷ This shows that the invalid *sepoys* were in a constant conflict with the indigenous society.

While *thanah* establishments had become the tools of intervention as well as defence in the distant provinces, the Company state claimed its sovereign position as the sole peacekeeper in the directly ruled areas. Hastings had started punitive measures mentioned previously, which had a temporary effect on the deteriorating social condition of Bengal in the late 18th century, but it's ideological effect had started to reinforce Company's sovereignty. This peacekeepers' position as

the legalizing force also had reinforced Company's dominance in the distant lands of indirectly ruled areas. Company had been becoming the symbol of security, which had a start in the fortified positions like Calcutta or Bombay by the start of the century and that hegemony was expanding slowly like an oil spot. Previously the indigenous capitals had been searching for security within the forts, and by the turn of the century the merchants on the move had been asking for judicial security from the Company state or its representatives in the indirectly ruled areas, undermining the authorities of the native rulers. This whole concept of Tillyan security mongering state can be traced back to the Westphalian developments in Europe. The western concept of sovereignty deriving from the Treaty of Westphalia linked state's legitimacy with its capability to provide 'protection and assistance for vulnerable population' and this was imported during colonization of the East.¹⁰⁸ For example, the Dutch colonization in Formosa Island showed that the colonial authorities had accumulated symbolic legitimacy by a contractual bond of feudal vassalage extended towards the Formosan village chiefs. Through this the Dutch authority had provided paternal authoritative security to those villages from outer encroachment and each other.¹⁰⁹ From that same point, Company sovereignty in the early colonial period had been defining itself from the concept of peacekeeping. It is though the Company's scarce resources had created hindrance for exercising control over the society, the intention of controlling it had been visible from the 1770s. Cornwallis' police reform was a strong approach but its impact was still not felt properly. In 1786, Rangpore's collector had only seventeen sepoy to stand against a huge crowd of fakirs and the situation had not changed much by the end of the 1799, when the collector of Dacca complained about the inadequacy of the reformed sepoy troops, employed in the job of escorting treasure shipments.¹¹⁰ As the grand strategic importance was towards the western front to check the potential threats from other powers,

regular soldiers were either kept in the dispersed garrisons mostly in the western side outside the directly ruled provinces or positioned in the frontiers duty. James Lees' argument shows that there were minute initiatives from the early Company administration to control the society through peacekeeping due to Fort William's lack of interest in empowering the local collectors. In spite of that, it's from the time of Hastings there was a bonding escalating in between the governing and the governed based on the idea of protection-taxation relation.

The enclave of British Empire in India, Calcutta by the end of the century turned into a place for ruler and ruled. By the year of 1790-91, some of the urban notaries of Calcutta like Jaganmohan Mukharjee, Netaichand Sarma, Ramgopal Bose etc petitioned to the Governor General regarding the growing robberies in Calcutta. Calcutta under the British city administration had walked a long way from the times of Gangaram Mitra, early black *zamindars* employed in the job of peacekeeping and by 1790's the subjects were petitioning for their security. In their petition, the petitioners complained that in spite of 'different modes of policy' were adopted 'by the principles and analogy of British law and government' but all seemed to be futile. After that the petitioners reminded the authority that the government under Warren Hastings had demanded *Choukydary* tax 'for defending the cities', which they had refused to, comply. But when this promise was made that if robbery happened and the robbers could not be apprehended, 'the property or its value should be restored to the proprietors by the *Faujdar*'. It was further stated that each division of city guard was trusted to selected inhabitants of each division called *Hoodadars*, who were empowered to nominate *Thanadars* or *Choukydars* with the affirmation from the Superintendent of Police. The petitioners complained that this system 'not lasted two whole years', when the power of these *Hoodadars* was replaced by the sole authority of the superintendent. The petitioners asked for reinstating the *Hoodadars* in the city peacekeeping

because ‘when power was committed in hands of *Hoodadars* there were no mischiefs attended’. The petitioners further asked for the appointment of one Mirza Akhbar Ally who had fame for intercepting robbers.¹¹¹ Now this case shows a tendency of power sharing in between the citizens as well as the governing authorities, where the former had a space to ask or bargain for their interest of power sharing. This approach which was still in a nascent situation would push the state-society bargain into a different arena of interaction, transforming from the earlier violent processes. This kind of petitioning was anomalous but such instances could be found more from the time of Warren Hastings who had tried to enjoin revenue extracting authority with the peacekeeper’s legitimacy. In the year of 1788, again some petitioners had complained in the similar tone that as they had been paying the *Choukydary* tax of ‘four or five rupees per annum for each *bigha* of ground’ the government was answerable for the robberies. Just like the previous petition, in this case the petitioners complained against the impotence of the Superintendent of Police Thomas Motte.¹¹² These kinds of symbolic sovereign authority had strengthened Company state’s hold which would be extended into the rural areas later on in the 19th century.

Company’s paternalist protectionism was extended into the indirectly ruled provinces too. The method was a slight tortuous if not thoroughly inefficient. In the year 1789, Resident E.O. Ives wrote to the Governor General about the growing incidents of robberies committed against the British subjects. In the letter Ives mentioned that there were two different kinds of opinion in the *Vizir*’s court; one mentioning that ‘thieves are notoriously in the pay of the *Amils* and *Zamindars*’ and to stop such acts local authorities ‘should be made answerable for the bad police which the sufferer to prevail’ and the other arguing that ‘the robbers frequently came in gangs from very distant places’ and that’s why ‘totally unconnected with the *zamindars*’. This portion

of the Ives advice is analogous to the previous petition filed at Calcutta where the local *thanadars* were made answerable for robberies committed within their area of guard. Ives' further suggested that a request should be made to the *Wazir* that there should be some extension of Company's jurisdictional authority in *Wazir's* dominion. He suggested about a committee of three Europeans in case of civilian's problem and a committee recommended by Commanding Officers in case of any soldier got robbed, to work as the jurisdictional bodies.¹¹³ Just like the Invalid *thanna* establishments which were used to undermine princely states' sovereign authority through extraterritorial jurisdictional intervention, these suggestions of the Resident show the circuitous methods of encroachment. Though people like Ives were ambitious enough to suggest that the principles which were adopted in directly ruled provinces were 'equally applicable to those of the Nawab *Wazir*' of Awadh, in the indirectly ruled areas Company's encroachments were often resisted in the societal level. In the year 1783, Captain Charles Wedderburn, the commanding officer of the 31st Regiment reports to the Resident John Bristow about the murder and robbery of discharged sepoy by a *zamindar* called Bhabani Singh, possibly of Sandila. It was reported that twenty six sepoy discharged of their duty and returning home when they were surrounded by a body of armed men numbering hundred or fifty under the leadership of Bhabani Singh Rajpoot. It was said that they had been robbed and ten of them were killed while others fled.¹¹⁴ Another report of the same incidence gives a comprehensive account of the case, according to which the head of the motley crowd, the alleged Bhabani Singh accused the sepoy as deserters and thieves and asked them to pay money for passing through. In spite of showing discharge letters Bhabani Singh refused to let them go; alluding that it's according to Tallukdar Durjan Singh's order the sepoy would not be able to pass until getting an order from the local *faujdar*. At such a situation after a sudden reviling affair Bhabani Singh ordered his people to cut

down the sepoys leading to the death of ten men.¹¹⁵ So it seems that in the indirectly ruled areas social resistance was frequent and even the legitimate bearers of Company's arms were not spared. Just like the invalid soldiers, sepoys had worked as the new collaborator of the emerging Company state, threatening the older patron-client nexus. These threats were violently countered in the indirectly ruled areas compared to the directly ruled provinces. As the threat of Maratha power until 1803, Company concentrated its armies for war and pacificatory campaigns as well as peacekeeping were either ignored or pushed to the authority of the paramilitary like 'provincial battalions' and later on '*sebundies*'. For saving the regular army from the exhausting job of revenue duties, Clive had employed *pargana* battalion in 1766 only to be replaced by a militia based revenue troops in 1770 for being cost effective. Finally in 1784 a 'poorly trained and equipped irregulars' called *sebundies* were used as the revenue troops and would continue to be there until the making of better provincial battalions in the early 19th century.¹¹⁶ G.J. Bryant had seen the revenue work of the *sebundies* as 'an indication that the collection of revenue by the 1780s was becoming more regular and that the Company's superior authority was increasingly taken for granted by the *zamindars*'.¹¹⁷ James Lees on the other hand mentions that the deliberate Company policy of keeping its local government under-resourced 'to impose checks upon the activities of its far-flung network of isolated officials', 'acted against the penetration of Indian society by any effective colonial bureaucracy'.¹¹⁸ But it seems that the penetration was on the symbolic ground where the peacekeeper's legal paternalism had made the way for accumulation of symbolic legitimacy. Though it does not mean intermittent small wars reduced than before. By the end of 1806 even after the British symbolic presence as the paramount, Company had faced conflicts from the local elements like Saheb Singh of Budyk. Captain Owen's detachment had to

siege the fort of Budyk and after a bloody conflict costing eleven men of Company, Fort Budyk was captured.¹¹⁹

So it seems that the pacificatory approaches of the early British rule had no doctrinal edema partly for Company's financial weakness and partly for the looming danger on the western and southern part of the subcontinent. This gave rise to the minimum coercion approach which was often not pursued in the Company provinces, but strictly followed in the indirectly ruled areas. Even the aggressive officials like Warren Hastings had practiced his different policies in directly and indirectly ruled provinces, with always emphasising on political approach. In case of Company ruled areas he had played the job of a ruthless pacifier, while in Awadh and Benares until the outbreak of rebellion he had exercised indirect diplomatic pressure. This dual tendency of early British pacification was possible for the strategic flexibility and civil dominance over military.

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Conclusion:

‘Everywhere in Chains’: Retrospective view from 19th century

The end of the 18th century was a triumphant march of the empire in the Indian politico-military theatre. Tipu Sultan, the Tiger of Mysore was caged and subsequently hunted down at the ramparts of Shrirangapatnam. The Empire, confronting and defeating such a formidable and pageant rival, turned into a ‘cause for national celebration’.¹ By the turn of 19th century, the British Indian Empire came closer to the panoramic vision of the metropolis. Triumphalism made way for sanguine benevolence. The uncertainty of the nascent Company state had been replaced by a sense of imperial permanence. Sense of permanence gave rise to the responsibility of good governance. This unfeigned sense of duty reinforced with martial pride started to emerge from the last decades of the 18th century, when Burke’s criticism of Warren Hastings allowed the former to designate natives as ‘our distressed fellow-citizens in India’.² This conceptual absorption of the colonized to contemplate a composite society is a unalienable character of imperialism, Roman or British. The last of the hurdles towards sub-continental supremacy for the British was the Marathas, who had engaged with the Company at irregular intervals from the Battle of Aras on 18 May 1775 until the Siege of Asirghar on 7 April 1819.³ Defeats of the Marathas at the Assaye on 23 September 1803 and at Argaum on 28 November 1803 were hard owned victories for the British army. This triumph at front will be followed by relative order in the societies by the end of the second decade of 19th century.

1818 shows that the Company’s army ‘was capable of all India strategy and logistics’, which had transformed the imperial perception, ‘supershedded by a new imperial mental disposition’.⁴ Lord Lake’s march to Delhi in 1803 was the start. With the completion of 1818’s treaty with Sindhia,

British imperial buoyancy had reached to the crescendo only to be challenged again in 1857. This military confidence had pushed British Empire towards its usual stand point of non-intervention; a classic example of '*Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*' or 'to spare those conquered and to defeat the proud'.⁵ This imperial axiom of Rome would be returning again and again in case of Imperial Britain's policy towards its colonies. Winston Churchill in case of his South Africa policy would urge for the need of 'fighting wars and other contentions with might and main till overwhelming victory, and then offering the hand of friendship to the vanquished'.⁶ When Lord Birkenhead quoted to him that Roman dictum in response Churchill said that many of the best ideas of British imperialism had been forestalled by the Romans.⁷ Churchill's conviction about the need of this Roman 'carrot and stick' method in 1906's South Africa can be compared with Lord Hastings's thought of British imperial policy subsequent to the 1818's treaty. Hastings had accepted the possible disappointment of the troops due to the 'diminished prospect of war', but according to him 'the act of carrying every desired point by equity and moderation' would be 'the proudest triumph for the British character'.⁸ What Hastings saw as the proudest triumph for British character reflects the 19th century shift in British policies, a transition from intermittent pacificatory campaigns alongside conventional wars towards relatively coherent policing of society.

George Saunders, the Commissioner of Customs at Agra, proposed in 1823 that by erecting a 'line of *chowkies*- rather than the haphazardly positioned original customs posts' to check the illegal trafficking of salt, which over the next half century would be developed into 'the great Customs Line'.⁹ This would be extended in 1869 as seen by Sir John Strachey, 'from the Indus to the Mahanadi in Madras, a distance of 2300 miles... guarded by nearly 12000 men... consisted principally of an immense impenetrable hedge'.¹⁰ Plan and fulfilment of such a grand project

shows that the colonial state was convinced about its supreme position, a position which would bolster reform and benevolence. Just like the great Custom Line, the Great Trigonometrical Survey, started in 1802, would come 'to be regarded as the most explicit expression of the newly won paramountcy'.¹¹ This sense of paramountcy would provide coherence towards further policies of controlling the society. Dirk Kolff gives an inferential argument that after 1818, 'the traditions of conflict, threats and carefully weighed measures of violence' would be 'edged towards the periphery of the political arena or declared criminal'.¹² By effectively demilitarising the regional leadership and abolishing the phenomena of military labour market, the paramount Company had moved back to its position of a policing state, criminalising and punishing the remnants of the military labour market. But by this the Company state achieved 'something approaching the demilitarisation, though not disarmament of India'.¹³ Kolff's differentiation between demilitarisation and disarmament shows the transitory character of the Company state. Disarmament of the society had still been too ambitious for the Company state in the early 19th century. But after the Maratha war by depriving the armed personals from joining any other native sovereign who can challenge British paramountcy, Company state had left very few options for these men rather than joining the Company force or living a life of a bandit. For those who had chosen the later were criminalized and later on hunted down throughout the 19th century. This new Company state had devised its new pacification plan, which was coherent and weighed against the scale of legal sovereignty, and here the concept of imperial policing became the defining component of repressive state apparatus. This 19th century methodical difference in retrospect helps to evaluate the inexplicit, fluid nature of pacification of late 18th century which on the other hand mirrors the incoherent nature of the Company state and informal empire.

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