

**The Nature of the Individual Self:
A Review of the Concept of Jīvātman from
the Mādhva and Advaita Perspectives**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY FOR THE
REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Arts) OF
JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY
(SYNOPSIS)

Prepared under the supervision of
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Sushen Mondal

2016

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he kriṣṇa karuṇāsindho dīnabandho jagatpate/

gopeśa gopikākānta rādhākānta namo'stu te//

PREFACE

By the grace of God I have been able to complete this dissertation and submit it. On completion of this work I felt it essential to convey my gratitude to those who helped me directly or indirectly in completing my thesis. At the outset I take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Rupa Bandyopadhyay, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University without whose personal supervision and guidance this work could not have been completed.

I convey my gratitude to all my teachers particularly Professor Gangadhar Kar, Professor Ratna Dutta Sharma etc. who have spent their valuable time to inspire me to complete this work.

I also convey my heartfelt gratitude to my parents Sri Santosh Mondal and Smt Sushila Mondal who have supported me throughout my life, maintained an academic environment in the family and they also encouraged me to do Pd. D. research work. I am indebted to my wife Smt. Purabi Mondal who has constantly keeps me in reading, writing and while the proofs correcting. I am also indebted to a great extent to my younger brother dr. Subrata Mondal and other members of my family and my uncle, Sri Smritimay Brahmachari for encouraging me to complete my thesis.

At last I regret the typing mistakes if any which have escaped my notice.

Kolkata

Sushen Mondal

August 22, 2016

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Introduction

Since ancient times the human individual has tried to explore both the external world and its own internal nature. The concept of the individual self is crucial to all major philosophical systems of classical India. A number of systems uphold the thesis that lack of knowledge lies at the root of all miseries. The individual self undergoes various kinds of painful experience mainly because of two reasons. First, it does not know itself and second, it does not know the world in which it is situated. Almost all the major Indian systems, save the Cārvāka School, maintain that it is possible for an individual to overcome pain by self-knowledge.

Most Indian systems are pragmatic because they think that all rational pursuits have a practical end. The end to be achieved by a rational inquiry may be of two types – cessation of sufferings and achievement of bliss. A number of Indian systems aspire to achieve the first end only. They are called ‘*abhāvamokṣavādins*’ because they consider liberation to be the highest end of human life and define liberation as the cessation of all sufferings. Of the orthodox systems, the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the Mīmāṃsā schools fall under this group. As opposed to these systems, all branches of the Vedānta school believe that on attaining

liberation the individual self does not merely get rid of all sufferings but also attains bliss. Since liberation is defined in these systems in terms of both cessation of all sufferings and attainment of bliss, these systems are called ‘*ānandamokṣavādins*’. One point is common between the *abhāva-mokṣavādins* and the *ānandamokṣavādins*. All these systems subscribe to the thesis that liberation cannot be attained without self-knowledge. Since self-knowledge is a necessary condition of liberation in all these systems, the concept of self plays a very important role in all philosophical systems of ancient India.

Five main conceptions of the individual self were prevalent in ancient India.

1. The individual is nothing but the conscious body (*caitanyaviśiṣṭadeha*) and consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the four material elements. This view is endorsed by the Cārvāka philosophers.
2. The individual is not an enduring entity. Rather it is a stream of conscious mental states (*cittasantati*). This view is admitted by the Yogācāra school of Buddhism.
3. The individual self is a substance. This substance is a substratum in which internal states such as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, volition etc.

reside. The individual self however is different from the body. The individual self lasts forever, but the body perishes. This conception of the individual self is to be found in the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems of Indian philosophy.

4. Several schools of the Vedānta system consider the individual self to be a part or component of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is the eternal absolute conscious principle and the individual selves are parts of the eternal all-pervasive consciousness. The *Dvaita* Vedānta system of Madhvācārya and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānujācārya fall under this school. These schools regard the individual as atomic (*anuparimāṇaviśiṣṭa*) and do not admit the individual as identical with *Brahman*.

5. The fifth conception of individual is found in the Advaita Vedānta system and the individual self is identical with pure absolute consciousness. The Advaita Vedāntins believe that the individual, in reality, is identical with pure, absolute consciousness. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga concept of the individual self is similar to the Advaita conception of self with one important difference. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophers, too, consider the individual as pure consciousness. For them, the individual selves are eternal and all pervasive (*vibhu parimāṇa*) but the Sāṅkhya-

Yoga systems admit many conscious selves. So the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophers are not monists like the Advaita Vedāntins.

In the present dissertation, I propose to review the debate between the Mādhva and the Advaita schools regarding the nature of the individual self. The dissertation will mainly concentrate upon the issue: “Is the individual self absolutely identical with *Brahman* or is a part of the *Brahman*?”

Of these systems, the Advaita School faces a problem at the very outset. The individual self never appears in ordinary consciousness as the eternal all pervasive pure consciousness. Besides, the Advaitins admit a single conscious principle but in ordinary experience we encounter many conscious individuals. So the main contention of the Advaita Vedāntin is refuted by one’s own immediate experience. So the question arises why do the Advaita Vedāntins adopt the position that goes against all ordinary experience?

To answer this question the Advaitins adopts a threefold strategy. First, they show that the entire corpus of the Vedas establish the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*. Second, the Advaita Vedāntins claim that all cognitions which present the individual as different from *Brahman* are erroneous. The Advaita Vedāntins admit that the individual in its embodied condition appears as different from *Brahman*, because no one appears in

his own experience as eternal, pure consciousness and pure bliss. Rather the individual appears in his own experience as finite and possessing various internal states such as pleasure, pain, volition, cognition etc. The Advaita Vedāntins demonstrate that all these cognitions are falsified when a person attains liberation. Third, the Advaita Vedāntins show that no apparent difference is real.

The introduction will contain a brief analysis of the major points of debate between the Advaita and Mādhva philosophers regarding the nature of the individual self.

In chapter one I shall try to establish the nature of the individual self on the basis of *Brahmasūtra* of Maharṣi Vyāsa and *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*. The entire *Brahmasūtra* and the entire commentary of Śāṅkara are directly or indirectly concerned with the *Śārīraka* or the embodied self. Needless to say, it is not possible to discuss all the *adhikaraṇas* where the nature of the individual self has been discussed within the limited span of a Ph. D. thesis. So, in this chapter I have concentrated only on those *adhikaraṇas* where Maharṣi Vyāsa and Śāṅkara have established the identity between individual self and *Brahman*. I have also discussed those *adhikaraṇas* which establish some major thesis about

the nature of the individual self. Roughly, I shall consider the *Vākyanvayādhikaraṇa*, the *Ārambhanādhikaraṇa*, the *Carācaravyapāśrayādhikaraṇa* and the *Ātmādhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra*.

Chapter two will be devoted to considering the reasons by which the Advaita Vedāntins consider all experience of difference to be false. This chapter will also review the Advaita account of the ‘I’-perceptions, that is, perceptions of the form “I am happy”, “I am sorry” etc. on the basis of the commentary *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Mīśra.

In chapter three I shall discuss the nature of the individual self on the basis of *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapādācārya and *Vivaraṇa* of Prakāśātmayati. Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati have discussed the nature of individual self and have also analysed the I-cognitions while commenting on the following statement of Śaṅkara’s commentary, “*katham punaḥ pratyagātmani aviṣaye adhyāsaḥ viṣayataddharmmāṇām iti?*”

In the fourth chapter I shall give an exposition of the Mādhva position. In this chapter I shall consider the main arguments by which the Mādhva philosophers establish the difference between the individual and *Brahman*.

Chapter five will be devoted to refuting the arguments by which the Mādhva Vedāntins establish the difference between the *jīva* and *Brahman* on the basis of *Advaitasiddhi* of Ācārya Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and its commentaries.

In the concluding chapter I shall make an assessment of the Advaita and Mādhva arguments.

The proposed dissertation will be based entirely on original Sanskrit texts. The exposition of the Mādhva theses will be based mainly on *Nyāyāmṛta* of Ācārya Vyāsatīrtha and the commentaries of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. The exposition of the Advaita view will also be based on original Advaita text. Such as the *Brahmasūtra* of Maharsi Vyāsa, Sankara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, *Pañcapādika* of Padmapādācārya, *Vivarāṇa* of Prakāśātmayati, *Advaitadipikā* of Nṛsimhāsrama, *Pratyaktattvapradipikā* of Citsukhācārya and *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

CHAPTER ONE

Identity Between the Self and *Brahman*: The Views of Vyāsa and Śaṅkara

It has been mentioned in the introduction that the main objective of this thesis is to ascertain the nature of the individual self from the Advaita and the Mādhva perspectives. It is also stated in the introduction that in this thesis I shall focus upon the debate between the Mādhva and the Advaita philosophers regarding the nature of the individual self.

The first question that any investigator/researcher in classical Indian philosophy has to face is this. The views of both these systems on the nature of the Individual self are quite well known. So, one might easily wonder: Is there any new fact left in this field that can be uncovered by fresh research? Or is it at all possible to establish any new relationship in this area by a present day researcher? The answers to these questions are far from obvious. It is common knowledge to all that these two systems developed as a result of two different interpretation of the same *Brahmasūtra*. The most curious point is that both Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya commented on the same scriptures and the same aphorisms, but arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions regarding the nature of the absolute

reality, the individual self and the world in which the individuals find themselves situated. Very few studies have been undertaken that trace the development of these opposing theories on the basis of original texts. Here I propose to undertake a study where I shall compare the views of both these systems regarding the nature of the individual self and I shall also trace the development of these views on the basis of original Sanskrit text.

The entire Advaita philosophy of Ācārya Śaṅkara aims at establishing a single ultimate reality which is called *Brahman*. This thesis, however, is contradicted by our ordinary experience. In our experience sentient organisms, human or non-human, appear as different from one another. No two individuals are alike. The world in which these individuals are placed also appears as different from them. So how can the Advaitins uphold the thesis that there is only a single reality in the universe?

The entire *Brahmasūtra* and Śaṅkara's commentary on them try to solve this problem in their own way. Śaṅkara's solution to this problem is quite simple. As a matter of fact Śaṅkara himself has summarized his entire philosophy in three statements:

1. *Brahman* alone is real.
2. The individual selves are essentially identical with *Brahman*.

3. The world is not ultimately real.

Needless to say, these three theses are very closely interconnected with one another and they also entail one another. In my thesis I shall mainly concentrate on the second aforementioned thesis and I shall try to show following Śaṅkara that the individual selves are identical with *Brahman*. In a sense the entire commentary of Śaṅkara directly or indirectly is connected with this problem; because Śaṅkara's commentary is known as *Śāraṅkāra Bhāṣya* where the term 'śāraṅkāra' is derived from the term 'śarāra'. The body is considered as ugly because it suffers from various kinds of disease and death. To indicate this ugliness the suffix 'ka' is added to the term 'śarāra'. So the entire term 'śāraṅkāra' means pure consciousness that appears in a body where the body undergoes change, deformation and death.

As has been mentioned earlier one of the three main contentions of the Advaita Vedāntin is that the individual self is identical with *Brahman*. The entire *Brahmasūtra* and the entire commentary of Śaṅkara are directly or indirectly concerned with the *Śāraṅkāra* or the embodied self. Needless to say it is not possible to discuss all the *adhikaraṇas* where the nature of the individual self has been discussed within the limited span of a Ph. D. thesis. So, in this chapter I shall concentrate only on those *adhikaraṇas* where Maharṣi Vyāsa and Śaṅkara have established the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*. I shall also

discuss those *adhikaraṇas* which establish some major theses about the nature of the individual self.

The main objective of the first chapter of *Brahmansūtra* is to show that the entire *Vedas* converge to establish a single reality which is *Brahman*. In the *Vākyaṅvayādhikaraṇa*¹ of the first chapter of *Brahmasūtra* Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara have shown that the individual self (*jīva*) is identical with the single reality that is *Brahman*.

Every *adhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra* aims at explaining some statement of the scriptures. The *vākyaṅvayādhikaraṇa* is mainly concerned with the famous statement of the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, “*ātmā vai are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyo*”². The interpretation of this scriptural statement gives rise to number of problems. This statement is interpreted by the classical Indian philosophical stream. These controversies revolve round the correct interpretation of ‘*ātman*’ as occurring in this scriptural statement. The other schools of Vedānta have interpreted this term as referring to the bound and embodied individual. On the contrary, the Advaita Vedāntins do not subscribe to this interpretation. They believe that this scriptural statement establishes the essential identity between the individual self and *Brahman*.

The first aphorism of this *adhikaraṇa* is “*vākyānvayāt*”³. Every aphorism resolves a particular doubt where one alternative represents the view of the opponent while the author alternative represents the view of the other of the aphorism. The doubt which is resolved by this aphorism is: Does the term ‘*ātman*’ in the statement ‘*ātmā vai are*’ stands for the individual self or for the divine self?

The meaning of any term in a scriptural statement can be determined only by referring to the context (*prakāraṇa*) in which the statement occurs. In this case, the opponents argue that there are several statements in the fourth chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which indicate that the term ‘*ātman*’ refers to the enjoying self. In the same *Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* called *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* where the aforementioned statement occurs it is also said “*na vai are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavatyātmānastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati*”⁴. In this statement it is said that one’s husband is not dear to oneself because one loves one’s own self. The main problem which constitutes the subject matter of *vākyānvayādhikaraṇam* is: What exactly is the meaning of the term ‘*ātman*’ in the scriptural statement “*ātmā vai are draṣṭavyaḥ*”. Does it signify the individual self (*jīvātman*) or does it signify the absolute reality namely *Brahman*. The opponents contend that in this scriptural statement the term ‘*ātman*’ signifies the individual self. The argument which the opponents offer in favour of this

contention may be briefly stated as follows. The statement “*ātmā vai are draṣṭavyaḥ*” belongs to a context (*prakāraṇa*) where the term ‘*ātmā*’ or ‘*ātman*’ occurs in many other statements. The meaning of the term ‘*ātman*’ in that particular scriptural context can be ascertained only by looking at those other occurrences of the same term. One of these other statements is “*na vai are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyaḥ bhavati ātmānastu kāmāya patiḥ priyaḥ bhavati*”. This statement talks about what is dear to the self and why is it so. Now, something can be dear to an entity only if that something affords pleasure to that entity. So that entity must be something which is capable of enjoying pleasure and pain. Hence the term ‘*ātman*’ in all these statements refers to the enjoying self. Though the individual self or *jīvātman* can be looked upon as an enjoyer, the highest self (*paramātman*) or *Brahmacaitanya* cannot be regarded as the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. So, the term ‘*ātman*’ in this context cannot refer to *Brahman* but must refer to *jīvātman*. The Advaita Vedāntins on the other hand believe that the term ‘*ātman*’ in this context stands for *Brahman*. In fact, the Advaitins think that the scriptures in this context first present the individual self and then establish the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*. Thus, if the opponent’s interpretation of the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* is accepted then the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* should be taken as not propounding the ultimate reality. On this interpretation the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* only talks about the individual self where a particular way of

meditation is laid down in which the ascetic meditates upon the individual self in order to realize its true nature.

Ācārya Śaṅkara in his commentary on the aphorism “*vākyānvayāt*” expresses this controversy regarding the interpretation of *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* through the following statement “*tatra etat vicikitsyate - kim vijñānātmā eva ayam draṣṭavyaśrotavyādirūpeṇa upadiśyate, āhosvit paramātmā iti*”⁵. This means what exactly is the point of issue in *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa*; Does this chapter indicate that the individual self or *vijñānātman* is the subject matter of the statement ‘*ātmā vai are...*’ or does this statement refer to the absolute self (*paramātmā*)?

Ācārya Śaṅkara also states very clearly the main argument in favour of the opponent’s position “*vijñānātmopadeśaḥ iti. kasmāt? upakramasāmārthyāt. patijāyāputravittādikaṁ hi bhogyabhūtaṁ sarvaṁ jagat ātmārthatayā priyaṁ bhavati iti priyasamsūcitaṁ bhoktāram ātmānam upakramya anantaram idam ātmanaḥ darśanādyupadiśyamānaṁ kasya anyasya ātmanaḥ syāt? madhye api ‘idam mahatbhṛtam anantam apāram vijñānaghanaḥ eva, etebhyaḥ bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāni eva anuvinaśyati, na pretya samjñā asti’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2/4/12) iti prakṛtasya eva mahataḥ bhūtasya draṣṭavyasya bhūtebhyaḥ samutthānaṁ vijñānātmabhāvena brūvan vijñānātmanaḥ eva idam draṣṭavyatvaṁ darśayati. tathā ‘vijñātāram are kena vijāniyāt’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2/4/14)*

iti kartṛvacanena śabdena upasamhāran vijñānātmānam eva iha upadiṣṭam darśayati. tasmāt 'ātmavijñānena sarvvavijñānavacanam' bhoktrarthatvāt bhogyajātasya, aupācārikaṁ draṣṭavyam iti"⁶. The opponents of the Advaitins maintain that "*ātmā vai are...*" this scriptural statement talks of the individual self. But one might ask: Why do the opponents of the Advaitins think that the term '*ātman*' in this statement refers to the individual self? The opponents would say that the meaning of any term in a scriptural statement can be determined only by applying the *tātparyagrāhakaliṅgas* or the marks which determine the sense of a scriptural statement. The Pūrvamīmāṃsaka and the Vedāntins admit six marks on the basis of which one may ascertain the significance of a scriptural statement. These six marks are: *upakramaupasamhārayoraikyam*, *abhyāsaḥ*, *upapattiḥ*, *arthavādaḥ*, *phalam* and *apūrvatā*.

These marks are: (1) the unity between the beginning and the end of a context, (2) repetition, (3) argument, (4) *arthavāda*, (5) statement of the result or effect of a prescribed action and (6) novelty. In this case the opponents have employed the first mark namely, the unity between the beginning and the end of a particular context. At the beginning of the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa*, it is stated that the world consisting of various enjoyable entities such as the husband, the wife, one's own children, various objects possessed by the individual such as one's own house etc.

are dear to the individual. The scriptural statement referred to by the opponents is “*na vai are....*”. The term ‘*priya*’ in this scriptural statement must refer to the self who is the enjoyer because something cannot be dear to an individual unless the individual considers it to be a source of pleasure. Hence the individual that is spoken about in the aforementioned scriptural statement must be capable of enjoying pleasure and pain. Now pure consciousness or *Brahman* cannot enjoy pleasure and pain. Hence the term ‘*ātman*’ in the above statement must refer to the *jīvātman*. In the middle part of this *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* “*idam mahatbhṛtam anantam apāram vijñānghanaḥ eva, etebhyaḥ bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāni eva anuvinaśyati, na pretya samjñā asti*” it is stated that when the five elements and their effects body, mind etc. are created, the self also appears as created. Just as sunlight reflected in a mirror appears as having a beginning and an end, only the individual self can have a beginning and an end. *Brahman* or the ultimate reality cannot have any beginning and an end. So it seems that the middle part of the *Brāhmaṇa* is also talking of the individual self. At the end of the context is “*vijñātāram are kena vijāniyāt*”. Here the self is being referred to as ‘*vijñātra*’ or the knower. Now pure consciousness is neither the knower nor the agent nor is it the enjoyer. So here the scriptures are referring to the individual. Thus the opponents have shown that the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* is talking of the individual self

at the beginning, in the middle and the end. So the meaning of the term ‘*ātman*’ in the statement ‘*ātmā vai are*’ must be the individual self.

The opponents however, would have to face an objection at this point. One might object that if the term ‘*ātman*’ is taken to mean the individual self then the opponents would not be able to explain the statement, ‘*ātmavijñānena sarvavijñānam*’⁷. This statement clearly says that if the self is known, everything will be known. The individual self on the opponents’ view is not identical with other selves and the objects around the self. Hence no one can acquire the knowledge of everything simply by knowing the individual self. In response to this objection the opponents would say that everything that surrounds the individual self is meant for the individual’s enjoyment (*bhogyo*). The opponents argue that if one knows the enjoyer then one is also able to acquire knowledge of the entities to be enjoyed. So the opponents conclude that the statement “*ātmā vai are draṣṭavyaḥ*”, is talking of the individual self.

To refute this thesis of the opponents Mahārṣi Vyāsa says ‘*vākyānvayāt*’ and to explain this aphorism Ācārcya Śāṅkara says “*evam prāpte brūmaḥ – paramātmopadeśaḥ eva ayam. kasmāt? vākyānvayāt. vākyam hi idam paurvvāparyyeṇa avekṣyamāṇam paramātmānam prati anvitāvayavam lakṣyate*”⁸.

Here Ācārcya Śāṅkara clearly states that this statement is about the *paramātman* or

the absolute self. The opponents would immediately ask: On what grounds do the Advaitins establish this thesis? Or what are the reasons in favour of this interpretation of the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa*? In answer to this question Ācārya Śaṅkara says that if one closely studies the sequence of statements that constitutes this *Brāhmaṇa* one would surely arrive at this conclusion. At the beginning of this *Brāhmaṇa*, Yājñavalkya says to Maitreyī, “*amṛtatvasya tu nāśā’si vittena*”⁹. This means that *amṛtatva* or liberation cannot be attained by riches. Maitreyī then asks her husband that what shall I do that which will liberate me? Sir, please tell me that which you know. Yājñavalkya then teaches *ātmavijñāna* to Maitreyī. Thus self knowledge (*ātmavijñāna*) is imparted to Maitreyī as a means to liberation. Now liberation can be attained only through the final immediate awareness of *Brahman*. Since *ātmavijñāna* is considered here to be a means to liberation, *ātman* in this context must mean *Brahman*. Furthermore, Ācārya Śaṅkara argues that if the term ‘*ātman*’ means the individual selves then no straight forward explanation can be given of the statement, ‘*ātmavijñānena sarvavijñānam*’. If the term ‘*ātman*’ in this statement stands for *Brahman* then only this statement would be meaningful. For, *Brahman* is the material cause of the entire universe. Since the effect on the Advaita view is not different from its material cause, one can know the effect if one knows the material cause. The statement ‘*ātmavijñānena sarvavijñānam*’ cannot also be taken in a secondary sense, because the scriptures immediately say

that “*brahma taṁ parādāt yo ’anyatrātmano brahma veda.*”¹⁰ This statement means one who looks upon the world as different from *Brahman* is defeated by the world in the sense that he fails to gain the highest end (*parama puruṣārtha*). In this statement, the scriptures have refuted the thesis that the world is different from the self. Thus this statement of the *Bṛihadāranyaka Upaniṣad* establishes the identity between the *ātman* and everything else. Now the entire world can be identical with its own material cause namely *Brahman*. So the term ‘*ātman*’ in the statement ‘*ātma vai are*’ means *Brahman*. The scriptures also states that this entire world appears out of *ātman*. The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* also describe the ‘*ekāyana prakriyā*’ where the scriptures show that the dissolution of the entire universe is *ātman*. This clearly shows that the term ‘*ātman*’ here refers to *Brahman* and not to the individual self.

Maharṣi Vādarāyaṇa here mentions three other interpretations of the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* by three earlier Vedāntins who are Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna. The view of Āśmarathya is mentioned in the aphorism 1.4.20, (*pratijñāsiddherliṅgamāśmarathyah*). On Āśmarathya’s interpretation the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* aims to establish the thesis that if the *ātman* is known, everything will be known. That the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* aims at establishing this thesis is known from the *pratijñāvākya* or the renunciation – “*idaṁ sarvaṁ jadyamātmā*”¹¹. On

Āśmarathya's view the term 'priya' in the statement "*na vai are patyuaḥ kāmāya patih priyaḥ bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyaḥ bhavati*" refers to the *viññānātman* or the conscious individual self. If the *viññānātman* were entirely different from *Brahman* then the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* will not be able to establish the thesis that everything is known if the *ātman* is known. Āśmarathya thinks that the statement "*ātmā vai are...*" is preparing the ground for establishing the main thesis of *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa*. This statement cannot be explained unless the conscious individual self is supposed to be identical with the absolute self in some way. Unless there is some sort of identity between the individual self and *Brahman* everything cannot be known merely by knowing the self (*ātman*). Āśmarathya thinks that there is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference between the individual self and *Brahman*. The relation between the two is identity in difference. *Brahman* is the cause of the individual self. An effect cannot be absolutely identical with the cause. For instance the pot is not absolutely identical with the clay out of which it is produced; for then the clay could have been used to bring water or to store water. The effect cannot also be absolutely different from its cause. For if the pot were absolutely different from the clay, there would be no explanation of the very common experience "it is the clay which transforms itself in the form of a pot". So, Āśmarathya is of the opinion that the relation between the cause and the effect is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference but it is

a relation of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*). The individual self and the *Brahman*, too, are related by this relation of identity-in-difference. The *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* starts by highlighting this identity in order to arrive at the thesis that everything is known if *ātman* is known. This identity-in-difference between the individual self and *Brahman* is a contemporaneous identity because both of them co-exist at the same time.

Maharṣi Vyāsa in the next aphorism that is “*utkramiṣyata evāmbhāvādityauḍulomiḥ*”¹² mentions the view of another ancient Vedāntin namely Auḍulomi. Like Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi too, maintained that the relation between *Brahman* and the individual self is identity-in-difference. The difference between Āśmarathya’s view and Auḍulomi’s view is that while Āśmarathya thinks that the relation between the two is one of simultaneous identity-in-difference, Auḍulomi thinks that the relation is of non-contemporaneous and non-simultaneous identity-in-difference. On Auḍulomi’s view, one thing cannot be both identical with and different from same thing at the same time. For instance, it cannot be said that a pot is both identical with the clay out of which it is produced and is also different from the same clay. For this reason, Auḍulomi says that although the relation between a pot and its material cause clay is one of identity-in-difference, the identity and the difference do not obtain simultaneously. When the

pot exists as a pot it is obviously not absolutely identical with its own material cause, because the function which can be performed by a pot cannot be performed by the clay. On the other hand when the pot again is converted into clay after its own destruction the pot becomes identical with the clay. In the case of the individual self and *Brahman* too, the individual self appears as different from *Brahman* when it exists in this world as the individual. But when it becomes free from all its defects and vices by performing yoga and meditation, the individual self is liberated from the mind-body complex which binds the self and becomes identical with the absolute self or the *paramātman*. So, in the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa*, the term ‘*priya*’ in the statement ‘*na vai are..*’ stands for the individual self but on Auḍulomi’s view the individual self is prior state of the absolute self; because the individual self will become *Brahman* when it attains liberation. So the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* is not actually discussing the nature of the individual self but it actually is trying to establish the thesis that the individual self will become identical with the absolute self when it is liberated. When the identity between the individual self and *Brahman* is established one will be knowable to everything just by knowing the self. It has already been mentioned that the main objective of *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* is to establish the thesis that one knows everything when one knows the self (*ātma vijñāne sarva vijñānam*). On Auḍulomi’s hypothesis there will be no difficulty in establishing this main thesis because when the individual self will

become identical with *Brahman* at the time of liberation it will also become identical with everything. As a result one will be able to know everything if one knows the individual self. There are scriptural statements too in favour of Auḍulomi's hypothesis: “*yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre'staṁ gacchanti namarūpe vihāya. tathā vidvānnāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parāt param puruṣamupaiti divyam*”¹³.

Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara do not admit the views of either Āśmarathya or Auḍulomi. The main reason because of which Vyāsa and Śaṅkara think that Āśmarthya's and Auḍulomi's interpretations of the Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa are not correct is as follows. If the individual were really different from *Brahman* and if the individual were a real mind-body complex – bearing the relation of identity-in-difference, the individual could not become absolutely identical with *Brahman*, because two absolutely different things cannot become identical with one another at any point of their existence.

Kāśakṛtsna thinks that the ultimate self or *Brahman* exists as the individual self. If the individual self were different from *Brahman* then it would not be possible to account for those statements which directly and unequivocally talk of the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*. For instance, the following statement of

Chāndogya Upaniṣad clearly says that it is the ultimate self which reveals itself as the individual self, “*anena jīvenātmanā ’nupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi*”¹⁴.

The opponents might argue that the statement can be explained even if the individual is taken to be an effect (*kārya*) of the highest reality. For them one can say that the highest reality transforms itself in the form of the individual self and then reveals itself to various names and forms.

Kāśakṛtsna refutes this contention by pointing out that although we come across a number of scriptural statements that talk of the creation of the universe, nowhere in the scriptures we come across any statement that talks of the creation of the individual self as an effect of *Brahman* is not supported by the scriptures.

Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara think that Kāśakṛtsna’s view regarding the relationship between the individual self and *Brahman* is supported by the scriptures. “*tatra kāśakṛtsnīyaṃ mataṃ śrutyanusāri iti gamyate, pratipipādayiṣitārthānusārāt ’tattvamasi’ ityādi śrutibhyaḥ. evaṃ ca sati tajjñānāt amṛtatvam avakalpate*”¹⁵

Maharṣi Vyāsa says that through the *mahāvākya* ‘*tattvamasi*’ the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* propose to establish the identity of the *Jīva* and *Brahman*. Thus the statement ‘*tattvamasi*’ is of the nature of enunciation which is corroborated by the

further statement that liberation is attained through the knowledge of *ātman*, “*tarati śokamātmavit*”¹⁶. If the individual self were not absolutely identical with *Brahman* then liberation could not be attained merely by the knowledge of the individual self.

The opponents might argue that if the individual selves were considered to be the effect of the ultimate self then also the individual would be identical with *Brahman*. For, all *satkāryavādins* believe that an effect is not different from its own material cause. To refute this suggestion Mahārṣi Vyāsa and Śāṅkara observe that if the individual self were an effect of *Brahman* then it would have been destroyed along with all other effects at the time of dissolution. Consequently the knowledge of the individual self would not produce liberation; because in order to attain liberation one needs to know the ultimate reality and one cannot surely know the material cause of the entire universe merely by knowing one of its effects. Unless the highest reality is known, liberation would be impossible. As a result, liberation could not be attained by the knowledge of the individual self. As a result all scriptural statements that talk of liberation must be considered as futile.

Besides if following Āsmarāthya and Auḍulomi the individual self is taken as both identical with and different from *Brahman* then this identity and difference would be both as real as *Brahman*. Now if the difference between *jīva* and *Brahman* is

taken as ultimately real then the difference cannot be destroyed by the knowledge of the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*.

For, knowledge can destroy only a false entity. It has no power to destroy something that is ultimately real. Besides, following Kāśakṛtsna, Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara point out that if difference were ultimately real, that difference would have persisted in liberation too. So, if one admits simultaneous identity and difference between the individual self and *Brahman*, the then scriptural statement such as “*brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati*”¹⁷ would become erroneous.

On the other hand if we accept Auḍulomi’s view and suppose that the *jīva* exists in this world as different from *Brahman* but on attaining liberation becomes identical with *Brahman*, then, we shall have to assume that whatever was different from *Brahman* becomes identical with *Brahman*. But if the individual is really different from *Brahman* then the question will be; does the individual remain different from *Brahman* even in liberation or is this difference destroyed at the time of liberation. The first alternative is not acceptable because if the individual is really different from *Brahman* then the difference cannot be destroyed at the time of liberation too. On the other hand if difference between the *jīva* and *Brahman* is destroyed during liberation then the individual too will be destroyed and it cannot be said that the individuals become identical with *Brahman*. So, on the view of Kāśakṛtsna the

Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa actually talks of the absolute self. So, although the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* starts with the statements such as “*na vai are patyuh kāmāya patih priyah bhavati*” and the term ‘*priya*’ indicates the individual self. Vyāsa and Śaṅkara think that the scripture indicate the individual self only to establish the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*. It is on the assumption of this identity alone the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* will be able to attain its ultimate reality namely it will be able to establish the thesis that one knows everything if one knows the ultimate reality.

Section 2

In the preceding section we have seen that the ancient Vedāntins debated over the nature of the relationship between the individual self and *Brahman*. Āsmarathya envisaged this relationship as identity-in-difference where the individual self is considered to be both identical with and different from *Brahman* at the same time. Auḍulomi, however, maintained that two things cannot be both identical with one another and different from one another at the same time. So, he proposed a relation of non-contemporaneous identity-and-difference between the individual self and *Brahman*. The individual self is different from *Brahman* when it exists as an individual in this world; but when the individual self is liberated it becomes identical with *Brahman*. Kāśakṛtsna of these three ancient Vedāntins alone

maintained that the individual self is absolutely identical with *Brahman*. We have also seen that Maharṣi Vyāsa and Śaṅkara have admitted the view of Kāśakṛtsna and have considered the individual self as not different from *Brahman*. The Advaita Vedānta system propounded by Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara consider *Brahman* to be the sole non-dual reality and everything other than *Brahman* is not considered as ultimately real. The Advaitins, however, would not be able to establish the thesis that *Brahman* alone is ultimately real without showing that the world is not as real as *Brahman*. This thesis is established in the *Ārambhanādhikaraṇa* of the second chapter of the *Brahmasūtra*. Although this *adhikaraṇa* is not directly concerned with the relationship between the individual self and *Brahman*, the thesis that *Brahman* alone is ultimately real cannot be established without considering this *adhikaraṇa*. So, in this section I shall give a brief account of the arguments presented in this *adhikaraṇa* by which Vyāsa and Śaṅkara establish *Brahman* as the single non-dual reality.

The first aphorism of the *Ārambhanādhikaraṇa* is “*tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*”.¹⁸ The main objective of this *adhikaraṇa* is to show that the apparent identity and difference between the world and *Brahman* is not ultimately real.

The opponents of the Advaitins have argued that the world emerges from *Brahman*. Now, an effect appears as both identical with and different from its own material cause. For instance, the waves appearing in a sea are both identical with sea and different from the sea. Considered as sea water a wave is identical with the sea; but considered as a particular wave, it is different from the sea. The opponents of the Advaitins think that there is nothing irrational in consider an effect as both different from and identical with its own material cause. So, the opponents consider the apparent identity and difference between an effect and its cause as ultimately real.

Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara do not consider this identity to be ultimately real. For them, the effect, in reality, is not different from its own material cause. To establish this identity Maharṣi Vyāsa says, the effect is not different from *Brahman* as it is stated in the scriptural statement, “*vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam.*”¹⁹

The Advaita thesis that the *jīva* is identical with *Brahman* is contradicted by our ordinary experience because in our ordinary experience the individual self does not appear as *Brahman*. On the contrary, in our ordinary experience the individual self appears as limited in a particular space and at a particular time. We feel that we exist here and not elsewhere and it also appears to us that we exist for a specific

period of time. Thus in order to establish the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*, the Advaitins need to show that

1. The ordinary experience of the self as limited in space and time is false.
2. The Advaitins also must offer positive arguments in order to show that the individual self is eternal all-pervasive and auto-luminous in nature.

Ācārya Śāṅkara establishes the falsity of ordinary experience in the introductory part of his commentary known as *adhyāśabhāṣya*. The eternal all-pervasive and auto-luminous nature of the self is established in the following *adhikaraṇas* of the *Brahmasūtra* and *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*.

The *adhyāśabhāṣya* will not be discussed in detail here; because in the next two chapters the purport of the *adhyāśabhāṣya* will be discussed in great detail, first following Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmāī* and then following *Pañcapādikā* and *Vivaraṇa*.

Section 3

After establishing the identity of the individual self and *Brahman* in the *Vākyanvayādhikaraṇa* of the first chapter of *Śārīrakabhāṣya*, Ācārya Śaṅkara establishes the nature of the individual self. The various properties of the individual self are established in the second chapter of the *Śārīrakabhāṣya*.

In the *carācaravyapāśrayādhikaraṇa*²⁰, Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara establish that the individual self does not come into existence or go out of existence. In other words the individual self is not born at a particular point of time. Nor does its existence terminate at some other point of time.

This *adhikaraṇa* aims at resolving the following statement of doubt: “*jīvanityatvaśāstrasya jīvotpattināśanimittakajāteṣṭyādiśāstreṇa virodhaḥ asti, na vā*”²¹. That is: there are many statements in the scriptures which state that the individual self does not die; for instance the statement “*na jīva mriyate*”²². There are also statements in the scriptures to the effect that certain Vedic rites such as *jāteṣṭi śrāddha* are to be performed when an individual is born or is dead. The scriptural statements clearly indicate that an individual is born at some point of time and it also expires at some point of time. Prima facie the first set of scriptural statement contradicts the second set of statements. This *adhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* aims at resolving this contradiction.

The Advaita Vedāntins resolve this contradiction by maintaining that the scriptural statements that talk about the birth and death of the individual are to be taken in a secondary sense.

The opponents might argue why do the Advaita Vedāntins propose to interpret the statements which talk of the birth and death of the individual are to be taken in a secondary sense whereas statements such as “*na jīva mriyate*” are to be taken literally.

Ācārya Śaṅkara answers this objection that “*na jīvasya utpattipralayau staḥ, śāstraphalasangrahaḥ.*”²³ Ācārya Śaṅkara points out that many statements of the scriptures motivate an individual to perform actions the results of which cannot be obtained in this life. There is no doubt about the fact that the body of an individual ceases to exist at some point of time. But if the existence of the individual self also terminates with the destruction of the body, then no individual can reap the benefit of actions performed in this life or some other life. But most of the Vedic rites are supposed to produce merits and demerits that give results after the destruction of the body. Now if the individual self does not continue to exist after death then there would be no point in performing actions which are unable to produce results in this life. Since most of the *karmakāṇḍa* of the *Vedas* prescribed actions that do not produce effect in this life, statements which talk of the eternal

character of the individual self must be taken literally. Consequently the statements which talk of the birth and death of the individual are to be taken in a secondary sense.

The opponents might ask: What is the locus of birth and death if the individual self is not the locus of birth death, or to put it differently, to whom birth and death may be ascribed primarily?

The answer to this question is given in the aphorism, “*carācaravyapāśrayastu syāttadvyapadeso bhāktastadbhāvabhāvitvāt*”²⁴. This aphorism means that birth and death belong to various bodies – mobile and immobile. Various kinds of bodies come into existence from the five basic elements and when these bodies die they get dissolved into these elements. The birth and death of a body is secondarily ascribed to that individual self which has a special relation with that body.

So, the birth of an individual is nothing but coming into a specific relation with body. When this relation is severed with the destruction of the body, death is ascribed to the individual self. Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara show that there is no other sense in which we can talk of the birth or the death of an individual self.

In the next *adhikaraṇa* named *ātmādhikaraṇa*, Maharṣi Vyāsa and Ācārya Śaṅkara showed the eternal character of the individual self. Each *adhikaraṇa* of the

Brahma Sūtra aims at resolving a particular doubt. The doubt which is resolved in this *adhikaraṇa* is “*ātmā utpadyate navā*” that is this *adhikaraṇa* dispels the doubt whether the individual self is generated or not. The opponents here argue that there are many scriptural statements where it is stated that the individual self is generated from *Brahman* just as the sparks of fire are generated from fire. The scriptural statements are as follows – “*tat sṛṣtvā tadevānuprāviśat*”²⁵ and “*yathā’gneḥ kṣudrāḥ visphuliṅgāḥ vyuccarantyevamevātas mādātmanaḥ sarve prānāḥ*”²⁶

These scriptural statements clearly indicate that the individual self is generated from *Brahman*. The statement of *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* mentioned earlier gives a slightly different account of the genesis of the individual self. It says that *Brahman* first creates the material universe and the effects constituting the universe, such as the bodies of living organisms and then enters into those effects. Thus an individual comes into being when the body, the mind and the sense organs of an individual are created and *Brahman* or pure consciousness enters into physical body and the mind of the individual.

The opponents do not merely quote scriptural statements in favour of their position but they also have independent arguments. The opponents do not base their thesis on scriptural statements alone but they also offer independent arguments to prove

their thesis. They have argued that an individual self acquires merits and demerits as consequences of their right and wrong action. The merits and demerits of one individual cannot be the same as the merits and demerits of another individual. Since the individual self is qualified by merits and demerits it cannot be identical with *Brahman* which is devoid of all properties.

The arguments of the opponents may be expressed the form of the following inferences.

1. “*jīvaḥ Brahmanaḥ bhinnaḥ viruddhadharmavattvāt, sammatavat.*

2. *jīvaḥ kāryapadārthaḥ Brahmanaḥ vibhaktatvāt, ghatavat*”²⁷

The opponents offered an *anukūla tarka* in support of these two inferences.

“*parasmāt ātmanaḥ bhinnatve ’pi jīvaḥ yadi tasya kāryam na syāt, tarhi ekavijñāne sarvavijñānapratijñāpi na syāt*”.²⁸

In the first inference the opponents are arguing that the individual self is different from *Brahman* because, the individual self and *Brahman* possess incompatible properties. The second says that the individual self is an effect because it appears as the individual self when it is dissociated from *Brahman*. This second inference gives a concise form to the argument which is expressed the scriptural statement “*yathā sudiptāt pāvakādvīsphuliṅgāḥ sahasraśaḥ prabhavante sarūpāḥ*

tathā'kṣarādvividhāḥ soṃya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caivāpiyanti"²⁹. This statement of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says that just as thousands of sparks emanate from a blazing fire, so the thousands of individuals arise out of one unchangeable *Brahman*. This Upaniṣadic statement very clearly says that there is a plurality of individual self and all individual selves are created out of *Brahman*. The *tarka* mentioned above is employed to strengthen both these inferences. In this *tarka* the opponents argue that if the individual self were not the effect of *Brahman* in spite of being different from *Brahman* then the scriptures cannot say that everything will be known if *Brahman* is known. Here the opponents are saying that the first inference mentioned earlier clearly shows that the individual self is different from *Brahman*; for the same properties cannot be ascribed to both. The scriptures state that *Brahman* is eternal and all-pervasive while the individual self appears as non-eternal and confined to a particular space. So it cannot be doubted that the individual self is different from *Brahman*. But, even though the individual self possesses properties that are different from those possessed by *Brahman*, the individual self cannot be entirely different from *Brahman* because the individual self is created out of *Brahman*. The *tarka* mentioned earlier says that if the individual self were not even an effect of *Brahman* then the scriptures would not be able to establish the thesis that everything is known when the absolute is known. But we have earlier seen that the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*

Upaniṣad very clearly aims at this thesis. Now the opponents have shown that it cannot be denied that the individual self and *Brahman* possess very different properties. Now there are only two conclusions which can be drawn on the basis of this undeniable fact first; the individual self is entirely different from *Brahman* or secondly; the individual self is an effect of *Brahman*. If we accept the first conclusion then the scriptural statement that propounded the thesis that everything is known when *Brahman* is known, could have been false. So the only conclusion which follows that the many different individual selves are effects of *Brahman* and it emerges out of *Brahman* just as sparks emerge out of blazing fire. With the help of these two inferences and the *tarka* along with the supporting scriptures the opponents prove that the individual selves are many in number and they are created out of *Brahman*.

Ācārya Śaṅkara starts countering the opponents' thesis from the statement “*atra ucyate na asya pravibhāgaḥ svataḥ asti, 'ekaḥ devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ sarvavyāpi sarvabhūtāntarātmā'* (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6/11) *iti śruteh*”³⁰.

Ācārya Śaṅkara here quotes this statement of *Svetasvatara Upaniṣad* in order to show that the individual self is never dissociated from *Brahman*. Now if the individual self is never dissociated from *Brahman* then the probans of the second inference mentioned earlier by the opponents will be vitiated by the fallacy called

svarūpāsiddhi. The opponents' inference purports to show that the individual self is an effect because it emerges through a process of dissociation from *Brahman*. Just as a pot get dissociated from its own material cause (clay) when it is generated. Ācārya Śaṅkara here observes that the individual self is never dissociated from *Brahman* and the example of a pot is also not proper because *Brahman* is present in the pot also and so the pot also is not dissociated from the all-pervasive *Brahman*. The Advaita Vedāntins can also deploy an *anukūla tarka* in favour of their own contention. The *tarka* is “*jīvaḥ yadi utpattimān syāt, tadā 'saḥ vai eṣaḥ mahānajaḥ ātmā' (Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad-4/4/25) iti śāstram anarthakam syāt; jīvasya utpattimattve vināśitvāvaśyambhāvāt kṛtanāśādidoṣo 'pi syāt*”³¹. That means if the individual self were produced from *Brahman* then the following scriptural statement “*saḥ vai eṣaḥ mahānajaḥ ātmā*”³² would become false. Besides if the individual self had a beginning then it could be destroyed also. But if the self could be destroyed then the law of karma would become ineffective; for in that case the individual would not have to enjoy the results of its own actions.

The opponents might further argue that the Advaita Vedāntins admit that the five subtle elements are effects because they appear out of *Brahman*. The scriptural statements which talk of the appearance of the five subtle elements are taken

literally by the Advaita Vedāntins. In this contention, one may refer to the statement of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, “*tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ. ākāśādvāyuh*”³³, where it is stated that the five subtle elements appear in a particular fixed order out of *Brahman*. Now the opponents argue that the Advaita Vedāntins take this statement in its literal sense and maintain that the subtle elements are the appearances of *Brahman*. But the Advaita Vedāntins refuse to take similar statements such as “*yathā sudiptāt pābakādviphulingāḥ sahasraśaḥ prabhavante sarūpāḥ tathā’kṣarādvividhāḥ soṃya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caivāpiyanti*”, this statement in their literal sense. But the Advaita Vedāntins do not explain why one statement is taken literally while another is not.

Ācārya Śaṅkara addresses this objection too in the statement “*buddhyādyupādhanimittam tu asya pravibhāgapratibhānam ākāśasya iva ghatādisamvandanimitam. tathāca śāstram – ‘saḥ vai ayam ātmā brahma vijñānamayaḥ manomayaḥ prāṇamaya cakṣurmayaḥ śrotramayaḥ’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-4/4/5)*”³⁴ Ācārya Śaṅkara here argues that in the absence of any counteractive condition (*vādhaka*) the abovementioned scriptural statement can establish that a particular entity appears out of *Brahman*. In the case of the statement of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which describes the emerges of the five subtle elements out of *Brahman*, there is no counteractive condition which may

prevents us from taking the statement literally but in the case of the statements which talk of the appearance of the individual self out of *Brahman*, there is a counteractive condition owing to which the statement cannot be taken literally. Just as the adjective *striṇa* applies to a man who is always under the influence of his wife so also the individual self comes under the influence of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) the mind along with the body and the sense organs which are superimposed on the individual self. As a result the mental states pertaining to the *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind are superimposed on the individual self. It is because of this superimposition the self appears as (*vijñānamaya*) or full of consciousness. Now *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. are effects of *avidyā* and when the individual self appears as non-eternal the apparent birth and death of the individual self are not its real properties. All these properties in reality belong to the mind and the mind imposes these properties on *Brahman*. Thus birth, death and change belong to the mind, body and the sense organs and the self is free from the vicissitudes of birth and death. The opponents might argue that the Advaitins want to counter the thesis that the self is an effect of *Brahman*. But in order to disprove this thesis they are taken resort to some thesis which contradicts their own position. They are saying that the individual self is *vijñānamaya* but the suffix ‘*mayat*’ is usually employed to denote an effect. So if the individual self is said to be ‘*vijñānamaya*’ then it must be

treated as an effect of the mind. But this contradicts the Advaita thesis that the individual self is not an effect.

To refute this objection, Ācārya Śaṅkara points out that here the suffix ‘*mayat*’ is not employed to denote an effect. This suffix here signifies abundance. There is abundance of mental states and as a result of the superimposition of the mind and its states on the self, the self also seems to have an abundance of mental states. Thus the suffix does not indicate the individual self as an effect. Rather the apparent non-eternal character of the individual self is due to the superimposition of the non-eternal mind on the self.

From the above considerations it follows that the apparent non-eternal character of the individual self is not a real property of the self. Rather, it is a property of the mind which is superimposed on the self.

Earlier the opponents quoted several scriptural statements which indicate that the individual self is generated out of the absolute self. The Advaitins maintain that these scriptural statements, too, are to be taken in a secondary sense in which they would mean that the individual self appears to have a beginning in time; because various effects of *avidyā*, namely, the mind, the body and the sense organs are superimposed on the individual self and these effects of *avidyā* have a beginning in time.

As a matter of fact the Advaita Vedāntins are trying to establish the thesis that the individual self is identical with *Brahman*. This thesis is established primarily on the basis of scriptural statements and the final immediate realization of the liberated person. Needless to say, the lay person does not have any access to any of these two sources of knowledge. Though the common man may read the scriptures, he may be unable to ascertain the correct meaning of the scriptural statements. So, the independent reasons are to be given to refute the opponents' position. The Advaitins also need to show that the scriptural statements, which the opponents have cited in favour of their own positions, have not been correctly interpreted by the opponents. Each *adhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra* purports to resolve a controversy regarding the interpretation of one or more specific scriptural statements. So, throughout the *Brahmasūtra*, Maharṣi Vyāsa has tried to refute the opponents' interpretation of the scriptures. This *adhikaraṇa*, too, is not an exception to this general strategy. Here also the author of the *Brahmasūtra* has shown that the scriptural statements that the opponents have cited to establish their own position do not straight-forwardly support their position. On the contrary, the Advaita Vedāntins have shown that alternative interpretations can be given to these scriptural statements and they can be treated as talking of the genesis of the various qualifiers, such as the body, the mind etc. of the individual self. So, the opponents' interpretation of the scriptural statements is not their only interpretations. The

Advaitins have also argued to the effect that the opponents' interpretation is also not the correct one. The author of the *Brahmasūtra* ends this *adhikaraṇa* by quoting a number of scriptural statements which expressly state that the individual self is eternal. The author of the *Brahmasūtra* has quoted the following scriptural statement in support of the Advaita position, “*na vā are'ham moham bravīmyavināśī vā are'yamātmā'anucchiddharmā mātrā'samsargaḥ tu asya bhavati.*”³⁵ The Advaitins' argument is this, the statement which expressly states that the self is eternal cannot be given any other explanation. But the statements quoted by the opponents admit of alternative interpretations. So, the statements that establish the eternal character of the self must be taken literally while the scriptures talking of the genesis of the self are to be taken in a secondary sense as talking of the non-eternal character of the various qualifiers of the individual self. The Advaitins have also employed various techniques of interpretation, such as one or more of the six *tātparyagrāhaka liṅgas* to show that their own interpretation of the scriptures is the correct one. The *ātmādhikaraṇa*, thus, refutes the opponents' thesis that the individual self is non-eternal and by so doing it takes one more step towards establishing the identity between the individual self and *Brahman*.

Section 4

In the 3rd section of this chapter we have establish the eternal and auto-luminous character of the individual self following the *carācaravyāpāśrayādhikaraṇa*, *ātmādhikaraṇa* and *jñādhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra*. The eternal and auto-luminous characters of the individual self determine the essence of the self. In the *adhikaraṇa* which immediately follows *jñādhikaraṇa*, Vyāsa and Śaṅkara have establish the ubiquitous character of the individual self refuting the various other hypotheses about the nature of the individual self. This *adhikaraṇa* is called *utkrāntigatiādhikaraṇa*. This *adhikaraṇa* deals with the extension of the individual self. The Advaita Vedāntins maintain that the two characters that being eternal and auto-luminous constitute the essence of the individual selves. For this reason these two characters are described as the “*antaraṅga svarūpa*” of the individual self. This thesis follows from two other theses admitted by the Advaita Vedāntins: 1. the individual self is identical with *Brahman* 2. *Brahman* is defined interms of pure being (*sattā*), pure consciousness (*cit*) and pure bliss (*ānanda*). If *Brahman* is auto-luminous, pure consciousness and if the individual self is identical with *Brahman* then needless to say, the individual self is also auto-luminous. The connection between the eternal character of the individual self and the *svarūalakṣaṇai* of the *Brahman* is not so obvious. The essence of *Brahman* is described in the *lakṣaṇa*

vākya of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which says “*satyam jñānam anantam Brahman.*”³⁶ In this statement *Brahman* is called ‘*anantam*’ because it is not limited by any object. Since *Brahman* is not limited in time and since the individual self is identical with *Brahman*, the individual self too cannot be limited in time. So, the individual self is eternal.

CHAPTER TWO

Vācaspati Mīśra on the Nature of the Individual Self

It has been established in the last chapter of my thesis that the *ahamartha* or the subject of I-cognitions of the form ‘I am happy’, ‘I know this pot’ etc. is neither pure consciousness nor the mind. This ‘I’ or *ahamartha* is actually a mixture of pure consciousness and the mind which is a material object. It is generated by the superimposition of the mind and its attributes on consciousness. Though the subject of I-cognition is a result of superimposition, yet it is this subject of I-cognition which appears as the individual self.

Vācaspati Mīśra, the author of *Bhāmatī* discussed the nature of *ahamartha* in detail while commenting on the *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* of Ācārya Śaṅkara. In the present chapter the nature of the ‘I’ or the individual ego will be analysed on the basis of *Bhāmatī* and its sub-commentaries *Vedānta Kalpataru* of Amalānanda and the *Kalpataru Parimala* of Appaya Dīkṣita.

Ācārya Śaṅkara at the beginning of his *adhyāśabhāṣya* considered the objection that the superimposition between the self and the not-self is not logically tenable. Vācaspati Mīśra also at the beginning of his commentary *Bhāmatī* considered a similar objection. In this objection the opponents have said that the self or

Brahman cannot be an object of inquiry because it is self evident (*asandigdha*) and redundant (*aprayojaniya*). According to the opponents, the self or *Brahman* is directly apprehended and also any inquiry about *Brahman* is redundant. That which is directly apprehended and that which does not serve any purpose cannot be the object of any philosophical inquiry. To introduce this objection Vācaspati Miśra said, ‘*atha yadasandigdhaprayojanam ca na tatprekṣāvatpratipitsāgocarah; yathā: samanaskendriyasannikṛṣṭaḥ sphitālokamadhyavartighataḥ karaṭadantā vā*’¹. This statement indicates two inferences advanced by the opponents –

1. *vimataṁ brahma na vicāryam asandigdhatvāt,*

samanaskendriyasannikṛṣṭaḥ sphitālokamadhyavartighatavat.

2. *vimataṁ brahma na vicāryam*

aprayojanatvāt, karaṭadantavat.

Brahman is the locus (*pakṣa*) of both these inferences and *avicāryatva* is the probandum of both these inferences. *Asandigdhatva* is the hetu of the first inference. The example of the first inference is such a pot which is located in a place that is adequately lit. The significance of the first inference is that if an object or a thing is beyond reasonable doubt then no man will engage in any inquiry in order to investigate the nature of that thing, for instance, a pot which is in contact with the sense organ of a person who is not inattentive. This pot can never be the object of any doubt and so this pot can never be the object of any inquiry. So in

this example, the *vyāpti* or the invariable concomitance ‘whatever is beyond doubt is not the object of inquiry’ may be grasped. If *Brahman* is beyond reasonable doubt then it can be inferred that *Brahman* cannot be the object of any inquiry. So, no rational being can engage in any investigation regarding the nature of *Brahman*.

In the second inference, the opponents of the Advaitins establish the thesis that *Brahman* cannot be the object of inquiry by another probans namely redundancy.

The significance of the second inference is that if a thing is absolutely redundant then nobody will intend to investigate the nature of the object. For example, to know the teeth of a crow is redundant for a human being. Therefore, no human being engages in an investigation regarding the nature of the teeth of a crow. Similarly, *Brahman* cannot be the object of inquiry since it is absolutely redundant.

The opponents of the Advaita Vedāntins, however, have to face an objection at this point. It may be objected against the opponents that the two inferences by which the opponents establish their thesis that *Brahman* cannot be the object of philosophical inquiry are themselves fallacious. For, the probans of the first inference is *asandigdhatva* and the probans of the second inference is *aprayojanatva*. But none of these probanses is established in the locus (*pakṣa*) of the inference before the employment of these inferences. If the probans of an inference is not established in the *pakṣa* of the inference before the employment of

that inference, then the inference is vitiated by the fallacy called '*svarūpāsiddha*' and such an inference cannot establish the thesis that *Brahman* cannot be the object of philosophical inquiry.

In answer to this objection, the opponents of the Advaita Vedāntins have tried to establish the probans, *asandigdhatva* or being beyond reasonable doubt and *aprayojanatva* or redundancy in *Brahman*. The opponents have discussed elaborately the nature of the I-cognitions in connection with establishing the probans of *asandigdhatva*. We shall, now, discuss the opponents' analysis of the first probans and in this connection we shall also discuss the nature of the I-cognitions. One might ask: Why do the opponents think that *Brahman* is *asandigdha* or beyond reasonable doubt? They could answer this question by pointing out that the Advaitins themselves identify *Brahman* with the individual self and every individual, however small or insignificant it may be, is aware of its own self. But why do the opponents think that every individual possesses knowledge of its own self?

In answer to this objection, the opponents of the Advaita Vedāntins have shown that every organism can apprehend its own self immediately through the I-cognitions. Thus, on the opponents' view, what is revealed as 'I' in the I-cognitions is nothing but the individual self or the *jīvātman*. So, the opponents

identify the individual self with the *ahamartha* or the object of the I-cognitions. Now in the *Māṇdukyopaniṣat* it is said that the individual self is identical with *Brahman*. The statement of the *Māṇdukyopaniṣat* which the opponents are referring to is “*ayamātmā brahma*”². If *Brahman* is identical with *ātman* and if *ātman* is revealed in the I-cognitions then *Brahman* also is revealed in the I-cognitions. So, every sentient organism is directly aware of *Brahman*. Even nobody have any doubt of the form ‘I exist or not’ and nobody have an illusion of the form ‘I do not exist’. If a thing is the object of direct apprehension and the thing is never the object of doubt then the thing is regarded as *asandigdha*. As the individual self is *asandigdha* and as the individual self is identical with *Brahman* then *Brahman* also will be *asandigdha* or beyond reasonable doubt. For this reason, the opponents say that *Brahman* is beyond reasonable doubt. So the probans of the first inference is not vitiated by the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddha*.

An objection was raised against the second inference of the opponents of the Advaita Vedāntins. It may be objected that the second inference is also vitiated by the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddha* since the probans, *aprayojanatva* or redundancy is not established in the locus (*pakṣa*) of the inference before the employment of this inference. One might argue that liberation is the ultimate goal prescribed by the scriptures. According to the scriptures, liberation may be generated only by self-

knowledge. On the contrary, lack of self-knowledge is the cause of bondage. The opponents say that every individual possesses the knowledge of his own self. Every individual apprehends directly its own self through the I-cognitions because the self reveals itself in the I-cognitions. Nobody can admit any other valid self-knowledge except the I-cognitions. As all sentient beings can apprehend their own selves in the I-cognitions, it has to be admitted that every sentient being has knowledge of its own self. But as empirical life and bondage co-exist with self-knowledge then empirical life and bondage cannot be brought to an end by self-knowledge. So there is no need to have self-knowledge because self-knowledge cannot remove bondage. For this reason, the probans of the second inference cannot be considered as a *sādhyasama hetu* or an unproven probans.³

To support these inferences the opponents have applied an *anukūla tarka* which is a kind of counterfactual reasoning. If an inconclusive doubt arises against the probans of an inference then a favourable counterfactual reasoning may be applied to remove the doubt. If no *anukūla tarka* can be employed to remove the doubt then the probans will not be able to establish the probandum. A subject that is the object of philosophical or scientific inquiry is either a subject that is not beyond doubt or is useful for human beings in some way or other. Thus, two invariable

concomitances can be established in the instance of *Āyurveda*. These two *vyāpti*-s are:

1. “*yatra yatra vicāryatvaṃ tatra tatra sandigdhatvam*”.
2. “*yatra yatra vicāryatvaṃ tatra tatra saprayajanatvam*”.

In both these invariable concomitances, ‘*vicāryatva*’ or being the object of philosophical inquiry is the probans. In the first *vyāpti* ‘being the object of doubt’ is the probandum and in the second *vyāpti* ‘being necessary for human beings’ is the probandum. The opponents argue that the absence of both these *sādhya*-s can be observed in the individual self. So, the self cannot be the object of inquiry.⁴

After citing the above *anukūla tarka* in favour of the probanses of the abovementioned inferences the opponents consider another objection. It may be objected that the *ahamartha* or the object of I-cognitions such as ‘I am slim’, ‘I am fair’ etc. appears as the locus of properties of the mind, the body and the sense organs. For example, in the cognition ‘I am fair’ the ego appears as the locus of an attribute of the body. In the cognition ‘I am blind’ *ahamartha* is apprehended as the locus of an attribute of the visual sense organ. In the apprehension ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sorry’ etc. *ahamartha* is apprehended as the locus of attributes of the mind. Now, since in the I-cognitions the *ahamartha* is revealed as the locus of the attributes of body, senses and mind cannot be identified with the self. Those who

raise this objection argue that in the above mentioned cognitions the ego appears as the locus of the attributes of the body, senses and the mind. Each of these appearances is expressed in the form of a *sāmānādhikarāṇya vyāpadeśa*. The definition of *sāmānādhikarāṇya vyāpadeśa* is ‘*bhinnapravṛttinimittānām śavdānāmekasminnarthe pravṛttiḥ sāmānādhikarāṇya vyāpadeśa*’. According to this definition if two different words standing for different things are applied to the same object, then that statement is called a *sāmānādhikarāṇya vyāpadeśa*. For example, in the statement ‘this flower is blue’, the term ‘blue’ means the blue colour and the term ‘flower’ means the genus of the flower. But here both the terms have been applied to mean the same object. Just as the statement ‘this flower is blue’ means ‘that which is blue is identical with a flower’, the I-cognitions also indicate that there exists a relation of identity between the *ahamartha* and the body, the senses and the mind. So, it cannot be accepted that the individual self is directly apprehended in the I-cognitions.⁵

In answer to this objection, the opponents would say that the *ahamartha* which is revealed in the perceptions ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sorry’ is not identical with the body, the sense organs and the mind. Though *ahamartha* is related by *sāmānādhikarāṇya vyāpadeśa* with the attributes of the body, the sense organs and the mind yet the *ahamartha* is different from the body, the sense organs and the

mind. To establish this difference between them the opponents have applied another inference-

vimatah ahamarthaḥ śarirādibhyaḥ bhidyate,

vyāvartamāneṣu anuvṛttamānatvāt, yathā kusumbhyaḥ sūtram.

The significance of this inference is that the *ahamartha* is different from the body, the sense organs and the mind; because though the bodies change in different times the *ahamartha* does not change. For example, in a garland different flowers are held together by a single thread. Similarly the *ahamartha* is apprehended as identical during the entire period of a person's life even though his body undergoes radical changes during his lifetime. A question here will arise against the opponents: What is the proof of the fact that the *ahamartha* remains identical, even though the body changes?

In answer to this question the opponents would say that it will be proved by a kind of recognition which is of the form “*yo'ham vālye pitarāvanvabhavam sa eva sthāvire praṇapṛnanubhavāmi*”. In this cognition, an individual perceives that I who had perceived earlier my father and grandfather, am now perceiving my children and grandchildren. But in the long period from childhood to old age the body of an individual undergoes a lot of change. The body of the child is entirely

different from the body of an aged person. The sense organs also can be destroyed or their abilities might decrease as a person becomes old. But in spite of these changes the *ahamartha* is apprehended as the same. So it is proved that though the body changes the *ahamartha* remains identical. Thus just as the thread which holds the flowers is different from the flowers, the *ahamartha* also must be different from the body, the mind and the sense organs.⁶

Again another objection may be raised against the opponents that though there is a lot of difference between the body of the child and the adult body then it cannot be said that the bodies are entirely different from each other because it is not established till now that the bodies change entirely over a certain period of times. So, the abovementioned recognition cannot conclusively establish that the *ahamartha* remains identical even though the body changes.⁷

To refute this objection, the opponents have introduced two other examples in which it can be shown that the object of I-cognition can be apprehended directly though the bodies are quite different from each other. One can enjoy divine happiness in his dream due to his good action. But according to the Indian philosophers nobody can enjoy divine happiness while he is in his human body. That means in order to enjoy divine happiness it is necessary to have a divine body. The question here may be raised: How is it possible for a human being to

enjoy divine happiness through human body during dream-experience? In reply, the opponents would say that a divine body is generated during the state of dream and the divine happiness may be enjoyed through this divine body. When the person wakes up from dream, the divine body is destroyed and the individual again enjoys human pleasure and pain through his human body. The divine body does not persist when a person wakes up from dream. That is why on waking up from dream, the subject realizes, “*nāhaṁ deva, manuṣya eva*”. But in spite of the difference between the bodies, the individual apprehends that ‘I who dreamt the divine pleasure am now enjoying empirical pleasure and pain’. So, the object of the I-cognition appears as identical though the empirical body is different from the dreaming body. So, the object of I-cognition cannot be identical with the body. It must be something different from the body and this different thing is the individual self.

The opponents have given another example to establish the difference between the body and the object of I-cognition. An ascetic may have different bodies at the same time in order to enjoy the fruits of the past action which have begun to give results. The bodies which are constructed by their power of meditation are called *kāyavyūha*. For example, an ascetic may enjoy the pleasure and pain of a tiger by constructing a tiger body. There is no doubt that his human body is extremely

different from his tiger body. But in spite of this difference he can apprehend that 'I who have enjoyed the pleasure and pain of a tiger am now enjoying the pleasure and pain of a human being through a human body. But in such apprehension, the object of I-cognition is not different though the bodies are different. So, the object of I-cognition is different from the body.

After establishing the difference between the object of the I-cognitions and the body, the opponents have established the difference between the object of the I-cognitions and the sense organs. A thing which has been perceived by the visual sense organ may also be perceived by the tactile sense organ even if the visual sense organ has been destroyed and then the apprehension may occur '*yo'hamadrākṣam sa evaitarhi spṛśāmi*'. There is no doubt that in this apprehension these two sense organs are different from each other. As the object of I-cognition appears as an identical thing, the object of I-cognition is different from the sense organs.

After that the opponents have established that the object of I-cognition is different from the *buddhi* or the intellect and the mind. The intellect and the mind appear as an instrumental cause in the apprehension of an individual; but the object of I-cognition is always apprehended as the subject. The instrumental cause cannot be

identical with the subject or the agent. So, the object of I-cognition must be a different thing from the intellect and the mind.⁸

One might ask the opponents that if the object of I-cognition is different from the body, the mind and the sense organs then why does the object of I-cognition appear as a locus of the attributes of the body, the mind and the sense organs in the cognitions of the form ‘I am fair’, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am blind’ etc.?’⁹

The opponents might say in reply to this question that in all these cases terms such as ‘happy’, ‘blind’ etc. are used in their secondary senses. For example, in the apprehension ‘*mañcāh krośanti*’ or ‘the stage is roaring’, the term ‘stage’ is used in a secondary sense for the persons who are seated on the stage. Secondary applications depend upon the difference and also upon the knowledge of that difference. It is known to all that a stage cannot make a lot of noise. Even he who applies the verb ‘*krośanti*’ to qualify ‘*mañcāḥ*’ knows the real meanings of the terms. Similarly the adjective blind is employed to qualify ‘*aham*’ only in a secondary sense even though the adjective does not really apply to *aham*. According to the opponents also, the primary meanings of the term ‘*aham*’ is really the self and not the body or sense organs. All I-cognitions are clear and distinct apprehensions. So, the self appears clearly and directly in the I-cognitions. The opponents have also mentioned that the I-cognitions are very clear apprehensions

which are also called *sphuṭatara anubhavas*. The question that would naturally arise is: What is a *sphuṭatara anubhava*? In reply to this question the Advaitins say that an *anubhava* can be of four types – *abhijñā*, *abhivadana*, *upādāna* and *arthakriyā*. The first determinate perception which is generated by the contact of sense organs with their objects is called *abhijñā*. The sentence which manifests the apprehension is called *abhivadana*. The action generated by the determinate cognition is called *upādāna*. Here the term ‘*upādāna*’ is inclusive of ‘*hāna*’. That is ‘*upādāna*’ means any activity of the agent which is generated by the determinate cognition. As a result of the action of the agent an external object also is used in a particular way. That is, the action of the agent leads to same action of an agent. For instance on having a determinate cognition of a pot, the knower may proceed to bring the pot in order to use it for bringing or storing of water. Now the agent’s action of bringing the pot is called *upādāna* whereas the pot’s use for the purposes of bringing or storing water is called ‘*arthakriyā*’. Of these four usages *abhijñā* is regarded as a non-explicit usage or *asphuṭavyavahāra*, because such apprehensions can also be generated in dreamless sleep. According to the Advaita Vedāntins, the mind dissolves in *avidyā* in the state of dreamless sleep. So, on their view, an apprehension which is produced in the absence of mind is called a non-explicit apprehension. On the contrary, the apprehension which is produced by the presence of mind is called an explicit apprehension or a *sphuṭatara anubhava*.

Explicit apprehensions are usually generated in the empirical state. Nobody can deny the apprehension which is generated in the empirical state and which is not contradicted during the waking state. The I-cognitions are generated in the empirical state and are not contradicted as long as the individual remains in the empirical state. For this reason, the objects of I-cognitions must be admitted as real. The opponents have established earlier by means of a recognition that the object of an I-cognition I is different from the body, the mind and the sense organs. So, the object of an I-cognition which appears in the I-cognition in the empirical state is nothing but the self. So, there is no need to investigate into the nature of the self. So, the view of the Advaitins regarding the nature of the individual self is absolutely wrong.¹⁰

Another objection may be raised against the opponents of the Advaita Vedāntins that the actual nature of self which is beyond hunger and thirst has been established in many *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads*. On the contrary, the object of I-cognitions which is subject to hunger and thirst appears in the I-cognition is not called the self.¹¹ To establish the opponents' position Vācaspati Miśra says, “*nacāhamiti sarvajanīnasphuṭatarānubhavasamarthita ātmā dehendriyādivyatiriktaḥ śakya upaniṣadām sahasrairapyanyathayitum; anubhavavirodhāt. nahyāgamāḥ*

sahasramapi ghataṃ patayitumīśate. tasmādanubhavavirodhādupacaritārthā evopaniṣad iti yuktamutpaśyām'¹².

The significance of the opponents' position is that since the self is established by a clear and distinct empirical perception as a different thing from the body, the mind and the sense organs no scripture can establish the self as anything else. Because when an uncontradicted perception is contradicted by *śrūti* the perception will be stronger than the *śrūti*.

To determine the relative strength and weakness of the perception and the scriptures the Mīmāṃsakas have employed the *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya*. According to this *nyāya*, a rule or a law which is applicable to more things is regarded as a *sāvakāśa* rule and that which is applicable to a lesser number of things is called a *niravakāśa rule*. When a contradiction occurs between a *sāvakāśa* and a *niravakāśa rule*, then the *niravakāśa rule* will be stronger than the *sāvakāśa rule*. Because, in such cases if the *sāvakāśa rule* is considered as stronger than the *niravakāśa rule* then since the scope of the *niravakāśa rule* is less than that of the *sāvakāśa rule*, the *niravakāśa rule* will have no applicability at all. But if the *niravakāśa rule* is supposed to have no applicability at all, then it will become invalid. Consequently the validity of the entire scriptures would be subject to doubt. For this reason, if any contradiction arises between a *sāvakāśa* and a

niravakāśa rule the *niravakāśa rule* will be considered as stronger than the *savakāśa rule*. In this case, the opponents have shown by applying the *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya* that if the *śrūti* is contradicted by a veridical perception then the perception will be stronger because in case of any conflict between a perceptual cognition and a scriptural statement, the perceptual cognition will have to be regarded as a *niravakāśa pramāṇa* and the scriptural statement will have to be regarded as a *savakāśa pramāṇa*.

Perception, inference and other ordinary sources of knowledge can establish their objects in only one way. But the scriptures can be interpreted in more than one ways. So perception etc. is a *niravakāśa pramāṇa* in comparison to *śrūti* which is a *sāvakāśa pramāṇa*. So if any contradiction occurs between perception and *śrūti*, perception is to be taken as stronger than *śrūti*. The scriptural statement, in such cases, will have to be interpreted in some other way. The opponents also admit that there exists a contradiction between the I-cognitions and the scriptural statements by which the eternal, indeterminate, transcendental self is established. To solve this contradiction the opponents say that these *śrūtis* are to be interpreted in a secondary sense. To present the opponents' position, Vācaspati Mīśra says that if a thing is established as a pot by perception then thousands of scriptural statements cannot establish it as a piece of cloth or as something else. On the contrary, there may be various interpretations of the scriptural statements which

talk about a transcendental self. So, according to the opponents these scriptural statements should be taken in a secondary sense. So, the apparent contradiction between the I-cognitions and the scriptural statements that talk of a transcendent self can be resolved in this manner. Thus, on the opponents view, what is revealed as 'I' in the I-cognitions is nothing but *ātman* or the individual self. So there is no need to discuss the Advaita theory for determining the nature of the individual self. To refute this objection of the opponents, the Advaitins say that though an uncontradicted perception may be considered as stronger than the *śrūti*, an illusory perception cannot be so. Since the I-cognitions are illusory there is no logical basis for imagining a secondary sense of the scriptural statements in order to resolve the apparent contradiction between the scriptures and the I-cognitions. The Advaitins may be asked: Why do they think that the I-cognitions are illusory perceptions? They may reply that the I-cognitions are not contradicted during our empirical lives, but they are contradicted at the time of liberation. On attaining liberation, the embodied ascetic realizes that 'I am *Brahman*' or '*aham brahmāsmi*'. In this apprehension a *jīvanmukta* yogi realizes that his self is identical with the transcendental self. Thus on the Advaita view, the I-cognitions being illusory perceptions do not reveal the real nature of the individual self. These I-cognitions arise owing to the superimposition of the self on the not self.

The opponents may further argue against the Advaita Vadāntins that the superimposition of the self on the not self is not logically tenable. Ācārya Śaṅkara said against the opponents that though the superimposition is not logically tenable, it is directly apprehended by all sentient beings and therefore the superimposition between the self and the not self cannot be refuted. In support of this view of Śaṅkarācārya, Vācaspati Miśra said that the true nature of the self is not revealed at all in the I-cognitions. The object of the I-cognitions is produced by the superimposition of the self on the not self and this object or *ahamkāra* is a fake entity (*mithyā padārtha*). The true nature of the self has been propounded in *śruti*, *smṛti*, *itihāsa*, *purāṇa* etc.¹³ The opponents said that the scriptures have to be interpreted in a secondary sense; because a scriptural statement is *sāvakāśa* in comparison to an I-cognition. To oppose this argument Vācaspati Miśra said that the schools who obey the authority of *Vedas*, in particular, the two Mīmāṃsā systems refer to six marks to determine the significance of *śruti*. These marks are- *upakramopasamhārayorikyam*, *abhyāśah*, *upapattih*, *arthavādah*, *phalam*, *apūrvatā*.

Vācaspati Miśra has shown by employing abovementioned first mark that the true nature of the self has been propounded at the beginning and at the end of many scriptural statements.

At the end of every section from the eighth to the sixteenth of sixth chapter of *Chāndogyoponiṣad* Ṛṣi Āruni told his son, Śvetaketu that ‘*tattvamasi Śvetaketu!*’

In the beginning, in the middle and also in the end of this context of *Chāndogyoponiṣad* the statement ‘*tattvamasi*’ has been mentioned repeatedly. So, the first mark namely the unity between the beginning and the end of a chapter applies to this statement. Again this statement is mentioned and repeated at the beginning and at the end of this context. So the second mark repetition also is present in the statement “*tattvamasi*”. Actually all these six marks are present in this statement. Now a statement in which all these marks are present cannot be explained in a secondary sense. It must be taken in its literal sense. Vācaspati Miśra said that whenever a particular statement is mentioned repeatedly in a text then the text clearly intends to highlight that statement. For example, if one says indicating a woman ‘*aho darśaniyā*’, ‘*aho darśaniyā*’ then the repetition indicates that the speaker wants to highlight the fact that she is good looking.¹⁴ The knowledge of the transcendental self has been repeatedly advised in the beginning, in the middle and in the end of this *prakaraṇa* of the *Chāndogyā Upaniṣad* and also has been mentioned several times in the Āruni-Śvetaketu episode of the sixth chapter of *Chāndogyā Upaniṣad*. From these repetitions it is quite clear that the scriptures are talking about the transcendental self and since the scriptures are talking repeatedly of the transcendental self this must be the significance of the

śruti. So, this *mahāvākya* cannot be taken in a secondary sense. Vācaspati Miśra wants to convey that repetition always indicates the importance of a particular subject matter.¹⁵ So, a particular scriptural statement which is mentioned repeatedly in the scriptures cannot be taken in a secondary sense and the I-cognitions which contradict the scriptures are to be considered as illusory. For this reason, the author of *Bhāmatī* asked the opponents to mention the reasons because of which the I-cognitions are treated as veridical by the opponents.¹⁶

The opponents again raised another objection that whenever there is a contradiction between the I-cognition and the *śruti*, the I-cognition must be stronger, because the perception is the first among all the *pramāṇa*-s and no mediate *pramāṇa* can perform its function without depending on perception. Because perception is employed before the other *pramāṇa*-s and the other *pramāṇa*-s cannot establish their objects before perception establishes its own object. So, the other *pramāṇa*-s are dependent on perception. Actually the opponents here have employed the ‘*upajīvyā-upajīvaka nyāya*’ and the ‘*upasañjātavirodhi-anupasañjātavirodhi nyāya*’ which are admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka philosophers. In accordance with this *nyāya*, if a contradiction occurs between two rules the *upajīvyā* rule will be stronger than the *upajīvaka* rule. Since the *upajīvaka* is dependent on the *upajīvyā*, the *upajīvaka* cannot contradict the

upajīvyā rule. Similarly the rule which is stipulated at first is called the *anupasañjātavirodhi* and its subsequent rule is called the *upasañjātavirodhi*. If a contradiction occurs between the *anupasañjātavirodhi* and the *upasañjātavirodhi* rule then the *anupasañjātavirodhi* will be stronger because the *anupasañjātavirodhi* is generated before the genesis of its opponent. For this reason, the validity of an *anupasañjātavirodhi* cannot be damaged by the *upasañjātavirodhi* rule. Since the *anupasañjātavirodhi* rule comes into existence prior to the *upasañjātavirodhi* rule, the later cannot establish its own object. Between the perception and the *śruti*, perception is *anupasañjātavirodhi* and for this reason, *śruti* cannot establish its object if there is a perception that contradicts the *śruti*. So, the opponents argue that because of the conflict between the I-cognitions and the *śruti* and since the I-cognitions are *anupasañjātavirodhi*, the *śruti* cannot establish the transcendent self which is beyond the purview of all perceptions.¹⁷

To refute this objection the author of *Bhāmatī* says that the *śruti* is beyond all doubt and suspicion and so its validity does not depend upon any other *pramāṇa*. For this reason, *śruti* is regarded as the self-evident proof to establish such objects as *Dharma*, *Brahman* etc. As the *śruti* is an independent *pramāṇa* to establish the transcendental nature of the self or *Brahman*, the evidence of perception, inference

etc. cannot contradict the *śruti*. *Dharma*, *Brahman* etc. are not objects of ordinary *pramāṇa*-s. As these are cognizable only by the *śruti*, *śruti* cannot depend upon any other *pramāṇa* to produce valid knowledge of *Dharma*, *Brahman* etc. It may be said in brief, *śruti* is able to establish its object independently.¹⁸

The opponents might further object that although the scriptures do not depend on any other *pramāṇa* for establishing its own objects, the scriptures have to depend upon perceptions for the genesis of the verbal cognition. Unless the hearer perceives a word or a sentence one cannot have any verbal cognition. That is why it is usually said that unless perception establishes its own objects no other *pramāṇa* will be able to establish its own object. Thus no one can deny that the scriptures have to depend on perceptions for establishing the objects of the scriptures. Hence, if there is any contradiction between perception and the scriptures, the scriptures must be treated the weaker *pramāṇa* and perception will have to be treated as a stronger *pramāṇa*. In case of any contradiction between a veridical perception and the scriptures, the scriptures will be unable to give rise to a veridical cognition. So, the Advaitins' contention that perception cannot contradict the scripture is not tenable. Since the scriptures must depend on perception for the genesis of verbal cognition, perception can contradict the scriptures.¹⁹

In reply to this objection that the Advaitins point out that they agree with the opponents' contention that the scriptures have to depend on perception for the genesis of verbal cognition. But there cannot be any opposition between the perception and scriptures regarding *Dharma* and *Brahman*. For, the validity of perception and the validity of scriptures are not of the same type. The Advaita Vedāntins admit only empirical validity of the other *pramāṇa*-s. But the scriptures do not merely have empirical validity (*sāṃvyaḥārika prāmāṇya*). But the kind of validity (*prāmāṇya*) possessed by the scriptures called *tattvāvedaka prāmāṇya*. Here the question will arise that: What exactly is the difference between the *tattvāvedaka prāmāṇya* and *sāṃvyaḥārika prāmāṇya*? In this question, the Advaitins would reply that the ordinary *pramāṇa*-s are falsified at the time of the final immediate apprehension of *Brahman*. If instrument of knowledge is falsified at the time of final immediate apprehension of *Brahman* then that *pramāṇa* will have empirical validity. On the other hand the scriptures are not contradicted even when a yogin attains the final immediate apprehension of *Brahman*. Precisely for this reason, the validity of scriptures called *tattvāvedaka prāmāṇya*. Since the scripture does not have any *sāṃvyaḥārika prāmāṇya* or empirical validity, there cannot be any opposition between perception and scriptures. As perception never claims to generate knowledge about *Dharma* and *Brahman*, the scriptures never depend on perception for the genesis of knowledge of *Dharma* and *Brahman*.

Dharma and *Brahman* are not the object of perception. So, the validity (*tattvāvedaka prāmāṇya*) which the scriptures possess regarding these objects is depending upon perception. Vācaspati Miśra has also established that scriptural evidence does not depend upon perception to produce valid knowledge of *Dharma*, *Brahman* etc. According to the Advaitins, the empirical validity of perception is not destroyed by scriptural evidence. That means, during the empirical state if a thing is established by any uncontradicted perception then no scriptural evidence cannot destroy its empirical validity. The Advaitins also admit that any scriptural evidence cannot establish a pot as a cloth. But scriptural evidence may contradict the transcendental validity of an ordinary instrument of knowledge, such as perception, inference etc. The Advaitins also admit that the I-cognitions are not contradicted in the empirical state. So they also admit that the way in which an individual apprehends himself in ordinary life is a valid cognition in the empirical state. But this apprehension has no transcendental validity. The transcendental validity of such I-cognitions is opposed by the *śruti*. Since perception does not have any transcendental validity, ordinary instruments of knowledge such as perception cannot oppose the transcendental validity of *śruti*. So the opponents can never establish the thesis that perception is stronger than the scriptural statements with regard to such objects as *Brahman*, *dharma* etc.²⁰

The opponents have also raised the fallacy of *upajīvyavirodha* against the Advaitins. The scriptures have to depend upon perception for establishing their own object. That is why perception is called *upajīvyā* of *śruti*. For this reason, the Advaitins must admit that perception is the basis of *śruti*. So, the opponents argue that since perception is the basis or foundation of all other epistemic instruments including the scriptures, the scriptures cannot establish anything in opposition to perception. The nature of the individual self established in the scriptures is contradicted by the I-cognition which is a variety of uncontradicted perception. Since the scriptural statements that establish the transcendental nature of the individual self are contradicted by perceptual evidence, the opponents claim that these scriptural statements should be interpreted in a secondary sense.

The author of *Bhāmatī* has refuted this objection in the statement, “*nacānanyaparam vākyam svārtha upacaritārtha yuktam*”²¹. That is, an independent scriptural statement can establish its own object without depending on any other *pramāṇa*. Since an independent scriptural statement does not depend for its validity on other *pramāṇa*-s, such an independent scriptural statement can never be taken in a secondary sense. Śavarsvāmīn has also said in his commentary on the Mīmāṃsā aphorisms that a Vedic injunction can never be taken in a secondary sense. Similarly, the Advaita Vedāntins maintain that independent scriptural

statements can establish their own objects without depending on any other *pramāṇa*. The statements which talk about the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman* or the statements which talk about the transcendental nature of the individual self are to be regarded as independent scriptural statements; because the subject matter of these statements cannot be known by any other *pramāṇa*. For this reason, all these statements are called *anadhigatārthajñāpaka vākya*, that is statements which impart knowledge about otherwise unknown objects. Since the scriptural statements which talk about the transcendental nature of the individual self are *anadhigatārthajñāpaka vākya*-s, and are, therefore, independent scriptural statements, they cannot be interpreted in a secondary sense.

The Advaitins have employed the *apacchedanyāya* admitted in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy to refute the abovementioned argument of the opponents. The *apacchedanyāya* enunciated in the Mīmāṃsā aphorism 6.5.54. After performing the *jyotiṣṭoma yāga*, the priests who perform this Vedic rite have to go out of the place where the rite is performed by holding the *kaccha* of one another. In this connection, it needs to be mentioned that the unsewn cloth worn by a classical Indian male is called a *dhoti* and the end of this cloth is called *kaccha*. If any of the priests becomes disconnected from the other, then a penance or *prāyaścitta* has to be performed. If the *udgātā*, who is one of the priests, become disconnected, then

the *jyotiṣṭoma yāga* will have to be performed again as an *adakṣiṇa yāga*, that is as a rite in which no *dakṣiṇā* or fee is given to the priests. On the other hand, if the *pratihartā* becomes dissociated then the same *yāga* i.e. *jyotiṣṭoma yāga* will have to be performed as a *sarvasvadakṣiṇa yāga*, i.e. as a rite in which everything possesses by the *yajamāna* be given to the priests as their *dakṣiṇā*. Now, the question arises is this: If first the *udgātā* and then the *pratihartā* become disconnected then which rite is to be performed? Should the *yajamāna* then perform the *jyotiṣṭoma yāga* as an *adakṣiṇayāga* or as a *sarvasvadakṣiṇayāja*? It is to be noted that the two penances prescribed in these two cases are mutually conflicting; hence both the penances cannot be performed together by the *yajamāna*. Needless to say, the *yajamāna* cannot perform the same *yāga* both as an *adakṣiṇayāga* and as a *sarvasvadakṣiṇayāja* at the same time. To solve this apparent contradiction between two scriptural injunctions, the Mīmāṃsā aphorism states that a later injunction is always stronger than an earlier injunction. Likewise a *pramāṇa* is not necessarily stronger than other *pramāṇa*-s because it is employed or applied prior to the application or employment of the other *pramāṇa*. Thus, perception may be employed prior to the employment of other *pramāṇa*-s such as *śruti*; but this kind of temporal priority does not entail that perception is always stronger than scriptural statements. Temporal precedence does not necessarily entail logical priority. Just as the later Vedic injunction is stronger than the earlier

Vedic injunction, so also in case of an ordinary perception, the later perception is usually stronger than an earlier perception. Otherwise an erroneous cognition could not be falsified by a subsequently arising corrective cognition. So, perception may be employed or perception may become operative before the scriptural statements. But that does not imply that perception is necessarily stronger than scriptural statements. In particular, the scriptural statements which talk about *dharmā*, *Brahman*, *atman* etc. do not in any way depend upon perception or any other ordinary *pramāṇa*. So, they cannot be contradicted by any perception. So, the opponents cannot employ the *upasañjātavirodhi-anupasañjātavirodhinyāya* and argue that perception is *anupasañjātavirodhi*, because perception becomes operative when the conflicting scriptural statements that oppose perception have not come into operation. The example of the erroneous and the corrective cognition clearly indicate that even a cognition which is generated after the genesis of its opposing cognition; and is, therefore, *upasañjātavirodhi* may be stronger than the *anupasañjātavirodhi*. The Advaitins do not oppose the opponents' claim that perception is *anupasañjātavirodhi*. But that does not make perception necessarily stronger than the scriptural statements which are *upasañjātavirodhi* or which come into operation later. On the contrary by employing *apocchedanyāya* the Advaitins show that here the scriptural statements will be stronger than the I-cognitions and it is because of the opposition of the scriptural statements the I-

cognitions will not be able to establish their own object. Thus the I-cognitions cannot prevent the scriptural statements from establishing the transcendental nature of the individual self. It is to be noted here the opponents have employed the *upasañjātavirodhi-anupasañjātavirodhi nyāya* to show that perception is stronger than *śruti*, whereas the Advaitins have employed the *apacchedanyaāya* to show that *śruti* is stronger than perception. Thus, the opposing systems have utilized the Mīmāṃsānyāyas to serve their own purposes.

In this way the author of *Bhāmatī* shows that the I-cognitions are unable to reveal the true nature of the individual self. Since the I-cognitions are erroneous, whatever is revealed by them as the self is actually a result of superimposition between the self and the not-self. The true nature of the self can be established only by scriptural statement.

CHAPTER THREE

Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati on the Nature of the Individual Self

In the two preceding chapters we have discussed the nature of the individual self following the *Brahmasūtra*, Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* and Vācaspati's commentary *Bhāmatī* on Śāṅkara's commentary. It is clearly propounded by all these writers that the individual self is in reality identical with *Brahman* or *ātman*. The entire *Vedas* converge to establish a single thesis, namely the identity of the individual self with *Brahman*. The *Vedas* uphold the thesis that the *Brahman* is pure being, pure consciousness and pure bliss, where being is defined in terms of the property *abādhitatva*. An entity is *abādhita* if it is not falsifiable at any point of time. An entity may be considered as *abādhita* if it does not possess the property *bādhitatva* and *bādhitatva* is defined by the Advaita Vedāntins as “*svaprakāarakapratītiviśeṣyaniṣṭhatraikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam bādhitatvam*”. This means that a falsifiable property is one which appears as the qualifier of a qualificand in some cognition, but in reality the qualificand does not possess that property. The Advaita Vedāntins have argued in great detail that consciousness or knowledge is never falsified at any point of time. Whatever is falsified at any point of time by any corrective cognition is the object of consciousness. These arguments vindicate the *Upaniṣadic* thesis that consciousness

alone is ultimately real (*pāramārthika sat*). The opponents might object that the objects around us, our own body, the mind and the sense organs are not falsified during our waking period or even during the entire lifetime of an individual. So, why do the Advaitins not regard these empirical objects as ultimately real? The Advaita Vedāntins would retort that even though these empirical objects are not falsified during the waking period of a bound individual, yet the world experience of a subject and the objects of such experience are falsified if the subject attains liberation. When a subject attains liberation, the subject immediately realizes that he is identical with *Brahman*. So, the world-experience of the subject, his experience of his body, mind and the senses are not ultimately real. The liberated person's experience thus lends support to the *Upaniṣadic* thesis that the subject is in reality identical with *Brahman*.

The opponents, however, argue that the individual self appears as different from *Brahman* in I-cognitions of the form "I am happy", "I am blind", "I am lean", "I am fair" etc. These I-cognitions are never contradicted during the life time of a subject. So, the opponents argue that the veracity of these I-cognitions cannot be denied. In the preceding chapter it has been shown following Vācaspati Miśra that all these I-cognitions are erroneous cognitions. These erroneous cognitions result from the superimposition of the not-self on the self. Since these I-cognitions are

non-veridical, they cannot be posed as contrary evidence against the *Upaniṣadic* statements which point towards the identity of the individual self and *Brahman*. Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary *Bhāmatī*, vindicated the *Upaniṣdic* thesis, by analysing the nature of the I-cognitions. The author of *Bhāmatī* discussed the nature of the I-cognitions while commenting on the introductory part of *adhyāśabhāṣya* where some objections are raised against the Advaitins regarding the possibility of superimposition between the self and the not-self.

But Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati have discussed the nature of the individual while commenting upon a different part of *adhyāśabhāṣya*. Padmapādācārya has analysed the nature of the I-cognitions in that part of his commentary which is known as the ‘*ahaṅkāraṭīkā*’¹. Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati have discussed the nature of the individual and have also analyzed the I-cognitions while commenting on the following statement of Śaṅkara’s commentary, “*katham punaḥ pratyagātmani aviśaye adhyāśaḥ viśayataddharmāṅām iti?*”² Here Ācārya Śaṅkara anticipates an objection against the Advaita thesis of superimposition between the self and the not-self. The opponents are objecting that the self cannot be the substratum of superimposition, because the self never appears as the object (*viśaya*) in any cognition. The self is

the subject (*viṣayī*) of all cognitions and does not appear as the object in any cognition.

It might be asked: Why cannot an entity be the substratum of superimposition if it is not the object of any cognition?

The opponents of the Advaitins would answer this question by pointing out that in all ordinary instances of erroneous cognition, the substratum of superimposition is an entity which can be the object of cognition. For instance, in case of the rope-snake illusion, the rope is ordinarily supposed to be the substratum of superimposition. But the rope can be the object of perception. The same is true of any other perceptual illusion, say shell-silver illusion. The opponents might further argue that in ordinary illusion the substratum of illusion must first come into contact with one of the sense organs of the subject. In an erroneous situation this sense-object contact leads to an incomplete perception where owing to some defect of the sense organ or of the object or of the mind or *antaḥkāraṇa* of the subject only the general features of the substratum are perceived by the subject, but the specific features of the substratum are not perceived. For instance, in case of the rope-snake illusion, the subject's visual sense comes into contact with a rope and the subject perceives the rope as something which is long, curved and has a dark colour. These perceived general features of the substratum are similar to the

features of some previously seen object, in this case, a snake. Due to this resemblance, the memory traces of the snake are aroused and the subject sees a snake in place of a rope. From this it can safely be concluded that no illusion is possible unless the general features of an entity are not perceived. If even the broad general features of an entity are not perceived, how can that entity become the substratum of any superimposition? The Advaita Vedāntins themselves uphold the thesis that the self cannot be the object of any cognition. There is no dearth of scriptural statements which indicate that the self cannot be the object of either the sense organs or speech or the mind. For instance, the scriptural statement “*yato vāco nivarttante aprāpya manasā saha*”³ figuratively states that speech and the mind return from the self without being able to touch it. Since sense-object contact with the self is not at all possible and since the self cannot be the object of even any mediate cognition, it cannot be the substratum of superimposition. No subject cannot even have a very general apprehension of the self, and unless something is apprehended at least generally, it cannot feature as the substratum in any erroneous cognition.

It might be objected against the opponents of the Advaitins that the abovementioned scriptural statement can be interpreted in many different ways. Have the Advaitins anywhere stated that the self cannot be the object of any

cognition? In reply to this question the opponents of the Advaitins would clearly point out that the very first statement of *adhyāśabhāsyā* clearly states that the self cannot be the object of any cognition, “*yuṣmadasmātpratyayagocarayoḥ viṣayaviṣayiṅoḥ itaretarabhāvānupapattau itaretarabhāvānupapattiḥ. ityataḥ itaretarabhāvānupapattau siddhāyām taddharmāṅāmapi sutarām itaretarabhāvānupapattiḥ. ityataḥ asmatpratyayagocare viṣayiṅi cidātmake yuṣmatpratyayagocarasya viṣayasya taddharmāṅām ca adhyāśaḥ, tadviparyayeṇa viṣayiṅaḥ taddharmāṅām ca viṣaye adhyāśaḥ mithyeti bhavitum yuktam*”⁴. In this very first statement of his commentary Ācārya Śaṅkara states very clearly and explicitly that the self (*ātman*) is the *viṣayin*, that is, the subject and its essence is *viruddha* or opposed to *viṣaya* or the object of a cognition. The term ‘*viṣaya*’ as used in the abovementioned statement refers to everything other than *ātman*; for everything other than *ātman* appears as the object of a cognition. In fact, Ācārya Śaṅkara also offers reasons in the abovementioned statement to support his thesis that the self or the *viṣayī* is essentially opposed (*viruddhasvabhāva*) to the not-self or the *viṣaya*. The reason why the self cannot be considered as an object (*viṣaya*) is that the self and the not-self are always revealed by two different kinds of awareness, namely *asmatpratyaya* and *yuṣmatpratyaya*. The term ‘*asmat*’ is the Sanskrit equivalent of the term ‘I’ whereas the term ‘*yuṣmat*’ is the Sanskrit equivalent of the English pronoun ‘you’. Ordinarily the pronoun ‘*yuṣmat*’ is used

in Sanskrit to refer to any sentient or conscious being that is situated in front of the subject. One might wonder here: Why does Ācārya Śaṅkara think that everything other than self is revealed by you-awareness (*yuṣmatpratyaya*). Usually an object which is other than one's ownself appears in cognitions of the form "this is so-and-so" or "it is so-and-so". Cognitions of this form are usually called '*idampratyaya*' in Sanskrit. But the curious point is Ācārya Śaṅkara does not say that everything other than the self is the object of *idampratyaya*. On the contrary, he says that everything that falls under the category of not-self is the object of *yuṣmatpratyaya*. The reason behind Śaṅkara's statement is related to the etymological meaning of the term '*yuṣmat*'. The pronoun '*yuṣmat*' is derived from the root '*ṣiñ*' which means to bind something or someone. The Advaitins maintain that pure consciousness in itself is not bound by any limit or demarcation. It does not possess any property or attribute. Consequently it cannot be differentiated from other things by means of its properties or attributes. But although pure consciousness does not have any limit or boundary, objective consciousness or consciousness of an object is always delimited or demarcated by the object which appears in consciousness. For this reason, the awareness of a pot is not the same as the awareness of a piece of cloth. These two cognitions do not differ qua cognition, but their objects differentiate them not only from one another but from all other cognitions. On the basis of such considerations the Advaita Vedāntins uphold the

thesis that pure consciousness is bound by objects. In the term ‘*yuṣmatpratyaya*’, the term ‘*yuṣmat*’ stands for anything that appears as an object to a subject. So, the term ‘*yuṣmatpratyaya*’ in this context really means objective awareness or the awareness of an object. By the use of the word ‘*yuṣmat*’ Ācārya Śāṅkara implies that there is a fundamental difference between the ways in which the subject and the object are revealed. The subject is never revealed as the object of an awareness whereas the object is never revealed as the knower or the subject. Since, the knower or the subject is never revealed as the object of an awareness, it cannot feature as the substratum in any erroneous cognition; because whatever appears as the substratum of an error always features as the object of some cognition where the general features of that entity are known, but the specific features are not revealed owing to various kinds of circumstantial factors. In fact one can easily establish the invariable concomitance “whatever is the substratum of superimposition is the object of some cognition” in any familiar instance of perceptual illusion, say the rope-snake illusion or the shell-silver illusion. Since the self is characterized by the absence of the probandum of this invariable concomitance, the self must also be characterized by the absence of the probans, namely the absence of the property ‘being the substratum of superimposition’.

While commenting on the abovementioned statement of Ācārya Śāṅkara, Padmapādācārya writes in his *Pañcapādikā*, “*sa (adhyāsaḥ) ceha na sambhavati*

*katham? yathaḥ sarvo hi puro'vashite viśaye viśayāntaramadhyasyati. yuṣmatpratyayāpetasya ca pratyagātmano'viśayatvaṁ bravīṣi. nahyaviśaye adhyāso dṛṣṭapūrvah sambhavī vā. ucyate – na tāvadayamekāntenāviśayaḥ; asmatpratyayaviśayatvāt*⁵.

Commenting on this statement of *Pañcapādikā* Vijñānātma writes in his commentary *Tātparyārthadyotinī*, “*aviśayatvasya tvayā abhyupagatatvādviśayatvakalpanaṁ siddhāntaviruddhaścetyarthaḥ. atasmin tadbuddhirityanena lakṣaṇavākyena vastuta āropyaikyahīnasyādhiṣṭhānasya āropyabuddhyālanbanatvamucyate, ato lakṣaṇavākyavirodhācca aviśaye adhyāso na sambhatītyāha - sambhavi veti*”⁶. What statement of *Tātparyārthadyotinī* means is as follows. Any superimposition may be defined as “*atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*” or as the imposition of one thing on another. This definition of superimposition clearly indicates that whatever is the substratum of a superimposition must be different from that which is superimposed on that substratum. This implies that the substratum is also the object of some awareness. For, unless the substratum is the object of same awareness, the difference between the substratum and the superimposed can be known. Now, if the substratum of a superimposition has to be the object of some awareness, the self, which is not the object of any awareness, cannot be the substratum of any superimposition.

While commenting on this part of *Pañcapādikā*, Prakāśātmayati writes in his *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*, “*adhyasyamānena samānendriyavijñānaviśayatvam evādhiṣṭhānasya dṛṣṭam, iha tadabhāvāt na adhyāsasambhavaḥ ityākṣepagranthārthaḥ*”⁷. Prakāśātmayati here argues that in case of a normal or ordinary perceptual illusion, the substratum of the illusion can be perceived by the same sense organ of the subject by which the superimposed object is perceived. For instance, the rope which is ordinarily taken to be the substratum of the rope-snake illusion, is perceptible by the visual sense organ of the subject and the snake which is superimposed on this rope is also perceived by the same sense organ. So, the substratum of an illusion must be capable of being perceived by the same sense organ by which the superimposed entity is perceived. But this rule does not apply to the superimposition between the self and the not-self; for, on the Advaitins’ own view, the self cannot be perceived by the same sense organs by which things other than the self are perceived.

Ācārya Śaṅkara himself has addressed this objection in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* where he writes, “*na tāvadayamekāntenāviśayaḥ asmatpratyayaviśayatvāt*”⁸. In this statement Śaṅkara observes that it is not true that the self is never revealed; for, the self is revealed through I-cognitions.

But, then, the opponents would ask: If the self is not the object of any cognition, how can it be the object of I-cognitions? The opponents would argue that the Advaitins themselves have said that whatever is the object of a cognition is usually revealed by an *idamākārapratyaya* or by a cognition of the form “this is so-and-so”. But the self is not revealed by an *idamākārapratīti* or a cognition of the form “this is so-and-so”. Besides, the Advaitins themselves claim that the self is the subject of all cognitions. Since subjecthood (*viṣayitva*) and objecthood (*viṣayatva*) are incompatible or contrary properties, on the Advaita view, they cannot reside in the same locus. So, the self cannot be the object of *asmatpratyaya* or an I-cognition. Padmapādācāriya, himself has raised this objection in his *Pañcapādikā*, “*nanu viṣayinaścidātmanaḥ katham viṣayabhāvaḥ parāgbhāvena idantāsamullekhyo hi viṣayo nāma bhavati. tadvaiparītyena pratyagrūpeṇānidamprakāśo viṣayī. tat kathamekasya niraṁśasya viruddhāṁśadvayasanniveśaḥ?*”⁹ To explain this statement of *Pañcapādikā*, Prakāśātmayati writes, “*ekasyām pratyakṣadarśanakriyāyāmekasyaiva kartṛsthāne tadaiva tadviparītakarmakāarakasthāne cāvasthānamanupapannamiti bhāvaḥ*”¹⁰. Rendered into English, this means, the self being the subject of all cognitions, must be different from all objects of cognitions. The reason why the subject must be different from the object is stated very clearly in the abovementioned statement of *Vivaraṇa*. The *kartā* or the agent of an action can never be the same as the patient

or the *karmakāraka* of the same action. Agency or *kartṛtva* is usually identified by the classical Indian philosophers with the property *svasamavetakriyājanya-phalaśālitva*, whereas the *karmakāraka* of an action is defined by the classical Indian philosophers in terms of the property *parasamavetakriyājanya phalaśālitva*. That is, both the agent (*kartā*) and the patient (*karma*) are the loci of the result of the action; but the difference between the agent and the patient is that the agent is the locus of the result of an action which has been performed by the agent himself whereas the patient or the *karmakāraka* is the seat or the locus of the result of an action which is performed by someone else. From this it is quite clear that agenthood and patienthood are two incompatible properties and so these two properties cannot reside in the same locus. So, the self cannot be both the subject and the object of any cognition, such as *asmatpratyaya*. The Advaitins cannot also maintain that one part or aspect of the self is the subject of an *asmatpratyaya*, whereas another part is the object of the same *asmatpratyaya*; because the self is devoid of all parts or aspects. So, how could Ācārya Śaṅkara write, “*na tāvadayamekāntenāviśayaḥ, asmatpratyayaviśayatvāt*”. The self on the Advaitins’ own view cannot be the object of *asmatpratyaya*.

To dispel all such objections Padmapādācārya mentions the real purport of the abovementioned statement of Ācārya Śaṅkara, “*atrocyate*

asmatpratyayatvābhimataḥ ahaṁkāraḥ”¹¹. This means, on the Advaita view, pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*) is not regarded as the object of *asmatpratyaya*. In fact, whatever is revealed in *asmatpratyaya* is a conglomerate of two entities one of which is ultimately real (*paramārthasat*), whereas the other is not (*vyāvahārikasat*). These two entities are the self and the not-self and the conglomerate of the self and the not-self which appears as the ‘I’ in an *asmatpratyaya* or I-cognition is called *ahaṁkāra* or *ahamartha* by the Advaita Vedāntins. Both Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati have shown there is a duality involved in the nature of this ‘I’ which in Advaita Vedānta is also identified with the empirical self or *jīvacaitanya*. To refute the abovementioned objection Padmapādācārya states very clearly, “*atrocyate asmatpratyayatvābhimataḥ ahaṁkāraḥ*”. From this statement of *Pañcapādikā* it is very clear that pure consciousness is not the object of *asmatpratyaya*; but only *ahaṁkāra* or the empirical ‘I’ is the object of *asmatpratyaya* or I-cognitions. Commenting on this statement of *Pañcapādikā* Ātmasvarūpa writes in his *Probodapariśodhinī*, “*sarvato viprasṛtasya savitr̥prakāśasyākāśe viśeṣābhivyaktinimittadarpaṇādivad-ātmacaitanyasya savikalpakatayā abhivyaktinimittam bhāsvaradravyam ātmnyabhedenādhyastam antaḥkaraṇamasmatpratyayaśabdena vivakṣitam, nātmakarmakam jñānamityāha – asmatpratyayeti. tatrābhivyaktatvādahaṁkāradisambhinnatayā avabhāsārhatā asyātmanaḥ. atastayoritaretarādhyāsaḥ*

sambhavatītyarthaḥ”¹². Ātmasvarūpa here introduces an analogy to explain the manifestation of pure consciousness. Ātmasvarūpa observes that even though sunlight is ubiquitous or all-pervasive, it requires a reflector such as a mirror for its clear and distinct manifestation in a specific location. Similarly, even though pure conscious is all pervasive, it requires a transparent substance (*bhāsvaḍravva*) such as the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) for being manifested in the form of a determinate cognition. The objectives ‘*svaccha*’, ‘*bhāsvara*’ etc. are applied to *antaḥkaraṇa* in a very technical sense. The mind is called ‘transparent’ (*svaccha/bhāsvara*) because it can capture the reflection of pure consciousness. Like all other evolutes of the ultimate material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) *avidyā*, *antaḥkaraṇa*, too, is constituted of three *guṇas* viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. But the *antaḥkaraṇa* has a predominance of the attribute *sattva* in it. This *antaḥkaraṇa* is superimposed on pure consciousness by the relation of identity and this superimposed *antaḥkaraṇa* is the object of the I-cognitions. Thus pure consciousness is not the object of *asmatpratyaya*. Consciousness becomes the object of the I-cognitions only when it gets mixed up with *antaḥkaraṇa*. Thus what appears as ‘I’ in the I-cognitions (*asmatpratyaya*) is a superimposed entity and every superimposed entity has a dual character inbuilt in it. For instance, in a shell-silver illusion although the presented object is, in reality, a shell it appears as a piece of silver in the erroneous cognition, “*idaṃ rūpyam*” or “this is silver”. Whatever appears as ‘this’ in this erroneous

cognition is at the same time identical with and different from a shell. The entity which appears as ‘this’ in the abovementioned erroneous cognition is, in reality, a shell. So, it is identical with a shell. But it does not appear as a shell in this erroneous cognition. So, it also differs from a shell. In fact, it is a shell which appears as silver. The object of every erroneous cognition has this kind of duality inbuilt in it. Applying this analogy to the case of I-cognitions, Ātmasvarūpa writes that whatever appears as ‘I’ in any I-cognition also has a dual character. These I-cognitions take place when the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is not-self (*anātmā*) is superimposed on the self. Since the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which appears in the I-cognitions is superimposed on the self, it does not appear as the not-self or as an inanimate entity in these I-cognitions. Similarly, consciousness too does not reveal its pure auto-luminous (*svapṛakāśa*) being in the I-cognitions; because, in such I-cognitions the mind is superimposed on consciousness. Owing to this superimposition, the real character of both the self and the not-self are not revealed in the I-cognitions. Thus, the ‘I’ which is revealed in the I-cognitions is conscious or sentient like the self, but it appears as an object of I-cognitions like any other not-self.

Padmapādācārya, then, makes a very strong claim. He says that this dual character of the ‘I’ is not merely an esoteric doctrine of the Advaita Vedāntins, but this dual

character is apprehended by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*) of all organisms, “*sa cedamanidamrūpavastugarbhaḥ sarvalokasākṣikaḥ*”¹³. That is, every individual is capable of immediately apprehending this dual character of the empirical ‘I’. The empirical consciousness appears to every individual as both blissful and miserable, as possessing accidental and transitory characteristics and also as the unchanging seer of these fleeting transitory characteristics. Prakāśātmayati’s commentary on Padmapādācārya’s statement “*atracyate – asmatpratyayatvābhimato ’hamkāraḥ*” is not substantially different from Ātmasvarūpa’s commentary on the same statement. Prakāśātmayati writes, “*tatra sarvato viprasṛtasya savitrprakāśasyākāṣe viśeṣābhivyaktinimittadarpaṇādivat ātmacaitanyasya savikalpakatayā sphuṭikaraṇavyavahāranimittam bhāsvara-dravyamātmanyadhyastamantaḥkaraṇamasmatpratyaya ityāha – asmatpratyayatvābhimato ’hamkāra iti*”¹⁴. Prakāśātmayati observes in the same vein as Ātmasvarūpa that the manifestation of pure consciousness may be understood by invoking the analogy of light, which is the only auto-luminous or self-manifesting entity that a subject comes across in his ordinary everyday life. Although sunlight is all-pervasive, it has to depend for its specific manifestation on things like a mirror. Similarly, although pure consciousness exists everywhere, it has to depend on a mind which is a transparent entity for being manifested in the form of a determinate cognition. Prakāśātmayati’s commentary on the

abovementioned statement of Padmapādācārya is more explicit than Ātmasvarūpa's commentary in one very important respect. Both Ātmasvarūpa and Prakāśātmayati mention that pure consciousness like light is all pervasive; but for their specific manifestations both light and pure consciousness have to depend on something else. But Ātmasvarūpa does not make it very clear what exactly is the meaning of 'viśeṣābhivyakti' or specific manifestation in case of pure consciousness. Prakāśātmayati, however, explains the meaning of 'viśeṣābhivyakti' very clearly in the sentence fragment, "*ātmacaitanyasya savikalpakatayā sphuṭīkaraṇavyavahāranimittam bhāsvaradravyamātmanyadhyastam-antaḥkaraṇamasmatpratyaya ityāha – asmatpratyayatrābhimato 'haṁkāra iti'*"¹⁵. Prakāśātmayati introduces the concept of 'sphuṭīkaraṇavyavahāra' or 'sphuṭataravyavahāra' to explain the notion of specific manifestation of pure consciousness. On Prakāśātmayati's view *vyavahāra* or usage is of four types – *abhijñā*, *abhivadana*, *upādāna* and *arthakriyā*.¹⁶ Of these four kinds of uses only the last three, that is, *abhivadana*, *upādāna* and *arthakriyā* are *sphuṭataravyavahāra* or explicit usages whereas *abhijñā* is *asphuṭavyavahāra* or non-explicit use. *Abhijñā* is the first awareness of an entity. *Abhijñā* may occur in dreamless sleep also when on the Advaita view the sleeping subject is aware of his own witness-consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*), the blissful nature of the witness-consciousness and *avidyā* or *ajñāna* which is superimposed on consciousness. But

the Advaitins maintain that dreamless sleep occurs only when the mind gets dissolved in *avidyā*. So, *abhiājñā* which may occur during dreamless sleep does not depend on the mind. Thus, the *sphuṭataravyavahāra*-s are those uses which cannot take place unless the mind is operative. By the term ‘*viśeṣābhivyakti*’ of consciousness the Advaitins mean the *sphuṭataravyavahāra*-s which depend for their occurrence on the mind. Although pure consciousness is present always and everywhere, these explicit uses take place only when the mind is superimposed on pure consciousness. The *asmātpratyaya*-s or the ‘I’ cognitions also are *sphuṭataravyavahāra*-s which cannot take place without the intervention of the mind. Thus, pure consciousness is not the object of *asmātpratyaya*. Only the mind superimposed on pure consciousness is the object of *asmātpratyaya*. So, the Advaita thesis does not involve any contradiction and though pure consciousness cannot be the object of any cognition, when the mind is superimposed on pure consciousness, the complex entity comprising consciousness and the mind can be the object of the *asmātpratyaya*-s or the I-cognitions.

Following Padmapādācārya Prakāśātmayati has highlighted the dual character of the empirical self and like Padmapādācārya Prakāśātmayati has also explicitly stated that this dual character of the empirical ego is not merely established on the basis of the scriptures or the liberated person’s experience, but is immediately

apprehended by every sentient organism. Prakāśātmayati writes, “*ayo dahatīti dagdhṛtvaviśiṣṭasyāgnerayasaśca dvairūpyāvabhāsavāt ahamupalabhe ityupalabdḥṛtvaviśiṣṭasyātmanaḥ antaḥkaraṇasya cāstyeva dvairūpyāvabhāsaḥ*”¹⁷.

Just as in an erroneous experience, “The iron ball burns” the red hot iron ball appears as possessing the property of fire and fire appears as possessing the shape and size of the iron ball, so also in all cognitions of the form, “I am happy”, “I am sad”, an exchange (*vinimaya*) takes place between the essences of the self and the not-self. In all such cognitions the self appears as possessing the attributes of the mind, body, and the sense organs such as pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, hatred and so on, although in reality the self is devoid of all attributes. All these properties are either properties of the mind, or of the body or of the sense organs and they appear in the I-cognitions as properties of the self owing to the superimposition of the mind, the body and the sense organs on the self. In like manner, the mind and the body appear as conscious in these cognitions, although none of them is actually conscious. In fact this exchange of properties is the characteristic feature of any superimposition. It is this exchange of features which is responsible for the dual character of the empirical self. The most important point which Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati are making here is that this dual character is immediately apprehended by any ordinary individual; because any ordinary individual realizes both the miserable and blissful nature of the individual self. ¹⁸

One might object that there is no ground behind the Advaitins' contention that every sentient organism realizes the dual character of the individual self. For, though an ordinary bound individual is aware of his own sufferings and miseries, yet he is seldom aware of his inner blissful core. It is to be noted that one who raises this objection grants it for the time being that the self is pure being, pure consciousness and pure bliss. But even if one grants the blissful nature of the individual self, can it be really said that any ordinary individual is aware of this real nature.

The answer to this objection can be found in Citsukhācārya's commentary *Tātparyadīpika* of *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*. Anyone who tries to go beyond this suffering clearly realizes that the self is not essentially bound or miserable and it is very much possible for the self to transcend all these worldly miseries and be transported and be transported into an existence of an altogether different kind. Unless one realizes that this worldly existence is not final or ultimate, one would not undertake the extremely difficult journey that leads to liberation. The ascetic's utmost endeavour for salvation clearly indicates that the ascetic has a glimpse of his inner self much before he is able to shake off his worldly shackles.¹⁹

An ascetic's pursuit for salvation establishes the Advaita thesis that every sentient organism realizes at the core of his heart that suffering and misery are not his

normal state and so he always tries to overcome sufferings. If the bound individual believed that bondage and the miseries resulting from bondage are his normal state of existence then he would have remained satisfied with his own bondage. But the fact that every sentient being, however small or insignificant he or she may be, always tries to overcome bondage and suffering clearly indicate that every individual realizes that suffering is not his essence. Essentially he is nothing but pure bliss.

The opponents might further argue that even if it is granted that the self is essentially pure bliss, yet it is not true that a conscious beings are aware of the dual character of their empirical selves. For, if all of us were aware of this duality, they would not have identified themselves with this empirical I. They would have realized that their selves are not identical with this empirical ego which is an outcome of superimposition between the self and the other. So, the Advaitins' contention that every sentient being is aware of the dual character of their own empirical selves is not acceptable.

Padmapādācārya has anticipated and addressed such objections in the statement, “*avahitacetastaya nipuṇataramabhivikṣya rūpakaparīkṣakavat.*”²⁰ This means that if one minutely examines the I-cognitions then only one realizes that in all these I-cognitions the empirical self appears both as the cognizer and also as the seat or

locus of cognition. So, the dual character of the I is revealed to anyone who undertakes the trouble of minutely scrutinizing these I-cognitions.

The opponents might further argue that as a matter of fact no duality is involved in the nature of the empirical self. The opponents observe that this apparent duality arises out of a grammatical feature of the Sanskrit language. In Sanskrit both transitive roots such as ‘*jñā*’ and intransitive roots such as ‘*bhū*’ with the prefix ‘*anu*’ attached to it are used to express the same act of cognizing. Whenever a transitive root is used to express the act of cognition, the empirical I appears as the cognizer or the agent of this act whereas the use of an intransitive root such as ‘*anu-bhū*’ makes the same empirical self appears as the seat or locus of the act of cognizing. Thus, the opponents would argue that only a contingent feature of the Sanskrit language is responsible for this apparent duality in the nature of the empirical I. Hence no duality is really involved in the nature of the empirical self.

Vijñānātma has answered this objection too in his commentary *Tātparyārthadyotini* on *Pañcapādika*. He observes that Padmapādācārya himself has indicated the answer to this objection by the term ‘*nipuṇataramabhibikṣya*’. Pure consciousness is not really the seer; but it is only the principle of seeing or manifesting in its purest form. Thus, pure consciousness is not dependent upon any object for its own auto-luminous character. But whenever pure consciousness is

revealed through an awareness of an object such as a veridical cognition (*pramiticaitanya*) it appears as transitive or as directed towards the same object. Thus, although pure consciousness itself is intransitive, it appears as transitive whenever it is manifested through a veridical cognition of a particular object. Our knowledge of the specific objects such as the knowledge of a pot (*ghaṭajñāna*), or the knowledge of a piece of cloth (*paṭajñāna*) are called *vṛttijñāna* in the Advaita system; because such objective knowledge arises only when the mind (*antaḥkarana*) transforms itself in the form of an object and pure consciousness is reflected in that transformation of the mind. As a matter of fact whenever a sense organ of the cognizer comes into contact with an object, the mind of the knower goes out through the sensory outlet and reaches the object. On reaching the object the mind assumes the form of the object. This transformation of the mind in the form of an object is called an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* by the Advaita Vedāntins. After assuming the form of the object, the *vṛtti* destroys the *avidyā* which has so far covered that aspect of consciousness on which the object is superimposed. In this connection, it needs to be mentioned that *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* being an evolute of *avidyā* is insentient (*jaḍa*) and so by itself it does not have the ability to destroy *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. Consciousness alone has the power to destroy the veil of *avidyā*. However, pure consciousness does not have the potency or ability to destroy *avidyā*. If pure consciousness would have been able to destroy *avidyā*, then *avidyā*

could not be superimposed on pure consciousness from time immemorial. In fact, on the Advaita view, pure consciousness as witness-consciousness reveals *avidyā* and that which reveals or establishes an entity cannot be its destroyer. But even though pure consciousness cannot destroy *avidyā*, consciousness reflected in an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* has the power to destroy it, just as sunlight by itself cannot burn a piece of paper but sunlight reflected in a convex lens has the power to burn the same. When the *avidyā* covering the consciousness delimited by the object is destroyed by consciousness reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, the consciousness delimited by the object (*viṣayāvacchinnacaitanya*) is revealed and along with the *viṣayāvacchinnacaitanya*, the *viṣaya* or the object superimposed on the consciousness delimited by the object is also revealed. The consciousness delimited by the object as manifested by consciousness reflected in an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is called *pramiticaitanya* or a veridical cognition by the Advaitins. This *pramiticaitanya* is transitive or directed towards an object, although pure consciousness is not. Thus, on the Advaita view even though pure consciousness is not transitive or intentional, *pramiticaitanya* or the veridical cognition through which pure consciousness manifests itself is intentional or transitive. Now, an I-cognition reveals both consciousness and its manifest form, namely *vṛttijñāna* or *pramiticaitanya*. So, in an I-cognition consciousness is revealed as both transitive and intransitive. Thus, the empirical self which is

revealed through these I-cognitions has this kind of duality inbuilt in it. So, the opponent's argument that the apparent duality in the nature of the empirical self is only due to a contingent feature of the Sanskrit language is not a valid argument. The duality involved in the nature of the empirical self is real and not merely apparent.²¹

Padmapādācārya, then, addresses another objection against the Advaitins' thesis that the empirical self involves a duality inasmuch as it is an admixture of two different entities, one of which is ultimately real, while the other is not.²² Padmapādācārya anticipates this objection in the statement, "*nanu kimatra veditavyam, asambhinnedaṁrūpa eva ahamityanubhavaḥ*"²³. The opponents of the Advaitins are here arguing that the empirical self cannot be regarded as an admixture of the self and the not-self and which arises owing to the superimposition of the not-self on the self. For in cognitions of the form "*ahamidamanubhavāmi*" the empirical self apprehends itself as different from '*idam*' or the object which appears before the conscious subject. So, the empirical self can very well distinguish itself from the objects of knowledge, that is, from the not self. So there cannot be any doubt about the fact that the empirical self apprehends itself as the subject of cognitions and not as the object towards which consciousness is directed. Thus, there is not sufficient ground behind the

Advaitins' contention that every sentient creature realizes the dual character of the empirical self and hence can immediately realize that the empirical self is an admixture of the self and the not-self. In fact, Padmapādācārya, here, is referring to an objection raised by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas against the Advaita Vedāntins. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the individual self (*jīvātman*) is revealed as the 'I' in all cognitions of the form 'I am aware of so-and-so'; but in no such cognition it is revealed as the object. On the contrary, in all I-cognitions the empirical I reveals itself as the subject. So, there is no ground behind the Advaitins' thesis that the empirical I is an outcome of superimposition between 'aham' and 'idam', between the self and the not-self.

The Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems might argue against the Prābhākara thesis that there are plenty of considerations which indicate that the individual self (*jīvātman*) can be the object of cognitions. The Sāṃkhya philosophers identify the *jīvātman* with *puruṣacaitanya*. *Puruṣacaitanya*, on the Sāṃkhya view, is not perceptible, but its existence is established by means of inference. But if the existence of *puruṣacaitanya* can be established on the basis of inference, then *puruṣacaitanya* can be the object of inferential cognition. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, on the contrary, believe that the self is perceptible when the self is the locus of perceptible specific qualities such as

cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition. But although the self is perceptible when it is the substratum of these perceptible specific qualities, the self as distinct from the body, the mind and the sense organs can be known only through inference. But if the self as distinct from the body etc. can be known only through inference, then the self can be the object of inferential cognition. So, all these systems maintain that the self can be the object of cognitions on various occasions. Thus, all these systems are not prepared to accept the Prābhākara thesis that the self reveals itself through I-cognitions only as the subject of those cognitions.²⁴

In response to these various views regarding the nature of the empirical self which is manifested through the I-cognitions, the Advaitins would say that the empirical self is not known through inferential cognition alone. Padmapādācārya states this answer in the statement, “*pramāṭṛpramīṭayastāvadaparokṣāḥ*”²⁵. That is, what is revealed as ‘I’ through cognitions of the form “I am so-and-so” is none other than the knower (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*). This *pramāṭṛcaitanya* is regarded as the empirical self by the Advaita Vedāntins. The *pramāṭṛcaitanya* is apprehended immediately just like the cognition and the object of cognitions in all cognitions of the form “*ahamidamanubhavāmi*”²⁶.

One might raise the question: Is the *pramāṭṛcaitanya* revealed as the object of I-cognitions? Or, as the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas contend, the knower is revealed as the subject of all cognitions? The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika philosophers would say that in a second order perception (*anuvyavasāya*) three entities are revealed at the same time, but all these three entities are revealed as objects. So, the Advaita Vedāntins cannot say that the *pramāṭṛcaitanya* is not revealed as the object of cognitions.

Padmapādācārya addresses this objection in the following statement, “*prameyam karmatvenāparokṣam. pramāṭṛpramiti punaraparokṣe eva kevalam, na karmatayā. pramitiranubhavaḥ svayamprakāśaḥ pramāṇaphalam. tadbaleṇa itaratra prakāśate. pramāṇam tu pramāṭṛvyāpāraḥ phalaliṅgo nityānumeyaḥ tatra ahamidaṃ jānāmiti pramāturjñānavyāpāraḥ karmaviśayaḥ, nātmaviśayaḥ. ātmā tu viśayānubhavādeva nimittādahamiti phale viśaye cānusandhīyate.*”²⁷

Padmapādācārya here observes that the object of cognitions alone is revealed as the *karmakāraka* of the cognition. But neither the cognition nor the cognizer are revealed as the object of the cognition. If the cognizer and the cognition were established in the same way in which the object of the cognition is established, then the cognizer and the cognition would have required an entirely different cognition to establish them, just as the object requires a cognition other than itself to establish its own existence. But unlike the object, the cognition and the cognizer

are revealed by the same cognition through which the object is revealed. Thus, the cognition reveals itself and the cognizer through the same cognition which reveals the object. Thus, all other entities in the world have to depend on a cognition which is different from itself for establishing its own existence. But a cognition does not have to depend on another cognition for revealing itself. So, the Advaitins argue that a cognition unlike the object, is not revealed as the object of a cognition.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers would argue that there is no fundamental difference between the manifestation of a cognition and the manifestation of an object. For a cognition requires a second-order perception for its own revelation. Thus, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers regard a cognition too as *jñānāntaravedya* or capable of being revealed only by a different cognition. So, the Advaitins and the Prābhākara thesis that a cognition reveals itself and so it is not revealed in the same way as the object of a cognition is not unquestionable. In fact several major philosophical systems of classical India do not subscribe to the auto-luminosity theory (*svapṛakāśatvavāda*) of cognitions.²⁸

The Advaita Vedāntins, however, have raised several objections against the hetero-luminosity theory upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsikas have raised the charge of infinite regress against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. They have argued that if a veridical cognition requires a second-

order perception for its own revelation, then an infinite number of cognitions would have to be postulated.

Gaṅgeśa, however, has answered this objection once for all in the chapter entitled ‘*anuvyavasāyavāda*’ of the *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa* of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* where he writes, “*vitteravaśyavedyatvābhāvenanavasthāvigamāt.*”²⁹ This means that on the Nyāya view a cognition is always revealed by a different cognition; but a cognition is not necessarily revealed. A cognition can very well have an unknown existence like tables and chairs. So, the second-order perception which reveals the first determinate cognition (*vyavasāyajñāna*) need not always be revealed and, hence, does not necessarily require a third-order perception for its own manifestation. So, the charge of infinite regress cannot be brought against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems.

This answer, however, is not accepted by the Advaita Vedāntins who point out that if a cognition may remain unknown even to the subject, then the subject can be in doubt about his or her own cognitions and is never mistaken about his or her own cognitions. One may lie about whether one knows something or not. But one knows in his or her own mind whether one knows something or not. If a person knows something then one never has a doubt of the form “Do I know this or not?”. And if one knows something then one does not have an erroneous cognition of the

form “I do not know this thing”. So, the Advaitins argue that the hetero-luminosity theory of cognitions is not supported by our experience. It is entirely counter-intuitive and hence, cannot capture the real nature of cognitions.

One might argue that apart from the two alternatives mentioned above there can be a third alternative as well. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers subscribe to the alternative that a cognition is always revealed by another cognition, but a cognition is not necessarily revealed. The second of these two theses enables the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers to avoid the charge of infinite regress. But these two theses jointly imply that a cognition can have an unknown existence. It may exist in an unknown manner. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins, on the contrary, subscribe to the auto-luminosity theory and so, on their view, a cognition reveals itself as long as it exists. The Advaitins have mentioned several undesirable consequences which follow from the thesis that cognitions can exist in an unknown manner. But, besides these two alternatives, there can also be a third alternative. One might say, that whenever an instrument of veridical cognition is employed two cognitions are produced at the same time – the first is a veridical cognition and the second is a higher-order cognition about that veridical cognition. Thus, a cognition will always be revealed by another cognition, and yet there will not be any possibility of the cognition’s existing in an unknown manner. But this third

alternative presupposes that the same instrument of cognition is capable of producing two cognitions. This presupposition is absolutely unwarranted, because nobody has ever seen an instrument of cognition that simultaneously gives rise to two cognitions at the same time. Thus, there are only two possible alternatives – first, the Nyāya alternative according to which a cognition is always revealed by another alternative and second the Advaita and the Prābhākara alternative according to which a cognition is auto-luminous. Of these two alternatives, the Nyāya one has to admit that a cognition may exist without being known even by the cognizer. But it has already been shown that this thesis leads to several undesirable consequences. So, the cognition and the cognizer unlike the cognized object cannot be manifested by another cognition. This is why Padmapādcārya writes, “*pramāṭṛpramitiṁ punaraparokṣe eva kevalam, na karmatayā.*” That is, the cognizer and the cognition are always revealed immediately, they are never known as the object or *karmakāraka* of some other cognition.³⁰

But if both the cognizer and the cognition are not revealed by another cognition, then how are they revealed?

In answer to this question Padmapādcārya has made it very clear that of these two entities, only the cognition is auto-luminous, but the cognizer is not. The Advaita Vedāntins clearly realize that there is no point in admitting two entirely different

auto-luminous entities. For this reason the Advaitins believe that only the cognition is auto-luminous, but the cognizer is not. It is the veridical cognition which reveals the cognizer.³¹

One might further ask: Why do the Advaita Vedāntins maintain that the cognition is auto-luminous but the cognizer is not? What would be the harm if the cognizer is considered as auto-luminous and the cognition is considered as hetero-luminous?

Ātmasvarūpa has answered this question in his commentary *Prabodhaparīśodhini* on *Pañcapādikā*, “*nanu ubhayoḥ svayamprakāśatvāyogāt anyatarasya svapprakāśatve prādhānyādātmaiva svapprakāśa ityatrāha – pramitiriti. pramiteḥ asvaprakāśatve viśvasyaivānavabhāsaprasaṅgādityarthah*”³². Ātmasvarūpa here observes that if the veridical cognition were not auto-luminous, then nothing in the world would have been manifested. In that case, the entire universe would have been immersed in darkness. This undesirable consequence is called (*jagadāndhyaprasaṅga*) in Sanskrit. Nothing in the universe, save a veridical cognition, can establish its own existence. The existence of everything else is established depending upon a veridical cognition. So, if a veridical cognition cannot reveal its own existence then the veridical cognition will not be able to establish its own existence. And if the existence of the veridical cognition itself is not established, then how can the veridical cognition establish the existence of all

other things in the universe? The cognizer, too, cannot establish his or her own existence. The cognizer's existence also is established by the veridical cognition. The veridical cognition is the result of the application of an instrument of cognition. The cognizer or the empirical self is not the object of this veridical cognition. Still the cognizer also is revealed by the veridical cognition. In this connection, it needs to be mentioned that the employment of the instrument of cognition is inferred on the basis of the result of the *pramāṇavyāpāra*. On the Advaita view, whenever an object is revealed by a *pramiticaitanya* a transformation occurs in the mind of the individual which is called an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. Consciousness delimited by this *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is called *pramāṇacaitanya* in the Advaita philosophy. When this *antaḥkaraṇavṛtavyavacchinacaitanya* destroys the cover of *avidyā* and reveals the consciousness delimited by an object (*viśayāvacchinacaitanya*) the veridical cognition or the *pramiticaitanya* is produced. On the basis of this resultant *pramiticaitanya* it is inferred that in the mind of the cognizer an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* of this form was produced and that *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* destroyed the *avidyā* which so far covered that aspect of consciousness on which the object was superimposed.

The opponents might further argue that if the Advaita thesis were valid, then the cognizer or the *pramāṇacaitanya* could never be revealed. The Advaita Vedāntins

have said that the *pramāṭṛcaitanya* is not auto-luminous. So, it cannot establish its own existence. Again, it is said that the *pramāṭṛcaitanya* cannot be the object of *pramāṭṛcaitanya*. Thus, the *pramāṭṛcaitanya* cannot also be revealed by the *pramiticaitanya*. Therefore, the question arises: How is the cognizer revealed?

Padmapādācārya addresses this objection in the statement, “*ātmā tu viṣayānubhavādeva nimittādahamiti phale viṣaye cānusandhīyate*”³³.

Padmapādācārya makes it very clear that the empirical self or the cognizer is known through the *viṣayānubhava* or the veridical cognition. But unlike the object of the veridical cognition, it is not revealed as the object of this cognition. Rather, it is revealed as the locus (*āśraya*) of the veridical cognition (*pramiticaitanya* or *viṣayānubhava*). The term ‘*nimittāt*’ in the abovementioned statement of *Pañcapādikā* means as the locus of the cognition.³⁴

The opponents of the Advaitins would, here, object that if the empirical self (*ahamartha*) is regarded as the seat or locus of the veridical cognition, then there would be no difference between *ātman* and the empirical self (*ahamartha*). For most of the major philosophical systems of classical India, such as the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā systems, admit that the self (*atman*) is the seat or locus of veridical cognitions. Now, if *ahamartha* is said to be the seat of veridical cognitions, then there will be no difference between

atman and *ahamartha*. But since *atman* cannot be the object of any cognition, *ahamartha*, too, cannot be the object of any cognition. Then, it would not be possible for the Advaita Vedāntins to say that *ahamartha* is both *idaṃrūpa* and *anidaṃrūpa* and a duality is built within the nature of *ahamartha*. For, in that case, *ahamartha* can only be the subject of all cognitions. It has already been mentioned that both Ātmasvarūpa and Vijñānātma think that this objection is actually raised by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas who subscribe to the thesis that *ātman* is the seat or locus of all cognitions and *ahamartha* is not different from *ātman*.³⁵

Prakāśātmayati answers this question in the following statement of *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, “*ayo dahatīti daghṛtvaviśiṣṭasyāgnerayasaśca dvairūpyāvabhāsavat ahamupalabhe ityupalabdṛtvaviśiṣṭasyātmanaḥ antaḥkaraṇasya cāstyeva dvairūpyāvabhāsaḥ*”.³⁶

In the abovementioned statement of *Vivaraṇa*, which has been mentioned earlier also, it is stated very clearly that all I-cognitions are results of superimposition between the self and the not-self just as the cognition “the iron-ball burns” is a result of superimposition between iron and fire. As a matter of fact iron is not the locus of the power to burn. The power or the capacity to burn actually resides in fire. But due to this superimposition the iron ball appears as the seat or locus of fire. Similarly, *ahaṅkāra* or the empirical self is an admixture of pure

consciousness and the mind (*antaḥkarṇa*). Of these two entities, the mind is insentient (*jaḍa*) because it is an evolute of *avidyā* which also is insentient. But although the mind is insentient, yet *ahaṅkāra* appears as the seat of cognitions in all I-cognitions. Prakāśātmayati points out that since the mind is superimposed on consciousness, it appears as the seat or locus of cognition in the I-cognitions. This explains why *ahaṅkāra* appears as the locus of cognitions and so appears as *anidamrūpa* or different from the objects of cognitions. Yet it is in reality an insentient entity and so is *idamrūpa* or belongs to the category of the not-self.

The opponents might argue that whatever is revealed in the universe, is revealed as the object of some cognition. So, the Advaitins cannot say that *ahaṅkāra* appears in I-cognitions only as the *nimitta* or *āsraya* of *viṣayānubhavaḥ* or veridical cognitions. Padmapādācārya himself anticipates this objection in the statement, “*nanu nāyaṁ viṣayānubhavanimittaḥ ahamullekhaḥ, kiṁ tu anya eva ātmātraviṣayaḥ ahamiti pratyayaḥ*”.³⁷ Prakāśātmayati, too, mentions this argument of the opponents, “*nanu yadavabhāsate tat jñānakarmatayaivāvabhāsate iti viṣayeṣu niyamāt ātmāpyavabhāsate cet karmatayaiva nāśrayamātratayā iti codayati nanu nāyaṁ viṣayānubhavanimittaḥ iti*.”³⁸ Nṛsisimhāśrama in his commentary *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakāśikā* on *Vivaraṇa* says that the opponents are actually employing an inference to refute the Advaita thesis that *ahaṅkāra* or the

empirical self reveals itself as the subject of I-cognitions. The form of the inference is – *ātmā samvidviṣayah samvidanyatvāt ghaṭavat*.³⁹ It may be recalled that on the Advaita view a cognition is auto-luminous but the cognizer is not. But If something is different from a cognition and is revealed by a cognition which is other than itself, then it must be the object of some cognition, like a pot. It is to be noted here that the opponents consider the cognizer (*pramātā*) identical with the self. So, the opponents have mentioned *ātman* or the self as the *pakṣa* of the abovementioned inference.

To refute this argument of the opponents the Advaitins would point out that if the self is considered as identical with the cognizer and the cognizer is said to be the object of I-cognitions, then the self or the *pramātā* would have to be regarded as both the subject and the object of I-cognitions; because none other than the self or the *pramātā* is the cognizer of the I-cognitions. But the *karṭṛkāraka* and the *karmakāraka* of the same act of cognition cannot be the same thing. For, *karṭṛtva* or agency of an action is usually identified with the property *svasamavetakriyājanyaphalaśālitva* and *karmatva* or objecthood of an action is identified with the property *parasamavetakriyājanyaphalaśālitva*. This means that both the agent and the object of an action are the loci of the result of the action. But the difference between these two is that the action inheres in the agent and not in

the object of the action. From the above characterization of the *kartā* and the *karma* of an action, it is quite clear that agenthood (*kartṛtva*) and objecthood are two incompatible properties, and hence cannot reside in the same locus. Thus the *kartṛkāra* and the *karmakāra* of an action can never be the same object. So, the self cannot be both the subject and the object of the I-cognitions.

The opponents might retort that there is actually no contradiction involved in their view. In the I-cognitions, the opponents would argue, the self or *ātman* is revealed in two ways. It is revealed both as a substance and as the knower. When it is revealed as a substance, it is revealed as the object of the I-cognition, and when it is revealed as the knower, it is revealed as the subject. Thus, although, on the opponents' view, the same *ātman* appears both as the subject and as the object in the I-cognitions. But the same aspect of *ātman* does not appear both as the subject and as the object. The self as qualified by the property *dravyatva* appears as the object and the same self as qualified by the property *jñātrtva* appears as the subject. The same entity as qualified by two different properties can perform two different functions. Here, also the same self as qualified by two different properties appears both as the subject and as the object in the I-cognitions. Thus, no contradiction is involved in the view of those philosophers who admit that the self appears both as the subject and as the object of I-cognitions.⁴⁰

To refute this argument of the opponents the Advaitins would point out that these opponents themselves maintain that the self or *ātman* does not have any part and it does not get transformed into any other form. If it possessed parts, the opponents could have said that one part of it appears as the subject and the other part appears as the object in the I-cognitions.⁴¹

On the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā views, the self cannot transform itself into some other form. If the self had the ability to transform itself, then it could have assumed the form of some not-self. But since the self cannot transform itself into any other form, all these systems will have to admit that the same *ātman*, which is simple, indivisible and unchangeable appears both as the subject and the object of all I-cognitions. But then the charge of *karmakartṛvirodha* can obviously be raised against all these views. In this connection, it needs to be mentioned that although the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā system admit that the self is revealed as the object in the I-cognitions, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas do not say that. So, even though the charge of *karmakartṛvirodha* can be raised against the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā systems, this objection cannot be raised against the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā system; for, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school subscribes to the thesis that only the object of a cognition appears as the *karmakāraka* of the cognition. The cognition itself is auto-luminous (*svapprakāśa*)

and it is this auto-luminous cognition which reveals both the cognizing self and the cognized object. The cognizing self is revealed as the locus or the seat of the cognition and the cognized entity is revealed as the object or the *karmakāraka* of the cognitive act. So, the charge of *kartṛkarmavirodha* cannot be raised against the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view. On the Prābhākara view, however, the self (*atman*) is identical with what reveals itself as ‘I’ in the I-cognitions. The self being identical with *ahamartha*, on this view, the self is not auto-luminous. Only the cognition is auto-luminous and the self is revealed by cognitions of the form “*ahamidamanubhavāmi*”.

The Advaita view, however, is different from the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view in one very important respect. On the Advaita view the self is not the same as that which appears as ‘I’ in cognitions of the form “I am so-and-so” and “I apprehend so- and-so” for the Advaita Vedāntins the self is pure being, pure consciousness and pure bliss. The self being pure consciousness, it alone is auto-luminous and everything else is revealed by this self-revealing pure consciousness. Pure consciousness being the only conscious principle, cannot be revealed by any other principle. So, the self is auto-luminous. The empirical I, on the other hand, is an outcome of the superimposition of various entities other than the self on the self. The empirical I, being an admixture of the self and the not-self, is auto-luminous.

But who reveals the empirical I or the *pramāṭṛcaitanya*?

If it is admitted that *pramāṭṛcaitanya* reveals itself, then the *pramāṭṛcaitanya* would have to be regarded as both the subject and the object of the same cognitive episode. But it has already been pointed out while refuting the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā views that this alternative is vitiated by the defect *kartṛkarmavirodha*. Now, if a second *pramāṭṛcaitanya* is admitted for the revelation of the first *pramāṭṛcaitanya*, then an infinite number of *pramāṭṛcaitanya*-s would have to be admitted and an infinite regress would be the only possible outcome. To avoid all these undesirable consequences, the Advaita Vedāntins admit a witness-consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*) which reveals the *pramātā* and its properties. In ordinary parlance the word ‘*sākṣi*’ stands for an impartial immediate seer. The Advaitins, too, mean an *udāsina-aparakṣa-draṣṭā* by the word ‘*sākṣin*’ it is a conscious principle that immediately reveals anything that is presented to it but it is not affected by anything that appears before it. Although the Advaita Vedāntins differ among themselves regarding the exact nature of the empirical self (*jīvacaitanya*), God (*īśvaracaitanya*) and the witness-consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*), the *Vivaraṇa* view is that pure consciousness which permeates in and through *jīvacaitanya* and *īśvaracaitanya* is *sākṣicaitanya*. This *sākṣin* is

different from the *ahamartha* and although *ahamartha* can be the object of cognitions, the *sākṣin* is the ultimate subject of all cognitions.

The Advaitins have argued at length to show that the self is not the same as the empirical I. For this purpose the Advaitins have given arguments to establish their thesis that the self is auto-luminous. The *pramāṭṛcaitanya* or the *ahamartha* is not auto-luminous. Of two entities, if one is auto-luminous, and the other is not, then those two entities cannot obviously be identical. Thus, in order to show that the empirical self is different from the self, the Advaitins have argued in favour of the thesis that the self is auto-luminous. In this connection, Padmapādācārya has posed the following question to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. If the self (*ātman*) is not *svayamprakāśa*, but cognition or *anubhava* is *svayamprakāśa*, then what exactly can be said about the nature of *ātman*. Padmapādācārya observes that only three alternatives are possible here. First, the self can be considered as auto-luminous pure consciousness and the cognition can be admitted as an unconscious luminous entity like light (*jadāprakāśa*). On the second alternative both the self and the cognition can be admitted as conscious luminous principles (*caitanya prakāśa*). On the third alternative, the cognition (*anubhava*) may be taken as a conscious luminous principle whereas the self may be considered as an unconscious luminous principle.

To refute the first alternative Padmapādācārya says that if a cognition were considered as an unconscious luminous principle, then nothing in the universe would have been revealed; for everything in the universe is revealed by same cognition or other. But if nothing in the universe could be revealed, then everything would be immersed in complete darkness. As a matter of fact, the universe is not immersed in complete darkness (*jagadāndhyaprasaṅga*). so, the cognition cannot be considered as insentient or unconscious. Besides, on this alternative, the self is taken to be a conscious luminous principle. But, Padmapādācārya would ask the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas: If the self is auto-luminous and conscious, then why would it require a cognition different from itself to reveal it? Thus, the first alternative does not stand the test of reason.

To refute the second alternative, Padmapādācārya says that if the self itself is a conscious luminous principle, then there would be no need to admit another luminous principle namely the cognition *pramiticaitanya* or *viṣayānubhava*. One conscious luminous principle cannot require another conscious luminous principle for its own revelation and there is no need to admit two different conscious luminous principles. Besides, if cognition is conscious and auto-luminous, then why is one person's cognition not revealed to another? Furthermore, if two conscious principles are admitted, then none of them would be dependent on the

other. But admitting two independent self-conscious auto-luminous principles, none of which is related to the other, is absolutely redundant.

The third alternative is actually admitted by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā system. On this alternative, the cognition is conscious and auto-luminous (*svaparakāśa*) but the self is an unconscious entity which is revealed by the cognition as its seat or locus (*ādhāra*). To refute this alternative the Advaita Vedāntins would argue that if the self is unconscious and not auto-luminous and if it cannot even be the object of a cognition, then how is it immediately revealed like a cognition? If an entity can reveal itself immediately without being the object of a cognition, then it must be an auto-luminous conscious entity. This argument of the Advaita Vedāntins can be expressed in the form of the following inference – *ātma citprakāśaḥ saṁvitkarmatāmantareṇāparokṣatvāt saṁvidvat*.

Now, the Advaitins would say that if the self is admitted as a conscious auto-luminous principle, then there would be no need for admitting another conscious auto-luminous principle. So, the Advaitins admit the self as the only conscious auto-luminous principle in the universe. It is this auto-luminous pure conscious itself which appears to us as *viśayānubhava* or *pramiticaitanya* when it is delimited by an object and is manifested by an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. The *vṛtti* merely removes the veil of *avidyā* which covers consciousness. So, a veridical cognition

(*pramiticaitanya*) is identified by the Advaita Vedāntins with *antaḥkaraṇavṛttyabhivvyaktaviṣayāvacchinnacaitanya*. What appears as ‘I’ in the I-cognitions is not pure consciousness. It can be the object of cognitions and it is a mixture of two different things. So, it involves a duality within its own nature. Thus, the conclusion which the Advaitins reach is the self is an auto-luminous conscious principle and it is different from the empirical self which is not auto-luminous.⁴²

The Advaitins have taken recourse to many other considerations to establish the difference between pure consciousness and the empirical self. One such consideration is dreamless sleep. In dreamless sleep the witness-consciousness which is identical with pure consciousness is revealed but the empirical self is not revealed. The individual is not aware of its individuality during dreamless sleep. In Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad it is stated, “*tad yathā priyayā striyāsampariṣvako na bāhyam kiñcana veda nāntaram evamevāyampuruṣaḥ prajñenātmanā sampariṣvako na bāhyam kiñcana veda nāntaram.*”⁴³ That is, in dreamless sleep the individual gets identified with divine consciousness which is referred to by the word (*prājñā*); but even though the witness-conscious becomes identical with the divine consciousness it does not realize this identity during dreamless sleep. But the opponents might ask the Advaita Vedāntins: Why do the Advaitins think that

the empirical self is not revealed during dreamless sleep? As a matter of fact when a person wakes up from dreamless sleep, he realizes that so long I have slept blissfully and was not aware of anything. This awareness of a person who wakes up from dreamless sleep usually assumes the form “*etāvantam kālam sukhamahamasvāpsam na kiñcidahamavediṣam*”. The Advaitins explain this awareness as a recollection. But a recollection cannot take place without a prior apprehension. In the recollection the subject who recollects is the empirical self (*ahamartha*). Then why do the Advaitins uphold the thesis that *ahamartha* was not revealed during dreamless sleep? On the contrary, it appears that it is the *ahamartha* which apprehends certain things during dreamless sleep and then recollects those entities on waking up from dreamless sleep.

The Advaita Vedāntins would answer this objection by pointing out that this recollective awareness of a person who wakes up from dreamless sleep can be explained even if one admits the difference between the self and *ahamartha*. On the Advaita view, it is the witness-consciousness which reveals itself, *avidyā* and its own essential bliss during dreamless sleep. On waking up, the mind is superimposed on the witness-consciousness and so in the recollection, the *ahamartha* appears as the one who recollects itself, its own bliss and *avidyā*.

The opponents might further object that the entity which appears and the entity which recollects must be identical. But the Advaita thesis violates this principle; for on the Advaita view the witness-consciousness is the one who apprehends whereas the empirical self is the one who recollect.

Prakāśātmayati answers this objection in the statement, “*ajñānasukhasākṣicaitanyākāramajñānaviśiṣṭātmāśrayameva sambhāvya, nāntaḥkaraṇāśrayamiti*”⁴⁴. This means, both the apprehension and the recollection resides in pure consciousness qualified by *avidyā* (*avidyopahitacaitanya*) and not in consciousness qualified by *antaḥkaraṇa* (*antaḥkaraṇopahitacaitanya*). For, recollection, being a non-veridical cognition, is not a transformation of the mind. The Advaita Vedāntins call it a transformation of *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. So, on the Advaita view, too, the *anubhava* and the *smṛti* reside in the same locus and so it cannot be objected that the cause and the effect are not located in the same locus. But *ahamartha* does not apprehend the abovementioned three entities, then how can it recollect them after waking up?

To answer this question the Advaitins reveal their real intention according to which it is the witness-consciousness which performs both functions – apprehension and recollection, but since the mind gets superimposed on the witness-consciousness, it appears as the *ahamartha* to the awakened person. The Advaitins have thus

anticipated and addressed many other objections and have established the difference between the self and *ahamartha*.

CHAPTER FOUR

Questioning the Difference Between the Self (*Ātman*) and the Empirical I: A Few Objections by the Mādhva Philosophers Against The Advaita Conception of the Individual Self

It has been established in the previous chapter following *Pañcapādikā*, *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* and the commentaries of these two seminal works that what appears as ‘I’ in all cognitions of the form “I am so-and-so” is not the self (*ātman*). Rather, this *ahamartha* or I is a superimposed entity resulting from the superimposition of the not self on the self. I have already mentioned that the Advaitins differ among themselves regarding the exact nature of *jīva*, *īsvara* and *sākṣicaitanya*. The *Vivarāṇa* school considers consciousness reflected in *avidyā* (*avidyāprativimbitacaitanya*) as *jīvacaitanya*, *vimbacaitanya* or consciousness that is being reflected as God and pure consciousness that permeate both the created and the divine self as the witness-consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*). Sarvajñātmamuni, the author of the commentary *Samkṣepaśārīraka* on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, however, adheres to a different conception of *jīva*, *īsvara* and *sākṣin*. Sarvajñātmamuni considers consciousness qualified by *avidyā* (*avidyopahitacaitanya*) as *īśvaracaitanya*, consciousness qualified by *antaḥkaraṇa*

(*antaḥkaraṇopahitacaitanya*) as *jīvacaitanya* and *antaḥkaraṇopalakṣitacaitanya* as the witness consciousness or *sākṣicaitanya*.

Keeping all these finer distinctions in mind I shall mention some objections mentioned by the Mādhva philosophers against the Advaita conception of the individual self in this chapter. All these objections will be presented in this chapter following the Mādhva text *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsatīrtha and its commentaries *Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa* written by Śrīnivāsācārya and *Nyāyāmṛtataraṅgiṇī* written by Rāmācārya.

It has already been mentioned in the previous chapter that the Advaita Vedāntins use an argument from dreamless sleep in order to establish the distinction between *ātman* and *ahamartha*. The Advaitins have argued that the self cannot be the same as that appears as ‘I’ in the cognitions of the form “I am so-and-so”; because *ahamartha* does not appear during dreamless sleep but pure consciousness manifests itself even during dreamless sleep. This argument of the Advaita Vedāntins may be stated in the form of an inference –

vimataḥ ahaṅkāraḥ anātmā ātmaprakāśe ’pi aprakāśāt.

Vyāsatīrtha objects that the probans (*hetu*) of the abovementioned inference is vitiated by the fallacy *svarūpāsiddhi*; because the Advaitins have not been so far

able to establish that during dreamless sleep only pure consciousness is revealed and the *ahamartha* is not revealed. Vyāsatīrtha also anticipates the Advaita response to this objection. He argues on behalf of the Advaita Vedāntins – “*yadi ca suṣuptavahahamarthaḥ prakāśeta, tarhi smaryeta hyastana ivāhamkāraḥ, anubhūteḥ smaraṇaniyamābhāve’pi smaryamānātmamātratvāditi,*”¹. The Advaitins might retort that if *ahamartha* too revealed itself during dreamless sleep, then on waking up the subject would have remembered this *ahamartha* as belonging to yesterday, that is as the ‘I’ of yesterday, and not as the ‘I’ of today.

One might reply on behalf of the opponents of the Advaitins that the temporal feature is obliterated from this recollection. It is not necessary that whatever is apprehended will also be remembered although the converse is admitted by everybody. That is, whatever is recollected must be apprehended in some earlier cognition. So, even if the empirical self (*ahamartha*) were apprehended during dreamless sleep, the temporal feature might not be remembered and the *ahamartha* would be remembered as only *ahamartha* and not as the *ahamartha* that existed yesterday.

To counter this kind of response the Advaitins might say that only the self is remembered. So, it must be concluded that only the self has been apprehended during dreamless sleep.

Against this argument of the Advaita Vedāntins, Vyāsatīrtha would ask: How would the Advaitins establish that the *ātman* reveals itself during dreamless sleep, but the *ahamartha* does not? Vyāsatīrtha expresses this argument in the statement, “*tatra na tāvat svaparakāśatvāsvaparakāśatvābhyām suṣuptāvātmāhamarthayoḥ prakāśāprakāśau. ahamarthaḥ svaparakāśātmānya ityasyādyāpyasiddhyā’nyonyāśrayāt*”². The Advaitins cannot say that *ātman* reveals itself during dreamless sleep but the *ahamartha* does not, because *ātman* is auto-luminous but the *ahamartha* is not; because arguments of this sort would be of help to the Advaita Vedāntins only if the Advaitins can establish the distinction between *ātman* and *ahamartha* before employing this sort of argument. The purport of Vyāsatīrtha’s argument is as follows. Most of the opponents of the Advaitins maintain that the self is identical with that which reveals itself as ‘I’ in the I-cognitions. Now, if the self is identical with the *ahamartha*, then if the self is manifested during dreamless sleep, then the *ahamartha* also is manifested, and if the self is remembered on waking up from dreamless sleep, then the *ahamartha*, too, is remembered in the waking state. So, if the Advaitins try to establish the distinction between the self and the *ahamartha* on the basis of the self’s appearance and the *ahamartha*’s non-appearance in dreamless sleep, then their argument would be circular. For, unless the distinction between the self and the *ahamartha* is established earlier, it cannot be said that of these two entities one has

appeared during dreamless sleep, but the other has not. Thus the Advaitins' thesis that the self appears in dreamless sleep, but *ahamartha* does not depends upon the distinction between the self and the *ahamartha*, while the Advaitins are trying to establish the distinction between these two entities on the basis of the thesis that the self appears but the *ahamartha* does not appear in dreamless sleep. So, the entire argument moves in a circle.

Vyāsatīrtha, then, argues that the Advaitins cannot establish the distinction between the self and the *ahamartha* on the basis of what is remembered and what is not remembered during dreamless sleep. Vyāsatīrtha writes, “*nāpi parāmarśāparāmarśābhyām, ahamasvāpsam na kiñcidahamavediṣamityahamarthasyaiva parāmarśāt*”³. Vyāsatīrtha here argues that *ahamartha* is remembered in the recollection which a person has on waking up from dreamless sleep. If *ahamartha* did not appear in dreamless sleep, then it would not have appeared in this recollection. The fact that *ahamartha* appears in this recollection proves that *ahamartha* also appears in dreamless sleep. Furthermore, Vyāsatīrtha says that in this recollection only *ahamartha* is remembered and pure consciousness or the self does not appear in this recollection as distinct from *ahamartha*.

Prakāśātmayati has answered this objection in *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* and I have mentioned his answer in the earlier chapter.

Prakāśātmayati has stated very clearly that whatever appears as *ahamartha* in the I-cognitions is the outcome of superimposition between the self and *antaḥkaraṇa*. On the Advaita view, the self reveals itself during dreamless sleep but the self which reveals itself during dreamless sleep is not unqualified indeterminate pure consciousness (*nirguṇa nirupādhika śuddhacaitanya*), but this consciousness is qualified by *ajñāna* (*ajñānopahitacaitanya*). But why do the Advaita Vedāntins subscribe to the thesis that the consciousness which is revealed during dreamless sleep is not pure indeterminate unqualified consciousness (*nirupādhika śuddhacaitanya*) but consciousness as qualified by *ajñāna* or *avidyā*? The reason why the Advaita Vedāntins subscribe to this thesis may be briefly stated as follows. *Suṣupti* or dreamless sleep is one kind of dissolution or *pralaya*. *Antaḥkaraṇa*, which is an evolutes of *avidyā* gets dissolved in material cause, i.e. *avidyā*, during the state of dreamless sleep. For this reason, *suṣupti* is called ‘*dainandinapralaya*’ or the state of dissolution which happens everyday in an individual’s life. But although *antaḥkaraṇa* gets dissolved in *avidyā* during dreamless sleep, *avidyā* is not destroyed during this state. It has already been mentioned in the last chapter that the individual self becomes identical, with divine

consciousness (*īśvaracaitanya*) during the state of dreamless sleep. But even though the individual self becomes identical with *īśvaracaitanya* during this state, yet the individual does not realize this identity owing to the veil of *avidyā*. This has been stated very clearly in the following statement of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, “*tad yathā’pi hirṇyanidhiṃ nihitamakṣetrajñā uparyupari sañcaranto, na vindeyurevamevemāḥ sarvāḥ prajā aharahargacchantya etaṃ brahmalokaṃ na vindantyanṛtena hi pratyūdhāḥ*”⁴. If *avidyā* also were destroyed during dreamless sleep then the individual would have attained liberation during dreamless sleep. But, as a matter of fact, an individual is not liberated when he falls into dreamless sleep. That the person is not liberated is owing to the cover of *avidyā* which prevents the individual from realizing that he has become identical with God in his dreamless sleep. Since *ajñāna* or *avidyā* is present in dreamless sleep, consciousness qualified by *avidyā* apprehends itself, that is *sākṣicaitanya*, the intrinsic blissful nature of the *sākṣin* and *avidyā* during dreamless sleep. On waking up from dreamless sleep, the same consciousness as qualified by *avidyā* (*ajñānopahitacaitanya*) recollects the abovementioned three entities which have been apprehended during dreamless sleep. So, on the Advaita view, there is no difference between the subject who apprehends during dreamless sleep and the subject who recollects on waking up from dreamless sleep.

Vyāsaṭīrtha, here raises another objection against the Advaita Vedāntins, “*asvāpsamityatrāpi uttamapuruṣaprayogayogyāhamarthasyaiva sphuraṇāt. uktam ca vivaraṇe’pi ‘antaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭa evātmani pratyabhijñānaṁ brūmo, na niṣkalamke, tasya mokṣāvasthāyinaḥ śāstraikasamādhigamyatvādi’ti*”⁵. That is, if the consciousness which appears during dreamless sleep is not pure consciousness, then it can be the object of I-cognitions. The author of *Nyāyāmṛta*, here has quoted *Vivaraṇa*, too, where it has been said that it is the consciousness qualified by the mind which has the *parāmarśa* in the waking state of the individual. So, the Advaita Vedāntins cannot say that the *ahamartha* does not exist during dreamless sleep and does not apprehend the *sākṣin*, the intrinsic bliss of the *sākṣin* and *avidyā* during dreamless sleep.

Vyāsaṭīrtha further objects that if the *ahamartha* were not remembered on waking up from dreamless sleep, then the individual would not have been sure about who has been asleep so long and who wakes up from dreamless sleep. As a result the individual could have doubts of the form, “Was it I or someone else who was asleep so long?” But no one has doubts of this form after waking up from dreamless sleep.

The answer to these objections have been given in *Vivaraṇa* and also mentioned in the last chapter. The answer is, although *ahamartha* appears in the recollection that

an individual has on waking up from dreamless sleep, yet this *ahamartha* is not recollected. During dreamless sleep the witness-consciousness apprehends itself, its own intrinsic bliss and *avidyā* and it is the witness-consciousness who remembers these three things in the waking state. Then why the *ahamartha* is mentioned in the statement “*etāvantaṃ kālaṃ sukhamahamasvāpsam na kiñcidahamavediṣam*” through which the awakened individual expresses his recollection? The answer to this question is also mentioned in the last chapter. As soon as the person wakes up from dreamless sleep, the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is superimposed on the witness-consciousness. This is why the witness-consciousness appears as ‘I’ in the statement through which the individual expresses his own recollection.

Vyāsatīrtha then raises another very important objection against the *Vivaraṇa* school. Vyāsatīrtha argues, “*nanu parāmrśyamānātmana evaṃ pratyaktvāttathā niścaya iti cet, pratyaktvaṃ na tāvat cinnirbhāsyapratidvandvi cittvaṃ anyatvapratidvandvi svatvaṃ vā cidasvapīditi vā svayamasvapīditi vā parāmarśāpātenāhamiti parāmarśāyogāt*”⁶. Vyāsatīrtha here points out if the *ahamartha* were not apprehended during dreamless sleep and only the witness-consciousness were apprehended during this state, then after waking up from dreamless sleep only the witness consciousness should have been remembered. But

if the witness consciousness alone had been remembered, then the form of the recollection which the subject has on waking up would have been quite different. The Advaitins maintain that it is the *sākṣicaitanya* who apprehends whatever is apprehended during dreamless sleep and it is the same witness-consciousness who remembers these entities on waking up. But why does Ācārya Vyāsatīrtha say that if the witness consciousness featured both in the apprehension and in the recollection, then the form of the recollection should have been quite different? To understand this comment of Vyāsatīrtha we need to recall what exactly do the Advaita Vedāntins mean by the term *sākṣicaitanya*? It has already been mentioned in the last chapter that the witness consciousness is an impartial and detached immediate seer (*udāsīna-aparokṣa-draṣṭā*). It is stated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, “*yat sākṣādaparokṣād brahma*”⁷ which means *Brahmacaitanya* alone is the immediate seer and the witness consciousness. Commenting on this statement of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* Sureśvarācārya writes in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāsyavārttika*,-

“*yadi vā draṣṭari prāpte sākṣāditi viśeṣanāt/*

tatprasaṅganivṛttyarthamaparokṣādityate//

draṣṭṛdarśanadr̥śyārthaprāptāvādyaviśeṣanāt/

lokavat tanniṣedhārthamaparokṣāditiryate”//

In these two verses of *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttika* Sureśvarācārya states very clearly that *sākṣicaitanya* is not the seer or the *draṣṭā* in the ordinary conventional sense of that term. For, there is always a difference between the seer on the one hand and the seen and the act of seeing on the other. Now, if the witness-consciousness is identified with the seer, then the *sākṣin* will be distinct from the seen and the act of seeing. But if *Brahman* is called the *sākṣin* and since the *Brahman* is beyond all differences (*bhedarahita*), the *sākṣin* should not be identified with the seer. On the Advaita view *sākṣin* is pure consciousness or pure luminosity (*dr̥śisvarūpa*) and is thus more immediate than the seer. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* points towards this greater immediacy by employing the epithet ‘*aparokṣāt*’ to characterize *Brahman*. Keeping all these theories and distinctions in mind, Vyāsatīrtha argues in the abovementioned statement of *Nyāyāmṛta* that if the witness-consciousness were apprehended during dreamless sleep and recollected on waking up from sleep, then instead of the *ahamartha*, the witness-consciousness would have appeared in the recollection. This witness-consciousness is different from whatever appears before consciousness and it is also the intrinsic essence of the individual. Thus the awakened person’s recollection would have assumed the form ‘*cidsvapīt*’ or ‘*svayamasvapīt*’. That is, on waking

up, the individual would have recollections of the form ‘so long consciousness was asleep’ or ‘so long the self was asleep’. But an individual never has recollections of these forms when he wakes up from dreamless sleep.

To show that the self cannot appear in the awakened person’s recollection, Vyāsatīrtha further observes, “*ghaṭādiḥ svasmād bhinno netyādipratītyātmanīva ghaṭādāvapi svatvasya sattvācca*”⁸. The author of *Nyāyāmṛta*, here, argues that the *ahamartha* appears in that recollection as different from all other things in the universe, say a pot or a piece of cloth. But on the Advaita view, the things constituting the universe are not really different from *ātman* or *Brahman*. All these things are evolutes of *avidyā* and *avidyā* along with its evolutes are superimposed on *Brahman*, and all these evolutes appear as real to a bound individual (*baddhajīva*) only because the reality or the pure being of *Brahman* are superimposed on them. Since the subject of this recollection appears as distinct from everything else in the universe, it cannot be *pratyakcaitanya*, and must be identical with *ahamartha*. Thus what is remembered after dreamless sleep is *ahamartha*. So, the Advaitins cannot say that the *ahamartha* is not apprehended during dreamless sleep.

One might argue in favour of the Advaitins that nothing save *pratyakcaitanya* or pure consciousness can appear in the recollection that occurs on waking up from

dreamless sleep. For, *pratyaktva* may be defined as *parāgyvāṛttatva*, that is being different from everything else. Whatever appears during dreamless sleep and in the recollection that takes place in the waking state manifests itself as different from *yuṣmadartha* or the objects of consciousness. So it must be different from *parāk* or the other and must be the same as *pratyakcaitanya* or pure consciousness.

To refute such arguments in favour of the Advaita Vedāntins Vyāsātīrtha writes, “*nāpi yuṣmadartharūpaparāgyvāṛttatvam, ahamarthasyaiva tadvyāṛtteḥ*”⁹. Vyāsātīrtha, here, says that *pratyaktva* cannot be identified by the Advaita Vedāntins with *yuṣmartharūpaparāgyvāṛttatva*, that is being different from the objects of cognitions which appear as the other to the individual self; because, *ahamartha*, too, never appears in a *yuṣmatpratyā* or you-cognition. It always appears only in I-cognitions. So, if the Advaita Vedāntins define *pratyaktva* in this manner, then *pratyaktva* would be distinct from the other and it would be present in *ahamartha* too. In that case, the Advaita Vedāntins would not be able to say that the *ahamartha* or the empirical self does not reveal itself during dreamless sleep.

Besides, Vyāsātīrtha argues quoting *Vivaraṇa* that on the Advaita view *pratyaktva* cannot be identical with *parāgyvāṛttatva*, “*vivarāṇe ‘ātmanaḥ sarvātmakatvānna parāgyvāṛttirahamuparāgādeva vyāṛtyavabhāsaḥ’, ityukteḥ. tasmādahamarthatvameva pratyaktvaṁ vācyamiti ghaṭṭakuṭīprabhātavṛttāntaḥ*”¹⁰.

The purport of the abovementioned statement is as follows. Prakāśātmayati, states very clearly that the self or *ātmacaitanya* is non-dual or *advitīya* because it is the essence of everything. Nothing is different from *ātman* or *Brahman*. It appears as distinct from all other things owing to the superimposition of the mind or *ahamartha* on *ātmacaitanya*. So, if *pratyaktva* is the same as *parāgyavṛttatva*, then *ahamartha* would be responsible for *pratyaktva*. Thus, *pratyaktva* would have to be identified with *ahamarthatva*. But the *Vivaraṇa* school has started this discussion about *pratyaktva* in order to establish the difference between *pratyakcāitanya* and *ahamartha*. But the discussion has led them to the identity of the *pratyakcāitanya* with *ahamartha*. Here Vyāsatīrtha has referred to a *laukikanyāya* called *ghaṭṭakuṭīprabhātnyāya* in order to show the absurdity of the Advaita position. A person who wanders around all night to evade customs duty on the bank of a river and ends up in sleeping and waking up before the tax office or toll plaza situated on the bank of the river actually defeats his own purpose. The Advaita Vedāntins also have defeated their own purpose by identifying *pratyaktva* with *parāgyavṛttatva*. They should have remembered that *ātman* or *Brahman* on their view is beyond all differences. All difference that appears in the universe is owing to the superimposition of *avidyā* and its evolutes on the *ātmacāitanya*. Thus, the main trend of Vyāsatīrtha's argument is to reduce the Advaita philosophy to a bundle of contradictions and absurdities.

CHAPTER FIVE

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on the Conception of the Individual Self:

In the previous chapter I have mentioned a few objections against the Advaita conception of the individual self. I have also mentioned the main objections raised by Vyāsaśrītha against the Advaita thesis the self is different from what appears as I in the I-cognitions. In his seminal work *Advaitasiddhi* Madhusūdana Sarasvatī refuted the Mādhva text *Nyāyāmṛta* statement by statement. In this final chapter I shall reduce the Mādhva objections mentioned in the last chapter following *Advaitasiddhi* and its commentaries.

The nature of the individual self is discussed in the *prakaraṇa* entitled ‘*athāhamarthānātmatvopapattiḥ*’ of the first chapter of *Advaitasiddhi*. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī starts this *prakaraṇa* with the statement, “*tataścāhamkāradisṛṣṭiḥ*”¹. In this statement the term ‘*tataḥ*’ means from *avidyā*. That is, *ahamkāra* or that which appears as ‘I’ in the I-cognitions arises out of *avidyā*.

The opponents of the Advaitins would immediately object that *ahamkāra* or the empirical self cannot be an effect of *avidyā* because it is identical with the self

(*ātman*). Madhusūdana states this objection in the statement, “*nanu ahamartha ātmaiva, tasya kathamavidyātaḥsrṣṭih*”².

In reply to this objection the Advaita Vedāntins would say that *ahamartha* or the empirical I cannot be identical with the self (*ātman*), because during dreamless sleep the self manifests itself but *ahamkara* is not manifested. I have mentioned earlier that this argument of the Advaita Vedāntins can be expressed in the form of an inference - *vimataḥ ahamkāraḥ anātmā ātmaprakāś'epyaprakāśāt*.

The Mādhva philosophers have argued against this inference that the probans (*hetu*) of this inference is *svarūpāsiddha*; because the Advaita Vedāntins have not been so far able to establish their thesis that *ahamkāra* is not revealed during dreamless sleep. To refute this charge of *svarūpāsiddhi* the Advaita Vedāntins have offered an *anukūlatarka* in favour of the aforementioned inference. The Advaitins would argue that if *ahamkāra* were revealed in dreamless sleep, then it would have been recollected after dreamless sleep as yesterday's I and not as today's I. The Advaitins would add that though whatever is apprehended need not necessarily be remembered, yet only the self and nothing but the self appears in the recollection of the person who wakes up from dreamless sleep.

The opponents would argue that the probans of the aforementioned inference is not yet established in the *pakṣa* of that inference and the *anukūlatarka* offered by the

Advaita Vedāntins actually serves the opponents' purpose. So, the *anukūlatarka* is actually an *iṣṭāpatti* for the opponents. Madhusūdana mentions this argument of the opponents in the following statement, “*hetorasiddheḥ, tarke iṣṭāpatteḥ, na hyadyāpi svaprakāśātmānyatvamahamarthe siddhamasti. ātmānyatvenāprakāśatvasādhane tena ca tadanyatvasādhane anyonyāśrayaḥ*”³.

The opponents are here arguing that the probans of the Advaitins' inference is not yet established the *anukūlatarka* also fails to serve the Advaitins' purpose. For, the opponents argue, the Advaitins are trying to establish the distinction between the self and *ahamartha* on the basis of their thesis that the self reveals itself during dreamless sleep but the *ahamartha* is not revealed. But how can the Advaitins be so sure about the fact that the *ahamartha* is not revealed during dreamless sleep and only *ātmacaitanya* is revealed during dreamless sleep. For the other major philosophical systems of classical India, the *ahamartha* is identical with *ātman*. So, if the *ātman* is revealed during dreamless sleep, then the *ahamartha* would also be revealed. So, the Advaitins cannot establish their thesis that the *ahamartha* is not revealed during dreamless sleep unless they first establish the distinction between the self and *ahamartha* and they would not be able to establish this distinction unless they first establish the thesis that *ahamartha* is not revealed during dreamless sleep. So, the Advaitins' argument is clearly circular. I have mentioned this objection raised by the author of *Nyāyāmṛta* in the last chapter. Furthermore,

the Mādhva philosophers would argue that the Advaitins cannot say that the *ahamartha* does not appear in the recollection which takes place after dreamless sleep; because the Advaitins themselves say that the form of the recollection is, “*etāvantam kālām sukhamahamasvāpsam, na kiñcidahamavediṣam.*” So, the Advaitins themselves admit that the *ahamartha* appears in the recollection which occurs after dreamless sleep. Madhusūdana mentions this objection also in the following statement, “*na cāhamarthasyāparāmarśaḥ, sukhamahamasvāpsam na kiñcidavedisamiti tasyaiva parāmarśāditi cet.*”⁴

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī starts refuting all these objections in the statement, “*na; ahamkārastāvadicchādiviśiṣṭa eva grhyate ityāvayoḥ samam. suṣuptau ca necchādaya iti katham tadā’hamarthānubhavaḥ.*”⁵ Madhusūdana here observes that both the Mādhva and the Advaita systems uphold the thesis that *ahamartha* is always known as the locus of the internal states such as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition. *Ahamkāra* is never apprehended by anybody as devoid of all these mental states. Whenever a person apprehends *ahamartha* at least one of the abovementioned internal states must be present in *ahamartha*. None of these states, however, is present during dreamless sleep. So, how can the Mādhva Vedāntins say that the *ahamartha* is apprehended during dreamless sleep? Madhusūdana admits that it is true that the *ahamartha* appears in the recollection

which takes place after dreamless sleep; but he explains that this appearance is due to the perception of *ahamartha* in the waking state. Thus, the *ahamartha* which appears in the expression of the recollection is actually perceived and not remembered.

The Mādhva philosophers might argue that although *ahamartha* is usually apprehended as the locus of cognition, pleasure, pain etc. yet it cannot be said that the *ahamartha* cannot be apprehended without these internal states. It is true that these internal states do not exist during dreamless sleep. But *ahamartha* is apprehended during this state even without these mental states.

Madhusūdana addresses this objection in the statement, “*na ca - icchādiguṇaviśiṣṭa evāhamartha gṛhyata ityatra na naḥ sampratipattiriti – vācyam. guṇigrahaṇasya guṇagrahaṇavyāptatvāt, anyaathā rūpādi hīno ’pi ghaṭaḥ pratheta.*”⁶ Madhusūdana in this statement says that the apprehension of a qualified substance is always pervaded by the apprehension of the qualifiers. For, unless one has knowledge of the qualifiers one cannot apprehend a substance as qualified by these qualifiers. Thus, in case of the awareness of any qualified substance one can establish the *vyāpti*, “*yatra yatra guṇaviśiṣṭagrahaṇam tatra tatra guṇagrahaṇam*”. Now, if this *vyāpti* is accepted, then if the absence of the *vyāpaka* of this *vyāpti* is perceived in an instance, then it may safely be concluded that the *vyāpya*, too, is absent in that

instance. In dreamless sleep the *vyāpaka* ‘apprehension of the qualifiers’ is not present; because no one is aware of cognition, pleasure, pain etc. during dreamless sleep. So, the *vyāpya*, viz. ‘apprehension of the qualified substance’ cannot also be present during dreamless sleep. Hence, *ahamartha* cannot be present and apprehended during dreamless sleep. But *ātmacaitanya* or the self is not a qualified substance. The self, on the Advaita view, is devoid of all properties. So, the aforementioned invariable rule (*vyāpti*) does not apply to the self. Thus, even though the *ahamartha* cannot be apprehended during dreamless sleep, the self or *ātmacaitanya* can be apprehended during that state. The charge of circularity which Vyāsātīrtha brought up against the Advaita view is also quite baseless. For, on the Advaita view, the distinction between *ātman* and *ahamartha* is established on the basis of the thesis that the *ahamartha* is not apprehended during dreamless sleep, but this thesis is not established on the basis of the distinction between the self and *ahamartha*. So, no circularity is involved in the Advaita position. To express these arguments Madhusūdana says, “*evamca guṇāgrahane katham guṇigrahaṇam? tathā ca nirguṇa evātmā gṛhyata iti svīkartavyam. anubhavābhāve tathācājñānāśrayatvena susuptāvanubhūyamānādātmano'haṁkāro bhinnaḥ. evamevātmānytve siddhe asvaprakāśatvasādhane nānyonyāśrayaḥ.*”⁷ In the abovementioned statement it is very clearly stated that the Advaitins base their argument on the *vyāpti*, “*yatra yatra guṇaviśiṣṭagrahaṇam tatra tatra*

guṇagrahaṇam?” Now, the internal qualities such as cognition, pleasure, pain etc. are not apprehended during dreamless sleep. From this premise it follows that the substance qualified by this internal qualities, too, is not apprehended during dreamless sleep. So, *ātman* alone is apprehended during dreamless sleep. *Ajñāna* is not destroyed during dreamless sleep; for if *ajñāna* were destroyed, then the sleeping person would have been liberated. Thus, *ātman* is apprehended during dreamless sleep as the locus of *ajñāna*. So, *ahamartha* is different from *ātman*. Since, it is different from *ātman* it is not auto-luminous (*asvaprakāśa*). Therefore, the Advaita chain of reasoning does not involve any circularity.

Madhusūdana admits that *ahamartha* appears in the recollection which occurs after dreamless sleep; but that is because *ahamartha* is superimposed on *ātmancaitanya* during the waking state.

Vyāsaśrītha also raised the objection that if *ātman* alone is recollected and *ahamartha* is not recollected, then the form of the recollection should have been, “*cidasvapī*”, “*svayamsvapī*” or “*kevalacaitanyamasvapī*”. But actually the recollection which occurs during dreamless sleep does not assume these forms. So, it must be admitted that *ahamartha* is not apprehended but is recollected on waking up from dreamless sleep.

Madhusūdana addresses this objection in the statement, “*ataeva cidasvapīt svayamasvapīditi parāmarśākāratāpattirnistā; tatkālānubhūtāntaḥkaraṇasaṁsarge ahamityākāropapatteḥ*”⁸. Madhusūdana remarks that the Advaitins can easily explain the fact that *ahamartha* appears in the recollection which takes place after dreamless sleep. It has already been mentioned that on the Advaita view the mind gets superimposed on *ātmacaitanya* as soon as the sleeping individual comes out of dreamless sleep. It needs to be mentioned here that the mind gets dissolved in its *upādāna kāraṇa avidyā* only during dreamless sleep. *Antaḥkaraṇa* arises out of *avidyā* as soon as the individual passes into the state of dream from the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, the mind is present both in the dreaming and in the waking state. So, as soon as the state of dreamless sleep ends and the state of dream begins *ahamartha* gets imposed on the self. This is precisely the reason why in both these states, i.e. in the state of dream and in the waking state, the self appears as ‘I’. Thus, although it is the self which is remembered after waking up from dreamless sleep, the self appears as ‘I’ in this recollection. Madhusūdana, here, also remarks that, on the Advaita view, the self being identical with pure consciousness cannot be the object of any recognition that covers a span of time. For instance, the self by itself does not feature in recognitions of the form “*so ’ham*”, but consciousness qualified by the mind is the object of such recognitions. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī here quotes *Vivaraṇa*,

“*yattuktaṁ vivaraṇe – antaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭa evātmani pratyabhijñānaṁ brūmaḥ, na niṣkalaṅkacaitanye, tasya mokṣāvasthāyinaḥ śāstraikasamadhigamyatvāt.*”⁹ In this statement of *Vivaraṇa* it is stated quite clearly that consciousness qualified by the mind is the object of any recollection, and pure consciousness cannot be the object of any recollection; because pure consciousness devoid of all qualifiers and delimiters (*nirupādhika anavacchinna śuddhacaitanya*) can exist only in the state of liberation. Prior to that state consciousness is always qualified by some *upādhi*. Consciousness devoid of all qualifiers can be known through the scriptures alone (*śāstraikasamadhigamya*) and cannot be known through perception, recognition or any other ordinary means of knowledge.

The Mādhva philosophers might object that if pure consciousness that is not qualified by the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) cannot exist before liberation, such consciousness cannot exist even in the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, in dreamless sleep also consciousness must be qualified by the mind. This contradicts the Advaita thesis that *ahamartha* is not present during dreamless sleep and if *ahamartha* exists also in the state of dreamless sleep then the Advaitins would not be able to establish the distinction between the self (*ātman*) and *ahamartha*. Madhusūdana refutes this objection in the following line of *Advaitasiddhi*, “*tadatra na virodhāya. mokṣāvasthāyinaḥ śāstraikasamadhigamyatvāditi hetūkyā na*

niṣkalaṅka iti upādhimātraviraḥiṇi pratyabhijñānaniṣedhena cāntaḥkaraṇasya upādhimātraparatvāt.”¹⁰ Madhusūdana observes that although on the Advaita view, the witness-consciousness which is not qualified by the mind cannot be the object of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), it can be revealed through *abhijñā* or the witness perception (*sākṣipratyakṣa*) that occurs during dreamless sleep. In fact Prakāśātmayati in his *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* has admitted four kinds of *vyavahāra* – *abhijñā*, *abhivadana*, *upādāna* and *arthakriyā*.¹¹ Of these the last three cannot take place unless the mind is superimposed on *ātmacaitanya* but the first kind of *vyavahāra* which is nothing but the first immediate apprehension of an object can take place in dreamless sleep without the intervention of the mind. Furthermore, it needs to be remembered that though, on the Advaita view, consciousness is not qualified by the mind during dreamless sleep, it is qualified by *ajñāna* and it is this consciousness qualified by *ajñāna* which is revealed during dreamless sleep. So, Madhusūdana also admits that consciousness devoid of all qualifiers does not exist prior to liberation. But there is no contradiction between the statement of *Vivaraṇa* and the final solution offered by Madhusūdana; for, the term ‘*antaḥkaraṇa*’ occurring in the abovementioned statement of *Vivaraṇa* stands for all qualifiers of *ātmanyacaitanya*. Since, in dreamless sleep, too, consciousness is qualified by the qualifier (*upādhi*) *ajñāna*, no inconsistency is involved in the Advaita theory.

Vyāsatīrtha further objected that if the *ahamartha* is not recollected, then the individual on waking up from dreamless sleep could have doubts of the form “*etāvantam kālam supto ’hamanyo vā*”. That is, “Is it I who has been asleep so long or is it someone else?” – doubts of this form would occur after dreamless sleep.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī answers this objection in the statement, “*naca - yadyahamartho na parāmṛśyeta, tarhi ‘etāvantam kālam supto ’hamanyo ve’ti samśayah syāt, na tvahameveti niścaya iti - vācyam; susuptikālānubhūtātmaikyādhyāsāditi gṛhāṇa.*”¹² The significance of this statement is that if we have definitive knowledge regarding an object then doubt does not occur regarding that object. On waking up from dreamless sleep, the individual recollects the witness-consciousness that has been apprehended during dreamless sleep but mistakenly perceives it as *ahamartha*. The awareness which the subject has on waking up is a definitive awareness. This definitive awareness prevents the occurrence of any doubt or error. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has addressed many other objections raised by the Mādhva philosophers in order to show that the *Vivaraṇa* conception of the individual self is free from all inconsistencies. The individual, in reality, is identical with pure consciousness, but in all states except dreamless sleep the mind is superimposed on consciousness and so consciousness appears as *aham* or ‘I’ in all apprehensions and recollections that occur during

dream and in the waking state. The Mādhva philosophers have tried to reduce the Advaita theory to a bundle of contradiction; but Madhusūdana Sarasvatī shows how all these objections can be answered if one keeps in mind the superimposition between the self and the not-self.

Conclusion

‘Who am I’ – this question has perplexed philosophers of all countries and civilizations since ancient times. Most of the major systems of classical Indian philosophy identify this I with the self or *ātman* and believe that the *ātman* is distinct from the body, the sense organs and the mind. The self or the *ātman* is the enduring principle which remains unchanged even though the body, the mind and the sense organs may change beyond recognition. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Mādhva Vedāntins view the self as identical with ‘I’. So, for all these systems there is no difference between *ātman* and *ahamārtha*. All these systems view the *ātman* as the knower (*pramātā*), doer (*kartā*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) of the fruits of actions. The reason why all these systems admit a self as distinct from the body, the mind and the sense organs is stated very succinctly by Vācaspati Mīśra in his commentary *Bhāmatī* while he states the view of the opponents of the Advaitins. He first refers to the general rule that whatever remains unchanged when other things change must be different from those other things just as a thread of a garland which runs through different flowers is distinct from the flowers. Then, the opponents argue that the self remains unchanged although all other things constituting the mind-body complex of the individual change or even may be destroyed. The opponents of the Advaitins have also tried

to answer the question: How do we know that the self remains unchanged even though all other things associated with the self change? They have drawn our attention to the fact that everyone has recognitions of the form “I who have perceived my grandfather in my childhood is now perceiving my great grandson.” Such recognitions cover a long period of time and neither the body, nor the mind, nor the sense-organs remain the same over this long period of time. All who identify the self with ‘I’ would maintain that if an enduring self is not admitted apart from the body, mind and the sense organs memory and recognition cannot be explained.

The Advaita Vedāntins, however, differ sharply from all these philosophers and subscribe to an entirely different conception of the individual self. They base their principal thesis, viz. the *jīva* is identical with *Brahman* mainly on the scriptures and the liberated person’s experience. In the Upaniṣads it is repeatedly stated that the *ātman* is identical with the all pervasive and eternal *Brahman*. We may refer here to the *mahāvākya* of *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, “*ayamātmābrahma*”¹. The scriptures also state very clearly that when a person attains liberation which can be attained by an ascetic before death (*jīvanmukti*) he realizes that he is identical with pure consciousness and everything else is not ultimately real. In other words, everything save consciousness, namely the world and its components, the body, the mind and

the sense organs are falsified at the time of liberation. The Advaita Vedāntins have argued in detail to show that whenever an experience or a cognition is falsified, it is falsified because of its object. The object of an erroneous cognition is neither real nor unreal. It is *mithyā* or *anirvacanīya*. It needs to be mentioned that in the Advaita system the terms ‘*sat*’ and ‘*asat*’ are used very technically where ‘*sat*’ means *abādhitatva* or not falsified and ‘*asat*’ means *aparokṣāvabhāsāviṣayatva* or not being the object of an immediate apprehension. Since, everything else save consciousness get falsified at the time of liberation, nothing save consciousness is ultimately real. This self is *nirguṇa*, i.e. devoid of all properties, but what appears as I in all I-cognitions is the repository of cognitions, pleasure, pain etc. So, the Advaita Vedāntis are very clear of one point – the self cannot be identical with I. This thesis primarily aims at establishing this doctrine namely distinction between *ātman* and *ahamartha*.

Śaṅkarācārya, for the first time establishes very clearly the erroneous character of all I-cognitions. In various other *adhikaraṇas* of *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* the nature of the self is discussed in great detail. I have discussed some of these *adhikaraṇas* in the first chapter of my thesis.

The second chapter is devoted to establishing the same thesis, namely, the distinction between *ahamartha* and the self following the *Bhāmatī* tradition.

The third chapter establishes the same thesis from the perspective of *Vivaraṇa* school. Padmapādācārya and Prakāśātmayati offer a very clear important argument to establish the doctrine that the empirical self is not identical with the real self. They point towards a particular state which occurs daily in the life-cycle of an individual-*suṣuptic* and they argue to show that the empirical self gets dissolved in this state or dreamless sleep, but pure consciousness exists and remains operative, that is performs the function of revealing whatever is presented before it, even during the state of dreamless sleep.

The fourth chapter is entirely devoted to the objections raised by the Vyāsaīrtha against the Advaita conception of *jīva* and the fifth chapter is devoted to resolving these objections following Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

The entire Advaita philosophy tries to establish a different conception of the human being and a different goal of human life. Since the human being is identical with pure consciousness, everything else, even its own body and the mind and the pleasures and pains pertaining to the body and the mind are not essential to its own nature. Essentially the *jīva* is pure being, pure consciousness and pure bliss. For this reason an ascetic who does not have any worldly possession can lead a blissful existence, whereas a rich person's life is full of woe and suffering. This intrinsic bliss cannot be explained unless it is admitted that pure consciousness and

pure bliss constitute the being of an individual. The Advaita conception of the individual points to an entirely different goal of human life where the goal is nothing but to realize this inner bliss and to lead a blissful existence which cannot be defined in terms of worldly happiness. A person who has attained this kind of bliss is also urged to work for the liberation of other individuals around him who are immersed in the cover of *avidyā* and have no idea of this infinite bliss.

NOTES

FIRST CHAPTER

1. *Brahmasūtra*-1.4.19-1.4.22
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, - 4/5/6
3. *Brahmasūtra*-1.4.19
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, - 4/5/6
5. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, in *Vedāntadarśanam* by Svāmī Viśvarūpānanda, edited by Svāmī Cidghanānanda Purī, first chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya, Kolkata, 2013, pp. 928-929
6. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, (first chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), pp-929-931
7. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*- 2/4/5
8. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, (first chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), p- 931
9. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*- 2/4/2
10. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*- 2/4/6
11. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*- 4/5/7
12. *Brahmasūtra*-1.4.21
13. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*- 3.2.8
14. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*-6/3/2

15. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, (first chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), p. 942
16. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*-7/1/3
17. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* - 3.2.9
18. *Brahmasūtra* - 2.1.14
19. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* - 6.1.5
20. *Brahmasūtra* - 2.3.16
21. *Sūtrārtha*, in *Vedāntadarśanam*, (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya),
p.588
22. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* - 6/11/3
23. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), p.589
24. *Brahmasūtra*- 2/3/16
25. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*-2/6
26. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Mādhyandina Śākhā* - 2.1.20
27. *Vedāntadarśanam, Bhāvadīpikā*, (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya),
pp.594-595
28. *Vedāntadarśanam, Bhāvadīpikā*, (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya),
p.595
29. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*-2/1/1
30. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), p.598

31. *Vedāntadarśanam, Bhāvadīpikā*, (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), p.598
32. *Bṛahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-4/4/25*
33. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad, (Brahmānandaballi, pratham anuvāk) – 2/1/3*
34. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (second chapter, Udvodhan Kāryālaya), pp. 598-599
35. *Bṛahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-4/5/14*
36. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad – 2/1*

Chapter two

1. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāhya with the Commentaries Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda, *Parimal* of Appay Dīkṣit, edited by Anantakriṣṇa Śāstrī, Coukhamvā Sanskrit Series Office, Vārāṅsī, 1982, p.5
2. *Māṇḍukya Ūpaniṣad- 2*
3. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā)*, p.5, “ ‘vṛhattvādvṛmhaṇatvādvātmoiva brahmeti gīyate’, sa cāyamākītpaṅgebhya ā ca devarṣibhyaḥ praṇbhṛnmātrasyedaṅkārāspadebhyo dehendriyamanovuddhiviṣayebhyo vivekena ‘ahaṁ’ ityasandigdḥāviparyastāparokṣānubhavasiddha iti na jijñāsāspadam. nahi jātu kascidtra sandigdhe-ahaṁ vā nāhaṁ veti”.
4. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā)*, p.5, “tathācedaṁ brahmeti vyāpakaviruddhopalavdhiḥ”.
5. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā)*, pp.5-6, “ahaṁ kṛśaḥ sthūlogcchāmītyādi-dehadharmasāmānādhikaraṇyadarśnāddehālmbo’ayamaṅkāra iti – sāmpratam”.
6. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā)*, p.6, “tadā lambantve hi yohaṁ vālye pitarāvanvabhavaṁ sa eva sthāvire praṇaptṛnanubhavāmīti pratisandhānaṁ na bhavet. nahi vālasthavirayoḥ śrūryorsti manāgapi pratybhijñānaganadho yenaikatvamadhyavasīyet. tasmād yeṣu

vyāvartamāneṣu yadanuvartate tattebhyo bhinnaṃ yathā
kusumbhyasūtram”.

7. Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.6, “tathāca vālādiśarīreṣu vyāvartamāneṣvapi
parasparamahamkārāspadamanuvartamānaṃ tebhyo bhidyate”.

8. Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.6, “savnānte divyaṃ śarīrbhedamāsthāya
taducitānbhogānbhujāna eva pratibuddho manuṣyaśarīramātmānaṃ
paśyan nāhaṃ devo manuṣya eveti devaśarīre
bādhyamāne’apyahamāspadamabādhyamānaṃ śarīrādbhinnaṃ
pratipadyate. apica yogavyāghraḥ śarīrabhede’api
ātmānamabhinnamanubhavatīti nāhamkārālamanaṃ dehaḥ. ataeva
nendriyāṇyapasyālamanaṃ; indraybhede’api yo’ahamadrākṣaṃ sa
evaitarhi sprśāmītyahamālamanaṃ pratyabhijñānāt. viṣayebhyastvasya
vivekaḥ sthavīyāneva. buddhimanasośca karaṇayorahamiti
kartṛpratibhāsaprakhyānālamanaṃtvāyogaḥ”.

9. Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.6, “kṛśo’ahamandho’ahamityādayaśca prayogā
asatyapyārope kathañcit”.

10. Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.6, “mañcāḥ krośantītyādivadaupacārikā iti
yuktamutpaśyāmaḥ. tasmādidamkārāspadebhyo
dehendriyamanobuddhiviṣayebhyo vyavṛttaḥ,

sphuṭatarahamanubhavagamyā ātmā saṁśayābhāvādajijñāsyā iti siddham. aprayojanatvācca”.

11. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.6, “saṁsāranivṛttirapavarga iha prayojanam vivakṣitam. saṁsāraścātmayāthātmyānanubhavanimitta ātmayāthātmyajñānena nivartanīyaḥ. sa cedayamanādiranādinātmyayāthātmyajñānena sahānuvartate kuto’asya nivṛttiḥ, avirodhāt. kutaścātmyayāthātmyānubhavaḥ; nahyahamityanubhavādanyadātmayāthātmyajñānamasti”.*

12. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.6*

13. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.8, “idamatrākutam - bhavedetadevaṁ yadyahamityanubhave ātmatattvaṁ prakāśet, natvetadasti. tathāhi - samastopādhyānavacchinnānantānandacaitanyaikarasamudāsīnamekamadvitīyamātmatattvaṁ śrutismṛtītiḥāsapurāṇeṣu gīyate”.*

14. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.8, “etāni upakramaparāmarśopasaṁhāraiḥ kriyāsamabhihāreṇedṛgātmatattvamabhidadhāti tatparāṇi santi śakyāni śakreṇāpyupacaritārthāni kartum”.*

15. *Bhāmatī (Coukhamvā), p.8, “abhyāse hi bhūyastvamarthasya bhavati; yathāho darśanīyāho darśanīyeti, na nyūnatvaṁ, prāgevopacaritatvamiti”.*

16. *Bhāmatī* (Caukhamvā), pp.8-9, “*ahamanubhavastu prādeśika-
manekavidhaśokaduḥkhādiprapañcopaplutamātmānamādarśayan
kathamātmatattvagocaraḥ katham vānupalavaḥ*”.
17. *Bhāmatī* (Caukhamvā), p.9, “*jyeṣṭhapramāṇapratyakṣavirodhād-
ānnāyasyaiva tadapekṣasyāprāmāṇyamupacaritārthatvaṁ ceti – yuktaṁ*”.
18. *Bhāmatī* (Caukhamvā), p.9, “*tasyāpouruṣeyatayā
nirastasamastadoṣāśaṅkāsyā, vodhakatayā svataḥsiddhapramāṇabhāvasyā,
svakārye pramitau anapekṣatvāt*”.
19. *Bhāmatī* (Caukhamvā), p.9, “*pramitāvanapekṣatve’apyutpattou
pratyakṣāpekṣatvāt tadvirodhādanutpattilakṣaṇamaprāmāṇyamiti*”.
20. *Bhāmatī* (Caukhamvā), p.9, “*cet na, utpādakāpratidvandvitvāt,
nahyāgamajñānaṁ sāmvyavahārikaṁ pratakṣasy prāmāṇyamupahanti; yena
kāraṇābhāvāt na bhavet api tu tāttikam. naca tat tasya utpādakam*”.
21. *Bhāmatī* (Caukhamvā), p.10.

Chapter three

1. *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapādācāriya, *Pravodhapariśodhinī* of Ātmasvarūpa, *Tātparyārthadyotinī* of Vijñānātma, *Vivaraṇa* of Prakāśātmayati, *Tātparyādīpikā* of Citsukhācārya, *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakāśikā* of Nṛsiṃhāśram, edited by S. Śrirām Śāstrī and S. R. Kṛṣṇamūrti, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, 1958, pp.84-100
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3. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad -2.4*
4. *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (Coukhambā), p.6
5. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), pp.83-84
6. *Tātparyārthadyotinī*, (Madras), p.84
7. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.230
8. *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (Coukhambā), p.6
9. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), pp.84-85
10. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.230
11. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), pp.85-86
12. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), pp.85-86

13. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.86
14. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.230
15. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.230
16. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.62
17. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.230
18. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.231-235, “*duḥkhipremāspadarūpeṇa pariṇāmitadāgamapādraṣṭṛrūpeṇa ahaṅkāraviṣayādiṣanusyūta caitanyarūpeṇa ahamiti ca vyāvṛttarūpeṇa ca sarvalokasākṣikam dvairūpyamityāha - sarvalokasākṣikaḥ iti*”.
19. *Tātparyadīpikā* (Madras), p.231, “*yadaiva duḥkhī tadaiva tatparihārāya sādhanānuṣṭhānadarśanāt tadaiva premāspadatvamastīyarthah*”.
20. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.86
21. *Tātparyārthadyotini*, (Madras), p.86-87, “*ahamjānāmīti kriyākartṛrūpeṇa, anubhavāmītyanubhavāśrayrūpeṇa ca dvairūpyam drśyata ityavahitacetstyā vīkṣaṇam kartavyamityāha avhitacetastayeti. atra dhātubheda eva nārthabheda ityāśaṅkya, jānātyarthah sakarmakakriyānubhava iti nipuṇam vīkṣaṇam kartavyamityāha - nipuṇamiti. ubhayadhātvrthayosasakarmakatvam-evetyāśaṅkya, yathā gamanakriyāyāḥ svataḥ sakarmakatvam tatphalatvāt prāpteḥ saṁyogalakṣaṇāyāḥ sakarmakatvapratibhānam tadvajjānātidhātvarthasya svataḥ*”.

sakarmakatvaṃ tadvyāṅgyatvena tatphalarūpatvādātmasvarūpacaitanya-lakṣaṇānubhavasya sakarmakatva-pratibhānaṃ na tu svataḥ sakarmakateti nipuṇataraṃ vīkṣaṇaṃ kartavyamityāha - nipuṇataramiti”.

22. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), p.87, “*atra viśayasamvidāśraya ātamā, tara ‘ahaṃ idamanubhavāmi’ iti samvidāśrayatayā pratīyamānātvenahaṅkārasya ātmatvena agrahyatvānnedamaṃśohastīti prābhākarovakti – nanu kimatreti”.*

23. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.87

24. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), p.87, “*yathā sautrāntikamate viśayasya nityānumeyatvam, tathā asmatpakṣe nityānumeyatvādātmanah kathamgrāhyatvamiti sāmkhyanaiyāyikavaiśeṣikāścodayanti – kathamiti”.*

25. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.87

26. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), p.87, “*pramitivadaparokṣānubhava-virodhāt na nityānumeyatvaṃ tayoriti pariharati - pramāṭṛprameyeti”.*

27. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), pp.87-88

28. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, *Tattacintāmani, Rahasyaṭīkā* by Mathurānatha Tarkavāgīśa, edited by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Oriental Book Center, Delhi, 1990, p.798,

29. *Tattacintāmani* (Delhi), p.798

30. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.88

31. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), p.88, “*nanu ubhayoḥ svayamprakāśatvayogāat anyatarasya svaprakāśatve prādhānyādātmaiva svprakāśa ityatrāha – pramitiriti*”.
32. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), p.88
33. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), pp.88-89,
34. *Pravodhapariśodhinī* (Madras), p.88, “*yadyātmanaḥ svaprakāśatvaṁ viṣayatvaṁ ca nāsti, tarhi apratītireva prāptetyāśaṅkāṁ vyudasyan agrāhytvamāha – ātamā tviti. nimittādityatra tadāśrayatayeti śeṣaḥ*”.
35. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.87, “*nanu kimatra vaditavyam, asaṁbhinnedaṁrūpa eva ahamityanubhavaḥ*”
36. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p-230
37. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.89
38. *Vivaraṇa* (Madras), p.244
39. *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakāśikā* (Madras), p.243
40. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.89, “*nanu nāyaṁ viṣayānubhavanimittaḥ ahamullekhaḥ, kiṁ tu anya eva ātmamātra viṣayaḥ ahamiti pratyayaḥ. tasmaiśca dravyarūpatvenanātmanaḥ prametvaṁ jñātrtvena pramātrtvamiti pramātrprameyanirbhāsarūpatvādahaṁpratyasya grāhyagrāhakarūpa ātmā. tasmādidamanidaṁrūpaḥ*”.

41. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), p.89-90, “*naitadyuktam - anamśatvādapriṇām-
itvāccātmanḥ. prameyasya cedamrūpatayā parāgrūpatvādanātmatvatvāt.
tasmāt nīlādiṅṅānaphalamanubhavaḥ svayamprakāśamāno
grāhyamidantayā grāhakaṁ ca anidantayā avabhāsayati grahanam ca
anumāpayatīti yuktam*”.

42. *Pañcapādikā* (Madras), pp. 90-91, “*ucyate - tatredaṁ bhavān praṣṭavyaḥ
kimātrā caitanyaprakāśaḥ anubhavo jaḍaprakāśaḥ? uta saḥ api
caitanyaprakāśaḥ? athavā sa eva caitanyaprakāśa ātmā jaraprakāśaḥ? iti.
tatra na tāvat prathamāḥ kalpaḥ - jaḍasvarūpe pramāṇaphale
viśvasyānavabhāsaprasaṅgāt. maivam – pramātā cetanaḥ tadvalena
pradīpeneva viśamidantayā ātmānam cānidantayā cedayate iti na
viśvasyānavabhāsaprasaṅgaḥ. tanna - svayam caitanyasvabhāvaḥ api san
viśayapramāṇenācetanenānānugrhitāḥ prakāśate naitat sādḥulakṣate. kim
ca pramāṇaphalena cet pradīpeneva viśayamātmānam ca cedayate tadā
cedayatikriyānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ.*

*dvitīyekalpe ātmāpi svayameva prakāśeta, kimiti viśayānubhavamapekṣeta.
atha caitanyasvabhāvatveḥ api ātmā svayamprakāśaḥ, viśeṣe heturvācyāḥ.
nahi caitanyasvabhāvaḥ san svayam parokṣa anytaḥ aparokṣa iti yujyate.
kim ca samatvānnetaretarāpekṣataṁ prakāśane predīpayoriva. tṛtīyehapi*

kalpe anicchatohapyātmaiva citiprakāśa āpadyate, na tadatiriktatathāvidhaphalasadbhāve pramāṇamasti”.

(pravodhapariśodhinī, Madras, pp.90-91, “tatrātmā citsvabhāvo ’nubhavo jaḍaparakāśa iti pakṣo na sādhubhūyāha na tāvaditi. caitanyameva jaḍānubhavavalādātmānam viṣayaṁ cāvabhāsayatīti śaṅkate – maivamiti. citiprakāśa ātmā ātmīyaparakāśane jaḍamapekṣata iti viruddhamityatrāha – pradīpeneveti. kim caitanyasya viṣayasamvandhaheturānubhavo vedāntinām vuddhipariṇāmavadiṣyate vā? iti vikalpya, ādyaḥ syādeveti matvā, dvitīyam pratyāha – tatreti. andhamapekṣya cakṣuṣmān paśyati itivat viruddham. pradīpa ’pi caitanyasya viṣayasamvandhahetau vuddhipariṇāme apekṣate na prakāśanem ityrthaḥ. cetayatikriyāpi kim jaḍasvarūpā? svaparakāśā vā? antye anubhavasyaiva sā svaparakāśatā kim na syāditi matvā ādye tasyāśca jaḍatvāt kriyāntaram vaktavyamiti anavasthetyāha – kiñceti.

ubhayacaitanyapakṣam duṣayati – dvitīyehapīti citguṇamapi puruṣāntarasya svayamprakāśam samvedanam na puruṣāntarasya svayamprakāśam, tathā ātmā citguṇaḥ api na svayamprakāśa iti śaṅkate – tatheti. anubhavo ’pi tarhi svayamprakāśo na syāt, avyadhānānneti cet ātmanyapi tattulyamityarthaḥ. etadvyanakti – na hīti. doṣāntaramāha kiñceti. ātmā jaḍo ’anubhavaḥ svayamprakāśaḥ tadāśrayatvenātmanaḥ siddhiriti pakṣam duṣayati - tṛtīyehapīti. ātmā citiprakāśaḥ

*saṁvitkarmatāmantareṇāparokṣatvāt saṁvidvadyāha – anicchato'pīti.
 ātmanaḥ svayamprakāśatve tadadhīnatvena jagadvabhāsasiddheḥ
 tadatiriktasvayamprakāśavastu kalpakābhāvāna siddhatītyāha – na
 tadatirikteti.*

43. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 4/3/21*

44. *Vivaraṇa (Madras), p. 266*

CHAPTER – IV

1. Vyāsatīrtha, *Nyāyāmṛta*, K.T.Pandurangi (ed.), Dvaita Vedānta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, 1995, p. 484
2. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484
3. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484
4. *Chāndogyopaniṣad-8/3/2*
5. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484
6. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484
7. *Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad -3/4/1*
8. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484
9. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484
10. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Bangalore), p. 484

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Advaitasiddhi*, Ananta Krishna Śāstrī (ed.), Parimal Publications, Delhi, 1982, p. 595
2. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
3. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
4. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
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6. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
7. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
8. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
9. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.595
10. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), pp.595-596
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12. *Advaitasiddhi* (Delhi), p.596

Conclusion

1. Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad -5

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