

**MIND AND WORLD: BEYOND THE
EXTERNALISM/INTERNALISM DEBATE**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ARTS**

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JULY, 2016

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Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate

submitted by me for the award of the Degree of *Doctor of Philosophy* in Arts at Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the supervision of **Dr. Madhucchanda Sen** and that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before for any degree or diploma anywhere / elsewhere.

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Supervisor:

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Dedicated to
My Mother, Mentor, Wife and You all...
Four Pillars of My Life!

Acknowledgements

The Vedic conception of pañca ṛna (five kinds of human indebtedness) bears a splendid value in my life, although personally I sustained my belief in the debts to the deities or gods. But the rest of the four (rishi, pitri, nri, bhuta) ṛna definitely has a great value in my works. My engagement with a big challenge to pursue my Ph. D on the topic entitled *Mind and World: Beyond Externalism/Internalism Debate* always remind me since the last three and half years, my debts and gratitude to the four ṛna as I mentioned.

My great pleasure is to remember the first rishi ṛna (debt) to my Gurudev Hilary Putnam, whom I not only consider as my guru (mentor) but a replica of sage. Whatever I have achieved and will achieve in near future is due to his choicest blessings and teachings. I am extremely fortunate to work under his kind guidance in the last eight years and equally unfortunate as before my completion of the thesis and release of my first book, he has taken eternal rest just a few months back (on 13th March). The impetus and the dedication for the philosophical works and thoughts of mine are highly nourished by the constant loving inspiration; encouragement and remarkable guidance of my mentor and ideal whom I would like to dedicate my thesis from the deepest core of my heart.

My sincere thanks go to my teacher and supervisor Professor Madhucchanda Sen for her helpful guidance and valuable academic inputs that always inspire me to think and construe my arguments more clearly and argumentatively. Similarly, I am happy to remember a few names of philosophers whose precious comments, works and their provocative conversations with me helped to shape my thesis in a better way. I happily locate the influence of Frank Jackson, Simon Blackburn, Maximilian de Gaynesford, David Chalmers, Duncan Pritchard, James Conant, Sanford Goldberg, Maria Baghramian, Mario De Caro, Tyler Burge, Charles Travis, and Richard Sorabji in my academic career. I would also like to add a few more with due respect whose supports and academic help I always remember and here I heartily prefer to express my sincere thanks to them; they are especially my respected professors at different universities and institutes. They include Amitabha DasGupta, Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty, Ramesh Pradhan, Rakesh Chanda, P.K. Mohapatra, Chhanda Gupta, Rupa Bandhopadhaya, and so on. I am extremely thankful to the faculties at the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University for their kind supports and constant academic

encouragement. I here remember my beautiful academic years at Rabindra Bharati University and Hyderabad Central University and would like to convey my thanks to the teachers and colleagues.

I sincerely owe my pitri ṛna or the debts to my parents (Sri Sunil Chakraborty and Smt. Puspo Chakraborty) and my ancestors for their choicest blessings, love and care on my endeavours and me. I am thankful to my sister Soma for her constant care and concern about my career.

Nri ṛna (debts to the human beings), always bring many wonderful memories in my life and I feel content and happy to keep in mind the names of a few who have always made remarkable changes in my thoughts and life. They are obviously my parents, relatives and more than relatives like Dr. Dhynesh Narayan Chakraborty, Mrs. Roma Sen, Mrs. Amrita Panda, Mr. Pradip Misra, Mrs. Bharati Misra, Nittnanda Mishra, Shanti Lata Bhattacharya, Mr. Nani Gopal Das, Anirban De, and so on. I am more thankful to them whom I have not mentioned here.

It is my pleasure to express my sincere thanks to the authorities and workers of different libraries like Jadavpur University Central Library, Departmental Library, Indira Gandhi Central Library at HCU, and ICPR Lucknow Library for their significant assistance during my research.

I am personally thankful to my villagers and friends for their constant criticism and inspiring words. Some of them are Dr. Dipak Biswas, Arun Biswas, Tapas Biswas, Sreejith KR, Lalon Roy, Dipak Dutta, Monoj Biswas, Souvik Sen, Dr. Ranjan Panda, Dr. Niranjana Saha, Dr. Nilanjan Bhowmick, Dr. C.A Tomy, Dr. C.D Sebastian and Dr. Priyedarshi Jetli. Thanks also to my little brothers and friends Aban-Arka for continuously cherishing me with joy.

My bhuta ṛna goes to many of my loving pets, without their enjoyable accompany I could not have done any fruitful works.

One name I must not forget in the long list of my acknowledgements is my wife Sreetama, without whom not! Here again my biggest gratitude would be to dedicate the book to the four pillars of my life, my mother, my guru, my wife and to you all who like and dislike me.

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INTRODUCTION

My thesis finds its basis in, what may be called, some ‘background enabling conditions,’ i.e. it has some background history and here my attempt is to clarify the history that I often call a journey from ontology to semantics. However, the most pressing questions that have been my concern over the years are the relation between mind and world understood in terms of language and thought. So the ongoing debate that I focus in my thesis has initially two parts.

- a. How could the relation between mind and world be possible?
- b. What is the location of content, meaning and thought?

Internalism tries to see mental content as an internal part of the agent’s mind (skin in hypothesis), whereas externalist aims to put the content of our belief and meaning of the terms in the believers’ location, i.e. outside of the skin. However, in the chapters that follow, I have systematically attempted to find justifiable answers to these queries and concerns. I claim to address the issues of location and possession of mental states especially against the backdrop of Descartes’ ‘self-containedness’ thesis. The location claim emphasizes that the mental phenomena in Cartesian sense are located in the speaker’s head and mind, whereas the possession claim insists that the mental phenomena is disjoined from the external properties. Both the theses give importance on the first person authority or the autonomy of the speakers.

In Chapter 1 entitled *A Journey from Ontology towards Semantics*, my focus has been to trace out the Cartesian legacy, by clearly portraying a vivid dichotomy and the interrelation between mind (the mental) and world (the physical). I take up this task both from the ontological as well as from epistemological level. From an ontological sense, Descartes dualism doctrine claims the world-independent existence

of the mind, where the double-edged nature of this dualism illustrates that mind is immaterial and that it is causally interactive with the material body, or one can say, physical world. This doctrine of interaction being ontological is closely tied to the epistemological hypothesis of *cogito ergo sum*, or 'I think, therefore, I am'.

I discuss primarily the post Cartesian semantic base analytic trends introducing Descriptivism and the Causal theory of reference. In the area of semantics, the analytic thinkers give significant importance on the language based ontological trend. Descriptivism is a thesis that gives importance on the descriptive properties associated with a term or word that has some psychological states to be identified in terms of the semantic content of a term that helps to determine its reference. Though descriptivism is close to internal content, yet it first initiates a referential turn of descriptive content that remained lacking in Cartesian content. However, I also look from a historical and conceptual insight how one may construe the mind-world relation by an investigation of Frege's idea of a semantic theory. Many philosophers have opined that Cartesian idea of subjectivity has deeply influenced Frege and Russell and that its tinges is noticeable in the Fregean notion of sense and the Russellian theory of description which bears a kind of Cartesianism in semantics. However, unlike this Fregean version, a new brand of descriptivism Russellian descriptivism introduces the expression as having what may be called meaning, whereas utterances are considered to be endowed with semantic values. Therefore, there is no question about the lack of reference regarding the singular term rather than meaninglessness of them in a sentence. So the problem of lack of reference resulting into lack of meaning does not plague the Russellian programme. We may say that the Russellian theory gives us a kind of internalistic descriptivism. The issue becomes even more intricate and contentious when Fregean scholars

disagrees amongst each other and come up with radically different interpretations of his sense theory – some open to internalism while some open to externalism, a thesis that rejects the theory of description to hold the causal theory of reference. I shall therefore look into the Fregean notion of sense and its varied interpretations and demonstrate how this discussion sheds light on the two crucial problems - the mind-world relation; and the question regarding the location and possession of mental states by tracing a way to internalism versus externalism debate.

Fregean descriptivism is a preliminary platform for internalism. Even Russell's theory of description raises a possibility in the context of 'identity-independent'. Here the utterances that are used in definite description can be satisfied through the descriptions. Putnam argues against Cartesian mental phenomenon and against the mentalese approach of Frege by giving more importance on the idea of causal theory of reference that would be nurtured by the causal relation with the word and the world. I emphasize on the internalists' adherence to descriptivism, first person authority and supervenience in details and shows that this makes internalism unique. Besides, externalism becomes unique, as its primordial aim is to rebuff the mentalese museum myth by moving beyond the internal to find out the location of mental content or meaning of the terms in the world or outside of the skin. The externalist's (like Kripke) strategy is spinning the concept of the world or reality and show that several descriptions that are related to proper names lead us to falsities as proper names are rigid designator that are capable of referring to specific individual across the actual world and the possible worlds.

Chapter 2 entitled *Semantic Canvas: Mind and World* represents the journey of both the strands internalism as well as externalism. The internalist journey can be mapped out from language to thought by intriguing the mentalese approach as

propounded by some prominent internalists like Jackson, Chomsky, Fodor and Devitt. On the other way, the philosophical implication of externalism is expounded in the light of their distinctive expedition from language to the world. I will look at how externalism can construe a causal relation between mind and world through meaning, language and socio-linguistic background, while internalism centre its appeals on some standing hypothesis such as mental content, representationalism, conceptual role semantic, innate language and thought precedes language hypotheses. Their aim is to establish that the conceptual competences are priori to linguistic competences. Even, the *cognitive impairment* that secures the conceptual role semantic argues in support of certain successful intentional actions, which by nature stand apart from the external objects and the linguistic practices. Externalism, an opponent, challenges against any kind of ‘mentalese’ appeal like semantic rules, conceptual semantic, and innate hypothesis etc. Externalism considers that thoughts are language involving and language is a social phenomenon. Externalists probably invert the direction of mind to world. Besides, the way to know language according to the internalist depends on the internalized rules of grammar, the presence of an innate hypothesis that conceptually precedes linguistic competence. The foundational claim of the externalism is that an extension carries over the meaning because of the ‘agreed practices of the community’. But, my point is that every person’s mental state may be psychologically unique, but the concepts are determined and shared publicly. The crucial part of Putnam’s externalism that impressed me highly is doubtlessly his claim for ‘shared paradigm’. Putnam seems right to the claim that the experts not only can fix the exact reference of the terms like ‘water’ through their scientific research, but an ordinary person who is ignored about the chemical formulas can also refer the same thing. It is just possible because of the ‘shared paradigm’ or one can call it ‘stereotypes’ that is

doubtlessly publicly sharable. Even Burgean externalism also demands that the constitutive determiners of the mental states are not bounded by states themselves, but the physical and the social elements are the genuine determiners of the constitute psychological states that only located in the external world, not in the head or mind of the speakers or believes. A speaker attains the conceptual account of something if and only if he/she can use or apply the conceptual account in the process of communication with others through some linguistic practices. Even if we admit that our conceptual development has some biological cum internal processing, then also it is true that concepts and the contents of our thoughts according to the externalist can be determined by the external world. So, the controversy of the internalism versus externalism debate continues and gets heated up in diversified forms in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 entitled *Meaning Atomism, Meaning Holism and Indeterminacy of Meaning* construes an interrelationship between externalism and meaning holism and internalism and meaning atomism and also finds out an amendment by bringing the thesis of ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ as advocated by Quine himself. It also contemplates on an appreciation of Meaning holism, a thesis on meaning and analysis and how it escalates beyond meaning atomism, thereby opening up a new paradigm for semantic externalism. For Quine, it did not make any sense to say like ‘meaning consists in,’ or ‘meaning depends on’ something as he considers meaning as a *second grade notion* that has no direct relation with language. Quine investigates language as a social art that shares public recognizable circumstances. I shall also inquire in this chapter as how much is it justified to call Quine, a philosopher who accepted the indeterminacy of meaning but goes towards meaning nihilism. What I will follow from Putnam’s stance is that Quine was neither a confirmation holist nor a meaning

holist. Quine's position on meaning can well be regarded as 'meaning nihilism' that tries to reject confirmation holism in Fodorian sense.

Quine's naturalism looks for the evidential checkpoints and believes in the tenet of inter-subjectivity that escalates all observational sentences towards objectivity. It seems to me that Quine's indeterminacy of translation that is considered as a consequence of behaviourism turns towards the holistic standpoint as for Quine the sentential meaning of a particular language is derived when we decipher it into another language. Though Quine is interested in the evidential acquisition of scientific knowledge, yet language as a vehicle of thought (in the sense of knowledge) takes a significant role in his regimented naturalistic epistemology that is actually anchored in a scientific framework. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is aware of linguistic trick can be the master of referential language. Another important question is that how could Quine's radical translation thesis reduce into semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his behaviourism? The amenability of native's behaviour makes our speech disposition indeterminate, as the expression of the native can express different things in different situations that incline to accept the 'inscrutability of reference' too. Other translators can challenge even the translation manual. So the notion and the analysis of meaning became hopelessly vague. I further argue on Quine's position of meaning that I call, following Hilary Putnam, 'meaning nihilism'.

I agree with Quine that no doubt our statement that face the tribunal of sense experience in terms of corporate body or whole can have a holistic background. But it sounds uninteresting to accept that in the case of child learning, a learner can grasp the total related body of sentences in order to learn the meaning of a sentence in the communicating language. I strongly consider that the leaning process of language

does not depend merely on ‘knowing that’ hypothesis, but also on ‘knowing how’, a thesis that gives importance on skill and social practices. However, in the next chapter, I look forward to an alternative possibility of the combination approach of the processes of ‘Knowing that’ and ‘Knowing how.’

Chapter 4 entitled *Self-Knowledge and Externalist Appeals* endeavours to re-evaluate the ongoing appeals of reconciliation between self-knowledge and externalism particularly from two major stands – from the perspectives of Davidson and Bilgrami. Here the major concern of mine is to analyse how first person authority and the privileged access of self-knowledge can go together with externalism? In this chapter, it would be fascinating to see that how can meaning be in the head of the speakers though what the speaker means may depend on the things outside of the speaker’s skin or body. Self ascription is one of the fundamental features of privileged access that Davidson and many others renovate from the perspective of Tarskian *disquotational truth*, whereas Burge dexterous conceptions of ‘ability of quoting’ and ‘bi-conditional’ for considering a thought as self-knowledge introduces a new era that I highly admire. Besides, it seems to me very pertinent mentioning the thoughts of Williamson who renews knowledge as action and try to vindicate a relation between mind and world. The residue of belief may be possible because of the maladaptive use of mind to world. The standard debate consists of the claim whether externalism can mingle with self-knowledge. Though Davidson emphasizes that special authority depends on immediate knowledge rather than necessary causal connections that are tied with public meaning, yet he believes in the process of self-knowledge in the sense that object authority can determine the content of the speaker’s beliefs that strictly depends on the agent’s knowledge. He argues in support of the claim that externalism can be well compatible with the first person authority. For him, mental states can be

well intrinsic in terms of the physical states. We know that Putnam rebuffs the idea of objects of thoughts in the case of externalism to elucidate external constituted contents, whereas Davidson tries to renounce the object of thought from the account of self-knowledge to pursue reconciliation between self-knowledge and externalism. Besides, Burge relooks upon the debate from his view of ‘basic cases’ that is also associated with ‘conceptual explanation’ that Bilgrami later challenged in favour of ‘constraint theses,’ a thesis that offers a unified content theory by rejecting the bifurcation of content hypothesis. His *constraint* hypothesis emphasizes that not only there is meaning theoretical level but there are fine grain concepts that can be shared by people through action explanation, a public centric way to look at meaning. Bilgrami argues that in the ordinary cases, the local attribution of the drinking water would be like ‘water will quench thirst’, where the person does not give any attention to the chemical formulas (meaning theoretical level) of the associate term ‘water’. Actually, in this case, the behaviour and the attribution of the content can be determined by local levels where the psychological realities of the deliverance concepts in a theory of meaning have been prevented. The procedure that turns towards to the transcendental self-knowledge induces him to admit that mental content does not only rely on the social world, but also construes content as unified. I would like to stress in this chapter how Bilgrami’s constraint thesis could bring to our attention the external determining items that are to be suited for the beliefs of the agents. His thesis may be regarded as *individualistic externalism* because it denies the role of social contents and hence becomes individualistic and it is regarded as externalistic as it accepts the public nature of contents. In the case of studying languages, an individual learns his/her idiolects, which are more connected with the intentionality of our beliefs and are closely related to meaning and contents. In the last

section, my effort is to see whether we shall go beyond the claims or not. Bilgrami argues that Putnam's externalism can be fitted with self-knowledge thesis, but Davidson and Burge's thoughts are highly unsuited. Bilgrami who is looking forward to see 'how can the agent's content and concept be fixed' becomes stern concerning the conception of the locality of the contents. A reformed outlook that I am searching here is nonetheless a peripheral diagram that has some holistic basis and argues in favour of *phenomenal avowals* to a certain extent in the case of first person authority, but mainly emphasizes the socio-linguistic background of language.

In all these chapters, I have attempted to follow an analytic style that offers contemplation to a critical analysis of language and theoretical clarity. Here my understanding is close to the Wittgensteinian method of 'conceptual based analysis of language' that is allied to the explanatory based understanding of mind and world. However, the study reaches another height when I persuade the idea of phenomenology interconnected with the concept of subjectivity.

Accordingly, in Chapter 5 entitled *Comeback to Phenomenology from Language*, I move towards the debate from a phenomenological perspective. I take up Husserl as one of the first thinkers from the realm of phenomenology who withdraws psychologism in favour of the 'theory of meaning' by bringing the idea of content, meaning, mind-world relation etc. Some Husserlean interpreters consider Husserl as 'mentalese' who tends towards the mental acts rather than the mental entities. It seems true that there is a long controversy to put Husserl as representationalist or non-representationalist, but indubitably, it sounds true that Husserl's theory of meaning has taken a good linguistic turn in the world of phenomenology. Husserl's incredible decision is to continue a break up with Brentano and invent 'meaning intentionality'. Husserl considers that intentionality that causally encounters with the external world

cannot accord with the conception of meaning that Brentano once held. However, there is a prominent part of Husserl's theory of meaning that bestrew two different levels of meaning in his thesis – *general meaning-function* and *respective meaning*. In the use of uttering the word 'I', here, two different persons who uttered the word may express the same *general-meaning function*, but the referent or respective meaning of the word would be different as it refers to two different individuals. Believing in *respective meaning* that determines the external referents induce Husserl to accept externalism. Two expressions that share the same meaning may refer to the same objects. The debate comes down on this issue when we relook on Husserlean conception of 'transcendental *epoche*', a thesis that gives precedence on the intentional content by focussing on the shed of internalism, paving the way for mental acts that allege to refer the external objects, but in reality the objects are absent there. Semantic role in the sense of intentional content can be quite similar to Husserl's thoughts on the *general meaning-function* as it context independently explains the behaviours of the agents psychologically.

I also make an effort to make a critical study on 'What is Being', another Intersubjective standpoint exposed by Heidegger to bring out the 'Being-in-the-world' hypothesis. Here my key purpose would be to exemplify mind-world interdependency by rejecting the understanding of the world that goes behind the subject centric belief systems. The intersubjective transcendental sociality exposes the way in which the involvement of 'Others' can ensure the rejection of primordial question of phenomenological reductionism (close to 'methodological solipsism' to an extent) from Husserlean sense. This approach fosters not only others as co-subjects, but also critiques the era of bland objectivism that is not adequate for curving out a meaningful place for 'life world'. Heidegger himself ingeniously articulates an 'a priori

existential' position of 'Dasein' that intends towards 'Being-in-the-world' hypothesis in a primordial way of *equipment, disclosing* and public world. My point in this chapter is to draw an intersubjective turn by bring the Husserlean idea of 'life world' and Heidegger's 'Being-in-the-world' hypothesis to show that mind and world entangle with each other.

In Chapter 6, the concluding chapter of my thesis, which is titled *Portrait of Going Beyond: My Findings*, I propose to go beyond the debate between externalism versus internalism by revisiting the phenomenological and the semantic approaches that endorsed the mind and world relation in different ways. Mainly Husserlean phenomenological approach ensures the world (object) as the act of thinking about, while the contents (mind based) are the act of reflecting on. The 'directly apprehended inspection' thesis stands the subject that tries to signify *own self* (I) to the others. However, another interesting thesis that is called 'comprehensive representation' construes subject (I) as a social being where *ownness* integrates with the external world and others. We find quite similar view in the semantic approaches of Davidson and Bilgrami in the analytic trend. Bilgrami invents unified content to reject the bifurcation theory of content. He highlights the external determining items under the agent's beliefs that I elaborately discussed in my Chapter 4.

From a different angle, I have adopted Davidson and Quine's approach on thought and language. Davidson's appeal makes it clear that the intentional nature of thought can be possible just because of language and the theory of meaning that have two basic ingredients – holistic method and building block method. For him, language, thought and rationality rest on the communicators in an intersubjective world - 'an intersubjective world is the concept of an objective world, a world about which each communicator can have beliefs'.

Under such a framework here, my whole task is to explore and portray the going beyond method that persist against the argument of skin in (mind centric) and skin out (world centric) way to look at internalism and externalism. The ongoing debate centres rounds the productivity of language, location of content, language of thought, innate hypothesis, conceptual capacity, linguistic capacity, socio-linguistic paradigm, and so on. Internalism and externalism, two belligerent teams' bifurcated content and thought in two extremely different ways encouraged them also to accept mind-world bifurcation strongly. The contribution that I attain here is actually a 'going beyond' method by defending in favour of 'thought' that plays a decisive role here. Thought as an inter-reliant relation construes a tie between mind and world by hooking a causal referential directness to the reality through the conceptual insight of the agent. There is a constant interaction that we find between the subject and intersubjective ways on relooking thought. We cannot detach the content of a meaningful thought from the external world. My thoughts are a part of the language community where I am. One's need to articulate the content of the thought that has some socio-linguistic background as it relates to the reality i.e., world, but the point is that in this manner we cannot dismiss the contribution of the intentioned based conceptual role of a thought that intends towards construing a propositional structure in our linguistic communication. The whole of this endeavour comes out fruitfully in the pages of my thesis.

Chapter 1

A Journey from Ontology Towards Semantics

Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to investigate into the Cartesian legacy that initiated the dichotomy between the mind and the body (the physical). This I do by taking up two perspectives: ontological and epistemological. This will enlighten us about the nuanced interwoven relation between mind and world. I also aim to resolve a crucial problem here. I want to address the issues of location and possession of mental states especially against the backdrop of Descartes' 'self-containedness' thesis.

Besides this, I shall also look into how one may construe the relation between mind and world by an investigation of Frege's idea of a semantic theory. It might seem strange to discuss Fregean semantics along with the Cartesian theory of the mind. But there are historical and conceptual reasons for doing this. Many philosophers have seen Frege (and his philosophical ally Russell) as deeply influenced by the Cartesian idea of subjectivity. They believe that the Fregean notion of sense and the Russellian theory of description actually herald a kind of Cartesianism in semantics paving a path towards what goes by the name of 'Descriptivism'. The issue becomes even more complicated when Frege scholars disagree amongst each other and come up with radically different interpretations of his sense theory – some amenable to internalism and some amenable to externalism. The location of content is at the core of the metaphysical debate regarding internalism and externalism in the sense that internalists believe that the mental proprieties are intrinsic only if they preserve across world identity of internal replicas. Externalism is opposed to this thinking. For externalists, the mental properties are in many cases

dependent on physical or social environment. I shall therefore look into the Fregean notion of sense and its varied interpretations and show how this discussion sheds a light on the two crucial problems that I discuss in this chapter:

1. The mind-world relation; and
2. The question regarding the location and possession of mental states.

Linguistic expression and semantic values set up an interrelationship between sense and reference in Frege's philosophy. Reference is one ingredient of meaning, whereas a function based truth value will be another one. By refuting 'meaning' as psychological content Frege represents reference through sense. What results is a sort of 'descriptivism'. However, we have to remember that Frege also challenges any sort of psychologism. Consequently, we cannot associate his idea of sense with a kind of psychologistic understanding of mental content. I shall discuss in detail Frege's handling of the meaning of a proper name or 'mock proper name' to demonstrate this as he takes the meaning of a 'mock proper name' as a public entity that can be shareable. This idea will show how Fregean semantic externalism will look like.

I would also be discussing a different brand of descriptivism – Russellian descriptivism. Russellian descriptivism, unlike the Fregean one, may be more close to the Cartesian idea of the subjective. This descriptivism introduces the expression as having what may be called meaning, whereas utterances are considered to be endowed with semantic values. Therefore, there is no question about the lack of reference regarding the singular term rather than meaninglessness of them in a sentence. So the problem of lack of reference resulting into lack of meaning does not plague the Russellian programme. We may say that the Russellian theory gives us a kind of internalistic descriptivism. This we shall discuss in detail later.

The externalist's (like Kripke) strategy is spinning the concept of the world or reality and show that several descriptions that are related to proper names lead us to falsities as proper names are rigid designator that are capable of referring to specific individual across the actual world and the possible worlds. Actually, the ongoing debate between internalism and externalism trace back to the question regarding how we can locate the content of our beliefs. Internalism tries to see mental content as an internal part of the skin, whereas externalist tries to put the content of our belief and meaning of the terms in believers' location, i.e. outside of the skin. Here 'skin' is a 'metaphor' for what is internal or intrinsic to the subjective. There may be some cases where we find that the intention of the agents remain same but the differentiation takes place because of the difference of the references as famously charged by Hilary Putnam (in favour of the causal theory of reference). Searle's psychological based representative contents claims for Intentionality of mental states as intrinsic (in pre-linguistic sense) throws a significant challenge to externalism.

My main concern here is to show how the theory of description (in referential sense), first-person knowledge and supervenience theses represent internalism as unique. I also pin down my focus on the source of the divergent theory called externalism that adheres to the determination of meaning and content of our beliefs through causal chain (i.e., the causal theory of reference and socio-linguistic background). In short, my effort in this chapter is to find out the origin of the ongoing debate and to scrutinize that what make these theories (internalism and externalism) distinctive.

1.1. Cartesian Legacy

In the Cartesian and post Cartesian era, two questions initiated a new direction in philosophy of mind – questions that concern with the linkage between mind and world. The questions are as follows:

- a) What sort of thing is a mind?
- b) How does mind relate to the material world?

In his philosophy, Descartes tries to give some fundamental replies that conceptually stand on epistemology and ontology. We know that the modern philosophy of mind begins with Descartes and its historical journey paves a new way of thinking that looks upon the mind and body problem, which becomes a dominant paradigm that challenges against two radical opinions, viz. *Monism* and *Materialism*. Mark Rowlands aptly claims that ‘The Cartesian conception is not just a single view of the mind; it is an array of interwoven views, like the strands of a rope, each lending support to the others, and each being supported by the others. The strength of the Cartesian picture lies not merely on the strength of the individual theses that make it up, but also, and perhaps even more importantly in the way these strands bind together to yield a sweeping and comprehensive vision of the nature of human beings.’¹ We know that Descartes’ substance dualism provides a thesis regarding the causal interaction between mind and body, which are by nature two different substances. The scientific outlook of Descartes led him to think that there is a distinctive place of mind within a metaphysical framework. Descartes’ dualistic doctrine is merged with his epistemology and ontology. From the perspective of ontology he claims that the existence of mind does not depend on the existence of the

¹Mark Rowlands, *Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again*, 2003, 7.

body and the vice versa. There interrelated relation can be regarded as external and contingent. Besides, from the perspective of epistemology, he also claims that we can know and be aware about our own mind. We have a privileged access to our own minds in a very special way.

For Descartes the physical things such as body has some spatio-temporal location. Actually, extension is the essential part of the body, whereas minds are essentially thinking entity. So we can call it immaterial. Now one can ask that ‘Is man an amalgam of two things – mind and body?’ In this case, Descartes’ answer would be ‘Yes’! There is a keen interaction between mind and body, but in principle, they can be separated. For Descartes, the body is not only considered as heavy, colored and hard things, but for him, the body can be extended in length, depth, etc. whereas mind as non-physical substance is detached from the extended substance (body) and is related to the thoughts.

Double Edged Nature of Dualism

Descartes divides reality into two basic kinds - physical objects that is the based on the mechanical philosophy and another isolated corner of reality is the ‘conscious reason’ of man or mind. Churchland writes in *Matter and Consciousness*, ‘As Descartes saw it, the real you is not your material body, but rather a non-spatial thinking substance, an individual unit of mind-stuff quite distinct from your material body. This nonphysical mind is in systematic causal interaction with your body.’²

Dualism taught us about two different sets of properties (mental and physical) that not only posses a dichotomy between the mental and the physical, but it also focuses on the notion of autonomy, exclusion, and a peculiar sort of privilege etc. The

² Paul. M. Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness*, 1997, 8.

exclusion and autonomy are not only applicable to mental, but also can be applicable to the physical. What makes the privilege relevant in the case of the mind is that consciousness brings with it the amazing property authoritative self-awareness. And possibly this is the seat of the conception of subjectivity found in Cartesian internalism that I will elaborately discuss later.

The first set of properties that we call mental properties includes features of thought, rationality, consciousness, subjectivity and self-knowledge etc. Beside, the second set of properties deal with the part of the mundane physical property like shape, size, weight, and extension etc. The conception of autonomy or 'privileged access' of own mind is what that externalism is questioning and I will focus on it later. Doubtless, it is true that many externalists have also tried to restore the 'privileged access' thesis. An individual can accept the both sets of properties that emphasize a mind-body problem by creating segmentation of puzzling situations. We can claim that mind and matter are heterogeneous substance.

Here the problem of Descartes' dualism points out the question about the nature of interaction between the physical and the mental properties. Rowlands says that 'The problem of Descartes' dualism is explaining how this interaction between mental and physical takes place. The general problem is that Descartes makes the mental and the physical so different that they don't seem to share the necessary properties to make this sort of interaction intelligible.'³ Descartes, a metaphysical dualist makes a sharp distinction between self-sufficient minds with the external object.

³ Opt, 10.

Dualism and Epistemology

Interactionism is not only a metaphysical issue. It has a broad epistemological perspective. In *Discourse on Method*, Descartes considers that to get rid of the flaws of knowledge, it is required that we must doubt from the very beginning. But a permanent skepticism cannot be a reliable way of sincere inquiries. From this fact we can show that in spite of denying everything, the denier remains. So the indubitable, fundamental truth of Descartes philosophy is that ‘Cogito ergo sum’ or ‘I think, therefore I am.’

There is a well-proven view that consciousness or self (I) is self-sufficient. Consciousness has a continuous and identical existence as it has a varied and successive mode of thoughts. This hypothesis talks about the persistence of self. One may ask whether one can know certainly that the material objects are affecting our senses. Can it not be the case that we are producing the material objects or that the existence of these material objects depends on our perception? McCulloch claims, ‘We have perceptual experiences and form beliefs which we take to be generally reliable guides to a material environment which we inhabit. That is, we take ourselves to know things about the material world, where *knowing things* about is a specific relation between minded things and their world.’⁴

We will consider two kinds of claims to understand the mental phenomena: the ‘location claim’ and the ‘possession claim’. The ‘location claim’ emphasizes that there is a keen token identity, belonging among mental particulars and the subject’s skin in. It actually says that our mental events are located inside the skin of the subject that possesses them. The ‘location claim’ cannot be regarded as a claim about

⁴ Gregory McCulloch, *The Mind and Its World*, 1995, 9.

properties rather it is exclusively a claim about particulars. Besides, the 'possession claim' insists the idea that the mental properties of the subject(s) do not rely on the external property of the subject, as the mental properties are intuitive and non-relational in nature. So the notion of individuation that is independent of mental properties can articulate an externalist approach to the subject of the properties.

We will find an epistemic repression within a subject that calls for the argument from certainty in Cartesian dualism. It goes like this:

Premise 1. I can doubt that my body exists.

Premise 2. I cannot doubt that I am a thinking being.

Premise 3. So, I am distinct from my body or I, as a thinking being, am not my body.

The idea of certainty does not fit with Descartes' argument for dualism, especially on the external world as it can deceive the perceiver. Beside one cannot doubt that one is a thinking being. So mind as a thinking being cannot be uncertain. It is certain that thinking cannot exist without a thinking agent. The question of certainty does not follow from Dualism. It originates from 'self-containedness' and 'self-presenting' hypotheses. We are not certain about our knowledge of the external world as it can be falsified. But knowing one's own mind has a special content, viz. first person authority that takes a better approach regarding to know one's own mind rather than knowing the external world. The claim of infallibility is associated with the concept of knowing one's own mind. If you do not undergo from any self-deception, then your mental states will provide you an incorrigible knowledge about your inner world. Descartes' position seems little less extreme than the present view about the

first person authority or self-knowledge. But we can surely claim that the idea of incorrigible knowledge of our own mental states leads to self-intimating content or it will be better to say that your own mind is transparently available to yourself and you are the only person who infallibly can think that you know things about 'x or y'. Rowlands also claims that 'Our knowledge of the content of the world – or even if there is a world – is, in comparison, a poor relation. Thus, the idea that the boundaries of the mental subject are, in part, epistemic ones leads very quickly to a downgrading of our knowledge of the external physical world and, consequently, to the spectre of skepticism. And it is precisely this sort of skepticism, oppose, that Descartes exploited in the arguments from certainty.'⁵

1.2. Descriptivism versus Causal Theory of Reference

We have already noticed that Cartesianism is a thesis that promotes internalism concerning the location of mental states and its possession claim. Cartesian internalism claims that mental states are located inside the speaker's mind. Similarly, its possession does not rest on the extra-linguistic entities or something that is external to the skin of the agents. From the way Descartes' internalism is constituted, it is clear that on this view the 'location claim' vindicates a way to understand mental states. For Descartes, the individuation of the mental can be done solely by mental properties. The conception of the interiority of mind not only encompasses mind as a substance that is located inside the individual's brain, but the essential nature of mind is not anyway dependent on the external facts. There is a fundamental asymmetry we find in Descartes' thoughts is that we have a special cognitive access about knowing our own mind that is different from our ways of knowing the others' minds. Our

⁵ Rowlands, 2003, 28.

knowledge about one's own mind is transparent and rests on introspective awareness that cannot be fallible. This is called a 'solipsistic internalism' that challenges against veridical mental states viz. the mental states that are correspondent to the reality or external facts.

Let me see here why I articulate descriptivism and the causal theory of reference immediately after Cartesianism. Cartesian internalism can be regarded as a thesis that gives importance on the *non-relational content*, where contents are located in the speaker's mind and obviously are detached from the external world. So we can assume that for Descartes the meaning of the content would be also internal. It is well known that descriptivism and the causal theory of reference also introduce mental content and meaning of the terms from two divergent levels. Descriptivism considers that the meaning of a general term consists in the descriptive content, where the subject centric description that involved with the conjoining properties plays a prominent role. Descriptivism is a thesis that first tries to initiate an importance on referentialism through description of the contents that is lacking in Cartesian internalism. Frege, a foremost descriptivist raises polemical arguments against Cartesian psychologism. Frege introduces the conception of sense (Sinn), a way of thinking of the reference. Reference is a relation between the singular terms and the extra-linguistic objects. Reference specially tries to confer language a reality. It is not true that Frege accept only reference as a property that ascribes a sentence its truth value. To refute 'the referential theory of meaning', Frege argues in favour of sense that helps to determine the meaning of the sentence that has some referential engagement. Actually descriptive content of a referring term X, for Frege, plays two different roles:

- a. In this case, the referring term that a competent speaker knows can help to understand the speaker about the referring term X.
- b. The referring term also determines the reference of X. So, here the theory of meaning along with theory of reference takes a prominent role in descriptivism that we do not find in Cartesian internalism.

Another important view is the causal theory of reference that not only critique descriptivism but also Cartesian internalism by arguing that the content of one's mental state and the meaning of the term are determined by the external world, or something that is outside of the internal boundaries of the subject. This thesis specially gives prominence on socio-linguistic background and the causal historical chain. They think that the mental states cannot be located in the brains or mind (this is a challenge to Cartesian internalism); similarly meaning a referring term is not determined by the descriptive content associated with the term. The meaning of the term or the content of the mental states only can consist in the extra-linguistic reference, socio cultural background and the use of language (this is a way to challenge descriptivism as descriptivism denies any kind of use theory of language). Now let me clarify first the descriptivist account of meaning (Frege and Russell trend) and later the way to determine meaning from the causal theory of reference (which is an externalist approach).

1.2.1. Frege's Theory of Meaning: A Re-examination of Evans' Response

Though the symbolic logic takes a significant role in Fregean philosophy, yet his broad philosophical framework is actually dependent upon his philosophy of language and somehow on his philosophy of mathematics, which are concerned with the notion

of an ideal language. Frege also constructs a new era of thinking which is now regarded as an analytic trend. He talks about a language that is fully regimented and a rigid language related suitably with his philosophical thinking.

Michael Dummett says, 'Frege's model of language is both rigid and static, and therefore fails to be a naturalistic portrait of ordinary language. It represents an ideal, however, just because its interconnections are minimal: there are just as many as are needed to confer on our sentences the use to which we want to put them – what Quine calls utility in social communication – and no more.'⁶

Gareth Evans disagrees with the points that Dummett emphasised, which have been mentioned above. Evans however, tries to see Fregean semantic theory from different alternative perspectives that I will discuss soon. Let me articulate the theory of meaning of that part of language which is simple and devoid of complications, like indexical and demonstratives.

One aspect of Frege's semantic theory is much more systematic. He emphasizes on some complex expressions, including sentences. For Evans we need to give more importance to the accounts of the conception of compatibility between the meaning of a specific complex expression that is associated as a function of their components and also the meaning that is basically assigned to these components as a holistic function of their complex expression of meaning. Evans says that 'His entire semantic theory was built around an account of the functioning of atomic sentences – sentences in which one or more singular terms are concatenated with a "concept-expression" or predicate of corresponding degree.'⁷

⁶ Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, 1981, 626.

⁷ Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, 1982, 7.

We can consider another aspect as the most vital aspect mentioned by Evans. Evans claims that Frege's semantic theory is developed in two phases. In his first phase he talks about a theory of meaning while his second phase assigns two kinds of semantic values: a meaning as well as a sense. Here one thing we need to add is that Frege's first phase deals with some significant linguistic expressions, like, singular terms, atomic sentences, and predicates etc. If we critically follow Evan's thinking, then we will find that he is concerned about some general features of Frege's semantic theory.

First, Evans claims that the significance (semantic power) of any significant expression (sentence, name, predicate, etc.) is embedded within the sentence which has a truth value. Evans believes that we need to set up a semantic theory in a way that claims for a sentence embed to the same semantic-power and truth value by being a component of a larger sentence. Evan's puts it, 'Frege was distinctive in supposing that the semantic power of an expression was determined by that expression's being associated with some extra linguistic entity. He called such an entity the expression's meaning ...'⁸ The concept of 'semantic power' can be regarded as a function of referents here.

Second, Evans also considers that the semantic theory is also associated with the semantic power of singular terms. We know that semantic power always related with some extra-linguistic entity, i.e., meaning. The referent of a singular term is also allied with an object of this world.

Here one thing is very important to mention that the concepts of truth value (semantic value of a sentence) can provide an epistemic cum logical way of

⁸ Ibid., 8.

understanding. Now, one can claim that though the name ‘Harry Potter’ and ‘Daniel Radcliff’ have same referent, yet they are associated with different meanings. If one believes that the sentence ‘Harry Potter can be invisible’ is true, then he/she must believe that the sentence ‘Daniel Radcliff can be invisible’ is false. The principle of ‘extensional content’ is violated here, as in the case of ‘extensional contexts’ two substitutions of co-referring expressions do not alter its substituted truth value. This is regarded as a natural construction of the meaning of the sentences. Even one of the celebrated principles which is called ‘substitution principle’ for the reference emphasizes that ‘if a sentence “A is T” is sound true and $A=B$, then the sentence “B is T” is also true.’ It shows that reference is sort of property that a term can only be possessed in the sentence that have a truth value.

Evans also argues that we can combine a singular term with a sentence in grammatical level. But in semantical level, we can combine an object with a function from objects to truth value. He also thinks that the function can produce an extra-linguistic entity or truth value. Here we need to clarify the concept of ‘meaning’ and ‘referent’ as it is used in Fregean philosophy. Rick Grush clarifies Evans’ thought and writes, ‘Meaning will be whatever extra-linguistic entity is assigned to an expression as its semantic value. Referent will be one possible choice for meaning (for singular terms), functions might be another (e.g. for predicates). Evans will later argue that one can remain broadly Fregean by choosing, as the extra-linguistic Meaning for some singular terms, things other than their referents.’⁹ Meaning is actually the semantic content of a term that helps to determine its reference.

Now the point is that Frege tries to distinguish between the study of word-

⁹ Rick Grush, Guide to chapter One of Gareth Evans' *The Varieties of Reference*, 2002, accessed on 4th January, 2011, http://www.u.arizona.edu/harnish/paper_unpublished/mock.pdf.

world relations (theory of reference) and the study of word-meaning relation (theory of sense). But he aims at putting all these in *one* fully integrated theory of language. If we critically follow his thinking, then we will find that he elaborates the idea from two different levels like singular terms and declarative sentences which are related to sense and thought. I will focus on these separately below, though I accept that these concepts are interconnected with each other.

Singular terms

Now I will focus on the fundamental part of Fregean philosophy that mainly relinquishes the theory of reference to realize the importance of the theory of sense. At first, I want to clarify that Frege's aim is to critique psychological entities. He believes that there is a radical difference between the concept of meaning and the meaning of the sentences in which it is expressed. He denies that 'meaning is a psychological content'. Frege considers that 'Thoughts are by no means unreal, but their reality is of quite a different kind from that of things. And their effect is brought about by an act of the thinker without which they would be ineffective, at least as far as we can see. And yet the thinker does not create them but must take them as they are.'¹⁰

I would like to come back to my main issue, i.e., singular terms. Frege's semantic theory, proper names, demonstratives, definite descriptions, singular pronouns, and indefinite descriptions, all of these terms are considered as singular terms. We can also consider that for Frege sentences are a kind of complex singular terms.

Frege draws a puzzling picture in the context of proper names or it would be

¹⁰ Gotlob Frege, "The Thought: A logical Inquiry," in *Philosophical Logic*, 1979, 38.

better to say the singular terms. In the case of two identical sentences, if the relation interacts between objects, then we should not find any cognitive difference. But there are such differences and Frege himself trying to resolve it by saying that '[t] he designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name. The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs, but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the reference supposing it to have one.'¹¹

To get some ideas of these difficulties, let us focus on this problem. The two cases that have been considered are:

- a. Morning star is morning star.
- b. Morning star is evening star.

As we know, here the subject term of both sentences 'morning star' designate the same object, i.e., the planet Venus. We cannot make a distinction between these sentences through the referential theory of meaning. Frege considers that here we need to grasp the sense of the subject term which helps us to make a distinction of these sentences. Actually, Frege thinks that in an ideal language each term has two aspects – its reference and its sense. The notion of the sense is here defined as the mode of presentation of the reference. Let us now consider that the sense of 'morning star' in this way: 'A star which rises in the morning sky' and the sense of 'evening star' would be 'A star which rises in the evening sky'.

Here I would like to mention a very important issue that many interpreters of Frege have defined the concept of sense from various angles:

¹¹Gotlob Frege, "On sense and Reference," in *Meaning and Reference*, 1993, 24.

- a. Sense is the mode of presentation of the reference. McDowell and Evans accept this opinion.
- b. Sense is the criterion for identifying reference. Dummett's interpretation on Fregean semantic rests on this way.
- c. Sense is something which determines its reference.
- d. Sense is the route of reference.
- e. Sense is meaning of a sign or proper names.
- f. Sense is the content of thought.
- g. Sense is the cognitive content.
- h. Sense is the logical concept; its truth value remains unchanged in the two having the same logical propositions.

We find a new era in the Fregean philosophy. Frege cautions us that it is not true that every term which has sense also has a reference. Even in our daily life, we find some words that have some sense in language but lack references. According to Fregean semantic theory, when a singular term lacks its referent, it is called 'empty singular terms'. In his famous paper 'Logic', Frege argues that a proper name without its designation is called 'mock proper name'.¹² For an example, 'Scylla has six hands; Scylla does not have six hands'. The proper name 'Scylla' fails to designate any referents, so according to Frege it is regarded as a 'mock proper name'. John McDowell suggests that that 'Mock thoughts should have only mock senses as constituents. If the purpose of Frege's saying that empty singular terms have senses

¹² Frege, "Logic," in *Posthumous Writings*, 1979.

would be better served by saying that they have mock sense...'¹³

Even, a 'fictitious' proper name or singular term like 'Chota Bhim' can be considered as a 'mock proper name' as it has a sense but no any referent. Let us discuss how Frege tries to establish his own view. We must remember that Frege believes in the 'Context Principle', which tells us that the sense of a term can be understood only in the context of a sentence in which that term is used. He also thinks that in logic, we will find that only an assertoric sentence can express a proper thought as the assertoric sentence can be true or false or it alone has a truth value. So it easily follows that there is a close connection between an assertoric sentence and a genuine or proper thought. Here it will be pertinent to mention that Evans tries to see the problem with the background of an 'atomic sentence'. In an 'atomic sentence', for instance, 'Quine is wise', here the subject term 'Quine' is regarded as a singular term; the semantic value of this term is its referent. But the predicate 'X is wise', determines the truth value of a meaningful sentence because a predicative function is a function from objects to truth value. The meaning of the sentence will be true (iff 'Quine' is wise) or false (iff 'Quine' is not wise). Here Evans points out two different kinds of problems which Frege treated together:

- a) It is possible that a singular term may fail to designate its referent. The sentence in which a singular term occurs has no truth value. Here Frege talks about an undesignated value or third value.
- b) We will also find some function, in which the semantic value of the predicate term is partial or may not be defined everywhere. Evans writes that 'If such concept expressions are allowed, some singular sentences will fail to

¹³John McDowell, "Singular thought and the Extent of inner space," in *Meaning, Knowledge and Reality*, 1998, 235.

have a truth value, as will many quantified sentences, especially universally quantified sentences.’¹⁴

Let us take two sentences:

- a. Cicero is Cicero.
- b. Cicero is Tully.

Here as we know, according to the theory of meaning (a) and (b) are identical sentences because they invoke the same object twice. But we can consider the sentence (b) as an informative sentence while the sentence (a) is not. The theory is not able to make a distinction of these sentences, so Frege considers making a distinction from the perspective of theory of sense. Evans declares that ‘the way of presenting’ meaning would be much more objective. So it will be relevant to write that ‘sense as ways of thinking of meaning’ which is conventionally related to expressions in the language. If we agree with this, then we can claim that ‘Venus’ is to be understood as the object which shines most brightly in the morning sky. One can also claim that ‘Venus’ is such an object that shines most brightly in the evening sky. Here the first and the second – both these ways – are conventionally associated with some expressions, such as ‘morning star’ or ‘phosphorus’ and ‘evening star’ or ‘Hesperus’ severally.

One thing I need to clarify here is that for Frege, the notion of sense is regarded as a cognitive phenomenon that is incumbent upon ‘propositional attitude psychology’ as Evans has used. Evans considers that the formulation of sense is a way of thinking of the referent. His formulation is as follows: ‘S is thinking about *a* in virtue of the fact that... S...,’ here ‘*a*’ refers to some account which creates the

¹⁴Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, 11

referents both subject *S* and the object *A*.

Evans himself refutes this proposal by suggesting that -

- a. Sense determines referent.
- b. Two individuals at different locations thinking of their surroundings in the same way (as 'here') would be grasping the same sense.
- c. Now their senses would not determine a referent as same sense would lead to two different referents.
- d. Therefore, the account is not correct.

Evans emphasizes the second condition or 'b' of this proposal to refine that in the case of one determination whether *S* and *SI* are thinking of *a* in the same way by substituting only occurrences of *S* and *SI*. But here one thing is relevant that there will be no change of the names of the objects, for instance, *aI* for *a* (names for two different location). For Evans, 'empty singular term' can be regarded as meaningful when it makes contribution to the sentences, though it lacks a referent. He calls it the 'descriptive name' as once called by Russell. Like Russell, he also considers that atomic sentences employ singular terms which themselves lack a meaning are not significant. I will discuss it later as it is the crucial source of Descriptivism and Anti-Descriptivism.

So we see that according to Evans, the empty singular term may be meaningful as here the semantic value of the empty singular terms depends on its referents. He clarifies his proposal by arguing that one can assign to the empty singular terms not like as actual objects, but treat it as some sets, where the sets are assigned to the singular terms. Either the singular terms contain the objects (the

referents) or sometime it sounds as an empty (in the case of the empty set in logical sense) that has no referent. According to this proposal, we can say that singular terms will have semantic value, as an extra linguistic meaning have.

Now I will return to my main issue, i.e. ‘mock proper name’. For Frege a sentence with a mock proper name will not express any proper thoughts. And if we need to assert such sentence, our assertion too would not be a genuine assertion. Let us take Frege’s own example:

A. Scylla has six hands.

B. Scylla does not have six hands.

What Frege wants to convey here is that the proper name ‘Scylla’ fails to designate something, so it also fails to make the contribution to the sentence which would make the sentence either true or false. According to Frege, ‘Names that fail to fulfil the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, may be called mock proper name.’¹⁵

Now, one can ask that what exactly Frege mean by mock or fictitious sense. From Frege’s writing, it is suggested that there may be three approaches to mock proper names and fictitious nature of their sense. Here I shall follow R.M. Harnish’s ‘Frege and Evans on Mock Proper Names’¹⁶.

Let us then discuss three approaches one by one:

1. *An Idealistic interpretation of Fictitious Sense:*

Frege considers that the fictitious proper names belong in the realm of ideas. Even a

¹⁵Frege, “Logic,” 130.

¹⁶<http://www.v.arizona.edu/harnish/papers/unpublished/mock.pdf>, downloaded on 4th January 2011).

sentence with such a proper name would be a sentence not about the world of physical object but the world of ideas. In his own words:

‘Indeed, one might try to interpret all sentences in such a way that they are about ideas’¹⁷.

One can think that for Frege sense can be regarded as an object, but this kind of idealistic interpretation compels Frege to accept that there are some fictitious senses which are completely changed from the concept of actual senses.

2. Not true or false:

From the Fregean perspective, we can take ‘fictitious proper name’ as neither true or nor false. Though it is true that ‘fictitious proper name’ devoid of sense because we know the sentence in which a genuine proper name occurs always expresses a thought which is either true or false. Frege argues that because of the lack of referent of a fictitious proper name fictitious thoughts also lack its truth values. Frege writes that ‘Instead of speaking of “fiction” we could speak a “mock thoughts” [Scheingedanken]. Thus, if the sense of an assertoric sentence is not true, it is either false or fictitious, and it will generally be the latter if it contains a mock proper name.’¹⁸

3. Not to be taken seriously:

Frege says that in logic, we cannot have mock proper names or mock thoughts. The reason is that if we take logic seriously, then it will require that we need to accept an ideal language which can avoid such an assertion of fictions. It is because of this, if it is said in a film that the world is going to be destroyed in 2015, we don’t take it

¹⁷ Ibid.,130.

¹⁸ Ibid., 130.

seriously, whereas if the great scientists say the same thing, we would be taking them seriously. So Frege aptly says that ‘Assertion in fiction are not to be taken seriously; they are only mock assertion. Even the thoughts are not meant to be taken seriously as in the sciences: they are only a mock thought... a work of fiction is not meant to taken seriously.’¹⁹

One can ask about the reference of the historical characters or some fictional characters like Julius Ceaser or Hamlet, etc. Frege says that ‘Even the proper names in drama. Through they correspond to names historical personages, are mock proper names. They are not meant to be taken seriously in the work.’²⁰

The word ‘mock’ is suggestive. It means ‘as if proper name’ or a term which seems to function like a proper name but actually does not. It seems to me that Frege is no longer taking mock proper names to be proper names without reference because definitely, ‘Cesar’ in a drama is a mock proper name and yet it refers to the great Roman Emperor. We may finally consider that Frege actually is reinstating ‘Not to be taken seriously’ but ‘Not being used to refer’. What I want to say here is that in fictions, though names are used there, they are not used in order to genuinely refer to something.

Declarative Sentences

According to Frege the reference of a sentence is its truth value. He also considers that not only a proper name has its sense and reference, but also a declarative sentence is also contained with a thought which has a sense and reference too. Thought can be regarded as a possessor of truth value in a particular context, whereas truth value can

¹⁹ Ibid.,130.

²⁰ Ibid., 130

be regarded as a co-reference of a proposition. Dummett clarifies that ‘Truth and Falsity are not-or, at least are not merely properties of thoughts on Frege’s view: they are related to thoughts as the referent of any expression is to its sense.’²¹

We can consider reference as a deviation part of any kind of declarative sentence. Now I am trying to sketch my thinking based on the Fregean account. Here it is relevant to mention that Frege tries to make a distinction between direct and indirect context. In the case of direct context if we replace the subject term with a co-referential word keeping the truth value of the proposition unchanged. In this indirect if we do so then there may be a change in the truth value of the proposition.

For Frege, to understand the meaning (both sense and reference) of a term, it is required to know in which context the term is actually used. We found several kinds of contexts and the contexts play a crucial role in the determination of the meaning of a term. Let us take an example: the proper name ‘Fodor’, the context of the term ‘Fodor’ can be used in a sentence, like: ‘Fodor was a student of Hilary Putnam’. We will find two kinds of occurrences in a sentence or context. The conception of direct context tells us about the usual referents of a term or more specifically a use of the term in a context which is direct. But there is an alternative context which is called indirect context, for instance: Arun believes that Fodor was a student of Hilary Putnam.

Here we are not talking about the person ‘Fodor’ by just using the name ‘Fodor’ directly. We are talking about Fodor indirectly as here Fodor expresses its sense within the context of what the believer Arun believes. The changes in context also lead a change in the meaning of proper names, Fodor in a particular context.

²¹ Dummett, *Frege's Philosophy of Language*, 401.

Whatever meaning we assign to ‘Fodor’ in this context has to be in consonance with whatever Arun believes. If we fail to do so, we actually fail to understand the meaning of the expression ‘Fodor’.

Here we find that Leibniz’s law (substitutivity) of co-referential *Salva Veritate* fails to apply in the case of indirect context. Let us direct our attention to an asymmetric treatment of the two following sentences:

- a. Ruth Anna Putnam is a pragmatist.
- b. I believe that the second wife of Hilary Putnam is a pragmatist.

Here, we can apply Leibniz’s law in (a) but not in the sentence of (b) As we know the ‘Ruth Anna’ and ‘the second wife of Hilary Putnam’ are two co-referential terms, so we can substitute ‘Ruth Anna’ for ‘The second wife of Hilary Putnam’ in the case of the first sentence (a) without changing its truth value. But it would not be applied in the case of the second sentence (b) as it will make a certain change of the truth value of the sentence. This is so because it might be possible for me that I am ignorant about the fact that ‘Ruth Anna’ and ‘the second wife of Hilary Putnam’ both then terms refers to the same person.

Let us take an example where the sub-ordinate clause may be true but the main clause remains false. For an instance, Copernicus believed that Uranus moves around the Sun. The sub-ordinate clause ‘Uranus moves around the Sun’ is a true sentence, yet the whole sentence is false as in the age of Copernicus this was unidentified information. Frege emphasizes that when we are discussing about one’s beliefs, the role of the customary reference or truth value takes an unimportant role. One could of course ask what it is that is relevant here.

Frege replies that only thought is pertinent here. We can regard customary sense as the reference in the sub-ordinate clause. In the case of sentences with indirect context, co referentiality is achieved by replacing a term by a term with the same sense. So Leibniz's law fails to apply in the indirect context. One could argue that here the principle of extensionality [If (X) is the same as (Y), and F(X), we may infer F(Y)] is normally hampered. But Frege thinks that here we need to make a reference shift which can help us to map over the whole indirect quotation. As we know a reference of an indirect context is its customary sense. A substitute word can have a same sense which can formalize the reference shift without making a refutation of the principle of extensionality. Once, Dummett claims that 'By "thoughts" Frege means not particular acts of thinking, but the contents of those acts; these contents are objective that is common to all. One person can think, or consider, or deny just that very sense thought which somebody else asserts. Frege made a sharp division between the subjective, which cannot be fully communicated, and the objective, which being independent of any particular mind must, Frege believed, exist independently of being grasped or thought about.'²²

Interpreters of Frege have interpreted his theory of meaning in two distinct ways. The supporters of internalism take the way of *sense* that helps to determine the reference of the term has some cognitive significance that interconnected with the propositional attitudes. Even the conception of mock proper name trace back the idea of mentalese as it talks about some proper names that have no external reference. Cartesian internalism gives prominence to the thought or the mental state, an attribute of mind that needs to be understood from within (following self-containdness). Similarly we can see that for Frege the expression of thought seems subject centric as

²² Andrew Pyle, *Key Philosophers in Conversation*, 1999, 2.

the content of one's mental state has to be understood from inside of the speaker's skin. Though it is relevant to clarify here that sense according to Frege, is an inner specification that cannot in anyway be treated as private specification. Frege emphasizes his belief in objectivity of sense as he argues that sense is the mode of presentation of reference and it would fail to exist when it would fail to present anything to the external world. So the idea of 'objectivity' and the extra-mental reality can be regarded as the core of Frege's analysis on sense.

But another way that Evans and Putnam-Kripke pointed out has some externalist appeals. Evans explains this by citing the Fregean analysis on the singular terms that fail to designate its referent (existing object). For Frege the singular sentence that is constructed by empty singular terms have no truth values. Even Putnam considers that Frege's revolt against psychologism in order to argue that the meaning can be publicly sharable as it is external and grasped by different people. This thesis preserves the claim of semantic externalism.

1.2.2. Russell's Criterion and Russell's Principle: An Approach to Theory of Description.

As we know Russell's view on a proposition makes a certain change in the intuitive category of referring expressions. For Russell, the grammatical subject of a proposition is a genuine proper name, i.e. a name directly signifying an object. A genuine proper name is actually an indexical and demonstrative expression. Here we need to clarify that what Russell meant by proposition. Russell denies the conception of 'proposition as abstract meanings of sentence types'. To understand a singular thought it is required that a proposition should be tied with the particular utterance of sentences. He thinks that a proposition is expressed by a particular utterance of the

sentence. Here his purpose is to make a link between proposition and act of utterances.

Stephen Neale in his famous book *Descriptions* tries to see the problem from two different perspectives:

- a) The linguistic meaning of an expression and
- b) The semantic value of an expression.

Here we can claim that the expressions have meanings while the utterances have the semantic values. But we will find some exceptional cases where a person knows the linguistic meaning of a word without knowing its semantic values, like in the case of the indexical term 'I'. Neale says that 'To know the linguistic meaning of the word 'I' is to know something constant across utterances, roughly that the referent is the individual using the word.'²³ But Russell himself raises quite different opinion in his well known book *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*²⁴ where he thinks that to make a certain change in the context of utterances and descriptions it is not possible to make a similar change in their indexical and demonstrative reference. Let us see the criterion that is given by Russell from the realm of singular term and definite description. Russell's criterion is a sort of semantic criterion that mainly focuses on the noun phrases. Even a genuine Russellian singular term does not lack of reference rather it associated with a meaningless sentence. Russell thinks that 'Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper name, i.e. not a name directly representing some objects.'²⁵ Here we need to talk

²³ Stephen Neale, *Description*, 1990, 68.

²⁴ Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1948, 103-104.

²⁵ A.N. Whitehead & Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 1927, 66.

about some 'sub-sentential expressions' and the semantic values of their utterances. One can talk about an indirect expression like 'the boy is hungry'. Here 'the boy' the subject term and the predicate term 'is hungry' are parts of the whole utterances. What are the semantical values of the whole utterance? Actually, the contribution of these both parts of the sentence will be the semantic values of the utterances. The semantic value can be regarded as the reference of the sentence. Besides, the properties of being hungry of the boy can be also regarded as its reference that has some semantic values, i.e. /being hungry'.

Another significant question can be raised here: what is the genuine proper name and how is it related with definite description? We already know, for Russell, an indexical or demonstrative can be a genuine proper name. Again, all kinds of noun phrases including proper names, demonstratives and indexical etc. are regarded as definite descriptions. Russell brings out the context in two different ways:

First way, the theory of description, tells us that a subject can know an object only by knowing a description of the object that uniquely satisfied a particular description. Russell again writes, 'By a "description" I mean any phrase of the form "a so-and-so" or "the-so and-so". A phrase of the form "a-so-and-so" I shall call "ambiguous" description; a phrase of the form "the-so-and-so" (in the singular) I shall call a "definite" description. Thus "a man" is an ambiguous description, and "the man with the iron mask" is a definite description.'²⁶

Second way, the theory of acquaintance tells us that a subject needs to be acquainted with an object or a referring expression like singular terms. Here Russell goes further to claim that a proper acquaintance relation would be possible in the case of

²⁶ Bertrand Russell, *The Problem of Philosophy*, 2005, 28.

subject and mental contents, like indexical or genuine singular terms that are amenable to the semantic analysis of those proper names. But Russell also cautions us that as a covert description an ordinary proper name fails to fulfil this criterion. The ordinary proper names have two different components: one purely mental and another non-mental. Not even all thoughts can reply on descriptive elements exclusively. In this case, our thoughts fail to relate to a unique set of objects, as in every description it is followed that more than one thing that will satisfy the criterion. Let us take a thought that can be expressed in language as follow:

‘the book is black’

We can express the sentence of this form:

‘this is black’

Here ‘this’ could be a description like ‘the physical object that caused this’, where the ‘this’ can be considered as a sort of mental demonstrative indicating to a sense datum or ‘blackness’. Now we can claim that all descriptions are anchored to reference to such mental items that one knows by acquaintance. Evans argues that the demonstrative expressions are affiliated with demonstrative thoughts. But he tries to go beyond the Russell’s idea of ‘regular physical objects’ to ensure that one can be mistaken about the fact whether they are entertaining a thought (refereeing to a demonstrative thought) that has no reference. But he does not talk about an empty mind rather Evans thinks that whatever is there will not necessarily qualify the criteria to be a thought.

Let me explain the concept of Russellian singular terms that tell us about the co-extensiveness of the sense and reference and the dependence of sense on its

referent. As we know, there are two different noun phrases connected with the concept of Russellian singular terms. The first one is genuine referring expressions and the second one is a pseudo or fake expressions. The criterion tells us that when we will get a noun phrase, then we should look at the sentence where the noun phrase used. If you find no reference term of this noun phrase, then consider that the sentence will be meaningless. A pseudo noun phrase is a kind of mock proper phrase, i.e., a phrase that does not refer to anything but they have meaning in a sentence of our language. For instance, 'the present king of France is bald'. Here the noun phrase 'the present king of France' does not refer to any genuine referring term or object but we cannot say that the sentence has no meaning.

Evans follows Russell when he tries to make a distinction between Russellian singular terms and the expressions that tied to descriptive content. The second condition, i.e. the expressions that are tied to descriptive content provided the expressions referent can be a subject of a sentence (A truth conditional sentence) that may be empty or not. But the Russellian singular term can be meaningless when it is used in an atomic sentence where the refereeing expressions are empty. Rick Grush argues that 'Descriptive names are names introduced by some reference fixing description... Evans will argues that such names are semantically, referring expressions, but yet are not Russellian, in that sentences in which they are grammatical subject can be meaningful even when the descriptive name is empty. Evans is thus arguing that the semantic category of referring expressions has Russellian expressions as one subtype ...'²⁷

In "On Denoting", Russell thinks that the definite descriptions are not any referring expressions. Russell gives us three alternative arguments regarding the issue:

²⁷ Rick Grush, Guide to chapters two Gareth Evans' *The Varieties of Reference*,

- a) Russell's first argument tells us that we can fail to know two definite descriptions having the same referent.
- b) Russell's second argument is more static that says that if one treats definite description as referring expressions, then it will follow that in the absence of a referent a sentence would fail to express a thought.
- c) Russell's third argument is that there is an implicit equivalence between referring expressions and Russell's singular terms. If we consider that definite descriptions are referring expressions then they would be meaningless if they are empty.

Evans criticizes these arguments to establish his own view that definite descriptions do not belong to the categories of referring expressions rather than the category of quantified expressions. These two arguments show that Russellian arguments are inadequate. Evans first argument that can be treated as negative focuses on the thought that if you try to see the definite descriptions as referring expressions, then you will create an inelegant theory with a clumsy explanation. Besides, the second argument is quite positive that gives more attention on the question that definite descriptions are actually quantifiers. Evans also argues (negative approach) that it is possible that Russellian referring expressions have no sense. We can find some informative identity statements that lack the notion of sense. He also criticizes that if we take definite descriptions as referring expressions then the entire system would be non-Russellian approach as an empty definite description can be meaningful though it has no referent. Evans tries to show that non-Russellian referring expressions are possible at all. As for Evans, the description of the empty terms may be possible through the reference of the empty sets that Russell doesn't believe.

Russell's Principle

Russell's principle emphasizes that in the case of the judgement about an object it is required that the person concerned be acquainted with the object and the person must know who, or what or which the object is. One can know easily an object through acquaintance without any kind of complex thoughts about the objects. Here we find some laws and restrictions that need to be applied to Russell's principle and without these restrictions, the principle would be 'trivial'. So we need to reform it again. Evans tries to modify this principle to suggest that 'anyone who is prepared to ascribe to a subject the thought that *a is f* in the first place will also be prepared to ascribe to him the thought, and presumably the knowledge, that it is that he is thinking about.'²⁸

It is very significant to point out that the principle of discriminating knowledge makes Russell's principle non-trivial. This principle talks about a cognitive process of language through which a subject can distinguish the object of the judgement from the rest of the objects in the world. The question is that if we consider this principle as a necessary condition, then what will be the sufficient conditions here? Russell's principle shows that there are at least three different types of sufficient conditions that make the discriminating knowledge possible. These are as follows:

- a) The subject needs to perceive it at present time.
- b) The subject needs to recognize it when it will be presented to the subject.
- c) The subject needs to know the certain criteria that can help him/her to make a distinction between present objects from all the other objects in the world.

²⁸ Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, 1982, chap 2.

Evans in his book *The Varieties of Reference* tries to cash out on these requirements of discriminating knowledge from the approach of ideal verificationism. In the later section, he refutes the argument of verificationism as an inadequate theory. Evans mainly focuses on the Dummettian idea of verificationism that suggests that we can draw a minimal distinction between the two sorts of thoughts that one can acquire about an object. The first thought tells us that one can think about an object to verify that whether or not they have certain properties. We can call it a demonstrative process that can identify an object. This is a one-step verification procedure.

The second sort of the thought that can be regarded as a two-step verification procedure clarifies that in the form of a sentence like ' a is f ', ' a ' is a name and the first step concern about some demonstratively identified objects whether it is in fact a or something else. This is the first step where the subject might be able to recognize the object ' a ' while the second step indicates a distinction between a and all the other objects. Here we find that in the case of discriminating knowledge not only acquaintance description plays an importance role but also recognition is important here. This harmony brings a tracheotomy in Russellian principle. Evans refutes verificationism from two different angles:

- a) In the case of some statements that are involving small, large, imperceptible objects like black hole, electrons, etc. here the principle does not apply.
- b) In the case of some statements that are involved with abstract objects, like unicorn, numbers, etc. also fails to fulfil the requirements of the principle.

Evans suggests that 'Evidently what is essential for a subject's conception to involve a spatio-temporal object is his conceiving that somewhere there exists an object which

his thought concerns and these imaging are no more than the reflection of this idea.²⁹ In the section of 'The fundamental level of thought,' Evans argues that if one think that 'P', one must also need to know what would make 'P' true. So thinking of 'P' depends on its truth value. From the concept of 'Generality Constraint', one can assume that in order to know 'P' is '*a is f*', it is required that here the idea of F-ness would be its property. We can consider it, like Evans, as a necessary condition.

Now Evans emphasizes on the query 'what make it possible that there are two objects of this kind rather than one or three?' As we know that the properties (colour, sound), physical objects, positions etc are distinguished from one another because of their position, phenomenal property, and geometrical properties etc. These can be called the fundamental ways of the objects through which an object as a part of a conception of world can make a distinction from all the others objects of the same category. One difficulty we will find in the case of 'number'. The numbers are differentiated by their positions along with an infinite ordering. The two numbers at the same position are the same number where as two numbers at the different positions are regarded as two different numbers. For Evans the idea of an object of the given kind can be distinguished from each other and all other objects because of the conception of a state of affairs that involving with *G*. Let us think that '*a G is F*', it assume that there is an *F* thing that is distinguished from all other things by a fundamental grounds of the deference appropriate to *G*s.

Here I would like to talk briefly about the basic points that Evans makes regarding Russell's principle. Like Russell, Evans also believes that we can find a special kind of thought which may call demonstrative thought involved with the demonstrative expressions. But we know the demonstrative thought not only imply on

²⁹ Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, 99.

mental entities but it identify also some physical objects. Here it is important to mention that there are some thoughts that we could not get by definitions. We can directly acquire with some mental entities that can be referred by demonstrative thoughts. A truly demonstrative thought entails that the object of an agent's thought exists.

However, two alternative theories that rule in philosophy of language are theory of description and theory of reference. Blackburn talks about the two preoccupations to understand the problem confronting any attempt not to equate reference with meaning and descriptive view of meaning.

Firstly, the theory of understanding would cohere with reality.

Secondly, we must improve our thought that always concern of the things.

For me, the second proposition is quite close to theory of description that indicates that the non-existence things are actually descriptive contents. If we describe them then we will find that the conjoining terms that help to create the word must have some external references. For an instance, the Golden Mountain, i.e. gold plus mountain that have separate existence in the world.

Blackburn thinks that the glory of analytic philosophy depends on the classification and the understanding of reference fixation of our world. We find that our understandings of referential expressions are intimated with the referred objects. Blackburn writes, 'A demonstrative needs a context to give it a reference: it can refer to different things on different occasions, and a competent user of the language will know this.'³⁰

³⁰ Simon Blackburn, *Spreading the Words, Grounding in the Philosophy of Language*, 1984, 303.

Now let me take an example of the term 'I'. Here I can refer whoever uses it. This is regarded as a competent user of our language. If the user denotes that 'that book', then it shows that there is an accompanying indication from the speaker's side that would lead the audience's attention. It is very relevant to add here that it may be possible that one can be well aware about an utterance (identity dependent) but other may not. For an example as Blackburn shows we may speak of the term 'the richest man in Germany is hard working,' and say that a person who does not know who is the richest man in Germany can understand the sentence with the expression, but a person who does not know what is 'Germany' cannot follow to understand the sentence. Even Russell also considers that the identity dependent sentences are quite puzzling. To understand this kind of identity dependent sentences it is required to understand several kinds of 'deconstructing' and 'reconstructing' sentences.

Russell introduces the conception of genuine referring term that is actually restricted on the terms that do not fulfil the referential criteria of denoting something to the external world. The problem that Russell attempts to address is doubtlessly the trick of descriptivism. Accepting descriptivism leads to accept the empty terms that cannot be suited with the analysis of acquaintance. Besides, the second problem hints to the shifting of the reference. In the case of descriptive analysis of a referred term through the descriptive properties or criterion can be well shifted and matched with another term of the world that may have some of the properties of the referred term. If I try to define a term (x) through some descriptive properties like *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* etc, then it may be well possible that the properties *a*, *b*, *c* can be associated with another quite similar term (y). So for Russell the theory of description cannot give a genuine reference of the term. Russell has some tendency to argue in favour of 'demonstrative terms like this and that' as it does not rest of any descriptive properties. But when it

describes something like ‘this pain’, then here the description of the pain becomes subjective centric and the speaker is the first person authority on his/her claim.

1.3. The Origin of the Internalism versus Externalism Debate

We noticed earlier that as an empirical theory Russell’s theory of description raises a possibility in the context of ‘identity-independence’. We can understand an utterance only if we know the indicated objects or subjects that is intended by the speakers. Blackburn rightly argues that ‘Any exploration of the relations between our experience and the objects of the world which we experience, must consider the way in which our experiences might have been the same, even had other objects caused them.’³¹

Putnam introduces a very crucial point regarding the possible world semantics in his brilliant work “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. The most problematic question here is that what would be same and different in ‘twin-earth’ case regarding the context of thoughts and meaning of the terms in language of the argument?

From a counter-factual account, Blackburn tries to give a reply to the questions. He writes, ‘Again, consider two astronomers looking through their instrument, and suddenly seeing a new planet where there should be no planet. In *Wa* they have indeed spotted a particular planet, in *Ws* they have spotted a different heavenly body (a star perhaps), and in *We* they are victims of a defect in the optics of their telescope which made it look as though there was a planet.’³²

Now Blackburn also says that from the standpoint of a subject the imagined situation of this story is same and there is a subsequent intention to refer, such as

³¹ Ibid., 311.

³² Ibid., 313.

‘Let’s get the radio telescope onto that planet’ etc. Here we see that the demonstrative is working as singular terms, for an example, in *Wa* there we find a reference of a particular but in *Ws* we find a different planet. But in the case of *Wc*, here speaker’s utterance does not succeed to indicate any reference at all. Now Blackburn claims, ‘But we have said that in each case the situation is the same from the subject’s point of view, and so it is natural to say that their understanding of what they have said is the same in each situation. If we say that there we need another ingredient then reference to locate their understanding.’³³

This ingredient is traditionally called sense, which according to Frege remains constant in spite of the change of reference. It also fulfilled the criterion for the identity of thought or object of understanding. This sense can be determined as a mode of presentation of reference. It also determines the speaker’s understandings about the use of a singular term in our ordinary language. Here we see that all thoughts can be identified in terms of the universal features and it remain unchangeable even in the case of the three possible situations like *Wa*, *Ws*, and *Wc*. Blackburn says that if we accept the above view, then we should need to accept also the following consequences:

- a) In every possible world, the environment and the subject’s mental state will be same.
- b) The idea of an ascription of thought is a psychological state.
- c) So, in every possible world thought is to be considered as same. We may claim that thoughts are universal.

Here we find some consistent argument regarding the issues:

³³ *Ibid.*, 313

- a) It is possible that in different possible worlds the subject apprehended different truths or facts, as we found in our planet example.
- b) We know that a thought should be individuated by its truth conditions.
- c) So there are some cases where thoughts differ from world to world, so it cannot be said as universal.

Now we see two different angles. From one side thoughts are psychologically real as a mental state of a subject. So it can be regarded as universal. Besides, thoughts are bounded with a common notion of truth and we find different truths in different possible worlds. According to the second sense, thoughts are singular. From the perspective of Universalist view, thoughts are regarded as identity-independent. Blackburn says that ‘The thought is identity-independent, or universal, just because thinkers could think the same even were they in the presence of a different cause of their thinking. It might then seem that we should present ... psychology of the thinker but by referring directly only to the mode of presentation of itself, rather than to the object which it latches onto.’³⁴

According to Blackburn, Russell first talked about this notion of reference properly. For him, a thought as an ordinary name and demonstrative function introduces the universal feature. Tyler Burge says that ‘Reference seems to depend on chains of acquisition and on the actual nature of the environment, not purely on the beliefs and discriminative abilities of the person doing the referring. This result suggests that reference cannot be reduced to psychological states of individuals,

³⁴ Ibid., 314.

unless these states are themselves individuated partly in terms of the individual's relations to his community and/or physical environment.³⁵

Besides, Saul Kripke mainly attacks Frege's theory of description as we find it in a part of Frege's essay 'On Sense and Reference'. Actually, he attacks mainly the footnote 4 of the essay where Frege claims that when various people speak a language where we found a single proper name, then the speakers correlate several descriptions with the proposed name. In some cases, the associate description of the speakers lead to ambiguity and that is a flaw of natural language. For Frege, the speaker expresses name that points out a definite description. Here the speaker is not only concerned about the changes of the definite description but also analyse the changes that are occurred in the definite descriptions. This process sounds like an ambiguity. But in *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke is mainly interested about the theory of the meaning of a name rather than its ambiguity. Kripke thinks that the meaning of a name that gets its sense through a definite description. Actually, the description theory of name points out a proper name like Aristotle that refers to an ancient Greek philosopher. But the question is that how could it be possible that an ancient thinker whose name was Aristotle can be marked with the name after his long dead by billions of people in our time. As we know that the name is a piece of language with a shape and sound. So again, the question would be how one can refer to such a wise person who passed away two thousand years ago by using a name like 'Aristotle'. The fundamental criterion of description theory rests on its use of definite description that is applicable for individual or names. For 'Aristotle' the definite description would be like the best pupil of Plato. Here we found that actually definite description deals with a combination of different words that only refers to the individual. So, one can easily

³⁵ Tyler Burge, "Philosophy of Language and Mind," 1950-1990, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 1. 3-51.

say that description is an identification theory that uniquely refers to the individual. A description would appropriately refer to the individual if it satisfies the condition of uniqueness in that description. We know that the best student of Plato was no other than 'Aristotle'. If we find any exception like there is another best student of Plato such as 'X', then the whole description leads to an ambiguity. So, the core part of the theory is that the name 'Aristotle' can be regarded as a disguise definite description as the name 'Aristotle' is able to refer to the individual Aristotle because of the uniqueness of the definite description. For Frege, the sense of the definite description depends on the mode of presentation of the reference. Sense can help us to understand or grasp the name of the referred term. So, following Collin McGinn, we can claim that 'The theory of description, then is a theory of what understanding the name consist in, and what once grasping the meaning of a name is a grasping of.'³⁶ In *Naming and Necessity*, Saul Kripke challenges against the Fregean description theory. Description theory gets its fame because it is one of the natural theories that give significance on the psychological condition of the speaker who utters or understands a name. The reason is that in the case of a synonymous description of a name, the description must be psychologically depends on the mind of the speaker. We find two types of synonymies in a sentence like 'A is A' or 'A is B'. In the case of 'A is A', we say that 'all dogs are dogs' or in the case of 'A is B', like 'bachelors are unmarried man', here, if a person know the meaning of the subject term 'bachelor', then there would be no problem for him to understand that 'bachelors are unmarried men'. This is an analytic knowledge that is associated with a priority. Here the necessity of the truth value of the sentence rests on the synonymy of the two terms that are used in the proposition. Here the main point of the description theory lies in the three

³⁶ Ibid., 38.

fundamental criterions: a priority, analyticity and necessity. Kripke challenges against the three criterions of the description theory. He argues that in the name of the description theory like 'Aristotle' in the sentence 'Aristotle was the best pupil of Plato', here; mainly the description 'the best pupil of Plato' is not a necessary truth. It is actually a contingent truth. Kripke refutes descriptive thought of argument regarding necessary truth by urging a theory of possible world, a totally different world. It may well be possible that in a different possible world, 'Aristotle' will not be the best student of Plato. He may be interested in music or playing a harp. So Kripke stresses that definite description cannot absolutely bring out a necessary truth. In some cases, it may turn out as contingent facts. Here one can ask Kripke that what he thinks about the necessary truth. Kripke answers that necessary truth would be like the mathematical fact like $2+2 = 4$ or 'all mothers are women'. Kripke's argument familiar with the name of modal argument because it gives importance on the question of modality that means the conceptions of necessity and contingency. Kripke's modal arguments regarding names are related to his famous invention of rigid designator. For him, names are rigid designators while definite descriptions can be regarded as non-rigid designators as it goes to falsity. Kripke believes that name can be regarded as rigid designators because it only refers to a specific individual from our actual world to possible world. Whereas non-rigid designators viz. the description theory denotes a contingent property of the object of the world.

Kripke's second objection against the theory of description is coming from a non-modal perspective, where he attacks the statement of analyticity. Description theory deals with the matter that *a priori* knowledge would be analytic. Moreover, in the case of analytic statement, the terms would be synonymous. But Kripke gives us an example to show that most of the common people who do not know about science

can commonly claim that ‘Newton was great scientist’ and ‘Einstein was a great scientist’. In this case, we see that common man doesn’t know how to make a distinction between two descriptions where the predicate term ‘a great scientist’ is already same because the common man does not have sufficient knowledge regarding the scientific discoveries of Newton and Einstein. But the mere description about the scientists could not help us to pick out one scientist from another. He claims that the descriptive information that is coming from the speaker’s mind is not able to determine the names like ‘Einstein’ and ‘Newton’ etc. Colin writes, ‘Frege (and later Russell) thought that when using a name like “Plato” or “Aristotle” we have in mind some famous deeds of the individual denoted. Eventually, the description of those famous deeds becomes synonymous with the name. Kripke’s objection to this proposal is that when a person performs those famous deeds, he has not *necessarily* performed them. It is conceivable that he might not have performed such deeds, and therefore it is not a necessary truth that he performed those deeds.’³⁷

In his paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Putnam argues that the content of our concepts, the meanings of the terms and the propositional attitudes cannot be determined by merely mental states of the speaker. We can determine contents and meaning through the physical and social environment. Actually, belief-desire psychology or folk psychology is regarded as non-solipsistic in its approach. So, here mental contents do not supervene on the subject’s brain states. For descriptivist, because of some internal descriptivist contents an object turns out as an intentional object. Now, one can argue that how could be descriptivism entail externalism as we know that both theories are very opposed to each other. There may be some descriptive externalist thoughts that I will focus later. According to Frege, sense can

³⁷ Collin McGinn, *Philosophy of Language: The Classics Explained*, 2015, 42.

determine the reference of a word and our minds can also grasp the abstract entity like sense. So, we can claim following Frege that a sort of psychological act of grasping can identify the reference of a term.

Internalism emphasizes that the intentionality of the mental state is dependent on the nature of the subject's mind or in other words, intentionality actually supervenes on the agent's brain states. We know that 'methodological solipsism'³⁸ taught us that the determination of the reference of content might be possible due to subject's thought. Externalist challenges this idea. Putnam's 'twin earth thought experiment' endorses that in spite of the identical mental states or contents, the environment or something outside of the head can define the difference of the reference. Now the question is that why Oscar₂ in Putnam's 'twin earth thought experiment' does not think about 'water'? Actually, Putnam claims that because of the conception of indexicality of the term 'water', we never claim that intension determines extension. For the natural kind term like 'water', the theory of intension determines extension does not apply. Similarly, the same theory cannot be applied also for indexical terms like 'I', 'this' and 'that' etc. Putnam thinks that the indexicality of the terms entails that the meaning of a term is externally determined. Externalism proves that there may be the same intension of an agent regarding different extensions. We can claim that an agent can ask that 'this is my ball pen' but counterfactually this pen that lay in front of the speaker was the pen of his best friend that is perceptually indistinguishable from his own pen.

Stalnaker wonderfully portrays the problem of internalism and externalism in this way: 'The internalists' problem then is, how do we move beyond these to form a conception of an external world, and how are we able to know that the world beyond

³⁸ Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, 220.

us answers to the conceptions that we form. The externalist, in contrast, proposes that we begin with the world we find ourselves in, and with what either common sense or our best scientific theories tell us about it. Among the things we find are human beings – ourselves – who are things that (it seems) can know about the world, can experience it, have a point of view in it.’³⁹ Internalists critique the externalist’s view by questioning their pessimistic approach that assumes an external world that will give an answer of their all internal conceptions. Actually, they are rejecting the knowledge about internal world. Externalists response is that they do not believe in what internalists’ have taken for granted the idea of phenomenon of mental entities. They located internal world in the wider boundary of external objects viz. external world.

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke tries to attack internalist thoughts of the phenomenal character of experience that is to be explained in terms of intentional content. As we know that internalists who follow descriptivist’s’ strategies considers that we can refer to a concrete individual by referring its properties and relations in terms of the thoughts that are internal to the mind or in other words, mind could grasp it from the insight. From Fregean perspective, internalist claims that in some sense, our content of thoughts and speeches are regarded as internal to the mind. Even we can find a propensity towards internalism in Russell’s view. Though Russell had a tendency to think that proposition might have a relation with physical objects, but he becomes internalist when he holds the view that an agent who was acquainted with all the constituent properties of the object can grasp this proposition. An agent can grasp this sort of acquisition of the constituent properties of an object only if the object is regarded as mental objects.

³⁹ Robert Stalnaker, *Our Knowledge of the Internal World*, 2008, 3.

Kripke mainly attacks the descriptive adequacy of the internalistic approach to say that there are some cases where a speaker does not have the required conceptual resources that can help him/her to refer to the exact referent. Kripke's another argument is that if we accept the descriptivist account as correct, and then the internalist theory cannot provide a satisfactory account of reference without accepting the externalists' view of referring to know the object in terms of causal reference. It is not possible for a speaker or a thinker to get 'perfect and complete' acquaintance of properties that can refer to the external object.

John Perry also believes that our thoughts refer to different intentional objects and the thoughts are different due to their truth-conditions. There may be some cases where intensions can be same but differentiation is occurred because of their extensions. It may possible that the thoughts that are related with indexical may well differ in extensions while they are sharing the intensions. Let us discuss how the concept of indexical account set out with Putnam's externalism. Externalism focuses on the idea that an agent can rightly point out the term 'water' by saying that 'this is water' only if the indexical liquid have the elements that are causally related with the other similar stuffs which most of the people in his/her linguistic community called 'water'. The relational elements that help to construe the term (water) can be determined by some scientific investigations in our actual world. The standpoint of externalism looks the legitimate thoughts that the meaning of the term like 'water' is determined by ostensively. Putnam was not satisfied with his previous arguments (indexical elements) fully, so he suggests that relational properties or elements that cannot be fully determined by speaker's intension. He mainly gives importance to microstructures or the chemical formulas of the natural kind terms like 'H₂O' for 'water' in earth. Because of this reason 'XYZ' properties cannot be regarded as

‘water’ rather than ‘twater’ in ‘twin earth’. One can still argue that one can be a descriptivist when one is defining the term ‘water’ by using an explicit description like ‘what has the same microstructure as this’. So a descriptivist may be well externalist in the sense that description can also express the microstructure of the natural kind terms.

John Searle opposes the externalist arguments mainly Putnam’s physical externalism, a thesis, where the reference of a term can be determined through the indexical or microstructure by arguing that this is a substitute process of re-establishing one intensional content for another intensional content where the both intensional contents are determined through extensions. Searle believes that Putnam’s externalism designs the meanings are not in the head hypothesis because for Putnam we do not know the microstructure that determines the extensions fully. So the brain or head of the agent can be regarded as insufficient for determining the extension of the natural kind terms like ‘water’.

In his book *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Searle claims that ‘Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.’⁴⁰ For Searle, Intentionality is an *aboutness* feature. When a person believes, then he/she believe in something. When one desires, then he/she must desire for something. So, it shows that the mental states like, beliefs, desires, fears, etc intend to the intentional objects. Now, one can claim that ‘Is there any intentional state that have no causal directness to the object?’

⁴⁰ John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, 1983, 1.

In this case, we see that there is no pain of something just as the way there is love or hate for something. Internalist like Frank Jackson claims that ‘The object of a pain is the (putative) disturbance located where the pain is felt to be. I of course agree that there is nothing a pain is of in the sense in which there is something one fearful of.’⁴¹ However, the problem is that we cannot claim that every mental state has an intentional object. What will be the intentional object of the mental state like, truth, universality etc? The concept of truth or universality lack intentional object. Searle actually gives us the example of undirected elation and anxiety. A certain change in intended objects can lead a consequent change in our beliefs. I believe in ‘ghost’ and I believe in ‘cancer’ is not anyhow a same belief. Searle thinks that even in the case of a mental state that is directed towards an existing object has an internalistic perspective. There are no beliefs that independently attached to an object.

Searle articulated three different features of Intentionality that are as follows:

- a) Psychological mode and representative content are two important features of Intentional states. The former deals with beliefs-desires psychology, whereas the later pertains to what is believed or what is desired etc. It is not that the intentional states have its own content but intentional states with its content refer to object.
- b) Mental states do not only depend upon the psychological modes. Let me take two ordinary examples, if X (a person) claims that ‘it is too hot today’, here the direction is mind to world but in the case of a belief where X (a person) believes that ‘Bhajahari (his friend) will come to visit his home today’; here the direction is of verse or towards world to mind. So, we find that

⁴¹ I am personally indebted to Frank Jackson for this note.

intentionality and mental states have contents and as well as objects; they are directed to fit together.

- c) The ‘condition of satisfaction’ is also a fundamental feature of Intentionality. It helps to understand Intentionality as an intention that can be satisfied only if what is intended is satisfied. When we want to know a person’s intentional state, then we must understand it in what condition his/her intention would be satisfied.

Now Searle claims that the Intentionality of mental states is intrinsic. It is not derived from other as Intentionality is considered here as a bedrock. But language’s Intentionality is derived as it has some representational capacities. Searle writes, ‘A sentence is a syntactical object on which representational capacities are imposed: beliefs, desires, and other Intentional states are not, as such, syntactical objects (though they may be and usually are expressed in sentences), and their representational capacities are not imposed but are intrinsic.’⁴² A parallel between language and mental states is drawn in terms of the contribution of the mind to language. Mind imposes Intentionality on language purposefully. The purpose is for language to express a psychological state. It is not that language does not have any significant role here, it helps mind to think. Language has the ability to refer and attributes that can be regarded as a mirror of the mind. We know that only words that are the part of language have meanings but there is a lack of meaning in mental states because mental states are by nature intentional. Logical positivists and ordinary language philosophers give significance on language rather than mind. They consider that the notion of incapability of understanding language denying the sense of knowing or believing of our mental states. Through language, we can structure or

⁴² Searle, 1983. vii-viii.

categorize the concepts of mind. Thinking is such a process that depends upon language. Even Searle accepts that without the help of language we cannot explain mind's Intentionality. Searle also raises a wonderful point by suggesting that we will find that animals and children have pre-linguistic forms of Intentionality. The children develop a richer concept of Intentionality or a complex series of developing mental states that interacted with Intentionality are possible when we anticipate and develop a more categorize linguistic form.

I would like to come back to Searle's arguments that challenge Putnam's thoughts on externalism. Searle interprets his thesis in support of the argument that intension determines extension. He argues that to be an extension of a relevant part of intension, anything has to follow certain conditions that are set up by intension itself. However, it would be quite odd to think that how could the relevant intension determine those conditions that help us to set up the intension itself. One can argue that the process of setting conditions along with the determination (speaker's decision) can go towards indeterminacy. Let us take Searle's famous thought experiment⁴³, the murder of Brown that will help us to understand the critical argument more clearly. In this case, we cannot claim that the intension of 'identical in structure with the stuff' cannot able to determine an extension fully. The reason is that in this case, a sort of indeterminacy takes place because of the indexical word 'this stuff'. It would be no way possible that an intension determines an extension as in the case of subject's knowledge; the argument of intension of 'identical in structure with the stuff' is not able to show the properties that an object has in order to fall under its extension. The prominence of externalism especially in twin earth case is that the twin earth case deals with extra-mental facts. In this case, if Oscars are familiar with the

⁴³ Please see the John Searle's *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind*, 1983. 205-206.

fact that while he/she is thinking about water or twater thought, and then their intensions would determine the extensions. But externalism shows that this hypothesis cannot be possible due to the extra-mental facts or environment that significantly determines the extension of the terms. So, meaning that determines an extension cannot rest in the head.

One can argue that in externalism agent's indexical thoughts that involve external elements can be able to determine the required referents of the thoughts. But the concept of indexicality cannot be a necessary or sufficient condition for externalist account. There may be some cases where the extension of indexical properties cannot involve external objects, like in the case of 'I' thoughts or an agent's thoughts about his ball pen. A descriptive indexical thought could be external. Here, the descriptive elements indicate the externality of the indexical thought.

The fundamental criterions on externalism are mainly the causal theory of content and reference. I would like to revisit the arguments of Searle's against externalism. Searle believes like Putnam that 'water' in our earth cannot refer to XYZ. Now the difficulty for him to face the externalist's stance, i.e. two identical minds can determine two different extensions. Searle replies that the self referential character of this content like 'water' and 'twater' have made a difference between intentional contents of the agents. For him, we can find the analysis that help us to know the definition of water like 'water is whatever is identical in structure to the stuff causing this visual experience, whatever that structure is'. Since, Oscars have different visual experiences and each of the experiences is designated by the term 'this' in agent's own experience and these experiences are caused by different structures of the various stuffs. Therefore, like different extensions, the agents' (Oscars) thoughts relate to different extensions as well as different intentional

contents. Even in the case of 'elm' and 'beach', where, according to externalist Putnam, we can make the difference of the trees 'elm' and 'beach' in their linguistic environment through experts as the intention is same but there is a differentiation in its extension that only experts can point out. Searle again tries to put this externalist juncture in conceptual role semantics. He suggests that though Putnam is familiar about the differentiation of 'elm' and 'beach' tree in his idiolect as he knows that elms are not beaches and beaches are not elms at all and this is a conceptual base knowledge, so the differentiation between 'elm' and 'beach' does not depend on its extensions but rather on its different conceptions. Both for Putnam and Searle, 'elm' and 'beach' are two different semantical contents. But for Searle, this semantical content is different because of their concepts that are intension based, whereas Putnam argues that this semantical content are determined by the experts because of their different extensions that a layperson cannot determine.

1.4. What Makes Internalism Unique?

Here I will look upon the several arguments that make Internalism unique and can be considered as the fundamental criterions of Internalism. The arguments are as follows:

1.4.1. Description Theory of Reference

Frank Jackson, a prominent internalist tries to preserve the description theory of reference (a thesis that makes Internalism unique) to refute the famous causal theory of reference, a thesis that adored by externalists. He claims that the objections that are raised against the description theory of reference are a type of the misunderstanding of the theory. Following Locke, Jackson claims that 'language is principally about states of belief' or in a word language is about how things are. The attraction of the description theory of reference is that one can talk about something that is invisible to

the speaker like one can claim that atom exists or there are electrons etc. He writes that 'If we are to use physical structures to give information on how we take things to be, we need association in the minds of transmitters and receivers of the putative information between the various structures and the various ways things might be.'⁴⁴ Jackson thinks that a 'flag' has different indications in various situations like road works, national dignitaries, and death of a famous person. An agent gets the knowledge of the 'flag' when he passes through a knowing association. There is no causal and necessary relation between a half-mast flag and the death of any famous personality. Similarly, the words and the physical structures teach us how we take things to be. In this case, we need an association of words with properties. Jackson's purpose is to show that the description theory of reference is not a mere theory of description. But we can reformulate it as a public language because here, public availability of the token of language. We have a tendency to use word and receive the information. Because of the property that makes a relation between word and thing, the description theory of reference has two parts – 'reference' and proper or common noun.

One of the relevant objections raise by Michael Devitt against the description theory is that this theory is an essentially incomplete theory. The motive of the description theory is to describe the association of the word in the matter of explaining the reference of a word. In the case of explanation, the reference of the word rests on the reference of the other words. So the process cannot go further. But Jackson claims that Devitt himself misunderstood the theory. Jackson argues that 'The description theory explain the reference of a word as that which possesses the

⁴⁴ Frank Jackson, "Reference and Description Revisited," 1998, 202.

property or properties associated with the word... it is not an essential part of the theory that we should have words or 'other words', for these properties.'⁴⁵

The philosophers who believe in the defence of the 'language of thought' mainly support that there is no difference between the problem of the reference for the public words and the reference of the words in mentalese. Even the revised version of the description theory argues that the reference of a term is given by the agents according to his/her association of properties that are related with the referred term. Jackson claims that in this case the subject has words in his/her mentalese that refer to those properties. So the journey is to pass from words in the language towards words in mentalese.

Someone like Jackson can see a difference between the two domains that I mentioned earlier for the sake of arguments. If we claim following John Locke that the words are actually voluntary signs then it would be plausible to establish a distinction between the reference for words in public language and the reference of words in mentalese. We can replace the word 'water' for 'gold' only if we have agreed to use the word 'gold' instead of the word 'water' in the circumstances where in fact use the term 'water' in a public language. This is no doubt an implicit convention of usage where we language users are involved in conversation because of there is a plausibility to accept the description theory of reference.

Jackson also shows the proposed difference between the words of reference in public language and the words of reference in mentalese. He argues that 'But this picture only makes sense for words in a public language; it would be a non sense to suppose that we entered into a convention to use the words of mentalese in certain

⁴⁵ Ibid., 203-204.

circumstances. Because we do not know what they are, we cannot make agreements concerning them.’⁴⁶

I would like to clarify the description theory in detail that goes in favour of Internalism. For Keith Donnellan, definite description may succeed to refer to what the speaker wishes talk of in an independently particular occasion of the use of a sentence. Russellian thoughts on definite description are more close to referential use. Besides, Peter Strawson is also a prominent supporter of ‘referential use of definite description’. Donnellan argues that ‘But what I think he (Strawson) did not see is that a definite description may have a quite different role – may be used non-referentially, even as it occurs in one and the same sentence. Strawson, it is true, points out non referential uses of definite description but which use a definite description has seems to be for him a function of the kind of sentence in which it occurs; whereas, if I am right, there can be two possible uses of a definite description in the same sentence.’⁴⁷

Donnellan tries to argue that the definite description may have two different angles – attributive use and the referential use. For attributive use, a speaker attributively uses a definite description in an assertion mentioning about whatever or whoever is the so and so. Besides, a referential use of a definite description gives importance on an assertion of a used description to help an audience to pick out the person the speaker is talking about. So we notice that in the first case, a speaker’s intended reference has to fit the description of something, whatever or whoever it may be. But in the referential uses, the main job of definite description is to call attention to a person or a thing, here, the attributing of being so and so does not make any sense. Following Donnellan, we can clarify the distinction of attributive use and

⁴⁶ Ibid., 204.

⁴⁷ Robert Stalnaker, 2008, 51.

referential use by showing an example. Let's imagine that X, a most wonderful lovely person was murdered last night. Now, we can assume that 'X's murderer is insane'. In this case, we don't know who murdered X. But considering the circumstances, we attributively use a definite description like 'X's murderer is insane'. Now suppose, Y has been charged with X's murder and at trial we saw some abnormal behaviours of Y. In this case, our sentence 'X's murderer is insane' is quite compatible with Y as Y is an insane person. If anyone asks me whom we are referring by using the description, then I will point out to Y. For Donnellan, this is a referential use of a definite description. Actually Donnellan thinks that the distinction between the referential and attribute use of definite description rests on the beliefs of the speaker. And, it carries some implications that are well fitted with the description. An agent who uses a definite description referentially believes also that what he wishes to refer is well fitted with the description that he expressed. Even in the case of attributive use of description, there is no chance of misdescription of speaker's belief. Besides, in the case of referential use of description, the implication of the description shows that a person can normally describe rightly what he wants to refer.

The slogan of externalism that attacks the internalist point of view is obviously in Putnam's words 'Meaning just ain't in the head'. Michael Devitt also in his well-known work *Coming to Our Senses* points out that the descriptive association of a word is no more than an outer state of the agent. As an externalist, he argues that 'No such inner state can make the word refer to a particular referent. For that, we must look for some relation that language and mind have to think outside themselves - we must look for an external relation.'⁴⁸ Jackson, as an internalist cannot support the argument fully, though he considers that this is a crucial argument against internalism.

⁴⁸ Michael Devitt, *Coming To Our Senses*, 1996, 160.

Jackson believes that definite description have some references. So, using the word for definite description rests on the abbreviations which refer to the specific properties that are associated with the abbreviated descriptions. Even an externalist can approach the proposal of this description theory. By the use of the word ‘Gödel’, one can mean the man who is famous to prove the incompleteness of arithmetic. In this case, ‘Gödel’ in the mouth of the agent would refer to ‘Karl Popper’ only if this theory indeed proved by Karl Popper. The description theory, according to Jackson, would be odd and strange if it does not have any truth in any words. Even in the case of flags, it gives information regarding the matter of how things are that obviously rest on a conventional association between the configuration of flag and the properties that are associated with the mind of the agent who use it. Jackson tries to clarify that ‘According to it (description theory), what settles the reference of words like ‘London’ and ‘cow’ is the combination of the properties associated with the words and a fact about the world, namely, what in the world has the properties. It is, therefore, false that the theory deprives the world of a role in settling what a term refers to.’⁴⁹ Jackson rightly says that we should accept that the approach of the reference of the word that depends on the nature of the world. But the description theory hints towards an unsettling reference of a word in the world where the condition of the reference cannot be fulfilled by anything in the world satisfying the description. But they cannot avoid the conception of rigidified definite description that relies on the external world. According to the description theory of reference, a term refers to something, which holds some properties and these properties or properties are associated with the term by the speakers. Two different ways can well express the claim that Frank Jackson argues well. The first way spells out that a term

⁴⁹ Frank Jackson, 1998, 205.

(T) can refer to x (x is a referred object) only if x has the properties in w at any world w . There is an alternative way that tells us about any world w , where a term (T) refers to x only if x is the thing with the associated property in the actual world.

Now Jackson says that ‘The reference of a rigidified definite description at any world w is precisely something that depends on how things actually are.’⁵⁰ It means that if the description theory accepts that referring expressions depend on the rigidified definite description; we should also admit that the reference conditions rest on ‘how things’ actually are.

There is a tendency to accept that in description theory, the reference of the name is an abbreviation of the definite description that is challenged by Russell’s thought. Russell argues that the definite description cannot be regarded as referring expression. So, the description theory is unable to refer but it can eliminate the phenomenon of analyzing rather than referring. Jackson does not agree with Russell regarding the conception that a definite description does not have any function referring expression. Russell shows that the truth condition of a definite description sentence does not depend on its semantical significant units. For Russell, a) The F is G, if and only if b) there is an F which is G and every F is identical with it. Description theory accepts a relation that they call reference, actually holds between the names and the things the name refers.

Even Russell’s theory can be well compatible with the fact that ‘the tallest person alive in 1990’ which make a quite difference from the person who is regarded as the tallest person alive in 1990. Russell will also accept that there is an important relation between the person which warranted a name and the words that mention the

⁵⁰ Ibid., 206.

fact that 'the tallest person alive in 1990'. Here the relation between word and the referred object/person is called by the description theorists 'reference'. But it is true that there is a difference between the rigidified definite description like the actual tallest man and the man himself. Frank Jackson argues that "One reply to this response is that, whatever their differences, definite descriptions, descriptive names and proper names are united in being markedly different from words like 'and', 'is', and 'to'. But the really important point is that we do not have in this response a *free standing* objection to regarding definite descriptions as referring terms: it is a good objection to treating definite descriptions as referring terms only if there is an independent good reason to reject the description theory of reference."⁵¹ Jackson also claims that if we accept the description theory of reference as correct, then we should also accept the idea of natural semantic kind as once mentioned by Gareth Evans. This natural semantic kind is commonly available in descriptive names, proper names and definite descriptions as these all are associated with properties in the minds of the agents. The fundamental mechanism of definite description theory rests on the claim of securing reference via the position of associated properties. In *The Varieties of Reference*⁵², Evans shows that there is a wide difference between definite descriptions and the behaviour of names in counterfactual assumptions. In this case, though there is a change in the reference of a definite description, but it does not lead to a consequent change in the reference of a name under counterfactual assumptions. But Jackson doesn't believe that this argument can make any harm for his claim that we can secure reference via some associated properties. Because it simply shows that the reference of a name under counterfactual assumption is determined by the associated

⁵¹ Ibid., 207-208.

⁵² Evans, 1982, 57.

properties whereas the properties under counterfactual assumption determine the reference of definite descriptions. The whole edifice makes internalism unique.

1.4.2. First-person Knowledge and Authority

Cartesianism taught us that the agent can be aware of his/her existence and know about the content of his/her mental states in a way that is called a privileged way that is only available to him/her. It seems to me true in regards of the cognitive attitudes like belief, desires, thought, and intention. But it may be possible that the propositional contents of these cognitive attitudes may be false like in the case of self deceptions. The crucial part of this thesis is not that the knowledge of the agent regarding these mental states is incorrigible. It may well be possible that one can commit mistakes about what one believes or desires. But we should admit that this sort of knowledge can be obtained independently of any empirical investigation that is related with external world. One can see and find out this sort of mental states in his/her just by passing through one's thoughts. The knowledge what we expand independent of empirical investigations is called a priori knowledge. An internalist who considers the principle that it may be possible to have an a priori knowledge of an agent's cognitive attitudes like thought, intention etc. can be defined as a principle of privileged access or in short 'privileged access'. The uniqueness of internalism is that it can depict the principle of privileged access that is the fundamental criterion of first-person authority. We know the traditional argument of Descartes regarding the direct and incorrigible existence of an agent and agent's thought that leads Descartes to admit the possibility of existence of an agent as a disembodied mind in a non-physical universe. This is a very controversial issue. Kripke raises one great challenge against this issue. He claims that Descartes' existence is no doubt dependent upon the existence of the other physical objects and this knowledge cannot grasp by *a priori*

thoughts. It is true that this fact has relation with necessity but the knowledge is obviously is *a posteriori* knowledge. So the dependency that we discussed before could not be deduced from Descartes' incorrigible knowledge and *a priori* thoughts.

Now I would like to discuss what is called first-person knowledge and how it makes internalism unique. First-person knowledge is the knowledge of an agent's mental life. But there is a significant difference between 'first-person knowledge' and 'first-person authority'. First-person knowledge does not relate with first-person authority as there is a crucial difference between the ways an agent knows something and the way others know the same thing. Here it follows that there is no difference regarding the authority with which each agent knows something. Besides, first-person authority refutes that there is a difference in the way an agent knows about his/her mental states. But another important point is that the main source of first-person authority is no doubt first-person knowledge. The process of knowing one's own mental lives is different with the way others know about it. The reason is that the knowledge about an agent's mental life is independent of experience and cannot be regarded as inferential based knowledge.

First-person authority claims that an agent can know *a priori* the content of his/her thought that is independent of any empirical evidence. In this case, the knowledge of the agent's thought is non-inferential, non-sensational and immediate access that is raised from the inside of the speaker. The conception of first-person authority is related with the idea of rationality of agents. It is plausible that our propositional attitudes like belief, desire, hope, intention can be very much fallible and cannot be error free. So our friends, guides and other people can help us to correct our belief desire or propositional attitudes. But in the case of first-person authority, our beliefs about our own thoughts do not depend on others correction. In this case,

the subject can be regarded as the first-person authority to know his/her own thoughts. If one would like to expand the account of first-person authority, then one should obviously avoid the perceptual model along with deflationary account and should accept a priori knowledge of our thoughts that leads to internalism that urges about the independency of mental content on external world or experience investigations.

1.4.3. The Idea of Supervenience

To show that the externalists' conception of broad content is misleading, Fodor tries to identify mental content in terms of narrow content to establish supervenience theory. In his early book, *Psychosemantics*, Fodor in order to sustain the claim of individualistic narrow content argues that 'states of type X supervene on states of type Y iff there is no difference among X states without a corresponding difference among Y states. So, in particular, the psychological states of organisms supervene on their brain states iff their brains differ whenever their minds differ.'⁵³ One can ask that 'what is the basic claim of supervenience theory?' Supervenience theory claims that any occurrence of the psychological change rests on the change of its physical states. One can argue that if we find any change in subvenient properties, then we can anticipate a change in its supervenient properties. This dependence relation makes the whole thesis as conceptually necessary like in the case of 'being colored' and 'being red'. But this thesis does not apply for psychological cum moral properties of an agent that could not be conceptually necessary. In the case of an honest human being, here 'being a man' and 'being an honest' cannot be regarded as conceptually necessary terms. The externalists' prominent idea of twin earth argument tries to take the conception of supervenience from two different levels. The first claim focuses that reference can supervene on meaning. Therefore, any difference in reference would

⁵³ Jerry Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, 1988, 31.

make a corresponding difference in the meaning of the two referring terms. The second claim mainly attempts to focus on the meaning that intends to supervene on the external features of agents. The differentiation of meaning could be possible because of the differentness of the physical world and not because of mental states. They challenge against the theory that psychological properties are internally individuated. A differentiation on the truth condition may be possible due to the difference of the propositional contents that only supervenes on external world. Besides, internalists who accepted the propositional contents as narrow argues that the propositional contents could suitably supervene on psychological properties or internal features of an agent. For them, the reference of a natural kind term can be determined by internal properties that are well suited with descriptive properties of an agent.

The world that has a structure and the constituent parts of the structure are significantly connected with one another. The idea of interconnectedness of things shows a notion of dependence that helps us to identify one thing and making a difference with other things. It shows that the causation is one of the fundamental dependence relations of these thoughts, where the effects are determined by their causes. To follow Hume's words, we can say causes are 'cement of the universe'. In this sense, supervenience is a relation like causation also created an interconnection between the structure of human experience and the objective world. Supervenience has two different parts, one is weak and the other is strong. The term 'supervenience' was first used in G.E. Moore's⁵⁴ writing specially to make a dependence relation between moral and non-moral properties. But the 'weak version of supervenience' is well portrayed in Donald Davidson's seminal idea of psychophysical supervenience.

⁵⁴ G.E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 1922, 261.

In Davidson's words, 'Although the position I describe denies there are psychological laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense, dependent, or supervenient, or physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects.'⁵⁵ We saw that Davidson tries to see the claims of supervenience from two different angles – from the angles of events and from the angles of objects. Davidson's idea emphasizes that the mental characteristics supervene on the physical world in the sense that if there were a change in the physical world then there would be consequently a change in mental characteristics. Kim defines weak supervenience in this way:

'A *weakly supervenes* on B if and only if necessarily for any x and y if x and y share all properties in B then x and y share all properties in A – that is, indiscernibility with respect to B entails indiscernibility with respect to A. We shall call A the *supervenient family* and B the *supervenience base* (family); properties in A are *supervenient properties*, and those in B are the *base properties*.'⁵⁶

Actually weak supervenience (in Davidson's word, 'psychological supervenience') tries to make a tie between the syntactical concepts and the semantic notion of truth to illustrate that though truth cannot be reducible through syntax yet the truth of sentence rests on its syntactic properties. Besides, the strong supervenience claims that as Kim again portraits that 'A-properties *strongly supervenes* on B-properties if and only if for any possible worlds w_1 and w_2 and any

⁵⁵ Donald Davidson, "Mental Events" in *Experience and Theory*, 1979, 88.

⁵⁶ Jaegwon Kim, *Supervenience and Mind*, 1993, 58.

individuals x in w_1 and y in w_2 if x in w_1 is B -indiscernible from y in w_2 , then x in w_1 is A -indiscernible from y in w_2 .⁵⁷

Here we see that the strong supervenience is more strengthened than the weak supervenience in the sense that weak supervenience believes in the thought that there is no possible world which holds individuals that are B -indiscernible but A -indiscernible. But strong supervenience gives importance on the possible world scenario and claims that in the same world or in the possible worlds we cannot find the possible individuals that are B -indiscernible but A -indiscernible.

The question is that how the supervenience theory plays a relevant role in internalism and externalism debate; especially on twin earth's thought experiment. Weak supervenience theory tells us that on the given condition that if two objects identical in respect of A properties are bound to be identical in respect of B properties too, then it is possible that a set of properties B supervenes on a set of properties A . For example, weight (set of properties B) supervenes on local gravity and mass (set of properties A). It is possible if and only if any two objects of the same mass, subject to the same local gravity must have the same weight. Here, weight does not supervene on size, yet the two objects of the same size may have different weights. To follow Gabriel Segal's example, I would like to emphasise that 'If the twin Zowie differs in respect of the contents of their beliefs, then this content fails to supervene on intrinsic properties. (Remember that, by hypothesis, the twins have identical intrinsic, micro structural properties.) By contrast, if any possible twin of Zowie, no matter what her external environment is like, must share all her cognitive contents with Zowie, then cognitive contents do supervene on intrinsic, microstructural properties, or to use a

⁵⁷ Jaegwon Kim, 1993, 79-91.

common abbreviation, they are “locally supervenient””.⁵⁸ Segal attempts to show that the conception of intrinsic to the subject and the question of whether content is locally supervenient cannot be regarded as same. The first reason is that if we see the claim in terms of local supervenience theory, then Cartesian dualism does not get any chance to argue in favour of their internalism. Because, the concept of subject’s cognitive contents deals with the physical things (the object on which cognitive properties depends). This assumption is a verdict against internalists’ or the Cartesian policy. An internalist who considers that contents are internally determined by the speaker’s mental states cannot support this issue.

The second important reason focuses on the question that the concept of intrinsicness and local supervenience fall apart because of the property that might be relational in a weak sense. One can argue that content can be relational by being locally supervenient only if the content is related to abstract objects like properties like the thought about diamond engages a relation to the property of being a diamond. Here, the property is regarded as an abstract object because it exists independently of its instances. This is a sort of externalism in a weak sense. But Segal is mainly looking upon the question that whether a relationship with diamond is necessary for having a concept of diamond. Externalist believes that diamond as a natural kind term is involved with a real relationship to the actual instance in the world. But internalist especially Segal takes supervenience theory to explain that contents are intrinsic and have no dependence on external world. In his own words, ‘... being in a state with specific cognitive content does not essentially involve standing in any real relation to anything external. Cognitive content is fully determined by intrinsic, micro-structural

⁵⁸ Gabriel Segal, *A Slim Book about Narrow Content*, 2000, 8-9.

properties; duplicate a subject in respect of those properties and you thereby duplicate their cognitive contents too.’⁵⁹

To show that the externalists’ conception of broad content is misleading, Fodor aims to identify mental content in terms of narrow content to establish supervenience theory. In his early book, *Psychosemantics*, Fodor in order to uphold the claim of individualistic narrow content argues that ‘states of type X supervene on states of type Y iff there is no difference among X states without a corresponding difference among Y states. So, in particular, the psychological states of organisms supervene on their brain states iff their brains differ whenever their minds differ.’⁶⁰ Supervenience theory claims that any occurrence of the psychological change rests on the change of its physical states. One can argue that if we find any change in subvenient properties, then we can expect some change in its supervenient properties. This dependence relation makes the whole thesis as conceptually necessary like in the case of ‘being coloured’ and ‘being red’. But this thesis does not apply for psychological cum moral properties of an agent that could not be conceptually necessary. In the case of an honest human being, here being a man and being an honest cannot be regarded as conceptually necessary terms as I already pointed out earlier. The externalists’ prominent idea of ‘twin earth’ argument tries to take the conception of supervenience from two different levels. The first claim focuses that reference can supervene on meaning. Therefore, any difference in reference would make a corresponding difference in the meaning of the two referring terms. The second claim of externalism mainly escorts to focus on the meaning that has to supervene on internal features of an agent. The differentiation of meaning could be possible because of the differentness of the physical world and not because of mental

⁵⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁰ Jerry Fodor, 1988, 31.

states. They challenge against the theory that psychological properties are internally individuated. A differentiation on the truth condition may be possible due to the difference of propositional contents that only supervenes on the external world. Besides, internalists who accepted propositional content as narrow argues that the propositional content could suitably supervene on psychological properties or internal features of an agent. For them, the reference of a natural kind term can be determined by internal properties that could be well fitted with the descriptive properties of an agent.

Internalism accepts the supervenience theory in the weak sense to establish their argument in favour of contents that are internal or intrinsic in nature. For them the contents supervene on microstructure, so this cannot relate to the external world. Besides, for them, the cognitive contents are fully determined by intrinsic or microstructural properties. And in this sense, if one can duplicate a subject in regard of these properties, then he/she can duplicate their cognitive contents. But it is difficult to articulate in the case of explaining cognitive properties which property or relation has taken a significant role. One can claim about the functional properties, another can claim about the descriptive or computational properties. But the advantage is that all these explanations go towards internal scheme. So the idea of supervenience makes the standpoint of internalism unique!

1.5. The Virtue of Being an Externalist

Physical externalism holds that though two qualitatively identical persons have identical internal states, yet the difference in their physical world construes a difference in the content of their mental states. The core arguments of externalism are as follows:

1. The content of an agent's thoughts rests on the external part of the subject or external environment.
2. In the case of an agent's thoughts, the content of the thoughts do not supervene on the agent's internal states.
3. The subject's thoughts presuppose the existence of the external objects.

All externalists' versions (though they may be different in their thoughts) adhere to the thought that there is a boundary between the internal and the external. For the externalists, the 'external' means the external to the parts of the body or it means 'skin out' of an agent. Here the content of an agent's thought rests on the external facts or outside of the skin of the subject. Besides, internalists think that mental contents are the intrinsic or internal part of a subject or it is located in the speakers' skin in. Here 'internal' refers to the inside of the skin of an agent. To oppose the dualistic version of internalism, externalism shows that the thoughts of molecule to molecule identical agents may differ due to the difference in their physical world. Katalin Farkas' suggests that 'But stipulating qualitative identity in the subject's physical makeup will not be sufficient to assure identity of mental states on the dualistic conception; states of immaterial souls or non physical properties of mental states need not supervene on bodily states.'⁶¹

We know that the Cartesian dualism and especially the theory of mind can be considered as the ground of internalism because of the case that Descartes' holds that mental states are dependent on bodily states. Putnam's natural kind externalism or physical kind externalism challenges the dualism to show that instead of the same verbalized thoughts or beliefs or feelings and so on two molecule for molecule identical agents have different mental contents due to the difference in the external

⁶¹ Farkas Katalin, "What is Externalism?" 2003, 189.

world of the agents. He thinks that the mental contents of an agent can be externally derived. Therefore, Burge makes a challenge in his paper 'Other Bodies'⁶² by arguing that Putnam's idea of having the same thoughts can be well suited for his semantic externalism rather than the idea of an argument for externalism about mental content. But this is a very controversial issue that I would not like to discuss here.

Now, let me consider whether the stipulation of identity in physical makeup is necessary for semantic externalism. Katalin Farkas points out that the example of 'water' in original 'twin earth thought experiment' is not able to express the argument more strongly. The reason is that the two agents cannot be identical because 'water', a physical element of their body could not be same in the two different worlds according to Putnam's own claims. So, the changes of the element of the water (in one place H₂O and in another place XYZ) make a radical change in the physical structure of the agents in the 'earth' and also in 'twin earth'. So we should take some elements that could not be a physical element that construe a human body. The conception of physical sameness would be eliminated if we take some elements that are also a part of the subject's body. Farkas thinks that 'The notion of subjective indistinguishability is fundamental in understanding the nature of human experience, and it is prior to the qualitative/intentional distinction, or to the outcome of externalism/internalism debate.'⁶³ Mainly externalists critique Cartesian theory of mind viz. Cartesian description of evil demon hypothesis as a central figure of internalism. The 'Brain in a Vat' argument shows that an agent's thought would not be true if he is deceived by an evil demon or a 'Brain in a Vat'. The question of subjective indistinguishability sets up a relation in "twin earth" scenario that vindicates a thought that if an agent is in a 'Brain in a Vat' system, then everything

⁶²Tyler Burge, "Other Bodies," 1982, 97-120.

⁶³Farkas Katalin, 2003, 196.

would appear same to him. Putnam indicates that this intelligibility hypothesis manifest a claim that would be contrary to the Cartesian assumption that the thoughts of 'Brain in a Vat' leads to a differentiation in our thoughts. Actually the disagreement regarding the 'Brain in a Vat' hypothesis constitutes a disagreement between internalism and externalism on the matter of subjective indistinguishability hypothesis. Physical externalist assumes that if twins are counterfactually swapped then for the subject, the situation would not be distinguishable.

There is a tendency to say that externalism cannot mingle with self-knowledge but Farkas would like to show that in this aspect internalism is not also well fitted with self knowledge. If we draw a boundary line between internalism and externalism in terms of skin, then the distinguishable feature would be where we should locate the contents of our mental state. Actually, there is a special way that indicates the content of one's mental state but the special way cannot know about the entailment of the content that rest on environment. I think Burge is right when he claims that 'Our problem is that of understanding how we can know some of our mental events in a direct, non empirical manner, when those events depend for their identities on our relation to the environment. A person need not investigate the environment to know what his thoughts are. A person does have to investigate the environment to know what his environment is like. Does this not indicate that mental events are what they are independently of the environment?'⁶⁴ This concern about compatibility is not only worry for externalism but also for internalism too. And it is plausible that for internalism, the content of our mental state depends on the body or the brain of the subject. In this case, a subject cannot know the brain states directly or non-empirically. Even it is not also possible to know the bodily states that help to entail

⁶⁴ Tyler Burge, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge," 1988, 650.

our mental states. Actually, one can find out the bodily states through empirical ways or third person's point of view like X-rays, surgery etc. So the decisive difference regarding the location of the mental content that would be within or outside the boundary of skin cannot able to differentiate internalism and externalism debate from truly an epistemological sense.

One can ask that how could externalism be incompatible with self-knowledge whereas internalism is not. We know a priority can be regarded as a feature that makes self-knowledge as 'privileged access.' But this criterion is not mingled with self-knowledge argument which can attempt to fulfil our required enquiries. If we allow the first-person authority as a required feature for self-knowledge then it would be well possible that externalism cannot be compatible with self-knowledge whereas internalism can be well-suited. First-person authority regarding self-knowledge shows that the agent is a better authority on his thoughts rather than its infallibility. I have elaborated the ideas and arguments given by Davidson in Chapter 4 (4.3.1). Self-knowledge or privileged access in this way talks about the thoughts or the experiences of an agent. Besides, the knowledge of our belief, desire psychology is more complicated because of its other phenomenon like self-deception that is created a hostile to the conception of first-person authority. So it would be better to restrict the concept of privileged access of our mental states in this sense. Farkas shows that 'The striking feature of externalism is that it forces a limitation on privileged access which is fundamentally different in character, it arises with respect to the simplest occurrent thoughts and experiences, and it is not explainable by these familiar facts of human psychology. This is an important point which is often overlooked by the externalists;

they simply list examples (like the above) where we have limited self knowledge, and then effortlessly extend the limitation to cases which are clearly quite different.’⁶⁵

The distinguishable part of externalism and first-person authority lies with the subject’s mental states. First-person authority contends to distinguish mental states or things in terms of subject’s point of view whereas externalism emphasises that a subject could have different mental states in various subjectively indistinguishable situations. Besides, first-person authority considers things as subjectively discernible. In this scenario, if an agent cannot notice the difference between this situation and twin situation, then no doubt other people would be the better person to detect the difference. But that would not lead a problem for internalism. The reason is that internalists do not believe in such a sort of restriction regarding the first-person authority. For internalists, a subject will be able to discriminate everything that makes a difference to his/her mental states.

On the other hand, externalists do not believe in the conception that the thoughts of an agent depend on his/her brain that could be restricted by first person authority. Rather the internalists legitimately believe in the individuated structure of the mental contents. It sounds interesting to accept that we can make a distinction between the subject’s point of view and the any difference in the agent’s content of thoughts within the realm of privileged access.

The ‘twin earth thought experiment’ has two different perspectives. The first perspective deals with actual possible world whereas the other gives importance on another possible world. Suppose, twin earth water (that they called ‘twater’) is very like to our earthen ‘water’ though there chemical compositions are not same. Let us

⁶⁵ Farkas Katalin, 2003, 203.

imagine that the chemical formulation of 'twin earth' is XYZ whereas in our earth the chemical composition of water is H₂O. Basically the objection is that in spite of the sameness of properties 'water' and 'twater', it is true that the term 'water' in our earth cannot refer to XYZ because the references are not the same in both cases. To refute the causal theory of reference, the description theory of reference argues that the term 'water' in our mouth refers to the properties (whatever may be) that we can associate with the term. So 'twin earth water' (water like-stuff) is not water in our earthen sense because we cannot have associated the properties with it that we already associated with 'water' in our earth. Even Jackson also accepts that 'twin earth' argument taught us a very important thing that is the notable idea of acquaintance. In his own words, 'The reason XYZ is not what *we* refer to when *we* use the word 'water' is that it is not the water-like kind *we* are acquainted with. We have never ourselves come across XYZ. But if we had, if some of the water-like stuff around us was H₂O, and some XYZ, and there was no reason to think of one as 'fools' water, then we would have been in the same situation with respect to 'water' as we in fact are with the word 'jade' - two different kinds would have been covered by the one word.'⁶⁶

Externalist argues that language can convey information about how things are, which follows an association between the words and properties. However, it is also true that language conveys information regarding the external objects and in this case, we require establishing a relation between word and objects, but not between properties and objects. So, there is a gap we find in defending a Lockean version of the description theory that deals with the association of properties. In reply to the externalists' argument, Jackson claims that without giving any information about properties, we cannot get any information about the objects. Any discussion or

⁶⁶ Frank Jackson, 1998, 213.

identification of the location of objects goes under the bundles of its properties that may insist the access of object via its properties.

But the notable idea that makes externalism unique is that externalism tends to clash with Internalism from the involvement of determination that stress the argument that meaning or content supervenes on the external world of the agent. Though there are several variations of the externalists' thoughts in their own terminologies as they have used like for Davidson, the correct interpretation of X 'depends' on Y (at least in part) and claims that X derives from Y. Putnam claims that X's being 'constituted' by Y, and of X's being 'a matter of' Y (at least in part); besides, in Burge's analysis, X's being 'individuated by' Y (at least in part). All these interpretations actually cite that X (speaker's meaning ain't depend in the head) and the content of our belief would be external that is causally and relationally dependent on external environment.

For externalists, the content of natural kind terms or the content of non natural kind terms, to the extent, their beliefs depend on the constitution of one's environment and one causal and historical relations to it (society or environment). The uniqueness of the externalists' claim is that they are trying to put the beliefs of the agent in the domain of where the believers locate. The journey of externalism goes from language to world where meaning, understanding, and ability - all sorts of contents involving characters depend on the socio-linguistic background that makes externalism highly unique. I shall discuss the issue in detail in the next chapter.

Concluding Remarks

A brief survey of the chapter is to bring out the ontological and semantic approaches that can be granted as significant origins of the debate. Ontological analysis of Descartes' dualism points out that there is a proposed dichotomy between mental and

physical following the notions of privileged access, authority, exclusion etc. Even the epistemological stand of Cartesian dualism generates location claim and position claim. The internalistic appeal of the locational claim hints that mental states locate inside the skin, whereas position claim insists them as non-relational, intuitive mental properties. Frege, who injects semantic approaches in the debate of internalism versus externalism quests for determining the location of mental contents and meaning of the terms from two diverse aspects. For him the semantic expressions are related to the external world that is his challenge to psychologism. But in the case of the reference of the predicates that he called concept, he strongly believes that reference cannot determine it completely. There he engages the notion of sense, the mode of presentation of reference. His thesis is also close to descriptivism not only for the reason that he accepts that to determine the proper names or mock proper names one should look into its sense but he also emphasises on context principle. Besides, Russell criterion and principle, another appeal to internalism claims in favour of descriptive content and discriminating knowledge that is based on cognitive processes. Russell thinks that the reference of the name is an abbreviation of the definite description. Frege and Russell's descriptivism pertain for one's thoughts (descriptive) that has some 'sense' oriented approach and gives prominence on the psychological conditions of the speaker who uttered the sentence or terms. So grasping the sense is relevant here rather than reference that was later invented by the externalists.

The descriptivism that gave birth to internalism holds that because of the internal descriptive contents one can know and understand an object as internal object. A more refined version of Internalism brings the idea of moving beyond the external world to find out the location of mental content or meaning of the terms.

Externalists like Kripke, Putnam, Burge and Davidson attack the descriptive adequacy of the internalist by pointing especially to the theory of description, conceptual schemes, Intentionality and supervenience theses to raise a satisfactory account of externalism that depends on the causal theory of reference, baptism and socio-linguistic backgrounds in different ways. But all the externalists' the primordial aim is to reject the psychological approaches of the meaning of the terms by showing that meaning cannot locate in the head and it is actually publicly shareable. Even the ongoing approach of Intentionality in favour for internalism relooks on mental states and language in terms of the contribution of mind rather than a causal relation between mind and world. For them, thoughts precede language, a mentalese stand that talks about the referential use of the word in regards of definite description and skin in hypotheses.

The uniqueness of internalism not only rest on its descriptive account of psychologism but is attached with the first-person authority and supervenience theories. The first-person authority that claims for the knowledge of the contents of his/her thoughts is independent of any external experience and he or she is the authority of his/her mental states as other can't perceive it directly. Besides, supervenience thesis in support of internalism stresses that narrow contents can suitably supervene on the psychological properties or the internal features of the agent, whereas externalist claims that reference can supervene on meaning. Here for internalist in weak sense mental contents can supervene on microstructure that is fully expressed by intrinsic properties. Externalists' distinctive points mainly give importance on the verbalized thoughts of the agents (two identical) by showing that mental contents of the agents can be externally determined and self-knowledge can be well compatible with externalism. Externalism becomes unique in regards of word

and world relation that is presumed by language and shows that beliefs of our contents locate where the believers are, i.e. meaning, understanding, beliefs, all these mental contents involve with socio-linguistic background and others in our linguistic society.

Chapter 2

Semantic Canvas: Mind and World

Introduction

The chapter tries to trace the internalist journey from language to thought, mapping a mentalese approach propounded by some prominent internalists like, Jackson, Chomsky, Fodor, Davitt and Harman in the first half of the chapter. Next, I attempt to re-examine the philosophical significance of externalism and their unique journey from language to the world. To assess them I will also look at how externalism can construct a causal relation between mind and world through meaning, language and socio-linguistic background. The appeals of internalism depend on the standing hypotheses like, mental content, representationalism, conceptual role semantic, innate language and thought precedes language claims. They aim at establishing the claim that the conceptual competences are priori to linguistic competences. Even, the *cognitive impairment* that is close to conceptual role semantic argues in favour of certain successful intentional actions which are in nature detached from the external objects and the linguistic practices. Externalism, an opponent, emphasises that the meaning of a term or word can be determined by the external world, socio-linguistic background and other people. They challenge against any kind of ‘mentalese’ appeal like semantic rules, conceptual role, and innate hypothesis etc. Externalism considers that thoughts are language involving and the language is a social phenomenon. The meaning of a word or the information that our sensory organs are holding get their semantic resource from the contents that are grounded in the world. Externalists probably invert the direction of mind to world.

2.1. Internalism: From Language to Thought

In this part of the chapter, I would like to illustrate the fundamental arguments of internalism that gives precedence to thoughts over language and also put forward the claim that thoughts and mental contents are internal to the subject, but the contemporaneous things that are located in the world (outside of the skin) cannot make up the mental states or thoughts of an agent. Internalism and their journey towards thought can be fulfilled only through a representational approach of internal states, or internalistic nature of language that is linked with innate hypothesis, or the conceptual role of semantic. Let me clarify all of these in details.

2.1.1. Representational Approach of Jackson

Many things are located outside of the skin and they are not anyway the constitutive parts of the mental states that are directed towards them. This internalist appeal also insists that mental content (beliefs and desires, etc.) can not only exist, but preserve their internal characteristic contents independently of the external world. In the introductory part of the lecture paper ‘Narrow Content and Representation - or Twin Earth Revisited’⁶⁷, Frank Jackson claims that intentional states (e.g. belief, desire etc) always represent something. Our belief represents how a believer takes things to be. Jackson believes that the representational nature of our intentional states is consistent with the possibility that tells us that how some intentional state represents things to be. This is a legitimate notion of content, but we have not regarded it as a final or an ultimate notion of content. Jackson writes that ‘Our topic is whether Twin Earth teaches us that internally identical subjects can have beliefs with very different

⁶⁷ Frank Jackson, “Narrow Content and Representation- or Twin Earth Revisited,” 2003, 55 -71.

representational contents merely by virtue of being in different environments.’⁶⁸

‘Twin Earth thought experiment’ suggests that the belief contents have anti-individualistic and broad/wide content which represent things and are related with external or environmental properties. This is why this sort of content is known as relational content. Jackson actually tries to refute the argument (Twin Earth thought argument) of externalism regarding the context of thinking or beliefs or the words that we use to express beliefs. He has taken a representationalist view in order to refute the thesis of externalism. There are two major issues here:

1. The first issue is related to the centered content.
2. The second issue is related to the sense of aboutness which hints that a minimal difference in aboutness implies a difference in content.

The representationalist asks us to understand the linguistic phenomenon of rigidity that is unnecessarily dependent on the question of belief content. Later I will see the important arguments (in favour of internalism) that Jackson raises to refute the ‘twin earth thought experiment’.

Now Jackson points out questions of two different orders which have great importance in his arguments. The *first order* question deals with the content and the reference of our words and head states. The *second order* question talks about what makes them the way they are. Actually, Frank Jackson thinks that causal descriptivism is associated with the idea of first order question while the causal theory of reference relies on the second order question. But the difficulty here is that we are giving more importance to the *first order* question viz., concerning the reference and contents of our beliefs rather than the *second order* question viz., why they are as they

⁶⁸ Ibid., 55.

are. Here the non-controversial point that mentioned by Jackson is that the conception of the determination of content from intentional and semantic perspectives entangles a causal relation between subject and environment. Jackson argues that ‘But this is consistent with (representational) content being narrow in the sense of not being environmental, in the sense of not being a property we can change merely by transport from one environment to another.’⁶⁹

The striking point about the twin earth cases is that representationalism vindicates an intuitive acceptability of *first order* question which the *second order* question does not, i.e. how contents and references get to be as they are or what determines them. Jackson considers that externalism treats the belief content as an environmental property. We can take a belief content as inter-world and narrow, only if the belief content tracks internal identity across the world. But the narrowness of belief content is not the same as narrowness of the causal dispositional properties. Here one can ask what representational content is and what is centered content that Jackson argued? For Jackson, to believe in a proposition is to believe in something about the arrangement of things and the possibilities in the worlds. Here the concept makes a certain division among the various possibilities.

A representational content focuses on the representational structures of the contents. Jackson argues against externalism and says, ‘When I believe that there is an apple on my head, I believe something about how the region immediately above my head is. When t (win) Jackson, a duplicate from the skin (or brain) in of me, believes that there is an apple on his head, he believes something about how the region immediately above his head is. In consequence, my belief and his differ in truth conditions; one is true if and only if one of the regions is the relevant, apple-

⁶⁹ Ibid., 56.

containing way, and the other is true if and only if the other region is the relevant way. Likewise, my thoughts and his will differ in reference. But this does not mean that our belief contents differ.⁷⁰

Jackson also thinks that if an agent believes that ‘there is an apple immediately above one’s head’, then this proposition would be related to an egocentric belief which also would be a ubiquitous belief. Even our perceptual beliefs are in Peacock’s words ‘positioned scenarios,’ which actually applies to perceptual content near where we ourselves are. An egocentric content of belief is associated with the concept of ‘centered worlds’. In general, an egocentric belief represents things in terms of a set of centered worlds. Jackson says, ‘The content of my belief that I have a beard is the set of centered worlds that are the way relative to the centers. The set of worlds that contain beards serve to capture the content of the belief that I am in a world with beards, but not that of my belief that I myself have a beard.’⁷¹

We can see the previous ‘apple example’ from the perspective of centered worlds. Here the belief of ‘center Jackson’ and ‘center t-Jackson’ can differ in terms of centered worlds. Even the difference in reference and truth are caused by the differences in centers as they are also consistent with the sameness of content. Jackson thinks that the representational sentences have two contents. Let me take a representational sentence, ‘I have a beard now,’ here this type of sentence have two contents of belief - *egocentric content* or *centered content*. In one case, their contents can be given by a set of centered worlds. But in other case, it is also true that ‘X has a beard at T’ is not a set of centered worlds rather it is a set of worlds where Jackson has a beard at noon, 14th February 2003. It is very important to mention that for

⁷⁰ Ibid., 57-58.

⁷¹ Ibid., 58.

Jackson, the centered worlds play two different roles. One role is the modelling of the dependence of the proposition and the second one is capturing centered content. We know that Twin Earth thought experiment talks about the very identity of 'twin earth' and 'our earth' and the identity of the inhabited persons who are molecule for molecule duplicate. But one thing is merely different here, in our world water refers to H_2O , but in Twin earth, water refers to XYZ or a different liquid whose chemical formula is complicated and different from Earthian water. However, all the other observable properties of H_2O and XYZ are remained unchanged. Frank Jackson analyses the anti-individualist view of this argument to say that Earthians are internally identical with Twin Earthians, the difference can only be explained by the difference in environments. But now Jackson tries to show that though one can argue that as Twin Earth is causally isolated from our earth, so it is quite impossible for us to have beliefs about XYZ ditto for Twin Earthians and H_2O . But a person who has a lot of knowledge about astrophysics may believe in this way. We know that Putnam actually in this example is talking about the natural kind terms, but Burge extends this issue to belief content or non-natural kind terms, like arthritis. For Jackson, the spelling matters of a broad content may be undetermined and varies from person to person. Here Jackson tries to give some replies to his opponents who raised many objections against his thoughts.

The first objection entails from the culmination of the distinction between *first order* and *second order* questions about content. As we know, the second order question emphasizes on the concept of causal connections between heads and environment i.e. regarding the question of 'What determines contents and its references?' As a result of this reason earthians are causally connected with H_2O and also refer to H_2O . Twin Earthians refers to XYZ and similarly causally connected

with XYZ. Jackson replies of this objection from four different points of view. We can't say that twin earth is regarded as the central figure of the causal theory of reference as it's a kind of proposition rather than argument. The causal theory of reference is linked with baptism, so the causal fact of earthian water mostly baptizes with watery stuff. (Two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom).

This significant reply was once given by Jackson. The use of the word actually rests on our decision. The causal fact cannot make the idea to use 'water' in such a way that it is able to cover both the meaning of H₂O and XYZ in Twin Earth argument. Jackson argues that 'But any plausible list of the decisions - and of the matters we felt undecided- will have our word referring to H₂O and Twin Earthians' word referring to XYZ, only if the decision is to use 'water' for that which stands in such and such a relation to users of the world in a way that would make beliefs expended using the word 'water' centered ones.'⁷²

Jackson requests us to imagine a scenario; the scientists in our earth believe in *Elysium* a term which does not interact with us, but exist to fulfil a gap in the Earthian periodic table. Similarly, Twin Earthian scientists come to believe in *telusium*. As according to Twin Earth argument *elusium* and *telusium* are two different elements. But Frank Jackson considers that these differences between *elusium* and *telusium* are not dependent on the truth conditions and references of the beliefs or says of the scientists or how are they interacted with *elusium* and *telusium* for Jackson, 'The difference can only be laid at the door of centering. Scientist and t scientist each believe that there is an elusive element in their own world.'

⁷² Ibid., 62.

The second objection against Jackson's thoughts is that to accept the supposition that the utterance and the belief about 'water' have a centered content is to delicately accept the idea of broad content case. Jackson tries to give a reply through his famous apple example case. As I mentioned above, here Jackson and twin-Jackson (t Jackson) both have beliefs that there is an apple above their respective heads. If one argues that Jackson and t-Jackson's beliefs are different then it follows that the difference is not because of their surrounding atmosphere rather because of their centers. So we cannot claim that the content can be changed through a certain changed in environments, still here the leaving subjects are still unaltered.

The third objection is quite impressive. We saw that Twin Earth example taught us that the reference of a natural kind word does not deal with any superficial properties that may either be centered or not. It goes with the same natural kind relation or it would be better to say that a causal relation to some samples which can have some superficial properties. But that must be the outside of the head or external world. Here Jackson writes, 'My reply is that any plausible account of narrow content allows that reference and so by a multitude of factors including superficial properties and underlying nature as revealed by science.'⁷³

The fourth objection is that Jackson used the concept of 'aboutness' which makes the room for a broad content thesis. As the Earthians and t-Earthians beliefs and words, are about different kind. As the beliefs and words are different, so it follows that they represent differently. Jackson refutes this objection to argue that it is true that a difference in 'aboutness' implies a difference in representational content. Jackson asks, suppose hearing a voice from the big partition wall, I can say that I have heard a voice of a man but I do not know who the person is. Let us hope that I heard

⁷³ Ibid., 63.

the voice of Aritra (Unknown people to me). Can I say that this belief of mine is about Aritra? For Jackson that depends on how we read the relevant sense of ‘aboutness’. Here my belief is about a single person and it would be true only if a person is talking in the next room. Jackson considers that an intentional sense also not refer to a particular person (Aritra). In the case of an intentional sense, the idea of “aboutness” being captured by the facts that how can a belief and thing be related and implies the truth that a person is talking beyond the partition wall. A certain difference in intentional sense also makes a consistent change of the content from the perspective of representationalism.

The fifth objection is quite powerful. We Earthians can report our belief like that ‘water is wet’ from the simplest way of putting the ‘Twin Earth’ into the realm of broad content. But it’s quite irrelevant to use the same word for Twin Earthians correspondence beliefs. Jackson now tries to reply that why Earthians can’t use their words for Twin Earthians beliefs. Jackson’s wonderful claim is that “As we might put it, to use of our word ‘water’ for their beliefs would be to relate them to the ‘wrong’ center. All the same, we believe alike in the sense that the set of centered words is the same for both of us. Analogy: you and I both believe alike when we believe that we ourselves have beards, but I cannot use ‘I’ for what it is that you believe.”⁷⁴ This is an internalist approach.

2.1.2. Chomsky: Internalistic Nature of Language

Noam Chomsky clarifies that for ‘naturalism’ he means ‘methodological naturalism’, counterpoised to ‘methodological dualism’: the doctrine that says that in order to pursue for ‘theoretical understanding’, language and mind are to be studied in some

⁷⁴ Ibid., 65.

manner other than the way we explore natural objects as a matter of principle. Chomsky tries to make a difference between internalist approach and naturalist approach. When we investigate into language, then we forget that language is a part of the natural world. We just remember that there are only people and the works that they had produced like ‘written documents’ in the world etc. We also forget that the language which exists is a language which is to be called common and public language. Chomsky also writes that ‘What is a thing, and if so what thing it is, depends on specific configurations of human interests, intentions, goals, and actions; an observation as old as Aristotle. It could be that in such cases I do not change my beliefs about the constituents of the world as identification changes – that in my own variant of “folk science”...’⁷⁵ Chomsky thinks that the ongoing debate between internalism and externalism elevate in the philosophy of language because of the theory of meaning, not for the phonology. The fundamental question is that ‘Are meaning in the head or in the world?’ The conventional answer is prone to support externalism which stipulates that meanings are externally determined by two factors – communities and external world. Putnam’s ‘Twin earth thought argument’ is directed to evaluate the theory of meaning in terms of external background where intuition does not make any sense rather than the meaning of the term is determined by the reference or extension of the world. So reference fixation is very important for Putnam’s point of view.

Chomsky attacks the externalist view, mainly the ‘twin earth thought experiment’ from the ordinary use of language. He also requests us to imagine that ‘twin Oscar’ has come to our world. He becomes thirsty and points for a glass of *Sprite* or some other odd mixtures of H₂O that somehow coming from the faucet.

⁷⁵ Noam Chomsky, “Language and Nature,” 1995, 30.

Chomsky asks that, can we claim that ‘twin Oscar’ is making mistakes in both cases and the vital question is that if it is not, then in which particular case he is committing mistake. If we look at the puzzle from the perspective of the ‘content of the belief’ of the agent, then we will find that it would be very difficult to claim that when ‘twin Oscar’ asked for ‘water’ pointing out to the odd mixtures that came from the faucet irrationally, then he irrationally changed his belief about the term ‘water’. But we will not find out any evidence of twin Oscar’s belief for such a change. Another perspective is that if we admit twin Oscar’s behaviour as rational, then we should also accept that ‘twin Oscar’ has his original belief about ‘water’ which allows him to accept that the combination of earthian water is H₂O, rather than XYZ in his twin earth. Chomsky thinks, ‘If the latter then beliefs about water are shared on earth and Twin Earth, just as on either planet, beliefs may differ about the very same substance, taken to be either water or tea as circumstances vary, even with full and precise knowledge that the objects of the different beliefs have exactly the same constitution.’⁷⁶

Chomsky claims that Putnam’s analysis on this matter is unpersuasive. Though Putnam agrees that in this position words do not refer, yet we need to formulate the intuition about the reference of words in a different level. As we know that for Putnam, there is a fundamental relation between words and things in the world, the thought that is unable to create a relation to the things is regarded as an empty word. It may well prove that the word ‘Bengali’ refers to the people who speaks in Bengali language in West Bengal and Bangladesh, then the same should apply to the other words like ‘mind’, ‘good soul’, ‘free trade’, ‘heaven’ along with the adjectives and verbs in our language. He argues that the externalist position and the

⁷⁶ Ibid., 42.

arguments will collapse in terms of their notable idea of ‘division of linguistic labour’, as the experts also speak the ordinary language that is full of empty terms or vague conceptions.

We know that Putnam believes in a relation between the speaker, words and the world. He suggests about a reference fixation of words, but Chomsky refutes the idea to argue that the pre-Avogadro chemists had used atom and had the conception about molecule interchangeably. But can we claim that the present idea of atoms and molecules and their ideas of atoms and molecules at that time are similar? After Bohrean model, we can assert that a path breaking insight or ‘a new era of physical inorganic chemistry rules out in the world.’ So, we cannot presume that the present idea of atoms or electrons and the ancient idea of atoms are similar. But Putnam does not think that the integrity of the similarity of our beliefs rests on mere structural similarity. Putnam assumes that there is a relation in the technical sense, which is called a reference.

Chomsky cautions us that ‘We cannot sensibly ask such questions about content, wide or narrow, technical notions again. But we can ask whether we attribute thoughts to people on grounds that do not keep to their internal state.’⁷⁷ Chomsky takes a wonderful example to argue that if Jones, a person who told Chomsky that he is crying for those who died in the trenches at *Verdun* fifty years ago, then Chomsky or any listener can properly guess that he is talking about the martyrs of the *First World War*, and not about the *Second World War*. Alternatively, Chomsky or any listener can think that Jones is mistaken about World War II that is what he is now talking about. Chomsky says that in the first case, I ascribe my beliefs on him, so my attribution to him is not internal as I am looking at my own beliefs and not at his

⁷⁷ Ibid., 46.

beliefs or psychological attitudes. Following externalism, a good argument on externalism can be raised to suggest that the content of the thought of an agent can only be determined by an external world otherwise, it cannot be publicly available or sharable. But Chomsky cautions us about the use of the notion of the term 'common public language'. If we claim that the notion is dependent on ordinary discourse, then it becomes useless in theoretical explanations. Putnam explains the Chomskian idea of shared language in terms of the essentialistic definition of culture that forgets the conception of shared public language to give importance to the computer model. This is a naturalistic appeal that mingles in language faculty. For Putnam, language and meaning are culture reliant and this idea is also accepted by Chomsky because he thinks that 'cultures crosscut anything that might reasonably be called language.' Chomsky writes that '... I describe the way the terms are understood in the cultures we more or less share in terms of structures of power and authority, difference patterns, literary monuments, flags, and often (critical) histories and so on.'⁷⁸

Culture, norms, and correct uses, these processes can determine various cultures, as they are too transparent. But Chomsky does not believe that if two different speakers live in a same place and speak in a same language, then it would be misleading to say the world is divided into objects and there is a shared common language. He refutes Putnam's idea of sharp boundaries. Though Chomsky accepts in the standard language system, but does not believe that in the ordinary use of language, 'shared public language' does not make any sense in the requirement of empirical inquiry on the adequate notion of the use of language.

We know that Frege stresses on the common thoughts which are expressed in the common language that also consists of some shared signs. One thing we need to

⁷⁸ Ibid., 50.

clarify here is that a sign has a reference; i.e. it denotes the objects of the external world. Secondly, a sign has also a shared sense that fixes its reference. In short, if we want to understand an expression, we should grasp the sense in the public (shared) language. Chomsky's also thinks that Frege's theory of meaning has an externalist appeal as once claimed by Putnam himself. Chomsky says that 'In addition, each person may have an individual mental image connected with the objective sense. Sign, sense, and referent are external entities, outside the mind/brain. To adopt Frege's analogy, suppose that we observe the moon through a telescope. We may think of the real image of the moon projected in the interior of the telescope, an object common to all observers, as analogous to the sense; the individual retinal image is analogous to the individual mental image.'⁷⁹

Besides, Dummett, who is a famous Fregean interpreter, claims that we may share the public language but actually, language is independent of any particular speakers, and we can partially grasp the language. Ordinary language has some attribution of rules following where it is not required that there are some rigid rules that one should follow. The significant analysis of communication as described by Chomsky is that in the process of communication it is not required that the process will be always related to 'public meanings' rather 'public pronunciation' plays a vital role here. Chomsky writes:

'Communication is a more-or-less matter, seeking a fair estimate of what the other person said or has in mind. A reasonable speculation is that we tacitly assume that the other person is identical to us, then introducing modifications as needed, largely reflexively, beyond the level of consciousness. The task may be easy, difficult, or impossible, and accurate determination is rarely required for communication to

⁷⁹ Noam Chomsky, *Language and Thought*, 1993, 17.

succeed for the purpose at hand. It could turn out that there really is something like ‘public shared meaning,’ because the highly restrictive innate properties of the language faculty show so little variation; that would be an interesting (and not surprising) empirical discovery, *but there is no conceptual requirement that anything of the sort is true.*⁸⁰

He also believes that ‘Language acquisition is something that happens to a child placed in a certain environment, not something that the child does.’⁸¹ But Chomsky believes that to know the language is to internalize the grammar. Now it seems that grammar is a set of rules and principles that allots structural description to linguistic expressions. Allotting structural description of linguistic expressions can take place just because of the presence of grammar, a set of rules and principles. An agent can do have some propositional knowledge, a sort of ‘tactic knowledge’ that holds between agent and grammar. Doubtlessly the mental state of Bengali speaking people and the French speaking people cannot be same, but instead of the individual differences, there may be some innate mental states that are common between different human communities. Actually, innate mental states are one of the fundamental common criteria of human being that instigates a differentiation with other species. Here Chomsky takes his own way to refute externalism by supporting the innateness hypothesis, an internalist approach.

2.1.3. Thought before Language: Devitt’s Analysis

Internalists have an attraction to the hypothesis that ‘thought precedes language’. There is a similarity we find between the structural rules of a speaker’s language and structure rules of his/her thoughts. The assumption is that like our mental

⁸⁰ Ibid., 21.

⁸¹ Ibid., 29.

representations, thoughts also involve a kind of language. Now the question is: Why does one ascribe the thoughts? The answer would be, first, the ascription of thoughts aims to explain or predict the behaviour of the agents, and second, by using thought of utterances, an agent can guide or communicate with the external world.

In the first case, let me take an example. Suppose one goes to hospital and we ask why does one go to the hospital? The answer could be that it is because she wants to check up her health condition. She believes that she is suffering from fever. Besides, she thinks that only doctors can help her to recover from her disease. Here, we see an ‘intentional explanation’ of one’s ‘intentional behaviour’ that tries to decline the thesis of ‘behaviourism’ by accepting a psychological explanation. Another important point is that the ascription of beliefs doesn’t only depend on the behaviour, but also is related to the evidences. It is not that if a person picks up an umbrella and dresses in a raincoat, then it shows that the weather is rainy. In some cases, we believe a reliable person, but there needs to be some good reasons of belief which one may call evidence. In general, we cannot reluctant the process of explaining the people’s behaviour through some ascriptions or beliefs. Devitt wonderfully claims that ‘Almost everything we know about the world – what we learn at mother’s knee, in classrooms, and from books – we get from ascribing beliefs to people and assessing them for reliability. If there really were not any thoughts, this success would be very hard to explain’⁸². Devitt’s words support intentional realism and the thought procedure that ahead of language. Now, one can claim that what is thought? Primarily, Devitt believes that the mental states that are associated with meaning or contents can be regarded as thoughts. There is a folk view called ‘language expresses thought’, which is a controversial assumption supported by

⁸² Michael Devitt, *Ignorance of Language*, 2003, 127.

Fodor, and Garrett. This assumption claims that though language and thoughts are independent, but in the case of theorizing language thoughts plays a remarkable role. The acceptance of ‘intentional realism’ leads to also accept the ‘language expresses thought’ hypothesis. One can ask, what is the basic claim of the hypothesis?

Devitt writes, ‘Roughly, it is the view that language production is a matter of uttering a sentence of the language to express a thought with the meaning that the sentence has in that language: the sentence conveys a “message” that is the meaning of the underlined thought.’⁸³ If we accept the reality of thought which is interlinked with meaning, then the relation between meaningful language and meaningful thought can be well established. In this case, two important aspects are there. First, there needs to be a match between the meaning of a sentence and the thought’s meaning in the context of utterance. Devitt claims that observing a person on fire leads me to thought that ‘HE IS ON FIRE’ and I can express this thought by uttering through a sentence ‘He is on fire’. Here, the indexical term ‘He’ that is contained in the sentence cannot match with the meaning of the observers thought. In this case, the use of ‘He’ by the observer is very important that particularly refers to the person who was on fire. Here the sentence token matches with the meaning of the thought rather than the sentence type. The token gets its meaning partly from the ‘context of utterance’ and partly from ‘the meaning of the typed sentence’. Secondly, there are some cases where the meaning of the sentences that express the thought of the speakers cannot be genuinely regarded as the thought of the speakers that the speaker means of uttering the sentence. Here the conventional meaning takes a prominent role rather than the speaker’s meaning. We can see the conception of linguistic competence that competence takes a relevant role in the ‘language express thought’ hypothesis.

⁸³ Ibid., 127.

Linguistic competence can be regarded as an ability (pragmatic ability) that is associated with a thought of the meaning of sound in the language that also rest on the context of utterances. So we see that linguistic competence is an ability that match with sound and also thought for meaning. It is clear that accepting linguistic competence, one should also accept that the competence of language can lead to a conceptual competence (a competence of thought that mingle with meaning) in the language. Without having the thought of meaning, one cannot match a sound to a thought for meaning. Linguistic competence is combined with processing competence and conceptual competence of thought. The conceptual development is also required for language development. Conceptual development is ontologically prior to language development. Secondly, this ontological priority escorts to an innate hypothesis that talks about the capability to acquire a competence in our natural language as developed by Chomsky. The three important points that are mentioned by Devitt regarding this issue are as follows:

First, we see that the conceptual competence is ontologically prior to the linguistic competence. For this reason, without the capacity of acquiring conceptual competence, we cannot develop the capacity to acquire linguistic competence. Even we can also consider that conceptual competence cannot be acquired entirely solipsistically.

Second, the construction of linguistic competence does not only depend on the conceptual competence, but also depends on the capacity to acquire processing competence. So there is a vast distinction between conceptual capacity and processing capacities. Some philosophers consider the processing capacity as a tool of thought. Besides, there are some philosophers like Harvard philosopher, Steven Pinker takes ‘processing capacity’ as an adaptation (something that was selected for) but this view

is rejected by Chomsky himself. If we take linguistic competence an adaptation then it also follows that the conceptual capacity can be ahead of because of this adaptation.

Third, if we don't accept the view that linguistic capacity can be regarded as an adaptation, then it also follows that the processing capacity that is present in the case of linguistic competence cannot do anything until conceptual capacity involves with it.

Devitt, who does not support all these views, argues that there are some grounds where we find that *cognitive impairment* and *linguistic impairment* took different paths. The main reason here is that the conceptual competence that is related to certain thoughts cannot competently well with these thoughts. He believes that there is an ontological priority that shows the conceptual competence as prior to the linguistic competence. Devitt argues that 'A consequence of that priority is that an organism *could*, logically, have the conceptual competence to think certain thoughts without having the linguistic competence to express them. But there are persuasive reasons for thinking that some organisms *do*, *as a matter of fact*, have a primitive sort of conceptual competence, at least, without any corresponding linguistic competence. First, consider apes, dogs, even sheep. The best explanation of their behaviour attributes to the thoughts of these animals; mostly the thoughts are primitive thoughts but thoughts nonetheless. And yet these animals do not have languages in which they could express their thoughts.'⁸⁴ Even in psychology, it is well proved that babies who do not speak language have very rich mental life. Even our very old ancestor (apes) had thoughts but no language. So thoughts no doubt precede language but the cases that we found, here thoughts cannot filter through language. Goldin- Meadow and Ming-Yu-Zheng claims that 'Our data suggest that there are indeed thoughts, the

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 131.

children themselves bring to the learning situations, conceptual starting points for grammatical notions.’⁸⁵

After ontological priority of conceptual competence, we can see the explanatory priority of thought. The Gricean model of speaker’s meaning structures rests on the communicative intention. Grice goes wrong as he does not give any substantial account regarding the nature of the content. Without giving such account of content, he holds that the speakers are intended to thought content. But Grice is true that there is a distinction between ‘speaker’s meaning’ and the ‘conventional meaning’. There is a priority of ‘speaker’s meaning’ in case of establishing explanatory priority of language. Devitt talks about a temporal consequence of the two theories. In the case of ontological priority, we will find that there is a temporal consequence and a person cannot acquire the linguistic competence only if he/she does not acquire the competence of thought that is expressible in the language. Even Gricean model is also affected by the same temporal consequences. Without accepting the priority of speaker’s meaning, Gricean explanation cannot establish the Gricean meaning in a community. In all these processes, we see that there needs a temporal priority of thoughts over language.

It seems to me that thoughts are claimed as prior to the public language in terms of its explanation, meaning or some more concepts that could be well explained by the convention of language. But Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan suggest that there are some concepts that do not depend on thought or intention, rather they depends on the nature of ‘reference borrowing’ or ‘the causal theory of reference’. Here, the question is that how can we fix the reference of a natural kind term or a proper name?

⁸⁵ Goldin-Meadow, Susan & Ming-Yu-Zheng, “Thought before Language: The Expressions of Motions, Events prior to the Impact of a Conventional Language Model,” in *Language and Thought*, 1998, 52.

The initial stage shows that the name that fixes their reference does so actually in terms of the grounding of an object. The “causal theory of reference” does not give importance only to ‘reference fixing’ but also to ‘reference borrowing’. If we keep aside the concept of ‘reference fixing’ in order to give importance on the concept of ‘reference borrowing’, then we will see that a person in the case of communication systems, who is not acquainted with a proper name can borrow the reference from the earlier users. In the case of the name ‘Aristotle’ who is designated as a famous philosopher and this designation over the years is not only causally linked with the name, but also on the initial ground that rest on the claim that ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’ via centuries becomes possible just for ‘reference borrowing’. Because, the speaker is acquainted about the name ‘Aristotle’ and therefore, borrow the reference of ‘Aristotle’ with the designation of a philosopher from the earlier users who have used the name in a similar manner. Putnam specially contributes to the causal theory of reference in the case of natural kind terms like tiger, water, etc. He has also originated the concept of ‘reference borrowing’ in terms of the ‘division of linguistic labor’ that I mentioned in detail in the previous sections. For the causal theory of referentialists, language is nonetheless a social phenomenon or a social artefact and the speakers who are not equally related to the reference of the term can use the term of the language in connection with the interaction between the term and world. The reason is that the speakers are bounded by the linguistic involvement with one another. Moreover, this interaction and involvement are grounded in a person whom they call expert who can identify the right referents of the terms. Tyler Burge takes up this issue and promotes it into non-natural kind term. He not only gives importance on the question of natural kind terms, but he extends his thoughts to non-natural kind terms like sofa, arthritis, etc. For him, ‘reference borrowing’ is also

interacted with non-natural kind terms, but he does not believe that all the words or kind terms will be associated with ‘reference borrowing’ from a perspective of the causal theory of reference. Burge tries to show that the conception of reference borrowing thesis emphasizes that a person who can be linguistically competent with a word, but may be ignorant or wrongly can designate its referent. One person may be competent with the name “Einstein” without knowing that Einstein was a physicist. Or, in Putnam’s words, a person may be competent with the proper name ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ without knowing that these two trees are different from each other. So it is clear that ignorance about the referent cannot make any sense in the sense of knowing any concept that he/she borrowed the reference of the concept from others. We see that the Gricean account that gives priority of thought over language considers that we have a concept of Aristotle and we can think about the thoughts of the ancient philosopher. So here, thought precedes language. Devitt says, ‘According to the theory of reference borrowing, we have the concept largely in virtue of a causal chain a stretching back to the philosopher. That is, the fact that one of our mental states is the concept <Aristotle> is largely determined by the fact that his mental state is plugged into an appropriate causal network grounded in the philosopher.’⁸⁶

We find a conventional use of the concept ‘Aristotle’ that actually help to determine the word <Aristotle>, but the causal theory of reference conveys that the conventional meaning of the word ‘Aristotle’ that borrowed reference from the generation is essentially linked with its causal changes that construe the meaning of the concept <Aristotle>. The concept <Aristotle> becomes related to Aristotle due to the relation to the conventional meaning of the word ‘Aristotle’. But this theory is not error-free, as firstly, we can’t say that all concepts have some reference borrowing

⁸⁶ Ibid., 139.

features. Though it is acceptable that in the case of natural kind terms, proper names and non-natural kind terms ascribed by Burge may fulfil the claim, but the concept ‘bachelor’, ‘hunter’ cannot fit with the claim. The point is that the concept does not have any *direct dependence relation* with linguistic convention. Secondly, it would be unjust to say that every person has the concept that is based on linguistic convention and ‘reference borrowing’. If we judge the concept of <Aristotle> from his contemporaries, then we will see that for the contemporaries who baptize his name or call him ‘Aristotle’ did not borrow the reference from others. Even in the words like ‘Kripke’, ‘Putnam’ or ‘elm tree’, we see that here, the concept of the proper names does not rest on linguistic convention or reference borrowing. Here, direct confrontation can fulfil its reference, though it is true that linguistic convention also takes a relevant part. To establish Gricean claims, Devitt writes that ‘For, the convention itself is explained in terms of groundings. The *creation* of the linguistic convention requires some people to have concepts that are not dependent on conventions. The convention makes it possible for other people to gain the concept by reference borrowing, thus having a concept that is to be explained partly in terms of that convention. Thought meanings explain the conventions that explain *other* thought meanings’⁸⁷. So, Gricean view also explores their fundamental claim that thought is prior to language. Internalist arguments are quite close to the hypothesis but externalism does not accept the claim. We will see the arguments of the externalist later.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 140.

2.2. Mental Content and Conceptual Role Semantics

Mental content⁸⁸ that is based on the ‘Conceptual role semantics’ can be regarded as a thesis that makes internalism elite. Gilbert Harman⁸⁹ says that his thoughts of ‘Conceptual role of semantics’ (Nonsolipsistic) implicit in the four different claims. The claims are as follows:

- a) The meaning of the linguistic expressions breaks on the thoughts of the contents that actually refer the concepts.
- b) The contents of thoughts are something that can be determined by their constructions that are primarily out of concepts.
- c) The conception of ‘Functional role’ has played a pertinent role in the case of determining the contents of concepts in an agent’s psychology.
- d) The ‘Functional role’ is in character nonsolipsistic as it is linked with the objects of the world that inclined with past and future.

Here the critical questions are that what is meant by ‘thought’ and what is meant by ‘Functional role’? Actually the ‘thoughts’ are related to the propositional attitudes like our beliefs and desires, whereas, ‘Functional role’ is quite different in characters because here, the concept takes a relevant role in perception, inference and in case of practical reasoning that leads to action. The parenthesis approach of ‘nonsolipsistic’ account of Harman construes a sharp distinction between Loar and Fodor’s conception of ‘conceptual role semantic’, an account that intends to vindicate internalism. Though the ‘(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantic’ contracts with the

⁸⁸ The linguistic notion of content tells us about the intentional state (belief, desires, etc.) that represents things to be. Contents are carried relations between mind and world as our mental states are represented something that are causally (externalist claims) or conceptually (internalist claims) related with the external world. Kim wonderfully claims that “Content has a lot to do with what is going on in the world, outside the physical boundaries of the subject.” (J. Kim, *Philosophy of Mind*, Colorado: West View Press, 1996, 29).

⁸⁹ Gilbert Harman, ‘From “(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics”’, in *The Philosophy of Mind - Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues*, 2013, 611.

watchword that ‘meaning is use’, yet the main thought is that there is a keen distinction in regard to the use of the ‘symbols’ through splitting the separate concepts - ‘use in calculation’ and ‘use in communication’. The symbols that use in ‘use of calculation’ could not be used in ‘communication processes. The basic uses of symbols are associated with ‘use of calculation’ in the sense that here, the concepts are treated as ‘symbols’ in our language of thoughts. We know that Grice emphasises the conception of meaning in terms of speaker’s meaning and his purpose is to set up speaker’s intentions regarding our communicating systems. So here we found a crucial connection between the intention of the speaker and user’s meaning (speaker’s meaning). Harman thinks that our beliefs, desires, all these propositional attitudes (unexpressed thoughts) do not express any meaning. He also writes that ‘I say “normally” because sometimes one has thoughts in English or some other real language. Indeed, I am inclined to think a language, properly so called, is a symbol system that is used for both communication and thought. If one cannot think in a language, one has not yet mastered it. A symbol system used only for communication, like Morse code, is not a language’⁹⁰. Even we cannot claim that the concept could mean anything in a particular occasion.

There is a trend to believe that the meaning of a word rests on its use. And the Rylean observations do not like to put these thoughts into sentences in language. They believe that the sentences have no regular use like words. The sentence gets its meaning because of the contents of its words. Even the ‘use theory of meaning’ emphasizes that a word gets its meaning because of their uses. In this theory, it is hardly believed that this process depends on sentences rather than uses. We will find a similar process in the case of concepts that plays a significant role in the uses of our

⁹⁰ Ibid., 613.

thoughts rather than our belief desire psychology, wherefrom the concepts emerge. We can take an example here. There may be a possible belief of an agent that she has bathed in blood. In this case, it is true that the belief has certain content, though this content has no function or use in normal ways. But it shows that there is no one to one relation between the contents of our beliefs and its functions or uses. The uses of concepts can be regarded as a progression of exercise.

It is worth mentioning here that Harman tries to find out a link between content and inferential role semantics as we know that the contents that are based on the concepts have a related to uses or functions. In the case of perception or colour concept, we see that our concept is associated with the content of our thought. But in this case, the inferential role takes a very relevant part. In Harman's words, 'A given colour concept is the concept of a normally persisting characteristic of objects in the world, a characteristic that can be used both to keep track of objects and as a sign of other things'⁹¹. This method is totally an internal relation. We traditionally know that 'yellowness' is a sign of 'ripe fruits'. Even in the case of number, shape, though the concepts of our nation depend on the aptitude or the perception of the agents, yet the concept of our notion inclines to accept an inference for a broader view.

Harman tries to point out that there is a keen relation between the concept of something with perceiving that things. But what we observe (thing) reflects in the way a person act. For instance, in the case of animals, when an animal perceives something as food, and extravagance the object as food only if the perceived object is edible for the animals. It is a complicated process, where the possibility of mistakes is so high. In his book *Thought*⁹², Harman holds the identification of representational states in terms of conceptual roles and external world. He claims that when a radar

⁹¹ Ibid., 613.

⁹² Gilbert Harman, *Thoughts*, 1973.

aimer determines to shoot a rival fighter plane, then first, he tries to interpret the data from radar and calculate the distance and measurement. This calculation is a representation of present and future location of the plane. In this case, the device, radar represents the location of the plane and if some mistakes happen, then the operation of the radar aimer will be filled. It means, the shoot will be missed. Harman always thinks that the contents are not bounded by one's thoughts and concepts. As a function based relation, it is 'non-solipsistic' in the sense that it has a relation with the external world. Following Putnam and Kripke, he claims that 'You might have a concept of an oak tree by virtue of which you have thoughts about oak trees where the crucial functional relation is a relation between your concept and the word "oak" in *English*... (Non-solipsistic) conceptual role semantics asserts that an account of the content of thoughts is more basic than an account of communicated meaning and the significance of speech acts. In this view, the content of linguistic expressions is derived from the contents of thoughts they can use to express.'⁹³ Of course, it is true that to follow Putnam's 'the division of linguistic labor', one can assume that there are some experts who can make a differentiation between 'oak' and 'elm' through various distinguishing properties of the trees. He also considers that the ordinary people also have a concept of oak tree that is linked with 'Functional role' and their concept of oak tree though has a sharp difference with experts concept of oak tree, but it is sufficient for them to know the word 'oak' in terms of concept and functional role. Because in their case (ordinary people), the using of the word 'oak' gets its meaning through the connection with the concept of an oak tree. And, the meaning of the ignorant person about oak and the experts' use becomes same because of the 'functional role' or the process of using the word. It would be significant to claim that

⁹³ Gilbert Harman, 2013, 615.

the content of experts' concept of an oak tree is more scientific and enriched rather than the ordinary people concept of an oak tree which is drawn from the ordinary use of word and meaning of the people's concept of oak tree. For Harman, the words actually used to express the contents of concepts that help us to know the meaning of the specific 'words'. Besides, the meaning of an agent's words cannot get its meaning through the contents of the agent's concepts.

In Putnam's 'Twin Earth Thought Experiment' case, we see that instead of the sameness of the mental contents of two molecule agents, the difference of the thoughts could be possible due to the external world. But Harman argues that 'The difference is due rather to the fact that the content of a person's concept is determined by its functional role in some normal context. The normal context for an Earthling's thought about what he or she calls "water" is here on Earth, while the normal context for a twin Earthling thought about what he or she calls "water" is on Twin Earth.'⁹⁴ There is a possibility to generate a change in normal context and this idea leads to arbitrariness. I think that there is a tendency to bring inference and perception in relating to the content of a concept particularly in the case of implication, an explanatory notion. Even it is well accepted opinion that in some cases we find a connection between the external world and concept. But, I would like to conclude here to mention an internalistic approach of Harman. In his words: 'The most primitive psychological notions are not *belief* and *desire*, but rather *knowledge* and *successful intentional action*. Belief and intention are a generalization of knowledge and success that allow for mistakes and failures. We conceive a creature as believing

⁹⁴ Ibid., 617.

things by conceiving it as at least potentially knowing things, and similarly for intentions.⁹⁵

2.3. Externalism: Revisiting Mind

Putnam thinks that the philosophers have given importance on the concept of ‘meaning’ or ‘semantic’ rather than linguistics. Ordinary language, philosophy does not care about science properly. Logical positivists however, claim that the terms of scientific theories can fix their ‘meaning’ through definition. This definition may be ‘operational definition’ or ‘theoretical definition’ like $C=1/2 MV^2$ is the definition of ‘kinetic energy’. Even the procedure of changing the definition depends on the changing of the reference of the terms. Putnam argues that ‘...when physicists gave up the idea that atoms are little solar systems (the Bohr model), they did not change the reference of the term ‘atom’ rather, and they arrived at a better idea of what atoms are.’⁹⁶

Here, a person can ask to Putnam that ‘what are the connections between this idea and externalism? Putnam answers this question from two different ways. These are as follows:

The concept tells us that a term must have an unchanging definition and this definition helps to fix their reference. We should reject such a kind of theory or conception. Externalism suggests that there is a causal link between what it refers to with the conception of not ‘unchanging definitions’. The reference is fixed by its environment, and not by what is in our head. Here, one thing is very relevant to point out that when Putnam taught at MIT, then he became a fond of ‘semantic rules’ like

⁹⁵ Ibid., 621.

⁹⁶ Hilary Putnam, “The Development of Externalist Semantics,” Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Stockholm, 01/11]2011. I am personally thankful to him for sending me the whole lecture paper.

Katz and Fodor (his two old students) by considering that the meaning of the words could be given by 'semantic rules'. But later he realizes that the concept of 'semantic rules' was a mistake. He refutes this idea of 'semantic rules' in 1967, while he taught a course on Philosophy of Language at Harvard University. Actually, the ideas of 'semantic rules' are associated with a sort of internalism which determines the meaning of every word of a competent speaker which are the parts of his/her repertoires. Even the semantic markers are supposed to represent knowledge that every competent speaker has. It shows that you have the whole things already in your mind. This is an internalist account.

For Putnam, the meaning of a natural kind term is partly fixed by the 'division of linguistic labor' and partly fixed by sharing 'stereotype'. One thing that is worth mentioning here is for Putnam head and brain are not the same. Brain that is located in the head undergoes appropriate changes like maturation, acculturation etc. before a person can speak a natural language. There is a close connection between reference and meaning, but it does not prove that both are same. The names of the substances and species (biological) intimate a differentiation in terms of their differentiation of meaning. Putnam thinks that if one considers that 'meaning' is stand for wide content, then the difference in extension (the set of things referred to) is by definition a deference. One can ask that whether different substance names always have different narrow content. Externalist will not sustain this type of thoughts. For an instance, the words 'elm' and 'beech' have different wide content, but the same narrow content. Narrow content is a function of whatever knowledge concerning the meaning of a term is coded in the brain of a typical competent speaker. The typical (urban) English speaker knows that 'elms' and 'beeches' are different species, but the speakers cannot make a difference between them by sight. Even the content (narrow) that is associated

with 'elms' is not equally associated with 'beeches'. So, we cannot count 'elms' and 'beeches' as a part of narrow content. Even if it's possible then the preservation of narrow content under translation into another language would not be fulfilled. Narrow content locates in the head of the speakers, but it does not suffice to fix reference. The names of species do not always specify the difference in narrow content. Putnam says that 'Meanings aren't in the head does not mean that the brain has nothing to do with semantic competence. But what fix the meanings of a speaker's words are not just the states of her brain; the reference of our terms is generally fixed by two things that classical philosophy of language either ignores or mentions only as an afterthought: other people and the world.'⁹⁷ It is quite a difficult task for a layman to make a distinction between an elm and a beech tree as these are very alike. An expert can properly determine what is called 'elm' and how it is different from 'beech' trees. Even in the case of determinants the substances like gold, diamond etc the division of linguistic labor has taken to play a very important role.

Putnam cautions us that it will be wrong to suppose the natural kind term like 'water' is rightly identified only by the experts and the common people mostly relying on its superficial properties, for instance, tasteless, colourless and liquid, etc. It would even be equally a mistake to claim that the term 'water' means two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom. This is a chemical formula that educated people and sometimes some uneducated people can know somehow clearly. The point is that the speakers who lived before Dalton and who were ignorant about the chemical formulas and the educated speaker who knew well about the formulas both referred to the same liquid *water* when they used the term 'water' in their own natural language.

⁹⁷ I am indebted to Hilary Putnam for this suggestion.

For Putnam, the change of the meaning of the term cannot subsequently make a change of their reference. Actually, there occurs a change in our knowledge. He wants to say that the theory of description and defining characteristics of a substance are not able to fix its meaning. It is fixed by the nature of the paradigms of the term. The meaning and the referent of the term are determined by what goes in the world but not in the head. By saying this, Putnam goes against the Descriptivist tradition of Frege and Russell. Even Putnam's famous "twin earth thought experiment" shows that the term 'water' has different meanings on earth and twin earth, yet the term 'water' are regarded as homonyms but they are not synonymy in earth and twin earth. Though the brain of X (an agent) and his/her twin X¹ are microphysical duplicate yet they do not refer the same term 'water' by using the definition or meaning of the proposed term 'water'. In spite of the sameness of their mental states the differentiation of 'water' takes place just because of its reference to the world. The microphysical duplicates denote the two different things by using the same word 'water' are possible because their environments are different.

Colin McGinn rightly claims that 'The logical point here is that sameness of word and sameness of appearance do not guarantee sameness of belief content, since distinct things can have the same appearance. The contents are distinguished by what the word is *about*, and this is something that lies outside the believer. We and twin earthians can have beliefs about different things despite the fact of our being intrinsic duplicates of each other.'⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Colin McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1996, 75.

2.4. Externalism: From Language to World

Putnam tries to see his semantic externalism from the perspective of meaning holism, as he believes that ‘Our verbalized thoughts have meaning only in conjunction with our transactions with the objects in our environment and with other speakers.’⁹⁹ One can say that this does not directly speak of Holism. It only speaks about the necessity of the speaker engagement with the objects of the world. He also thinks that mind has world involving abilities and it exercises of those activities as it has no definite location.

In his well known paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Putnam points out that one may know the meaning of the word “gold” or any natural kind term without knowing the fundamental properties or chemical formulas of the term. The problem he faced is that if one tries to give the meaning of a term like ‘gold’ just by semantical rules, the descriptive part of the semantical rules would be insufficient. For him the meanings of a natural kind term like ‘gold’ is partly fixed by ‘stereotypes’ and also partly fixed by what he called ‘division of linguistic labor’. But he cautions that the concept ‘stereotype’ is not supported any sort of analyticity. The shared stereotypes of the natural kind term like ‘gold is a precious yellow metal’ is not regarded as an analytic truth as it may turn out to be false. Putnam accepts that a radical change in stereotype can lead a change in the meaning of the term. In 1963 at the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, Putnam suggests, “It is not true that only those people who are able to identify gold know the meaning of the word...’. It is true that identifying the term ‘gold’ or ‘diamond’, physicists, chemists, and jewellers actually depend on each other and the laymen always rely on the experts but in the case of ‘water’ we don’t normally rely on the experts. Here the substance itself helps

⁹⁹ Hilary Putnam, “The Development of Externalist Semantics,” Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Stockholm.

to fix the reference that is called by Putnam “shared paradigm”, i.e. a kind of agreement of the community. So Putnam suggests that this stereotype or shared paradigm can partly fix the meaning of the term. Another part of his story is that the scientific research to discover the ultimate part that fixes the reference of the natural kind term and it can be fixed by the experts. But in his later writing, especially in “Meaning Holism”, he tries to keep a distance from the scientific reading of externalism. He feels that ‘In physics, ‘water’ means chemically pure water; in ordinary language, things are more complicated. On the one hand, ‘water’, in the ordinary sense, may have impurities; on the other hand, tea and coffee are not ‘water’. What sort of or degree of departure from ideally “pure” taste, colour, or odor disqualifies H₂O-Cum-impurities from being ‘water’ in ordinary circumstances is interest-relative and context-sensitive. But this is not to say that ‘water’ in ordinary language, is an *operationally-defined* word, pure, and simple.’¹⁰⁰

One may argue that ‘let imagine that we are staying in a society where there is no one whom we can call an expert’. In this scenario, the concept of ‘division of linguistic labor’ and the concept of ‘constraint of publicity’ does not make any sense. But Putnam replies that ‘The linguistic division of labor applies to the term for which there are experts. In a society such as you imagine, there would be no such terms (although even hunter gather societies have such experts, in fact, e.g. in identifying different kinds of birds and animals). Perhaps all words would have operational definitions in terms of observable properties in such a society. But there would still be an externalistic element: the difference between a real cat and a hallucination of a cat is externalistic (here it is all normal people who are the experts).’¹⁰¹ I agree with him that the ‘division of linguistic labor’ makes language a social phenomenon. We

¹⁰⁰ Hilary Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face*, 1992, 282.

¹⁰¹ I am thankful to Hilary Putnam for this valuable note.

cannot grasp the conventional meaning in terms of mentalist approach. Actually, it has a socio-linguistic framework. I also think that an ordinary people have a partial grasp of the meaning of the natural kind term, but the comprehensive grasp of the meaning of the natural kind term can be identified by the experts. I will discuss this issue later.

John McDowell in favour of Putnam supports the concept of the link between what words mean on agent's lips and what the agents say when they utter those words. He writes that 'If we keep those links, Putnam thesis about extension carries over to meaning: that a speaker means what she does by "water" must be constituted at least in part by her physical and social environment.'¹⁰²

McDowell gives importance on the question that how we ought to conceive the nature of the mind. Putnam thinks that mind that is the locus of our manipulation of meaning cannot be in the head. He actually attracts the "psychological states of narrow sense". McDowell thinks that mind is not a space-occupying material stuff. It is an immaterial organ that does not equate in the brain. He even refutes an independent side of the intrinsic mind that conflict with the idea of the location of the believer or environment. But he accepts that our mental life is somehow function because of the contribution of our brain. Mainly Putnam asks that 'is there any intuitive or pre-theoretical notions that are associated with the mental? How can the conception of intuitive mental state be associated with psychological states that are prescribed by "methodological solipsism"?'

We can reply in this way that, 'methodological solipsism' is a thesis that argues that our psychological states are in the proper sense narrow. McDowell critics

¹⁰² John McDowell, "Putnam on Mind and Meaning," in *Meaning, Knowledge and Reality*, 1998, 275 - 276.

Putnam's thought to argue that Putnam did not think on the matter that the command of a meaning can be related to the conception of how an agent can hold the meaning in his/her mind. Even he did not try to combine this thinking with the non-solipsistic account of explicit expression of meaning that actually determined by its extension. McDowell also throws a challenge to Putnam's famous 'Twin Erath Thought Experiment'. Putnam emphasizes in his paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" that X and Twin-X are unable to make a distinction between 'elm' and 'beech' in our earth and twin earth. The experts in our community can properly draw these distinctions. Putnam also claims that in this case of psychological state of X (in earth) and the psychological state of twin X in (twin earth) remain same. McDowell argues that 'Putnam's psychological state involves his mind's being directed towards, say, beech (if beeches constitute the extension of the word that he is disposed to use in order to give expression to his psychological state); his Doppelganger's psychological state involves his mind's being directed towards elms. This psychological state of each as it were expends in accordance with the determination of the extensions of their terms, in a way that is compelled if we are maintain both of the two assumptions.'¹⁰³

It is an accepted fact that Putnam and his twin in the case have something in common (some psychological properties are in common). But for McDowell, these psychological common properties persist in 'wide' psychological state rather than 'wide' state of common properties that are linked with the environment. In his book *Reason, Truth and History*, Putnam suggests that the mental states are not intrinsically directed to the external world. If we claim that our mental states are intrinsically referential, then we should obviously accept that it deals with the magical conception of reference. For Putnam, the mental states are in nature representational and the

¹⁰³ Ibid., 283.

occurrences of the minds are intrinsically characterizable (narrow), there it is totally independent of its representational properties. Putnam also thinks that we can stop our stream of thought when and where we want to stop them. We just catch some feelings, images and sensations in this situation. It follows that introspective evidences establish the contents of mind. But McDowell refutes this argument to say that ‘...when I am struck by the thought that I hear the sound of water dripping, the fact that my thought is, say, about water is not part of what I find in my stream of consciousness, but has to be read into what I find there.’¹⁰⁴ Let’s hope that a person closed his eyes and saw a plate of mutton curry, then it would be wrong to suggest that what he was visualizing (a plate of mutton curry) is a fact that relates his mental state extraneous to the contents of his consciousness or related to the extra psychological environment.

If we trace back to Putnam’s argument, then, we will find that he was extremely worried about the fact (primitive question) that “how does thought hook on to the world?” To say that thinking is in itself is to claim that without the referential properties it is absurd to deny the genuine thoughts that thinking is directed to the world. McDowell does not accept Putnam’s view that thinking is mental manipulation of representation that does not bear any referential directness at reality. McDowell rejects Putnam idea of ‘just postulating mysterious powers of mind’ because McDowell believes that it is possible to take our thinking unmysteriously as thinking being itself and we can live cognitively and also practically with keep a relation to the world. Similarly, he refutes Putnam’s another notable thought what is called ‘phenomenological investigation.’ Putnam thinks that the attempt to understand thought leads to a philosophical puzzlement that actually missed the point that

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 287.

understanding, viz. How does a thought hook on to the world? McDowell agrees with Putnam regarding the issue of the possession of a concept as ability rather than occurrences. But he does not believe like Putnam that there cannot be any occurrences that are not intrinsically directed at the world. He writes that ‘If the concept of water is an ability that is exercised in thinking about water, we can conceive its exercises as, precisely, occurrences that are intrinsically episodes of thinking about water.’¹⁰⁵ Actually, McDowell takes a distance from Putnam’s argument as he thinks that the intrinsic structure of our inner medium could help us to map our psychological talks into a subject matter. Without accepting the conception of Putnamian ‘introspection’, it is plausible to ensure that we are fully aware about the conception of the causal order.

2.5. Meaning, Understanding and the Socio-linguistic Background

I would like to add here some of my observations that can synthesize the whole debate in a nutshell. There is a long misunderstanding about the fact that Putnam’s semantic externalism is dependent on his ‘scientific realism’. He also believes (in a wider sense) in ‘quasi realism’, a view supported by Simon Blackburn that it is not that the problems of philosophy can be solved by natural science, but the complete description of reality (as it is ‘in itself’) can be drawn from natural science. But he rejects all this view in his later writing. We consider that the twin earth thought experiment gives importance on the aspect that in twin earth, the term water does not consist of H₂O, so we earthian should say that it is not water at all. The term water has a different meaning of our earth and twin earth as that is varied on their environment. Putnam says that earthian Oscar’s word ‘water’ and twin earthian Oscar’s word ‘water’ is not synonymous but can be homonymous. They are not synonyms as the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 289.

earthian Oscar and twin earthian Oscar are not being microphysical duplicates. Putnam is not worried about the irrelevancy of the physical compound like XYZ that he mentioned in his experiment. For him, the question is that what we can perfectly imagine in a circumstance rather than what is chemically possible. He tries to avoid this problem in his later paper “Meaning Holism” to suggest that we can easily imagine a twin earth ‘water’ that consist 50% water and other 50% D₂O or heavy water that is also tasteless, non-poisonous liquid but does not quench our thirst. It is plausible to suppose that twin earthian drinks this ‘water’ and ordinary people did not notice this and for them, this fact does not have any relevance to derive the meaning of the term ‘water’ even if they noticed it. The interpreters of the twin earth thought experiment misinterpreted the whole thought to consider that Oscar and twin Oscar are microphysical duplicates. Putnam thinks that ‘... it is enough if their brains are in sufficiently similar states with respect to those systems that enable the appropriate use of the words. The conclusion of this argument is that what our words refer to is, in general, not determined merely by what goes on in our brains, or, more broadly, inside our bodies: the difference that make a difference between us and the Twin Earthers lies at the “other end” of the causal chains connecting us with the stuff we drink. Reference depends on causal connection to the extra-bodily environment.’¹⁰⁶

Like Putnam, I also find a link between *Twin Earth Thought Experiment* with *Brain-in-a-Vat* argument. We know that Putnam’s *Brain-in-a-Vat* argument is a thought experiment (scientific) that tries to refute Cartesian denial of external world hypothesis. The concept of disembodied mind that is deceived by an evil demon might be challenged through BIV experiment. There is a keen similarity that we find in the cases of *Twin Earth Thought Experiment* and BIV experiment. In his early

¹⁰⁶ Hilary Putnam, “Sixty five years of philosophy: A Participant’s Thoughts and Experiences,” East Anglia Lecture. I am personally thankful to him for sending me the lecture paper.

writing, like *Reason, Truth and History*, Putnam criticizes traditional realism through his famous *Brain-in-a-Vat* argument. The skeptical point that Putnam makes here is that there is little that can distinguish the *Vat World* from the Real World. Any robust Realism has to seek a way of construing the difference between the two worlds. Putnam believes that a term refers to an object only if there is an appropriate causal connection between the term and object. Actually, he rejects the referential theory of meaning as I several times mentioned in earlier. He also concerns about the fact that reference cannot be an accident or magically refers to the object. Because, as an anti-realist Putnam considers that there is a reality, but is a partly constructed by our ‘conceptual operators’. In the case of *Brain-in-a-Vat*, if a person claims that “I am a *Brain-in-a-Vat*”, then she is not in brain in a vat. Notice that one can never truthfully assert ‘I am a *Brain-in-a-Vat*’ because in case she is right her terms would not refer to real people in real world but vat objects in the vat world. So if she says she is a brain in a vat in the real world then her terms *Brain-in-a-vat* cannot refer to the brain in a vat in the real world. So the statement if true has to be false. Hence, the situation is paradoxical, which makes the BIV kind of skeptical position a self-refuting one. For Putnam, a *Brain-in-a-Vat* is never able to think about the real brain in the real world. In vat world there is no real object. Objects are actually stimulated by images. So there is no causal connection between actual tree and BIVS’s token tree.

In the case of *Twin Earth Thought Experiment*, here the reference of a natural kind term like, water, tiger, gold, etc. are dependent on the causal connection of the instances of these terms. This process can be possible in two different ways:

First, there may be a direct way that depends on the part of speaker’s perception.

Second, one can communicate with other speakers who have a right causal connection with the instances of the natural kind term and get information from him/her.

Third, it is also possible that one person can interact with such a thing that may not exist or no other people may be familiar with it like an extraterrestrial intelligent etc. We may call it like Putnam 'reference by description'. But this 'reference by description' is also ultimately dependent on the direct reference theory. Putnam actually generates his claim by arguing that '... reference to objects in the external world depends on information carrying causal connection with those objects or at least with objects that have properties in terms of which the object referred to can be described, and the causal connection has to involve the properties in question. The *Brain-in-a-Vat* argument depends on this generalization of the conclusion of the Twin Earth Argument.'¹⁰⁷

We see that BIV does not carry any causal interrelation with external world where as semantic externalism or *twin earth thought experiment* paves the way for causal interaction with the world and environment. If we claim that *twin earth thought experiment* is right, then we should also accept that BIV is wrong or BIV agent does not speak the English language, they speak just 'Vat-English' and in their language the term 'tree' means the image of not the 'real tree' but 'Vat tree'. Actually, the words used by vat person are not same with the language speaking with ordinary language people who are molecule to molecule duplicates. Now the question is that if a skeptic challenge to semantic externalism and its consequences than he/she should accept the BIV argument that go wrong.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 8.

The main point, I would like to focus is that what makes externalism attractive or what is the importance of semantic externalism today? It seems to me that the most attractive part of semantic externalism is that a naturalistic outlook towards human beings in the world. Another part is that to challenge the view of incorrigibility or intrinsic ability, a thesis that tries to see the whole debate from the skin in. Semantic externalism defends that the concepts that are important for our knowledge become meaningless if and only if it has no causal connection with the referent or the external world. Putnam thinks that ‘To have concepts it is necessary to have an appropriate causal connection with an environment. Semantic externalism implies externalism about the mind; if to have a mind is to have thoughts, then to have a mind, it isn’t sufficient to have the right goings-on in the brain and the rest of the body; to have a mind you have to be hooked up to an environment in the proper way, or at least to have a mind that can think about an external world, you have to casual interactions that extend into the environment.’¹⁰⁸

We know very well that Frege talks about an objective characteristic of sense. He thinks that through senses we can communicate between one person and the others. Therefore, he makes a distinction between sense and images that is quite personal. One can ask that ‘what is the everyday sense of language?’ Frege considers that a common overlap of idiolects can able to explain a language properly. But Putnam aptly opposes this thought. Dummett agrees with Putnam regarding the context of ‘social character of language’ that Frege did not give more importance. It is true that Kripke also believes that the meaning of the determination of a term depends on the social background of the speakers, as words are used for communication between speakers. Putnam probably will be the first thinker who gives a clear version

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 13.

of the arguments in his famous ‘elm and beech’ example. He tells us that it would be quite difficult for a layman to make a clear distinction between ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ two different trees that look like very much similar.

This is we may call ‘socio-linguistic practice’ and Frege considers that it may possible that two persons are using the same proper names to identify something but their meanings can be different as their language is totally different. Here it may be followed that though their senses can determine the same referent, yet they attached different senses to the proper names. In defence of Frege, Dummett writes that ‘It seems clear enough what Frege would say about the ‘elm’ case, namely that a man who does not know how to tell an elm from a beach does not fully grasp the sense of the word ‘elm’: he has only a partial understanding of it.’¹⁰⁹ In the case of communication with others, a ‘social acknowledgement’ about senses can be exploited by a partial sense of a word. Even it would be also possible that we will not find any socially agreed sense; it is just dependent on speaker’s own acknowledgement of sense where the reference is not stable. One can argue that here Frege does not give importance on the content of ‘socio-linguistic practices’ rather he is intended in giving more importance to the defects of the natural language where we found the variation of senses from person to person. The concept of senses may change as the different variations have taken place between different individuals. Dummett comes back to Putnam’s example. Many peoples in our society use the word ‘elm’ without knowing its exact identifying criteria. They are unaware about the full meaning of the term. In some critical situations like to identify gold or diamond, etc. we need to take help from the experts as our ordinary knowledge about gold or diamond are not sufficient and also more reliable here. Putnam’s famous idea

¹⁰⁹ Michael Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, 1978, 425-426.

‘division of linguistic labor’ that assures us that the laymen have a partial grasp of the sense of a natural kind term where as an expert or jewellers have the comprehensive grasp of the knowledge to identify the natural kind term like ‘gold’. Dummett refutes Putnam’s thought and says, ‘Language is a social phenomenon, and it is a characteristic of a word of any language so considered that it is or that is not, treated as a technical term; it is, e.g. a feature of the word ‘amino acid’, considered as word in English language, that there are no ordinary criteria (criteria known to ordinary English speakers) for its application.’¹¹⁰ Dummett’s thesis shows that it is not that an ordinary people cannot get a comprehensive meaning of the terms like ‘gold’ etc. We find that there are no specialized criterions for its applications. Here both speakers (laymen and experts) have quite similar knowledge, like the word ‘sticky’. Dummett cautions us to say that in the case of ‘gold’ we will find that it has two different applications - ordinary and specialized criteria. Even he also supports that the criteria that is applied by the ordinary speakers are quite sufficient for their ordinary uses. If the ordinary speakers try to understand the specialized criteria that are once suggested by the experts, then it would be considered as an extra-ordinary case. In his book *Meaning and Moral Science*, Putnam claims that ‘Meaning, is in my view, is a coarse grid laid over use.’¹¹¹ Putnam talks about a standard minimum amount of information about a natural kind term of an agent. But Dummett thinks that if the ordinary speakers try to understand the specialized criteria given by the experts, then it would be considered as an extraordinary case.

The ‘division of the linguistic labor’ gives importance on the account of language as a social phenomenon. It conveys that the meaning of a natural kind term (gold) cannot be expressed fully by the descriptions of the criteria given by the

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 427.

¹¹¹ Hilary Putnam, *Meaning and Moral Science*, 1978, 98.

experts and this cannot be known by the mere description of the language users or ordinary speakers. To grasp the full meaning there needs an interrelationship between the two phases. But Dummett suggests that there will be no problem to accept the first principle (Meaning has to do with knowledge) if we consider that the notion of sense that is conferred on an expression by the practice of the linguistic community can be regarded as a community, where the different members of the community play the different roles. He puts it in this way:

‘The knowledge possessed by the community is neither the interaction nor the union of the knowledge possessed by each member. Within the community, some individuals are communally acknowledged as speaking with authority on certain matters; an item of knowledge may be said to belong to the knowledge possessed by the community as a whole even though only very few are aware of it, provided that it is accessible to all who acquire the necessary expertise.’¹¹²

Putnam’s often claim is that it seems to be important for Dummett is that in Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth Thought Experiment’, we find that a similar object like ‘water’ in a twin earth that can be molecule to molecule identical with our earthian ‘water’. Let us imagine that, before we familiar with the exact chemical formulas of the natural kind term ‘water’, we see that in an alternative world that we called ‘twin-earth’, there we find an object that passes all the preliminary tests and became indistinguishable from the term ‘water’ in our earth. But we cannot properly call it ‘water’ if and only if it cannot full fill all the chemical criteria given by the experts. For Kripke, not only the external appearances of an object are considered as important here, but we need to see the stable internal structure of the object that can be verified or known by the experts in the community. Here, we find that Dummett challenges

¹¹² Michael Dummett, 1978, 428.

the thoughts to consider that just imagine that in Mars there is a creature who is most similar like our 'tiger' in earth in the respect of the internal structure and even superficially the creature is exactly like our 'tiger'. But it would be an irrelevant claim that if one calls this creature 'tiger' (earthen tiger). We can genuinely call it 'Martian tiger' without any hesitation but we cannot claim the creature as 'earthian tiger' as they would not spring in the same stock as the real tigers in our earth did. Even one can also charge that if we consider that twins (molecule for molecule identical) are cited as the relation of 'having same thoughts', the concept of dualism will be failed. Once, Putnam wrote to me that 'Molecular duplicates do not necessarily have the same thought; that's the whole point of externalism. But molecular duplicates in environments which are physically identical in the relevant respects, e.g. the "water" is H₂O in both environments, the 'gold' is AU, etc. - do have the same thoughts. That means that thoughts are globally supervenient on the physical state of the world. Is that compatible with dualism? Only if the dualist thinks that thoughts are causally inert (a weird metaphysical position, usually called 'epiphenomenalism', but not self contradictory)',¹¹³

The chemical analysis can make a distinction between two similar objects. It can establish one as element and other as a compound, though both of these satisfied all the other ordinary criteria for being the same objects. Dummett also thinks that an indexical element of a word can be verified by its meaning in terms of applying to something where we found a structural resemblance. A language can be changed, but it is required that a speaker may aware of the fact that in which context the language is used now or the presently 'agreed practice of the community'. Here it will not be of any value to consider how the world used this creature many years ago. Dummett

¹¹³ I am indebted to Hilary Putnam for his helpful notes that stimulate me.

denies accepting the crudest form of the causal theory of reference as he thinks that in this case, we will not find any allowance for the change where the reference can be skipped. He suggests that if we allow that reference can be altered unintentionally like the every other feature of the use of the expressions, then the causal theory will lose its distinctive features that will also do harm for the social version of Frege's theory.

Social Externalism: A Relook

Woodfield starts from the analysis that social externalism deals with the 'individuation-conditions of thoughts'. For him, the thoughts are in nature 'trained-thoughts'; it does not mean that the thinkers have some special training about the subject matters of the thoughts rather it shows that they have certain basic skills (linguistic) and values about the communication processes. Woodfield defines 'social externalism' as follows: 'Social externalism, as I understand it, says that people who are competent in a public language are equipped to have certain thoughts whose contents are fixed (in part) by the lexical semantic norms of their language.'¹¹⁴

One thing needs to be clarified here, like Quine, Woodfield also believes that in the case of translation or seeing through the perspective of other languages the meaning of a word or a sentence would be indeterminate and he also suggests that the content which will be expressed by this indeterminate meaning would be also regarded as indeterminate content. So here, it is also followed that we cannot always claim that the content of our thoughts in a public language can be fixed by the lexical semantic norms. In the case of non-language user and pre-linguistic children, this suggestion does not follow as they have lacked of this cognitive capability of trained thoughts. Woodfield clarifies that Burge does not claim his own externalist position as

¹¹⁴ Andrew Woodfield, "Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity," in *Thought and Language*, 1997, 77.

‘social-externalism’ rather he calls it ‘anti-individuation’ as our contents depend individually upon the environment and also linguistic society.

As we know that Tyler Burge set out two types of thought-experiments against internalism in his well-known papers “Individualism and the Mental” (1973) and “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind” (1986). In his paper, “Individualism and the Mental,” Burge argue that a protagonist speaker (let us call him Peter) says that ‘I have arthritis in the thigh’. But we know this is an odd claim as according to the medical science, we known or listen that ‘arthritis only occurs in the joints or bones’. So the belief of Peter is actually different (counterfactually) from the content of his belief in the actual situation. Let us also believe that in the both scenarios (actual or possible) the agent’s (Peter) intrinsic physical make up and causal history are remain unchanged. Social externalism considers a concept as a norm. Concepts are by nature abstract; these are not located in people’s mind. Basically, it is dependent on social practice or ‘socio-linguistic environment’.

At first, Burge focuses on the limited scopes of twin-earth thought experiment. The arguments look like this:

It just talks about the natural kind term like water.

It only considers about the dependency on the external environment.

Burge focuses on not only natural kind terms, but also on non-natural kind terms like government, sofa, arthritis, etc. His main intention was to show that non-natural kind terms have wide contents. In his latest writing *Origins of Objectivity*¹¹⁵, Burge claims that the question is not that beliefs are not in the head or external objects constitute them, but the claim is more commonsensical, which talks about the location

¹¹⁵ Tyler Burge, *Origins of Objectivity*, 2010,

of beliefs contents. He adds a new idea that belief states are located where the believers are located. He believes in a crucial relation between belief content, and the believers in the sense that social, linguistic practices are embedded into these belief contents. In the case of arthritis argument, Burge argues that only through our socio-linguistic practice we can determine whether one has arthritis in the thigh or in the joints. Now Burge says that an agent would surely lack in arthritis thoughts, though his internal history remained same even in the counterfactual situation. This difference lies what the social environment determines regarding arthritis. Let us see the points in detail. Anti-individualism, an externalist view is strongly presented by Burge in his several writings, especially in *Origins of Objectivity*. The general belief of anti-individualism is that the nature of the mental states rests on the relation between the subject who has the mental state and the subject matter beyond the subject. But Burge revises the claim of anti-individualism as follows:

‘The natures of mental states that empirically represent the physical environment depend constitutively on relations between specific aspects of the environment and the individual, including causal relations which are not in themselves representational; the relevant environment – individual relations help determine specific natures of the states.’¹¹⁶

Actually, Burge tries to refute the idea that causation is a representational relation. Though it is true that some of our mental states like belief, desire, perceptions are constitutively representational. He also claims that the nature of various mental states is quantitatively related to the environment. So, there is a conception of constitutive dependency that could be reciprocal. But that is another issue. Let us see that how does constitutive dependency distinguishable from the

¹¹⁶ Burge, 2010, 61.

causal dependence, following Burge's point of view. Constitutive dependency talks about explanation of one's mental state while many mental states are causally dependent on the relation of agent and the environment. The important issue is that an agent's nature of mental state that constitutively rests on the relation of the environment does not follow that the mental state contents exhibit a relation to the external environment. We cannot consider the relation as a part of the nature of mental state. Burge rejects that for anti-individualism mental state cannot stay in the head or mind. He claims that 'Mental-state kinds ground psychological explanations. Most constitutive relations between the individual and the environment are not kinds that are cited in psychological or other scientific explanations. Still, they are relevant to a constitutive explanation of an individual's being in specific psychological states.'¹¹⁷ He challenges the thesis that mental states are not in the subject's head and it is just a relation to the environment.

We know that anti-individualism considers that the mental state of an agent depends on a relation (constitutive) between the agent and other things of the world. So here, the explanation of the constitutive mental state gives importance on the reference of the external world, like in the case of hearts, an organ that is associated with the function of pumping blood in regards of a circulatory system. So having this function involves several things or conditions like blood vessels, other parts of the organism's body, etc. that actually rests outside the hearts' boundary. So heart is not something that can have a personal structure, or cannot be regarded as a relation. Similarly, our representational mind is not any kind of relation or it has no internal structure. Its' constitutive relation always depends on something that is external or environment based. But there is another view that hints the structural features of a

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 64-65.

mental content that is regarded as non relational to the environment. For them, our representational content of belief and its structural element can be regarded as a mental state (psychological explanation). A more revised version that Burge favours to accept here is that ‘For an individual to have any representational state (such as a belief or perception) as of a subject matter, the state must be associated with some *veridical* representational states that bear referential, indicational, attributional representational relations to a suitably related subject matter.’¹¹⁸ In the case of the thought like ‘philogistan figures in burning’ we see that the concept of ‘philogistan’ cannot be a representator. This thought could be related with others thought or perception in a veridical way and that bear the representational relation to the external world.’ A mistaken thought like philogistan’s figures in burning can have the content ‘philogistan’ in regards of the veridical representations of others’ mental state where physical matters make a suitably relevant part to the attribution of the use of ‘philogistan’. Actually here, inference and veridical representational states make a constitutive relation of the psychological state regarding philogistan contents.

I agree with Burge that the key point of *Origin of Objectivity* is that the constitutive determiners of the state are not necessarily part of the state. The circulatory system is a constitutive determiner of the heart... it is necessarily referred to in an explanation of what a heart is; a heart would not be a heart if it did not pump blood in a wider system; but the wider circulatory system is not considered as a part of the heart. Similarly, although elements in the physical and social environments are constitutive determiners of what it is to be in specific psychological states, they are not part of the psychological state. The psychological states are not located where they are.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

In “Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind”¹¹⁹ Burge assumes that Ramprosad (an agent) who is inhabiting in a society where in spite of same physical structure ‘sofa’ does not mean the one use for sitting. Once Ramprosad comes to accept the claim 1, then he no longer accepts claim 2 or its negation. Now the consequences look like this:

Sofas are religious artefacts.

Sofas are large, overstuffed pieces of furniture made for sitting.

Sofas are not large, overstuffed pieces of furniture made for sitting.

It seems to me that the concept expressed by ‘sofa’ comes under the heading of what Burge terms a ‘reduced’ notion of a sofa, like an anthropologist might employ on coming into a society that uses a term for objects that he or she can recognize. But by whom it is used he or she has not yet determined. Burge briefly considers some remarkable ways to synchronize the notion of ‘reduced’. One elaboration considers that the reduced notion is ‘tied to perceptual aspects of sofas’. The other proposal is that the reduced notion is *thing of a kind relevant to understanding what these things are* (where some sofas are indicated). Burge suggests that the first proposal might not capture the agent’s notion of ‘reduce’ properly, and that the second at best confuses reference-fixing with a meaning-given description. Even Burge also considers that ‘The idea that we can attempt to determine what our thoughts are from a vantage point that is neutral as to which of various alternative thoughts we are rethinking seems to me to be not only deeply implausible, but incoherent... One’s first person standpoint is inseparable from the thoughts that one actually thinks.’¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Tyler Burge, “Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind,” *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 697-720.

¹²⁰ Tyler Burge, “Cartesian Errors and the Objectivity of Perceptual,” in *Contents of Thought*, 1998, 93.

Now it will be implausible to see that social externalism can go together with first person authority. Social externalism entails generally the existence of other peoples and their linguistic practices that bringing the contents of thoughts. So, it seems to follow that if we know *a priori* the contents of our own thoughts, we must know *a priori* that there are social and linguistic practices and other peoples too. Burge refutes this argument by arguing that one may know something without knowing the “background enabling conditions” that make that knowledge possible. For example, your knowledge of your thought that ‘water is a liquid’ does not require knowledge of the conditions that make the thought possible. For an instance, the existence of water or H₂O. Once, Timothy Williamson in his 2004 Presidential Address to the *Aristotelian Society* argues that the use of thought experiments need not involve any *a priori* intuition, but involves only ‘our general cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals, which is not exclusively a priori...’¹²¹ That is, Williamson assimilates the crucial parts of thought experiments in philosophy to ordinary, contingent counterfactuals that are not asserted on a priori grounds. For example, ‘If Dr. Johnson had kicked George Berkeley, he would have kicked a bishop’ is both a posteriori and contingent.’

Besides, Woodfield thinks that in both of these thought experiments a counterfactual supposition and a comparison take a very significant role. He adds that ‘The comparison leads to the conclusion that the protagonist’s belief content is not fixed by his present physical state or physical life history. The content depends rather upon the public meaning of the key word.’¹²² The point is that an agent can get information about a word in the period of communication with others. Here the main

¹²¹ Timothy Williamson, “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking,” 2004, 1.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 78.

intention of Burge is to fix a communal meaning and also the norms for understanding a word. We even saw that in 'sofa argument' the agent does not mean by 'sofa' as 'furniture made for sitting'. In his linguistic environment (where he inhabited), he (agent) considers 'sofa' as a religious artefact. We can make reconciliation between social externalism and psychology showing the implication of social externalism in the field of psychology. Social externalism cannot be a causal development hypothesis rather an individutive dependence thesis that can make a difference with the hypothesis of linguistic relativity. In his first step, Woodfield tries to see the social content as a psychological content. I will discuss it briefly. We are well aware about the fact that some propositional attitudes have semantic contents. One can question that how we can claim that our saying is quite similar with our thinking, though it is also an available fact that the proposition that is expressed by the subject's utterance cannot really match with his/her beliefs. Jerry Fodor and Tim Crane argue against Burge that we cannot claim that the key utterances of a speaker accurately express his/her own belief. They believe that the normal social content of an utterance does not refer to belief whose meaning is incompletely understood by an agent (speaker). But this argument seems unconvincing to Woodfield as he believes like Burge that in the case of an adult speaker's utterance in his own language without making any slip of the tongue we may find that the utterances are literally expressed by his/her beliefs.

Brain Loar, as a critic, also raises a distinction between social contents and psychological contents. Loar believes that following Burge's thought we can choose the two modes of individuation for different purposes. In the case of ordinary purpose, social contents take a satisfactory role, but in the case like arthritis problem, we should follow the psychological content. Here we need to identify the pure, linguistically untrained thought content of the speaker first, and then the problem

arises to characterize it verbally. The context of ‘inner content’ is regarded as a wrong approach of internalists. Woodfield argues that ‘Internalist accounts of thought content imply that only people who fully understand the public sentences they utter are in a position to have thoughts whose contents coincide exactly with the public meaning. This implausible doctrine has the effect of drastically undercounting the number of fully articulate thinkers in a given language-population.’¹²³ On the other hand, social externalism gives importance on the thought associated with public sentence meaning. Though Woodfield accepts that there is a mismatch between speaker’s thought and utterances, yet one can express his/her thoughts literally. But the interesting point is that the concept of mismatch between thoughts and utterances takes place in a social context. For an example, if an agent speaks that ‘sophisms are religious artefacts’, then a hearer takes the sentence to mean that ‘sofas are religious artefacts’. These thoughts are a social content that can be fixed by public meaning of ‘sofa’. However, the agent did not produce the sound sofa. Loar also argues against Burge’s thought experiment. He argues that content distinction are not only socially determined, but it can be determined by psychological. We find a difference between Woodfield and Loar’s thoughts. Loar talks about the two ways of thinking (two beliefs with distinct psychological content about ‘cat’) can express an ingenious opinion. We can appeal this distinction from showing a difference between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions’. Now, one can ask that what is a ‘concept’ and what did he mean by ‘conception’ here? For Woodfield, the concept is a rule, and it will be better to say a ‘classificatory norm’ that determines the correctness or incorrectness of a symbolic classification of a term (symbol) like ‘cat’ in English language or ‘chat’ in French and other languages are marked by other symbols. So it cannot consider as an internal

¹²³ Ibid., 82.

representation of the symbol like cat, chat, etc. besides, conceptions are a linked beliefs about a particular term. It may be a package of information or misinformation. Woodfield makes a type-token distinction of conceptions. Our personal positions can be regarded as token conception. Here the conception of my thought can differ from the conception of your thought, besides both of our conception about a term can be qualitatively identical. It may also be possible that we have different token conceptions about a same type conception. Woodfield tries to solve Loar's problem of two ways of thinking in this way. Woodfield thinks that 'The interesting fact about Paul is that he has two token conceptions of the cat type. One is linked to his internal representation of the word 'cat', the other is linked with his internal representation of the word 'chat', and the two packages contain different (somewhat overlapping) collection of information.'¹²⁴ Even in the case of some causally relevant conceptions we determine people's actions by their conception as well as beliefs and desires etc. but social externalists claim that the contents of our thoughts and beliefs have social contents. Loar talks about psychological contents regarding the context of idiosyncratic background conditions. But Woodfield does not feel any necessary of this psychological content as we can attribute sets of social contents to this conception. For an example, an agent (Bert) can consider 'arthritis' is a disease that can afflict in the knees and elbows of the agents. We can see this conception from the background of social content because here the agents talk about a public concept disease, knee and elbow etc. He also can subscribe this public concept. By this public concept, we can also fix the individuation conditions of our propositional contents. Here, one thing is very important that Woodfield does not claim that our psychological content shall put into an iceberg. He tries to deny the existence of

¹²⁴ Ibid., 84.

psychological contents not for the sake of the claim that ‘all content full mental states have social content’. But he claims that, ‘On the contrary, I maintain that social contents are found only at the level of conceptualized thinking in language users (i.e. trained thinking). Minds contain many representations exhibiting various species of non social content and it is, of course, open to anyone to call these “psychological”.’¹²⁵ Basically Woodfield opposes the Loarian psychological content about individual’s idiosyncratic conceptions. For social externalists, in the case of trained thoughts, the content of the thoughts cannot be fixed by its liaisons within the individual, but as a sharable content, it can be fixed by its semantic norms that linked with public concepts in our community. Though Woodfield accepts that every person is psychologically unique, yet he also adds to the favour of social externalism that the concepts are publicly sharable and the agents can share a given concept for classifying the things.

Woodfield raises an important issue that for the classification norm of a concept, we do not need a level of skill or recognition capacity (as prescribed by old empiricists). He believes in a correct non-standard approach for evaluating appropriate performances. It may be possible that a forester can be more skilful than an office worker, but they can entertain the ‘elm’ thoughts equally well. So skill does not relevant here rather than the correct standard process or it will be better to say some special tests. Even in the case of recognizing, the difference between the pure nicotine (in powdered form) and powdered borax in our visual level does not possible. So we need some special test here. But Woodfield claims that it does not prove that I have not some distinct concepts about the objects. We can have some distinct concepts of thoughts regarding some similar objects, but in the case of evaluating an

¹²⁵ Ibid., see the footnote, p.85.

appropriate performance for a correct standard level, we should carry out some special tests. Similarly, it may follow in Burge's arthritis example, that though both doctor and agent have some qualitatively different conceptions of 'arthritis', yet they make a successful communication using the concept 'arthritis'. One can ask that how can it be possible?

Woodfield answers that 'Alf's (agent) thinking was idiosyncratic and deviant, whereas the doctor's thinking may be presumed to have exemplified a pattern characteristic of a full understander. If functional roles were individuated, these two subjects would have distinct concepts.'¹²⁶ I think the answer that is given by Woodfield sounds unclear. Though I agree with him that concepts as norms can stand outside of the psychological states and I also very agree with him that for the classification norm of a concept need a correctness standard special test, yet it does not prove that having a full understanding pattern in the case of recognizing 'arthritis' for a doctor and a deviant understanding a patient (Alf or Bert) can possess a genuine functional role in a linguistic communication. I believe like Putnam that this communication between an idiosyncratic patient and a doctor would be possible if and only if, we accept that there is a 'division of linguistic labor' in our society and the doctor as an expert in our society can know the exact criteria of the disease like 'arthritis' and our society prescribes that we should accept the doctor's thought as he is well aware about the social phenomenon of our language and also knows that there is a distinction between conventional phenomenon (where we use our ordinary criteria about an object) and the experts criterion (a comprehensive group of knowledge to identify a term or object). Even in our society there is a socially agreed application that tells us that to know the specialized criteria or exact nature of an object or term

¹²⁶ Ibid., 87.

we should accept the experts' thoughts. So because of a social acceptance it may be possible to keep a successful communication between an idiosyncratic patient and a doctor (expert). I also think that there is a keen idea of concept possession given by the experts whereas the common people try to acquire the concept through their own 'concept-acquisition' capacities. We will find such an instance even in our scientific progress. No scientist can claim that this is my individual invention or discovery. Every invention has a long background like a causal chain. It is like an inspiration that is given by other people or fellow thinkers.

Let me examine Woodfield's wonderful claim in favour of the mind of a trained thinker. Woodfield think that our concepts are in nature abstract. Even they do not stay in people's mind or elsewhere. He rethinks on the notion of 'concept-formulation' that he considers as worse. For him, the term 'concept-possession' and 'concept acquisition' are not a right distinction and even the ideas are also not suitable. We cannot possess a concept as a personal property and concept are actually the intellectual properties of our culture. Woodfield takes the traditional form of 'Morris dance' as an example. No one can claim that he/she has possessed this dance in England. Just one can wish to take part in this traditional Morris dance and enjoy. Similarly, an agent can avail the concepts that has been offered or accepted by his/her own socio-linguistic environment. It can be regarded as a discourse of the acquisition of conceptual ability of an individual in his/her socio-linguistic environment. Woodfield thinks that 'Provided that S is suitably ensconced in a language community and is internally ready and conditions are favorable, then S's learning a general term normally causes S to acquire the ability to use the concept expressed by it.'¹²⁷ One can ask promptly, 'What are the characteristics of a "trained thinker"?' According to

¹²⁷ Ibid., 88.

Woodfield, a 'trained thinker' basically holds the sincere opinion basically the principle of rationality which consistence of beliefs. They actually try to grasp the true belief from an authentic source or evidence. They also try to relinquish misunderstanding in their verbal communication and accept correction when it is pointed out. It is not the case that ordinary people are slavish copiers. Even the experts are not the definers of meaning; actually, they are the most reliable person whom ordinary people can trust as an estimator of the meaning in the language.

We can roughly compare our rational-social intercourses with games like 'chess', as both have some constructive rules. But we can well define chess rather than our rational social intercourses because the rules of the game chess are more systematic and well-grounded. It is very important to mention here that the 'locutionary acts' are linked with the rational dialogues, such as calling an object something or symbolizing the categories etc. This is called the basic moves of the rational dialogue. Besides, the non-basic moves focus on the illocutionary acts like denying and asserting etc. Symbolic categorizing as an intrinsic background may contrast to perceptual categorization. But the process of knowing the symbolic categorization is dependent on practice rather than theory. Woodfield argues that 'Individuals become responsive through training and practices to the norms which regulate other people's shared classification. They witness their own and other people's act of calling, then they observe the consequences. They feel normative pressures and they imagine what it is like for others whom they see pressured.'¹²⁸

One can ask about the internalistic part of a trained thinker or what may be going on inside of the head of a concept user? In the period of our rational dialogue the internal aspect of the trained thinker is organized in the way that the agent must

¹²⁸ Ibid., 90.

subscribe the same norms of categorization in his/her thoughts when she/he is engaged in rational dialogue. We know that there is a co-relation between mental act verbs and speech act verbs. There are some verbs that try to omit the mere distinction between public and private. The verbs, try to cover both our purely mental act and the speech acts. For an instance, we can say about ‘accepting, supporting etc.’ one can perform all these acts either by speaking or by silent thinking. The conceptual amount of something can be acquired by a speaker only if he/she has the ability to use the same as it is offered by the socio-linguistic environment where he/she lives in. The acquisition of a concept can be gained by a child in the case of word-learning situation only if she/he got some suitable and prepared conditions that feed her with enough true information. Woodfield claims that we should accept the theory ‘what is inside the head’ rather than ‘what is in the head’ in favour of the account of our conceptual thinking. So we need to find out some theory which can help us to determine the causal developmental process of a child that also inspires to gain a child his/her inner organization and skills. There is also a social bondage in our social community. A child as a first language learner becomes the member of two clubs in tandem. The first club which we can prescribe as a major club has an association of a rational discourse. So its membership is in Woodfield’s word ‘world-wide’. Besides, we can call the child’s ‘neighborhood’ as a minor club where the child is brought up. To join the both clubs a child can able to qualify the criteria to take part in rational discourse that is conducted in the language where he/she (child) is brought up.

It is possible that one can be a member of a club without being a member of other clubs in his/her social community. A immigrate person can be a new entrant in a community and also be fluent in their native language. But it would be not possible if the immigrate person does not grasp the language (L) in the community which is

speaking with the neighbour. On the other hand, an insane who can speak the neighbour language or community language has also been unable to become a member of major club. He/she is not able to think properly or engage in rational discourse. Even the infants can't be a member of the both clubs. In the case of children (normal) it is incredibly fast to be a member of both clubs as they have some innate capacities that help them to acquire any concepts quickly from society. Woodfield considers that 'Children are also predisposed to subscribe the communal concepts. Many of the cognitive capacities that are preconditions for joining rational thinkers club appear to be innate... Moreover, normal children naturally trust the ones who nurture them, they engage in join cooperative activities, and develop sensitivity to the approval and disapproval of others.'¹²⁹ But he also admits social externalists claim that the conceptual development of an infant is designed in such a biological way that help his/her to grasp quickly our accessible public concepts.

Concluding Remarks

The representational approach enhances the claim of belief content as an internal part of the mind or skin in. Jackson's representational approach sounds to me very interesting in two different senses. First, if an agent duplicates X from the skin in then, the person created the creature or duplicate of X would represent his/her thoughts or mental states similarly like X. Second, it is not that representation is merely solipsistic, but for Jackson, an agent's representation is not about how the world is like that but how the subject is. He claims that when in an exact situation (s), X and Y (two agents) can do the same things, then it is not only that both of them have similar thoughts or X and Y's thoughts coincide, but it also proves that they are in the same world or the 'centered contents' of their thoughts are not lined up with

¹²⁹ Ibid., 96.

different worlds. For these reasons, in support of internalism, Frank Jackson believes in the hypothesis that content can supervene on the internal nature in the sense of inter-world not intra-world. Chomsky, a strong believer of internalism rebut externalism from the perspective of innateness hypothesis by rejecting the 'shared common language' hypothesis as he deeply thinks that language acquisition is closely related to the environment, but the process to know the language is to internalize the rules of grammar that is innate. Besides, the internalist prominent issue regarding 'thought precedes language' depends on the conceptual analysis of mental states that is ontologically prior to the linguistic development. To the critic, the view of 'reference borrowing' of externalism does not become more pertinent than the thoughts that formalize the conventions to explain others about the meaning of the thoughts. Even the conceptual role or inferential role semantic that mingle with 'functional role' in Harman's sense rejects Putnam's thoughts of 'division of linguistic labor' which is based on other people and sociolinguistic background. Language-based externalism refines itself by transacting the process of language as a public or social phenomenon. Even the description about the thing as thoughts has some contents that cannot be determined internally or intrinsically. Externalist does not believe in the mentalese approach of conventional meaning, but for them meaning depends on the sociolinguistic background and other people. Even the change of the meaning of the terms cannot make any subsequent change of the referent. But it is true that there occurred a change in the level of our knowledge. The crucial part of Putnam's externalism that impressed me highly is doubtlessly his claim for 'shared paradigm'. Putnam is right to the claim that the experts not only can fix the exact reference of the terms like 'water' through their scientific research. An ordinary person who is ignored about the chemical formulas can also refer the same thing and

it is just possible because of the 'shared paradigm' or one can call it 'stereotypes'. The foundational claim of the externalism is that here extension carries over the meaning. The social character of meaning, the bulldogger of externalism try to break down the ground of internalism (their intrinsic principle, innate language, etc.) by suggesting that language can be changed and the tentative meaning of the terms can somehow be changed. But the vital point is that speakers should be aware about the matter that in which context the terms or the present language is being used now. The process can be possible because of the 'agreed practices of the community'. Even Burgean externalism also demands that the constitutive determiners of the mental states are not bounded by states themselves, but the physical and the social elements are the genuine determiners of the constitute psychological states that only located in the external world, not in the head or mind of the speakers or believes. I think Burge seems right when he claims that without knowing the 'background enable conditions' one may know something and the general cognitive capacities can help us to avoid the charge of *a priori* as once wonderfully mentioned by Timothy Williamson. Fixing the communal meaning, and understand the meaning of the required terms from perspective of social contents is wonderfully challenging by Woodfield that I elaborately discussed in this chapter. Mind not only has some social content, but there are many non-social contents that can of course be determined by psychological states. But he also opposes to admit any kind of individual idiosyncratic concepts in Loar's sense. Every person may psychologically unique, but concepts as norms are determined and shared by publicly. A speaker attains the conceptual amount of something if and only if he/she can use or apply the conceptual amount in the process of communication with others through some linguistic practices. Even if we admit that our conceptual development has some biological cum internal processing, but it is

true that concepts and the contents of our thoughts according to externalist can be determined by the external world. So, the controversy of the intenalism versus externalism is continuing.

Chapter 3

Meaning Atomism, Meaning Holism and Indeterminacy of Meaning

Introduction

The chapter concentrates on an appreciation of Meaning holism. Holism is a thesis about the meaning and analysis. Here I shall discuss how it escalates beyond the meaning atomism, thereby paving the way for semantic externalism. Meaning atomism depends on the semantic representations that deal with fragment of the sentences but not the corporate body of the whole sentences, a thing that gets attention by holists.

My attempt would be to see how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine's theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. Though Quine is interested in the evidential acquisition of scientific knowledge, yet language as a vehicle of knowledge takes a significant role in his regimented naturalistic epistemology that is based on a scientific framework. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is aware of linguistic trick can be the master of referential language. Another important question is that how could Quine's radical translation thesis reduce into semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his behaviourism? The amenability of native's behaviour that makes our speech disposition indeterminate, as the expression of the native can express different things in different situations that incline to accept the 'inscrutability of reference' too. Even the translation manual can be challenged by other translators. So the notion and the analysis of meaning became hopelessly vague. I further argue on Quine's position of meaning that I call, following Hilary Putnam, 'meaning nihilism'. It seems to me that Quine had no belief like

‘meaning consists in’, or ‘meaning depends on’ something. Through this argument, I would like to challenge the confirmation holism that was foisted by Fodor on Quine’s thesis. I will show from Putnam’s point of view that Quine was neither a confirmation holist nor a meaning holist. Quine’s portion on meaning can well be regarded as ‘meaning nihilism’ and confirmation rejectionism.

The rejection of mentalist approach on meaning vindicates externalism that somehow pave the way for ‘meaning holism’, a thesis where the meaning of a sentence is defined with regards to the totality of nodes and paths in its semantic networks and the meaning of linguistic units depend upon meaning of the entire language. I think that both Putnam and Quine denied the concept of constitutive connection of meaning as a second grade notion. So, linguistic meaning cannot be formed by any sample of its uses. For Quine, the concept of meaning in metaphysics is heuristic and need not be taken seriously in any ‘science worthy’ literature. Even there is no usable notion of a priority unless one relativised it. Because of the collapse of the unrelativized a priority, the sentences depend on the connection of the reality. Here, I relook on Quine’s heart throbbing claim about the co-extensiveness of the sentential relation and the evidential relation that indicate an affirmation of meaning holism from an epistemic sense. I would be putting this juncture into the realm of behaviorists’ account of language that care for ‘stimulus response conditions’ and drop (I suppose) the talk of observations by rejecting the semantical relation to observations.

3.1. Meaning Atomism: A Model for Internalism

There is a long discussed question regarding the meaning of the sentence and the content of our beliefs that I have minimally hinted in the chapter one. The question is

that whether the meaning of the sentence or the contents of our beliefs are determined by the web of the sentences or relatively small fragments of the web or independent of the web of sentences or beliefs? Semantic in the linguist's sense mainly concerns with the issues of how the meanings of words (terms) can determine the semantic properties and internal structures of sentences. This is an idea that seems to be more close to internalism, a thesis that considers meaning or the content of one's beliefs are located in the head of the speakers rather than the external world as proposed by externalist. I scrutinized the debate in details in the chapter 2.

Meaning holism claims that the meaning of a sentence or the contents of our beliefs can be determined by the web of the other sentences and beliefs. Meaning atomism is a thesis that is described by Ned Block in this way:

'Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to any other sentences or beliefs and therefor independently of any theories in which they appear.'¹³⁰

Actually, meaning atomism is a theory that gives importance on the small set of representations that would be semantically atomic (simple and basic) in the system for determining the meaning of a sentence. They do not think that the meaning of a term can be determined in terms of the whole sentence and even the meaning of a simple sentence is co-related with other sentences or whole language. Meaning atomism rests on two fundamental requirements. First, meaning atomism gives importance to the theory of atoms, a semantic representation that talk about the

¹³⁰ Ned Block, "Holism, Mental and Semantic," forthcoming in *The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.nyu.edu/qsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/MentalSemanticHolism.html> (download 29/4/2015).

fragment of the sentences (terms or words) rather than the whole. Secondly, meaning atomism also gives more importance to the theory of description¹³¹ or definition rather than socio-linguistic background.

The traditional approach of atomism holds that the concept of non-inferentiality (intuitive knowledge) or incorrigibility that could be the sufficient condition for analyticity. Actually, analyticity is uninformative in nature and one could give an account of it in terms of synonymy that is doubtlessly interchangeable. So here, the meaning of the term does not depend on the ‘totality of the sentences’, but to the interchangeable terms that is synonymous to the referent term. And we know that the remarkable challenge against this approach was raised by W.V. Quine in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine thinks that in intentional language these two synonyms ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are not interchangeable everywhere. He takes a counter example to show that the truths which become false under substitution of ‘unmarried man’ for ‘bachelor’ are easily erected with the help of ‘bachelor of arts’ or ‘bachelor’s buttons’, also with the help of quotation, thus: ‘Bachelor has less than ten letters’. Quine is not interested in psychological synonymy or poetic synonymy as these are concerned with cognitive synonymy that Quine tries to reject in defense of informational empirical based synthetic sentences that is related with the other sentences as a ‘corporate body of the sentences’.

Here, I would like to look forward the substantive claim of the theory of reference that is also a challenge for atomism like meaning holism. Atomism cannot avoid the theory of reference or causal theory of reference, a paradigm theory of philosophy of language. So, they need to explain the theory of reference to reply to the critics. Atomism takes this issue in the following ways:

First, in a given theory of atoms, one should indicate a substantive account that applies to a small set of atoms directly.

Second, in a given theory of description, one must have an indirect account of reference regarding the much larger set of non atoms. But the problem is that in the latter case, it would be difficult to judge a substantive theory of reference like causal, informational theory of reference that gives a plausible account of dark, curve, etc. rather than the natural kind terms like water, tiger and abstract entities like ghost, unicorn etc. In this case, the referential theory is much more dependent on mental representation (psychosemantics) rather than socio-linguistic background.

The inferential role semantics is the main threat for atomism. Inferential role semantics claims that the meaning of any mental representations rely on the other mental states (at least partially) that are inferentially, causally or functionally associated with it. Another objection that is raised by inferential role semantics in favour of meaning holism to refute the opinion of atomism is that atomists believe in the representation (n) that can be defined in terms of a small subset of other representations in S (in a system). In this case, one should make a difference between the other representations in S that can be regarded as a part of the definition of n (representation) could be relevant to a constitutive meaning of n . Besides, there is something that cannot be the part of n 's (representation) definition that made a constitutive difference in the definition.

Now if we sketch the claims of atomism and inferential role semantics, then we will see that both the theories are worried about each other.

1. An atom occupies a primitive meaning and it does not depend on representation that is inferentially linked with the meaning.

2. The meaning of the representation is also related to some inferentially associated representations.

Similarly, atomists are also worried for holists' claim that is as follows:

3. A small subset of inferentiality that is also related to representation is able to define non atomism.
4. The meaning of any representation rests on all representations that are inferentially related with it.

The incompatibility between the claim of (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) is basically implicit in the idea of representation and meaning because there is a presupposition that talked about one to one correspondence between meaning and token representation (an unambiguous meaning bearer).

Let me see that how internalism and meaning atomism does fit with each other. The theory of description is an internalist thesis that gives importance on the properties of the terms and these properties of the terms constitute the meaning of the sentence. For internalist, one can get the meaning of the sentence or the words just by conjoining each of its descriptive properties of the terms. And the properties are obviously the descriptive part of the referred terms. This thesis becomes 'mentalese' by rejecting any kind of the causal theory of reference that can determine the meaning of the terms. The theory of description considers that the meaning of the terms can be described by description and all these descriptions are the internal parts of the mind (internal part of the speakers) and this thesis also close to atomism as the process of the determining of the properties of the terms and the meaning of the sentence do not depend on the whole body of the sentence but to the fragments of the sentence or the semantic representation of the words that have some internalist background.

3.2 Meaning Holism: A Model for Externalism

Here I would like to see the thesis of meaning holism from the perspectives of Quine and Putnam and obviously I will analyse further whether Quine is a meaning holist or meaning nihilist? As we know that Quine mainly attacks the positivist accounts of the theory of meaning to urge that the sentences have lacked their own 'range of confirming experience'. Actually, he tries to deny the 'mentalese' approach of meaning and platonic entities to think that meaning cannot be determined unitly or as a fragment of sentence. For Quine, the idea of meaning of a word consists in the whole body of the sentences that ultimately goes towards 'tribunal of experience as a corporate body'. Putnam writes that 'Frege taught us that words have meaning only in the sense of making a systematic contribution to the truth conditions of whole sentences. Quine argues that to the extent that there are 'procedures' for deciding what is and what is not assertible, such procedures are associated with the entire language, not with any single sentence.'¹³²

Even in the case of 'stimulus meaning' that is associated with 'individual sentence' cannot be regarded as the meaning of the individual sentence. The reasons are as follows:

- a. Even in the case of simplest sentence, Quine says that the extension of the predicate can be determined by meaning. The stimulus meaning would be same even in the case of different co-extensiveness of the sentences that is built out by predicates.

¹³² Hilary Putnam, "Meaning Holism," in *Realism with a Human Face*, 1992, 278.

- b. Stimulus meaning can resolve the normal confirmatory or disconfirmatory situations. Even in the case of abnormal situations, there is a holistic account for accepting or rejecting the decision of the sentences.

But the point is that Quine does not initiate a distinction between holism with respect to meaning and holism with respect to belief fixation. There are two groups. The first group believes that we should reject holism with respect to belief fixation. And, the second group thinks that Quine's holistic account of belief fixation is correct in the sense that there is a philosophical and scientific importance of meaning. Putnam thinks that it is a hopeless move to deny the holistic character of rational belief fixation. 'Sophisticated mentalism' is an approach that tries to preserve the psychological reality of meaning by throwing a challenge to meaning holism (holistic character of meaning). They consider that postulate meaning can be regarded as psychological entities. To show that meanings are non-holistic, they associate psychological entities of postulates meaning with individual words, morphemes and sentences too. But Quine's thoughts are more close to meaning holism, in the sense that there are some process which can guide an agent to decide what sort of sentences he/she would like to accept or what sort of sentences he/she would like to reject and the whole process will rely on the whole language, they are not associated with the piecemeal of sentence. Putnam says that '... I call him (Quine) a "meaning holist": because in his view the acceptance of his doctrine is just a further step in the direction of seeing the "unit of empirical significance" as something larger than the word. Prior to Quine, we had already been forced to see the sentence and not the word as primary

unit; since Quine, we are (he holds) forced to see the whole language as “the unit of empirical significance”¹³³.

Though, we are well aware of the fact that Quine rejects the obscurity thesis of meaning that possess explanatory value, yet in his writing like “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and “On What There is”, we find a new era of psychology that talks about the mental representation and the contents too. This thesis is called ‘sophisticated mentalism’ that challenges against any sort of naive mentalism.

Actually, the argument is that if we accept the ‘sophisticated mentalism’, then meaning would be associated with three different entities like -

- a. psychologically real
- b. connected with individual sentences
- c. involve in the processing of the sentences.

But in the case of determining meaning if we accept the mentioned entities that even also involve with the sentence themselves, then it would make a problem to consider every sentence as its own meaning. The reasons are as follows:

First, in our pre-analytic notion, we see that the use of the concept of meaning or different sentences may enrol with the same meaning or sometimes same sentences that can have different meanings in some other situations. Here, any theory that rejected the idea of belief about meaning could not do any worthy work with the pre-analytic notion of meaning that we discussed before. Actually, Putnam depicts the three constraints of any theory of meaning where the first constraint of the meaning is that meaning must have the right powers of disambiguation. Quine thinks that

¹³³ Ibid., 283.

‘gavagai’, a native’s language about animal can indicate undetected rabbit part or could mean rabbit also though presuming that there was a fact of matter that means to the referred term ‘gavagai’ without making any change in its stimulus meaning. We can call for a theory that leads a disambiguation between two sentences like ‘lo a rabbit’ and ‘undetached rabbit part’ because in a true sentence the rabbits are not the same thing as undetached rabbit part.

The differentiation of meaning is available when the term has different references like in the case of tigers. Here we know that tigers have stripes, but that is not any analytical truth that could be necessarily followed as stripe less tiger or “albino tigers” have no stripes and it is available in different countries. One can perplex to determine the meaning of tiger and can ask to an expert about the stimulus meaning of the tiger. Now, the question is that whether the stimulus meaning of a tiger and the stimulus meaning of a striped tiger can be same. We can find a difference between their meanings. Stimulus meaning that is highly insensitive deals with the meaning of a term in an observation sentence that indicates different meanings which are related to the same classes because of similarities of the all members of the speech community. Putnam argues that ‘Again, if all the members of the speech community become adept at recognizing tigers without relying on the presence or absence of *stripes*, then the stimulus meaning of “Lo, a tiger” will change: but this is not what we think of as the word “tiger” *changing its meaning*. What this illustrates is that stimulus meanings are *not invariant under normal processes of belief fixation*.’¹³⁴

The problem is that this *invariance of meaning under normal processes of belief fixation* (a second constraint thesis) makes an encounter with the ‘method of

¹³⁴ Ibid., 285.

verification' because it is closely related with observation sentences to determine the stimulus meaning as meaning. But Putnam hints to pass sentences like 'a couple with six children lived here two hundred years ago'. This canonical method of verification rests on certain written documents today. But in the case of pre writing society (a society who is unaware about writing skill), the words of the elders and the verbal discussions of the society members is being relied upon for gaining any knowledge about the past. It is true that we cannot regard 'canonical method of verification' as invariant under technological change. But it could be a normal process of belief fixation. The third constraint thesis as illustrated by Hilary Putnam is that 'every speaker who count as fully competent in the case of the language. This might be called the *constraints of publicity*; it requires that meaning should be public. Alternatively, one might think of this as a constraint of *psychological reality*; a theory in which 'meanings' are known only to experts could not be *mentalist* theory, since the guiding idea of mentalism is that 'meanings are psychological entities which play an explanatory role in accounting for the competence of the native speaker.'¹³⁵ It is also to be noted that as we cannot expect competence of average speaker regarding the scientific theories, the average speaker are unaware about scientific knowledge. In this case, the meaning of a term like *electron* that an average speaker knows (whatever may be) cannot be compared with a sophisticated physical theory.

The three constraints discussed by Putnam cannot suit with 'sophisticated mentalism', a psychological thesis regarding meaning. Here, there is one thing that we need to be clear about as a prominent externalist, Putnam in his 'twin earth cases' argues that the intended reference of a term water depend on its same composition in which an agent can substitute any of the local paradigms but that will not affect on its

¹³⁵ Ibid., 286.

meaning. Putnam claims that here, the reference of the term 'water' can be partly fixed by the substance fixer and partly because of the differentiation between the 'water' and the 'twater' in the twin earth that is caused just by the difference of the stuffs 'water' (H₂O) and 'twater' (XYZ) that consist in the external environment but in no way in the mind and brains of the speaker that supports any psychological modes. Even in the case of 'elm' and 'beech', here the differentiation of the two different trees cannot be pointed out by the ordinary speakers. Basically, the conceptual content cum perceptual view regarding "elm" and "beech" are practically the same. The real differentiation of the two very similar trees "elm" and "beech" can be determined by the experts who know the exact criteria of the trees and with whom (experts) the ordinary people are cooperatively related in a society. Putnam writes that 'In short, extensions cannot be determined by (individualistic) "concepts" because extension depends upon other people. Because of both these sorts of cases, if we are going to be mentalistic, then we have to omit the traditional requirement that "sense fixes reference". However, this weakens the constraint that "meanings" can do what we preanalytically suppose they can do in the way of disambiguating words and sentences.'¹³⁶

There is another trend which is called MIT *Mentalase Groups* (who believes in sophisticated mentalism) propounded by Katz, Fodor and Chomsky. They think that the meaning of content is in the head or internal to the speaker. Fodor is actually reluctant about the idea that content fixes the reference to think that elm and beech, two different trees have the same content. Fodor mainly depends on the thoughts of 'mental representation' that postulates mentalism, a language of thought hypothesis that I discussed in detail in the chapter 2. Like Chomsky, Fodor also accepts that all

¹³⁶ Ibid., 288.

concepts are innate. Here the problem would be that the universality of concept would be hostile in the sense of synthetic category as the different language communities like German, English, Indian have different concepts, for example *Geist*, *mind*, *Manas*. So, here the universality of the concept cannot be similar in ‘universal concept’ that one can get through his/her ‘innate hypothesis’ as proposed by Chomsky and highly accepted by Fodor. Putnam challenges against this Mentalese approach to argue that this opinion cannot mingle with mentalism as the existence of it leads to accept the different characters of language and in the case, one should also admit that our belief fixation is holistic as in public language similarly in Mentalese. Putnam writes that ‘For the holistic character of belief fixation is no accident: it is required by rationality. Mentalese cannot, any more than scientific knowledge, obey the two Dogmas of empiricism: individual “words” in Mentalese cannot, in general, have operational definitions if Mentalese is to be an adequate vehicle for *general intelligence*’¹³⁷.

Now, let us accept that Mentalese exist, but here the prominent question will be how Mentalese could help to determine the meaning of the term ‘*Biral*’ in Bengali is same with English term ‘*cat*’. Let us focus on another problem. An English speaking adult knows that ‘*gold*’ and ‘*brass*’ both of the metals are yellow in colour and shiny. But ‘*gold*’ is precious that ‘*brass*’ not. Now it may well be possible that an immature child learnt that “*gold*” is a yellow metal, whereas another child also learnt that ‘*brass*’ is yellow metal. Both did not learn anything more about the metals except the colour ‘*yellow*’. Here, we see that at the present stage, Mentalese representations of the speakers are different. But this differentiation does not escort any differentiation in their contents. In the normal belief fixation, we can see that the

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 295-296.

Mentalese word that is associated with 'gold' does not change, even if there is a difference between stereotypes. Actually, in the changing of the mental representation that is associated with the change of a stereotype like 'gold is precious' and 'gold does not tarnish' etc. would be highly peculiar as 'mental representation' is correlated with *biral*, *cat*, *meeu* cannot be regarded as different. But here the problem is as we know that stereotypes are not considered as meanings, so the sameness and differentness of mental representation that must be a functional neuro-psychological criteria for the sameness and differentness of the stereotype. Stereotypes are socially moored; it means they are actually sociolects that people can share with each others.

We can claim that the Mentalese approach is more atomistic in the sense that here, the meaning or the content of belief can be determined by the unit of sentence that is based on the mental representation of the speaker. MIT Mentalists, especially Fodor and Chomsky, try to see meaning in terms of internal states. But following Putnam's analysis, it seems to me that the meaning of the term that is partly dependent on 'stereotype' and partly dependent on the 'division of the linguistic labor' can have a holistic background. As we saw that Mentalism cannot be well suited with stereotypes as stereotypes are not any innate hypothesis, it actually rests on verification base social acts. So, the meaning of a term can be determined by the whole sentence that refers to the socio linguistic background and not to the fragment or piecemeal process. Though, it is quite true that in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine tries to reject the mentalese theory of meaning by denying the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction. The first dogma as Quine puts it is the cleavage between analytic propositions that are grounded independently of matters of fact and synthetic propositions that are grounded only on facts or empirical contents. Critics consider that this rejection of mentalese theory vindicates externalism which paves the way for

semantic holism. Here one thing is important to mention that the heart of semantic holism is that the meaning of a sentence is defined in regard to totality of nodes and paths in its semantic networks. Another important point I assume that can help to show that how meaning holism compatible with externalism is as follows. Meaning holism depends on semantic externalism hypothesis. It is an acceptable fact that we can have *holistic externalist semantics* and also *non-holistic externalist semantics*. Let us try to understand what we mean by *holistic externalist semantics*. We mean three things- **first**, meanings are not in the head (externalism); **second**, meanings of linguistic units depend upon meaning of the entire language (holism). **Third**, language as social phenomenon can be sharable with others in the socio-linguistic background.

Let us take a simple example of the determination of the meaning of a predicate. Suppose we have a sentence that uses a natural kind term in its predicate, viz. the sentence 'Tana is a dog'. In order to understand the sentence we have to know which particular denoted by the name 'Tana' and which property or bundle of properties are denoted by the predicate "is a dog". Further, we need to know if 'Tana' is indeed an instance of those properties. But this we need to know only if we are interested in determining the truth of the sentence. How do we decide which properties will be denoted by the predicated. We shall have to rely on the socio-linguistic practices of the community in which this sentence is uttered. If we are looking at the socio-linguistic practices of a community, this meaning cannot locate 'in the head'. Besides, as the meaning of a single predicate is depending upon the entire socio-linguistic practices that are related to the entire language, this thesis sounds like holistic theory. In this way, we have managed to show, how a *holistic externalist semantic theory* will work.

3.3. Indeterminacy of Meaning: Some Important Things Left Out

Now I attempt to look on the ‘indeterminacy theory of meaning’, a prominent argument of Quine against the traditional theory of meaning. The purpose of discussing the thesis here has two relevances:

First, I would like to see how meaning could go towards indeterminacy.

Second, Can we call the ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ hypothesis as a sort of ‘meaning nihilism’?

In the following sections, I will turn to the proclaimed thesis.

Quine’s Status of Meaning: Revisiting Putnam’s Thoughts

The most conspicuous part of Quine’s philosophy seems to me that his note on the theory of meaning has various dimensions. He tries to treat a theory of meaning, but his acceptance of radical naturalism leads a unique turn that compels him to accept an indeterminacy principle and also the thesis of inscrutability of meaning and reference. Once Putnam writes to me that ‘As for “meaning holism”, I have noticed something peculiar: I have noticed that whenever a passage from “Two Dogmas” is quoted to show that Quine is a “meaning holist”, the passage isn’t ever about *meaning*. What is cited are passages that display Quine’s “Duhemianism”, that is, the view that our bodies of scientific theory confront “recalcitrant” experiences as wholes. This is a form of holism—calls it “evidential holism”, but it doesn’t concern meaning.’¹³⁸

¹³⁸ I am personally thankful to Hilary Putnam for this note.

Naturalism and its consequences

Quine, (as far as my knowledge goes) was the first philosopher who probably used the term “naturalism” from an empiricist point of view holding that science serves a standard paradigm for all knowledge and the commitment. Quine thinks that the idea of a ‘First Philosophy’ is regarded as vague. Actually for Quine, ‘naturalism’ is not a separate claim that can be regarded as a foundation of the sciences, but it is just like a proclamation about the truth that science is all there is and that which transcends science is meaningless. Quine outlooks on science and philosophy were unique. He does not impose science upon philosophy. Without a standard base in natural science a philosophical method can be irrelevant. Quine was influenced by empiricism and Vienna circle. Lockean empiricism taught him that we need to deduce the truths of nature from the sensory evidences and we should define the truths in terms of logico-mathematical auxiliaries and observation too that can be confirming and also infirming it. Actually, Quine follows the Tarskian model of truth. If one asks to Quine that “When a people claim that ‘snow is white’ is true just as well as I understand ‘snow is white’ is true, in this case what did he/she mean by using the term ‘understand’? Quine’s answer would be, the process of understanding a sentence depends on the conditions under which it is true. It does not construct any progress at all. Putnam believes that ‘...Quine’s account of understanding does not use the notion of truth (which is how circularity avoided). To understand an observation sentence is to be conditioned in such a way that appropriate sensory stimulations will prompt one’s assent to the sentence. And to understand a non-observational sentence is to master its role in the system.... Calling a sentence that someone (myself or someone

else) utters (or thinks) “true” is just an indication that I would currently include that sentence in the system I use to predict.’¹³⁹

Quine was very much cautious about the fact that we cannot formulate all the statements of the world into the same boundary of verificationism. He was well aware about the failure of the radical empiricism which emphasizes that only immediate experiences can validate science. Actually, Quine’s purpose is to reorient ‘modern empiricism’ by challenging two tenets of empiricism. He writes that ‘Two cardinal tenets of empiricism reminded unassailable, however, and so remain in this day. One is that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other, to which I shall return, is that all inculcation of meaning of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.’¹⁴⁰ Now we can ask to Quine that “What is the basic nature of natural science that Quine admitted?” There is no exact answer from Quine’s side. He has several ideas about natural science in his various writings. Some of them are as follows:

First, He claims about an evidential checkpoint of science as Wittgenstein cited in his ‘Language game’. For Quine, “A sentence’s claim to scientific status rests on what it contributes to a theory whose checkpoints are in prediction.”¹⁴¹

Second, For Quine, the checkpoints must be ‘inter-subjective’ that shows that the evidence should be available to a third person perspective.

Third, All the theoretical claims are resting on experiments and observations. But Quine thinks that mathematics does not belong to this domain.

¹³⁹ Hilary Putnam, 1992, 271.

¹⁴⁰ W.V. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, 75.

¹⁴¹ W.V. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, 1990, 20.

Fourth, For Quine the ‘web of belief’ should be in a ‘single language’ and also followed the same logic. One can ask that ‘What is the utility of this view’? Gary Kemp clarifies Quine’s position by saying that ‘... all the evidence point to a single reality, not two or more, it ought to be possible to have a single theory describing it, where each part of it coheres with the rest on the score of explanation, where this in turn is a matter, in the best cases, of subsuming the explananda under maximally general quantified statements.’¹⁴²

We have already noticed that Quine’s naturalism is not just a rigorous science. Quine himself admits that from the impacts on sensory surfaces we can derive a theory of the external world with more or less successful prediction. For testing a theory Quine accepts the predictions as the pointers or evidential checkpoints. Observation as an evidence of a theory has two notable features, one is ‘inter-subjectivity’ and the other is called ‘correspondence to stimulation’. Quine thinks that an observation sentence, like ‘it is raining’ or ‘that’s a cow’ are based on occasion sentences. Here the observation of the speakers would be true or false on the basis of occasion sensitivity. The conception of ‘inter-subjectivity’ refers to the thesis that evidence must be public. Observational sentences are holophrastic ones, i.e. they could be formed out of any conjunction. We can link between an observation and a theory through a prediction. To clarify the important features of observation sentences, Quine thinks that ‘The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the prediction that checks a theory. The requirement that it commands a verdict outright is what makes it a final checkpoint. The requirement of inter-subjectivity is what makes

¹⁴² Gary Kemp, *Quine versus Davidson, Truth, Reference, and Meaning*, 2012, 18.

science objective.’¹⁴³ He also believes that observation sentences are considered as a vehicle of our scientific evidences as well as it also an entering wedge of language.

There is a sort of naturalistic perspective that is engaged on issues of language as a social art in Quine’s writings. It sounds to me very unique. Here one can ask that ‘are observational sentences theory laden?’ We know that observational sentences have two roots – language and science and it goes these two ways excellently. Another relevant question is that ‘how could an observation sentence be relative to linguistic community?’ For Quine the observation sentences are that on which the members of the community agreed upon outright on witnessing the occasion. In a word, the observation sentences are not theory laden. Actually, observation sentences are associated to stimulations with conditioning. Even words in an observation sentence may recur in other sentences in some theoretical contexts. This is the link that is also a relevant part of any scientific theory. But Quine writes that ‘Seen holophrastically, as conditioned to stimulatory situations, the sentence is theory free; seen analytically, word by word, it is theory laden. Insofar as observation sentences bear on science at all, affording evidence and tests, there has to be this retrospective theory lading along with the pristine holophrastic freedom from theory.’¹⁴⁴ It is true that for Quine the conception of being ‘theory laded’ or ‘not theory laden’ does not play any important role in the case of observation sentences, the reason is that there is no fact of the matter as to what it means. If we accept a translation manual then we should somehow accept that the words in an observation sentence contained ‘theoretical terms’.

¹⁴³ Quine, 1990, 4-5.

¹⁴⁴ Quine, 1990, 7.

Quine's naturalistic epistemology is inseparable from his naturalistic conception of language. Natural science can be regarded as a building stone of Quine's philosophy. But it is amazing that he does not deny the relevance of the conceptual analysis of common sense that is also based on experience or evidence, though these are slipshod, piecemeal, and comparatively unsystematic ways of knowledge. Quine says that 'Science is not a substitutive for common sense, but an extension of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an effort simply to broaden and deepen the knowledge which the man in the street already enjoys.....'¹⁴⁵ Actually, Quine tries to give a naturalistic account of knowledge that outpaces knowledge of knowledge. It not only concern with mere justification of knowledge but also gives importance to its explanation, whereas the traditional epistemology is concerned with 'skepticism' and tries to find out the 'certainty of knowledge'. Epistemological inquires have two dimensions. The first side is called by Quine the 'conceptual side' and the second side is called the 'doctrinal side'. The 'conceptual side' of traditional epistemology defines the various concepts of phenomenal knowledge. Besides, the 'doctrinal side' actually deals with the justifications that prove those concepts raised in the 'conceptual side' of epistemology. The 'conceptual side' is closer to the theory of meaning, whereas the doctrinal side is akin to the theory of truth and reference too. In the beginning part of his paper "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine writes that epistemology is concerned with the foundations of the sciences. Even he is not happy to accept the Cartesian quest for certainty and suggests that it is a sort of 'lost cause'. But Kim shows that 'In urging naturalized epistemology on us, Quine is not suggesting that we give up the Cartesian foundationist solution and explore others within the same framework-perhaps to adopt some sort of 'coherentist' strategy, or to

¹⁴⁵ W.V. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, 1966, 229.

require of our basic beliefs only some degree of ‘initial credibility’ rather than Cartesian certainty... Quine’s proposal is more radical than that. He is asking us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered epistemology. That is what is new in Quine’s proposals. Quine is asking us to put in its place a purely descriptive causal-nomological science of human cognition.’¹⁴⁶ Kim also suggests that Quine’s epistemology focuses on the vital question ‘how does evidence relate to reality?’ This sort of empiricist account tries to explain the world from the outlook of naturalism but the fact is that our interpretation of the world expresses by the set of sentences and words. Here language is mingled with naturalized epistemology. Though it is true that Quine is interested in the eventual acquisition of the scientific knowledge, yet language as a vehicle of knowledge takes an imperative role in his regimented naturalistic theory. Here we find a kind of shift from talking of reference to talking about words. Quine calls this shift as a ‘semantic ascent’. Quine believes that a person who is aware of linguistic tricks can be master of referential language. For him, the dispositional use of reference fixation cannot be irrelevant. Language of reference is suitable when an agent says ‘my cat’ is to refer to his/her own cat. Here the relation between language and the world depends on the observational sentences and the reference is just a capacity that is bonded with certain linguistic apparatus (which is complex) that is also conjoined with observation sentences.

Indeterminacy of Translation

We know that through the limited words, we can construe unlimited sentences. Therefore, we should have a comprehensive grasp of the meaning of the words in general. Quine thinks that, except such kind of situations actually words get their

¹⁴⁶ Jaegwon Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’,” in *Epistemology: An Anthology*, 2008, 304-305.

meaning in terms of sentences. He writes that ‘We learn short sentences as wholes, we learn their component words from their use in those sentences, and we build further sentences from words thus learned.’¹⁴⁷

From this discussion, Quine mainly indicates two points that are worth mentioning here:

- a) The notion of meaning is inextricably related to the sentences that together constitute language as a social art. This is called by Quine ‘holistic standpoint,’ a very controversial issue that I will elaborately discuss later.
- b) The meaning of a sentence is not independent. The sentential meaning of one language can be derived when we translate it into another language. Quine calls this profound thought experiment as “radical translation” that also indicate the translation of object language that does not depend on any kind of pre-existing aid. One can set up more than one set of translation manual for an object language that led to accept Quine, a thesis of indeterminacy of translation.

Quine admits that indeterminacy of translation thesis is a consequence of his behaviourism. He claims that behaviourism is mandatory for linguistic. He argues that ‘In psychology one may or may not be a behaviourist, but in linguistics one has no choice. Each of us learns his language by observing other people’s verbal behaviour and having his own faltering verbal behaviour observed and reinforced or corrected by others.’¹⁴⁸ In Quine’s thought, an experiment (indeterminacy of translation) of the source language is coming from the *jungle*. It is obviously a sort of jargon and here the ‘target language’ of the translator is not other than English. In such a situation

¹⁴⁷ Quine, 1990, 37.

¹⁴⁸ Quine, 1990, 38.

where language becomes inaccessible, there we can receive the data by observing native's utterances and behaviours. The communicating process that is dependent on the queries (expedient) of assent or dissent is purely a conjectural and observational science. The case of attempt to translate a native language and the fact assent and dissent can be considered as modes of rudimentary linguistic behaviour. I will discuss on this aspect in detail later.

Quine's 'indeterminacy of translation' thesis that is perhaps best discussed in his well-known book *Word and Object* can be regarded as a thought experiment. Quine believes that it is easy to find out a resemblance between two kindred languages like, French and English as in the case of their translation we found a kind of similarity of their cognate word forms. Even translation equations have also been possible between two unrelated languages like English and Hungarian because of their shared culture and beliefs. But Quine is vexed about the translation manual where there is no such a cultural similarity or similarity in their cognate word forms. Putnam says that 'A point which many critics missed is that Quine was arguing at least as much for the determinacy of translation in the case of observation sentences as for indeterminacy. True, Quine wants us to see that the use of a sentence need not fix its *exact* translation into another language, or even determinate what objects the sentence is about.'¹⁴⁹

Let us imagine that a linguist who visits in a jungle or native place, where the native language is totally different from his/her own language (English) and there is no pre-existing aids of translation. Let us also imagine that a rabbit is passing by in a field and a native suddenly utters the word 'gavagai'. Just by hearing the word 'gavagai' and by seeing that a rabbit scurrying by one linguist can note down the

¹⁴⁹ Hilary Putnam, *Realism With a Human Face*, 272.

sentence 'rabbit' as a tentative translation of the native word 'gavagai'. But this is a kind of rough approximation. The linguist cannot ask to the native speaker what he means by using the word 'gavagai'. Is it a rabbit or a rabbit passing by or is it something else? Their intercommunication is not possible as they individually possess a different vocabulary for their communication. Quine suggests that 'Only by taking the initiative and querying combinations of native's sentence and stimulus situations so as to narrow down his guesses to his eventual satisfaction..... what he must do is guess from observation and then see how well his guess work.'¹⁵⁰

Here one should see the expressions of assent and dissent of a native speaker. It will also help us to predict the speech disposition of the native speakers. Next time when a linguist notice that by catching an animal into a cage, the native utters the same term 'gavagai', then he can predict from this situation that 'gavagai' cannot mean *a rabbit is scurrying by* or that 'gavagai' means the same as 'rabbit'. Here, in terms of stimulus conditions a linguist or a translator can share or translate the speaker's utterances (a process of assent dissent). Quine in his early writings claims that there is a sameness of stimulus meaning that we will find between speakers, but in his later works he modifies this thought about stimulus meaning and says that 'If querying the sentence elicits assent from the given speaker on one occasion, it will elicit assent likewise on any other occasion when the same total set of receptors is triggered; and similarity for dissent.'¹⁵¹

We saw that Quine tries to accept the concept of single speaker regarding the sameness of stimulus meaning. But he does not try to avoid the jargon of 'inter-subjective sameness of stimulus meaning' in his naturalism. 'Inter-subjective

¹⁵⁰ W.V. Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, 29.

¹⁵¹ W.V. Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, 25.

sameness of stimulus meaning' applies only to observation sentences that show that the evidence should be available to the third person perspective. Quine tries to avoid the jargons of the studies of translations. Later Quine believes that if each of members of a community observes a sentence, then spontaneously this sentence becomes an observation sentence for the whole community. But Davidson argues that 'Inter-subjective likeness of stimulation' is possible only if we accept the stimulus to be not just as a bodily surface irritations, but as a share situation or 'a shared cause of the pertinent' behaviour of the two subjects. But Quine does not support Davidson's view as his naturalize epistemology taught him to find out evidence. He again writes that 'My naturalism does allow me free reference to nerve endings, rabbits, and other physical objects, but my epistemology permits the subject no such starting point.'¹⁵²

Quine accepts both of the stimulus meaning and private stimulus meaning on the subject's surface in his philosophy. Actually Quine shows that the stimulus meaning depends on the individual speaker, for example, 'rabbit', and this observational sentence is the sort of 'stimulus meaning' for the field linguists whereas 'gavagai' has its stimulus meaning for the natives. We find that the concept of 'inter-subjective liken' also make a challenge to the possibility of communication. One can think it as a direction to the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. A linguist observes the assent of the term 'gavagai' by the natives when he looks that a 'rabbit' is passing by the field. Later, he tries to assign his stimulus meaning 'rabbit' to native's stimulus meaning 'gavagai'. Quine considers that 'Empathy dominates the learning of language, both by child and by field linguist... In the field linguists case it is empathy on his own part when he makes his first conjecture about 'gavagai' on the

¹⁵²Quine, 1990, 42.

strength of the native's utterance and orientation, and again he quarries 'gavagai' for the native's assent in a promising subsequent situation.'¹⁵³

Quine thinks that 'radical translation' is a continuous process of use. He is mainly revisiting the translation manual that lights his/her success and failure of communication with the native language. In the field situation, where a radical translator does not follow the native's speech, there the translator tries to extract meaning from the native's behaviour. Even the native's behaviour is amenable to various translation manuals. In this case, meaning loses its actual uniqueness and this kind of speech disposition leads to an indeterminacy thesis as the same expressions of the natives can express different things in different situations. Quine claims that 'Their manual might be distinguishable in terms of any native behaviour that they give reason to expect, and yet each manual might prescribe some translation that the other translator would reject. Such is the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.'¹⁵⁴

Quine also believes that this kind of indeterminacy of translation not only occurs in the field situation (native's speech) but it can be applied in our ordinary language. There is a very important point where Quine indicates that, except some contrary evidences; actually, the linguist takes a native's ways of beliefs or thoughts to be similar to his beliefs or thoughts. The translator even tries to impose his/her own linguistic patterns on the natives to find out the compatibility of their behaviors and speeches, which also shows a similarity between the linguist's own attitudes or speeches with native's attitudes or speeches. This is known as 'principle of charity'.

Quine thinks that in the case of indeterminacy thesis a linguist or translator should find out similarities in more cases between his stimulus meanings with natives

¹⁵³Quine, 1990, 42.

¹⁵⁴Quine, 1990, 47-48.

stimulus meaning. So in the location of the jungle, there are many changes to be misled because of the indeterminacy of the translation that lead some time to the striking simplification of referential directness. Quine clarifies his thoughts to suggest that 'It is the unsurprising reflection that divergent interpretations of the words in a sentence can so offset one another as to sustain an identical translation of the sentence as a whole. It is what I have called inscrutability of reference; 'indeterminacy of reference' would have been better.'¹⁵⁵

In his book *Pursuit of Truth*, Quine for the first time clarifies his very long controversial and obscure thought regarding 'Ontological relativity'. He writes that 'It is relative to a manual of translation. To say that 'gavagai' denotes 'rabbit' is to opt for a manual of translation in which 'gavagai' is translated as 'rabbit', instead of opting for any of the alternative manuals.'¹⁵⁶ In the case of 'word for word' translation, we need to see that how much the sentences lead the speaker to belief in the concept of universal. But this would not be possible in the case of non-observational sentence as things become here much more indeterminate because of the lack of the sharing reference. Quine thinks that if we construct the world predicting from the realm of sensation, then it would be an opaque if we posit some non-empirical entities like, idea or meaning in our systems. The sameness of meaning depends on the role of similarity of the sentences play in two different languages. We cannot deny the usefulness of sameness of meaning in our ordinary language, but the first class scientific theory does not bother about it. Hilary Putnam tells us a story about his experience when he delivered a lecture in a Chinese university (Fudan University) in 1984. He says that in Chinese language there is no special suffix that can distinguish 'mo' (cat) from 'mohood' (cathood). 'Cat here' and 'Cathood there' are similar in

¹⁵⁵ Quine, 1990, 50.

¹⁵⁶ Quine, 1990, 51.

ordinary Chinese language use. But Quine does not give importance to this question. Quine thinks that the conceptual scheme of the English people and the Chinese people work on the ‘observational categories’ but the sentences they (Chinese) express are not exactly isomorphic compared to our sentences. The ‘parochial ontology’ of the English language that talks about particulars and universals can be expressed in Chinese sentences in more than one way as we found in Putnam’s example. Here we will find the ambiguities in the case of using the different words. Analytic philosophy that gives more importance on the notion of meaning is tremendously refuted by Quine to suggest that the ‘notion of meaning’ and the ‘analysis of meaning’ are hopelessly vague.

3.4. Search for an Alternative

Rosa and Lepore, in their joint paper “Quine’s Holism”¹⁵⁷ inject a thesis of ‘confirmation holism’ in Quine’s thought on meaning. Is Quine a meaning holist? This is a very controversial issue. I will discuss about my own observation later. Here, let us see that how could the two philosophers Rosa and Lepore try to establish their claims. For them, Quine’s meaning holism can derive from his other associated thesis that is called ‘confirmation holism’ and ‘verificationism’. Confirmation holism subsumes the thought that no empirical content can exist in isolation. We can identify an empirical content only through the theory as a whole. The possibility of knowing a hypothesis does not merely depend on knowing the evidence and counter-evidence in the case of observation. They justify their words by quoting the Quine’s dictum that ‘The meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it.’¹⁵⁸ For Quine to know the meaning of a sentence is to recognize its evidence. Even

¹⁵⁷ Raffaella DeRosa, & Lepore, Ernie, “Meaning Holism,” 2006, 18-45.

¹⁵⁸ W.V. Quine, *From A Logical Point of View*, 1963, 37.

Quine also believes that ‘To learn a language is to learn the meaning of its sentences, and hence to learn what observations to count as evidence for and against them. The evidence relation and the semantical relation of observation to theory are co-extensive.’¹⁵⁹

For De Rosa and Lepore, Quine’s thesis on ‘Meaning Holism’ runs as follows:

Premise 1. Meaning of a sentence consists in its confirmation evidence. This is called verificationism about meaning. We can call it a scientific practice argument. The general form of this hypothesis is that the truth value of the auxiliary assumption is based on the observational evidences in a certain condition where it will be true. If in any situation, it turns out as false, then the scientists do not refute the whole theory/hypothesis, rather they refute the antecedent of the observational categories.

Premise 2. A scientific theory cannot confirm its evidence or experiences individually, but it works only as a corporate body. This is called Duhem’s thesis. This theory tells us that the observational sentences are mingled with the theoretical sentences and constructed a whole scenario where the meaning of a particular sentence is related to a unit of others sentences. If any case one of our linguistic predictions turns out as false, then we should revise the sentence to avoid the false prediction.

Conclusion. The sentence of a language does not have meaning individually or in isolation, but as a corporate body or whole it depends on the other sentences of the language. This is a sort of meaning holistic approach.

Another very important point that is also close to ‘meaning holism’ is Quine’s thesis on natural science. For this reason he claims that ‘With Dewey I hold that

¹⁵⁹ W.V. Quine, *The Roots of Reference*, 1974, 38.

knowledge, mind and meaning are part of the same world that they to do with, and that they have to study in the same empirical spirit that animates natural science.’¹⁶⁰ Quine investigates the meaning as a social art of language that has public recognizable circumstances. Even his framework of meaning can be emphasized as a property of behaviour. Behaviour as a public evidence can be verified ‘meaning holism’ from the context of indeterminacy of translation. We find in Quine’s *Word and Object* that the conception of stimulus meaning cannot determine the various stages of ‘rabbit’ and ‘rabbit’ to as a translation of ‘gavagai’. Rosa and LePore suggest that ‘The moral of radical translation is then that meanings are not language-transcendent entities (propositions, mental or platonic entities); on the contrary, to understand a sentence is to understand a language and the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of the other sentences in the language.’¹⁶¹ In the case of radical translation, Quine holds that the dichotomy between analytic truth and synthetic truth leads to a confusion regarding the picture of how language links to the world. Because, we know that an analytic truth deals with language (especially on synonymy) where as the synthetic truths report on the world (informative). It is obviously true that language has no piece meal relation with the world but the sentences are connected to the world in terms of the relation with other sentences.

Here the most important question is that ‘Is Quine a strong or moderate holist?’ To consider Quine as strong or moderate holist, we should first define the concept of strong or moderate holism separately. Later we need to focus what will be the suitable area of Quine’s thesis. Actually ‘strong holism’ emphasizes that the meaning of any sentence of the language is determined by its (evidential or inferential) relation to every other; here the unit of meaning is the whole language.

¹⁶⁰ Quine, 1969, 26.

¹⁶¹ Raffaella De Rosa & Lepore, Ernie, 2006, 23.

Rosa and LePore suggest that ‘That is, there are no statements whose truth values remain untouched by revision made in response to contrary experiences (namely, there are no analytic statements). These two claims required that no sentence has meaning in isolation from every other of the language.’¹⁶² This is a type of strong holism.

Besides, ‘moderate holism’ considers that the meaning of any sentence of a language consists in its evidential relation to many other sentences and the units of meaning are regarded as the fragment of the language. In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, we have seen that Quine tries to refute the conventional distinction between the analytic and the synthetic statements. As we aware that in analytic statement the predicate term is contained in the subject term. So the analytic sentences become true in virtue of the meaning of the component words. Here the relation of the world does not take any relevant role. So he refutes to accept analytic statements to consider that the meaning of any sentence of a language is determined by its (observational/evidential) relation to every other sentence. For Quine, ‘Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.’¹⁶³ This turn can be recognized as a strong holistic framework. But in Quine’s later writing like *Word and Object* (1960), and “Epistemology Naturalized” (1969), we can find that his strong holistic framework becomes quite fixable. One can consider like Rosa and Lepore that later Quine moves toward ‘moderate holism’ by thinking that the observational sentences do not have any interconnectedness of sentences as they independently are carrying the stimulus meaning of the rest of the language. Even in the essential process of language learning, the observational sentences are based on ‘the repository of evidence for

¹⁶²Raffaella De Rosa & Lepore, Ernie, 28.

¹⁶³Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 42.

scientific hypotheses'. But in the case of theoretical sentences, the tribunal of experience escorts for more or less inclusive aggregate. Quine rightly points out that 'In this matter of understanding language, there is thus a subtle interplay between word and sentence. In one way the sentence is fundamental: understanding a word consist in knowing how to use it in sentences and how to react to such sentences. Yet if we would test some one's understanding of a sentence, we do best to focus on a word, ringing changes on its sentential contexts.'¹⁶⁴

Hilary Putnam challenges the premises that were raised by De Rosa and Lepore and also supported by Jerry Fodor. He does not believe that Quine had a belief that a) Meaning consists in its empirical content or b) Meaning of a sentence is dependent on the corporate body of sentences. He once suggested me that 'I don't believe Quine ever said anything like a) or b). His position was that the notion of "meaning" is too unclear to be usable in serious science and philosophy. He had no position of the form "Meaning consists in X" and no position of the form "Meaning of a sentence depends on X". To ascribe positions like that to him is to totally misunderstand in *Word and Object*. He did regard "stimulus meaning" as a science worthy notion, and perhaps empirical content (identified with an observation-conditions implied by a theory) but "stimulus meaning" is not supposed be meaning and 'empirical content' is not supposed to be meaning either, which ("meaning") is at best a notion of "heuristic" value; needed for practical purposes, but to be discarded when our interests are theoretical.'¹⁶⁵

Some philosophers think that Quine takes his 'meaning holism' to rest on associating meaning with confirmation, and since confirmation for him includes (in

¹⁶⁴ Quine, 1990, 58-59.

¹⁶⁵ I am personally indebted to Hilary Putnam for this discussion.

fact, consists in) empirical confirmation, his 'meaning holism' is incompatible with the notion of a priority. But just holding that the meaning of every term or sentences is constitutively connected with meanings or uses with all other sentences or terms don't in itself state an epistemic position. They think that 'meaning holism' in either Quinean form or the more general form just stated is incompatible with analyticity, unless every one holds that all sentences are analytic (something Leibniz did hold). It also seems to me that if the meaning of every sentence depends on connections to the meanings of all other sentences, and some of the other sentences have meanings that becomes true in virtue of connection to the world, then it seems that all sentences have meanings that turns true in virtue of at least indirect relations to the world. I agree with Putnam that there is no property of (some) sentences that guarantees that a sentence will never need to be revised, or in other words, there is no usable notion of a priority, unless you relatives, and speak of 'a priority relative to a framework of ideas'. I agree with Putnam on the claim that Fodor and Lepore have foisted Quine as a semantic holist. Hilary Putnam considers like Quine that 'meanings' aren't objects. The dictionary meaning of a word can give us information, but that information does not determine the truth-evaluable content of a sentence in a context. He accepts that what sentences are used to mean always depends on connections to the world, even in the case of logical or analytic sentences the same rules have been followed. But that is not because of some supposed grand theses of "meaning holism", but because of the collapse of the unrelativized a priori. For Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic sounds like a dogma that he strongly tries to refute. He refutes any concept of mentales like apriority or analyticity that is beyond of our observational evidence. I already concentrated on these issues in the beginning of the section.

Besides, the heart of semantic holism is that the meaning of a sentence is defined in regard to the totality of nodes and paths in its semantic networks. Besides, the meaning of a single predicate is depending upon the entire socio-linguistic practices that are related to the entire language, this is regarded as a holistic appeal. But my query is that 'Are the contribution of the theoretical sentences depending on the contribution of the other sentences?' It seems to me that if a sentence can causally be related (not inferentially) with other sentences or social characters of meanings, then we can understand the meaning of the sentence or words. The problem is that when a person knew a sentence, then is it not possible for him/her to know the entire meanings of the sentences at a time. Though I agree with Quine that our statements face the tribunal of the sense experience only as a corporate body, yet it seems to me that it is quite impossible for a learner to grasp the total related body of the sentences. For me, in this situation, a learner tries to grasp those sentences which are much more relevant for the knowledge of the expression (that she/he wants to know) but not the whole scheme. It is a reliable process of a speaker to know partially the knowledge of the meaning of an expression and later the learning process of the knowledge can be gradually increased.

Quine urges that we can understand our thoughts in terms of the relation to language use and linguistic behaviour etc. but it is not like that he denies the conception of sharing thoughts in the case of linguistic communication. Actually for him, the meaningful thought can be availed because of the mastery of language through behaviour and uses. But he is reluctant to use the notion of meaning as a tool of language. In his paper "Mind and Verbal Dispositions", Quine argues that 'We understand expression by knowing or grasping their meaning: and one expression serves as a translation or paraphrase of another because they mean the same. It is of

course spurious explanation, mentalistic explanation at its worst... where the real threat lies, in talking of meaning, is in the illusion of explanation.’¹⁶⁶ Quine challenges the idea of general explanatory power of meaning of the term. Though, he believes in the identity criterion of the entities that concern for meaning sounds (for Quine) as a superficial sense for explanation. It is true that Quine’s animus cannot worry about the common people’s ordinary uses of the word ‘meaning’ in a very limited sense. But he refutes strongly the notion of meaning as something that helps to understand language through explanation. Hylton explains Quine’s view as follows:

‘The meaningfulness of language is not to be explained by means of such a notion. It is, rather, to be explained as a matter of the language users’ having dispositions to exhibit certain forms of behaviour, especially verbal behaviour, in certain circumstances. (Possessing knowledge in Quine’s view is also a matter of having such dispositions; this is one way to think about Quine’s view that knowledge and language go hand-in-hand).’¹⁶⁷

Quine also believes that we cannot explain our mental state in terms of behaviour. Mental state can be explained through neurology. Talking about mental state rests on physical facts not just on bandying words. Quine strictly rejects the psychological explanation of language from his thought. Language is something that is publicly shareable and learned from others. The learnability and shareability of language both are publicly observable cannot be regarded as any psychological states. In short, the processes of grasping language, for Quine rely on the reference of behaviourism, perception or empirical root. His fascination to empiricism and social inculcation of language that are based on linguistic behaviorism radically attack any

¹⁶⁶ W. V Quine, “Mind and Verbal Dispositions,” in *Mind and Language*, 1975, 86-87.

¹⁶⁷ Peter Hylton, *Quine*, 2010, 101.

sort of psychologism or mentalistic approach. Quine pursues a difference on language depending on the conception of language learning. Linguists concerned with the grammatical correctness of sentences but Quine looks after on epistemology as his aim is to see that how the sentences of the speaker's could claims about the world. Actually, Quine gives importance on the learning way of forming sentences rather than learning of the sentences through grammatical construction. Quine has constrained the process of giving priority on grammar in his language learning procedure. He mainly invokes on the knowledge about world mode that is based on observation sentence. Quine thinks that the process of learning grammatical construction depends on the truth value of the other sentences. So here, the learning language is the ability to distribute truth values. But Quine is more interested about epistemology, so for him, learning of the pre dictational construction call for evidence to construct a sentence but that is not the whole story as there are lot of sentences that is beyond the observational status. Hylton writes that 'Holism limit how much there is to be said about the evidence relation. If Quine is right, however, holism equally limit how much there is to be said about the learning relation. Our present considerations thus support Quine' idea that his genetic account gets part of its significance from the insight that it gives us into the relation between theory and evidence – even if that insight is less than one might have hoped for.'¹⁶⁸ The important issue here is that observation sentences are the primordial part of the language acquisition of a child who is not master about another complex part of language. In this case, the process of ascent, descent and abstain gives them the ability to use and response to the simple observational sentences said by the elders.

¹⁶⁸ Peter Hylton, 2010, 155.

The philosophers who quoted a passage from “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” to prove that Quine accepted ‘meaning holism’ has committed a mistake as Quine’s thesis never talks about the meaning here. So it would be an injustice for us to call him ‘meaning holist’ that paves the way for externalism. He has supported Duhem’s scientific theory of ‘evidential holism’ that gives importance on the bodies of the scientific theory that confront on some recalcitrant experiences as a whole. No one can claim that Duhem was a meaning holist as he was less bothered about the fact of meaning. Some philosophers like Dummett called Quine ‘moderate holist’ as in his philosophy, we found a relation between theory and evidence. He like a positivist believed that empirical statements can be verified. But I agree with Putnam that Quine was not a verificationist in the Positivist sense. Fodor, Lepore called him verificationist in a holistic sense where the whole theory is presented to experience for validation. They think that the confirmation of an empirical theory doesn't only depend on its relation dates, but also related to the other factors like availability of alternative theories, simplicity or plausibility etc. that is Quine’s holism. They believe that the ‘Quine-Duhem’ thesis is the standard that proves their words. I think that Fodor made a great mistake to consider ‘verification’ and ‘confirmation’ as synonyms from an ordinary sense that Quine did not. Like Hilary Putnam I also believe that Quine is not a ‘confirmation holist’ he is a confirmation rejectionist. For Quine, the body of theory can confirm some of our beliefs in a good sense, but it does not follow that the body of the theory itself is confirmed by our observation. The reason is that Quine does not believe in the ‘science-worthy’ conception of confirmation. Putnam points out that for Quine, meaning is not a ‘science-worthy’ notion rather it is a second grade notion. So, it would be a mistake to call him a ‘meaning holist’ as he was a ‘meaning nihilist’.

We know that in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine tries to refute the claim that the theory of verification and confirming and disconfirming is relevant for language. He shows that the method of verification of an individual sentence is impossible. In *Word and Object* Quine claims that without the positing of meaning, our communication procedure can be well granted. Actually, he gives importance on verbal behaviour that rooted from Skinner. For Quine, the notion of analyticity and the notion of verifiability are both in troubles. In his Two Dogmas of Empiricism, we will find that he does not talk about any acceptable conditions (identity) for meaning. But in *Word and Object*, Quine emphasizes on ‘science-worthy’ term “stimulus meaning” and “translation manual” just to show that communication (speaking and translation) may possible without accepting meaning as an entity. There is no ‘meaning’ in a single utterance or as a whole according to Quine.

It is true that semantic holism rests on the associating meaning with confirmation, and since confirmation consists in empirical confirmation, therefore semantic holism is incompatible with a priority. But just holding that the meaning of every term is constitutively collected with meaning of all other terms in the sentence, it states an epistemic position. Putnam agree with the claim that semantic holism is incompatible with a priority and he also thinks that the history of science proves that there is no property of sentences that assure us that a sentence will never be needed to be revised. Putnam does not accept the view that the meaning of every sentence/term is constitutively connected with the meaning of all other terms/sentences does not in itself state an epistemic position. In his famous paper “Meaning Holism”, Putnam argues that the literal linguistic meaning that insists the sense of whatever a speaker supposes to know cannot be determined from any fixed sample of its uses. Putnam called this thesis simply ‘interpretation’ whereas Quine called it ‘radical translation’.

Both of these do not deal with meaning. Actually, Quine denied the notion of constitutive connections of meanings. For him meaning is regarded as a second grade notion. Putnam writes to me that ‘I have been writing to you that Quine is not a meaning holist, but a semantic nihilist. He does not believe that there is any such thing as ‘meaning’ in the semantic sense. The term ‘empirical meaning’ is widely used in philosophy of science, but it does not refer to anything semantic. In Quine’s version, the empirical meaning of a theory is the ‘observation categorical’ it implies. ‘Empirical meaning’ is holistic by definition, trivial, but it is not what anyone calls the meaning of sentences and words. Fodor sometime paints Quine as a meaning holist by pretending that what Quine says about the holism of empirical meaning has to do with the holism of ‘meaning’ in the semantic sense, but that is a mistake. There are no meaning and no semantic nodes – no semantic *anything* - for Quine. Semantic talk is heuristic and not to be taken seriously in metaphysics, according to Quine.’¹⁶⁹

Putnam thinks that there is a good sense in which we can claim that some of our beliefs are confirmed relative to our body of theories. But he does not believe that Quine accepted ‘science-worthy’ sense of confirmation where the body of theory itself is confirmed by observation. For Quine, propositional attitudes and mentalist terms that certainly include beliefs about meaning are not ‘science-worthy’. When meaning is not regarded as a ‘science-worthy’ notion for Quine, then, how can Quine possibly have a theory of meaning? I firmly agree with Putnam that for Quine, the notion of meaning has no place in serious scientific metaphysics. Even I agree with Putnam that Quine considers ‘stimulus meaning’ as a science-worthy notion identified with the observation conditionals which implied by a theory. But for Quine, these are regarded as a notion of ‘heuristic value’. The important thing is that we will find a

¹⁶⁹I am personally thankful to Putnam for this note.

puzzling line in Quine's famous book *The Roots of Reference*¹⁷⁰, where he claims that 'To learn a language is to learn the meaning of its sentences, and hence to learn what observation to count as evidence for and against them. The evidence relation and the semantical relation of observation to the theory are co-extensive.' For me, it sounds like meaning holism. Even Putnam also supports this view with me. But he cautioned me that when one reads it carefully, one's will notice that (1) 'the semantic relation' is not a relation of theoretical sentences to their referents (e.g. of sentences about electrons to electrons, or sentences about genes to genes), which is what a philosopher of language would normally mean by a semantic relation. But it is only a relation of theoretical sentences to the observations that are connected to them by stimulus-response conditioning (which is no other philosopher would count as a 'semantical' relations at all-here Quine is influenced by his friend Skinner's behaviourist account of language). And (2) in the very next section, Quine says we should drop the talk of observations in favour of the talk of observation sentences! So we are left without a semantical relation to observations as well, because we have dropped observations.

Still a clue that mistakenly raised by some philosophers is that Quine's approach to semantic has two parts: a. Verificationism and b. Holism. These two theories are mingled with each other. I think that in his later writings, Quine extremely changed his mind and moved away himself from the boundary to admit the indeterminacy of meaning and reference too. His translation manual leads him to accept the inter-subjective sameness of stimulus meaning in his naturalism. For him, the concept of inter subjectivity can be regarded as a checkpoint that shows that the evidence should be available to the third person perspective. But some philosophers like Fodor, Lepore and Rosa called Quine a verificationist in a holistic sense where

¹⁷⁰Quine, 1974, 38.

the whole theory presented to experience for validation. Fodor and Lepore think that the confirmation of an empirical theory doesn't only depend on its relations to data, but also related to the other factors like availability of alternative theories, simplicity or plausibility etc. That is Quine's the form of confirmation holism. They claim that the 'Quine-Durkheim theses' is the standard evidence of their work. Fodor committed a great mistake to consider that verification and confirmation as synonyms from an ordinary sense as I mentioned quite earlier that Quine did not.

If a sentence can causally and referentially (not inferentially) be related with other sentences or external world, then we can know its meaning. When an agent knew a sentence, then it is not possible for him to know the entire meaning of this sentence at a time. Though I agree with Quine that our statement face the tribunal of sense experience only as a corporate body, yet I assume that it is impossible for a learner to grasp the total related body of sentences. In this case, a learner tries to grasp that sentences which are much more relevant to know the expression (which he/she wants to know) not the whole schemes. For me, it is a reliable process of a speaker to know partially the knowledge of the meaning of an expression and later the learning process of knowledge can be gradually increased. Once I asked this question to my mentor Hilary Putnam and he personally wrote to me that 'The contribution of a sentence (in Quine's sense) is the help it affords in predicting observational-conditionals (and ultimately, sensory stimulations). I reject completely the idea that this is what meaning is. Thus, you are asking a question that presupposes Quine's "empiricism" and "behaviourism" of someone, myself, who rejects that whole picture. But at other times, you treat the meaning of a sentence (or word?) as something one has to "know", and that presupposes a picture of language use as based on having theories in one's head, which I also reject. I think of language skills as unformalizable

cognitive capacities. (See my book *Representation and Reality*, if your library has it.) Of course, there is a use of “know” in which I, for example, ‘know the meaning’ of a word, say, “butter”; but that is a misleading way of putting it, because really there is no fact or theory or proposition which is “the meaning of the word ‘butter’”; my knowledge here is an instance of “knowing how” not “knowing that”: I know *how to use the word* ‘butter’. Could I *describe* that know-how? Not very well. I could give a few examples, and the listener would have to “meet me half way”.¹⁷¹

Concluding Remarks

Meaning atomism that challenges the web of beliefs holds the content of beliefs or the meaning of sentence in regards of the fragment of the sentence and the semantic representation that also gives significance on the substantive account of a small set of atoms and try to make out the implicit idea of representation and meaning through piecemeal procedure. This hypothesis turns towards internalism. Here the reason is that the piecemeal procedure of representation and the constitutive meaning of a term have no connection with the causal efficiencies. It compels to accept an internalist plea that lead a way to internalise the content of beliefs in terms of theory of description, and the theory of acquaintance that ignores all sorts of causal theory of references. Besides, meaning holism culminates the previous ideas of atomism by laying out the thesis about the meaning of a word that consists in the whole body of the sentence.

The unit of empirical significance that tries to reject the ‘sophisticated mentalism’ brings an innovative way of reference fixation by illuminating the thoughts of *constraints of publicity* as proposed by Putnam. I have already attempted

¹⁷¹I am personally thankful to Putnam for this note.

to show that the mentalese approach related to the operational definition of the term cannot lead to a differentiation in the contents of belief fixations, though there took place a consequent change in the state of stereotypes. Meaning holism that fitted with externalism in the sense of critiquing the psychological mode of meaning and content considers that the meaning of linguistic unites depend upon meaning of the entire language. So, like externalism meaning holism also accepts the sociolinguistic backgrounds and language as a social phenomenon.

My concern in this chapter was to inquire how much is it justified to call Quine, a philosopher who accepted the indeterminacy of meaning, as a meaning holist. Quine's naturalism that claims about the evidential checkpoints also believes in the tenet of inter-subjectivity that escalates all observational sentences towards objectivity. It seems to me that Quine's indeterminacy of translation that is considered as a consequence of behaviourism turns towards the holistic standpoint as for Quine, the sentential meaning of one language can be derived when we translate it into a different language. This thesis refutes any sort of pre-existing aid in the case of objective language, and also believes in the thesis of the corporate body of other sentences. This thesis of indeterminacy of translation induces him to accept the indeterminacy of meaning theory though several times Quine relooks at and exemplified the concept of stimulus meaning in his thesis as a second grade notion. But I strongly agree with Putnam that Quine is not a holist who accepts meaning of a sentence as consist in/consist of something or in its confirmation evidences. Fodor mistakenly called him confirmation holist that I think he was not.

It is true that the heart of semantic holism is that the meaning of a sentence is defined in terms of the totality of nodes in its semantic networks. Quine argues that meaningfulness of language is possible because of the linguistic communication or

the relation between thought and language through behaviour, but accepting this thesis does not lead to accept the vague notion of meaning of the terms that he called a secondary notion. People commit mistakes by considering that Quine's thoughts on holism of empirical meaning (in the sense of observational categories that science accepted) can fit on the same line with meaning in the semantical sense.

I agree with Quine that our statement that face the tribunal of sense experience in terms of corporate body or whole can have a holistic background no doubt, but I do not feel comfortable to accept that in the case of child learning, a learner can grasp the total related body of sentences to learn the meaning of a sentence in the communicating language. I strongly believe that the leaning process of language that is gradually increased and this process does not depend merely on 'knowing that' hypothesis, but on 'knowing how', a thesis that gives importance on skill and social practices. The combination of the processes of "Knowing that" and "Knowing how" can be an alternative (possible) of the debate between internalism versus externalism that I would like to discuss on my last chapter.

Chapter 4

Self-Knowledge and Externalist Appeals

Introduction

In this chapter my attempt is to locate self-knowledge into the sphere of psychological attitudes (internal experience), where the ascription of oneself is independently relied on the authoritative, non-inferentiality, and silence by rejecting the claims of the accessibility of the speakers' external affairs. The question that haunted the philosophers is nonetheless the appeal of reconciliation of self-knowledge in the sphere of externalism. The orthodox externalism raises a *prima facie* problem that makes no room for mind and privilege access.

Even the conception of 'first person authority' in the case of self ascription can be intimidated because of the 'self deception' and 'experts'. The failure of transparency is a thesis that I would like to emphasize from the perspective of Timothy Williamson here. Another attempt would be to see from the perspective of leads externalists like Putnam, Davidson, Burge and Bilgrami's analyses on self-knowledge and externalism. It would be fascinating to see that how can meaning be in the head of the speakers though what the speaker means may depend on the things outside of the speaker's skin. We know that Putnam rebuffs the idea of objects of thoughts in the case of externalism to elucidate external constituted contents, whereas Davidson tries to renounce the object of thought from the account of self-knowledge to pursue reconciliation between self-knowledge and externalism. Besides, Burge relooks upon the debate from his view of 'basic cases' that is also associated with 'conceptual explanation' that Bilgrami later challenged in favour of 'constraint theses', a thesis that offers a unified content theory by rejecting the bifurcation of

content hypothesis. I would like to stress in this chapter that how could Bilgrami's constraint thesis that brings attention to the external determine items be suited with beliefs of the agents. In the last section I effort to see whether we shall go beyond the claims or not.

4.1. Privileged States of Self-knowledge

In the light of ongoing account of self-knowledge and first person authority, I would prefer to discuss first the importance and the relevance of these accounts in our philosophy. As we know, self-knowledge is a sort of knowledge of our own beliefs, desires and intentions, etc. Actually analytic philosophy gives importance on the particular self-knowledge rather than substantial self-knowledge from different angles. Following Quassim Cassam's masterpiece *Self Knowledge for Humans*¹⁷², I would like to sketch these different angles.

- A) In the case of explaining the knowledge of intentional mental states or particular self-knowledge, philosophers have closely narrowed down their focus on the knowledge of our beliefs, desires etc. Here the question is that how does one know one's own beliefs rather than one's hopes?
- B) Particular self-knowledge does not talk about the relatively factual attitudes like 'it is raining' etc. Here, the required question is that how may it be possible that an agent believes that 'truth is supreme' or 'men and women are equal'?
- C) Particular self-knowledge emphasizes on the query of what one's beliefs instead of why she or he wants? For them, the attitudes of self-knowledge would be formed of 'what' rather than 'why'.

¹⁷²Quassim Cassam, *Self-Knowledge for Humans*, 2014.

Cassam in the introductory part of his forthcoming book *Self-Knowledge: A Beginner's Guide* claims that substantial self-knowledge includes knowledge of your own character, values, abilities and emotions. The important point about substantial self-knowledge is that it represents a genuine cognitive achievement and has an obvious claim (which may or may not turn out to be right) to being regarded as valuable.

I think that rationality has taken an important role in self-knowledge. If an agent is aware about his/her beliefs and desires, then it obviously follows that he/she has the knowledge of them. To be blind about one's own beliefs and desires are paradoxical¹⁷³. It is like saying 'it is shiny, but I don't believe that it's so'. Though there is a logical inconsistency yet from a psychological perspective, it can be true. Because one can psychologically believe that, it is not raining though in the actual world it has happened. Here, it would be relevant to mention that asserting is considered as a criterion through which we can make justification of truth in our judgments. Therefore, we cannot get a first's person psychological statement based on bodily and behavioral facts. What is surprising about first person statement is that it is not always talking about the speaker's body. First person authority is regarding the internal experiences and not about external bodily affairs. The access of the first person experience has been always internal and not external. The incorrigible statements are talking about private experiences or mental events and first-person statement is based on the criteria for the truth of a 'non-personal component'.

In the case of skeptical doubt about our own existence, Descartes has shown that 'I think, therefore I am', which means thinking are the criteria through which we can be aware of our own existence. This Cartesian line of reasoning summarized the

¹⁷³ There may be hidden beliefs and desires of our mind that is well portrayed by Freud.

idea of indubitability or infallible knowledge of individual's thoughts which are not based on empirical knowledge. Self-knowledge is ultimately based on the observation of our inner side; we can also know that self-knowledge is not empirically corrigible by others.

However, we find a crucial difference between the way we know our own mind and the way we know others. The distinction between first and third person utterances depends on the concept of *avowals*, i.e. expressions of our intentional or sensational states. The statement 'I have a "toothache"' is regarded as a '*phenomenal avowals*' while the statement 'I hope the weather stays cool' is regarded as '*attitudinal avowals*'. Three alternative characters are interconnected with the concept of *avowals* or self-knowledge. These are authoritative, non-inferentiality, and salience where we found that it is possible for a third person to be familiar with all the relevant facts of first person's behaviour, but the third person cannot be able to grasp the basic psychology of the first person. Here, I would like to mention that first person's beliefs and desires are in nature salient to 'own self', but not to others.

Self-ascription¹⁷⁴ is an ascription whose subject is identical with the ascriber. As an ascriber or the subject of the ascription the individual would correctly make an ascription on himself or herself like, I believe that 'I feel hungry'. Besides, there are some cases where the individuals themselves are not ascribed, but others attribute ascriptions on him/her like, X believes that 'Y feels hungry'. One can find a striking difference between the epistemic statuses of self-ascription in various fields. For instance, 'I feel hungry' and another sentence 'I am more handsome than you are'. In the first case the authority is totally dependent on me, but in the rest case I am not the

¹⁷⁴ Self-awareness (in this case awareness of particular states of minds) and self-ascription may not always go hand in hand. You may have experience of particular mental states where you are in a way unaware of yourself. Like in deep aesthetic experience, one loses oneself.

special authority and it may be easily possible that others may be more expert or authoritative than me. Self-ascriptions are independent of accessibility to the subject's state of affairs. The same goes for knowledge of minds other than your own. You need evidence – usually behavioural evidences - to know what someone else thinks or feels, and your beliefs about such matters are neither infallible nor authoritative in the way that self-knowledge is authoritative. So there is what Paul Boghossian describes as a 'profound asymmetry between the way in which I know my own thoughts and the way in which I may know the thoughts of others'. A philosophical account of self-knowledge must surely acknowledge and explain this asymmetry.

We know that externalism gives significance on the direct reference theory that consists in the causal conception of reference and meaning hosted by Putnam and Kripke. But the problem for externalist account would be intentional content or more specifically, first person authority over intentional content of an agent. For Bilgrami, self-knowledge and first person authority are mostly interchangeable except the scenario where self-knowledge can be inferential, whereas, first person authority is non-inferential.

Externalism denies the thesis of intentional states, a thesis that does not presuppose the existence of anything external to the subject who possesses such states. This is a general definition of externalism drawn by Putnam himself. Bilgrami thinks that self-knowledge can be well compatible with this sort of general definition of externalism, but not suitable for orthodox externalism. Bilgrami calls the problem that externalism possessed for self-knowledge is a *prima facie* problem. The *prima facie* problem tells us that the states that are constituted by external things of a person can be unknown of the person who is engaged in these states. Bilgrami writes that 'The idea is that a pair of internally identical twins on earth and twin earth

respectively have different but, as far as they can tell, indistinguishable substances, which they both call 'water', in their environments; so, given externalism, they have different 'water'- concepts and 'water'- thoughts. Since they have different thoughts without really being able to tell the difference, they do not fully know what their own thoughts are.¹⁷⁵

Bilgrami thinks that it was not Putnam's purpose is to take it easy the concept of content with the denial of self-knowledge of one's thoughts, because he unwillingly accepted that there are two different notions of our thought's content – internal and external. For Putnam, the external contents cannot mingle with self-knowledge. Besides, internal content is well compatible with self-knowledge, except some cases where psychological phenomenon occurred like self-deception, inattention etc. Bilgrami argues that Putnam is right as he thinks that the *prima facie* problem of self-knowledge makes no room for the inadequate idea of unbifurcated or unified mind. But Burge and Davidson have different approaches that have no link with Putnam's ideas. Bilgrami partially accepts Putnam's thesis, but defends against Burge's and Davidson's externalism.

4.2. First-person Authority and Privileged Access

Self-knowledge and first person authority promote that an agent's own mental state (mental life) can enjoy a privileged epistemic stand that assure an immediate access and authority of the agent regarding his/her own mental states. For Descartes, this access could be incorrigibly infallible. But the conception of infallibility and incorrigibility is prone towards a controversy of self-deception where a person unwillingly or sometimes willingly deceives himself or herself.

¹⁷⁵ Akeel Bilgrami, "Can Externalism Be Reconciled with Self Knowledge?" 1992, 235.

So, the best aspect of privileged access is portrayed by the capacity of direct knowledge of an agent about own mental states. This direct knowledge cannot depend on evidence. So, it is limited only one's (agent's) mental state that cannot be known or grasped directly by other person. Here, the conception of the 'direct knowledge' is not similar with Russell's idea of 'knowledge by acquaintance'. Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance' is also a knowledge that we expand directly and causally. So, the propensity of the knowledge becomes more contingent matter in Russell's case. But direct knowledge in the previous access background does not depend on any evidence. So, here, the knowledge is based on epistemology that would be much more authoritative. Though critics can well argue that sometimes one's direct knowledge needs some support from evidence or sometime it is based on process of self-analysis, where indirect method or external evidence takes an important role.

Besides, the conception of direct knowledge in some cases is based on the external world and experience. If in the case, an agent claims that I know directly that 'ice-cream is chilled', in this case, the direct knowledge of the agent can be well grasped by the others in the sense that here, the 'ice-cream is chilled' is not only an epistemic knowledge of the agent but the thought is causally related with the external world where the object 'ice-cream' has the property of being chilled.

In the case of intentional state, a particular content and attitude can be regarded as two independent components. John Heil writes that 'This suggests that knowledge of intentional states incorporates a pair of distinguishable aspects, one pertaining to the content of the state, the other to its place in an agent's psychological economy. It suggests, as well, that in so far, as we can be wrong about such things, we can be wrong in different ways – as when we fail to get the attitude right while being

clear about the content, or grasp the attitude by misapprehend its object. And if we can be mistaken about each, it must be possible as when to be in the dark about both at once.¹⁷⁶

The direct knowledge theory of mental state is not error free. Critics can argue that first; the direct access of an agent's thought can be highly indirect. Second, some beliefs about our mental states can be neither fallible nor incorrigible. One may directly not know what thoughts he/she docks. One can claim that in the case of direct knowledge of mental content that is capable of harbouring intentional states, depends on self-awareness. We know that intentional contents are relational to the external world. One can retain the privileged access of mental states in the epistemological sense within the boundary of intentional content that must depend on the external world. It would be quite peculiar, if we claim that the content of one's mental state is complicatedly dependent on the external circumstances and the features of the external circumstances highly oblivious to the agent than grasping the content would be quite contingent or indirect knowledge based. So two different opinions that contradict each other is as follows:

First, the conviction that the agent's belief about his/her own thought could be epistemologically direct, i.e. independent of evidence.

Second, the belief of our mental state which rest on evidential checkpoint could be regarded as mistake based. So, we need to make a reconciliation of the direct content of mental content with externalism, a thesis that gives importance on the claim that the mental contents or the meaning of the term can be externally determined.

Externalist thesis admits that the mental state of a person which is linked with the content like 'this is a house' in virtue of being cause in me by a house, an external

¹⁷⁶ John Heil, "Privileged Access," 1988, 241.

object. In this case, the state of affairs of the mental content that is also caused by the external occurrence like the 'house' is associated one step inside the agent or his mental content and the second step; it is also anchored in the external world outside of the mental content of the speakers. If we allow the externalist thesis as true, then the belief of the contents of one's thought that rest on experiment and the external world would not be error free.

Externalist approach cannot fit with privileged access. If we claim that like externalist, the content and the belief are not in the head of the speaker, then the concept of privileged access regarding content would be uncertain. Heil says that 'The culprit, according to Donald Davidson, is not externalism, but a certain "picture of the mind" in which beliefs about the contents of one's mental states are taken to be based on inward glimpses of those states or on the grasping of particular entities (contents, perhaps, or propositions, or sentences in mentalese)'¹⁷⁷. Abandoning the notion of mental content entails inwardly perceiving, if so, then it would be easy to remove the reason to support externalist views that undermines privileged access thesis. There is a tendency to call privileged status regarding the content of one's own mind as analogous. Here, we need to renew the traditional conception of mind where mind can be regarded as a theatre and in which conscious self is watching a play. The ordinary objects of the external world do not appear on the stage show. Their appearance is represented here. So, the problem according to Davidson is that philosophers are tempted to think 'Whatever we know about the world outside depends on what we can glean from the inner clues'¹⁷⁸. A Cartesian picture of mind entails sentences as mentalese and the pictures on an interior scheme. In our processes of ascription and description, there is a chance to illustrate the entities as an existing thing. So, it is not

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 247.

¹⁷⁸ Donald Davidson, "Knowing one's own mind," 453.

always that having a thought in mind means having an object ahead of the speaker. Davidson strongly believes in the conception of the thought that is determined by the identity of the object. This is a flawed idea because there is a possibility to be unaware of some properties of the object.

To specify, the truth condition and the process of self-ascription are the two fundamental criterions that makes self-knowledge possible. We can claim following Davidson that a person can be concerned about self-knowledge only if he/she can specify the truth condition of his uttered sentence. Here, actually Davidson follows Tarski's conception of truth or disquotational theory about truth. If a person claims that he/she has self-knowledge regarding the statement that his friend 'Kolkakanshi died happy', then the statement of the utterance would be true if he can specify the truth condition of the sentence by means that 'My utterance of "Kolkakanshi died happy" is true if and only if Kolkakanshi died happy'.

Besides, Burge in his paper "Individualism and Self-Knowledge"¹⁷⁹ claims that a person can claim about his thought as a self-knowledge only if he/she can think it on the base on self-ascription. One cannot be authoritative or attributed the concern of self-knowledge if (according to Davidson), the agent has lacked either the ability of quoting or the ability to claim biconditionals. Besides, Burge indicates that the lack of the ability to think the utterance or thought of an agent 'self-ascriptively' is a challenge/hurdle in considering a thought as self-knowledge. First-person authority tells us that an agent has an *a priori* knowledge regarding his/her content of thoughts. It means a person can know the content of his/her own thoughts independently of any empirical evidences. Here, the conception of the rational agency of an agent takes a relevant part in first person authority. We know that for Descartes, the first person

¹⁷⁹ Tyler Burge, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge," 1988, 653.

authority could be regarded as secure. Even our mental content, thoughts, beliefs could be fallible. So it would be subject to correction. In this case, we can take the example of 'self-deception'. Actually, first person authority can be no doubt defeasible in some cases and the errors can be corrected by others. We find some different conditions that can fulfil the criterion of being first person authority. First, the agent must be conscious of his/her thoughts. Second, one must have first person perspective that helps him/her to recognize his/her thoughts as own thoughts. Third, in order to know the propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires) of an agent, one must have the concept of believing and desiring etc.

Timothy Williamson argues that 'Knowledge and action are the central relations between mind and world. In action, the world is adapted to mind. In knowledge, mind is adapted to world. When world is maladapted to mind, there is a residue of desire. When mind is maladapted to the world, there is a residue of belief. Desire aspires to action; belief aspires to knowledge. The point of desire is action; the point of belief is knowledge.'¹⁸⁰ Williamson thinks that the concept knowing (mental state) can lead to confusion between the certainty of subjectivity and objectivity. So knowing the mental state or the conception that one must know what mental state one is in no way can be regarded as same. Descartes did the mistake to consider that one always knows one's own mental state. So the argument challenges the state of a priori reasoning in the sense that knowledge is dependent on external world and experience. So, knowledge in a form of informative proposition is dependent on experience plus external world. So there is a possibility to be wrong about one's own mental state.

Besides, transparency thesis emphasizes that every mental state S in the case of when an agent is alert and conceptually sophisticated then the agent no doubt in the

¹⁸⁰ Timothy Williamson, *Knowledge and Its Limits*, 2000, 1.

position of knowing whether one is in *S*. In this case (transparency), when a person knows *P*, it is not a mental state in any substitute propositions of *P*. This transparency thesis can be doubtful and sometimes goes wrong like in the case of pain. A person who has very much self-pity can make a mistake to identify itch with pain. It means when he is in a pain, then a careless and healthy person may mistake to consider it as an itch. Besides, when a self-pity person feels itching, then he mistakes to consider it as a pain. Williamson writes that 'Perhaps failure of transparency could not be the normal case, although that claim would require extensive argument. A more plausible claim is that we have some non-observational knowledge of our own mental states and not of the mental states of others. But then the same may be said about knowing: we have some non-observational knowledge of our own knowledge and ignorance and not of the knowledge and ignorance of others. Any genuine requirement of privileged access on mental state is met by the state of knowing *P*. Knowing is characteristically open to first-person present-tense access; like other mental states it is not perfectly open.'¹⁸¹ Now the thousand dollar question is that can an agent's belief the same whether the agent knows *P* (a proposition) can be defeasible by some new information that was totally unaware to the agent. In this case, after getting the new information, the same agent does not believe *P* is true. This is a very controversial opinion. It may well possible that a person who of late joined a religious sect and is convinced through their (religious group) pressurization that the world would come to an end in the coming year. But the person was well assured that the world would not come to an end in the coming year because of the unwillingness to cash in pension. Though it is well proved that one's belief regarding the matter that he/she can think clearly and alertly be defeasible by new information like the

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 25.

addiction of drug etc. But this defeasibility of belief (an agent knows *P*) does prove that knowing *P* is a mental state. This failure of transparency thesis makes a reconciliation of the debate between knowing the mental state and skeptical argument. Skeptics claim that unchangeability of mental state could lead to the unchangeability of knowledge of the agent. Skeptics argue that one cannot be in different mental state in any indiscriminable situation. This thesis also leads to an account that is very much controversial.

An ascription of attribution of mental state to an agent implies that the statement of the speaker can easily elude the boundaries of the hearer (to whom the speaker ascribe the attribution of mental state). But internalist claims that the mental states of an agent can be determined by his/her internal physical states. Their slogan is ‘mind is in the head’! They even try to replace ‘phenomenological state’ to constitute a thesis that would be independent of environment. Actually the process of knowing is fact based thesis. If we claim that ‘X knows *y*’ or ‘Sreejit knows horse riding’, then the knowledge or skill of ‘knowing horse-riding’ is not determined by the internal state of the speakers. Williamson thinks, ‘Jerry Fodor drew just such a conclusion from his formality condition, according to which mental states and processes defined over representations apply to them in virtue of the syntax of the representations: ‘Since, on that assumption [that you can’t know what's not the case], knowledge is involved with truth, and since truth is a semantic notion, it's going to follow that there can’t be a psychology of *knowledge* (even if it is consonant with the formality condition to hope for a psychology of *belief*).’¹⁸² Besides, Burge, a prominent social externalist also believes that the fictive verbs, like ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘remember’ escort a precise distinction between subjects and objects.

¹⁸² Ibid., 50.

An important question is that can social externalism mingle with apriority? Social externalism depicts that the content of an agent's thought can be determined by social and linguistic practices. If we talk about social and linguistic practices, then we should have to admit the existence of other peoples. Besides, we know that the knowledge of the other people can be known through experience based knowledge. In this case, if one claims that he/she knows *a priori* of the content of one's thought, then one must have to admit the concept of other people's social and linguistic practices that could be known through *a priori* knowledge. But this seems quite peculiar. We know that Burge tries to make a reconciliation of the debate to argue that an agent may know something without knowing the 'background enabling conditions' that I already discussed. Here, our knowledge of the thought that 'gold is precious' does not relate with the background enabling conditions like 'the atomic number of gold is 79'. Now the problem is that if we claim that one can know a priori 'If I believe that water is liquid, then there exists other people' is regarded as true, then one must have accepted the justification of social externalism being compatible with apriority. This is a very controversial issue.

The benefit of social externalism is that for them, the content of our thoughts are intersubjectively knowable. It means, the thought of one person can be known and shared by others. Besides, social externalism that tries to mingle with first person authority but without accepting the idea of solipsism. Social externalism also takes the issue of first person authority as a defeasible knowledge because when an agent claims that he believes in something then the claim of the agent could be evaluated by the society and other people. So here the standard of the correctness does not depend on the speaker but on public meaning.

4.3. Externalist Responses

As far as my knowledge goes, physical externalism tells us that the concepts are derived their contents from the natural kind terms that belongs in the environment. Putnam claims that what words mean is more than what is in our head. So, being psychologically identical does not follow that two agents might refer same objects by using the same words. Here, the identification of thoughts that are expressed in words depends on the objects and the events that are causally related to the world. Following Putnam's "twin earth thought experiment", one can say that the truth value of the terms like 'water' rely on the planet or environment in which the speaker utters the sentence. So here, the authority becomes fallible. The reason is that there is a possibility to be self-deceptive as one may be unaware about the fact that he/she is in "twin earth" where 'water' is not 'H₂O' rather than something else or 'XYZ'. The reason is that in this case, the skeptical doubt plays its dice and this deception has taken place because of the objects and the environment of the speaker not by mere psychological verbs of the speakers. We see that 'twin earth' argument shows the unauthoritativeness of the self-ascription rather than its falsity. I think in this way Putnam challenges against first person authority by proposing that first person authority or self knowledge is incompatible with externalism. For Putnam an agent does not have any authoritative knowledge about the meaning of the uttered words in the sense of 'knowing that' or mere descriptions.

4.3.1. A Response from Davidson

My attempts would be to find out Davidson's approaches on the epistemological explanation of self-knowledge and his invention on the linguistic account of first person authority. At first, Donald Davidson as an externalist tries to clarify the debate between externalism and first person authority to say that first person authority is

better privileged than second or third person authority. He admits that ‘Special authority attaches directly to claim about the desire and belief, less directly to claim about the necessary causal connection.’¹⁸³ He is well aware about the fact that the claim of first person authority could turn out false. So he does not believe the concept of infallibility in the realm of self-knowledge. Davidson thinks that the post Cartesian model of objects of thoughts has a long tradition. John Searle has a tendency to accept this idea. Other philosophers actually make a separation from the Cartesian concept of inner consciousness by accepting a model of internalism that illustrates the intrinsic aspect of meaning or in a word, ‘meanings are in the head’. Davidson argues that there will be no problem to accept the concept of self knowledge only if the content of an agent’s thoughts can be determined by a sort of special kind of object authority that completely depends on agent’s knowledge. Putnam rejects the idea of objects of thought, an internalist account. He also gives up the idea of first person authority over the contents. Bilgrami writes, ‘Having diagnosed, to its own satisfaction, why it is that Putnam gives up on a reconciliation between self-knowledge and externalism, Davidson then goes on to say that the reconciliation should not be hard to achieve, if we do take the radical step of also giving up on the assumption that objects of thought account for self knowledge.’¹⁸⁴

For Davidson, one should accept the traditional model of objects of thought because one need to interpret others’ or attributing thoughts to others, may only be possible if the agent has direct and non-inferential knowledge of his own thought. One interpretee must have the authority over his or her own thoughts. For Davidson, the concept of a thinker rest on the object of interpretation or in short, to be a thinker is to be the object of interpretation.

¹⁸³ Donald Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, 2001, 4.

¹⁸⁴ Bilgrami, 1992, 237.

Davidson's asymmetry tells us that in the case of self-ascription when I say 'I am happy' and X, a second person claims that 'Sanjit believes that he is happy', here the self-ascriptive statement is more authoritative than the ascription by the third person. First person utterances logically differ from the third person's utterances. The latter is liable to error more often than previous one where as the former are taken as true under normal circumstances. Even then, the first person authority is not actually error free.

Davidson suggests that 'Mental state (such as believing) can be, and usually are, identified in part by their causal relations to events and objects outside the subject whose states they are.'¹⁸⁵ Like Putnam, he also supports that the meaning of a word depend upon the speaker's linguistic background and what he/she has learned in the linguistic community. Davidson's externalist account mainly relies on his arguments of causal component of meaning, and the connection between language and reality. He accepts that the learning process depends on the interaction between speakers and environment.

Davidson tries to show in his "Knowing One's Own Mind" that externalism may well be consistent with the claim of first person authority. He wants to point out that something which is external to the subject (or part of his physical or social environment) may well be intrinsic to it in the sense that mental states may well be individuated in terms of it. He comes up with his famous sunburn example. Suppose a person has a skin condition which is identified by the doctor as sunburn. Here, though the sun is external to the patient it is in terms of the sun that something that is internal to him, i.e. his skin condition is identified. Similarly broad relational content of

¹⁸⁵ Donald Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjectivity," in *Relativism, Interpretation and Confrontation*, 1989, 167.

thought is external to the subject, yet it is individualized. Davidson holds the following in this regard:

First, mental states, like beliefs and desires, are similar to other states like diseases, which are identified in terms of their causes, because they are partially identified in terms of the social and historical context in which they occur.

Second, one should not think that this implies that physicalism is wrong, as “how we describe or identify events has nothing directly to do with where those states and events are?”

Third, it is possible for us to communicate with others, and also have an access to their minds, only because other peoples’ mental states and the meanings that their words have, are partially identified in term of the causal relation between them, and the external world too. However, his does not jeopardize first person authority. We know that externalist claims about the mental or intentional content of a person is causally related to the person himself and his physical or social environment. It may be possible that one may ignore about the causal relation, but he/she does not disagree with the causal relations. It is true that intentional content that glimpse on the knowing of immediate thoughts of myself also rests on the facts through investigating environment but not anyway by inspecting those thoughts. Even the understanding of a word rests on the explanation of what it means and what construes a rule for its correct use. Like Wittgenstein and Putnam, Davidson also believes that objects do not give the words its meaning, but it is human practices that give the words its meaning.

According to Davidson, here causal interaction has taken an important role in our linguistic reference. In his words, ‘The claim that all thought and language must

have a foundation in such direct historical connections, and these connections constrain the interpretation of thoughts and speech.’¹⁸⁶ Even in the case of ‘water’, when an agent thinks about water, the concept of water is not out of his/her head. He thinks that the thoughts about water and ‘twater’ are different in the sense that water is causally related to H₂O while ‘twater’ is causally related with XYZ. Here two different causal relations make a critical difference in their mental states. For this reason we cannot claim that mental states are out of mind or out of head. So the claim about the first person authority on mental state is justified. Davidson also tells us that philosophers who denied compatibility between self-knowledge and externalism are mistaken. They consider self as a theatre where the mental contents are displayed, and the world is mirrored. So they find it difficult to tie mind with the world. Davidson rejects this Cartesian model of mind. For him mind is necessarily related to the external world. Davidson considers that ‘On the one hand, there are the true inner states, with respect to which the mind retains its authority; on the other hand there are the ordinary states of belief, desire, intention and meaning, which are polluted by their necessary connections with the social and public world.’¹⁸⁷ As we see that Davidson tries to reject the conception of infallibility of self-knowledge and accepts the view of communicating phenomenon that claims about the third person’s psychology as groundlessly true. One can ask that Davidson’s principle of charity talks about the causal theory of content that shows what other peoples say and do is mostly true or we must interpret others comments in this way that comes true. But this stagey does not accept by Davidson. He actually gives importance on some sort of special authority regarding one’s beliefs and thoughts and his purpose is to refute the epistemic sound to explain his special authority by linguistically. Davidson, who believes in anti-

¹⁸⁶ Donald Davidson, “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” 450.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 454.

mentalism argues against mental content by raising two different arguments. The first argument tries to refute an epistemological mental object that conflict with semantic facts which is more causally linked with the object involving characters. The subject's mind has some mental objects. So he/she can attribute the attitudes like X believes that P. Davidson denies the relation between X (subject) and an abstract object (a proposition) referred by that clause. This epistemological account is mainly criticised by Davidson. As an externalist, Davidson also believes that the sentence attitude is causally related with objects and he denies that objects are in mind. For him, an object must have a difference between its existence and perception. First person knowledge can presuppose an object, but the content determining mental object cannot possible as it is not directly causally related to the external world. The second argument of Davidson shows that as intentional contents are rested on the external objects, so it is incompatible to consider that contents are dependent on the transparent mental objects or the myth of metal contents. This sort of assumption threatens the conception of first person authority that is mingled with externalism. Twin Earth thought argument teaches us that in order to know one's belief; one must need to verify where he/she is staying and the fluid that he/she has observed. Externalism claims that the immediate knowledge of an object is inconsistent and we actually verify our mental contents through environment and world. We can also say that Putnam's 'Causal theory of reference', Davidson's 'Principle of Charity' indicate that one need to interpret one's or other's expression so that it comes out true. We know that for externalist, an object fixes the content of a mental state and an agent may be ignorant about this matter. Externalism tries to exclude the idea of content determining mental object. Davidson is the exceptional internalist who tries to combine externalism and first person authority together. Externalism shows that to identify an object, one need to know

about the stuff which determines one's thought. Davidson claims that twin earth argument only shows the fallibility of second order beliefs. One may be wrong about a stuff that is structurally identical with other stuffs. But Davidson says that still the person is authoritative regarding the belief that 'I believe to have a belief about water (stuff)'. He may be true that the reference of my thought or belief may be wrong, but it is obviously true that what I thought. Davidson unlike the externalists cannot deny the authority that cannot lose even if some of our second order thoughts go wrong. In his well-known paper "First Person Authority" (1984), Davidson claims that there is a keen difference between speaker's knowledge of the meanings of its own utterances and the third party's knowledge about it. First person authority claims that other person may not know immediately what a speaker means by his utterances. For Davidson, the concept of rationality is an ability of self-ascription and holding a sentence to be true from third person's point of views. But the problem is that Davidson's first person authority is linked with an empirical relation that can be verified by the third person or interpreter's point of view.

4.3.2. Burge's way of Reconciliation of the Debate

Tyler Burge is talking about a constitutive condition that indicates to self-knowledge that he called 'basic cases' of self-knowledge. The 'basic cases' of self-knowledge are expressed by the first person's present tense that has connection with the thoughts of an agent. If an agent in a basic cases thinks that P has a necessary condition, then obviously agent is also thinking that P. Here it is true that the agent only has the authoritative power to show for it in the 'basic cases'. Even Burge also believes that externalism does not make any problem for self-knowledge. Bilgrami expresses Burge's argument in this way:

‘And so if one is unaware of the various external factors that go into its being that thought, it neither follows that one does not have that thought nor, given their common necessary conditions, that one does not have the iterated thought that expresses self-knowledge of the thought.’¹⁸⁸

Bilgrami claims that the reconciliation that is based on ‘basic cases’ and tries to answer to the *prima facie* problem is not well argued and wrongly posed by Burge. One important *prima facie* problem indicated by Bilgrami is that Putnam’s natural kind externalism that has a scientific outlook hints that the inconsistent thoughts of an agent may well be possible, like ‘water is not H₂O’ or ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ etc.

Bilgrami is talking about two dilemmas of externalism. The first dilemma we saw in Putnam’s specific externalism is that the agent must often be falsely accused of logical idiocy. The second dilemma as he pointed out is Putnam’s specific externalism which tells us that self-knowledge cannot be compatible with externalism as they denied the self-knowledge of the contents. These two dilemmas show that there is a bifurcation of content and wide content that derived from externalist perspective cannot be compatible with self-knowledge; whereas, narrow content, an internalist approach may well compatible with self-knowledge. Bilgrami’s uniqueness is that here he put a new conception of *trilema*, a third opinion that eliminate the bifurcation of contents. Now Bilgrami focuses on Burge’s reconciliation theory and try to give some responses to Burge’s argument. In his paper “Wherein is Language Social?”¹⁸⁹ Burge is concerned about two different concepts. In the first case, while concepts are actually linked to the words that he called ‘the concept’. Besides, the concepts are

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 239.

¹⁸⁹ Tyler Burge, “Wherein is Language Social?” in *Reflection of Chomsky*, 1989.

associated with those entities that he called ‘the conceptual explanation’. He writes that ‘For our purposes, the explicational meaning is the semantical analogue of the conceptual explanation. The translational meaning of a word can be articulated through exact translation and sometimes through such trivial thoughts as my word ‘tiger’ applies to tigers, but need not be exhaustively expressible in other terms in an idiolect.’¹⁹⁰ Even for Burge, the mistaken part of tradition view is that there is an interchangeability we may find between ‘explicational meaning’ and its ‘translational meaning’ in an individual’s idiolect. He argues that in some cases, referent may play the individuating the concept and translation meaning. Because of this reason, non explicational abilities take a considerable part in the individuals’ use of the word and concepts. For Burge the content of one’s mental state that we always expressed with the clause ‘that’ is dependent not only on physical externalism but social environment.

The problem of inconsistency arises because of the ‘conceptual explanations’ not for ‘the concepts’. One can defend Putnam’s thought to suggest that the attribution of inconsistency of Putnam’s thought experiment cannot be justified as the utterance of arthritis involved with its ‘conceptual explanation’ rather than its ‘the concept’. The problem of this process as pointed out by Bilgrami is that here we need to accept the second notion of concepts as here the contents are composed by concepts. The first notion of concept is familiar with the name of ‘proper concept’ that marked by its reference as externalists have exposed. The second notion of concepts depends on ‘the conceptual explanations’ of the agent’s articulating thoughts. Self-ascription always involves articulate thoughts. If we follow the second notion then it may possible that we can avoid the charge of agent’s inconsistency in Putnam’s thought argument. If an

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 181.

agent claims that ‘arthritis’ is a sort of painful disease for some old persons and ignore the matter that it only occurs in joints and not in thigh, then in such a case, we find a sort of ‘conceptual explanation’ of an agent who have no relation to the reference of arthritis or ‘the concept proper’ that is based on expert’s explanation or direct reference.

The second response from Bilgrami’s side to Burge is that Burge can well deny the necessity of talking in the previous way to avoid the charge of attributing inconsistency. Even he may argue from Putnam’s point of view that the concepts rest on scientific essence and the objective nature of external items that associated with an agent. So the inconsistency would be here only if an agent’s belief (rewrite) that ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’. But one can also argue that this rewrite regarding inconsistent attribution may be well only if we accept the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this case one can argue that ‘arthritis’ has a definite meaning like ‘a disease of the joints only’. But externalist like Burge or Putnam denied such a kind of old cart horse of a distinction between analytic versus synthetic. Bilgrami says that ‘It is unfair to him (Putnam), then, to interpret his idea of the external element’s constitutively relevant to the concepts and contents as the idea that we take any definite belief or set of beliefs defining ‘arthritis’ and plug them into the representations of individual agents’ beliefs whenever we might have said ‘arthritis’. But without plugging it in we cannot have the first horn, we cannot have our inconsistent belief attributed.’¹⁹¹ The crucial question here is what is meant by ‘constitutive’ and what would count as constitutively relevant. I feel that in the latter case it will vary from context to context.

¹⁹¹Bilgrami, 1992, 243.

This picture would be suitable with Putnam's externalism if in the case of arthritis, most of the knowledgeable people or experts think that what arthritis is referred to a scientific essence. Even, the external elements somehow take a relevant part in Putnam's externalism. Someone, on behalf of Burge accepted meta-linguistic way to say that 'arthritis is whatever the experts call "arthritis". This is a very weaker thesis that collapse with Putnamian externalism, even with Burge's own view. Bilgrami writes that, 'The reference is no longer crucial in the specification of concepts. It is the differing beliefs or description of the relied-upon and the relying agent which are doing the work, so the concepts attributed to them will be quite different.'¹⁹²

4.3.3. Bilgrami on Self-Knowledge and Externalism

Davidson thinks that Putnam rejected the idea of self-knowledge because of accepting external constituted contents. The mere rejection of internalism leads to give up self-knowledge thesis. But Bilgrami does not accept the analysis of Davidson on Putnam's thought. He wrote, '... Putnam's idea that we may often not know what we believe turns on just simply repudiating the internalist position with its commitment to internal objects of thought. Rather, it turns on the specific externalist commitment which flow from his (and Kripke's and Burge's) views on reference and meaning.'¹⁹³

Putnam's externalism comes from his thesis on the natural kind term, stereotypes and the idea of concepts that is determined by external contents. If any concept of mind is fixed by external objects, then the intentional contents of the speaker will be composed of those concepts to give that 'water will quench thirst'. In this case, the speaker cannot claim the full first person authority about his/her

¹⁹² Ibid., 244.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 250.

statement, as the speaker does not have the appropriate knowledge about the chemical formulation of the objects. In this case, the meaning of a term is partly determined by the stereotype of the objects and the division of linguistic labor. So, the externalist claims about a partial knowledge of the content, which contains the speaker's concept of external objects like 'water'. Because of this reason, Bilgrami claims that in such cases, the object of thought that account for self-knowledge is merely irrelevant. If Putnam would like to follow his consequence of externalism, then he cannot support Davidsonian perspective of object of thought that well mingled with self-knowledge. Putnam rejects the idea of self-knowledge because the idea of self-knowledge of thoughts initiate thoughts about inner objects that he always reluctant in his thought experiment.

Bilgrami claims that there are some externalisms that are threatening for self-knowledge and some are not. Davidsonian diagnosis that talks about the reconciliation of self-knowledge and externalism is regarded as an unsatisfying unspecific diagnosis. Bilgrami points out to such a charge against Davidson's thought. Davidson thinks that first person authority can well mingle with the social character of language and the external determinants of thoughts only if we abandon the myth of the subject with the idea that thought entails mental objects. Bilgrami attacks Davidson on his conception of third person or interpreter. Davidson focuses on the third person or interpreter acknowledge about interpretee's authority over his own states. But Putnam's doctrine was more specific because for him, the contents are constituted by the deliverances of the interpreter who is associated with the environment of an agent. Bilgrami again charges against Davidson that 'Putnam's externalism, in the initial question we are interested in, claims that the interpreter makes the essential appeal to the objective nature's of natural kinds in the agent's external environment as constituting his

contents. Davidson's positive explanation of self-knowledge makes no mention of this appeal at all.¹⁹⁴

Bilgrami's main intention is to see how we can fix an agent's content and concept. He thinks that if one accepts that meaning and concepts are publicly determined, then it would be available to another. Now, the main question would be what is the nature of the content rather than how it could be available to others. Bilgrami focuses on the partly construction of the external things that fixes the concepts of others.

The second important thing is that Bilgrami assumes a close relation between meaning and intentionality. For him, the concepts are the counterpart of terms, whereas the content is the counterpart of the sentence. In the case of an agent's content of belief, here, arthritis is painful get its meaning in terms of the meaning of the sentence 'arthritis is painful'. In this case, the concept of arthritis also gets its meaning in terms of the meaning of the term arthritis that composes the sentence.

The third important thing is that Bilgrami believes that the concept that externally determined can be fixed by indexical contents like 'it's cold' or 'that's a gun'. Indexical contents are first clues of external sources of public meaning, so it takes a very relevant part in other's mind. Indexical can be regarded as a central claim of externalism as here the agent's perception and responses to think an event has an impression to direct reference.

The fourth important thing is that obviously it is true that there are some concepts which cannot be determined externally like numbers, abstract entities etc. But Bilgrami thinks that in such cases, the concept of the number five or unicorn, here we

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 253-254.

found that the relevant concept is related with the composition of other concepts which we will find in external world like the concept of horse, horn etc.

For Bilgrami, the heart of externalism is (no other than) ‘constraints thesis’ that I already mentioned in the second chapter from the perspective of Putnam. Bilgrami claims that his ‘constraints thesis’ on externalism is a specific version that selects the item from the environment to fix the concept and carefully describe this external determinate concept. The crucial element in Bilgrami’s thought is the conception of locality of content. For Bilgrami, the constraint thesis accepts that the attribution of concepts along with externalistic perspective rests on the consonance with the other contents of the agent to whom the attribution is ascribed. This provides a resource that one agent can use in that way so that the attribution of a specific content can explain the behaviour of an agent. Bilgrami takes a wonderful example to say that there are two persons, one of them knows chemistry and the other one is illiterate. So in this case, the attribution of the concept water from the accord with constrain for literate person is different from the concept attributed to an illiterate person. Because, in the first case the person is well aware about the chemical compositions of water whereas, in the second case the person (who does not know chemistry) is not aware of the fact. Bilgrami argues that ‘This is the level at which theories of meaning do their work: they specify the concepts or the term meanings of an agent along the lines of this constraints external method. At the meaning-theoretic level, as I’ve been saying, the concepts of very fine grained and their hardly ever shared by people.’¹⁹⁵ But the meaning theoretic level is not the only level for Bilgrami. Action explanation is another level that takes a very crucial role in local content. In this case, to know the term water, it is not relevant to know the entire

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 259.

aggregate of beliefs that a speaker associated with the specific term water. Bilgrami suggests that if two persons feels thirsty and drink some substance from tab, then both the person may, in the same locality attribute the content as ‘that water will quench thirst’. In this scenario (local level), the chemical formulation of the learned speaker does not play any usable role in the local explanation of speaker’s behaviour. This is called the local concept of water where the specification of the content that explain the behaviour of the agent selects a small sort of belief from the aggregate of beliefs that an agent (learned) associates with the term ‘water’. Bilgrami emphasize that here, the chemical beliefs of the agent are not needful to explain his thought of drinking water that quenches thirst. The chemical formulation of a concept like ‘water’ is needful only for meaning theoretical level, and not for local level. Bilgrami says that ‘Content is attributed and behaviour is explained only in localities and the aggregative deliverances of a theory of meaning have no direct role to play in them. The deliverances of such theories, then, have no psychological realities since the concepts they specify do not pull their weight in any explanation of an agent’s behaviour. Only local concepts compose contents, so only local concepts pull their weight in explanations.’¹⁹⁶

Now Bilgrami sketches the main diagram in such a way that it shows the reconciliation of self knowledge with externalism. Here, the purpose is to show that how can his constraint externalist thesis mingle with the thread of self-knowledge and how could it differ from orthodox externalism that he rejected.

First, there is a difference between Burge’s orthodox externalism and Bilgrami’s externalism. For Burge, the external determinants can be mediated by experts’ belief, whereas Bilgrami looks to the external determinants as the belief of

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 260.

the agents whose concepts are being fixed. The keen difference between Putnam's externalism and Bilgrami's externalism rests on the inconsistency thesis. Putnam's conception of inconsistency of agents in his twin earth theory compelled his externalism to move away from the threat of self-knowledge. But since Bilgrami's externalism remains suitable with inconsistent attribution, so, for him, the concept of self-knowledge is not under threat. He writes that 'My constraint sees to it that external items which determine concepts do not determine concepts that are at odds with an agent's other beliefs that she will fall into the situation of uttering or thinking inconsistent thoughts just on the basis of the concepts attributed to her. Agents, on my view, may think thoughts that we specify as 'water is not H₂O' or 'I have arthritis in my thigh', but the concept of water or arthritis in these cases will not be determined by the experts' beliefs or by scientific essences. The sorts of inconsistency, which follow upon these other externalist views of concepts, therefore, are simply not entailed if one applies my constraint. If the agent lacks certain chemical or medical beliefs, he will not be attributed to the same concept of arthritis or water as the society's and its experts. Thus, if he goes on to say things like 'I have arthritis in my thigh', etc., this will not amount, even *prima facie*, to inconsistency. My constraint has the effect of bringing in the external determining item under descriptions, or more properly under beliefs, of the agent.'¹⁹⁷ Bilgrami already mentioned that the social external items that depend on experts' knowledge makes an entry into the agent's belief that leads to a metalinguistic specification like 'water is whatever the experts call water'. On this way, one can remove oneself from the threat of inconsistent attribution. But Bilgrami's approach is that it may be possible that we can avoid the metalinguistic specification by taking external items as social and accepting ordinary

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 261.

beliefs of the chemically ignorant agents. In this case, it is not required for a chemically ignorant person to determine the concept of water by the chemical composition of external substance. So, if a chemically ignorant person claims that 'water is not H₂O' then there is no concept of inconsistency here. Here the first horn about the inconsistency of an agent and the second horn of threat to self knowledge do not make any sense.

Recently Bilgrami has taken the idea of the transcendental self-knowledge. He actually tries to reject the traditional concept of Cartesian self-knowledge like his teacher Davidson to argue that it is not the case that our own mental states are infallible for us. For an example, the belief of our past mental state has a tendency to go wrong. Even one can reject the idea of *transparency* which tells us that the mental states are easily accessible to correct beliefs. He refutes the thesis to cite that there are some racists who believe that all men are not able to create equally. This is definitely a mistaken belief. Let us take an example; X, an agent mistakenly believes that he wanted whiskey on the eve of New Year of 2012. But he does not believe or come to believe this that he wanted wine. Bilgrami emphasizes that beliefs about our mental contents are not evidentially based and warranted by their virtue of the relationship to other evidential beliefs. As I go further, I would like to take up the issue of Bilgrami's *Constitutive Thesis*, which tells that 'There is a clear sense in which... there can be no exceptions to the claim that if someone believes that P, then he believes that P and vice versa.'¹⁹⁸

The intuitive starting point of Bilgrami's transcendental argument has shown a distinction between first order intentional beliefs and second order intentional beliefs. Let take an example, Jit believes that 'he believes that his father is worthy of respect'

¹⁹⁸ Akeel Bilgrami, "Self Knowledge and Resentment," in *Knowing Our Own Mind*, 1998, 211.

while his behaviour reveals a contemptuous attitude towards his father. Now we can correctly attribute the first order beliefs of Jit towards his father that he is not worthy of respect which is revealed through his behavioural evidence. One thing is relevant here; Bilgrami admits that Jit's second order beliefs cannot be regarded as a mistake. Here the first order belief renders its truth from the second order beliefs though it follows an inconsistency in the realm of first order belief regarding the misbehaviour towards father was done by the agent's resentment. Bilgrami holds that 'Self knowledge is a necessary condition of responsible agency.... not merely know that he has acted ... but (he must) also know the intentional states which cause and explain (rationalize) the action.'¹⁹⁹ An intentional belief regarding his father is worthy of respect and help us to explain and cause him to assert that his father is worthy of respect. Now Anthony Brueckner²⁰⁰ formalizes Bilgrami's constitutive thesis as follows:

For all intentional state *i* and all subjects S, if *i* meets the condition of responsible agency (CRA), then S has *i* iff S believes that he has *i*.

Brueckner also formalizes Bilgrami's thinking to add that without any intentional state it will be a problem to rationalize or describe an action, if an agent does not know the belief-desire pair that rationalize his/her action. It is not that only self-knowledge requires first order beliefs. Even second order beliefs can be true under the condition of responsible agency.

Social externalism and natural kind externalism both reject the concept of unified content to show that there is one notion of content which is called externalism.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 222-223.

²⁰⁰ Anthony Brueckner, "Two Transcendental Arguments Concerning Self knowledge," in *New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge*, 2003, 189.

This externalism is separated from any kind of self-knowledge and internalist views. Bilgrami thinks that self-knowledge argument makes threaten only for orthodox externalism. Bilgrami raises a prima facie problem of externalism to argue that ‘If things outside the agent’s ken determine the contents of an agents intentional states then, prima facie, that raises a question about how the agent can always have knowledge, or at any rate full knowledge, of those contents. That is, to the extent that there might be features of the external things that the agent does not know, then to that extent he would not fully know the concepts and contents that those external things determine.’²⁰¹ Bilgrami does not accept the social externalist view that our mental contents are fully determined by the social world. So he comments that ‘Burge claims that one does not have to know the necessary conditions that go into the thought that p being the thought it is in order to have that thought. And so if one is unaware of the various external factors that go into its being that thought, it neither follows that one does not have that thought nor, given their common necessary conditions, that one does not have the iterated thought that expresses self-knowledge of the thought.’

For Bilgrami, self-knowledge of the mental contents is an essential part of those contents. Bilgrami holds that two alternative choices are waiting for the orthodox externalist: either they will choose the possibility of attributing inconsistency to agents or they will admit the concept of bifurcated content. The first choice is totally unacceptable to any orthodox externalist. The second choice is also unacceptable for them because they refute any kind of unity between externalism and self-knowledge. The meaning of an agent’s utterance can be one thing and the content of his belief will be another. It would be contradictory rather than inconsistent, if one

²⁰¹ Akeel Bilgrami, *Belief and Meaning*, 1992, 50.

utters that 'Water is not H₂O' or 'I have arthritis in my thigh'. For them, meaning is external while the content is internal.

Orthodox externalism does not admit self-knowledge for the reason that it will lead to inconsistency. That is why it bifurcate the content into narrow or wide content. However, Bilgrami rules out this bifurcation of content. Bilgrami claims that 'But my externalism unlike these others, has no problems with inconsistent attributions in the first place. Neither dilemma nor therefore 'tri-lemma' ever exists in my view. My constraint on externalism sees to it that external items which determine concepts do not determine concepts that are as such odds with his other beliefs that he will fall into the situation of uttering or thinking inconsistent thoughts just on the basis of the concepts attributed to him. Agents, on my view, may think thoughts that we specify as 'Water is not H₂O' or 'I have arthritis in my thigh' but the concepts of water or arthritis in these cases will not be determined by the expert's beliefs or by scientific essence etc.'²⁰²

Bilgrami offers a unified content theory that neither makes room for narrow content nor for wide content. For it, there is a unity of both contents in our beliefs. So it is easy for his constraint theory to show that social external items are capable of entering into contents that are routed through the agent's beliefs. Even in the alternative position where external items lack some social contents, Bilgrami's 'constraint thesis' clarifies it's meta-linguistical specification through eliminating these issues into an ordinary belief like, 'water is the substance that comes out of the tap' thus he removed his constraint theory from the threaten of self-knowledge where social and non-social external elements are unified with agent beliefs.

²⁰² *ibid*, 55.

4.4. A Reformed Theory

Externalism about our mind urges that thoughts and our experience are in nature relational and depends upon the external environment. This is a temptation for metaphysics. But epistemology makes salvage for thoughts and experience in the sense that they claim that thoughts and experience cannot be relational as people can well know about their own mental states and thoughts in a better way than others could assume or experience on him/her. One can know his/her own thoughts in the privilege access that intends him/her to first-person authority and self-knowledge. Besides, there is another opinion (Burgean Trend) that emphasises that what we know in many cases are dependent on the others mind or in simple, because of our relation of the other subjects. Here the content of our thoughts are preserved in our communication of the others. Even the content of our beliefs become true because of the reliability thesis that is intersubjective in the sense that where the content of the persons beliefs have a large diversified informational reports, different experiences etc. in their linguistic community.

Dretske, as an externalist about mental content thinks that ‘Beliefs are in the head but what makes them beliefs, what gives them their intentional content, what makes them about something, are the relations in which these internal states stand (or stood) to external affairs.’²⁰³

Externalism actually denies the hypothesis that thought supervenes on the neurobiology (mental state) of the thinkers. This idea leads to an incompatibility with self knowledge that inclines to say what is going on in an agent’s mind. Externalists believe that one cannot recognize or think about something as water without having

²⁰³ Fred Dretske, ‘Externalism and Self-Knowledge’, 2003, 132.

any encounter with water in a causal and relational way. So, following Dretske and his externalism, I would like to say that an externalist can well argue against the conception of special authority. There is a keen difference between knowledge regarding one knows that 'this liquid is called water' and one knows that 'I am drinking water to quench my thirst'. In the first case 'this liquid is called water', here the knowledge of water consists in the causal informational, functional relation to the external object 'water'. But in the second case, 'I am drinking water to quench my thirst', here the speaker is the first person authority of his claim. Because, he is the only person who can well know of his own thoughts by introspection and gazing inward to himself/herself, but others can make a mere inference or assume about his/her behaviour. So in the second case, externalism and their conditions do not apply. So it goes wrong. The main problem is that perception the model that tells us about our external world do not tell what is going on in our mind. In the same way, introspection that is authoritative about our mind cannot tell us how mind is related to the world. What we think and experience are not same with what we are saying. There are some external conditions that can be regarded as historical matters and we can obtain it though experience and thoughts. In this case, one has some privileged access about this thought and experience. Dretske rightly says that 'I also think that we have privileged and authoritative access to what we think and experience. But my privilege and authority does not extend to the fact that I think and experience - fact that are constituted by these external relations. My first person authority extends only to the facts that, *given that these external relations obtain*, are internally accessible to me - to content, to what I think and experience.'²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Ibid.,140.

Now I will analysis on Bilgrami's new theory on externalism which can be regarded as *individualistic externalism* that tries to establish self-knowledge thesis. Through the concept of unified content here, he attempts to bring the debate between internalism and externalism within one framework. Bilgrami does not believe in the non-social orthodox externalism in his theory of externalism but he also rejects the claims of social externalism too. He escorts a distinction between the public nature of content and the social nature of content and he denies the second one. His thesis became *individualistic externalism*²⁰⁵, because it denies the social contents as an individualist and it is also regarded as externalism as it accepts the public nature of contents. In the case of study languages, an individual learns his/her idiolects which are more connected with the intentionality of our beliefs closely related to meaning and contents. Besides, the objects of study which we call sociolects or the social contents of our beliefs are deeply related with language of the community or a more local language, for examples, French and Parisian, Hindi and Bhojpuri etc. Once I asked to Bilgrami that 'Why do you consider that the bifurcation of content (wide and narrow) are an artificial division?' Still I remember Bilgrami's fascinating reply that 'For several reasons, the most commonsensical reason being that it is very unintuitive to say that every time I have a thought, I really have two thoughts. The second is that a thought with wide content is very often the kind of thought that one cannot know that one is thinking, and I do not think that we should ever say that there is failure of self-knowledge unless there is some psychological evidence for it, such as self-deception or some similar Freudian style reasons – one should not deny self-knowledge on the basis of theories of reference of linguistic terms (in other words, I

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 65.

may get to know more astronomy if I discover that the morning star is the evening star or that water is H₂O, but I don't get to know *my own mind* better.)²⁰⁶

If we accept the Davidsonian process of language learning, then we find that the linguistic ability of a normal brain human being depends it's acquire and exercises to use the words and sentences in the communicating system. In this process we first learn the use of words by trained and later we taught and learn the procedures by which we can explain and understand the meaning of the words and whole sentence. Even Putnam also believes that as knowledge is like a 'contagious disease' in McDowell's words, so we can say that the knowledge of an individual rests on a linguistic communication with others. But a collective discussion would be fulfilled only if the speakers have a standard minimum amount of information about the terms that he/she used in his or her communicative system. Putnam claims that such a model of speakers and hearers communicative system would be especially holistic, the conditions under which any particular sentence will be uttered and the behaviour that will result in any given sentence is uttered does not depend upon any isolated thing that could be called the 'sense of the sentence, but on the total systems.

We saw that Davidson agreed with Putnam that the concepts derive their contents from the natural kinds that belong to the environment. Putnam claims that what words mean is more than what is in our head. So being psychologically identical does not follow that two agents might refer same object by using same word. For him, the identification of thought that expressed in words rest on objects and events that are causally related to the world. To follow Putnam's 'Twin Earth thought argument', we can say that the truth value of a term like 'water' depends on the planet or environment in which the speaker utters the sentence. So the notion of truth becomes

²⁰⁶ I am personally indebted to Bilgrami for this point.

fallible. The reason is that in such a case, the sceptical doubt will play its dice and so the authoritativeness will be threatened. There is a possibility to be self-deceptive as one may be unaware about the fact that he is in twin earth where water is not H₂O rather than XYZ. This deception has taken place because of objects and environment not by psychological verb. So there is a possibility that we found which shows the unauthoritativeness of the self-ascription rather than its falsity. Actually the problem is that the causal external relation cannot be determined by the subject. So, subject in no way is authoritative about his/her self-ascriptions.

My point is that if we claim that the meaning of a sentence is derived from a holistic framework, then can we argue that self-knowledge with first person authority would be possible at all. If we claim from the perspective of physical externalism that the meaning of a term is external to the subject's mind, then we can argue that knowledge is something that we achieve skilfully from the socio-linguistic perspective. Knowledge even the meaning of a term is not something that is given to user a process of knowing that. Knowledge and the learning process actually a process that depends on a practice or a skill that is called 'knowing how'. We cannot take 'knowing how' process just narrow behaviourist language as Skinner once argued. Actually 'knowing how' process depends on a socio-linguistic background, and we the common people know the meaning of a term or sentences through uses and practices, so we can't say that we have the first person authority or are authoritative about our own mental states that we grasp or learn (through practice) from the society. In the peripheral diagram of socio-linguistic paradigm, we found that a person can be deceived by linguistic process. Even in some cases, experts whom a person believes may be deceived the agents unwantedly, like in the case of 'whales are fishes'. Here, the problem that I would like to focus is that language has some of its own problems

and even the process through which an agent learns language or gets some knowledge about the external affairs may be well challenged as it is not always error free. To an extent, we can claim about the authoritativeness of an agent in the case of phenomenal avowals like 'I have toothache' but this sort of authoritativeness cannot well suit to the external affairs that is well portrayed by Putnam in the case of 'Twin Earth' argument where we find that the two agents can be deceived by environment of which they are not aware.

Even our linguistic communication system that does not depend on meaning holism or a corporate body of sentences at a time, for me, our linguistic communication is a sort of process (knowing how) that can be gradually increased. So, here we cannot be incorrigible about our claim which can be changed in near future. If we claim that knowledge is radically external of the human brain, there is no chance to put it into the realm of self-knowledge or any sort of mentalesse periphery.

One thing may be possible that one can be authoritative about his thoughts that at present he is thinking about this or that. But when he will express his or her thoughts in language, it would be obviously public. Even it seems to me that our communication system that rests on language or our thought processes are entirely rests on socio-linguistic paradigm and the contents of our thoughts get their meaning from this external world or causally lined with the social practices. So whatever we may think or say cannot be fully in the mind of the speakers because of which one can claim in favour of a sort of a priority or first person authority.

Concluding Remarks

Making a contrast with factual attitudes, the idea of self-knowledge mainly discussed here looks towards the knowledge of beliefs, desires, etc. Rationality dependent

mental states that assimilate with first person authority in regards of internal experience show privileged access as the fundamental features of the view. Self-knowledge and first person authority can be interchangeable terms, except in the case of inferences where self-knowledge sometimes takes a prominent role. Actually, self-knowledge and first person authority ensure about agents' mental states that are also associated with privileged access from an epistemic outlook and tries to ascribe a kind of authority that may be often called immediate access of the speakers. Self ascription is one of the fundamental features of privileged access that Davidson renovates from the perspective of Tarskian disquotational truth, whereas Burge adroit the conceptions of 'ability of quoting' and 'bi-conditional' for considering a thought as self-knowledge. Besides, it seems me very pertinent to mention the thoughts of Williamson who renews knowledge as action and try to vindicate a relation between mind and world. The residue of belief may be possible because of the maladaptive use of mind to world. The standard debate consists of the claim whether externalism can mingle with self-knowledge. Though Davidson emphasizes that special authority depends on immediate knowledge rather than necessary causal connections that are tied with public meaning, yet he believes in the process of self-knowledge in the sense that the content of the speaker's beliefs can be determined by object authority that strictly depends on the agent's knowledge. He argues in support of the claim that externalism can be well compatible with the first person authority. For him, mental states can be well intrinsic in terms of the physical states. It may be possible that one can be wrong about a stuff that is structurally identical with other stuffs, but one may be authoritative regarding the belief that reference of my belief may be wrong but the thoughts that he/she ascribed cannot go wrong. Self-ascription is possible in the sense of empirical relation (verification) that is formed by a third person's charitable point

of view. Burge's reconciliation theory also put forward the conception of "conceptual explanation" that depends on the "basic cases" where concepts are linked to social entities. The dilemma intricate narrow and broad content hypotheses or the concepts and conceptual explanation theses, but a challenge of all these theses comes from the hand of Bilgrami, who molest the bifurcation of content theory by introducing the conception of *trilema* that eradicate the bifurcated contents. Bilgrami argues that Putnam's externalism can be fitted with self-knowledge thesis, but Davidson and Burge's thoughts are highly incompatible. Bilgrami who is looking forward to see 'how can the agent's content and concept be fixed' becomes stern regarding the conception of the locality of the contents. His *constraint* hypothesis emphasizes that not only there is meaning theoretical level but there are fine grain concepts that can be shared by people through action explanation. Bilgrami argues that in the ordinary cases, the local attribution of the drinking water would be like 'water will quench thirst', where the person does not give any attention to the chemical formulas (meaning theoretical level) of the associate term "water". Actually, in this case, the behaviour and the attribution of the content can be determined by local levels where the psychological realities of the deliverance concepts in a theory of meaning have been prevented. The turn towards the transcendental self-knowledge compels him to accept that mental content does not only depend on the social world and construes contents as unified. I conclude the chapter by offering a position that because of the intersubjective reliability thesis the content of subject's belief can come out true as it has some large diversified informational reports associated with socio-linguistic background.

Chapter 5

Comeback to Phenomenology from Language

Introduction

Analytic philosophy (especially in Dummettian sense) tempted some philosophers to consider that phenomenology culminate its boundary in the borderline of linguistic sense. Phenomenology is not only a subject that emphasizes on intentionality, seeing and external phenomenon, but its neutron nuke approach expands subjectivity by entangling with the objective world. Husserl is the first thinkers from the realm of phenomenology who recoils from psychologism in favour of 'theory of meaning' by bringing the idea of content, meaning, mind-world relation etc. like the analytic philosophers. Some Husserlean interpreters consider Husserl as believing in mentalese. They take Husserl to be concerning on mental acts rather than the mental entities. It seems true that there is a long controversy regarding whether we should take Husserl as representationalist or non-representationalist, but undoubtedly, Husserl's theory of meaning leads to a linguistic turn in the world of phenomenology. He may be the first who founded the meaning on the surface of the phenomenon that instigates an original contribution. Husserl's incredible decision was to continue a break up with Brentano and invent 'meaning intentionality'. Husserl believes that intentionality that causally encounters with the external world cannot fit with the conception of meaning that Brentano once claimed. There is a specific assortment of inner activates that are solely concerned with the meaning. Phenomenology is preserved the 'things in themselves' hypothesis by basing on the model of 'perception'. However, what we are doing or understanding actually rests on the

shareability of the word and intersubjective hypothesis. I will elaborately discuss this later.

There is a prominent part in Husserl's theory of meaning that attempts to confer two different levels of meaning in his own thesis – *general-meaning function* and *respective meaning*. In the use of uttering the word 'I', here, two different persons who utter the word they may express the same *general-meaning function*, but the referent or respective meaning of the word would be different as it refers to two different individuals. Believing in *respective meaning* that determines the external referents induces Husserl to accept externalism. Two expressions that share the same meaning may refer to the same objects. The debate comes down to this issue when we relook on Husserlean conception of "transcendental *epoche*", a thesis that gives precedence on the intentional content by focussing on the light of internalism, paving the way for mental acts that allege to refer the external objects, but in reality the objects are absent there. Semantics role in the sense of intentional content can be quite similar to Husserl's thoughts on the *general meaning-function* as it context independently explains the behaviours of the agents psychologically.

Next, my attempt would be to relook on 'What is Being', another intersubjective standpoint raised by Heidegger to bring the idea of subjectivity that intermingles with objectivity. Challenging the 'methodological individualism', Heidegger himself ingeniously articulates an 'a priori existential' position of 'Dasein' that intends towards 'Being-in-the-world' hypothesis in a primordial way of *equipment, disclosing* and public world. My point in this chapter is to draw an intersubjective turn by bringing the Husserlean idea of 'life world' and Heidegger's 'Being-in-the-world' hypothesis.

5.1. Intentionality and World: Husserlean Analysis

In phenomenology, perception (experience) and presence, these two concepts have taken some bedrock roles. The transcendental analysis that talks about phenomenological outlooks indicate a cultural and historical change in the human world relation that also rest in the presence and the experience. Phenomenon and experience come close to each other in this context. This attempt of attacking privilege experience is first found in the writing of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900) when he challenges the Brentanian process of psychologism by getting rid of the conception of empirical context, social groups etc. I shall discuss this point later.

Intentionality can be regarded as a bridging conception that Husserl has borrowed from his mentor Brentano, who claims that intentionality (consciousness) cannot be self-contained, a denial of solipsistic argument. Intentionality has always intended towards the phenomenal world. Martin Jay points out that 'Intentionality meant the tendency of subjective consciousness to strive towards an object as its teleological goal, the object providing the terminal focus for the subject. In Husserl's special lexicon, the intentional content or "noema" manifest itself in the "noetic" multiplicity of its perception of its apparently objective existence.'²⁰⁷

Though Husserl takes experience as an essential part in the quest for his foundational base of science in philosophy, especially in phenomenology, yet his fundamental aim is to find out the ideal truth that any rigorous science tries to evade. The commentators like Derrida and Merleau Ponty rightly point out that the Husserlean phenomenology seeks for idea and essence as an inclination to the flux of contingent subjectivity that also incorporates with the objective existence. For this

²⁰⁷ Martin Jay, "The 'lifeworld' and Lived Experience," *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, 2006, 94.

reason, Husserl reconciles between reason and experience in the purpose that we can get a rationalized experience. Husserl says that ‘The task of the *retrogression* to the world as the universal ground of all particular experiences, as the world of experience immediately pregiven and prior to all logical functions. The retrogression to the world of experience is a retrogression to the “lifeworld”, i.e. to the world in which we are already living and which furnishes the ground for all cognitive performances and all scientific determination.’²⁰⁸

J.N Mohanty tries to introduce Husserl’s thought on intentionality from three different directions as once well portrayed by Husserl himself in his work *Logical Investigations*. In the first investigation, Husserl gives importance on the question of the theory of meaning relating to the question of expressions. In the fifth investigation, the fundamental theme of Husserl is consciousness, a thesis that directly relates to Brentanian approach. The sixth investigation looks upon the concept of knowledge from intention and all these arguments are interconnected with one another.

The first approach tries to find out a resemblance between Frege and Husserl’s thought on the nature of a semantic theory. Husserl differs from Frege in urging that the expressions not only say something, but also in his word ‘says it of something’. For Husserl the concept of ‘of something’ has a derivation that not only relies on meaning, but also allied to certain objects. It is plausible to remember that Husserl does not consider that the objects and the meanings coincides each other, but an expression that can refer to the objects in regards to its meaning be possible. Meaning (Bedeutung) as an ideal entity to an extent is quite close to abstract entities. Husserl considers that Fregean *Sinn can* be putted in the circles of cognitive contents or

²⁰⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, 1973, 41.

linguistic meaning. As there are some unexpressed meaning available in our language, so one cannot keep away themselves from these issues in language. The sense, in the basis of linguistic sign can resolve 'cognitive value'. Mohanty expresses Frege's thought in this way, 'Not only is the sense what one grasps when one understands an expression, but it also contains the "mode of presentation" of the object referred to. Since, the mode of presentation is determined by the unique context and (subjective) perspective of the thinker, the sense is also the "cognitive content,"... It appears to me that, in spite of Frege's concern with acts in his later essays, a sense remains externally related to the acts that grasp it. There is no suggestion in his writings of a concept of intentionality of acts. The senses are still senses of the appropriate signs. The mental acts grasp them, or exhibit some appropriate attitude toward them. When in an act of thinking I grasp a thought, the thought is not the content but the object of my grasping.'²⁰⁹ Mohanty wonderfully draws a differentiation that has been highlighted between Fregean *Sinn* and Husserl's *noema* for articulating *noema* as the sense of an act that does not hassle on linguistic or non-linguistic issues. In Husserl's phenomenological thinking, we notice that the mental acts that intend towards sense have some expressible parts of our communicative language. It does not prove that an act expressed by the meaning of the sentence can go hand to hand with the sense of the expressed acts. If we emphasize *noemata* not as conceptual, then Husserlean model will mingle with Fregean model. There is a keen difference between the two models as the Husserlean model of *noema* unlike the Fregean model of *Sinn* that can be linguistically expressed. *Noema* is not only a conceptual entity, but it sounds implicitly conceptual. Even some critics of Frege consider that Fregean *Sinn* is actually a cognitive content. Mohanty argues against the point of approaching an

²⁰⁹ J.N. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy*, 1985, 17.

‘unstable poise’ of Fregean sense. Mohanty writes, ‘I would only want to add that Frege’s philosophy of mind has no place for a genuine notion of cognitive content. If the content is a real part of mental life, it is incurably psychological, i.e. private; if the content is to be intersubjectively available, then it becomes the timeless extrinsic to the act. Not having the notion of a structured and intentional mental act, Frege’s *Sinn* remains in an unstable poise between the concepts of cognitive content, linguistic meaning and ontological abstract entity.’²¹⁰

Following Descartes’ thought, Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations* tries to establish philosophy as certain and stable, like science. Therefore, any kind of arbitrary assumptions cannot play any significant role. Actually science, a collection of judgments that are related to rational argumentative analysis, aims to achieve a hierarchical order of the structure of judgments which are based on evidential foundation and does not depend on mere presuppositions. In science, the judgment that is grounded on clarification is also concerned about correctness and truth. Here the conception of judgments has two parts –

- a. Immediate judgment, that does not depend on other judgments, and
- b. Mediate judgments that rest on other judgments, where the sense of the judgment is relevant for the proposed judgment.

There are some judgments where cognition takes *a priori* role that is called knowledge, and in Husserl’s words an ‘abiding possessions of grounded judgment’. Now, the question is what type of judgment one should accept. From a scientific position, Husserl claims that the evidential judgment or a judgment that talks about the ‘state of affairs’ and a relevant part of the judgment could be regarded as

²¹⁰ Ibid., 18-19.

acceptable judgment. A judgment would be appropriate, if it fulfils the meaning of intention that can act in the external world. In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl claims that evidence in a very broad sense is close to ‘mental seeing of something itself’. He also believes that the conception of the ‘state of affairs’ can be considered as the evidence of judgment in the world. In the case of positive evidence, the judgment like ‘snow is white’ would rely on the ‘state of affairs’ that shows the existence of white snow in the world, but in the case of negative evidence like the judgment ‘the golden mountain’, here the ‘state of affairs’ about ‘golden mountain’ is absent in the world. Evidence would be appropriate only if it deals with pure and genuine truth. We know that in ordinary life our judgment is more close to inadequacy and relativity. The approach of Husserl is to find out something (evidence) that would be indubitable. Husserl considers that we cannot accept any judgment without any evidence and his first methodological principle argues that an experience can justify our judgment. Evidence has a tendency to be subject of doubt. Husserl asks about the evidences that would be certain and indubitable which he called *apodictic evidences*, where the negations of the evidences are unimaginable. In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl again says, ‘An *apodictic evidence*, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affairs complex (state of affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses itself to a critical reflection, as having the signal particularly of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non being and thus excluding in advance every doubt as objectless.’²¹¹ Husserl argues that if *apodictic evidence* can be regarded as ‘first in themselves’, then the foundation of the philosophy would depend on such an evidence that is absolutely perfect evidence or indubitable. One can ask that what sort of judgment an *apodictic evidence* has. Husserl’s twist is that he first

²¹¹ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 1960, 15-16.

questions about the judgment that have lacked the *apodictic evidence* in reality. Husserl shows three types of judgments that lack *apodictic evidence*. These are as follows:

- a. The judgment about the external world
- b. The judgment about own mind
- c. The judgment about other's mind

Husserl tries to abstain himself from these sorts of knowledge. In this case, he suspends his belief but following Descartes, he also urges that the conception of 'abstaining' is also a mental act, so there would be an ego or mind that tries to abstain from these sorts of knowledge that we discussed before. As the objective world is not indubitable, so Husserl does not rely on the objective world though it is true that he cannot reject the objective world. He actually takes up a phenomenological reduction with introducing the idea of bracketing (*epoche*) to distinguish between the objective world and the *transcendental ego*. When he brackets the objective world to show that beyond the bracket what is remained is no doubt the *transcendental ego*, a pure conscious life that shows that the entire objective world exists for the transcendental ego or subject 'I'. This universal and radical method emphasizes that the *transcendental ego* can be the foundation of all the other knowledge like external world, one's own mind and other's mind. Undoubtedly, this sort of knowledge of *transcendental ego* would be conceptually *a priori* that has no relation with an empirical foundation.

I would like to clear that Husserl's second phase of *Logical Investigations* can be considered as a general theme of descriptive phenomenology that is concerned about the validity of knowledge and the essence that would help to ground the validity of knowledge. He mainly shows that how the conception of consciousness can be

directed to the objects. In this era, Husserl's phenomenology is mainly interested in perception, judgment and feelings that relates to the objective world. He even made a keen distinction between pure descriptions of phenomenology that we discussed above with an empirical description of natural science. Later Husserl feels that the understanding of pure phenomenological analysis is possible in terms of the disconnection of the mind from the objects of the external world. He adopts the process of bracketing the objective world to know the conception of selfhood or conscious being. Generally this process of bracketing and the achieved of selfhood can be called transcendental phenomenology. His purpose is to find out the realm of universal consciousness that leads him to accept the transcendental subjectivity that is beyond the necessity of objective world. This real issue needs more attention.

Before establishing the point, let me clarify first that there is a vital disagreement between Husserl and Brentano. Husserl claims that all of our experiences are intentional by challenging Brentano's hypothesis that mental phenomenon cannot be intentional. Husserl takes up consciousness as a relation. Actually, it is a relation between meaning act and meaning of the object. We know that Brentano tries to distinguish between physical phenomena and psychical phenomenon in terms of intentionality. Brentano thinks that intentional in existence is a thesis that exclusively applicable to psychical phenomenon as it intentionally encloses an object in themselves. Brentanian hypothesis give priority to the concerned framework of 'being directed towards' viz. the objects (depends on *ontological* status) towards that any mental acts are directed. The conception of 'directedness' does not consider as a *relation* for Brentano, but for him it is a *relation like* matter. Husserl takes a U-turn from Brentano to initiate the idea of the mental inexistence of an object. Husserl thinks that 'all mental acts have their correlative noemata or

senses.’²¹² For Brentano, the intentional experience that can be regarded as phenomenon denotes to an appearing object as such. Husserl adds that not only a phenomenon in this sense refers to an appearing object as such, but it also means certain intentional experiences that may be non-existence being. As intentional experience indicates various fashions to the objects, so we should accept some intentional sense, which is associated with the presentative experiences. Even Husserl considers that the Brentanian idea of intentional is not free from ambiguity. He in fact tries to stay away from physical phenomenon by replacing the concept of intentional experience, which indicates the characteristic of intention that always escorts towards something objective or in his own word ‘material essences’. He accepts the notable idea of *pure ego*, which cannot be reduced, so the essential feature of the sphere of experience would rest on two notable ideas.

First, every cogito is directed to an object, and *second*, we should accept necessarily a cogito of this ego. Husserl takes intentionality as a unique experience. Though we cannot argue that every experience has some intentionality, but the understanding of the way of intentionality rests on experience. In the case of everyday experience, the directness towards co-related objects cannot be available. Here, the conception of intentionality remains concealed. Actually, Husserl tries to avoid the term physical phenomenon in order to use the term experience in the sense of intentional experience. Undeniably, intention indicates to the reference of something objective. Husserl also thinks that the expressions and intentions are considered as *acts*, i.e. aiming at something. Though in his early writings, Husserl accepts intentionality as an ‘acts of consciousness’ but later (in *Logical Investigation*) he changed his mind to accept that intentionality is the ‘essence of consciousness’. He

²¹² J.N. Mohanty, 1985, 16.

emphasizes that the primary content that deals with sensory content, which are the meaning giving layer that also is close to the intentional experience as sensible elements. Here, sense data plays the role of gathering materials for the information of meaning in different levels. This phase is called *noetic* phase where the meaning giving characteristic in an intentional experience can be possible. M. K Bhadra thinks that ‘These data give an idea of the “noematic content” or “noema”’. Perception and reconciliation have their respective noema and the “perceived as such” or the “remembered as such” constitutes the perceptual meaning. The noematic correlate is referred to as “meaning” only to the extent that it is immanent in the experience of perception, judgment, etc.’²¹³

It would be important to bring the idea of ‘noema’ and ‘noesis’ of an act that Husserl developed in his masterpiece *Ideas*. For Husserl, ‘noesis’ is meaning giving part of an act, whereas ‘noema’ is an act of meaning. Here the main question is that “are ‘noema’ or ‘noesis’ content or objects”. Husserl’s writings do not show ‘noema’ as objects on which the act is directed. Husserl depicts ‘noesis’ of act as a real content, while ‘noema’ of an act is considered as an intentional object.

Accepting this thesis leads Husserl to introduce real content and intentional content in corresponding to the idea of “quality”. ‘Noesis’ act corresponds with real component that is familiar as ‘meaning giving component’ or ‘thetic component’. Similarly, ‘noema’ also correlates with two ideal components – ‘thetic component’ and ‘meaning’ or ‘intentional component’. One can argue that this analysis sounds that for Husserl, the conception of the notion of meaning is representational or intentional character of an act as internalist argued. An interesting reply from Husserl’s side would be the very conception of extra linguistic things that talks about

²¹³ M. K. Bhadra, *A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism*, 2004, 67.

linguistic aboutness gives values towards intentionality or concept dependency. Because of this reason, in our language, we use the terms like Pegasus, the supreme number etc., though the terms have no real existence. Bringing the relation between mental representation and linguistic, Husserl intend to see noematic act as a *Sinn* or meaning that has some intentional characters.

Let me see that what Husserl' theory of 'noema' and 'noesis' engage. First, the meaning related to the linguistic expressions is capable of referring something. An act becomes intentional because of the 'noesis' that brings the act its meaning or 'noematic sinn'. Second, the 'noematic' scene (meaning of an act) could determine the object that is directed by the same act. Third, meaning can differ from reference. It means the meaning of an expression can refer to something that does not exist. Fourth, it may also be well possible that the meaning could be different but the reference remains same like the case of 'the victor of jena' and the 'vanquished of waterloo' have different meanings, but represent the same meaning, i.e. Napoleon. McIntyre and Smith aptly indicate that, 'The key to understanding both linguistic and mental representation, then, is the notion of meaning. Nonetheless, we would emphasize one huge difference between these two kinds of representations. Linguistic expressions are representational because of their meanings we face, but a linguistic expression cannot give meaning to itself... the representational or intentional character of language is "derivative", derivative from the fact that we conscious beings can give meaning to various sounds and marks. Thus, the meanings that made linguistic expressions representational come to them from "outside". By contrast, Husserl holds, the representational or intentional character of our mental states comes to them from the "inside". The noesis of an act is an intrinsic part of the ("real") phenomenological

content of that act itself, and the chief role of the noesis is to give “meaning” to the act.’²¹⁴

They also consider that linguistic expression is not well suited to ‘noesis’. Because of the phenomenological content that makes a mental state meaningful, it can also provide an intrinsic intentional characteristic. We saw that ‘noema’ and the object of an act is actually different. ‘Noema’ has some intentional content, whereas the objects of acts are ordinarily physical objects that one could perceive. It is worth to mention that for Husserl, the phenomenological content of one’s intentional experience that we call ‘noesis’ may provide meaning to give an experience that intends to something. But for Husserl, perception is more than ‘noesis’ as it deals with the sensory experiences that is directly related to the external world. One can imagine or think about a blue sky that would be quite different when the person perceives the same sky through his/her visual experience. But it is true that for Husserl, the sensory content and the ‘noesis’ can help a perceiver to perceive an act by mingling sensory and intentional experience together. Mohanty quoted from Husserl that ‘The location “intentional experience referring to an object” should not be construed as meaning that two things are present in experiences, an object and an intentional act directed towards it. Only one thing is present, an intentional experience, and “if this experience is present, then *eo ipso* and through its own essence (we must insist), the intentional ‘relation’ to an object is achieved, and an object is “intentionally presented”.’²¹⁵ For Husserl, without any intentional object, there cannot be any intentional experience.

If we scrutinize the history of modern philosophy, then we will see that the object of human knowledge is no more than an agent’s own mental state. The British

²¹⁴ Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith, “Theory of Intentionality,” in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook*, 1989, 150-151.

²¹⁵ J. N Mohanty, “Intentionality,” in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, 2006, 71.

empiricist's terms 'ideas', according to Berkeley and Hume is regarded as an object of knowledge. Here the object of nature cannot be representational. These are merely ideas. Husserl was impressed by Descartes' thoughts and he attempts to find a solution to Descartes' problem. Husserl considers that like trees and its roots, consciousness also grasps the objects and cannot confine in any constituent state. For him consciousness is something that is directed towards the external world, not confined within it.

The intentionality that is the key notion of consciousness is always directed to the world or objects. To understand intentionality, one should see very carefully two important terms – 'noema' and 'noesis' that has been severally used by Husserl's pen. Gurwitsch, a famous commentator on Husserl's works tries to see intentionality and consciousness of Husserl's thoughts from different angles in his well-known work, *Husserl's Theory of Intentionality in Historical Perspective*²¹⁶. He claims that for Husserl, every 'act of consciousness' is intentional that is directed towards something and the concept of directness can be regarded as purely phenomenological features that is related to an *act*. He also thinks that there is a distinction between the objects towards which an *act* is intended and the *act* itself. We know that to understand a linguistic utterance, one should know meaning that align with the external world. Husserlean notion of *noema* is actually the linguistic meaning, which is integrated with *linguistic act*. Therefore, in every act of consciousness, we will find a correlating meaning (*noema*). In the changing of acts, it does not lead that there would be a change of meaning. Even in some cases, some different meaning can refer to the same object. Therefore, Husserl wonderfully claims that *noema* or meaning of an act can be differentiated from the acts that are object intended. In this sense, one can claim that

²¹⁶ A. Gurwitsch, "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality in Historical Perspective," in *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, 1967.

Husserlean idea of *noema* or meaning is abstract or ideal. But we see that in Husserl's thought, the meaning of a thought is always object intended as its nature is always intended. David Smith claims that 'In some, Gurwitsch understands and acts *noema* or meaning as what is sometimes called an "intentional object": an object that is intended independently of whether it actually exists and is exactly and only "as" it is intended (having just those properties it is intended as having)... Further, Gurwitsch understands the object "which is intended to be merely an intentional object comprising not only the given aspect, but all other aspects, the same object might have. ("The existence" of an object consists in its having a place in a system of objects appropriately related to one another, this system prescribed by the relevant system of noemata: cf. Gurwitsch [26], p. 123.)'²¹⁷ One more thing is that for Husserl, *noema* or meaning can be regarded as non mental entity in the sense that it is aligned with the external world whereas *noesis* is a mental act. I will discuss the issues in chapter 6.

Follesdal, one of the best interpreters of Husserl's works, agrees with Gurwitsch, and says relating to the concept that *act* is intentional and intentionality is a phenomenological feature of these acts. Even both Gurwitsch and Follesdal consider that the key notion of Husserl's works is nonetheless intentionality and the notion of *noema*. Follesdal admits that *noema* which is a generalisation of meaning is regarded as an intentional entity. Follesdal thinks that 'noema' has two different components. The first one deals with all acts that have the same object and same properties that are called the *thetic* characteristic of the act. The second one tells that if there is any difference in an *act* there will be a difference in its *thetic* character. Husserl thinks that because of the noematic meaning, consciousness mingles with the object. To mention

²¹⁷ David W. Smith, "Husserl's Philosophy of Mind," *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey*, 1983, 257.

the agreement between Gurwitsch and Follesdal, Smith writes that ‘Highlighting our comparison so far, we find Follesdal and Gurwitsch in agreement on the following fundamentals of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. An act is (in most cases) directed toward something other than itself. Correlated with the act is a noema, including in particular a Sinn. The act is directed toward an object in virtue of its noema, in particular, its Sinn. Different acts may have the same noema, and different noemata or Sinne may be related to the same object. A noema predelineates other noemata related to the same object, presenting that same object under different aspects. The noema or Sinn is not the object. The noema or Sinn is an abstract entity. Indeed, Sinn is a generalisation of meaning.’²¹⁸

Still two questions remained untouched, the first of which I would like to discuss critically in the section of my attainment viz. chapter 6 (see, especially on the first part). The second one, I would like to discuss elaborately in the following sections. The questions are as follows:

- a) Will the transcendental ego be of any help in understanding the intentionality of mental states that are discussed within the debate of externalism and internalism?
- b) How can we cash out the notion of *noema* or *noesis* in order to understand the mind-world relation, if we consider Husserl as a representationalist or non-representationalist too?

We know that phenomenology is a descriptive science, which copes with consciousness. Even the consciousness of the mind has an intention towards the objects. Husserl considers that ‘The “noema” is nothing but a generalization of the

²¹⁸ Ibid., 260.

idea of meaning (*Sinn*) to the field of all acts.²¹⁹ We may find that a *noema* has two components:

a) One that has some objects with certain properties as common to all acts.

b) It has different properties that rest on the characters of different acts.

The ‘noematic’ meaning has a virtue of which consciousness relates to the object. It is an intuitive grasp of an object, which must be an internal object. It is actually an ideal object not physical or mental. It is considered as object as intended. Now one may claim that ‘is it a replica of the Platonic idea?’ The answer will be something controversial. Like Wittgenstein, Husserl also makes a distinction between meaning and essence. Husserl finds out the conception of transcendental essences under phenomenological reduction where he mentions that our mental picture theory of meaning is not a ‘copy theory of perception’. He mainly gives importance on ‘phenomenological reduction to bracket the real existence of a perceived object.’ This is an internalist approach that tries to stress on the content, essence, meaning or intentionality in terms of the internal or the conceptual state of the mind of the speakers.

But ‘noematic meaning’ has an act. Husserl thinks that sameness of *Sinn* (meaning) takes place only where the objects are identical. It depends on same properties etc. His ‘noematic meaning’ is actually the meaning that attached to the linguistic meanings and acts. Like Frege, Husserl also formulates a distinction between the meaning and the reference. In his famous book *Logical Investigations*, we will find that Husserl makes a threefold distinction between the subjective mental content, the objective entities, and the abstract entities. Linguistic meanings as an

²¹⁹ Edmund Husserl, *Ideen III*, 1952, 89.

intentional entity are ontologically detached from the grasp of consciousness. For Husserl, they are themselves 'act meaning'. Husserl claims meaning to be of an act character, a part of phenomenological experience, whereas Wittgenstein has rejected the appeal of inner experience.

Husserl thinks that the reference of the words is the meaning of the sentence that is related with the *noematic sinn* of the underlying acts. Meaning is communicated from the speaker to the hearer. Husserl has a general view that the words used in speech acts can express its meaning through 'noematic act' of consciousness. Actually, the intentional act that refers to an object is the primary unit of consciousness. Husserl says that the referring to the meaning of a sentence is regarded as a reflective act of thinking. The act of experiencing the object by the mind called *noesis*. This appeal is very close to the externalists who having the same conception of meaning by calling it external or object oriented.

In Husserl's theory of meaning, we will find that object is considered as a name determined by the subject of a sentence. There is an alternative tendency to consider objects as a 'state of affairs' through our nominalization. Now one may ask, 'how are we to understand the meaning of predicate?' Tugendhat gives us a wonderful answer; he says that 'To understand the meaning of predicate does not mean to see something but rather to master the rule which determines the application of the predicate. The universality of the predicate is a universality of the rule, not a 'universal object'.'²²⁰

There are two different levels in understanding the meaning: (a) linguistic level and (b) phenomenological level. Linguistic level deals with the empirical

²²⁰ E. Tugendhat, "Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse," *Hermeneutik Und Dialektik*, II, , 1970, 15.

consciousness of the mind, while phenomenological level copes with the pure or transcendental consciousness of mind. ‘Noesis’ is considered as an actual act of experiencing the object, but ‘noema’ is a particular method of experience the object. So, ‘noema’ is not a real part of the act that can be related to the external world. Mohanty rightly picks out the point where Husserl makes an unfavourable mistake. In his theory of meaning, the misleading point is ‘Meanings are ideal entities’. The conception of making a distinction between ‘meaning’ and ‘reference’, Husserl has taken this idea from Frege and extended this thinking beyond linguistic expressions just through the act of consciousness. Mohanty argues that the conception of ‘Meanings are ideal entities’ comes from the other conception of ideal entities which is regarded as ‘essences’. He also thinks that there is a sharp distinction between the meaning of $\sqrt{4}$ and the essence or number 2. Even the concept of essence is an ontological concept while meaning is an epistemological concept, which is also regarded as a medium of reference. We may consider essences as entities, but not meaning as such. Now one may ask, ‘are all Husserlean essences meaning?’ Mohanty refutes this thinking to say that ‘They all are certainly objects of possible reference. Just as one and the same real thing may be referred to through different meanings. So, one and the same essence (the number 2, for example) may be referred through the different meanings (for example, the meanings of ‘ $\sqrt{4}$ ’ and $3\sqrt{8}$).’²²¹

Mohanty also claims that Husserl’s meaning theory is not a linguistic theory, it is actually a theory of speech acts. For Husserl an expression is an indication in communicative speech. But he turns away from communicative speech to solitary monologue, where we do not find any indicative function of our ascribing expressions. Because speaker’s inner mental states are something his/her own. The

²²¹ J. N. Mohanty, “On Husserl’s Theory of Meaning,” 1974, 230.

phenomenological content that Husserl articulates in his theory for bringing the conception of intentional based phenomenological content acts is independent of any extra-mental world. So, the content of the phenomenological acts has some intentionalistic characters. There seems a distinction between the content of an act and the objects or the extra-mental world. This is a representational account that may be very close to internalists' claim, but the non-representational way of thinking hints towards object theory of content and emphasizes on the intentional characteristic that is structurally related to the external objects or the objects represented by the phenomenological acts. The representational account of the phenomenological content can be well mingled with the representational contents in regards of the internal objects or ideas that one's mind can possess, but not existing in reality like *Pegasus*, or *Spiderman* etc. This is an attitude that also can suit with internalism.

Besides, a non-representationalist approach that well fits with the object theories of intentionality attacks two different views together. The first view focuses on the idea of an object of an act that is essentially built intentionally, whereas the second view claims that the phenomenological content of an act would be also intentional. The combination of the different views emphasizes that an object of the act would be internal that Husserl tries to reject by proposing that an object of act can be distinctive from the acts content. Actually, the acts content construes intentional parts that act object cannot do. Here it is important to clarify that for Husserl the content of one's agent makes one's act as a representation of an object. One can question that an agent can well think about an object that reflects through his mental states. But we cannot reluctant the differentiation that one can raise between reflecting object and the act of reflection. If we scrutinise this claim, then we will see that because of the act content, the conception of an act becomes intentional. A

phenomenological internal content of an act bestow representational characteristic upon the act. Actually, the act is not related to the content in the sense of 'about' or of sorts of relation. Because of the content, an act can represent with an object. And an object is one of which agents are aware. The demarcation line that Husserl draws between the objects and the content enhance intentionality from a new sense of existence independence. This is also a way where representationalism which is close to internalism can argue that an intentional act only depends on its content that does not consist in any external objects seems to me quite interesting.

5.2. What is Being?

I have mentioned in the introductory part of the chapter that my key purpose would be to exemplify mind-world interdependency by rejecting the understanding of the world that goes beneath the subject centric belief systems. Here, I believe that Heidegger strongly challenged against the hypothesis of 'a view from now where' as he proposed that the primordial intimate relation that is mingled with Dasein (Being) and world tries to relinquish the bracket of subjectivity and objectivity by the concept of 'equipment' that discloses being to the world. Here, Dasein is referentially related to the world and familiar with the public involvement as a whole, but not as a part.

Both Philosophy and Science accept a primordial method viz. that to understand anything properly one should have to know the accurate account of what the thing is that he/she tries to understand. Heidegger thinks that the misunderstanding on the question of human being arises from the Platonic ideas, a fascinating theory that imposes a division between being and the world. Dreyfus claims that 'Plato and our tradition got off on the wrong track by thinking that one could have a theory of everything - even human beings and their world - and that the way human beings

relate to things is to have an implicit theory about them.’²²² Heidegger mainly challenges the explicit understanding of the possibility and desirability of the conception of the traditional Being. He talks about a critical reflection that cannot well understand the idea of Being. We see that Plato, Descartes, and Husserl turn towards an implicit way to represent human being as mind that need some background of sheer practices which would be analysed also in terms of further mental states. This approach tries to see all human activities from a background practice that underlies a tacit belief system. Actually, Heidegger tries to reject the understanding of the world that goes beneath the subject centric belief system. Even in his writing Heidegger challenges against the methodological individualism. He agrees with some philosophers that we can solve the philosophical problems in terms of description that is related to everyday social practices. But his process is quite different from others in the sense that he emphasizes on the enquiry of phenomenon in the realm of everyday shared activities and questions about Being to show that the three vital misunderstandings of the nature of Being has been well accepted in our traditional conception regarding Being.

He attempts to remove himself from the bondage of traditional approach regarding Being to give a paramount importance to the question of Being. Heidegger writes that ‘... Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its being as it is; in reality; in occurantness; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the “there is.” In *which* beings is the sense of being to be discerned? ... Which entity shall we take for our example, and in what sense does it have priority?’²²³

²²² Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, Division I, 1995, 1.

²²³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 1962, 26, [6-7].

He even questioned about the consciousness of Dasein. We know that the German word 'Dasein' refers to human beings. Dreyfus, the great commentator of Heidegger's works, considers that Dasein cannot be regarded as conscious subjects as we can't understand it as an individual person. Actually, it is a mass term that is associated with people and other objects of the world etc. In *Division I of Being and Time*, Heidegger uses the word 'Dasein' that refers to 'being there' or 'way of being'. But in *Division II* of the work *Being and Time*, he is much more concerned about the individual being and human being and therefore, uses the word 'a Dasein'. Heidegger is less bothered about the matter that to be a conscious subject is to be human existence. Heidegger writes that 'The existential nature of man is the reason why man can represent being as such, and why he can be conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes... existence as the *essentia* of man.'²²⁴

Dasein, which is no doubt human being and the essence of Dasein that is inseparably related to its existence can be self-interpreting. The special three modes of existing cannot show that Dasein has any solipsistic nature. The one special mode of Dasein which is called by Heidegger 'mineness' makes a differentiation in Husserl words which he calls 'the sphere of ownness'. Heidegger argues that the 'ownness' or 'mineness' of Dasein do not refer to any isolating world. It has some public stances that deal with the public understanding of human nature. Because of the public world, Dasein gets anxious about its unsettledness. This anxiety (concern) is the second way that is tremendously related to the existence of Dasein. Here, Dasein makes a choice of the social possibilities that is available with its way to understand its own existence. And the third special mode of Dasein is nonetheless authenticity. The authentic way of life means choosing itself or understanding the meaning of Being.

²²⁴ Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics," *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, 1957, 272.

Besides, the inauthentic way where Dasein most of the times submerged in so-called ordinary life where, Dasein cannot concern about its own existence or 'mineness'.

The approach of Heidegger towards 'Being' is called the fundamental ontology as it primarily and directly focuses on the question of 'Being' by attempting the thousand dollar question of what is the meaning of 'Being'. Another crucial part of Heidegger's thought focuses on the in separation between human being and the external world where it exists. Traditionally, there is a tendency to make a distinction between the knower and the objects that he has known. We the fellow thinkers can deal with what is in our mind in relation to what is outside of the mind. Even the Cartesian thesis also tries to see the mind as a separate thing that is independent of the world. Rejecting this approach, Heidegger claims that one cannot see the world objectively as the world is not something that can separately exist outside of the knower or the agent who perceives it. I am inextricably associated with all other entities in the objective world. Heidegger disagrees with the line that 'Being' is not a thing or entity that can exist or be known. His method is not to strive to know 'Being' but to discover the meaning of 'Being'.

Heidegger thinks that there are three presuppositions concerning the conception of 'Being' which can mislead our philosophical thoughts. The presuppositions are as follows:

The first presupposition is that 'Being' can be considered as a universal concept. In the ancient or middle era of western philosophy, 'Being' was identified with transcendence. Even in the writings of Hegel we find that as a categorical explanation 'Being' hints towards indeterminate immediate. Heidegger refutes the idea of taking 'Being' as involved with everything. It is not relevant to submerge each

individual in same species or every species into the same genus because the conception of species and genus can make a differentiation between the objects or individuals. For Heidegger, the concept of 'Being' cannot be distinguished with the concept of Non-Being as all our thoughts are surrounded or related to 'Being'. Actually 'Being' surrounds everything. So there is nothing which can transcend 'Being'.

Secondly, the concept of 'Being' is indefinable. Heidegger does not believe that as a universal, we cannot define the concept of 'Being'. Heidegger thinks that 'Being' can be regarded as individuals or others. The critique argues that we cannot define 'Being', the reason is that there is nothing (entity or phenomenon) to which 'Being' does not refer. Through a definition, we can make a distinction between a defining term and the rest of the terms. In this case, nothing can rest without 'Being' as 'Being' is in nature all-pervading. Therefore, there is a lack of definable content. Heidegger refutes the traditional opinion to claim that this tendency is a failure of philosophical imagination. It is true that one cannot define 'Being' through the delimitation of the extension of a class that is also suited with the analysis of entities. The reason is that 'Being' is not suited with an entity or a type of entity. However, we can define Being as a foundation of entities.

A being (entity) refers to everything that has an existence in our objective world like humans, animals, chairs, tables, stones etc. It can be an event or thing in existence but the fundamental idea of Heidegger's 'Being' actually refers to something that determines 'beings as beings' through which all entities can be understood and as a primordial condition that permits everything in the universe to come into existence. There can be no conception of 'Being' without beings and vice versa. Though 'Being' is not any entity or abstract noun but 'Being' determines

entities as entities. Because of the ontological existence, Heidegger makes a differentiation of 'Being' with 'What-being', 'That-being' and 'How-being' etc. 'What-Being' mainly indicates the essence or fundamental nature of 'Being' and 'That-being' from its ontological ground refers to the specific type of an existent 'Being'. Sometimes Heidegger calls it the 'Mode of Being' that is shared by everything that exists in the world. Besides, 'How-being' asks about the way of 'Being' or 'Mode of Being' that is used rather than the properties. There is a keen similarity between 'That-being' and 'How-being' according to Heidegger's analysis. In his book *Being and Time*, Heidegger's famous claim is that "'Dasein' is ontically 'closest' to itself and ontologically farthest."²²⁵ Heidegger argues that 'Dasein', following the concept of physical itself is the most closest to itself as it cannot be separable from itself. But 'Dasein' ontologically is farthest from itself in the sense that the capability of understanding its own being can be regarded as further from Dasein's capability of understanding the other entities (beings). As 'Being' is hidden in the beings, so it cannot be perceptible. Heidegger's approach is to find out the 'Being' by questioning its 'Being of beings'. Heidegger emphasizes a logical starting point for this enquiry because he noticed that human being have the unique privilege to 'Being'. All entities that are existent is ontologically related to 'Being'. Only human being can question to understand the meaning of the 'Being'. Heidegger writes that 'Dasein is an entity which does not just occur amongst other entities. rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that being is an *issue* for it... and this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly... *Understanding of being is itself*

²²⁵ Martin Heidegger, 1962, 37.

a definitive characteristic of Dasein's being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.²²⁶

So we can see that Heidegger, a philosopher who tried to carry out the meaning of 'Being' via an analysis of human existence. To recognize the essence of 'Dasein', Heidegger claims that it lies in its existence. 'Dasein' actually means 'da' (there) 'sein' (being). So, it may be called 'Being there' or 'there where Being dwells'. Here obviously 'there' refers to the external world. 'Dasein' can reveal in the life of human understanding. Watts rightly pointed out that 'Mankind's selfhood Dasein, is thus, at a point which beings as a whole are illuminated - become visible to themselves in the light of being. Thus Dasein is the finite site or clearing in which beings are understood in their Being and the site at which Being can be: Being is thus founded upon Dasein. The Being of other beings and thus Being as such is disclosed because how Dasein is in the world always already transcends (steps beyond) its own particular being.'²²⁷

In this case, we find a differentiation between Husserl and Heidegger regarding the essence of man. For Husserl, the essence of man is nonetheless is 'pure consciousness' whereas Heidegger thinks that the essence of 'Dasein' is its 'various possible ways of Being', which always is connected to existing human being but not with pure consciousness. Here existence is not any traditional conception of the existence of an entity. Actually, Heidegger takes the term 'existence' in an unusual way to emphasize Dasein's '*unique essence*' that is very different from the essence of other entities. For Heidegger, the essence of 'Dasein' is rooted in its mode of 'Being'. A claim of Heidegger that strike the mind of the readers is that 'Dasein' knows a

²²⁶ Ibid., 32.

²²⁷ Michael Watts, *The Philosophy of Heidegger*, 2011, 41.

priori the existence of its own 'Being' and also the 'Being' of the others. That is referred to an ontological structure of the 'Being'. So in *Being and Time*, Heidegger innovatively expresses that 'Dasein' is equal to 'Being-in-the-world'. Here the conception of the world has a notable significance that not only indicates to the physical space, but also hints to a context of meaning that is intractably connected with the active understanding of 'Dasein'. As we see that, the conception of 'a priori existential' of 'Dasein' is no doubt 'being-in-the-world'. Here the 'being-in' is a priori capability to understand 'Being' related to a care or concern of ourselves within the surrounding world. The relation between 'Dasein' and the world is a fundamental familiar relation where 'Dasein' is concerned about the world.

Heidegger emphasizes that the objects of the world or the entities that we can encounter in our everyday life do not have relation with 'Dasein' in the same way. He talks about the different ways by which being encounters with the objects – 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-at-hand'. The fundamental mode of Being is 'ready-to-hand' that is often called a relation of concern. Besides 'present-at-hand' can be regarded as an objective interest of the 'Being' towards the entities. Science looks at entities as "present-at-hand" to observe and study the physical properties of the entities. Now the thing is that relating with "ready-to-hand" is a process that help 'Dasein' to understand the item as fundamentally existing within the network of other entities in the world. This network helps 'Dasein' to understand how the things or entities would be fit into human's life. Here, the world can be regarded as a context of references. The understanding of the process is a priori and that implicit a network where inter-referential equipment takes place and 'Dasein' can know this equipment in totality, like in the case of writing a letter, where one need to use a pen, stamp, paper, post box, postman etc. In an inter-referential equipment that cannot be known

ontologically (in separation), there is a chain of connection between entities that 'Dasein' knows a priori.

Now Heidegger is concerned about the question that he investigates, who am I. I actually absorb myself in the everyday world where I experience things in relation to other people. Now the point is that I cannot be separated from others as it is ontologically impossible for me (I) to exist as 'Dasein' in isolation with others. The world where I exist now is no doubt a public or social world. This communal dimension of 'Dasein' is often called the 'being-in-the-world' and 'being-with'. The association of 'being-with' is an a priori capability of 'Dasein' that he inherently achieved from mankind. Even in the case of being completely alone, 'Being' is also related to the mode of 'being-with' in the sense that there may be absence of a man, but there may not be any absence of man-made things around me or 'Dasein'.

Heidegger's main concern was on the reawakening of the question of 'Being'. The problem of 'Being' enters into European philosophy from the domain of Greek philosophy (Pre-Socratic, Plato and especially from Aristotle). In Aristotle's philosophy, the conception of 'Being' becomes a genuine problem of the philosophical queries. Heidegger accepts the Aristotelian conception of universality of the concept of 'Being'. But he adds that this conception of universality of 'Being' goes ahead of any genus. For Heidegger, 'question of the meaning of Being' is the primordial question because all ontological question of being and even all forms of science presuppose a necessity to accept that there is something that is called 'Being' in the first place. They never even ask about the meaning or truth of 'Being' that Heidegger gave importance in his book *Being and Time*. Heidegger writes that 'Every determination of the essence of man that already presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is

metaphysical... Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being, and so it thinks the Being of beings. But it does not think the difference of both.²²⁸

Heidegger thinks that the indefinable characteristic of 'Being' is an obscurity that cannot be assumed or comprehended from any superior concept or presented by any inferior concept. There is a similarity between Heidegger and Aristotle's thoughts regarding the theme of question of meaning of 'Being'. 'Being' can be somehow related to the everyday concepts that introduce it in all our behaviour and knowledge in the sense that in Heidegger's words we can claim that we are living in the world for 'understanding of Being'. It is very relevant to mention here that Heidegger differs from Aristotle especially on the point that for him 'Dasein' or 'Being' cannot be a perceptible thing. It sounds like a phenomenon that has some ontological structures. He tries to give an 'existentialistic' structure of human 'Dasein'. 'Dasein', so called human life is ontologically distinguished from all the rest things that are not 'Dasein'. Now the question would be what is the characteristic or nature of the 'Dasein'. First, following Heidegger, we can claim that 'Dasein' is one's own 'Dasein', which cannot be ontologically grasped by the genus of beings. Based on the conception of my own beings, we can find out two fundamental modes of 'Being' – unauthenticity and authenticity. The concept of 'vorhanden', which is ontologically grasped by genus of beings, is always related to some special qualities like houses or trees. In this case, the essence of the genus can be describable but we cannot put 'Dasein' in the realm of qualities. It is a possible way of 'Being', so it means, 'Being there' rather than its essence. In this respect, Heidegger thinks that the fundamental characteristic of 'Dasein' would be 'Existence'. Following Husserl's method of phenomenology, Heidegger also tries to prevent any ordinary readymade epistemological construction

²²⁸ Martin Heidegger, "Letter to Humanism," in *Basic Writings*, 1993, 226.

regarding the issue of transcendental subjectivity. It is also true that there are some cases where Heidegger rejected Husserl's method of phenomenology (which I will discuss later). But he solely accepts Husserl's conception of reasonal ontology which he called 'Human Dasein' in his book *Being and Time*. Here his main purpose is not to study the transcendental subjectivity as his intention was to overcome the attitude of subjectivity which was well portrayed by Husserl, Descartes and Kant. The fundamental aim of Heidegger is to find out the relation between 'Dasein' and world and non-being with 'Being'. However, Heidegger's philosophy is quite close to Greek philosophy, but the transcendental analysis of 'Being' makes a deep difference between Heidegger and Greek philosophy.

Time is another conception that is intimately linked with the meaning of 'Being'. There is a similarity between Greek philosophy and Heidegger regarding the ontological characteristic of 'Being' that is associated with temporal meaning. The basic features of 'Being' is fundamentally envisaged Being as 'present'. The interpretation of 'Dasein' gets its significance in the way of temporality that also makes a relationship between Existence and future. In the introductory part, Werner Brock rightly points out that 'the aim of the expositions of temporality of Dasein is to gain an insight into the nature of Time itself, an insight which, in Heidegger's view, has hitherto not advanced substantially beyond Aristotle's interpretation of Time in the "Physics"... the explanation of Time as the "transcendental horizon" for the problem of Being was to lead to the aim: the analysis of what is meant by Being.'²²⁹

The characterization of 'Dasein' with human being actually coincides with 'Being in the world'. Heidegger does not believe that 'Dasein' have any factual sense. It may well be possible that it will not exist. Heidegger's purpose was to reject the

²²⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, 1949, 35.

‘ontic’ sense of ‘Being’ to establish the ontological definition of ‘Dasein’, that is nonetheless ‘Being-in-the-world’. Here the term ‘world’ does not refer to the total things of the nature, but it shows in which sense the things are in the world associated with human ‘Dasein’. Even here, the term ‘in’ is not used in any ordinary sense. Actually ‘in’ can be regarded as a relationship as spatial. But Heidegger does not use the term ‘in’ in regard with ‘Dasein’ just to mean in a primarily ‘aspatial’ sense but his aim is to find out the sense of ‘sojourn’ or ‘to stay’. Here we can take an example; a matchstick can stay in a box in an ordinary and spatial sense. In a similar way, we cannot claim that a man stayed and is related to the world in a primary and spatial sense. Heidegger’s main concern is to analyze the term ‘world’ or worldliness. Werner Brock claims that ‘In the course of this enquiry, Heidegger comes to define the worldliness of the world as “The Being of the ontic condition of the possibility of the discoverability of any beings encountered in the world.”’²³⁰

The next very question that Heidegger gives priority is the question about the ‘Dasein’s owner’ or *who of Dasein*. Heidegger thinks that the subject matter of ‘Dasein’ is nonetheless ‘I’ or self, and it cannot be isolated from the ‘world’ or ‘vorhanden’. Here we need to analyze the term ‘In-Being’ (In-Sein). Actually ‘In-Being’ indicates the way in which ‘Dasein’ reveals to life that also surrounds the world. Heidegger claims that ‘Dasein’ should be borne in the mind with various ‘moods’. So, it is always directed towards the world. The conception of temporality that is also associated with ‘future’ drives ‘Dasein’ towards the dread of death. Death is the ultimate end of ‘Dasein’ through which it becomes complete. The concern or the fear of ‘Dasein’ is nonetheless ‘death’. The twist is that ‘death’ is always related to the subject’s ‘own death’ or the death of myself (‘Dasein’) that can be

²³⁰ Ibid., 44.

irreplaceable. Now the question would be in which sense one can claim that ‘death’ can be regarded as the end of ‘Dasein’. Here the meaning of ending is not like ceasing or vanishing of something. Actually ending refers to ‘Being-towards-the-end’, a thread about which ‘Being’ is always concerned. The care for death or in a general sense ‘Being-towards-one’s-death’ can undergo with some ingredient parts like ‘Existentiality’, ‘Faktizitat’ and ‘Verfallen’. Death is an eminent characteristic of ‘Dasein’, which cannot be avoided. It is a sort of potentiality that is at stake for ‘Dasein’ because it dissolves all the relation of ‘Dasein’ with the world. Death reveals itself as the absolute extreme irrelative innermost potentiality, which ‘Dasein’ cannot overcome. ‘Dasein’, which also related with ‘faktizitat’ shows that ‘Dasein’ has potentially thrown into the world. This thrownness into death generates a dread for ‘Dasein’ and the dread of death can be regarded as the innermost potentiality of ‘Dasein’ that ‘Dasein’ itself concerns. The dread of ‘death’ is not any arbitrary one, but a fundamental mode of ‘Dasein’ that makes ‘Dasein’ fulfil. The mode of ‘verfallen’ is a state of ‘Dasein’ where ‘Dasein’ misunderstood the authentic understanding of the existence of ‘Dasein’ because of the mere conscience of everyday life. A ‘Dasein’ leads an authentic life when it understands the certainty of death, which can be unavoidable. In addition, the certainty of death cannot understand through observation of other’s death. Brock rightly suggests that ‘The kind of certainty, here involved, discloses itself only when the “running forward in thought” renders the potentiality of death actually potential. Then it will be found to be more “fundamental” than any kind of certainty of the things that are encountered or of formal objects. For it ascertains the Being-in-the-world itself and the innermost Being of Dasein as a “whole”.’²³¹ Here the ‘Being-towards death’ cannot enclose ‘Being’

²³¹ Ibid., 78.

with the conception of wholeness. It is also a mode of characteristic that can be regarded as a 'call of conscience'. That applies only for one's own self.

5.3. Being-in the-world and 'lifeworld'

We saw that Heidegger criticized the idea of *self containedness thesis* that is directed towards the subject and make it isolated from objects. There are three different ways of Being – availableness, unavailableness and occurance that tries to presuppose our phenomenal world. But Heidegger argues that the description of the world can be regarded as a fourth 'Dasein ontic' compartment that helps to understand Dasein's worldliness.

Heidegger first introduces the four senses of the world where first two senses are dealing with the 'universe' while the last two are discussing about 'world'. Heidegger's first inclusion of the world or the *ontical categorical* sense tells us that the world (actually it would be universe) is conceived as the totality or set of all physical objects that can often be called a universe of discourse.

The second inclusion of the world can be well portrayed by Heidegger's idea of the *ontological-categorical* sense. Here he claims that in this case we are trying to find out the essential characteristic of the entities that help to make a particular set. One can act that what would define the physical object or what is the common properties of all physical objects. In fact, for Heidegger, the way of being deals with universe rather than world. The two senses that I mentioned above is very much close to categorical analysis. Now Heidegger's third analysis on the idea of the *Ontical-existential* sense talks about the factual Dasein that dwells in the 'world'. Heidegger calls *the world*, a total system of equipments and practices that goes towards the 'public' we-world. Heidegger says that the public 'we-world' is a shared based world

that is always prior to mind world i.e. individual world. He writes, 'Dasein is with equal originality being with others and being-amidst intraworldly beings. The world within which this latter beings are encountered, is ... always already world which one shares with the others.' For Heidegger, the understanding of the public 'we-world' is no doubt a pre-ontological thesis. The reason is that the world is unveiled to us, so people who are engaged with practices, equipments, and concerns for the world forget to notice the worldly entities.

The 'ontological-existential' sense is the fabulous idea of Heidegger where we find the worldliness of the world. Heidegger thinks that in the case of practices or general equipment when we imagine or think about worldly objects like cat, dog, etc. then one can understand these as the notion of improvised versions of the world. Here we need to find out the general structure of the world through our ontological investigation. This process to know the structure of the world cannot be spelled out completely. Dreyfus writes that 'Thus we cannot achieve a priori knowledge concerning the world traditionally claimed for propositions about essential structures. The structure of the world is "a priori" only in the weak sense that it is *given as already* structuring any subworld. The best we can do is point out to those who dwell in the world with us certain prominent structural aspects of this actual world. If we can show a structure to be common to the world and each of its modes, we shall have found the structure of the world as such.'²³²

The phenomenological approach of Heidegger point towards some broad varieties of situation where human beings links to the world with the purpose of actions that aims towards accomplishing. And this accompaniment is occurred without any representational state like one's skill activity of playing piano, one's

²³² Hubert L. Dreyfus, 1995. 91.

unthinking activity like making gestures when in case of communication (speaking), spontaneous activity like becoming more excited or jumping up during debating lecture. All actions that are associated with our mental states in some intentionalistic way or 'non-intentionalistic' way can be regarded as a flow of directed activity. Heidegger calls this activity 'towards which', i.e. 'for the sake of which the activities are done'.

Now, let us see the interdependence of 'Dasein' and the world from Heidegger's point of view. 'Dasein' and world are interrelated with each other from a pre-ontological understanding. I would like to quote here a very relevant explanation of Dreyfus regarding Heidegger's idea of interdependency of Dasein and the world. Dreyfus writes, 'In laying out world, Heidegger seems to shift without explanation from speaking of the workshop, to the referential whole (*Verweisungsganzheit*), to the equipment whole (*Zeugganzes*), to the involvement whole (*Bewandtnisganzheit*), to the phenomenon of world, to worldliness. The *equipment whole*, I take it, describes the interrelated equipment; the *referential whole* its interrelations; and the *involvement whole* adds human purposiveness. The workshop is a specific example of all these wholes; the *phenomenon of world* is the special way the world manifests itself; and *worldliness* is the way of being of the world and of all its subworlds.'²³³

Dasein (subject) and world (object) intimately mingle with one another in a primordial way, so one cannot separate the worldliness of the Dasein. Actually, here the involvement of the 'Dasein' with the world is very important and this involvement took place because of 'for the sake of whichs'. Though there is a mere difference that we find between subjective and the objective in a phenomenal way, but at the way we will not find any such differentiation. The reason is that the self-interpreting mood of

²³³ Ibid., 97.

‘Dasein’ from a subjective sense emphasize that Being is always surrounded with the world and assigning itself to the ‘for the sake of whichs’ to get its succession of reference. Even from an objective perspective, we also see that there is equipment that also defines in order to touch with the tongue ‘towards whichs’ always indicates to Dasein, a subjective look. Heidegger thinks that ‘Dasein itself, ultimately the beings which we call man are possible in their being only because there is a world... Dasein exhibits itself as a being, which is in its world but at the same time, *is by virtue of the world in which it is*. Here we find a peculiar union of being in the world with the being of Dasein which itself can be made comprehensible only in so far as that which here stands in this union, Dasein itself with its world has been made clear in its basic structures.’²³⁴

The important question is that the two very important modes of ‘Dasein’ that reveal ‘Dasein’ to the world are nonetheless *disclosing* and *discovering*. Let us see that how *disclosing* is related with being-in-the-world. Dasein needs a referential whole that also equip Dasein to interlink with the external world. This referential relation, according to Heidegger, is a recognizable relation where Dasein is familiar with the referential world in the sense that Dasein knows the public involvement as a whole not by piecemeal. He takes a wonderful example to describe this matter. He says that in the case of encountering in a room, a person does not see the things one by one; rather he sees the manifold of things as a referential wholeness from which he individuates or separates the piece of furniture from his own interest. Similarly, the disclosedness of the world in front of ‘Being’ in an unprominent way carried out a manifold of things or the familiar objects that ‘Dasein’ would like to perceive. The concern, another mood of ‘Dasein’ can help to familiar ‘Dasein’ with the world and

²³⁴ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 1985, 202.

the whole process is a holistic background rather than piecemeal. To criticize Husserl, Heidegger tries to implicit an account of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' that is linked with a phenomenological theory of perception. He writes that 'Why can I let a pure thing show up at all in bodily presence? Only because the world is already there in thus letting it shows up *because letting-it-show-up is but a particular mode of my being-in-the-world and because world means nothing other than what is always already present for the entity in it*'.²³⁵

Heidegger mainly transforms the question of 'Being' into the way of phenomenological transformation. So Being for Heidegger is nonetheless being of entities. The uniqueness of Heidegger is that he does not take these entities as a raw existence of entities. He tries to give it a meaningful disclosure to human experience. Besides, he also tries to give it a kinetic transformation that charges against the failure (metaphysics) of being as an intrinsically kinetic entity, which determines human nature in terms of ontological movement.

Now we will see there are some areas where Heidegger refutes Husserl's thoughts. First, Heidegger tries to see intentionality in terms of ordinary habitual experience. This approach is called 'everydayness of being' whereas Husserl's logico-theoretical interest keeps him away from the everydayness, the basic field of intentionality. The difference between Husserl and Heidegger is that Husserl takes natural attitudes more involving with scientific pattern, which Heidegger tries to get rid of. Let we take an example of perception. For Husserl, perception can be regarded as staring at objects. But Heidegger thinks that perception leads to a wholeness that has a pragmatic concerned dealing like when we perceive a book, then we not only perceive this book, but we perceive the other related things that are associated with

²³⁵ Ibid., 196.

the book such as tables, chairs, or the totality of the things that surrounds the book. The second important thing that Heidegger appreciated is the question of the historical existence of being of 'facticity' that Husserl tries to ignore. Husserl was fascinated by the thought of ideal content from a logical perspective, whereas ontological query of being has been discarded. Husserl actually gives importance on pure consciousness where the question of being remained untouched. Husserl thinks that consciousness is immanent being that directs towards intentional act. Besides, Heidegger's aim is to see being into the world. So the factual intentionality of being for Heidegger indicates to our being-in-the-world. And the evidence of the being-world concern tries to see Dasein in the moods of worldliness. For Husserl, apodictic self-givenness is a reflect act of consciousness that emphasize the transcendental self through bracketing the world. Heidegger tries to see human being (Dasein) into the public world. He does not make any bracketing between the world and Being. Another important difference between Heidegger and Husserl is that Husserl considers consciousness as self-position whereas Heidegger thinks that Being is thrown in the world in a certain time, so facticity, situation and the time are the very moods that impose and sometimes concern beings to understand the meaning of life or mineness. There are vast differences that one can find between Husserl and Heidegger regarding their methods that I would not like to include here.

Now I would like to go back to the Heideggerian conception of disclosure, a phenomenological approach that gives importance on facticity. We know that animals have the power to produce sound but the difference between animals and human beings is that only human can utter a meaningful sound. It is possible because of the referential utterances that mingle with the world. Heidegger thinks that the referential character of language (meaningful sentences) can be intrinsically social. In our

utterance, the conception of affirmation or denial has occurred due to the reason of disclosure; it means mental representations that are related to the world. The current assertoric talk or incorrect assertoric talk, all these possibilities rest on the directness of the phenomenological world.

We know that Heidegger proposes to inquire the meaning of the 'Being'. He questions, 'What is "Being"?' A primordial question that remains within the understanding of the 'is' that is also conceptually unclear. So Heidegger tries to see 'Being' familiar to itself; his purpose is to discern the concept of 'Being' into a sort of entity that is essentially inseparable from it. For Heidegger, 'Dasein' can be such an entity which each of us have in itself and the essential construction of 'Dasein' or human existence makes an average understanding of 'Being' without doing any sort of circularity. The conception of 'Dasein' shows that there is no distinction between subject and object as Heidegger claims 'Dasein' as 'Being-in-the-world'. We know that the essence of an entity which is 'Dasein' subsist in its existence. We cannot distinguish being with the world, so we cannot claim that we know ourselves better than our knowledge of the external world. Heidegger portrays 'Being' and 'world' as a single phenomenon (a unitary phenomenon in Heidegger's words). By rejecting the traditional idea of ego and making inseparableness between Being and world, Heidegger mainly attacks two traditional views. He does not believe that ego can be the basis of everything as there is no phenomenological evidence regarding this thing. Besides, for him, world and the objects of the world are not the same. To establish his first argument, he follows Humean process to argue that experience cannot express ego. Even he does not believe in Humean idea that there is only experience. Heidegger believes that there is only being in the world where 'Dasein' intimates with the world. But it is true that the necessary connection belongs between 'Dasein' and

world and not between 'Dasein' and entities of the world. The reason is that we can talk about the absence of the entities of the world, but we cannot talk about the absence of the world. When 'Dasein' encounters with the world, then in this primitive encounter, the conception of knowing has come. In this encounter, Heidegger thinks that 'Dasein' does not first encounter with things. Actually, 'Dasein' encounters first with entities, and later with these entities it 'equip' with things. From Rylean perspective, we are familiar with two kinds of knowing – 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. Heidegger's conception of knowledge renovate 'knowing how' process that is linked to equipment as primitive whereas things that can be known by 'knowing that' process are derivative. Heidegger emphasizes that entities and things are two kinds of objects that are associated with world. When 'Dasein' encounters with the entities as equipments, then Heidegger calls them as 'ready-to-hand'. Besides, Heidegger 'presence-at-hand' calls the process by which the entities are related to things. All these procedures show that existence means the projection of possibilities. We know that the essence of 'Dasein' is nonetheless 'the existence of human being'. Each 'Dasein' has its own choice and possibilities that indicates the refutation of 'a priori' thesis of characterization of human projects as same. We find as sort of disagreement between Heidegger and Sartre regarding the concept of 'existence'. For Sartre 'existence precedes essence' whereas Heidegger argues that the opinion of Sartre is quite traditional in the sense that here the concept of 'existence' refers to mere objects in the world. Heidegger thinks that actually 'existence' has a special feature that asks an analytic true sentence like 'The existence of man is his essence'. Besides, for Heidegger the relation between existence and man is ontological but Sartre talks about a temporal relation to add the conception of 'precede or before' in his claim.

The possibilities that Heidegger concerns about have a structure that is related with the world. The possibilities are not concerned about the possibilities of knowing, experiences etc. For him, the possibilities are the moods that associated with 'Being-in-the-world'. The conception of oneself cannot be separable from the conception of the world. The projection of possibilities is a structure of world that eliminates the distinction between world and 'Dasein'. 'Dasein' not only knows the world or unwillingly acts in the world but 'Dasein' has the power to plan and make a chance of the possibilities that always intimated with the world.

Husserl and 'lifeworld'

Husserl's phenomenological invention of 'lifeworld' is not only accepted in philosophy and phenomenology, but also in sociology. Here the approach of Husserl is to see a relation between the common sense or practical oriented experience and scientific theories. So in a word, he was trying to clarify the rampant question of objectivity and scientism together in a broad sense. His conception of 'lifeworld' also tries to clarify the idea of transcendental reductionism to find out a close relation between subjectivity and objective world in a different way. Another important point of Husserl's idea of 'lifeworld' gives tremendous focus on the analysis of intersubjectivity.

For referring to a crisis in scientific knowledge, Husserl invents the idea of 'lifeworld' in his phenomenology. Because of the massive success of positive science, we see a faint light beneath on their foundational claims and eventual limitation. The very advanced technological issues mainly govern science that separates science from the fundamental queries of truth, knowledge and reality and especially what is good and meaningful in life. Husserl claims that the positive science not only lost the

epistemological and ontological clarification but their existential relevance. The scientific revolution that tries to make a distinction between facts and values to insist that science only talks about reality and objectivity. For Husserl, this is a crisis of science along with humanity. Zahavi writes, ‘According to Husserl, the only way to overcome the present scientific crisis and to heal the disastrous ruptures between the world of science and the world of everyday life is by criticizing this reigning objectivism. This is why Husserl commences his analysis of the ‘lifeworld’, a ‘lifeworld’, which, although it constitutes a historical and systematic foundation of science, has been forgotten and repressed by it.’²³⁶ So, we see that Husserl talks about pre scientific experience or a practical oriented experience that looks at the world as a concrete intuitive object. We also see that the scientific world is based on a system of idealities and tries to transcend sensuous experience whereas ‘lifeworld’ can be regarded as a world that deals with relative truths. Actually, science tries to see objective knowledge freeing it from the bondage of the subjective perspective. But Husserl’s ‘lifeworld’ characterize object in terms of relation and perceptual givenness where subjectivity takes a relevant role. For example, for science, water is liquid or in some cases, cold or hot. But Husserl’s analysis would be a glass of water can be hot for me when I experience the water but might be lukewarm for my friend. So the perspective of mine and the perspective of my friend regarding water are not same. Both have their own way of experiencing the object that science tries to reluctant. Scientific knowledge would be rigid, strict, non-perspectival, and univocal. So, there is no conception of vagueness or relativity as science tries to avoid our individual’s choice or intention and our interaction with the world from a mere perceptual acquaintance. Their effort is to see world mind independently as in itself. They

²³⁶ Dan Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, 2003, 126.

actually give importance on the primary qualities of the object that could be regarded as the mathematical precision of the objective property. Whereas, taste, colour, smell, these are considered as subjective epiphenomenon. Husserl challenges this distinction of primary and secondary qualities that classical science and philosophy accepted deeply. Husserl solely accepts the contribution of science for humanity by rescuing the world from the onslaught of scepticism. Even he also accepts that the secondary qualities of the object like taste, smell, colour that depends on human mind cannot be considered as the fundamental properties of the object. The colour and the taste of the drinking water and the water of the sea are not same. He accepts the view of science that the most essential part or the fundamental characteristic of water is objectively verified. In the case of water, the objective properties of H₂O are essential. Husserl's outstanding analysis claims that if we would like to see the world as mere objects cutting with the relation of intentionality, then it will cause a categorical mistake. Husserl does not believe that an object merely appears to human mind. He attacks the representational theory of perception. He actually tries to criticize certain elements of science like some scientific assumptions that tries to define reality in terms of physics to say that the common sensational beliefs are actually illusions. Besides, he analyzes the idea of bland objectivism that claims for an independent of subjectivity and historical community. He claims that physics does not present to us a new physical object. The purpose of physics is to present a more exact objective determination of the same object that we encounter in our day-to-day life. Husserl thinks that one should not forget about the contribution of intuition or the common sense of the subject when he/she tries to enquire about the object from a scientific view or experimental evidence. The empirical theories that rest on evidence cannot be free from subjective perspectives. To accept the subjective perspective in his 'lifeworld'

theories, Husserl tries to analyze his 'lifeworld' thought as non-static. He says that the concrete 'lifeworld' undergoes into the process of transformation. It sounds as a genesis outlook. The mere empirical investigation of 'lifeworld' does not get importance in Husserlean sense. For Husserl, ontological essence is a philosophical method that brings a fresh air in the morphological structure of 'lifeworld'. The conception of morphological structure can be distinct from idealizations that science accepted. Through idealizations, science can think about an absolutely straight line and though it can be approximate. Besides, morphological conception of dog refers to the concrete animal that we can see in our society. The problem of idealizations that science accepted is not always referential in nature. So, Husserl tries to avoid this idealization theory of science in his 'lifeworld' to make it more specific and subjective base philosophy. Husserl adopts the morphological structure in his 'lifeworld' because it accepts theoretical explorations along with scientific outlook where subject's intention and understanding can fit with each other. The idea of possibility and changeability that are actually based on subjective outlook gets importance in Husserl's 'lifeworld'. For this reason, he does not accept the static view of idealistic science. Zahavi writes that 'Thus Husserl actually argues that there is a universal and essential structure of every possible "lifeworld", regardless of how different it might otherwise be geographically, historically or culturally.'²³⁷

The essential characteristic of 'lifeworld' rests on its functioning body that no doubt is intersubjectively structured where other co-subjects in the intersubjective life of consciousness surround the subject 'I' is not a separated subject in the world. So here, the conceptions of subjectivity, objectivity, community and historicity work together in Husserl's 'lifeworld' theory.

²³⁷ Ibid., 131.

The first feature of 'lifeworld' as mentioned by David Carr is pre-givenness that shows something has been given before of something. We know that Husserl who attacks scienticism (scientific realism) in philosophy by arguing that philosophy becomes chair leader for science as it has thrown the conception of articulation of man's sense in the domain of philosophy. He appreciated the thought of scientific enquiry but cautions that philosophers should not be more dependent on scientific theory so that we forget about our human activity in a cultural boundary of everydayness where subject and object lives together. For him, the concept of pre-given is indicated as 'prior to science'. Actually, before the development of sophisticated theories of reality, we people have lived in the real world of perception. So, perception in the pre development period of humanity (even in the post development period of humanity) takes a significant role in human life. In this sense, Husserl's subjective analysis of perception leads him to accept direct realism or the direct contact of the subject with the real world rather than scientific realism. There is a historical sense adopted by Husserl to insist that 'lifeworld' is always before science as it is not that a civilization that lives in the world has always established a deep scientific interest. Another strong argument that we find in Husserl's thought in support of the pre givenness of 'lifeworld' is that perception is the most general structure of 'lifeworld' through which we can be aware about the particular things and events that are related with the world. David Carr rightly pointed out that 'Particular real things are like so many aspect of the real world that present themselves to us in turn, and yet the world is not itself a large-scale thing or even the sum total of all real things, consider as an object. It is the horizon against which all things stand out and without which they could not appear to us... Our commitment to its reality is always

linked to our ongoing perceptual experience, to be sure, but does not require any particular inventory of objects.²³⁸

We find a quite different view in *Cartesian Meditations*, where Husserl gives more importance to the theoretical thought that treats an objective experience integrated with scientific theory. He was even trying to propose and idealize full theoretical knowledge of the totality of real objects that he called world by extending the world as a whole that is co relative to the perfect experimental evidence²³⁹. We should accept that this perfect experimental evidence could not be achieved through ordinary perception. There is a keen difference between the direct experiences of the world with the idea of an experience. But in his book *Crisis*, he returns to his previous claim that there is a pregiven character of the perceived world that quest for theoretical comprehension of the real to get an adequate description of consciousness.

The second feature that he called intersubjective or public is an account that shows what is straightforwardly perceptual can be regarded as communalized²⁴⁰ or the world is common to all. Here we find a problem of direct realism. As once, Husserl considers that the object is same in our perception. The object that I perceive is the same object that you also perceive. He makes a change about the intersubjectivity and gets a more developed opinion in the *Cartesian Meditations* by introducing that one can acquire and develop the concept and the experience of others through a full-fledged perceptual world that has given beforehand to us. He talks about a sphere of ownness and claims that the ownness of sphere emphasizes that there cannot be later without the former but there could be former without later. 'Lifeworld' is specially an

²³⁸ David Carr, "The Life World Revisited," in *Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook*, 1989, 296-297.

²³⁹ E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 61.

²⁴⁰ E. Husserl, *Crisis*, 163.

intersubjective world that is pregiven in terms of the relation to particular experience to me just as much as it is experienced to others.

The third prominent feature of 'lifeworld' can be followed through the first and second one. The concept of pregiven characteristic and the intersubjective term renovates an idea of cultural object and properties to the 'lifeworld' by showing that the concreteness of 'lifeworld' is not only associated with bodily perception but grasping the others. In David Carr's words 'He (Husserl) is obviously impressing on us the difference between conceiving the world through the scientists' theoretical concepts and encountering those concepts themselves as ideas put forward by persons in the everyday world and passed along to us in the classroom, in books or by hearsy. We encounter them as 'human formations, essentially related to human actualities and potentialities' (*Crisis*, 130) and as such they have a reality which is integrated with the reality of concrete things around us.'²⁴¹ We can call the three ways to see 'lifeworld' a version of natural standpoint of consciousness that relook on phenomenological method of understanding consciousness that comprehends the sense of the objects to which consciousness stands in all possible moods in our world. We can here interconnect another idea of *epoche* that reimburse the thought of phenomenological reduction through bracketing the natural standpoint. Now, one can question that if we accept the Husserlean idea that what is posited as an object should be bracketed, then the hypothesis of 'lifeworld' need to be bracketed? Here it is very relevant to clarify that the account of 'lifeworld' is not any object but a prior condition of anything that could be posited as an object. Besides, another critical question that may trouble Husserl is how could be the universal or inherent structure of 'lifeworld' common to all. As we know that for Husserl, 'lifeworld' is not the

²⁴¹ David Carr, 1989, 299-300.

person but cultural properties involving with ideas. So, the concern is that in spite of the different theoretical gap of ideas, how we could have common universal and invariant 'lifeworld'. It is not easy to make a distinction between the world that we experience and the world that we interpreted. It seems to me that the sedimented approach of theoretical accomplishment can make a concern for universal invariant structure of 'lifeworld'. Besides, it also makes a differentiation between cultural groups or one agent to other as it is depending on the structure of sedimented interpretation. However, with the changing of the new theoretical accomplishment, there could be a consequent change followed by its structural periphery. It is very difficult for Husserl to find out a satisfactory answer of this claim.

5.4. Mind-World as a Whole: A Reformed Theory

Though there is a tendency to call Husserl as a 'methodological solipsist' yet his thoughts on intersubjectivity transformed his philosophy on the ground of transcendental idealism. Husserl's phenomenology is often called 'methodological solipsism'. We are aware about the matter that 'methodological solipsism' tells us that only the consciousness of the subject exists and it is impossible to know others. Husserl's conception of *epoche* and the method of transcendental reductionism ascertain the concept of pure ego (I) that sounds a solipsistic turn as here, the conception of pure ego or 'I' phenomenolise one's own consciousness and nothing else. 'Methodological solipcism' shows the problem of intersubjectivity by arguing that –

First, it is impossible for one to construe others as others must be mere than a product of construction. Secondly, in Dan Zahavi's words, 'If the purpose of the intentional constitutive analysis is to investigate the world's givenness for me, how should it then

ever be capable of disclosing the world's givenness for another subject, not to speak of the *self givenness* of this foreign subject?'²⁴² There are the interrelated difficulties that are faced by Husserl's 'methodological solipsism'.

The claim that Husserl's phenomenology fails to appreciate the process of intersubjectivity is highly misleading. We can show the concept of intersubjectivity very easily in connection with his theory of intersubjectivity. Husserl also emphasizes that the perception of an agent represents the accessibility of intersubjectivity, an analysis that shows not only the exits being for me alone but for everyone. In supporting Husserl's view, Zahavi points out from Husserl writings that 'I experience objects, events and actions as public, not as private. (Hua 1/123, 15/5) Husserl consequently claims that an ontological analysis, in so far as it unveils the being-sense (*seinssinn*) of the world as intersubjectively valid, leads to a disclosure of the transcendental relevance of foreign subjecting and thus to an examination of transcendental intersubjectivity'. (Hua 15/118, p.110)

For Husserl, the concept of intersubjective transcendental sociality can be regarded as the source of truth and being. It is true apparently, that transcendental phenomenology looks like solipsistic and sounds methodological because of introducing the method of primordial reduction.

Now the thousand-dollar question is why Husserl does talk about the intensive nature of intersubjectivity. Husserl was convinced with the idea that the construction of objective reality and transcendence leads to intersubjectivity, an important issue of phenomenology. Husserl does not intend to show any interlink between *I-thou* relation. He tries to analyze the constitutive function of intersubjectivity to urge the

²⁴² Dan Zahavi, 2003, 69.

conception of 'empathy' that leads to an indirect or direct experience of the Other and see the conception of Other from a phenomenological background. Truly, it is a relation between subjects (inter-subjectivity) and the conception of empathy arise in the sense that how can I experience others. Dan Zahavi rightly hints that Husserl's most relevant explanation of intersubjectivity tries to examine the concept of intersubjectivity from a third person perspective. It is obviously first personal. Here one's experience can presume the Other.

The conception of the Other in Husserl's thought can be regarded as the concrete bodily appearance of the Other that one can experience. So, his turn towards intersubjectivity intends to the incarnated subjectivity. Here the existence of Other does not rest on mere inference, but on experience. This is an experience of subject object status of one's body, which allows him to distinguish other's body as a foreign embodied subjectivity. Zahavi writes 'That I have an actual experience of the Other, and do not have to do with a mere inference, does not mean that I can experience the Other in the same way as the Other experiences himself or herself, nor that the consciousness of the Other is accessible to me in the same way as my own is.'²⁴³ Though he talks about the intersubjectivity, yet he is very much concerned about the *self givenness* part of Other that would be inaccessible for observer or me who experience Others. This is a limitation of the subject's experience. The conception of this limitation hints that the subject is pure ego that constantly transcends the Other, but Husserl fervently believes that Others also transcend to mine. But he cautioned that the Others are not any intentional object that we perceive. The relation is between subject to subject and experience can access the subjective inaccessibility. So no doubt the phenomenological description of the subject to subject relation can be

²⁴³ Ibid., 113.

regarded as asymmetry, so the clarification points out that the Husserl's conception of intersubjectivity tries to refute the 'methodological solipsism' or egoistic perception of the subject (I). Husserl thinks that the subject (I) cannot produce or invent Other instead of constituting them. So, the conception of intersubjectivity escapes him from the blame of solipsism. Now, another important question is that how can intersubjectivity constitute as we saw that objectivity along with transcendence of the world constituted the intersubjectivity and this constitution ask for a transcendental intersubjectivity in the sense that one subject can experience the Other subject. A question arises in the mind why can Other be regarded as a necessary condition when I experience an objective world. Dan Zahavi explains that 'Basically, Husserl's thesis is that my experience of objective validity is made possible by my experience of the transcendence (and inaccessibility) of foreign subjectivity, and that this transcendence, which Husserl designates as the first real alterity and as the source of all kinds of real transcendence, endows the world with objective validity.'²⁴⁴ In the case of intersubjective experiencibility the real transcendence of a subject's experience on an object can be possible only if the Other's transcendence (a foreign world-directed subject) also can experience the same. Here the object is not any intentional object that can only be perceived by myself. They are real, as others including myself also perceive it.

Husserl considers that when a subject encounters with Others, then he/she understand that his/her perspective on the world is just a single part of the perspective among many others. He also believes that the experience of a subject (I) can be changed, only if the subject feels or understands that the object of his/her experience are not only his/her own, but it is observed by others. It shows that the subject (I) is

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 115.

experienced by others. This sort of understanding compels one to think that myself or my experience not only depends on me but to Others. This is an issue where we see that Husserl tried to take a U-turn from his thesis of ‘methodological solipsism’.

For Husserl, the sense along with the three categories of objectivity, reality and transcendence represent the concept of intersubjectivity. Only a subject who has experienced Others can constitute the validities of the categories. When an individual understands that the object that he/she has experienced can also be experienced by Others, then he/she basically realizes that the appearance of the object to him/her and the objects in itself are not similar. The reason is that Husserl believes in the autonomy of objectivity. The appearance of the object can alter because of the human mind and their perception that is based on time and space.

Husserl says in favour of intersubjectivity, that it is of two fundamental kinds. The first one that he called ‘apodictic intersubjective’ structures that focuses on the analysis of the transcendental ego. In this case, the perceptual object does not rest on only subject’s experience, but to the experience of others as co-subjects. Zahavi writes, ‘Since the perceptual object is always there for Others, too, whether or not such other subjects do in the fact appear on the scene. The object refers to those Other subjects, and is, for that very reason, intrinsically intersubjective. It does not merely exist for me, but refers to a plurality of possible subjects as does my intentionality whenever I am directed at these intersubjectively accessible objects.’²⁴⁵ Another kind of intersubjectivity is associated with *horizontal experience* of another bodily subject where intersubjectivity is presented as co-subjectivity. From this discussion, it is clear that Husserl’s conception of subject or ego (I) can experience the world as a member

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 119.

of a community. So, in no way the conception of 'I' or 'ego' can be regarded as 'methodological solipsism' that Husserl refutes in his later works.

Concluding Remarks

In search of an 'apodictic evidence', which is in general indubitable, Husserl abstains the judgements that are related to own mind, other mind and external world by introducing phenomenological reduction, a process of bracketing (*epoche*) objective world for depicting a distinction between the external world and the transcendental ego. Transcendental ego is 'pure subjectivity' for which the whole world and the other mind stand for. His purpose is to find out the realm of universal consciousness that leads him to accept the 'transcendental subjectivity' that is beyond the necessity of objective world. The act of consciousness is intentional and directed towards the external world. Being a supporter of the thesis 'all mental acts has their correlative noemata or senses', Husserl continues a sharp distinction with Frege as he accepts the model of 'noema' or *Sinn* can be linguistically expressible. Another issue that impressed me is nonetheless the way where Husserl considers that consciousness as an immanent being direct to the intentional acts, while Heidegger concentrates on the factual inside of the being that always surrounded with the external world. He does not like to bracket the world to find out being or the transcendental ego as a pure subjectivity. Husserl attempts to argue in favour of 'sociological transcendental phenomenology' that inspired Heidegger to quest for seeing 'Being' into the domain of the public world.

In the concluding section, I would like to add that for Husserl the concept of 'noema' is a thesis that denies the claim of 'every act of consciousness has a real object'. Actually for Husserl the term 'to be directed' is simply indicated to 'noema' or meaning through which a linguistic expressions get its reference. Though it is true

that the process is based on the mental act, yet in the orthodox sense it is nothing, but ‘perceived as such’. However, it would be turns towards danger (a subjective idealist position), if we claim that ‘noema’ are a sensory object rather than as a meaning ‘viewed’ the objects. One important thing is that for Husserl ‘noema’ is not any image but ‘irreal’ in the sense that we cannot call it real object. I think ‘noema’ is actually close to ‘meaning on the conceptual level’.

There is a representational approach (close to internalism) that Husserl persists to look on by scrutinizing the intentional based phenomenological content which can act independently of the external object as it has some intentional based characteristics where ‘noema’ or meaning is related to conceptual base. But one may concern about Husserl’s non-representational approach that is close to the externalist point of view by bringing the objective base intentional theory in the sense of object of acts (*noesis*) that tries to refute acts content in the sense of conceptual base. Even a touchy way to preserve subjectivity that intentionally intends towards the external objects through self-contained mental contents has posed intentional representation (a view based on the conceptual representation that internalism accepted). It seems to me that though the idea of ‘transcendental subjectivity’ has some ego functioning constitutive roles, yet it brings the idea of intersubjectivity and also indicates a relation between the world and the subject in the sense that a subject can experience the world as a member of the community, where reference would manifest to the ‘multiplicity of conscious subjects communicating with one another’.²⁴⁶ The intersubjective approach of Husserl admits that world is common to all and the objects that are associated with the world appeared to us is quite same to others and me. ‘Life world’ is no doubt an intersubjective world which is pre-given to us in

²⁴⁶ E. Husserl, *Shorter works*, 1981, 68.

regards of the relation of some particular experiences (in the sense of subjective realism) to me; just it is similarly experienced to others. So, the analyses of Husserl and Heidegger culminate that mind and world interrelationship can be possible through the subject and object interdependency.

Chapter 6

Portrait of Going Beyond: My Findings

Introduction

This chapter cannot be considered as a full-fledged chapter that concentrate on a particular topic of the thesis. For me, it serves as a conclusion where I have portrayed my attainment of going beyond of the debate by introducing the idea of conceptual insight (mind based) that can well mingle with the socio-linguistic background or world. When we attempt to realize the conceptual part as a mind based process then the process would definately be intrinsic parts of the functioning. But the linguistic use and communication depends on the sociolinguistic practices and in this process we cannot discard the conceptual insight of an agent that is causally and referentially related to the world, a physical boundary of the subject.

First, I have tried to revisit the phenomenological approach, a way to see mind world intermingle stance in Husserlian sense. This section becomes exclusive as here my focus is not only to renovate the argument from the methodological stand point of intersubjectivity that introduces the phenomenological reductionism. But it also emphasizes on the linguistic expression of an act, a hypothesis that unify an act of consciousness and an object of consciousness by bringing out an interdependent relation in the sense of ‘synthetic structure’, a mode of consciousness that goes toward the object of consciousness.

Besides, sprouting up the semantic approach, a major concern of my thesis, I especially summarize the debate between internalism versus externalism in the second section. The central problem with which I proceeded from the start of the thesis is

whether thought precedes language or, whether the conception of thought adequately rest on the propositional structure or not.

I aim to put forward a facet that construes the mind and world interlinking going beyond the ongoing debate between internalism versus externalism. I have designed this sections in three different parts that adequately reflects the attainment of my study.

First, my effort is to articulate what is language and what role thoughts and concepts play in language. A few thoughts and concepts are beyond language use as it is inexpressible in words. Similarly, the language of thought hypothesis suits thought with the syntax of the sentence to crop up productivity of language. My next attempt would be to trace the content of thought in favours of the causal theory of reference and see whether the conceptual role of thought can proceed more than the socio-linguistic background or not.

Second, from another angle I have adopted Davidson and Quine's approach on thought and language. Davidson's appeal makes it clear that the intentional nature of thought can be possible just because of language and the theory of meaning that have two basic ingredients – holistic method and building block method. For him, language, thought and rationality rest on the communicators in an intersubjective world - 'an intersubjective world is the concept of an objective world, a world about which each communicator can have beliefs'.

Under such a framework here, my whole task is to explore and portray the going beyond method that persist against the argument of skin in (mind centric) and skin out (world centric) way to look at internalism and externalism. The ongoing debate centres rounds the productivity of language, location of content, language of

thought, innate hypothesis, conceptual capacity, linguistic capacity, socio-linguistic paradigm, and so on. Internalism and externalism, two belligerent teams' that attempts to bifurcate content and thought into two extremely different ways encouraged them also to admit mind-world bifurcation strongly. The contribution that I attain here is actually a 'going beyond' method by defending in favour of 'thought' that plays two decisive roles together. Thought as an inter-reliant relation construes a tie between mind and world by hooking a causal referential directness to the reality through the conceptual insight of the agent. There is a constant interaction that we find between the subject and intersubjective ways on relooking thought. We cannot detach the content of a meaningful thought from the external world. My thoughts are a part of the language community where I am. Similarly, the content of the thought has some socio-linguistic background as it relates to the reality i.e., world, but the point is that in this manner we cannot dismiss the contribution of the intentioned based conceptual role of a thought that intends towards construing a propositional structure in our linguistic communication. Permit me to see how it may possible.

6.1. Phenomenological Approach Again

In this section, I once again investigate into the phenomenological approach of Husserl (in particular) to see Husserl's venture of linguistic analysis of phenomenological demands on communicative functions and intersubjective way of understanding mind and world. In his philosophy of language, Husserl makes a distinction between signs and expressions. All expressions are signs but not vice versa. He considers that the expressions are employed with an object that carries a meaning to fulfil the communicative functions. Let me clarify how one can understand the sign. Sign is a physical object. In the case of understanding a sign, the first thing that is required is what sort of relation a person should have with the sign

so that we can claim a person understands a sign. The person who understands sign sees through sign as a mental act, but it is true that this mental act of sign cannot be regarded as meaning. If a person claim that ‘the sky is beautiful,’ then it does not mean to others that the meaning of the term ‘sky’ and ‘beautiful’ rests in the mind of the agent. Husserl actually believes that meaning is not subjective but intersubjective, that I have briefly discussed in the previous chapter. Husserl thinks that the expressions refer to concrete individuals and it actually says about something. Therefore, the expression not only discusses on meaning, but also refers to the external object. In the case of a name like Rabindranath Tagore, and the description that the noble laureate who wrote *Gitanjali*, both indicates the same meaning and reference, whoever may use it. It may also be possible that different meanings included with expressions can refer to the same object. For example, *the victor of Jena* versus *the vanquished of Waterloo*. On the other hand, there may be some synonymous words that are found in different languages, like in the case of two and deux. So, we see that for Husserl, not only names but also expressions designate some references. Husserl differs from Frege on the stance that one can make a distinction between sense and reference as German terms *bedeutung* and *sinn* are synonymous terms. Another important distinction between Frege and Husserl’s thought is as follows. Husserl thinks that as a referent, sentence have some states of affairs. However, for Frege, truth values have some states of affairs. Besides, a term like ‘horse’ is regarded as a common name in Husserl’s theory. But Fregean theory shows that the noun phrase ‘horse’ is some undetectable parts of the predicates. Husserl’s aim is to accept a single meaning without any single ambiguity that refers to the reference. Therefore, he does not believe that sense determines reference in Fregean sense. The most striking difference between Husserl and Frege lies in the conception

of the relation between the meaning and the mental acts. The relation that Frege draws between an abstract meaning and the subjective mental act are based on the external objects and the subject that grasp the meaning of the objects publicly. But Husserl believes that there is an intimate relation available between the meaning and the mental acts. Husserl rejects any sort of psychologism regarding meaning as mental act. Husserl prefers to use the term 'content' that does not lead towards any psychological issues, but refers to the meaning of the word. He challenges the Platonic status of meaning to argue that meaning is not carried out via meaning in subjective sense, but as an *act matter* it intends towards the object.

It seems to me that in Husserl's thoughts on semantic we find that there is a phenomenological reduction. It would be an irrelevant phenomenological analysis, whether a mental act that refers to objects has existed or not. Husserl thinks that there are some cases, where the proper names that are directed towards intentional objects do not bear the actual names. 'Mahatma Gandhi' can be an intentional object and the name has an actual bearer. In the case of 'Sherlock Holmes' this name has some reference, but there is no actual bearer of the name.

There is a threat that makes Husserl's view more complicated. The threat is that what would be the identity of meaning in regards to expression with variable meanings. Like 'I', 'you', 'this', 'yesterday' etc. are regarded as context sensitive, as its meaning depends on the occasion of the use. In a word, the indexical expressions construe a hazard for Husserl's view on meaning of expression that is close to immutable Platonic senses. It is well proved that the indexical meanings that vary on circumstances or occasions express incomplete meaning. In this case, Husserl's conception of indexical expression goes close to the flexibility in matters of language. By showing fidelity to subjectivity rather than objectivity, one may claim that

Husserl's methodological form in his *Logical Investigations* challenges the descriptive psychologism to investigate intersubjectivity in terms of the phenomenological reductionism. Husserl denies the conception of the reference as a relation between the referred objects and the act of expressions. Even we cannot regard reference as properties that are associated with semantic. Therefore, the vital question is, 'what is reference?'

Reference, for Husserl is a linguistic expression that goes towards the external objects, that he himself called 'referent'. It seems to me that Husserl do not supposed meaning as a sufficient condition for reference, but a necessary condition, whereas reference can be regarded as a sufficient condition for meaning, and not as a necessary condition. In his *Logical Investigations* Husserl claims that the referent to one expression has relation to an object of an act. In addition, it seems important to remember that for Husserl, an object of an act is no doubt intentional object that is interconnected to some modes of the determination. Husserl discusses that in the case of an act of perceiving or imagining or thinking about *German Emperor*, our act is directed to the *Emperor of German* where the intention is related to its object as an emperor but not to other possible kind of mode of determination like the son of Fredrick Third or blaa blaa blaa. The distinction that Husserl raises between intention and object of reference is dependent on another critical distinction that focuses on the division between the 'object as it mean' and the 'object which is meant'.

Let me see again the concept of intentionality in terms of the concept of perception. Here the intentional object of perception transcends the concept of perceiving act. This act can be regarded as 'primary content' that leads to sensory complexes. Besides, intentional acts draw attention to meaning upon the 'primary contents' by construing the issue as objective. Mohanty writes, 'This perceptual

models extended by Husserl to understanding an utterance: here, too a meaning-giving act supervenes upon the presented acoustic “primary content”; the latter is interpreted, resulting in the auditors grasping of a meaning’²⁴⁷.

For Husserl, *Sinn* is a complex structure of meaning. In the case of perceiving an object, one can question what would be the structure of the *Sinn* of the perceiver’s experience. One can describe the experience phenomenologically by bringing the idea of subjectivity like ‘I see this blossoming tulip plant’. Here, the *Sinn* of the speaker would be the meaning that is actually referred to the noun phrase like ‘this blossoming tulip plant’. The conception of the indexical term ‘this’ makes the sentence quite complex. The structural aspect of the *Sinn* maintains that here two basic components pertain different roles. The first component takes care of the acts or the particular objects like in the mentioned example the indexical term ‘this’ plays. But the second component is mainly prescriptive that attempts to describe the structure of *Sinn* through the properties that depend on the perceptual version of the phenomenological description. But the object of the perception can be determined by the objects in the *Sinn*. Husserl refutes the conception of the descriptive properties that are linked to its companion of the predicative sense.

Now I would like to enter into the Husserlean thoughts on intentionality that represents an experience, which is correlated with a relation between mental state of the experience and the extra-mental things or objects. In this case the object of one’s perception would be ‘about’ or ‘of’ something that are extra-mental or in a word causally related to the referent. And I tried to focus on these issues. But Husserl was aware about the matter that the relation will not always be related to the extra-mental objects of the world. It may be suitable that one can think or believe ‘about’ the non-

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 71.

existence of something like 'Pegasus'. It is because the intentional object can be a non-existing object that Husserl does not want to understand in terms of some causal relations.

I agree with McIntyre and Smith that 'The existence-independence of intentionality means, Husserl believes, that intentionality is a *phenomenological* property of mental states and experiences, i.e., a property they have by virtue of their own "internal" nature as experiences, independently of how they are "externally" related to the extra-mental world. And this view is reinforced by a second feature of intentionality that creates problems for the opposing "external-relation" view: even where an act is directed toward an object that does exist, the intentionality of the act changes with its internal character in ways that are independent of what is actually true of its object.'²⁴⁸

One thing is very clear from the previous discussion, viz., being conscious of an object does not edify that the object must exist. In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl introduces 'internal sensuousness' for underlying sensuousness in one's mental life that is not related to any sense experience. But for this reason, in the period of *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl intends upon the independency between the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness. This interdependence relation is obviously internal, as identifying the item does not depend on the relation and the exploration of the relation between the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness. Obviously, this internalist turn may worry others who like to see Husserl as an externalist. Here one (who believes in externalism) can understand or identify the relation only if he/she identifies it through reference to the others. The hypothesis that unify an act of consciousness and an object of consciousness by

²⁴⁸ McIntyre and Smith, 1989, 162.

bringing out an interdependent relation where without investigating an object the agents cannot know what is called an act of consciousness, similarly the objects are also not independent from consciousness viz. an object is always oriented with an object for consciousness. It is very fascinating from Husserl's point of view that this inseparability (interdependency relation) between consciousness and the object of the consciousness can well be reflected through the phenomenological description. 'Phenomenological description' takes an exclusive part especially in section 17 to 19 of the 2nd Meditations in Husserl's masterpiece *Cartesian Meditations*, where Husserl concerns two-fold ways of phenomenological descriptions. The first way cites the structural features of a particular experience from a descriptive point of view, while the second way introduce the methods of phenomenological description. Husserl begins with an example called, 'perceiving a die', a theme where actual die has been bracketed and perceiving a die becomes the intentional object of perception. The concept of intentional objects of perception is a noematic process of description that describes the concept 'die' having relation through *cogitatum*. Let me clarify it first. The noematic structure stresses on the idea that the description of the 'die' cannot be any independent object that has no relation with consciousness. The noematic stance emphasizes the description in support of consciousness where one person perceives it. The method, which Husserl takes here, is called 'collective unity,' an experience where the same thing has been perceived or experienced by a group of people. So the conception of others takes a very relevant role here. Husserl named the method of unifying collection as 'synthesis' and he also called the structure as 'syntactic structure'. So, in the case of perceiving a die, unified collection becomes possible because of collective appearance of the same ideal die. If there is a differentiation between the appearance of the subject and the appearance of others regarding

perceiving a die, then the conception of ‘collective unity’ becomes meaningless. The fundamental form of synthesis, a method that Husserl adopted in the beginning of section 18 of *Cartesian Meditations*, tries to involve all kinds of consciousness with the consciousness of objects in general in the sense of a sort of synthesis that concerns all consciousness. The aim of Husserl is here to describe experience in the light of natural science. So he prescribes the model of syntactic structure that rules out the individual pattern to establish a stance by claiming that all consciousness of objects associated with the synthesis of identification are concerned about others’ side of perceiving a die. Here perceiving a die from a noematic description moves from an individual description to a universal stance. Husserl believes that an agent’s experience is not a mere collection of properties but a unity that goes towards the synthesis where ‘the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically’²⁴⁹. The term ‘fundamental’ in the use of the phrase, ‘fundamental form of synthesis’ is very relevant here. The term ‘fundamental’ actually consists of all synthesis or conscious process that identifies all synthesis of appeared objects. It is true that in this process, the description of perceiving a die, here Husserl analyses horizon, time, etc. But I do not worry about the matters in this discussion as my implicit concern is to scrutinize the descriptive part of Husserl’s meaning theory where I would like to emphasize the relevance of Husserl’s discussion on the Intersubjective outlook which takes a prominent position. I shall discuss this later on. Here one thing needs to be clarified. The noematic description is a sort of generalized form of a particular description where the concept of consciousness is a flux, not in any way a mere chaos. Actually there is no persisting object that construe consciousness, but a constituent token (this word is not used by Husserl himself) of consciousness in all types express that

²⁴⁹ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 42.

different persons can experience the same type consciousness that form a synthesis. So synthesis is a mode of consciousness that mingles with different types of objects of experience that one can call the state of affairs. In the end of the 2nd *Meditations*, Husserl looks into an intentional analysis that not only exposes experiences and objects at different levels but shows that the whole objective world can well intermingle with the whole conscious life by conjoining a unity or unified structure.

It would be very difficult to establish intentionality in terms of conception dependence or existence dependence. The approach of Husserl is to see the issue from the phenomenological point of view. Here intentionality is considered as ‘internal characteristic’ and ‘first-person’ knowledge. We cannot explain it from hardcore objective sense and ‘third-person’ perspectives. It obviously has a subjective stance in itself. Even we know that the methodological tactic that Husserl accepts in his phenomenology attempts to sustain his belief from the extra-mental world by bracketing (*epoche*) the world as naturalistic beliefs that can turn into true or false. Critics impose that this tactic is an approach that is much close to the hypothesis of ‘methodological solipsism’. But the aim of Husserl is not like that. He intends to make clear the act that is related to the phenomenological features of intentional characteristics of our mental experience. For Husserl, there is a keen distinction between the contents and the objects. The contents are some acts that are ingredient to the internal and phenomenological characters, which are also related to representations, but this representation is not always intended to the acts with ‘of’ or about feature, i.e., intends to the external objects. Besides, the objects are what on which the speakers are aware of. Actually, the objects are the act of thinking about and the contents are the act of reflecting on. McIntyre and Smith rightly claim that ‘By distinguishing content and object, then, Husserl can explain the existence

independence of intentionality in a new way: an act's being intentional depends only on its content, and an act's content is independent of the existence of anything external to the act. And the distinction also provides him a new explanation of conception-dependence: *different* contents can give acts of the character of being directed toward the same object, although those contents will represent that object differently.²⁵⁰

The conception of different contents also makes a notable distinction between Husserl's theory of meaning by arguing a characteristic demarcation of *noema* and *noesis*. *Noesis* is an act that is regarded as a part of real content. It means *noesis* is an act that only consists in the acts or in short, in a specific act; whereas *noema*, which is considered as intentional content deals with some shared ideal structures (several acts). For Husserl, *noesis* has two different components –thetic component and meaning giving component whereas, *noema* has two ideal components – meaning andthetic component. These issues have been discussed. Now the foremost question is that why Husserl accepts that *noema* (notion of meaning) has representational (intentional) characteristic? As I have discussed earlier that language talks about the extra-linguistic things and the names and the definite descriptions that we use in language actually refers to the external objects. Moreover, we notice that in this case, the hypotheses of existence-independence and conception dependence both take a prominent role. So we see that the linguistic aboutness thesis articulates mental representation or intentionality in two different ways that I have just mentioned. As one can discuss about the existent objects, similarly one can also discuss about the non-existence thing like prime number, ghost etc. So, Husserl raises the conception of

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 156.

noematic and *noema* in the sense of a wider meaning that can include the meaning of existence and non-existent objects together.

Another vital issue for Husserl is his striking belief in the objective world that is not ‘My Own’ and even not for the own of ‘Others’. The negative significance of ‘not-own’ takes a prominent role in both the cases. Here ego (I) comes together with transcendental empathy that strives to construct the objective world. Let me clarify the thought properly. Actually, ‘empathy’ not only assists me to think how the things are presented to me and others but it teaches how I (myself) also present to others. The process is that I can appear to others in the same way as others are also appeared to me. It is not that ‘directly apprehended inspection’ can only represent I (subject) to others. There is another process that is called ‘comprehensive representation’ that constructs myself to the social human beings through the conception of others. The ‘ownness’ or my human ‘I’ becomes world centric just by integrating to the objective world. So what I attempt to bring in focus here is that the conception of myself, others and linguistic world that are entangled with each other leads me to analyse again the semantic approach to recur that the demarcation between the borderline of internalism and externalism debate is quite weak. One should see beyond it where mind and world are intermingled with each other as we saw in the case of phenomenological attitudes in Husserl and Heidegger’s writings earlier.

6.2. Semantic Approach: A Revisit

It sounds quite fascinating that semantics is not only the major concern for the analytic trend, but the phenomenologists also give full attention to it, though in different ways. I have clarified this in detail in Chapter 5. In this section, I again develop the semantic approach that I have discussed elaborately in the first four

chapters. So it would be suitable to consider this as an upshot of the first four chapters. It may well emerge that language is an expression of thought while the words and the sentences (the mediums) can synchronize the thoughts publicly. Hence, in our normal ways of communication we find that our speeches and writings have thoughts, but the pertinent way of the dependence of language on thought cannot be channelised in a single way. One can question about the sayability of something. Alternatively, it would be more argumentative to ask whether we can think of something that has no propositional structure.

The conception of understanding or sayability of something preserves a new bridge between language and thought. ‘What is thought?’ is a serious question that I would like to study from the perspective of Michael Dummett. Thoughts are not merely mental images, but it has some idiosyncratic features that can turn out as true or false. For Dummett, thoughts have not only concomitance with inner experience, but it has some unique characterization that is called a representative stance. Even the existence of the thoughts is independent of any kinds of grasping that is raised by rational beings. Besides, the code conception of language grasps a large numbers of thoughts that could be an antecedent of the language. It sounds to me true that without knowing about what sort of thought a sentence could express, one cannot understand what a sentence expresses by its thoughts. Understandable thoughts that are expressed by the sentences can be regarded as ‘language’. Language genuinely has some meanings and it can be able to produce the new thoughts (productivity of language).

Dummett strongly believes that language, the vehicle of thought is allied to the primary function that is called communication. Meaning is a communicative intentional process that is related to language. Davidson has taken a holistic stand regarding the theory of meaning by arguing in favour of the view that the linguistic

community mainly evokes a corporate body of knowledge. But Dummett writes that 'Frege's conception is that a sentence uttered by another will convey to a hearer a thought, and that which thought it conveys will depend upon the senses the hearer attaches to the words, and thus upon the hearer's language. Which thought a speaker intends to convey by a sentence that he utters will doubtless likewise depend largely upon the speaker's language.'²⁵¹

Communication process also rests on empathy, faith (testimony) in the case of understanding other words and the way to express one's reply to others is being associated with the beliefs that others (hearer) can understand the agent's reply or words.

Concepts, Meaning, and Thoughts

A common approach on concept is that the word exposes a concept and the concept locates itself in an agent's head. One can illustrate it by adding that the meaning of the word can articulate the concepts. We are aware strongly regarding the matter that a sentence can express thoughts and we can connect the two notions to say that the meaning of the sentence is the thought that it expresses. An interesting thought is that there are a number of concepts and thoughts that might sound quite indescribable, but they exist in the mind of the speaker without being associated with the words. The same thing is applicable for babies and apes. Babies and apes have some thoughts and concepts in their mind, but they do not know how to give it a sentential structure by using the words through language. So they can reply what is going on surrounding him/her in the world and sometimes they can solve the problems without understanding the language.

²⁵¹ Michael Dummett, *The Seas of Language*, 2003, 175.

If we presuppose that the concepts and thoughts are always related to the words and it needs to be pronounced, then there are some cases, where we cannot claim that we have some concepts like the case of hearing a sound of *clarinet*. We cannot express or describe exactly what a *clarinet* sounds like without imitating the sound. Ray Jackendoff challenges the language of thought terminology. He does not believe that thought is like a language. He argues that ‘A language is a system that links concepts and thoughts with pronunciation. But concepts and thoughts themselves don’t have pronunciations, they’re *connected* to pronunciations. In other words, thoughts are not like a language, they function as a *part* of a language. Saying “thought is like a language” is as nonsensical as saying “wheels are like bicycles” or “peach pits are like peaches”.’²⁵²

Now the most critical question is that whether the thoughts are deeply structured by our language or not. We can find here a fascinating controversy between the philosophers. But the reason as I see is not based on language, but rather on culture. It may well be possible that language is similar, but there is delineation in the places of cultures and the rituals, like the foreign policies, and the education systems etc. Even the customs of marriage, liberty, patriotism these conceptions may also differ in the same English speaking cultures. Actually, differences in cultures can construe differences in language and do the same for thoughts. Chomsky thinks that ‘Language is not properly regarded as a system of communication. It is a system for expressing thoughts, something quite different... Language use is largely to oneself: “inner speech” for adults, monologue for children.’²⁵³

²⁵² Ray Jackendoff, *A User's Guide to Thought and Meaning*, 2012, 73.

²⁵³ Noam Chomsky, *On Nature and Language*, 2002, 75-77.

However, Wittgenstein considers language as the vehicle of thought as later Dummett also argued. For Wittgenstein, language is not in the head or mind of the speakers. Verbal behaviour may be in the head, but language is socially constructed. One can claim that it may be possible that people will unconsciously copy other people's acts and try to confirm the convention. Now the question will be how it could be possible to maintain and learn language and the conventions by the members of the community. Even the conception of changeability of language takes place because of the introduction of new vocabularies and pronunciation introduced by the community members specially actors, politicians, teenagers etc. We know that meaning has two different roles. One, the meaning that is related to the scientific concepts, like water = H₂O, and the meaning of the ordinary concepts, like 'water quenches thirst'. And the ordinary concepts are linked to the terms through description and locate itself in peoples' mind. It is actually a manifest image that is related to our ordinary conception and contrast with scientific perspective sometimes. In our language, some words like 'laundry,' 'buddy' etc. has some ordinary conceptions in our mind. We cannot give it any scientific perspective. Similarly, there are some words like 'bug' (computer flaws), 'e-command', 'X-ray' etc. these are the technical terms that only can be known by the experts, and not by the ordinary people in a common sense who are detached from the scientific knowledge. If ordinary people can grasp the scientific knowledge, then they will become experts who have scientific outlooks.

We know that there are many vague terms and empty terms take a reasonable role in our linguistic communication, but Wittgenstein asks an intriguing query: what does the term 'this' mean? Here one thing needs to be clarified is that Wittgenstein asked the question regarding the non-referential way of the word 'this' not in the sense of the referential (indexical) way of the word 'this' like 'This is a marvellous

painting'. We are also aware that 'loves' and 'hates' are emotional based impacts but the meaningful word 'this' does not have any connection with emotion. So there is an amazing way that put the words together and helps to construct meaningful sentences. Some philosophers consider that thoughts are similar with the 'propositional attitudes' that have representational contents and causally related to the external world. Actually for internalist, thoughts are internal state of mind of the agents that are partly associated to the 'propositional attitudes' and partly ascribed by 'the causal references' of the mental representation.

Fodor's conception of language of thought depends on the propositional or mentalese attitudes as I mentioned earlier. Even he also considers the causal covariance theory as a standard semantic theory that genuinely stand for atomism, a thesis that provides semantic value of the expression one by one or the property of the sentence unitly not as wholly or in regards of the semantic value of the others. So it shows a prominent argument that semantic atomism is well compatible with language of thought as mentalese approached deliberately. Basically, Fodor's argument is implicit from the following hypotheses.

- a. The properties that are related to the folk psychological attitudes (belief-desire etc.) exist and are also correlated to the causal interaction.
- b. The propositional attitude that calls for scientific psychology cannot be attached to a holistic background.
- c. By objecting semantic holism, one can appeal for semantic atomism, an account that talks about an intentional content of propositional attitude.
- d. The standard causal coherence theory that depends on semantic atomism has a mentalese turn.

- e. So, it can be derived that language is not natural language. Actually it is Mentalese.

It will be interesting to see that why Fodor rejected holism thesis in support of the mentalistic approach of language of thought. It is quite true that Fodor who believes in content holism in the sense of *epistemic liaison* charges against holistic notion of scientific psychology. Content holism (traditional holism) claims that the content of a particular belief can be determined by its total *epistemic liaison*. Besides, *epistemic liaisons* of a belief means that any readymade belief is able to decide whether it is true that p (an *epistemic liaison* of a belief) or not.

Carruthers writes, ‘Note that the notion of an *epistemic liaison* is relative to a thinker and a time. It is the belief which *i take* to be relevant to the evaluation of others which determine their epistemic liaisons, for me; and if my assessment of such relevance change over time, then so do the epistemic liaisons.’²⁵⁴

In the case of Y’s belief regarding X, content holism considers that an agent’s belief on the reliability of X will be partly determinating. According to the content holism, all of the agent’s beliefs are related to the current affairs. The reason is that here *epistemic liaison* corresponds with each one of them. If we accept this sort of very strong content holism, then it would be hard to talk about very same content of two different people who entertained beliefs on the same content. So, in this case the communication process will be hampered. Concerning the state of affairs, the process of communication has some cognitive content as it talks about the psychological explanation of the concerning thoughts. So, cognitive content based holism leave a room for semantic content that does not play a role here. Fodor talks about content holism rather than semantic holism. The real problem of holism is nonetheless the

²⁵⁴ Peter Carruthers, *Language, Thought and Consciousness*, 1998, 108.

implication of content holism that is concerned about two different peoples' entertained beliefs regarding the same content that is not fulfilled, as here the notion of belief content does not play any significant role in the scientific psychology that once Fodor claimed. Actually, we know that scientific content based psychology attempts to make their generalisations and it loses its applicability to everyone. The reason is that it describes the different causal roles that are actually associated with the propositional attitude contents, as no two people can share their beliefs regarding the same content. So, the psychological law turns to be applicable for a particular individual and hints that no other will share it similarly, as the individuals think or believe. Carruthers explains it in this way: 'It would follow, indeed, if holism were true, that scientific psychology should head off in some new direction, not involving propositional attitudes with their holistic principles of individuation. And it would follow that our common sense psychology is not a secure or appropriate basis of science.'²⁵⁵

In his outstanding work *Psychosemantic*²⁵⁶, Fodor indicates to the process of the *total set* of the beliefs about the world that is related to the tribunal of sense experience as once also proposed by Quine. We cannot verify the beliefs in an individualistic way. One can argue that without accepting the verificationism about meaning, the premise of the mentioned argument cannot be true. If we like to preserve the thesis of realistic holism then obviously one has to believe in the process of confirmation holism that claims for a causal co-variance account of meaning in the realm of functional role semantic. Besides, another important point of the conformational theory of holism is that any psychology based individualistic theory holistically corresponds to the evidences, viz. the circumstances and behaviour of the

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 110.

²⁵⁶ Jerry Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, 1987, 62-67.

thinker. Now, one can question that why am I still talking about the all references and the total evidences without ascribing strong psychological attitudes?

The reason is nonetheless functionalism based semantic or a restricted form of functional role semantic that maintains a linkage with the mental states of the speaker in general. The philosopher who intends to avoid Cartesian dualism and tries to understand mind and brain together cannot avoid mental state as a thesis that is individuated by causal role semantics. Even in the case of belief-desire psychology or propositional attitudes like *the belief that p*, here functionalism mingles with holism. Fodor also cannot reject this functional based semantic in the case of propositional attitude. It is important to see that mind dependent functionalism takes care of the mental states in the sense of potential causal interaction with bodily stimulus and with others' behaviours. No functionalist can oppose the thought that his/her pain is distinct from your one. They believe in the similarity of the mental states and consider that if we find the similarity between other mental states of two different speakers, then the particular mental state like pain will affect in the same way in the two different speakers. But this thesis will not apply for the case of *the belief that p*. In this case, causal connections between the states and agent's belief and desire that are individuated cannot play an exact role. Here, potential connections seem important to me. Though we see that the functional role semantics intends towards cognitive content by marginalising the thought of reference, but Fodor do not like to avoid 'reference' from his confirmation holism. In reply to the question that how could we make a distinction between *that the tomato is red* and *that the tomato is der* without accepting functional roles, Fodor replies that in the level of mentalese representation 'red' and 'der' can be regarded as syntactically distinct. These two beliefs as concerning about worldly referent can be similar, but distinct in the sense that they

function differently in the case of mental representation. This is a very controversial opinion as this thesis gives importance on the *sub-personal processing* rather than the personal thought level. Fodor's words sound that the distinction between these beliefs and the content of their beliefs may be possible because of their functional roles. Now my point is that the functional role semantics has some holistic base as it characterise the mental states in general by underpinning the common sense theory. As to take a demarcation between 'red' and 'der' even from the function of mental representation, it seems to me relevant to know the 'corporate body of the sentences' argued by holist. Here one has to know how the colour 'red' differs from the non-red colors like green, black, white and so on. My main concern is still to see the features of the thoughts. The semantic properties that a sentence possesses can be the same for a thought that is referentially related to the external world. Even thought like sentences can be allied to inference or like the beliefs, it could turn out as true and false. Besides, thought can well be suited with the syntax of the sentences. One can attribute syntax to the beliefs because of thoughts and the same process can be applied in the case of language that makes language more productive. The process of piecemeal procedure cannot help an agent to learn or understand the meaning of the sentence, but putting the elements of the sentences together one can learn the sentence and understand it easily. Similar process has been followed in the case of thoughts; here one can indefinitely produce many thoughts that he/she never have.

The previous discussions show how the inner representation and the linguistic representation can go hand by hand. So, it would be fascinating to claim that public language and the inner system are mingled together. What an agent can think in language, he/she can also express it in the same language. Even the propositional attitudes of an agent can take its place under the umbrella of thoughts that represent

states by linking to the external world. But there are some thoughts that are adverse to language like the thoughts of pre-matured human or higher animals. Another crucial question is that 'can content of the thought be same with the meaning of the sentence?' Here my attempt would be to look at how the ongoing debate between internalism and externalism could go beyond through a proper conduit of the mind and world. I think that one can consider the content of thought as something internal to the subject's mind (as internalist proposed), but the meaning of the sentence would be its referent that locates outside of the skin (as externalists demand). The conception of mind-world interlinking construes a facet that can go beyond the concentrated debate. In the following writings, I promise to do so.

A significant concern is that to understand the meaning of the speaker's uttered sentence, it requires us to see the content of his/her thought that causally underlies it. So here, identifying the content of a thought relies on the meaning of the sentence that is conventionally related to the public language. Gricean view on the conventional meaning of a sentence rely on the way, where an agent basically means the word that he uttered to designate the physical objects also can be exemplified by the sentence. If we précis the analysis, then we will find that the speaker's meaning depends on the thought content and the content can be determined by the meaning of the thought sentence. Meaning according to Grice, can be explained by conventional meaning that is also explained by speaker's meaning. So, one can see a circle here. Devitt and Sterelny break the circle specially attacking on Grice's view of *conventional meaning* by charging that accepting the content of thought rests on *conventional meaning*, a process where one can prioritise speaker's meaning. This process can only be followed in the case of causal referential theory of meaning that I highly appreciate. The social and the collective nature of this referential outlook of

thought may have its conventional content. This process indicates also to the convention of reference borrowing along with the reference fixing. The meaning of a sentence like 'Socrates is wise' hints to the convention from where people can borrow the meaning of the term 'Socrates' conventionally by the conventional linguistic practices of the society. Here the convention does not work properly. In the case of speaker's meaning of a term that occurs in the thought referred to the referent term which cannot entirely depend on the convention. In a general case, a speaker can borrow a reference where the meaning is conventionally well explained. But it may possible that when he/she grounded the term, then the meaning is not well explained as it was before. So, here conceptual role of the thought that the agent possessed is more than the conventional meaning in the case of the presentation of the term.

Let me take a non-basic term like 'bachelor' or one criterion work like 'hunter,' here description theory would be appropriate for its reference fixation. Not only their meaning of the thought can be determined by the reference determining conditions, but also by the basic terms upon which it relied on. But the rejection of the theory of description is well determined by the externalist in support of the dictum 'Meanings just ain't in the head'. Chomsky refutes the thesis by arguing in favour of the cognitive account of linguistic competence. By giving prominence on the syntax, he articulates language use in terms of the 'rule govern process' that is actually innate. People are born pre-programmed with the kind rules that one need to learn through language. This thesis shows the 'creativity of language' from the subject's mind. But the knowledge of the grammar is for Chomsky universal as I mentioned in the Chapter 2.

A plausible thesis on the origin of language emphasizes that before our linguistic convention or the use of language, we are being capable to think. Besides

animals also can think but cannot talk (or express their thoughts in language). But this hypothesis cannot propose that the thought precedes language is an innateness hypothesis. There are different stimuli that in different ways deserve innate dispositions. The stimuli that an agent receives along with the predisposition can represent the world in the thought of the speaker. It is possible only because of the causal relation that mingles the mental representation with the world. It is interesting that language and thought that engage with the public language has some conventional forms that carry on a regular connection with the speaker's meanings. Without the existence of speaker's meaning, we cannot talk about the conventional meaning. But it is also true that mental representation in the case of thought or language can be expressed by convention that is causally related to it. One can think beyond the conventional belief of the established language by expressing the ability of productivity of language with new thoughts that is incumbent with new words. So thought have some metal representation that produces new thoughts in connection to the world.

Thought and Language: A Re-examination of Davidson and Quine

Being a supporter of externalism, Davidson and Quine take mental phenomenon as a manifestation (in the sense of manifestability) and adopt a third person stance not only on the basis of meaning, but also depend on mind. Here, one thing that needs to be clarified is that Davidson and Quine do not have beliefs in favour of the belief-desire psychology that is considered as propositional attitudes. Quine supports the manifestability of the mental even in his writing of naturalistic epistemology by bringing the idea of relation between theory and evidence through scientific outlook as theory or observation that could be based on science will be able to express in words. Even in the case of non-scientific words, especially in methodological

behaviourism, we can find mental phenomenon that is beyond *intersubjective checkpoint*. Chomsky and Fodor, the opponent of Quine agrees with Quine especially on the issue that the postulation of non-observable phenomenon ultimately rely on the observable phenomenon. But they deny Quine's rejection of mental presentation and tacit knowledge by arguing that the tacit knowledge can well suit with science, because of its linguistic competence that plays a role for explanation here. But one thing to be remember here is that the non-observable mental phenomenon can only be accepted in science in respect of indirectly observable propensity. That, of course is a different issue.

However, Quine tries to show the independence of manifestation of thought from scientific methodology, where the capacity of thought recur the capacity of manifestation of the thoughts. So, the ascription of thoughts depends on the identification of the thoughts. Davidson has some similar opinions but denies the conception of thoughts that is reducible to linguistic activity. For him, one cannot deny the 'conceptual ties' that encompass between thought and behaviour and claims for the ascription of thought based on behaviour. Like Wittgenstein, Quine believes that the non-linguistic creatures like animals can avail thought which can be expressed through their behaviour (non-linguistic). Wittgenstein believe that a dog can think or believe that his master is waiting behind the door but cannot think or believe that his master will not come today but tomorrow. Davidson holds a more radical view on linguism that is strictly associated with pragmatism, where he tries to reluctant any sort of priority thesis to language over thought. For him, language and thought can go together and an animal, who have thought necessarily possess language. We can see the different arguments of Davidson in favour of thought requires language hypothesis as follows:

First, Thought having Intentional natures:

Davidson strictly believes in an anthropocentric basis of language that is compatible with thoughts. It may be true that the evaluation process gives some similarities between non-linguistic and linguistic animals, but Davidson does not believe that non-linguistic animals have some mental life. One can point out that our ancestors and the so-called chimpanzee have 98% DNA similarity with us but they do not have any language. Davidson will argue that this 98% DNA similarity cannot demand for 98% similarity of mental life including thoughts. May be this very minor dissimilarity of genetic or neuro biological process offers us the capacity of constructing language and vocabularies that they (animals) miss. One serious objection is that without attributing thought, we cannot explain or predict the behaviour of the animals, as the human and animals behaviour are more or less similar. So, it shows that animals have also thoughts, but Davidson argues that this is a pragmatic justification that cannot claim for animals having thought hypothesis. Attributing thought to animals sounds like attributing reasons to belief desire psychology of animals that is highly dubious. We cannot exemplify the concept of propositional attitudes to the technological device like an aeroplane wish to fly to UK, but we can ascribe justifiably in the case of behavioural animals as they have desire and perceptual capacities. But Davidson is disinclined to this thesis to show that this illusion actually came from the writings of Aristotle's folk biology that vindicates the way to animal behaviour which could be expressible in regards of psychological process. Davidson argues for holistic wave of propositional attitudes that defines our psychological law by construing a difference with animals' behaviour. Davidson believes that animals do not have propositional attitudes that are compatible with holistic framework. Davidson writes that 'For example, can the dog believe of an object that it is a tree? This would seem

impossible unless we suppose the dog has many general beliefs about trees: that they are growing things, that they need soil and water that they have leaves or needles, which they burn. There is no fixed list of things that someone with the concept of a tree must believe, but without many general beliefs, there would be no reason to identify a belief as a belief about a tree, much less an oak tree. Similar considerations apply to the dog's supposed thinking about the cat. We identify thoughts, distinguish among them, and describe them for what they are, only as they can be located within a dense network of the related beliefs. If we really can intelligibly ascribe single beliefs to a dog, we must be able to imagine how we would decide whether the dog has many other beliefs of the kind necessary for making sense of the first. It seems to me that no matter where we start, we very soon come to beliefs such that we have no idea at all how to tell whether a dog has them, and yet such that, without them, our confident first attribution looks shaky.²⁵⁷

Another problem is attributing thought to animal. It focuses on the idea that by thought, we consider verbal behaviour, but the thought that we ascribe to animals is totally a non-verbal behaviour. Even, human thought have some intentional contexts that can have some truth values. In the case of attributing thoughts a sentence may reveal its semantic intentionality that help to change the truth value of the required sentence from true to false or false to true. But animals' non-verbal behaviour doesn't have this sort of properties. The intentional context of human thought that is compatible with language always produces a descriptive mode that is accepted by the describer. But animals who have some non-verbal behaviour cannot accomplish the descriptive mode of their thought by accepting or rejecting something as true or false. One can ask that whether an animal has some discriminatory capabilities by which

²⁵⁷ Donald Davidson, 2001, 98.

they can judge the bad or good and right and wrong. Davidson seems to me right as he claims that without some general beliefs or propositional attitudes that are associated with holistic web of beliefs, no one can have belief about an object or identify a belief as a belief. This thesis hints that a creature without having language and the causal history of reference cannot insist or construe a descriptive thought. If we accept the famous dictum of Quine ‘No entity without identity,’ then we should also follow Davidson’s line that ‘animals don’t have any lingual capacity to make discrimination between X object from Y object.’ Davidson also claims that ‘My thesis is not, then, that each thought depends for its existence on the existence of a sentence that expresses that thought. My thesis is rather that a creature cannot have a thought unless it has language. In order to be a thinking, rational creature, the creature must be able to express many thoughts, and above all, be able to interpret the speech and thoughts of others.’²⁵⁸

Second, Concept and Thought:

An ascription of the thoughts to the animals faces challenges when one does evaluate the matter from the realm of concepts that no animal can endorse. In the purpose of attacking animals thought hypothesis, Davidson insists that the concepts and thoughts have similar credibility in the use of language. If we allow the thesis, then one should also consider that without grasping the required concepts no one could construct any kinds of thoughts. Davidson has no belief in the process of thinking that evokes the concerning relation between subject and abstract entities. He writes that ‘Words have no function save as they play a role in sentences: their semantic features are abstracted from the semantic features of sentences, just as the semantic features of sentences are

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 100.

abstracted from their part in helping people achieve goals or realize intentions.²⁵⁹ For him, the theory of meaning always follows two different methods, building-block method and *holistic method*. So, a complete account of semantic features rest on the whole sentence of the language, but not to the fragment ones. And without a full understanding of the semantic account we cannot able to determine the truth value of the uttered sentence. Human belief system is a ‘holophrastic’ that ascribe beliefs to the linguistic creatures depending on sentences as a whole. Animals’ thoughts cannot be suitable with the mentioned procedures that a linguistic being can follow. It is very interesting to remember Dummett’s words who call animal thoughts, like Putnam, as ‘proto-thoughts’ that have some special representation, which actually consisted in concepts. Whether animal acquire concepts or not? It could be an interesting topic. Davidson, following the suggestion of Frege and Dummett, considers that animals may have perception but they do not possess any concepts.

But the laboratory reports and the wild behaviour strictly report that animals can possess concepts²⁶⁰ as they can well distinguish between different tastes, colours, sounds, creatures etc. Even the very important thing is that these capacities are not innate or biologically intrinsic but it has been learned or trained.

Davidson will disagree to these arguments. Davidson shows the counter arguments from different levels. The first argument relates to *reductio ad absurdum* hypothesis. He thinks that the discrimination and the physical phenomenon of

²⁵⁹ Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, 1984, 220.

²⁶⁰ Colin McGinn argues that animals have propositional structure in their brains. He also believes that ‘Human children also innately have conceptual structures in their brains before they learn to speak; language cannot create these structures—it is just sounds. Animals also perceptual structures innately.’ Personally I am thankful to Colin for this discussion. But my query is that can a human baby who has a conceptual innate structure construe propositional attitudes without any linguistic communication? Language helps one to construct the thoughts and belief systems, so animals that have no beliefs and language can seldom construct the thoughts. For them, the concepts are the proto-concepts and similarly the thoughts are the proto-thoughts that are related with the behaviour expressions and the biological instincts. I will discuss on these issues later.

different objects that are related to the causal inputs rest on the creatures' perceptual capacities, where not only perception is required, but the prerogative sentiment is necessary. His second argument hints at a difference between *classification* and *discrimination*. *Classification* is the process where the concept possession plays an important role. But *discrimination* is the process that can be well fitted with non-linguistic creatures. Davidson thinks that classification is an anthropocentric process where to identify a concept is to classify the object properties, events etc. But the concept of discrimination is a sort of 'disposition' that is beyond any normative forces. So, the discrimination process cannot recognize any informed mistake, as the creature don't have any knowledge relating to correct and incorrect behaviours.

Davidson's point goes wrong as he holds that non-linguistic animals do not have abilities, but possess dispositions. The pre-linguistic animals and babies produce some voluntary actions as they can abstain themselves from a meticulous actions by showing their behavioural agreement or disagreement. This argument shows that non-linguistic concept position may be feasible in regards of normative sense that is raised by Davidson to apes and infants.

Now the question is that this sort of discussion may not confine concept possession that relies on language, but indicates to the discriminatory behaviour, a sort of complexity and flexibility. No one can claim that the complex appearance of the animals' behaviour lead to deception, only if he or she also asks for the same thing regarding human being. Some thinkers also believe that animals have two capabilities – voluntarily and intentionally. In different purposes, they act accordingly to these capabilities. Intentionality persists with a strong sense of acting reason. Refuting the conception of act of reason in the case of animals inspire to accept that the discrimination process of animals depends on the voluntary act, but not on

intentionality. It necessarily does not follow that animals have the ability to possess concepts. Davidson strongly believes in the concept formation process that does not relate to disposition and judgement.

Third, Thought and its Holistic nature:

Holistic nature of thought emphasizes that the character of the propositional attitudes of one thing demands for a full complement with the other things. One can identify thought and describe them, as these thoughts are not atomic, but situated within a 'dense network of related beliefs'. To ascribe a single belief to an animal needs to ascribe some other beliefs that imaginarily could be related with the single belief and this process becomes insecure. For Davidson, to ascribe a belief means there are three types of beliefs – particular beliefs, general beliefs and logical beliefs. General beliefs and logical beliefs can argue against the animal's beliefs that to have a belief means to have rationality that is disclosed not only to a wave of consistent thoughts, but to concern about also the identity conditions of the required thoughts. As logical beliefs remain attached with the identity of the thoughts, so we cannot detach the content of thoughts with what it entails. We cannot find out the similarity between the beliefs of *A* and *B* two different agents, if *A* is partly ignorant about his/her content of belief, where *B* is cognizant of the same content of belief. So, here we notice that Davidson's concern is regarding holistic argument of rational beliefs. Critic can argue that the great ape or chimpanzee can be rational not only in their biological evolutionary sense, but in terms of what they learnt from long practices in environment through their intelligence and applying their thoughts. It may be possible that a chimpanzee like human being in some cases behave irrationally and later improve the behaviours according to the practices and the constant trials. Davidson cannot reluctant this thesis as it will intend to rule out the learning process of children and adults too. Davidson's

answer would be close to our conceptual beliefs that have two different parts like the general belief and logical belief. Davidson gives importance on the general belief that also can be demarcated in different lines like empirical beliefs and analytic beliefs. One thing require to clarify here is that like Fodor and Lepore, one can charge against Davidson's thought that there may be some cases where empirical belief can make a conceptual change in the case of talking about some general problems that are related to some unscientific assurances. A person can believe that a cloud is covering the sun without knowing that clouds are made of water vapour that cannot cover the tremendous heat of sun. Here, Davidson takes a radical step by invoking general beliefs in terms of analyticity. He claims that only man can think in an analytic way and animals cannot recognize the status of analyticity or believe that 'cats are cats' etc.

Davidson thinks that there is a lack of holistic sense in animal thoughts. But it would be very challenging to say that animals have lack of *web of beliefs* (in holistic sense and human concepts) means that they have no beliefs and no concepts. Davidson writes that 'My thesis is rather that a creature cannot have a thought unless it has language. In order to be a thinking, rational creature, the creature must be able to express many thoughts, and above all, be able to interpret the speech and thoughts of others.'²⁶¹ So it shows that thought and language for Davidson are entangled with each other and language helps us to express thought to other in our communicating system.

Fourth, The Concept of Belief:

We have already noticed that for Davidson, to have a belief means one must possess the concept of belief. And the process of concept of belief is only available in the case

²⁶¹ Donald Davidson, 2001,100.

of language use. He also writes that ‘Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken, and this requires grasping the contrast between truth and error – true belief and false belief.’²⁶² Davidson thinks that without reflective thoughts, one cannot construct his/her belief. It does not show that all beliefs are self-conscious. Actually, Davidson means that to have a belief means there are some beliefs about one’s beliefs. Davidson thinks that one can be aware about one’s beliefs in some cases of disappointment of the expectation of the belief. It is a sort of reaction that is related to the expectation of beliefs. But that does not show only human have the capacity of being surprised, as claimed by Davidson. A chimpanzee can be surprised to touch a decoy when he is expecting for a banana. Davidson in reply to the critic is worried about two different things. He says that there are two things – ‘being startled’ and ‘being surprise’. In the case of surprise, Davidson believes that a person can recognize he is mistaken in believing this and that thing. It follows from Davidson’s thought that the linguistic communication that is based on the notion of truth sounds problematic because of the notion of error. But he is right on the conception of intersubjective truth that is related to the intersubjective world by constructing the concept of different objects that is associated with different communicator’s beliefs or thoughts. But he does not want to confine the conception of objective truth into the belt of communicators. He strongly believes that the concept of belief may be possible only if it communicates with other beliefs through a language. So language is the main communicating medium. Language, thought and rationality, all these are confined to communicators according to the sense of language and social contexts as once mentioned by Davidson himself. Davidson’s triangulation argument is not well suited with our ‘second-order belief’ that is hostile

²⁶² Donald Davidson, 1984, 170.

to the position of the concept of truth. Davidson's uses tools like intentionality, concepts and holism do not intend that language is necessary for constructing thoughts, but it actually maintains that without language there probably cannot be a body of thoughts/thoughts held by groups of people mass thoughts. Davidson thinks that if we attribute single thought (not animal thought) then it must be non-intentional, non-conceptual, non-holistic way of thought. Davidson writes that 'Communication depends on each communicator having, and correctly thinking that the other has, the concept of a shared world, an intersubjective world. But the concept of an intersubjective world is the concept of an objective world, a world about which each communicator can have beliefs. I suggest, then, that, the concept of intersubjective truth suffices as a basis for belief and hence for thoughts generally. And perhaps it is plausible enough that having the concept of intersubjective truth depends on communication in the full linguistic sense.'²⁶³

6.3. Portrait of Going Beyond: My Findings

The process that is eventuated earlier regarding the ongoing debate can impress us to believe that the mental features of an agent are determined by his/her internal states. There is a Cartesian line that can conjoin the privileged accessibility of the mental states with internalist claims. Besides, externalist who calls for an extrinsic property of mental content also give importance on the causal relation that actually enhance extrication between the subject's thoughts and an intrinsic way of representing the thoughts.

The phrase 'external' means that something is external to the skin or brain, whereas internal means something inside the skin. Here it would be fascinating to see

²⁶³ Donald Davidson, 2001, 105.

how much the claim of external to the skin would be compatible with externalism (twin earth externalism). We know that twin earth externalism claims that the molecule for molecule duplicates only share internal properties. Well, then we should accept that there is something called internal properties. My query is that to accept that internal properties are there leads to accept that the properties are intrinsic and that cannot be well argued by the external object related issues rely on experience. If the claim of externalism goes true that twins share similarity in their physical structures, then the demarcation line between an internal and external would be flabby. Externalist mainly attacks the content theory that talks about ‘content supervene on internal physical properties.’

Here, if one argues that the external world or the taste, size, smell, and sound etc. (things appear to the twins) appear to the twins as same, then externalism needs to accept that there may be a difference in the internal content of the agents from a subject centric outlook. Internalist actually gives concern on the subject’s point of view by defending the conception that things would be subjectively equivalent while externalist differentiation of the thought content can be possible from the external factors of the subject’s point of view.

Two things that I would like to give attention is that the physical equivalence and the phenomenal properties. The two things that construe the ongoing debate between internalism and externalism are as follows. Equating a relation between molecule for molecule duplicates (twins) and physical sameness would not be possible because an indistinguishability of sameness between two experiences can occur, though there may be some differences that took place in their physical realization. Externalism can put behaviourism in support of their non-mental hypothesis on bodily states. But one can argue that the behaviour of the twins would

be same though it is true that *X* in earth was holding a bottle of water, while *Twin-X* in ‘Twin Earth’ was holding a bottle of twater. Still, here the description of the behaviour of the twins interrelate with the external world and the difference would occur as there are differences between the two worlds.

My argument is that only the characterization of the physical properties cannot show the indistinguishability of the twins, and here the position of the mental terms plays a significant role. Even the conception of the phenomenal properties is worth mentioning. The perception has some mental modes, as if something is appearing to the perceiver. The mental presentation of the perception process can be given just by describing how things appear to the agents. The phenomenal characteristic of an object would be shared as same for twins only if the thing that appeared to the perception of the twins present (read appear) in the same way. This hypothesis leads us to admit the shared phenomenal properties of an object.

In the notable paper “Notes on Denotation and Denoting”²⁶⁴, I am amazed to see that Chomsky depicted (although he later rejected it) the referential theory of meaning that tries to make a link between the words and the objects by presenting language as a social art. In the case of noun phrase here, the act of referring makes an integrated relation between the terms and the external world. Chomsky argues that if we accept the thesis that the noun phrase can denote an act of referring as true, then we must also accept that there are some internal symbols like ‘this kitchen’ etc. These internal symbols have the power to refer to something that could be mind-independent like in the case of internal symbol ‘ki’n’, where we can produce a mind-independent event ‘S’ (sound). Here, we cannot conceive a relation between the phonetic symbol and sound. Even in the case of noun phrases (like ‘Cat’, ‘Wittgenstein’), it would be

²⁶⁴ Noam Chomsky, “Notes on Denotation and Denoting,” 2013, 38-45.

difficult to make a postulation between the noun phrase and the mind independent objects. It seems to me that the communication process does not only depend on the object involving language or the word-object relation, but in our language we find a few words such as 'for the sake of', 'miles', 'kilometres' etc that have some mentalesse existence and independent of the external reference.

Another inspiration comes from Aristotle's conception of *form* and *matter* that nurture the theory of description in a sense that refutes the referential doctrine. Chomsky emphasizes on the syntax theory and the pragmatic stance (mode of the use) to explain that the process of denotation is not externally derived. In fact, in natural language the conception of semantic cannot able to expose the causal relation between the symbols and the mind-independent world. In favour of externalism, no externalist can argue that the meaning of every singular term is determined by the causal and referential connection. Mainly they are talking about the natural kind terms that have an extension in the external world. Speakers sometimes mistakenly believe that the empty terms are regarded as the natural kind terms. So externalists are less bothered about the conception of words like 'for the sake', 'ghost', 'quark' or even some logical words like 'if and then', 'or', etc. The logical terms and an example like 'for the sake' are truly associated with the agents' conceptual roles semantics. These conceptual roles and the apparatus somehow depend on the external world in the case of real understanding of any words. As mental states are world directed contents, so internal meaning can be fixed externalistically, especially in this case, where environment holds a fundamental role. In the acts of referring, and pronouncing, environment plays a peripheral role in determining the focus of the act of referring and the sound we produce. There are some words that we use in our ordinary discussion which has meanings and the conceptions are useful in our communications,

but for the externalists these words has representational statuses that can be well-known by its mere descriptions, as these are the descriptive terms that they attempt to challenge. Externalist refutes the semantic rules and the semantic markers hypotheses that are supposed to represent knowledge as every competent speaker has already in their mind. The terms that conceptually exist are not under the discussion of externalism as I find it. Meanings are not in the head does not mean that the brain has nothing to do with the semantic competence. What fixes the meaning of the speaker's words is not just the state of his/her mind or brain. Like Putnam, I also believe that two things can fix the reference of the terms (the natural kind terms and the non-natural kind terms instead of the empty terms): other people and the world. Even in the case of empty terms, the beliefs of the intentional content about this term also stand for the external objects. A relevance that I found here is that when a person personally believes something, then the intention of his beliefs cannot be an isolated thing that can only exist in his mind. If I believe that I have a 'mole' in my eyes then another belief consequently comes to my mind is there may be some other people who have the same 'mole' in their eyes. The conception of others shows that the concepts and beliefs are not intrinsic in nature; these are external and publicly shareable. So how could it be possible that people can think and express the meaning of a sentence without intending the idea of bringing in certain beliefs of the audiences? As language is a social phenomenon, so the intentions, beliefs and conventional meaning all these are interconnected to the socio-linguistic framework. It is undeniable that if we define 'language' as a social phenomenon, then it seems as a social phenomenon. Moreover, if we take 'conventional meaning' to be a sociological concept, then it cannot be grasped by the normal biological internalism.

The central question of human enquiry is no doubt, ‘how mind can represent the world’. One may underline two different methods here. The first method talks about the use of language or ‘linguistic communication’ where the words and the content of thoughts represent the external world. The second one is images, a visual process that indicates to all the sensory records like the paints of gods, photography of moon, perceiving death in a movie etc. It seems to me interesting that though the tools like language and images have some external connections, yet they are also intermingled with the mental presentations. The empiricist way turns towards the external sense where the mental images are located in the record of perceptual experience. Lockean empiricism tries to see Aristotle’s accumulation of mental images by resituating it in the form of ideas. However, the Leibneitzian way of defending rationalism argues against the sensible ideas or images by bringing the notion of innate knowledge, a sort of knowledge that comes prior to experience. Besides, it differs from empiricism in the sense that for rationalism, this innate knowledge cannot be stored in the sensory experience. The idea of language of thought, a rationalist approach gets a good stance in the hands of Chomsky that I have already discussed in different contexts. The significant outlook that language of thought or in other words innate hypothesis chalked out is a conception that represent some abstract properties like ‘being coloured,’ without specifying any specific colour that the sensory empiricist way of language cannot identify. This sort of symbol like ‘truth’, ‘value’, ‘justice’ etc. that make our language more enriched can well be identified through the imaginary visualisation that is deciphered by an innate hypothesis. The language of thought in the sense of innateness has some concatenative way of understanding of the mental states. One’s sensory images relating ‘a dog is sleeping’ and the same dog is chasing are two different forms of

images of the same referent, where as the mental structure represents the same form of dogs that no sensory image can represent. The mental images cannot fit with any productivity. We cannot consider in a justificatory way that a bird is sleeping and a dog is flying. The *productivity of thought* is just possible in language, which is publicly shareable and people understand the meaning of the terms in the process of their communication. It seems to me interesting that even the procedure of imagination is rely on the mental images that can exhibit the prior base experimental understanding as wrong. Let me clarify it with an example. If someone tells me that there are some ‘carnivorous plants’ available in the dense forests of South Africa, then instantly the idea will come to my mind that the plants have their own teeth and they can able to bite their foods. In this case, normally in our linguistic communication, we have experienced that ‘carnivorous’ refers to some animals who have teeth and they can chew or bite foods. If we think in this way about our mental image, then we will go wrong, as the carnivorous trees do not have teeth. Even there are some mental images which we cannot experience in our language, like ‘life is worthless’ etc. No theory can actually understand what it means by the abstract ideas.

It sounds true to me that there are two puzzles that any language learning systems have to confront. The first one is the thesis of productivity that talks about the creativity part of the language by moving beyond the limit of what is previously known by the learner or an agent. In this process, acquiring knowledge can lead to something that is totally new and informative in the sense that it was previously unknown to the speaker. Besides, the second thesis demarcated a fringe line by mentioning that one can learn various knowledge and understand different things in the specific area (i.e. in a basic framework) that cannot go beyond the direction of the new knowledge. The problem of the basic framework argues that the idea of

productivity is an induction and we cannot go beyond the basic framework of language by introducing new thoughts and knowledge. Even they also claim in favour of relativism, where the mutual understanding can sound unstable because of the different cultures (in anthropological sense), different periods (in historical sense), and different paradigms (Kuhn's jargon). So for me, the debate encircles the worries of what is known and what is learnt. Here my query is that can an agent know something that he/she cannot learn before?

If we trace back to the history, then we will find that the dilemma enhanced in the writing of Plato's *Meno*, where we see the paradoxical argument of Socrates and the slave boy. The slave boy acquires something new about the geometrical truths, but Plato think that what the boy acquired is not something that was not in his mind before. Here the structure of knowledge of the slave boy have some productivity stance as he gained some new knowledge, but here the twist is that what he gained is the knowledge that he once forgot and now it represented in his mind. This process initiates something new that can go beyond knowledge that the slave boy achieved before. Plato's paradox taught us that we cannot acquire much, but what we consider as a new knowledge actually undertakes a change in our attitudes to something that has not yet changed. The empiricists who consider that through sense experience one can learn new knowledge illustrate another account of knowledge. Behaviourism is one of the most important empiricist theories that take care of the process of learning in support of underpinning agents' behaviour. Determining the verbal behaviour and the process has been under control by the environment as the Skinner once argued. Skinner's idea of past-experience and the behavioural determination of one's future behaviour cannot fit with the model of productivity. One can argue as Chomsky did that our knowledge or understanding is not limited to our behaviour or social

environment. For Chomsky, language is not a sort of reinforcement that is tied to experience and uses. Language is possible because of the innate universal grammar that has two parts – *generativeness* and *transformative rules* which no doubt have some creative aspects. The language that a child learns cannot be utilised if the child has no innate grammatical rules. It is not like that an agent learns something, which the learner has already in his/her mind. Chomsky's productivity of language initiates a turn towards the new knowledge that possesses a kind of special intellectual ability (innate hypothesis). Another view that critique Chomskian innate hypothesis has raised a new account of communication is often called the socio-linguistic convention. For this thesis, language is a medium of communication and the process of communication rests beyond the subjective, private mental state of the speaker. It looks like an intersubjective framework that the speaker shares with the others in a socio-linguistic background.

From the above discussion, still I feel that the debate is centred round the same questions that I have haunted from the starting of the study - 'What is the location of the content of thought?' and 'Are thought something new that is interlinked with the external world or thought is something innate that is sited in speaker's mind?' My attempt has been to show that thought is a domesticated model (reformed model) that can go beyond the jargon of mind-word bifurcation or in short, the ongoing debate between internalism versus externalism. Twentieth century analytic trend that is inclined towards externalism considers mind as something public. They reject the idea of intrinsic mind as a *museum myth*. On the other hand, internalists have a tendency to believe that the subject is the first-person authority on his/her private world, especially what is going on there he/she (subject) can well know from his/her mental states, beliefs or thoughts. The third person only can infer from an agent's behaviour.

The behaviourist's way to see mind as something outer tries to reject the ontological innerness by bringing the idea of epistemology where one can determine the external determining items that stress beneath the framework of an agent's belief that have some prescriptive roles. I think it would be fascinating, if we think mind as inner that has some outer properties like intention, action, and effects. All these symptoms or properties of mind have some tendencies to merge with the outer world. The naturalistic outer world that rebut mind as something inner cannot be a right opinion. The agents' thoughts, imaginations and emotions are beyond communicative language, so we can put all these in the realm of inner entities about which the subject has a sort of privileged access. For me, the innerness of mind can be regarded as privileged in nature. It can only express in public domain when a subject structures his/her thoughts/sensations in a sentence to give it a linguistic form that could be shareable with others in our linguistic community. The proposal tries to hint that a concept that cannot be regarded as images, but it is associated to the external objects that cannot have a picture form in the mind of the speakers.

Let me clarify here the best reflection of Plato's claim on innate centric conception of learning that we find in the writing of Jerry Fodor, especially his work *The Language of Thought* where he claims in favour of *computational cognitivism*. For Fodor, individual's cognitive learning has some deductive base relation, which the agent actually possesses. And to explain the complex human behaviour, linguistic and conceptual representation underlies a computational base system, which the subject's mind innately acquires. Fodor attempts to argue against behaviourism from two different levels. Ryle and later Wittgenstein had a tendency to reject psychological phenomenon. Fodor critique this opinion by putting more concentration on the necessity of grammatical truth that has conceptual base analysis in case of the

use of language, as once well claimed by Chomsky to support the psychological explanation that suits with the generative approach to language. Next, Fodor analyzes behaviourism by arguing that if we support behaviourism then we cannot talk about the productivity of mental process.

Therefore, here the two important points that I like to relook on is the ‘productivity of mental process’ and the origin and nature of the ‘language of thought’, which is relatively universal and innate base learning system. Fodor considers that learning is not dependent on the universal grammar through which we can combine the words and construct a sentence. He argues that in the process of learning, one should know what the meaning of words is and sentence too. And it is possible because of the mental framework and the language of thought which refers that one’s thoughts are intrinsically meaningful. This idea of learning I assume can be regarded as language acquisition from a conceptual aspect. Fodor²⁶⁵ by some means believe that the procedure of learning on which language rests on are the meaning of the predicates that are used in the sentences. So one can ask what contribution thought plays in our learning process. Fodor considers that in our language one-to-one correspondence between the words and world is unstable. The representational power of language of thought has some innate backgrounds that can easily demonstrate the complex concept like ‘aeroplane’ into the simpler components by describing it as a ‘flying machine’. Here, in the learning process of the term ‘aeroplane’ has some unlearned part ‘flying machine’ that underlies the domain of productivity of language. The primitive concept of our language is actually given by our experience but one could not learn it.

²⁶⁵ Jerry Fodor, 1979, 63-64

One thing that touches my mind is the style of Wittgenstein's approach on the language of thought in *Tractatus* that may well fit with Fodor's concern that I discussed earlier. In *Tractatus*²⁶⁶, Wittgenstein strongly believes that the isomorphic characteristic of thought make thoughts intrinsically meaningful. Interpretation and analysis are the processes that are initiated from the idea of thought. If we follow Russell's interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, then we can claim that for Wittgenstein, thought is mental that could be regarded as the notion of meaning, and this meaningfulness of thought can be depicted by the internal properties that have some formal structures or reality based structures, as Wittgenstein considered in his early writing. Meanwhile, we find a reflection of thought of language hypothesis in early Wittgenstein's works, though it is absolutely right that in his later writings like *Philosophical Investigations*²⁶⁷, he strongly opposes the mentioned opinion of thought as a mental. He re-modified his views against language of thought hypothesis by arguing in favour of language game and the form of life, where meaning is considered as public. Even for him, the learning process is also embedded with public language, language game, form of the life, and language use. The approach of later Wittgenstein sounds to me appreciative when he points out that thought depends on language and language that is related to the shared form of human life has a kind of natural history. There is a massive prospect to create new thing in language. Wittgenstein's metaphor to compare language as old and new city upholds language a new height. A compare that I sternly find between Piaget and Wittgenstein that both of them have believe in the idea of language as an adaptation and the process of learning relies on the model of innate action pattern that Piaget called sensori-motor pattern. But the difference that one can easily find in their thoughts is doubtlessly the way of their presentation.

²⁶⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1961, please see, 2.2, 2.16, and 4.023.

²⁶⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1953, 261.

Wittgenstein has some fascinations on the behavioural changes rather than the mental changes in the case of language acquisition that make him differ from Piaget by adopting a socio-environmental language game instead of the natural environment that Piaget argued. Even the most decisive divergence between Wittgenstein and Piaget thoughts centre rounds on the concern of the relation between language and thought hypotheses. Piaget claims that it sounds odd that language acquisition becomes possible because of the structure of the thoughts. But for Wittgenstein, thoughts develop into the realm of language. Wittgenstein's training therapy presents language as more intersubjective where the contribution of the others becomes necessary, not only as a part of physical environment but as a master or trainer of the language. Here others can train their pupils by providing a limited set of words and sentences to see the development of the pupils regarding the transcend process of the limited given words. One thing looks apparently fine that for Wittgenstein learning is framework oriented and the adaptation method of learning language can able to surpass the information that it received from the society. The tactic that the adaptation procedure aims to follow is obviously the creativity aspect that Chomsky has given core importance but in a difference sense that I have already mentioned elaborately. I think there has been a keen difference between Chomsky and Wittgenstein though both believe in the productivity of language. Wittgenstein²⁶⁸ actually considers that productivity may well suit with the nature of language, but the method to learn a specific language in terms of the language game need to be concerned about a limit of language on the basis of finite set of social encounter or words, otherwise the whole learning procedure would be arbitrary and meaningless. But Chomsky rejects the idea to establish his path breaking opinion that productivity can blend with innate

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 198.

hypothesis and the conception of limit of language in Wittgenstein sense sounds flabby with the allege of productivity of language.

Let me comeback to the heart of the debate again. The two different poles that still sound like internalism-externalism debate can be looked further (or going beyond) if we consider language as biological cum socio-linguistic (human equipped) product. Biology of human being is necessary, but in no way it is sufficient for language learning procedure as it has an exclusive combination of mental structure with the socio-linguistic practices. I do not believe in the bifurcation between communicative semantics role and conceptual role of language. It seems to me that there is a strong interconnection between the two: the language skill, the process of training language, and specially the communicative action that has some cognitive and biological structure. The vehicle of language thought for me, is the production of a socio-biological intermingleness. Human language can be framed out because of the interaction of the mind that is structured with the external world. Here the conceptual thought is a humanoid process attached to the socio-linguistic practices, or in a broader way, to world that is my first point of the going beyond policy.

The forgoing account emphasises that the minds are intermingled with others or world when the content of one's thought are expressed in propositions. The thoughts are subjective (in the sense of *privileged-access*) but the content of our thoughts turns toward objectivity as it loses its *privateness* just when it is shared with the others. So our minds (in plural) are embedded in the world and causally interacting with the world in a way that the internal states represent the way the world is (not the idea of world would be). This is my second point in favour of going beyond policy.

My next belief is close to the ‘generative grammar’ of language. But for me it cannot play the whole task. It is actually a part that constructed with another essential part, might be called the ‘linguistic practices’. In the ‘linguistic practice,’ an agent follows two different rules:

The *first* thing that he/she does is that he or she uses an ostensive process that is based on the shared paradigm. In maturation, this process helps the agent to fix the reference of the terms through an ascent and decent procedure.

The *second* important thing is called ‘reference borrowing’, a process that is intimated with the society and social customs designed by the elders. In the ‘process of reference borrowing’, an agent learns the ‘use of the terms’ following elders’ patterns or customs. I think that the mentioned processes are society dependent so there is no question about its apriority or incorrigible approach. Children have ‘generative-grammar’ in their brains, but the grammar only helps to construct new sentences and present their expressions to an extent in the linguistic communication. But I do not think that without the help of the ‘elders’ or the constant practices in the linguistic society, one can learn words or is able to fix the exact references within the very specific period of their childhood. When they become younger, their previous experiences and present situations (circumstances) of the society and obviously their own intelligence may help them to develop their thoughts to determine the question of justification and values and so on. Language learning system is a game where you will not find any fixed rules (some rules are depended on assumptions or some are on experiences) but all these are no way mentalese. Only ‘universal grammar’ or the way one can construct the sentences and express their thoughts seems to me ‘innate’ or mentalese; otherwise all rests on the external world, other person and especially on experience.

It is feasible that in the case of use of language, some contents that occur in the mind, i.e. it has some intrinsic/internal stands. Even, the mental states are in nature representational and the occurrences of the minds are internally characterizable (narrow), there it is fully independent to its representational properties that may be external. Introspective evidences establish the content of mind. We just catch some feelings, images and sensations in these situations. I cannot accept that thinking only as mental manipulation of representation that does not bear any referential directness at reality. When we express things as ‘thoughts’, an agent can assume that she/he has content and this content not only locate in the mind, but causally referentially is also related to the external world or the socio-linguistic background and I consider it as a point²⁶⁹ through which we can exceed the jargon of internalism versus externalism debate.

Besides, it seems interesting that ‘conceptual capacities’ have different stages like ‘use the new words’ or ‘an ability to learn’. But it would be problematic to claim that the ability to learn language is *a priori* based processing. One thing can be considered as *a priori* in the sense that if we cannot learn language then our own mind would function in a very primitive way that is obviously based on its intrinsic features. If we accept McDowellian interpretation of Kant’s thoughts on perception, then we will see that the conception of disjunctivism confirms that our ‘impressions’

²⁶⁹ I elsewhere wrote that ‘I do not think, like Bilgrami, that there is a unity of contents. For me, contents are in general unified in our thought, but a division is made by natural language, like wide, narrow, external and internal, in favour of our communication. My concept of *internalistic externalism* can be best understood in the realm of thought; it is not in the natural language, because in natural language, there are so many vague concepts, like “this” and “that”, used as indexical terms, and also certain inferential concepts which raise problems regarding the conception of unified contents.... In this case, the content of my belief is not so easy to point out from the perspective of internalism or externalism. But for *internalistic externalism*, it is not difficult to understand the problem, as I believe that, from the internalists’ point of view, we can fix the meaning of concepts, and from the externalist point of view, we can fix their references.’(Please see, Sanjit Chakraborty, *Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism*, 2016, 106.)

are not anyway mental entities that can concern about certain illusions, but it is also associated with the external world.

My point is that thought plays two different roles at a time. In the first level, thought is subjective as a mental event. On the other hand, in the second level, thoughts has content that have some propositional structure, but does not have any temporal positions like belief, desires had in the first level. We know that thinking occurs in a certain time, but it is not that the proposition must occur also at the same time. In the first level, a temporal mental event can be an act, but at the second level, the content of thought constructs propositional attitudes that mingle with the external world. In this sense, one can put thought into the realm of objectivity as it is always slipping away from internal state and conjoins with community and world. As a mental act, thought is subjective, but being content, it is tied to the causal referential world and the linguistic community. A constant interaction we find between the subjective and intersubjective regarding the matter of thought that helps me to go beyond the bifurcation of content preserved by internalism and externalism.

I also believe that if one can consider 'processing capacities' like as an adaptation then the conceptual capacities that assist us to learn language and practice linguistic communication cannot depend on the semantic capacities that are associated with the social practices, rather it would be blended to the linguistic competence, an I-language process as once Chomsky argued. Conceptual capacity is a biological adaptation that has some internal parts, but the use of new words and the communicating process of language in fact depend on the socio-linguistic background. Another important issue for me is that though the conceptual capacities are in a sense mind based processes that work only when the process of their intrinsic parts function as a biological system, yet the 'conceptual capacities' incorporates with

the words that have some paradigm shifted to the environment. Now the interesting question is how could an agent use language and respond in the words in his/her communication that is only rooted in his/her linguistic ability and the socio-linguistic background.

We have already seen that the representational approach enhances the content of the propositional attitudes as an internal part of the skin in. Frank Jackson's hypothesis says that 'what we think supervenes on how we are from the skin in as a matter of fact'²⁷⁰. Chomskian hypothesis that rebuts externalism in defence of the 'innateness hypothesis' rejects the idea of the 'shared common language,' a paradigm that is propagated by externalism. Chomsky deeply believed that 'language acquisition' is interconnected to the environment, but the process to know the language is to internalize the rules of grammar that is innate and genuinely 'universal'. Language-based externalism refines itself by transacting the process of language as a public or social phenomenon. Even the thought that helps an agent to describe or understand the content can only be determined by the external world. As we already noticed that externalism strongly snubs the mentalese approach of conventional meaning as for them, meaning depends on the socio-linguistic background and other people. The foundational claim of externalism is that here extension carries the meaning. The social character of meaning, the bulldogger of externalism attempt to break down the ground of internalism (their mentalese approach on content and meaning, innate language, etc.) by suggesting that language can be changed and the tentative meaning of the terms can somehow be changed. But the essential point is that speakers should be aware about the matter that in which context the terms or the present language is being used now. The process can be

²⁷⁰ My thank goes to Frank Jackson for his notable point.

possible because of the *agreed practices of the community*. Even Burge also claims that the constitutive determiners of the mental states are not located in the states themselves, but the physical and the social elements are the genuine determiners of the constitute psychological states that are located in the external world, not in the head or mind of the speakers. Burgean conception of ‘background enable conditions’ helps us to avoid the disease of a priori by fixing the communal meaning and understand the meaning of the required terms from the perspective of social contents, not from the ‘background enable conditions’ that bring the content of thought from a *a priori* background. A speaker attains the conceptual amount of something only if he/she can use or apply the conceptual amount in the process of communication with others through some linguistic practices. Even if we admit that our conceptual development has some biological cum internal processing, it is true that the concepts and contents of our thoughts according to externalist can be determined by the external world. The journey of externalism goes from language to world where meaning, understanding, and ability – all sorts of content involving characters rest on the socio-linguistic paradigm that makes externalism highly unique.

My understanding is that thought that may be in the form of proposition gets its justification through language and previous experience from our socio-linguistic framework. I think that the perception and the visual process have some tendencies to be reformulated in verbal propositions. The verbal propositions acquire its structures through language and world. Even in the case of visual perception of traffic jams and car driving the thought about how to avoid the traffic does not depend on language but is rather based on the visual imagery. However, I argue against this *internalist pendulum* as this process like car driving, or how to avoid traffic jams is not bounded by any innate rules, but the rules or the processes are applied by the people and

society, where instead of innateness, actually common sense, practices and situation regulate the experiences. The externalism appeals that the words do not have meaning in it, just as the shells have pearl naturally. The journey of externalism goes from language to world where meaning, understanding, and ability – all sorts of content involving characters are allied to the socio-linguistic paradigm that makes externalism unique.

Actually, the experts and sometime the ordinary people inject meaning to the words and so it becomes public centric. Both the words have descriptive and referential aboutness that is somehow related to the world and the external affairs. Even it is also true that because of the scientific knowledge, the meaning of the referred term can be changed, but it does not show that the reference of the term has been also conceptually changed. One big challenge that I think can go beyond the debate of internalism versus externalism is apparently the mind-world intermingled relation in terms of the mental event that is eventually thought oriented (subject centric) in a specific occasion. Here the content of the thought becomes world oriented (object centric) when it is loaded with concepts that have some causal referential directness to the reality.

The contribution that I attain here is the mind and world inter-reliant relation. For me thought can hook a causal referential directness to the reality through a conceptual insight of the agent. The embedment of mind and world relation is closely interacted with the external world that cites a way, which also generates the internal states to present the world. Let me clarify it here.

Though I believe that the linguistic expressions are internal, but it becomes external as language allows us to talk publicly about the experience. In this sense, meaning can be world centric and sharable. I do not believe that people intend to use

word with the meaning that they posit. Even there is no reduction of the word meaning to speaker's intention. Actually, speakers' meaning depends partly on the context sensitivity (that depends on linguistic practices) and partly on speaker's intention. In our shared language, as a fellow thinker, what we can share supervenes on how we are from the skin in (mentalese). Even the mental states in our linguistic communication cover a large territory that goes beyond the internal language system by entangling with the concepts of others. Personally, I firmly support that we need to take meaning and mind together so that it can hook a causal referential directness to the reality through the conceptual insight of an agent. I also think that an agent's mind can interrelate to the world through interacting with that world in terms of internal states, which represent the way the world is. Now the agent can use words to tell others about how our states represent things to be. Concepts enter into the picture and it makes some sense of the world that impact on us. My purpose is to go beyond the ongoing debate between externalism and internalism in the sense that the embedment hypothesis of mind-world can hook to the causal referential directness to the world (an externalist point that I fully accept). Here, we cannot reject the role of our conceptual insight that externalist tries to refute. I also believe that the causal history of content concerns about the shared language and we the language users, what have achieved (the contents) by our linguistic skills can be shared with others. I also strongly believe that mind, world and other people constitute a common circle where mind is related to the world and we cannot separate mental content from the physical world. The contents are sometimes directly and causally related to the world and also sometime indirectly related to the world through descriptions, especially in the case of non-existent conceptual terms. I believe that thoughts have some causal relation with the external world in the sense that thoughts as a state of mind causally and

referentially relates to the causal histories that engage several aspects including the linguistic skills, world, evolutionary forces etc. A few thoughts are there that are not tied to the matter of the facts. The reason is that they have some idiosyncratic efforts on the agents' behaviour. In the meantime, I furthermore believe that mental states have some causal power that helps it to relate to the world. But there are some cases where we will notice that the mental thoughts precede physical thoughts (especially world) like in the case of 'deaf and dumb' children. Here without any physical inputs mental construction of thoughts can perpetuate. I am speaking of the intentional properties of non-linguistic thoughts: mental images, like linguistically expressed thoughts can represent (or can be about) things in the world, can have conditions of satisfaction, etc. They are not the mere causal effects of our irradiated retinas etc. In addition, they in turn can play a causal role in our actions (not merely in our behaviours). This is another point that I give more attention to make sure that thought can go beyond the internalism and externalism debate.

Even in the case of linguistic communication I think language based communication process depends on the meaningful words, speech acts and communicative actions of the agents. All these have some sharable modes and have an intense relation with the world. My query is that can thought exist without language and meaning? One way we can put the argument is that the intention that produces the subject's thoughts can able to recognize the referent of the content of the thought without uttering any language. Therefore, intention can confer meaning of the words and helps to recognize the content of thought in the absence of language. It seems to me right that there is no essential connection between language and thought. By considering 'speaker meaning' as the base of 'linguistic meaning,' one can avoid language cum linguistic meaning in the sense that linguistic meaning and language do

not inheritantly associate with meaning. A similar process can follow in the case of thought, where thought can precede language as I discussed earlier. If so then we have to accept that meaning consists in the head of the speaker with some complex intentions. And the communicative actions consist of others by helping us to be aware regarding the intention of meaning.

My argument is that thought based on the concepts level cannot be detached from language and the public centric shareability of meaning. One may ask whether the meaningful thought that has some genuine contents can be discarded from language or not. To see all these conditions, I would like to concern about meaning first. Why we consider the words or sentences have their own meaning? Is it totally a fantasy or something else?

It sounds intriguing that actually the words and sentence have no meaning. Only people can insist meaning to the words. Therefore, insisting meaning to the words is a man-made process. The traditional way considers that the words derivatively mean something whereas, we human being mean something non-derivatively. In our ordinary life, we see that the color of tomato is non-derivatively red, whereas the color of book cover is derivatively red. We know that meaning is not like the mentioned facts. It is not anyway a property that one can ascribe to the words. We cannot inflict meaning on a word as we impose color to the objects. Even meaning is not some things that have some function and use based attitudes like the artefacts (table, chair etc.) Words are like dummy and we are the people who speak through the words. In reality, the words don't mean anything. People refer to or mean things by the use of words. This is a conventional way to see the meaning of the words that clash with the intention oriented mentales type of meaning that is attached with a proposition. It sounds promising that the meaning is actually the study of

belief, proposition and specially intention rather than language in the sense that it depends upon the speakers' meanings rather than linguistic meanings in general. But for me, thought that rest on meaningful words at a certain level also have an intention based part that is linked to subject's conceptual insight. But securely to understand the meaningfulness of the words is not any way a mentales process that totally detaches thought from the reality. Here, the bifurcation between content of the thought in terms of mind-world dualism can be challenged. I firmly conclude that my above appraisal (the proposal of going beyond) sounds successful, as the thoughts are a combination of intesion and extension where the intension side of thought (internal content of a thought) is suitable for the concepts and its meaning. Besides, the extension side of thought that have some propositional structures to derive the content of the thoughts are tied to the world.

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