SATYAJIT RAY AT THE CROSSROADS OF BENGAL RENAISSANCE

Dissertation submitted to Jadavpur University, Kolkata

For the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Arts)

By

Baisakhi Banerjee

Under the Supervision of

Prof. Mahua Sarkar

Professor, Department of History

Jadavpur University

Kolkata-700 032

2017

Certified that the Thesis entitled

----

submitted by me for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts at Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the Supervision of -----------------------

----

And that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before for any degree or diploma anywhere / elsewhere.

Countersigned by the   Candidate :

Supervisor :   Dated :

Dated :

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The present thesis 'Satyajit Ray At the Crossroads of Bengal Renaissance'has worked on the notion of placing Ray as imbued with the Renaissance ideals and how far these ideals were reflected in his Films. This research work is an offspring of long years of encouragement, sacrifices and efforts of many people. I am just an ordinary mortal who is blessed by family, friends and well wishers who have helped me to finish this thesis which germinated in my idea to transcend the barrier of disciplines and explores the cinematic journey of Ray from different perspectives. While acknowledging my indebtedness to various people, the name that comes first and foremost to my mind is my Maa. Without her encouragement my academic endeavours wouldn't have been successful ever. Encouragement and cooperation from my husband Manojit Mandal can never be thanked enough. My daughter Mohul remains the guiding light of all my efforts. She sacrificed the most while I was busy with my research work.

The very thought that I can dare to research about the maestro's works geminated in the long conversations I had with Prof. Sanjay Mukhopadhyay, the best teacher I ever met in the department of film studies, Jadavpur University and my guide under whom I started my research work. Prof. Mahua Sarkar of Dept. of History present Ph.D guide is the most encouraging teacher I have ever met. Had there not been her constant support and guidance, my research work would have never reached a culminating point Prof. Subhasis Biswas Dean of Arts, J.U. remains one of those pillars of strength who will always show the ways to overcome all obstacles. The young scholars in the department of History, J.U namely Priyanka , Mrinmoy & others have constantly extended their hearty support. I can never fail to thank them profusely.

My dear colleague Parveen Kaur has helped me immensely specially in the last phase of my research work by sharing my administrative duties. I cannot but humbly remember Late.Janab Sultan Ahmed's (President of my college) cooperation during the stage of my pre-submission. Janab Jameel Manzar the Vice President of governing body had been equally encouraging. I can't thank enough the other GB members namely Jahangir Sahab and JB. Ziauddin Haider .

Usually it is immensely tedious for any mother to carry on with her research work, but my burden was much lessened by Beladi , my daughter's governess, who took good care of my daughter during my research days and helped me to feel less guilty.

<u>CONTENTS</u>

INTRODUCTION

My continuing interest in Film Studies and Political Science has compelled me to choose a topic which can address both these disciplines. The formulation of my research question has however faced a problematic state since the topic cannot be dealt without tracing the theme through the time and space of history.Thus this effort seems to be a combination of three disciplines. This is important mainly to situate Satyajit Ray, an international Film maestro mainly as an icon of the cognitive revolution of 19th century Bengal.

Much has been written on the activities of Ray and his contribution towards films and vernacular Literature. Books such as '*Apu and After :Revisiting Ray's Cinema*' depicts Ray's magic.The simple poetry of his images and their emotional impact.To start with a biographical sketch of Satyajit Ray Andrew Robinson's book '*Satyajit Ray: The Inner Eye*'appears to be the most suited one.Marie Seton's book '*Portrait Of a Director: Satyajit Ray*' depicts his success as director and also depicts how his different films depict him as a scenarist,such as *'Kanchenjunga'*. Chandak Sengupta's book *'The Rays Before Satyajit'* gives an open hint to the development of a modernizing trend in Ray which was mainly inherited by him from his predecessors.

This literature review improved my understanding and at the same time I didnot find any vision connecting the personality with his time on a national and international level. He was a product of his time not borne out of any 'tabula rasa'.My original enterprise is to locate the contribution of this person within the metaphor of colonial modernity of Bengal. In the present thesis the much debated paradigm of the 'Bengal Renaissance' has been discussed with its features being earned both from tradition and European Enlightenment. The purpose is to signify the role of this last icon i,e Satyajit Ray among the intelligentsia of 'Renaissance' Bengal. Europe visited the East with its ideals of rationalism ,humanism and science .On the other side of the edge lay issues of poverty, gender discrimination and bourgeoisie nationalism. I discussed the Hypotheses with the following research question.

1.How Far Ray a product of European Enlightenment?

2.Was he the last metaphor of Bengal Renaissance?

3.What were his positive contributions towards a cultural production like Cinema?

4. What were his innovative contributions that acted as examples for the later films.

To attempt these questions I have limited my argument only to the discussion of Ray's Films.

My Chapters formed are thus

The present thesis has traced its evolution from the rise of renaissance movement to its influx into Colonial Bengal and consequent infiltration of its ideas into the minds of Satyajit Ray. However a brief discussion of the chapters will give a broad outline.

Chapter 1 of the thesis is entitled as *European Renaissance-The Harbinger of a New Cultural Modernity* . It gives a broad outline of the Renaissance phase that Europe witnessed during the 15th and 16th centuries.This chapter creates the base of the thesis framed on the role of an icon of the Renaissance.

Chapter 2 of the thesis entitled *The Road Towards An Enlightened Era* offers an explanation of the rise of Enlightenment ideas that was noticed in Europe in the 17th and 18th century. This Enlightenment ideas got its gradual infiltration into the colonial capital of Bengal through the process of colonization.Satyajit Ray was very much a product of the ideas of European Enlightenment.

Chapter 3 of the thesis entitled *The Advent of Renaissance in Bengal* explains the effect of this infiltration of Enlightenment ideas on Colonial Bengal and shows how the Bengali intelligentsia class got imbued into such ideological orientations of Colonial modernity.It speaks on the social and religious reform movements and the advent of Western education as vehicles of modernity.

Chapter 4 of the thesis entitled Satyajit *Ray as an icon of Colonial Modernity* relates the development of a liberal humanist attitude in Satyajit Ray and his consequent emergence as an eminent Filmmaker .That his films reflected his ideas and has put him at the crossroads of a Renaissance phase has been explained through this chapter.

Chapter 5 of the thesis the concluding part ends up with the probe as to how far Satyajit Ray's films could generate a liberal and humanistic attitude which he imbibed through a renaissance enriched ambience.

The Saddler Commission appointed to enquire into the state of the Calcutta University in 1917,commented on the usual degree of intellectual curiosity they found among the youth in Bengal.They were not satisfied,the commissioners commented ,with knowing what was going on in Bengal and abroad.They read extensively and did so for the sheer pleasure of finding out what was happening in the field of knowledge and what had happened in this area of human endeavour down the centuries.Thus Renaissance became a fact of Bengali life,lived otherwise in

an ambience of deprivation and,indeed poverty.Despite the material constraints,the leading intellectuals and reformers of the period were remarkable in their intellectual ambitions and achievements.

Thus they had a faith in the possibility of inter-cultural understanding,the ultimate validity of an inclusive civilization of mankind which could transcend all parochial boundaries.Such hopes and perceptions were major inheritance handed down by the great tradition of modern Bengali intellectual history.Despite the discouraging arrogance of the ruling race,their reluctance to concede humanity to their Indian subjects,the Bengali reformers, intellectuals ,creative artists and men of faith never lost trust in the universality of man's culture,the possibility of mutual understanding.

Satyajit Ray is in many ways shaped by the values of nineteenth century Bengal .The latter includes a moral compulsion to do with great thoroughness and devotion whatever task one undrertakes:we thus find him doing his work as a Film maker in a country like India, which is a self imposed task when he became director.Ray's achievements are very considerable .Decades of intensive study has given him a command over a wide range of subjects in the domain of Film making.His pattern of dedication,width of scholarship his knowledge of social and cultural History.His life of total integrity of dedication to scholarship entirely for its own sake are models unlikely to be emulated.He returns again and again to the protagonist of Bengal Renaissance, and to those of the West who in one way or another influenced or bore comparison with them.The mind of the cognitive scientist is a remembering ,knowing ,problem – solving,perceiving,communicating,reacting,planning,adapting kind of mind.

The legacy of Ray's films on the next generation of film makers will show how he has epitomized the tradition of the ' Bengal Renaissance' ushering a break after his demise.Bengal could never produce a personality like Satyajit Ray without the infiltration of these ideas.

The family archives of Satyajit Ray has been of great help to compose this research. The research work of late Siddhartha Ghosh on the Ray family was path-breaking in its time which helped much in the research work. Innumerable books, periodicals and photocopies are unfailing reliable source of information.Barun Chattopadhyay,who is himself working on a comprehensive biography of Dwarkanath and Kadambini Ganguli,led me to sources and issues that were new to me. The scanned documents of National Library,Nation Archives of India have also been helpful in the formulation of the research. Innumerable books on Satyajit Ray has

been helpful in formulating a detailed research problem that helped further to compose this thesis dissertation.

European Renaissance-The Harbinger of a New Cultural Modernity

The term 'renaissance'was coined by French historianJules Micheletin his 1855 work, *Histoire de France* (History of France) part VII. He used the word renaissance mainly to denote the birth of new consciousness and thinking of 14ᵗʰ century cultural upsurge in Italy.This cultural upsurge worked as kind of mirror where Michelet could witness his own escalation of thinking as he was thoroughly doomed and despondent after the death of his wife.

But if we go a little backward we find similar word 'rinascita'used by Giorgio Vasari in the biographies of Italian artificer[1].

Wallace Fergusson in his book 'The Renaissance in Historical Thought' has pointed out that the word Renaissance which was used as an epigram by Michelet was later given a noble meaning by Jacob Bhucardt in his book'The Civilization Of Renaissance in Italy'.

Renaissance with its varied contours

That Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay was also acquainted with the word Renaissance is evident from his writing *'Bibidho Probondho'* where he made reference to the word Renaissance while discussing the history of natives of Bengal or *' Bangalir Itihas'* .Here Bankim Chandra mentioned that sudden and unanticipated recovery of Greek literature made Europe enriched with new ideas and thinking. Europe experienced a knowledge upswing that gradually marked a civilizational progress with significant knowledge upgradation.He again opined that 15ᵗʰ century Bengal experienced similar knowledge upsurge with the rise of eminent personalities like Chaitanya,Raghunath,Gadadhar,Raghunandan and later on the Vaishnavite poets .This stage was enriched further by Bidyapati, Chandidas who preceded the age of Chaitanya. Bankim Chandra questioned the origin of Bengal Renaissance or from where do this renaissance originate.In 1880 while having a discussion with Haraprashad Shastri he compared this knowledge upsurge of Bengal with Florentine renaissance.Keshab Chandra Sen used the word 'Nabajagriti '.Bipin pal compared Italian Renaissance and Bengal renaissance and considered Raja Rammohun Roy as the mastermind of Bengal Renaissance.This trend was followed by Shivnath Shastri who later composed *'Ramtanu Lahiri O Tatkalin Bangasamaj'*.In the 20ᵗʰ century M.N.Roy ,the spokesperson of Commintern, in his *'India In Transition'*(1922) pointed out that as renaissance was the ideological replica of Bourgeousie Revolution it was only a kind of broker of English Bourgeousie class. The Bengali middle class were also not capable

to carry on the essence of this type of revolution in thinking.Shivnarayan Ray's 'Renaissance Jigyasha'gradually moved away from the mechanical Marxist interpretation of disregarding the noble essence of Renaissance. Infact the basic tenet of Renaissance that condemned the religious domination or subjugation was not at all honoured or given importance by western educated Indians.Thus the historians like B.B.Misra ,Anil Seal have given a negative approach and is not prepared to consider its noble essence.

However Buchardt's interpretation of Renaissance evoked much debate among the western scholars.A good amount of books and articles were written following Buchardt's explanation.There are scholars like Wallace Fergusson,Federico Chabod,Johan Huizinga,Hans Baron,Dennis Hay,Kenneth Clarke,Edward Panofsky,P.O.Kristeller who criticized Buchardt's interpretation as not only one sided but based on illusion. The source that intensified these interpretations against Buchardt were religious romanticism at the end of 19th century, narrow and aggressive nationalism of Germany and France ,re-organization or revaluation of economic and social history of medieval and Renaissance period, new thinking about classical tradition and humanism.

The critics mainly pointed out that the liberal attitude of the 19th century and the Hegelian idealistic inspiration motivated Buchardt to apply the word 'Rinascita'which was coined by Vasari,in every possible case of political ,religious and cultural efflorescence. The working of Medieval Church, working of the state, independence of man from the rigid laws and custom of medieval church ,the planning for a well constructed state .All appeared to have been embodied within the single concept of Renaissance by Buchardt.In fact he visualized Renaissance as a separate independent age which worked as a breakthrough that succeeded in initiating a new age devoid of any religious narrowness and parochialism. He changed Mitchele's writing of discovery of Man and Nature into discovery of world and of Man .He could historically project an age where man could succeeded to place his personality on a high moral and respectful zone. But the last 133 years of research and writing on Renaissance clearly negate classical tradition as the source of Renaissance. Again Renaissance cannot be called the birth child of literary and cultural upsurge that took place in Italy .Also it cannot be said as sui generis or self developed age which was not dependent on any previous cultural trail.Infact it is better to say that evolution actually intensify changes which is the characteristics of every age.The rise of Humanism and liberal ambience in Italy instilled a growing cultural upgradation that never denied the active

complicity of the church. This is very well proved by Emile Gebhart,Doughlas Bush,C.H.Haskins and many others. Albert Hyma has talked about the mystic inspiration of Medieval age and Humanism of North Europe. Louis Curajod has spoken of the isolated industrial development in Burgundy and France and in no way it was swayed by the Renaissance stimulus. Viollet-le-Duc , Huizinga provided elaborations to escalate the medieval cultural achievements.Elliote Gilson has shown that that in the Medieval times the observance of Christian tradition was witnessed along with a trend of   sudden cultural spurt. The Medieval period was the harbinger of the development of Humanism in Europe during the Renaissance period. Dante talked of the platonic love in his *Vita Nuova* . Thorndyke and George Sarton however ,are of different opinion .They pointed out that scientific development during the Medieval times was obstructed by the renaissance trends.C.H.Haskins on the other hand has tried to trace the trends of renaissance in the 12th century.Other historians try to trace its origin during the days of Charlemagne. Huizinger in his books *Men and Ideas* and *Waning of The Middle Ages* have pointed out about the pronouncements of medieval customs and industrial growth and occurrences could be witnessed during the Renaissance period[2].

But Humanism can be considered an essential tenet of Renaissance. But what were its trends and features.Myron Gilmore[3], E.Garin[4], Hans Baron[5] ,P.O.Kristeller[6] all have given different perspectives of Renaissance. Kristeller has tried to identify three distinct stream of this"essentially scholarly educational and literary movement". In the first case rhetoric was used while writing letters,bonds,speeches. Latin was also taught in France.From 13th century onwards literature was added with Rhetoric.For this Italy became noted.At the end of 14th century to this was added the classical Greek Literature.This became the second trend.Thus grammar,rhetoric,poetry,History,Deontology the regular syllabus of the students.This syllabus was named "Studia Humanities".The third stream was motivated by neo –platonic thinking.

 The Humanist movement was motivated by several trends of thinking.The Humanists were mainly influenced byAristotle, Christian Mysticism and Plato.The Humanist thinking rested on the idea that man should have belief in himself and should control his fate and destiny. This was the time when Natural religion came into origin. Infact the main feature of Renaissance was to protest against medieval dogmas and respect the present world.

That Renaissance was an elitist movement is beyond question. The age was adorned with 'gifted personalities' as pointed out by Vasari. During this age we hear of certain persons who were

called "Lumo Universale" .But Krystellar also talked of conducive political and economic situation that favoured such cultural upsurge. But how far this politico-economic situation was really conducive is debatable.The proponents of Medieval age supremacy emphasized on the continuity of industrial skills that were followed during the Renaissance age[7].

But apart from the trends of contuinity even the originality and the change that the age brought was truly commendable.Even the strong upholder of medieval continuity cannot deny the 'astonishing vigour and originality of the fifteenth century Italy in painting,sculpture and in architecture…..By their exploration of perspective,of landscape of the nude,and of the human face,they opened up fresh dimensions in art' The art of Pissano,Michelengelo improved stage by stage. Thus Michelengelo's David proved much more superior to ancient Greek art formations.His compositions of loftya and sturdy Jesus,the desolate look of mother Mary all seemed to be absent in compositions of classical age. The compositions of Sandro Botticelli like *punishment of the rebels*, *Temptations Of Christ, Trial Of The Mosses.* His other compositions *La Primevera* was a novel one which blended the sketch of feet with the subtle waves of water in a wonderful and majestic way. Leonardo's Monalisa features a mysterious smile which remain unsolved for ages. Even the anatomy of plants has been presented in a vivid and distinct way. The distinct anatomy of plants can be obtained from the notebook of Leonardo and from the preserved paintings of Windsor Castle. The Madonna of Rafael is well known but the replica of *Saint Cecilia* or Pope Leo X[th] is also distinct for its vividness.

Vasari while describing the Renaissance period has pointed out about *rinascita* or the ideology of *'rinascimento* and *imitatio*. But what kind of imitation was made during the Renaissance period. Whether this imitation was blind folded or was an example of distinct art forms. If it was an imitation it naturally sever the distinct art forms from the Renaissance tides.But this imitation was not the imitation of medieval obscurities where stagnation and ingloriousness dominated.This imitation should be the imitation of classical Greek and latin tradition.The poetry writing,language compositions,sculpture,painting all should follow the brilliant artistry and virtuosity of classical age of Greece and Rome. But there should not be blind emulation. Francesco Petrarca was the first modern thinker as pointed out by Renan to initiate this process of imitation of Greek and Roman culture. When Petrarca discovered a bunch of letters of Marcus Tullius Cicero from a church library he got too overwhelmed to write that it is *'far better to speak like Cicero than to be Pope'* . Il Canzoniere or Song Book also known as the Rime Sparse , but originally titled Rerum vulgarium ,is a collection of poems by the Italian humanist, poet, and writer Petrarca[8].

Though the majority of Petraeca's[9] output was in Latin, the *Canzoniere* was written in the vernacular, a language of trade, despite Petrarch's view that Italian was less adequate for expression. Of its 366 poems, the vast majority are in sonnet form (317), though the sequence contains a number of canzoni (29), sestine (9), madrigals (4), and ballate (7). Its central theme is the poet's love for Laura, a woman Petrarch allegedly met on April 6, 1327, in the Church of Sainte Claire in Avignon.A few lines can be quoted from the book

"He looks in vain for heavenly beauty,he

Who never looked upon her perfect eyes

The vivid blue orbs burning brilliantly-

He doesn't know how love yields and denies,

He only knows who knows how sweetly she

Can talk and laugh,the sweetness of her sighs.."

(translator-Joseph Auslander)

However Petrarca deserve respect not only for his capacity to revive the Greek – Roman trends in Renaissance cultural process but he was eminent for his humanism and love for the world. This makes him different from Dante .His *Letters to Classical Authors* was very artificial . Giovanni Boccaccio ,another scholar knew both Greek and Latin. His most noted composition *'Decameron'* is truly remarkeable. The book is structured as a Frame story containing 100 tales told by a group of seven young women and three young men sheltering in a secluded villa just outside Florence to escape the Black Death, which was afflicting the city. Boccaccio probably conceived the *Decameron* after the epidemic of 1348, and completed it by 1353. The various tales of love in *The Decameron* range from the erotic to the tragic. Tales of wit, practical jokes , and life lessons contribute to the mosaic. In addition to its literary value and widespread influence (for example on Chaucer's The Canterburry Tales), it provides a document of life at the time. Written in the vernacular of the Florentine Language it is considered a masterpiece of classical early Italian prose. Ludovico Ariosto , (8 September 1474 – 6 July 1533) was an Italian poet. He is best known as the author of the romance epic *Orland Furioso*(1516). The poem, a continuation of Matteo Maria Boiardo's *Orlando Innamorato*, describes the adventures of Charlemagne, Orlando, and the Franks as they battle against the Saracens with diversions into many sideplots. Ariosto composed the poem in the ottava rima rhyme scheme and introduced narrative commentary throughout the work. Ariosto also coined the term "humanism" for choosing to focus upon the strengths and potential of humanity, rather than only upon its role as subordinate to God.

THE RENAISSANCE BUILDERS

The Scrovegni Chapel is a church in Padua,Italy. It contains a fresco cycle by Giotto, completed about 1305 and considered to be an important masterpiece of Western Art. It is 20.88 metres long, 8.41 metres wide, and 12.65 metres high. The area is composed of a square area (4.49 meters deep and 4.31 meters wide) and a pentagonal area (2.57 meters deep) One of the main features of Giotto's paintings is his focus on revealing human emotion through facial expressions. Along with the naturalistic beauty of the blue sky offsetting the human drama, this piece by Giotto from the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua eloquently and intentionally captures the amazement, grief, and reverence undergirding the effects of Jesus' actions directing the Biblical story. Focusing on the figure representing Jesus, the stern expression on his face has immediate

impact. This expression helps to convey the determination of Jesus in the story to show the glory of God through his miraculous act. His expression also sets him apart from the others participating and witnessing the event.For example, the group to the left of the raised Lazarus, representing the Jews in the narrative, has raised hands and mixed expressions of curiosity and disbelief, whereas the two figures kneeling at the lower portion of the painting embody and convey acceptance of Jesus as the Son of God. Mary of Bethany, one of Lazarus' two sisters, communicates through her eyes an ambiguity and multiplicity of emotions. There is an indication of intense grief and concern along with a glimmer of astonished gratitude, like a mother who, believing her child to be in imminent danger, has just realized her child is safe and protected.

Through Giotto's art, the presence of God's actions upon the human world are powerfully expressed. The artist embeds a theological understanding that, although there are many ways to respond to God and to Jesus, Lazarus was dead but now is risen. *The Descent from the Cross* (or *Deposition of Christ*, or *Descent of Christ from the Cross*) is a panel painting by the Flemish artist Rogier van der Weyden created c. 1435, now in the Museo del Prado, Madrid. The crucified Christ is lowered from the cross, his lifeless body held by Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus.

The c. 1435 date is estimated based on the work's style, and because the artist acquired wealth and renown around this time, most likely from the prestige this work allowed him. It was painted early in his career, shortly after he completed his apprenticeship with Robert Campin and shows the older painter's influence, most notable in the hard sculpted surfaces, realistic facial features and vivid primary colours, mostly reds, whites and blues. The work was a self-conscious attempt by Van der Weyden to create a masterpiece that would establish an international reputation. Van der Weyden positioned Christ's body in the T-shape of a crossbow to reflect the commission from the Leuven guild of archers (Schutterij) for their chapel Onze-Lieve-Vrouw-van-Ginderbuiten (Notre-Dame-hors-les-Murs). Andrea Mantegna was an Italian painter, a student of Roman archeology, and son-in-law of Jacopo Bellini. Like other artists of the time, Mantegna experimented with perspective, e.g., by lowering the horizon in order to create a sense of greater monumentality. His flinty, metallic landscapes and somewhat stony figures give evidence of a fundamentally sculptural approach to painting. He also led a workshop that was the leading producer of prints in Venice before 1500. asaccio, born Tommaso di Ser Giovanni di Simone, was the first great Italian painter of the Quattrocento period of the Italian Renaissance.

According to Vasari, Masaccio was the best painter of his generation because of his skill at recreating lifelike figures and movements as well as a convincing sense of three-dimensionality.Masaccio died at twenty-six and little is known about the exact circumstances of his death.

The name Masaccio is a humorous version of Maso (short for Tommaso), meaning "clumsy" or "messy" Tom. The name may have been created to distinguish him from his principal collaborator, also called Maso, who came to be known as Masolino ("little/delicate Tom").

Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni (6 March 1475 – 18 February 1564) was an Italian sculptor, painter, architect, and poet of the High Renaissance who exerted an unparalleled influence on the development of Western art. Considered to be the greatest living artist during his lifetime, he has since been described as one of the greatest artists of all time. Despite making few forays beyond the arts, his versatility in the disciplines he took up was of such a high order that he is often considered a contender for the title of the archetypal Renaissance man, along with his rival and fellow Florentine Medici client, Leonardo da Vinci.

A number of Michelangelo's works of painting, sculpture, and architecture rank among the most famous in existence. His output in every field of interest was prodigious; given the sheer volume of surviving correspondence, sketches, and reminiscences taken into account, he is the best-documented artist of the 16th century. He sculpted two of his best-known works, the *Pietà* and *David*, before the age of thirty. Despite holding a low opinion of painting, Michelangelo also created two of the most influential frescoes in the history of Western art: the scenes from Genesis on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in Rome, and *The Last Judgment* on its altar wall. As an architect, Michelangelo pioneered the Mannerist style at the Laurentian Library. At the age of 74, he succeeded Antonio da Sangallo the Younger as the architect of St. Peter's Basilica. Michelangelo transformed the plan so that the western end was finished to his design, as was the dome, with some modification, after his death.

Michelangelo was unique as the first Western artist whose biography was published while he was alive. In fact, two biographies were published during his lifetime; one of them, by Giorgio

Vasari, proposed that he was the pinnacle of all artistic achievement since the beginning of the Renaissance, a viewpoint that continued to have currency in art history for centuries.

In his lifetime he was often called *Il Divino* ("the divine one"). One of the qualities most admired by his contemporaries was his *terribilità*, a sense of awe-inspiring grandeur. The attempts by subsequent artists to imitate Michelangelo's impassioned and highly personal style resulted in Mannerism, the next major movement in Western art after the High Renaissance.

Lorenzo Ghiberti ,born1378 – 1 December 1455, also known as Lorenzo di Bartolo, was a Florentine Italian artist of the Early Renaissance best known as the creator of the bronze doors of the Florence Baptistery, called by Michelangelo the *Gates of Paradise*. Trained as a goldsmith and sculptor, he established an important workshop for sculpture in metal. His book of *Commentari* contains important writing on art, as well as what may be the earliest surviving autobiography by any artist. Filippo Brunelleschi born on 1377 – April 15, 1446 was an Italian designer and a key figure in architecture, recognised to be the first modern engineer, planner and sole construction supervisor. He was one of the founding fathers of the Renaissance. He is generally well known for developing a technique for linear perspective in art and for building the dome of the Florence Cathedral. Heavily depending on mirrors and geometry, to "reinforce Christian spiritual reality", his formulation of linear perspective governed pictorial depiction of space until the late 19th century. It also had the most profound – and quite unanticipated – influence on the rise of modern science. His accomplishments also include other architectural works, sculpture, mathematics, engineering, and ship design. His principal surviving works are to be found in Florence Italy. Unfortunately, his two original linear perspective panels have been lost.

Brunelleschi was born in Florence, Italy. Little is known about his early life, the only sources being Antonio Manetti and Giorgio Vasari. According to these sources, Filippo's father was Brunellesco di Lippo, a notary, and his mother was Giuliana Spini. Filippo was the middle of their three children. The young Filippo was given a literary and mathematical education intended to enable him to follow in the footsteps of his father, a civil servant. Being artistically inclined, however, Filippo enrolled in the *Arte della Seta*, the silk merchants' Guild, which also included goldsmiths, metalworkers, and bronze workers. He became a master

goldsmith in 1398. It was thus not a coincidence that his first important building commission, the Ospedale degli Innocenti, came from the guild to which he belonged.

In 1401, Brunelleschi entered a competition to design a new set of bronze doors for the Florence Baptistery. Seven competitors each produced a gilded bronze panel, depicting the Sacrifice of Isaac. Brunelleschi's entry, which, with that of Lorenzo Ghiberti, is one of only two to have survived, made reference to the Greco-Roman *Boy with Thorn*. Brunelleschi's panel consists of several pieces bolted to the back plate.

The main proponents of politics of Medieval age were Bruni and Mechiavelli.They were mainly Humanist Historian.Infact Mechiavelli asked the question which had not asked before by political thinkers-or had not been asked since antiquity-such as those of the role of Force,of religion,of virtu in politics,of the place of the civic militia ,of the methods of territorial expansion,of the function of founders and reformers of states,of the interaction of society and institutions and the connection with the corruption of the relationship between will and necessity between *virtu* and *fortuna*.Mechiavelli opined that the main cause of political unrest in Florence was the generalization of politics.He believed that power should be distributed among the various classes of society that no particular class should get more power.Thus Mechiavelli stressed on the need for a 'Mixed Economy'[10].

Trends of Renaissance Age

However the main point of the discussion is to find out the reason for stressing on the need for reviving the cultural upsurge of classical age and also assessing its importance during the Renaissance period.It was not that in the medieval age there was no practice of classical literature and culture.But they were only 'decorative fringes' devoid of any inner cravings to revive them.The classics of renaissance period was only 'a pattern of life'.There was realism in the Medieval age which was only the imitation of nature ,thus was limited and mechanical.This realism of classical age found its expression during the Renaissance period in a more sensible way. Leonardo gave a distinct autonomous character to the Renaissance phase and made significant research with the renaissance era. Infact whether renaissance was a phase of paganism or was a antichurch or anti God movement. Edgar Wind in his'Pagan Mysteries In the

Renaissance' has pointed out that the statue of the Venus Goddess of Love was sculpted on the model of Maddonna. Rudolf Wittkower in his 'Architectural Principles in the Age Of Humanism' has pointed out that Christ was represented as the savior of human kind during the medieval age whereas during the Renaissance period Christ was represented as embodiment of bodily beauty.The neo-platonic thinking of Michelengelo raised his compositions from the stagnant positions of Sistine Chapel to the position of spiritualism[11].

In fact there are various stages of renaissance which entailed different forms of cultural upsurges with different characteristics. There was the rise of 'Civic Humanism' during the clash with autocracy of Milan, rise of sense of freedom among individuals. There was significant development of human personality during this phase. But the age witnessed varied political conspiracies amidst which development of human personalities took a significant turn.

This was mainly because as Jacob Buchardt has pointed out that 'political impotence does not hinder the different tendencies and manifestations of private life from thriving in the fullest vigour and variety.

The rise of renaissance phase has both political and economic basis. However the economic base recently has been under much survey. Initially the rise of renaissance phase has been judged in the context of Bourgeousie Revolution, rise of Bourgeousie class, rise of capitalism. However, recently this Marxist interpretation of the rise of renaissance has been studied closely.Dopsch,Latouche,Henri Pirenne gave an economic basis of the rise of renaissance period. Pirenne pointed out that the advent of Islam in the trade routes of Mediterranean sea and the spread of urban civilization gradually brought an end to the classical civilization. But Robert Lopez in his 'Muhammad and Charlemagne'has strongly refuted the doctrine of Henri Pirenne in his 'Cambridge Economic History Of Europe' part II. Pierenne pointed out that Henri Pirenne (23 December 1862 – 24 October 1935) was a Belgian historian. A medievalist of Walloon descent, he wrote a multivolume history of Belgium in French and became a national hero. He also became prominent in the nonviolent resistance to the Germans who occupied Belgium in World War I[12] .

Henri Pirenne's reputation today rests on three contributions to European history for what has become known as the Pirenne Thesis, concerning origins of the Middle Ages in reactive state formation and shifts in trade and for a distinctive view of European medieval history and for his model of the development of the medieval city.

Pirenne argued that profound social, economic, cultural, and religious movements in the long term resulted from equally profound underlying causes, and this attitude influenced Marc Bloch and the outlook of the French Annales School of social history. Though Pirenne had his opponents, notably Alfons Dopsch who disagreed on essential points, several recent historians of the Middle Ages have taken Pirenne's main theses, however much they are modified, as starting points. Robert Lopez however criticized Pirenne's thesis in the sense that Pirenne considered the disappearance of gold coins,end of papyrus, disappearance of western silk clothes as the indicators of the decline of classical civilization. Robert Lopez pointed out that all this never disappeared and continued till 9th century A.D. From 10th century onwards there was a gradual improvement in the stages of money economy[13].

The Effluxion of Philosophical Ideas During the Renaissance Age.

Kristellar noticed three separate streams of philosophical thinking.The Aristotelian and platonic thinking that was strong during the Medieval phase continued during the Renaissance period. This continuation of thinking led to the development of Humanistic feeling. Humanism is a philosophical and ethical stance that emphasizes the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively, and affirms their ability to improve their lives through the use of reason and ingenuity as opposed to submitting blindly to tradition and authority or sinking into cruelty and brutality. Humanism can be divided into three phases i) Petraecan Humanism as he hoped to revive ancient Roman republicanism ii)Civic Humanism , Hans Baron (June 22, 1900 – November 26, 1988),was a German-American historian of political thought and literature. His main contribution to the historiography of the period was to introduce in 1928 the term *civic humanism* (denoting most if not all of the content of classical Republicanism). iii)During the 16th century thinking of Guichardini and Machiavelli brought about practical Humanism .Another ideology called Neoplatonism which was used to designate a tradition of philosophy that arose in the 3rd century AD and persisted until shortly after the closing of the Platonic Academy in Athens in AD 529 by Justinian I. Neoplatonists were heavily influenced

by Plato, but also by the Platonic tradition that thrived during the six centuries which separated the first of the Neoplatonists from Plato[14] .

In defining the term "Neoplatonism", it is difficult to reduce the school of thought to a concise set of ideas that all Neoplatonic philosophers shared in common. The work of Neoplatonic philosophy involved describing the derivation of the whole of reality from a single principle, "the One." While the Neoplatonists generally shared some basic assumptions about the nature of reality, there were also considerable differences in their views and approaches, and so it can be difficult to summarize the philosophical content of Neoplatonism briefly. Instead, the most concise definition of Neoplatonism casts it as an historical term. It refers to the dynamic philosophical tradition that Neoplatonism was over the course of its history: to the work of Plotins, who is traditionally identified as the founder of Neoplatonism, and to the many thinkers after him, who developed, responded to and criticized his ideas[15].

Scholasticism[16] is a method of critical thought which dominated teaching by the academics ("scholastics," or "schoolmen") of medieval universities in Europe from about 1100 to 1700, and a program of employing that method in articulating and defending dogma in an increasingly pluralistic context. It originated as an outgrowth of and a departure from Christian monastic schools at the earliest European universities. The first institutions in the West to be considered universities were established in Italy, France, Spain, and England in the late 11th and the 12th centuries for the study of arts,law , medicine, and theology,such as Schola Medica Salernitana the University of Bologna, and the University of Paris. Scholasticism is not so much a philosophy or a theology as a method of learning, as it places a strong emphasis on dialectical reasoning to extend knowledge by inference and to resolve contradictions. Scholastic thought is also known for rigorous conceptual analysis and the careful drawing of distinctions. In the classroom and in writing, it often takes the form of explicit disputation a topic drawn from the tradition is broached in the form of a question, opponents' responses are given, a counterproposal is argued and opponents' arguments rebutted. Because of its emphasis on rigorous dialectical method, scholasticism was eventually applied to many other fields of study.

As a program, scholasticism began as an attempt at harmonization on the part of medieval Christian thinkers, to harmonize the various authorities of their own tradition, and to reconcile Christian theology with classical and late antiquity philosophy, especially that

of Aristotle but also of Neoplatonism .The main figures of scholasticism include Anslem of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotas, William of Okham, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. Saint Thomas Aquinas was the foremost classical proponent of natural Theology and the father of Thomism. His influence on Western Thought is considerable, and much of modern philosophy developed or opposed his ideas, particularly in the areas of ethics, natural law, metaphysics, and political theory. Unlike many currents in the Church of the time, Thomas embraced several ideas put forward by Aristotle—whom he called "the Philosopher"—and attempted to synthesize Aristotelian Philosophy with the principles of Christianity. The works for which he is best known are the Summa Theologiae and the Summa contra Gentiles. His commentaries on Scripture and on Aristotle form an important part of his body of work. Furthermore, Thomas is distinguished for his eucharistic hymns, which form a part of the Church's liturgy.

During the Medieval days Plato, Pythagoras ,their education, practice of maths , thinking was not unknown. Like all philosophy Renaissance philosophy has its basis ,the knowledge of man's relation with god, the knowledge of assessment of man's morality. Renaissance humanism[12] is the study of classical antiquity, at first in Italy and then spreading across Western Europe in the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries. The term *Renaissance humanism* is contemporary to that period — Renaissance (*rinascimento* "rebirth") and "humanist" (whence modern *humanism*; also *Renaissance humanism* to distinguish it from later developments grouped as humanism).

Renaissance humanism was a response to the utilitarian approach and what came to be depicted as the "narrow pedantry" associated with medieval scholasticism. Humanists sought to create a citizenry able to speak and write with eloquence and clarity and thus capable of engaging in the civic life of their communities and persuading others to virtuous and prudent actions. This was to be accomplished through the study of the "studia humanitatis", today known as the humanities: grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy.

Early Italian humanism, which in many respects continued the grammatical and rhetorical traditions of the Middle Ages, not merely provided the old Trivium with a new and more ambitious name (*Studia humanitatis*), but also increased its actual scope, content and

significance in the curriculum of the schools and universities and in its own extensive literary production. The *studia humanitatis* excluded logic, but they added to the traditional grammar and rhetoric not only history, Greek, and moral philosophy, but also made poetry, once a sequel of grammar and rhetoric, the most important member of the whole group. Some of the first humanists were great collectors of antique manuscripts, including Petrarch, Giovanni Boccaccio, Coluccio Salutati, and Poggio Bracciolini. Of the four, Petrarch was dubbed the "Father of Humanism" because of his devotion to Greek and Roman scrolls. Many worked for the Catholic Church and were in holy orders, like Petrarch, while others were lawyers and chancellors of Italian cities, and thus had access to book copying workshops, such as Petrarch's disciple Salutati, the Chancellor of Florence[17] .

In Italy, the humanist educational program won rapid acceptance and, by the mid-15th century, many of the upper classes had received humanist educations, possibly in addition to traditional scholasticist ones. Some of the highest officials of the Catholic Church were humanists with the resources to amass important libraries. Such was Cardinal Basilios Bessarion, a convert to the Catholic Church from Greek Orthodoxy, who was considered for the papacy, and was one of the most learned scholars of his time. There were several 15th-century and early 16th-century humanist Popes one of whom, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II), was a prolific author and wrote a treatise on *The Education of Boys*. These subjects came to be known as the humanities, and the movement which they inspired is shown as humanism.

The migration waves of Byzantine Greek scholars and émigrés in the period following the Crusader sacking of Constantinople and the end of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 greatly assisted the revival of Greek and Roman literature and science via their greater familiarity with ancient languages and works. They included Gemistus Pletho, George of Trebizond, Theodorus Gaza, and John Argyropoulos.

Italian humanism spread northward to France, Germany, the Low Countries, and England with the adoption of large-scale printing after the end of the era of incunabula (or books printed prior to 1501), and it became associated with the Protestant Reformation. In France, pre-eminent humanist Guillaume Budé (1467–1540) applied the philological methods of Italian humanism to the study of antique coinage and to legal history, composing a detailed commentary on Justinian's Code. Budé was a royal absolutist (and not a republican like the early

Italian *umanisti*) who was active in civic life, serving as a diplomat for François I and helping to found the Collège des Lecteurs Royaux (later the Collège de France). Meanwhile, Marguerite de Navarre, the sister of François I, was a poet, novelist, and religious mystic who gathered around her and protected a circle of vernacular poets and writers, including Clément Marot, Pierre de Ronsard, and François Rabelais.

Renaissance Philosophers

Nicholas of Cusa (1401 – 11 August 1464), also referred to as Nicholas of Kues and Nicolaus Cusanus, was a German philosopher, theologian, jurist, and astronomer. One of the first German proponents of Renaissance humanism, he made spiritual and political contributions in European history. A notable example of this is his mystical or spiritual writings on "learned ignorance," as well as his participation in power struggles between Rome and the German states of the Holy Roman Empire.

Papal legate to Germany from 1446, he was appointed cardinal for his merits by Pope Nicholas V in 1448 and Prince–Bishop of Brixen two years later. In 1459 he became vicar general in the Papal States.

Nicholas of Cusa has remained an influential figure. During the period 2000-2001, the sixth centennial of his birth was celebrated on four continents and was commemorated by publications on his life and work.

Nicholas of Cusa was noted for his deeply mystical writings about Christianity, particularly on the possibility of knowing God with the divine human mind — not possible through mere human means — via "learned ignorance". Cusanus wrote of the enfolding of creation in God and their unfolding in creation. He was suspected by some of holding pantheistic beliefs, but his writings were never accused of being heretical. Physicist and philosopher Max Bernhard Weinstein wrote that Nicholas was, to a certain extent, a Pandeist. Nicholas also wrote in *De coniecturis* about using conjectures or surmises to rise to better understanding of the truth. The individual might rise above mere reason to the vision of the intellect, but the same person might fall back from such vision[18].

Theologically, Nicholas anticipated the profound implications of Reformed teaching on the harrowing of Hell (Sermon on Psalm 30:11), followed by Pico della Mirandola, who similarly explained the *descensus* in terms of Christ's agony.

Marsilio Ficino[19] (19 October 1433 – 1 October 1499) was an Italian scholar and Catholic priest who was one of the most influential humanist philosophers of the early Italian Renaissance. He was also an astrologer, a reviver of Neoplatonism in touch with every major academic thinker and writer of his day and the first translator of Plato's complete extant works into Latin. His Florentine Academy, an attempt to revive Plato's Academy, had some influence on the direction and tenor of the Italian Renaissance and the development of European philosophy.

The documentary "Les mystères du Tarot de Marseille" (Arte, 18 février 2015) claims Marsilio Ficino was the inventor of the Tarot de Marseille.

Ficino's main original work was his treatise on the immortality of the soul (Theologia Platonica de immrtalitate animae). In the rush of enthusiasm for every rediscovery from Antiquity, he exhibited a great interest in the arts of astrology , which landed him in trouble with the Roman Catholic Church. In 1489 he was accused of magic before Pope Innocent VIII and needed strong defense to preserve him from the condemnation of heresy

Writing in 1492 Ficino proclaimed: "This century, like a golden age, has restored to light the liberal arts, which were almost extinct:grammar, poetry rhetoric, painting, sculpture, architecture, music ... this century appears to have perfected astrology."

Ficino's letters, extending over the years 1474–1494, survive and have been published. He also wrote *De amore* (1484) and the influential *De vita libri tres* (*Three books on life*.) *De vita*, published in 1489, provides a great deal of curious contemporary medical and astrological advice for maintaining health and vigor, as well as espousing the Neoplatonist view of the world's ensoulment and its integration with the human soul:

'There will be some men or other, superstitious and blind, who see life plain in even the lowest animals and the meanest plants, but do not see life in the heavens or the world ... Now if those little men grant life to the smallest particles of the world, what folly! what envy! neither to know

that the Whole, in which 'we live and move and have our being,' is itself alive, nor to wish this to be so.

One metaphor for this integrated "aliveness" is Ficino's astrology. In the *Book of Life*, he details the interlinks between behavior and consequence. It talks about a list of things that hold sway over a man's destiny.

Probably due to early influences from his father Diotifeci, who was a doctor to Cosimo de' Medici, Ficino published Latin and Italian treatises on medical subjects such as *Consiglio contro la pestilenza* (Recommendations for the treatment of the plague) and *De vita libri tres* (Three books on life). His medical works exerted considerable influence on Renaissance physicians such as Paracelsus, with whom he shared the perception on the unity of the micro- and macrocosmos, and their interactions, through somatic and psychological manifestations, with the aim to investigate their signatures to cure diseases. Those works, which were very popular at the time, dealt with astrological and alchemical concepts. Thus Ficino came under the suspicion of heresy; especially after the publication of the third book in 1489, which contained specific instructions on healthful living.

Ficino introduced the term and concept of "platonic love" in the West. It first appeared in a letter to Alamanno Donati in 1476, but was later fully developed all along his work, mainly his famous *De amore*. He also practiced this love metaphysic with Giovanni Cavalcanti, whom he made the principal character in his commentary on the *Convivio*, and to whom he wrote ardent love letters in Latin that were published in his *Epistulae* in 1492; there are also numerous other indications to suggest that Ficino's erotic impulses were directed exclusively towards men. After his death his biographers had a difficult task trying to refute those who spoke of his homosexual tendencies. But his sincere and deep faith, and membership of the clergy, put him beyond the reach of gossip, and while praising love for the same sex, he also condemned sodomy in the *Convivium*.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola[20] (24 February 1463 – 17 November 1494) was an Italian Renaissance nobleman and philosopher.He is famed for the events of 1486, when, at the age of 23, he proposed to defend 900 theses on religion, philosophy, natural philosophy, and magic against all comers, for which he wrote the *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, which has been called the "Manifesto of the Renaissance", and a key text of Renaissance humanism and of

what has been called the "Hermetic Reformation". From 1480 to 1482, he continued his studies at the University of Padua, a major center of Aristotelianism in Italy. Already proficient in Latin and Greek, he studied Hebrew and Arabic in Padua with Elia del Medigo, a Jewish Averroist, and read Aramaic manuscripts with him as well. Del Medigo also translated Judaic manuscripts from Hebrew into Latin for Pico, as he would continue to do for a number of years. Pico also wrote sonnets in Latin and Italian which, because of the influence of Savonarola, he destroyed at the end of his life.

He spent the next four years either at home, or visiting humanist centres elsewhere in Italy. In 1485, he travelled to the University of Paris, the most important centre in Europe for Scholastic philosophy and theology, and a hotbed of secular Averroism. It was probably in Paris that Giovanni began his *900 Theses* and conceived the idea of defending them in public debate

In the *Oratio de hominis dignitate* (*Oration on the Dignity of Man*, 1486), Pico justified the importance of the human quest for knowledge within a Neoplatonic framework.

The *Oration* also served as an introduction to Pico's 900 theses, which he believed to provide a complete and sufficient basis for the discovery of all knowledge, and hence a model for mankind's ascent of the chain of being. The 900 Theses are a good example of humanist syncretism, because Pico combined Platonism, Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, Hermeticism and Kabbalah. They also included 72 theses describing what Pico believed to be a complete system of physics.

Mirandola's *De animae immortalitate* (Paris, 1541), and other works, developed the doctrine that man's possession of an immortal soul freed him from the hierarchical stasis. Pico may have believed in universal reconciliation, since one of his 900 theses was "A mortal sin of finite duration is not deserving of eternal but only of temporal punishment;" it was among the theses pronounced heretical by Pope Innocent VIII in his bull of 4 August 1487. In the *Oration* he writes that "human vocation is a mystical vocation that has to be realized following a three stage way, which comprehends necessarily moral transformation, intellectual research and final perfection in the identity with the absolute reality. This paradigm is universal, because it can be retraced in every tradition."

A portion of his *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem* was published in Bologna after his death. In this book Pico presents arguments against the practice of astrology that have had enormous resonance for centuries, up to our own time. *Disputationes* is influenced by the arguments against astrology espoused by one of his intellectual heroes, St. Augustine of Hippo, and also by the medieval philosophical tale Hayy Ibn-Yaqzan which promoted autodidacticism as a philosophical program. Pico's antagonism to astrology seems to derive mainly from the conflict of astrology with Christian notions of free will. But Pico's arguments moved beyond the objections of Ficino, who was himself an astrologer. The manuscript was edited for publication after Pico's death by his nephew Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola, an ardent follower of Savonarola, and may possibly have been amended to be more forcefully critical. This might possibly explain the fact that Ficino championed the manuscript and enthusiastically endorsed it before its publication.

Pico's *Heptaplus*, a mystico-allegorical exposition of the creation according to the seven Biblical senses, elaborates on his idea that different religions and traditions describe the same God.

On Being and the One (Latin: *De ente et uno*), has explanations of several passages in Moses, Plato and Aristotle. It is an attempted reconciliation between Platonic and Aristotelian writings on the relative places of being and "the one" and a refutation of opposing arguments.

He wrote in Italian an imitation of Plato's Symposium. His letters (*Aureae ad familiares epistolae*, Paris, 1499) are important for the history of contemporary thought. The many editions of his entire works in the sixteenth century sufficiently prove his influence.

Another notorious text by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola is *De omnibus rebus et de quibusdam aliis*, "Of all things that exist and a little more" which is mentioned in some entries on Thomas More's *Utopia* and makes fun of the title of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*.

In the 'Oration on the Dignity Of Man' he expressed his Humanistic views

'We have made thee neither of Heaven nor of earth,neither mortal or immortal,so that with freedom of choice and with honour,as though the maker and moulder of thyself,thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer.Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish .Thou shalt have the power,out of thy soul's judgement,to be reborn into the higher forms,which are divine'

Criticism of humanism being over-idealistic swiftly began in the 19th Century. For Friedrich Nietzsche, humanism was nothing more than an empty figure of speech – a secular version of theism. Max Stirner expressed a similar position in his book *The Ego and Its Own*, published several decades before Nietzsche's work. Nietzsche argues in *Genealogy of Morals* that human rights exist as a means for the weak to constrain the strong; as such, they do not facilitate the emancipation of life, but instead deny it.

The young Karl Marx is sometimes considered a humanist, as opposed to the mature Marx who became more forceful in his criticism of human rights as idealist or utopian. Marx believed human rights were a product of the very dehumanization they were intended to oppose. Given that capitalism forces individuals to behave in a profit-seeking manner, they are in constant conflict with one another, and are thus in need of rights to protect themselves. True emancipation, he asserted, could only come through the establishment of communism, which abolishes the private ownership of all means of production.

In the 20th century, the view of humans as rationally autonomous was challenged by Sigmund Freud, who believed humans to be largely driven by unconscious irrational desires.

Martin Heidegger viewed humanism as a metaphysical philosophy that ascribes to humanity a universal essence and privileges it above all other forms of existence. For Heidegger, humanism takes consciousness as the paradigm of philosophy, leading it to a subjectivism and idealism that must be avoided. Like Hegel before him, Heidegger rejected the Kantian notion of autonomy, pointing out that humans were social and historical beings, as well as Kant's notion of a constituting consciousness. Heidegger nevertheless retains links both to humanism and to existentialism despite his efforts to distance himself from both in the "Letter on Humanism"

Leonardo di ser Piero da Vinci (15 April 1452 – 2 May 1519), more commonly Leonardo da Vinci or simply Leonardo, was an Italian polymath whose areas of interest included invention, painting, sculpting, architecture, science, music, mathematics, engineering, literature, anatomy, geology, astronomy, botany, writing, history, and cartography. He has been variously called the father of palaeontology, ichnology, and architecture, and is widely considered one of the greatest painters of all time. Sometimes credited with the inventions of the parachute, helicopter and tank, he epitomised the Renaissance humanist ideal.

Many historians and scholars regard Leonardo as the prime exemplar of the "Universal Genius" or "Renaissance Man", an individual of "unquenchable curiosity" and "feverishly inventive imagination". According to art historian Helen Gardner, the scope and depth of his interests were without precedent in recorded history, and "his mind and personality seem to us superhuman, while the man himself mysterious and remote".Marco Rosci notes that while there is much speculation regarding his life and personality, his view of the world was logical rather than mysterious, and that the empirical methods he employed were unorthodox for his time.

Born out of wedlock to a notary, Piero da Vinci, and a peasant woman, Caterina, in Vinci in the region of Florence, Leonardo was educated in the studio of the renowned Florentine painter Andrea del Verrocchio. Much of his earlier working life was spent in the service of Ludovico il Moro in Milan. He later worked in Rome, Bologna and Venice, and he spent his last years in France at the home awarded to him by Francis I of France.

Leonardo was, and is, renowned primarily as a painter. Among his works, the *Mona Lisa* is the most famous and most parodied portrait and *The Last Supper* the most reproduced religious painting of all time. Leonardo's drawing of the *Vitruvian Man* is also regarded as a cultural icon, being reproduced on items as varied as the euro coin, textbooks, and T-shirts. Perhaps fifteen of his paintings have survived. Nevertheless, these few works, together with his notebooks, which contain drawings, scientific diagrams, and his thoughts on the nature of painting, compose a contribution to later generations of artists rivalled only by that of his contemporary, Michelangelo.

Leonardo is revered for his technological ingenuity. He conceptualised flying machines, a type of armoured fighting vehicle, concentrated solar power, an adding machine, and the double hull. Relatively few of his designs were constructed or even feasible during his lifetime, as the modern scientific approaches to metallurgy and engineering were only in their infancy during the Renaissance. Some of his smaller inventions, however, such as an automated bobbin winder and a machine for testing the tensile strength of wire, entered the world of manufacturing unheralded. A number of Leonardo's most practical inventions are nowadays displayed as working models at the Museum of Vinci. He made substantial discoveries in anatomy, civil engineering,

geology, optics, and hydrodynamics, but he did not publish his findings and they had no direct influence on later science.

Pietro Aretino[21] (20 April 1492 – 21 October 1556) was an Italian author, playwright, poet, satirist and blackmailer who wielded immense influence on contemporary art and politics and invented modern literate pornography.Born out of wedlock in Arezzo (hence the name *Aretino*, meaning "from Arezzo"), very casually educated and then banished from his native city, Aretino spent a formative decade in Perugia, before being sent, highly recommended, to Rome. There Agostino chigi, the rich banker and patron of Raphael, took him under his wing.

When Hanno the elephant, pet of Pope Leo X, died in 1516, Aretino penned a satirical pamphlet entitled "The Last Will and Testament of the Elephant Hanno". The fictitious will cleverly mocked the leading political and religious figures of Rome at the time, including Pope Leo X himself. The pamphlet was such a success that it started Aretino's career and established him as a famous satirist, ultimately known as "the Scourge of Princes".

Aretino prospered, living from hand to mouth as a hanger-on in the literate circle of his patron, sharpening his satirical talents on the gossip of politics and the Papal Curia, and turning the coarse Roman pasquinade into a rapier weapon of satire, until his sixteen ribald *Sonetti Lussuriosi* (Lust Sonnets) written to accompany Guilio Romano's exquisitely beautiful but utterly pornographic series of drawings engraved by Marcantio Raimondi finally caused such outrage that he had to temporarily flee Rome.

After Leo's death in 1521, his patron was Cardinal Giulio De Medici, whose competitors for the papal throne felt the sting of Aretino's scurrilous lash. The installation of the Dutch pope Adrian VI ("la tedesca tigna" in Pietro's words) instead encouraged Aretino to seek new patrons away from Rome, mainly with Federico II Gonzaga in Mantura, and with the condottiero Giovanni De' Medici ("Giovanni delle Bande Nere"). The election of his old Medici patron as Pope Clement VII sent him briefly back to Rome, but death threats and an attempted assassination from one of the victims of his pen, Bishop Giovanni Giberti, in July 1525, set him wandering through northern Italy in the service of various noblemen, distinguished by his wit, audacity and brilliant and facile talents, until he settled permanently in 1527, in Venice, *the* anti-Papal city of Italy, "seat of all vices" Aretino noted with gusto.

Portrait of Pietro Aretino by Titan, 1545 (Palazzo Pitti)

He was a lover of men; having declared himself a sodomite since birth. In a letter to Giovanni de' Medici written in 1524 Aretino enclosed a satirical poem saying that due to a sudden aberration he had "fallen in love with a female cook and temporarily switched from boys to girls..." (*My Dear Boy*). In his comedy *Il marescalco*, the lead man is overjoyed to discover that the woman he has been forced to marry is really a page boy in disguise. While at court in Mantua he developed a crush on a young man called Bianchino, and annoyed Duke Federico with a request to plead with the boy on the writer's behalf[22].

Safe in Venice, Aretino became a blackmailer, extorting money from men who had sought his guidance in vice. He "kept all that was famous in Italy in a kind of state of siege", in Jacob Bhucardt' s estimation[23] . Francis I of France and Charles V pensioned him at the same time, each hoping for some damage to the reputation of the other. "The rest of his relations with the great is mere beggary and vulgar extortion," according to Burckhardt. Addison states that "he laid half Europe under contribution".

> *"His literary talent, his clear and sparkling style, his varied observation of men and things, would have made him a considerable writer under any circumstances, destitute as he was of the power of conceiving a genuine work of art, such as a true dramatic comedy; and to the coarsest as well as the most refined malice he added a grotesque wit so brilliant that in some cases it does not fall short of that of Rabelais."*
>
> —Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, 1855.

Apart from both sacred and profane texts—a satire of high-flown Renaissance Neoplatonic Dialogue is set in a brothel — and comedies such as *La cortigiana* and *La talenta*, Aretino is remembered above all for his letters, full of literary flattery that could turn to blackmail. They circulated widely in manuscript and he collected them and published them at intervals winning as many enemies as it did fame, and earned him the dangerous nickname Aristo gave him: *flagello dei principi* ("scourge of princes"). The first English translations of some of Aretino's racier material have been coming onto the market recently.

La cortigiana is a brilliant parody of Castiglione's Il Corte, and features of the adventures of a Sienese gentleman, Messer Maco, who travels to Rome to become a cardinal. He would also like to win himself a mistress, but when he falls in love with a girl he sees in a window, he realizes that only as a courtier would he be able to win her. In mockery of Castiglione's advice on how to become the perfect courtier, a charlatan proceeds to teach Messer Maco how to behave as a courtier: he must learn how to deceive and flatter, and sit hours in front of the mirror.

Aretino was a close friend of Titan, who painted his portrait (*illustrations*) at least three times. The early portrait is a psychological study of alarming modernity. Clement VII made Aretino a knight of Rhodes, and Julius III named him a Knight of St. Peter, but the chain he wears for his 1545 portrait may have merely been jewelry. In his strictly-for-publication letters to patrons Aretino would often add a verbal portrait to Titian's painted one.

Aretino is frequently mentioned in English works of the Elizabethan and later periods and differently appreciated, in comments ranging from 'It was one of the wittiest knaves that ever God made' of Nashe (*The Unfortunate Traveller*) to 'that notorious ribald of Arezzo' of Milton (*Areopagitico*).

He is said to have died of suffocation from "laughing too much ". The English traveller Sir John Rearsby visited "the obscene profane poet" Aretino's grave in San Luca,Venice in the mid-1650s. He relates that the following epitaph had been removed by the incuisitors: "*Qui jace Aretin, poeta Tusco, qui dice mal d'ogni uno fuora di Dio; scusandosi dicendo, Io no'l cognosco."* This he translates as "Here Aretin, the Tuscan poet, lies, who all the world abused but God, and why? he said he knew him not."

Michelangelo[24] was born on 6 March 1475 in Caprese near Arezzo, Tuscan. As a young boy, Michelangelo was sent to Florence to study grammar under the Humanist Francesco da Urbino. The young artist, however, showed no interest in his schooling, preferring to copy paintings from churches and seek the company of painters.

The city of Florence was at that time the greatest centre of the arts and learning in Italy. Art was sponsored by the Signoria (the town council), by the merchant guilds and by wealthy patrons such as the Medici and their banking associates. The Renaissance, a renewal of Classical scholarship and the arts, had its first flowering in Florence. In the early 15th century, the architect Filippo Brunelleschi had studied the remains of Classical buildings in Rome and created two churches, San Lorenzo's and Santo Spirito, which embodied the Classical precepts. The sculptor Lorenzo Ghiberti had laboured for fifty years to create the bronze doors of the Baptistry, which Michelangelo was to describe as "The Gates of Paradise". The exterior niches of the Church of Orsanmichele contained a gallery of works by the most acclaimed sculptors of Florence – Donatello, Ghiberti, Andrea del Verrocchio, and Nanni di Banco. The interiors of the older churches were covered with frescos (mostly in Late Medieval, but also in the Early Renaissance style), begun by Giotto and continued by Masaccio in the Brancacci Chapel – both of whose works Michelangelo studied and copied in drawings. During Michelangelo's childhood, a team of painters had been called from Florence to the Vatican, in order to decorate the walls of the Sistine Chapel. Among them was Domenico Ghirlandaio, a master in fresco painting, perspective, figure drawing, and portraiture who had the largest workshop in Florence at that period.

In 1488, at the age of 13, Michelangelo was apprenticed to Ghirlandaio. The next year, his father persuaded Ghirlandaio to pay Michelangelo as an artist, which was rare for someone of fourteen. When in 1489, Lorenzo de' Medici, de facto ruler of Florence, asked Ghirlandaio for his two best pupils, Ghirlandaio sent Michelangelo and Francesco Granacci. From 1490 to 1492, Michelangelo attended the Humanist academy that the Medici had founded along Neo-Platonic lines. At the academy, both Michelangelo's outlook and his art were subject to the influence of many of the most prominent philosophers and writers of the day, including Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola and Poliziano. At this time, Michelangelo sculpted the reliefs *Madonna of the Steps* (1490–1492) and *Battle of the Centaurs* (1491–

1492).The latter was based on a theme suggested by Poliziano and was commissioned by Lorenzo de Medici[11]. Michelangelo worked for a time with the sculptor Bertoldo di Giovanni. When he was seventeen, another pupil, Pietro Torrigiano, struck him on the nose, causing the disfigurement that is conspicuous in all the portraits of Michelangelo.

The longest sequence displaying a great romantic friendship, was written to Tommaso dei Cavalieri (c. 1509–1587), who was 23 years old when Michelangelo met him in 1532, at the age of 57. These make up the first large sequence of poems in any modern tongue addressed by one man to another, predating Shakespeare's sonnets to the fair youth by fifty years:

I feel as lit by fire a cold countenance
That burns me from afar and keeps itself ice-chill;
A strength I feel two shapely arms to fill
Which without motion moves every balance.

— (Michael Sullivan, translation)

Cavalieri replied: "I swear to return your love. Never have I loved a man more than I love you, never have I wished for a friendship more than I wish for yours." Cavalieri remained devoted to Michelangelo until his death.

In 1542 Michelangelo met Cecchino dei Bracci who died only a year later, inspiring Michelangelo to write forty-eight funeral epigrams. Some of the objects of Michelangelo's affections, and subjects of his poetry, took advantage of him: the model Febo di Poggio asked for money in response to a love-poem, and a second model, Gherardo Perini, stole from him shamelessly.

The openly homoerotic nature of the poetry was a source of discomfort to later generations. Michelangelo's grandnephew, Michelangelo Buonarroti the Younger, published the poems in 1623 with the gender of pronouns changed, and it was not until John Addington Symonds translated them into English in 1893 that the original genders were restored. Even in modern times some scholars continue to insist that, despite the restoration of the pronouns, they represent "an emotionless and elegant re-imagining of Platonic dialogue, whereby erotic poetry was seen as an expression of refined sensibilities".

Late in life, Michelangelo nurtured a great platonic love for the poet and noble widow Vittoria Colonna, whom he met in Rome in 1536 or 1538 and who was in her late forties at the time. They wrote sonnets for each other and were in regular contact until she died. These sonnets mostly deal with the spiritual issues that occupied them. Condivi recalls Michelangelo's saying that his sole regret in life was that he did not kiss the widow's face in the same manner that he had her hand.

WORKS:

Madonna and Child

The *Madonna of the Steps* is Michelangelo's earliest known work. It is carved in shallow relief, a technique often employed by the master-sculptor of the early 15th century, Donatello, and others such as Desiderio da Settignano. While the Madonna is in profile, the easiest aspect for a shallow relief, the child displays a twisting motion that was to become characteristic of Michelangelo's work. The *Taddeo Tondo* of 1502 shows the Christ Child frightened by a Bullfinch, a symbol of the Crucifixion.The lively form of the child was later adapted by Raphael in the *Bridgewater Madonna*. The *Bruges Madonna* was, at the time of its creation, unlike other such statues depicting the Virgin proudly presenting her son. Here, the Christ Child, restrained by his mother's clasping hand, is about to step off into the world. The *Doni Tondo*, depicting the Holy Family, has elements of all three previous works: the frieze of figures in the background has the appearance of a low-relief, while the circular shape and dynamic forms echo the Taddeo Tondo. The twisting motion present in the *Bruges Madonna* is accentuated in the painting.

the term "Proto Renaissance"[25] refers to the pre-Renaissance period (c.1300-1400) in Italy, and the activities of progressive painters such as Giotto (1267-1337), who pioneered the new form of figurative "realism", which was fully developed by artists during the era of Renaissance art proper. Giotto's groundbreaking art did not however, represent the European or even the Italian mainstream. Derived from traditions inherited from Christian Byzantine art - which itself influenced the murals of Romanesque painting) - the style known as Gothic art, championed in Italy by the city of Siena among others, was still the predominant style of painting and sculpture. In fact the Gothic idiom survived well into the 15th century in the form of a style known as International Gothic, which became popular in many of the royal courts across Europe,

notably France, Spain, Bohemia, and England. The Renaissance proper began around 1400 in the city of Florence[26], but its ideals and methods did not become a dominant force in European art until the mid-15th century. The main types of art practised during the Proto-Renaissance period included: fresco mural painting, tempera panel painting, book illuminations, relief sculpture, goldsmithing and other forms of metalwork. Most of the artistic developments of the *trecento* Proto-Renaissance period had a direct effect on Early Renaissance painting (c.1400-90) of the *quattrocento*.

Renaissance Architecture[27]

Church of St Francis

The proximity of Rome and the Church's influence on all aspects of Italian culture, meant that most art (painting and sculpture) was religious art. Not surprisingly therefore, two churches form the gateway into the Renaissance proper. The first was the convent church of St Francis at Assisi. In the last decades of the 13th century, it was decorated entirely in fresco, by Cimabue (Cenni di Peppi), one of the most famous painters of the day. His assistant was a young man called Giotto di Bondone (1267-1337), whom he employed after seeing the youth sketch his father's sheep. The fresco scenes of the life of St Francis were portrayed with much greater realism than contemporary styles of Byzantine art.

The Scrovegni Chapel

The second church was the Scrovegni Chapel (also called the Arena Chapel) built in the 1300s by Enrico degli Scrovegni, in Padua. This too was decorated with fresco murals, only this time they were wholly created by Giotto. He painted the entire biblical story of three generations of the Holy Family: the Virgin's parents, the Virgin herself and Jesus.The narrative is depicted with great drama in a comic-strip set of wooden panels, in three rows along the walls. In contrast to previous convention, these religious paintings have a three-dimensional quality, a sense of depth and space, achieved through Giotto's unprecedented use of modelling, shadow and linear perspective. Not only do his figures look real, they possess a heroic stillness - an attribute which becomes a key hallmark of Christian art during the Italian Renaissance proper

Renaissance Paintings

As a young boy, Michelangelo was sent to Florence to study grammar under the Humanist Francesco da Urbino. The young artist, however, showed no interest in his schooling, preferring to copy paintings from churches and seek the company of painters.

The city of Florence was at that time the greatest centre of the arts and learning in Italy. Art was sponsored by the Signoria (the town council), by the merchant guilds and by wealthy patrons such as the Medici and their banking associates. The Renaissance, a renewal of Classical scholarship and the arts, had its first flowering in Florence. In the early 15th century, the architect Filippo Brunelleschi had studied the remains of Classical buildings in Rome and created two churches, San Lorenzo's and Santo Spirito, which embodied the Classical precepts. The sculptor Lorenzo Ghiberti had laboured for fifty years to create the bronze doors of the Baptistry, which Michelangelo was to describe as "The Gates of Paradise". The exterior niches of the Church of Orsanmichele contained a gallery of works by the most acclaimed sculptors of Florence – Donatello, Ghiberti, Andrea del Verrocchio, and Nanni di Banco. The interiors of the older churches were covered with frescos (mostly in Late Medieval, but also in the Early Renaissance style), begun by Giotto and continued by Masaccio in the Brancacci Chapel – both of whose works Michelangelo studied and copied in drawings. During Michelangelo's childhood, a team of painters had been called from Florence to the Vatican, in order to decorate the walls of the Sistine Chapel. Among them was Domenico Ghirlandaio, a master in fresco painting, perspective, figure drawing, and portraiture who had the largest workshop in Florence at that period.

In 1488, at the age of 13, Michelangelo was apprenticed to Ghirlandaio. The next year, his father persuaded Ghirlandaio to pay Michelangelo as an artist, which was rare for someone of fourteen. When in 1489, Lorenzo de' Medici, de facto ruler of Florence, asked Ghirlandaio for his two best pupils, Ghirlandaio sent Michelangelo and Francesco Granacci. From 1490 to 1492, Michelangelo attended the Humanist academy that the Medici had founded along Neo-Platonic lines. At the academy, both Michelangelo's outlook and his art were subject to the influence of many of the most prominent philosophers and writers of the day, including Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola and Poliziano. At this time, Michelangelo sculpted the reliefs *Madonna of the Steps* (1490–1492) and *Battle of the Centaurs* (1491–

1492). The latter was based on a theme suggested by Poliziano and was commissioned by Lorenzo de Medici. Michelangelo worked for a time with the sculptor Bertoldo di Giovanni. When he was seventeen, another pupil, Pietro Torrigiano, struck him on the nose, causing the disfigurement that is conspicuous in all the portraits of Michelangelo.

Lorenzo de' Medici's death on 8 April 1492 brought a reversal of Michelangelo's circumstances. Michelangelo left the security of the Medici court and returned to his father's house. In the following months he carved a polychrome wooden Crucifix (1493), as a gift to the prior of the Florentine church of Santo Spirito, which had allowed him to do some anatomical studies of the corpses from the church's hospital. Between 1493 and 1494 he bought a block of marble, and carved a larger than life statue of Hercules, which was sent to France and subsequently disappeared sometime in the 18th century. On 20 January 1494, after heavy snowfalls, Lorenzo's heir, Piero de Medici , commissioned a snow statue, and Michelangelo again entered the court of the Medici.

In the same year, the Medici were expelled from Florence as the result of the rise of Savonarola. Michelangelo left the city before the end of the political upheaval, moving to Venice and then to Bologna . In Bologna, he was commissioned to carve several of the last small figures for the completion of the Shrine of St Domonic, in the church dedicated to that saint. At this time Michelangelo studied the robust reliefs carved by Jacopo della Quercia around main portal of the Basilica of St.Petronius, including the panel of *The Creation of Eve* the composition of which was to reappear on the Sistine Chapel ceiling. Towards the end of 1494, the political situation in Florence was calmer. The city, previously under threat from the French, was no longer in danger as Charles VIII had suffered defeats. Michelangelo returned to Florence but received no commissions from the new city government under Savonarola. He returned to the employment of the Medici. During the half year he spent in Florence, he worked on two small statues, a child *St. John the Baptist* and a sleeping Cupid According to Condivi, ‚Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de' Medici for whom Michelangelo had sculpted *St. John the Baptist*, asked that Michelangelo "fix it so that it looked as if it had been buried" so he could "send it to Rome ... pass [it off as] an ancient work and ... sell it much better." Both Lorenzo and Michelangelo were unwittingly cheated out of the real value of the piece by a middleman. Cardinal Raffaele Riario, to whom Lorenzo had sold it, discovered that it was a fraud, but was so impressed by the quality of the sculpture that he invited the artist to Rome. This apparent success in selling his sculpture abroad

as well as the conservative Florentine situation may have encouraged Michelangelo to accept the prelate's invitation.

Michelangelo arrived in Rome 25 June 1496 at the age of 21. On 4 July of the same year, he began work on a commission for Cardinal Raffaele Riario, an over-life-size statue of the Roman wine god Bacchus. Upon completion, the work was rejected by the cardinal, and subsequently entered the collection of the banker Jacopo Galli, for his garden.

In November 1497, the French ambassador to the Holy See, Cardinal Jean de Bilheres-Lagraulas, commissioned him to carve a Pieta, a sculpture showing the Virgin Mary grieving over the body of Jesus. The subject, which is not part of the Biblical narrative of the Crucifixion, was common in religious sculpture of Medieval Northern Europe and would have been very familiar to the Cardinal. The contract was agreed upon in August of the following year. Michelangelo was 24 at the time of its completion. It was soon to be regarded as one of the world's great masterpieces of sculpture, "a revelation of all the potentialities and force of the art of sculpture". Contemporary opinion was summarised by Vasari: "It is certainly a miracle that a formless block of stone could ever have been reduced to a perfection that nature is scarcely able to create in the flesh". It is now located in St. Peters Basilica.

Michelangelo returned to Florence in 1499. The republic was changing after the fall of its leader, anti-Renaissance priest Girolamo Savonarola, who was executed in 1498, and the rise of the *gonfaloniere* Piero Soderini. Michelangelo was asked by the consuls of the Guild of Wool to complete an unfinished project begun 40 years earlier by Agostino di Duccio: a colossal statue of Carrara marble portraying David as a symbol of Florentine freedom to be placed on the gable of Florence Cathedral. Michelangelo responded by completing his most famous work, the statue of David, in 1504. The masterwork definitively established his prominence as a sculptor of extraordinary technical skill and strength of symbolic imagination. A team of consultants, including Botticelli and Leonardo da Vinci, was called together to decide upon its placement, ultimately the Piazza della Signoria, in front of the Palazzo Vecchio. It now stands in the Academia while a replica occupies its place in the square.

With the completion of the *David* came another commission.In early 1504 Leonardo da Vinci[28]had been commissioned to paint *The Battle of Anghiara* in the council chamber of the Palazzo Vecchio, depicting the battle between Florence and Milan in 1440. Michelangelo was

then commissioned to paint the *Battle of Cascina*. The two paintings are very different: Leonardo depicts soldiers fighting on horseback, while Michelangelo has soldiers being ambushed as they bathe in the river. Neither work was completed and both were lost forever when the chamber was refurbished. Both works were much admired, and copies remain of them, Leonardo's work having been copied by Rubens and Michelangelo's by Bastiano da Sangallo.

Also during this period, Michelangelo was commissioned by Angelo Doni to paint a "Holy Family" as a present for his wife, Maddalena Strozzi. It is known as the *Doni Tondo* and hangs in the Uffizi Gallery in its original magnificent frame, which Michelangelo may have designed. He also may have painted the Madonna and Child with John the Baptist, known as the *Manchester Madonna* and now in the National Gallery, London.

Michelangelo painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel[29] the work took approximately four years to complete (1508–12)

In 1505 Michelangelo was invited back to Rome by the newly elected Pope Julius II and commissioned to build the Pope's tomb, which was to include forty statues and be finished in five years. Under the patronage of the pope, Michelangelo experienced constant interruptions to his work on the tomb in order to accomplish numerous other tasks. Although Michelangelo worked on the tomb for 40 years, it was never finished to his satisfaction. It is located in the Church of San Pietro in Vincoli in Rome and is most famous for the central figure of Moses, completed in 1516. Of the other statues intended for the tomb, two, known as the *Rebellious Slave* and the *Dying Slave*, are now in the Louvre

During the same period, Michelangelo painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, which took approximately four years to complete (1508–1512). According to Condivi's account, Bramante, who was working on the building of St. Peter's Basilica, resented Michelangelo's commission for the pope's tomb and convinced the pope to commission him in a medium with which he was unfamiliar, in order that he might fail at the task. Michelangelo was originally commissioned to paint the Twelve Apostles on the triangular pendentives that supported the ceiling, and to cover the central part of the ceiling with ornament. Michelangelo persuaded Pope Julius to give him a free hand and proposed a different and more complex scheme, representing the Creation, the Fall of Man, the Promise of Salvation through the prophets, and the genealogy of Christ. The work is

part of a larger scheme of decoration within the chapel that represents much of the doctrine of the Catholic Church.

The composition stretches over 500 square metres of ceiling and contains over 300 figures. At its centre are nine episodes from the Book of Genesis, divided into three groups: God's creation of the earth; God's creation of humankind and their fall from God's grace; and lastly, the state of humanity as represented by Noah and his family. On the pendentives supporting the ceiling are painted twelve men and women who prophesied the coming of Jesus, seven prophets of Israel, and five Sibyls, prophetic women of the Classical world. Among the most famous paintings on the ceiling are The Creation of Adam, Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, the Deluge, the Prophet Jeremiah, and the Cumaean Sibyl.

In 1513, Pope Julius II died and was succeeded by Pope Leo X, the second son of Lorenzo dei Medici. Pope Leo commissioned Michelangelo to reconstruct the façade of the Basilica of San Lorenzo in Florence and to adorn it with sculptures. He agreed reluctantly and spent three years creating drawings and models for the façade, as well as attempting to open a new marble quarry at Pietrasanta specifically for the project. In 1520 the work was abruptly cancelled by his financially strapped patrons before any real progress had been made. The basilica lacks a façade to this day.

In 1520 the Medici came back to Michelangelo with another grand proposal, this time for a family funerary chapel in the Basilica of San Lorenzo. Fortunately for posterity, this project, occupying the artist for much of the 1520s and 1530s, was more fully realised. Michelangelo used his own discretion to create the composition of the Medici Chapel, which houses the large tombs of two of the younger members of the Medici family, Giuliano, Duke of Nemours, and Lorenzo, his nephew. It also serves to commemorate their more famous predecessors, Lorenzo the Magnificent and his brother Giuliano, who are buried nearby. The tombs display statues of the two Medici and allegorical figures representing Night and Day, and Dusk and Dawn. The chapel also contains Michelangelo's *Medici Madonna*. In 1976 a concealed corridor was discovered with drawings on the walls that related to the chapel itself.

Pope Leo X died in 1521 and was succeeded briefly by the austere Adrian VI, and then by his cousin Giulio Medici as Pope Clement VII In 1524 Michelangelo received an architectural commission from the Medici pope for the Laurentian Library at San Lorenzo's Church. He

designed both the interior of the library itself and its vestibule, a building utilising architectural forms with such dynamic effect that it is seen as the forerunner of Baroque architecture. It was left to assistants to interpret his plans and carry out instruction. The library was not opened until 1571, and the vestibule remained incomplete until 1904.

In 1527, Florentine citizens, encouraged by the sack of Rome, threw out the Medici and restored the republic. A siege of the city ensued, and Michelangelo went to the aid of his beloved Florence by working on the city's fortifications from 1528 to 1529. The city fell in 1530, and the Medici were restored to power. Michelangelo fell out of favour with the young Alessandro Medici, who had been installed as the first Duke of Florence. Fearing for his life, he fled to Rome, leaving assistants to complete the Medici chapel and the Laurentian Library. Despite Michelangelo's support of the republic and resistance to the Medici rule, he was welcomed by Pope Clement, who reinstated an allowance that he had previously granted the artist and made a new contract with him over the tomb of Pope Julius.

Rome, 1534–46

The Last Judgement (1534–41)

In Rome, Michelangelo lived near the church of Santa Maria di Loreto. It was at this time that he met the poet Vittoria Colonna, marchioness of Pescara, who was to become one of his closest friends until her death in 1547.

Shortly before his death in 1534 Pope Clement VII commissioned Michelangelo to paint a fresco of *The Last Judgement* on the altar wall of the Sistine Chapel. His successor, Paul III, was instrumental in seeing that Michelangelo began and completed the project, which he laboured on from 1534 to October 1541. The fresco depicts the Second Coming of Christ and his Judgement of the souls. Michelangelo ignored the usual artistic conventions in portraying Jesus, showing him as a massive, muscular figure, youthful, beardless and naked. He is surrounded by saints, among whom Saint Bartholomew holds a drooping flayed skin, bearing the likeness of Michelangelo. The dead rise from their graves, to be consigned either to Heaven or to Hell.

Once completed, the depiction of Christ and the Virgin Mary naked was considered sacrilegious, and Cardinal Carafa and Monsignor Sernini (Mantua's ambassador) campaigned to have the fresco removed or censored, but the Pope resisted. At the Council of Trent, shortly before Michelangelo's death in 1564, it was decided to obscure the genitals and Daniele da Volterra, an apprentice of Michelangelo, was commissioned to make the alterations. An uncensored copy of the original, by Marcello Venusti, is in the Capodimonte Museum of Naples.

Michelangelo worked on a number of architectural projects at this time. They included a design for the Capitoline Hill with its trapezoid piazza displaying the ancient bronze statue of Marcus Aurelius. He designed the upper floor of the Palazzo Farnese and the interior of the Church of Santa Maria degli Angeli, in which he transformed the vaulted interior of an Ancient Roman bathhouse. Other architectural works include San Giovanni dei Fiorentini, the Sforza Chapel (Capella Sforza) in the Basilica di Santa Maria Maggiore and the Porta Pia.

While still working on the *Last Judgement*, Michelangelo received yet another commission for the Vatican. This was for the painting of two large frescos in the Cappella Paolina depicting significant events in the lives of the two most important saints of Rome, the *Conversion of Saint Paul* and the *Crucifixion of Saint Peter*. Like the *Last Judgement*, these two works are complex compositions containing a great number of figures. They were completed in 1550. In the same year, Giorgio Vasari published his *Vita*, including a biography of Michelangelo.

In 1546, Michelangelo was appointed architect of St. Peter's Basilica, Rome. The process of replacing the Constantinian basilica of the 4th century had been underway for fifty years and in 1506 foundations had been laid to the plans of Bramante. Successive architects had worked on it, but little progress had been made. Michelangelo was persuaded to take over the project. He

returned to the concepts of Bramante, and developed his ideas for a centrally planned church, strengthening the structure both physically and visually. The dome, not completed until after his death, has been called by Banister Fletcher, "the greatest creation of the Renaissance".

As construction was progressing on St Peter's, there was concern that Michelangelo would pass away before the dome was finished. However, once building commenced on the lower part of the dome, the supporting ring, the completion of the design was inevitable.

On 7 December 2007, a red chalk sketch for the dome of St Peter's Basilica, possibly the last made by Michelangelo before his death, was discovered in the Vatican archives. It is extremely rare, since he destroyed his designs later in life. The sketch is a partial plan for one of the radial columns of the cupola drum of Saint Peter's.

The Sistine Chapel ceiling was painted between 1508 and 1512. The ceiling is a flattened barrel vault supported on twelve triangular pendentives that rise from between the windows of the chapel. The commission, as envisaged by Pope Julius II, was to adorn the pendentives with figures of the twelve apostles. Michelangelo, who was reluctant to take the job, persuaded the Pope to give him a free hand in the composition. The resultant scheme of decoration awed his contemporaries and has inspired other artists ever since. The scheme is of nine panels illustrating episodes from the Book of Genesis, set in an architectonic frame. On the pendentives, Michelangelo replaced the proposed Apostles with Prophets and Sibyls who heralded the coming of the Messiah.

Michelengelo began painting with the later episodes in the narrative, the pictures including locational details and groups of figures, the *Drunkenness of Noah* being the first of this group. In the later compositions, painted after the initial scaffolding had been removed, Michelangelo made the figures larger.One of the central images,The *Creation Of Adam*, is one of the best known and most reproduced works in the history of art. The final panel, showing the *Separation Of Light From Darkness* is the broadest in style and was painted in a single day. As the model for the Creator, Michelangelo has depicted himself in the action of painting the ceiling.

As supporters to the smaller scenes, Michelangelo painted twenty youths who have variously been interpreted as angels, as muses, or simply as decoration. Michelangelo referred to them as "ignudi". The figure reproduced may be seen in context in the above image of the *Separation of Light from Darkness*. In the process of painting the ceiling, Michelangelo made studies for

different figures, of which some, such as that for *The Libyan Sibyl* have survived, demonstrating the care taken by Michelangelo in details such as the hands and feet[30]

Notes and Referrences

1.Giorgio Vasari, *Lives of the Most Eminent Painters,Sculptors and Architects*(Everyman,1963)4 vols.

2.Lorenzo de Medici, Canzona di Bacco(song for Bacchus),The Penguin book of Italian Verse,p.142.

3.Myron Gilmore,*The World Of Humanism 1453-1517*(N.Y.,1952)pp.22-23

4.E.Garin, *Italian Humanism:Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance*(transl.from Italian,1952)pp.6-7

5.Hans Baron,*The crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance*(revised edn.,Princeton,1966) pp.10-11

6.P.O.Kristeller,*Renaissance Thought:The Classic,Scholastic and Humanistic Strains*:Chapter on Humanism,The Cambridge History Of Renaissance Philosophy :N.Y.,1961,.pp.7-8

7. Ibid

8.Hans Baron ,*From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni*(Chicago, 1968):pp.3-4

9. Ibid

10. Federico Chabod ,*Machiavelli and Renaissance:*The Cambridge History Of Renaissance Philosophy, (trans.,1958),op.cit.,pp-430

11. Rudolf Wittkower , *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* : Wiley, 1998:pp.5-6

12. R.S.Lopez , *Cambridge Economic History Of Europe* volumeIII chapter II,IV

13.Ibid

14.P.O.Kristeller,*Renaissance Thought:The Classic,Scholastic and Humanistic Strains*(N.Y.,1961),op.cit

15.ibid

16.ibid

17. Johan Huizinga, *Men and Ideas*, Princeton University Press, 2014 :pp.286-87

18. ibid

19. ibid

20. ibid

21. ibid

22.J.R.Hale, *Renaissance Europe 1480-1520*(Fontana,1971):pp.18-19

23.Jacob Buchardt, *The Civilization Of The Renaissance In Italy,* Penguin Classics,1990

24. Patricia Emison ,*Creating the "Divine Artist": from Dante to Michelangelo*, BRILL, 2004 .

25. Rona Goffen, *Renaissance Rivals: Michelangelo, Leonardo, Raphael, Titian:*Yale University Press.2004p.2

26. Luciano Berti, *Florence: the city and its art*; Scala:1971.p.20

27. Nikolaus Pevsner,*An Outline Of* Architecture :Penguin,1953

28. L.A.Ritcher(ed) ,*Selections from the Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci*(O.U.P.,1952)p.5

29. Bernard Berenson , *Italian Painters of the Renaissance* : The University of Michigan: Meridian Books, 1957.pp.9-10.

30. Antonio Manetti, *The Birth and Rebirth Of Pictoral Space* (Translated by John White,1957).pp.25-27

THE ROAD TOWARDS AN ENLIGHTENED ERA

The most famous definition of Enlightenment is that of German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804): "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of reason, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! 'Have courage to use your own understanding!'— that is the motto of enlightenment" (Kant 2010 [1784], p. 1).

INTRODUCTION

The main theme of the dissertation cannot be addressed without reference to another intellectual ferment of 18th century Europe i,e the Enlightenment. Colonial modernity and its manifestation had been largely influenced by the Enlightenment. In fact Enlightenment delivers revival and revision, breaking European boundaries by opening up new vistas through geography, seeing not one grand philosophical Enlightenment but many. It elucidate the progress in Europe while simultaneously defining the intellectual import to other countries. The vast commercial and imperial traffic between the littoral and the great "centers of calculation" of London's Kew Gardens or the Jardin des Plantes in Paris gradually began to take place. Hence, the endlessly new external world redefined the European center from where emanated a reformed enlightened vision that sought to change that world which began to grasp this new progress. Writing in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1784, Immanuel Kant[1] speculated that the "hidden plan of nature" was to bring about justice in civil society and peaceful relations between nations by means of the very antagonism that seemed to promise only civil unrest and international conflict. He assured his readers that "though folly and caprice creep in at all times, enlightenment gradually arises," and thus the "chiliastic expectations" of philosophy for the triumph of justice were something more than an illusion. Over the last several decades, a remarkably diverse group of philosophers and social critics have traced the origin of a number of social and cultural maladies to something they call the "Enlightenment project"[2]. Over the same period, an equally diverse group of political and social commentators have hailed the promise of, lamented the demise of, or sought ways to reinvigorate what they call "civil society".[3] The concerns at stake in these discussions would appear to be related. As Kant's essay shows, the nature and promise of civil society were important concerns in the Enlightenment. Yet, with a

few exceptions, current debates over the viability of the Enlightenment project and discussions of the prospects for civil society are conducted in different registers.

The two aspects of intellectual activity that a full account of Enlightenment political thought would have to encompass may be designated by the adjectives "critical" and "constructive." By "critical" it means uncovering of abuses and proposals for reform; by "constructive" it refers to more general political theories and schemes for a better society. Such an integrated study of both aspects has not been written. Here the problem of interpretation may be specifically designated. Were the philosophes realists, or were on the contrary, locked up in their abstract systems and idealistic plans? This problem, whose importance is attested by its perseverance, is easily solved. One would have to try to evaluate proposals on a case basis, by subjective judgment, by what did happen at the time, what happened later.

ENLIGHTENED PERSONALITIES

Modern political system that became supportive for the growth of an enlightened ambience arose immediately after the stabilization of the power system. This occurred around 1700 with the rise of a political system, the outlines of which, roughly speaking, have been preserved in Europe for more than 200 years. It is true that Prussia, the youngest of these political configurations did not attain maturity until the 1740's and had to present the final evidence of her strength and the "justification" of her political existence as late as the second half of the 18th century. But since Prussia did attain a power position, one may assume that the European political order had become established and relatively stable by 1750. Only after this was it possible for the feeling of confidence to develop, which Ranke expressed in the middle of the next century. He said: "In times of great crisis one may trust with confidence the genius which has always saved Europe from the rule of one exclusive and one-sided trend . . . which always pre- served her general liberty and independence ..”

Among the enlightened writings that got published in about 1750 that are of special value to modern theories of history are: Hume's *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois* in 1748; Turgot's *Discours sur les Progre's de l'Esprit Humain* and Rousseau's *Discours sur la Question si le Retablissement des Sciences et des Arts a contribue d epurer les Moeurs* in 1750. In 1751 and 1752 respectively, Voltaire's *Siecle de Louis XIV* appeared and Hume's *Political Discourses* were edited; in 1754, Voltaire published *the Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Nations* in its first form; Rousseau *the Discours sur l'Origine et les*

Fondemens de l'Inegalite parmi les Hommes; Hume's the first volume of the History of England which covered the last period of those with which he was concerned; and in the spring of 1755 appeared Winckelmann's first work*, Gedan- ken jiber die Nachahmung der Griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildauerkunst.* There are few periods of so brief a span which have had greater importance for Enlightenment history and political theory. Before 1748, the first period of modern historical writing, the age of the Enlightenment had hardly begun and within the next seven years, its main features had been perfected and in the next phase already, with Rousseau and Winckelmann, it was producing the seeds of its destruction and of a new growth. Even during the first years of the Enlightenment one may find indications of an awareness in varying degrees, of three problems which are of great importance for modern historical writing. The one which is common to most of the historians of this period and which, though variously treated, illustrates a basic problem of their writings, is that of development which became so important in the process of the formation of modern historical thought that Troeltsch in his work, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, made the analysis of development the very core of his book. Closely related to this problem is the question of the historically essential: What constitutes, what justifies the success of Enlightenment? The "success" in question need not be socio-political in nature, although in many cases it was indeed outward success which became the object of historical reflection. The third problem which was just beginning to be recognized by some of the historians of this period was that of individuality during the age of Enlightenment. During the Enlightenment, the importance of the individual was fully recognized; but, with most of the historians of this time, we miss that concern for, and delight in, individuality for its own sake. This had already been known to the Renaissance, and is very characteristic of later periods. For, although according to an ancient dictum: *individum est ineffabile*, generations of modern historians will strive to describe exhaustively the human individualities that come to light in their historical research during the phase of Enlightenment. Obviously, these three problems do not exist for modern writers and philosophers alone. But the importance which has been accorded them in recent times and the relationships which have been discerned between them are, indeed, characteristic of the modern period. Moreover, these questions of historical development, of historical success, of individuality (a single or a collective individuality) have served to a large extent to form what may be called the modern historical sense. This sense may exist even when and where no outstanding writing has developed. An example of this is to be found in Italy

during the two generations following the Napoleonic era. It cannot, of course, be said that these three problems comprehend every important question which has existed or has been developed in the age of Enlightenment. They may serve, however, as points of view from which we may survey a period so prolific in historical writing as were the 150 years after 1750. One could hardly find a more characteristic expression of what the writers of the age of the Enlightenment expected to find in history, than the two following sentences from Voltaire's introduction to his Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Nations.

Vous voudriez que des philosophes eussent ecrit l'histoire ancienne parce que vous voulez la lire en philosophe. Vous ne cherchez que des verities utiles et vous n'avez guere trouve-dites-vous-que d'inutiles erreurs.'. . . Vous ne cherchez dans cette immensity (de l'histoire moderne) que ce qui merite d'etre connu de vous: l'esprit, les moeurs, les usages des nations principales, appuyes des faits qu'il n'est pas permis d'ignorer.

Voltaire's survey of the "spirit, manners and habits of the principal nations" led him to distinguish, as is well known, four great periods of human history. "The person who thinks," he wrote in the introduction to the Sie'cle de Louis XIV, "or what is still rarer, the person of taste, counts but four centuries within the history of the world . . . four centuries which are the prototypes of grandeur to the human mind, which give examples to posterity. . .. It is not that these four ages were exempt from misfortunes and crimes. . . . All centuries are similar in so far as the wickedness of man is concerned; yet I know only four centuries distinguished by great talents.... The fourth of these centuries is that which is called the century of Louis XIV, and among these four it is perhaps this which approaches most towards perfection.... Enriched by the discoveries of the others, it achieved more, from certain aspects, than the three others combined." It was in this age, according to Voltaire, that "human reason in general was perfected," and this was to him the chief task of historical development. "The arts," he admitted, "have never been perfected beyond what was done in the periods of the Medicis, of Augustus and Alexander." [4]

However, Voltaire's preference for the last great period does not indicate a belief in progress from his point of view. It could be said that in exalting the France of Louis XIV, he was deliberately passing judgment on the France of his own day[5]. Moreover, one may perceive in Voltaire's attitude a conviction of the insularity of those periods in which a relative human happiness was attained. Though human nature, to Voltaire, had best and most fully unfolded itself only in the age of Louis XIV, the belief in one and the same basic human nature throughout

the ages ("the core is always the same")[6] which Voltaire shared with his contemporaries was a deterrent to faith in human progress throughout history. The same assumption likewise checked any real enjoyment in individuality and fostered the attitude epitomized in the statement that "without attempt to guess who Mazarin was, we will tell only what he did." ' To Voltaire, the individual becomes important only insofar as he contributes to intellectual development and to the building up of a community of mutual intellectual under- standing - "this great society of all-wise men which exists everywhere, which is everywhere independent, and the existence of which brings some consolation for the evils which ambition and politics have spread over the earth." ' According to this attitude towards history, the outstanding historical individuality is Newton. Montesquieu provides an illustration of that concern for general causes so characteristic of the Enlightenment. "I set forth the principles," he says in the introduction to the Esprit des Lois, "and I was able to see the single cases adjust themselves thereto as if they worked by themselves; the histories of all the nations seemed to be but the consequences of these principles." We still feel the excitement of the discoverer today: "This matter has large size.... Amidst the plenty of ideas which present themselves to my mind . . . I must push aside on the right and on the left, in order to attain my aim, in order to see distinctly." [7]

However, **Montesquieu** continues with the statement that as he found himself faced with the periods of antiquity, he sought to grasp the spirit peculiar to each, lest he consider to be similar what in reality was different. Indeed, he entitled Chapter XIX, Section 4, "Ce que c'est que l'esprit general." Thus Montesquieu had an eye for collective, if not for single individualities, as if in anticipation of Romanticism he attempts to grasp the mind of a period or of a nation. "The legislator acts best when he follows this mind and does not attempt to change it. We never do better than when we follow . . . our own natural genius." [8] Montesquieu did not always attempt to seize the spirit of an epoch. For example, when he studied the political structure of ancient Rome -the historical subject which most concerned him -he saw it primarily as an especially im-pressive example of general political theory rather than a historical individuality important in its own right - an attitude shared by many in that age, even by J. B. Vico.

It is, perhaps, when Montesquieu deals with the medieval institutions of "our fathers," the Germans, that he best succeeds in grasping individual reality. "The feudal laws," he wrote, "offer a beautiful spectacle: an old oak rises; first, the eye perceives only the leaves; we approach; then, we see the trunk, but still are not able to perceive the roots; in order to

find these, we must penetrate beneath the soil." **9** The method here suggested is also that followed by Montesquieu in his attempt to understand the inner nature, the logic of Medieval Laws. When Montesquieu followed this latter trend, he anticipated the relativism which is often believed peculiar to a fully developed theory of history. He stated, for example, that each nation will find in its work the reason for and justification of its own standards. There seems to be lacking in him, too, that belief, which had been a basic conviction of Voltaire, in the existence of one standard of reason, according to which every period and people can be judged. Yet, Montesquieu is not consistent in his relativism; he is far from being free of the Enlightenment belief that human nature never changes. It is upon traits of this basic human nature that he established the different forms of government. In this belief, he is reminiscent of Machiavelli with whom he shared the conviction of the evil nature of man, which justified in the minds of each the task of politics and political coercion. Machiavelli and Montesquieu also regarded historico-political problems as a matter exclusively of conscious and rational planning[10].

Thus, two trends - a search for concrete, individual reality and a concern for abstract laws and principles- balance each other in the writing of Montesquieu. At times we find the two closely juxtaposed, as is the case with England where the perfection of her constitution is deduced from general political principles, while realistic observations on Rome evoke his prediction that this nation, too, may lose its liberty and then perish." The interest in general causes would, to a certain extent, be in opposition to a concern for the single individual. As regards the appreciation of human individuality, not even the relativistic approach, which enabled Montesquieu to look for a collective individuality, helped him to enjoy the single personality. If we read the characterization he gives of Cicero and Cato in his Considerations, or the parallels he draws between certain rulers in the *Reflections sur les characters de quelques princes*, we find not so much the desire to grasp an individuality as an attempt to determine the part played by an individual at a decisive moment. Yet at times, the importance of the role played in history by the individual, has almost disappeared and we find him saying: "If Caesar and Pompey had thought as Cato did, other men would have thought like Caesar and Pompey; and the Roman republic, destined to perish, would have been pushed to the precipice by another hand."Destined to perish !" Thus the part of "chance" in writings and narratives was eliminated by Montesquieu. Historical success corresponds to the dominating general causes: "It was not the battle of Pultawa which was the ruin of Charles XII: if he had not been defeated there, he would have

been crushed at some other place." Certain events result from the very nature of things; this lesson may be read everywhere in the history of the Romans[11].

Any attempt to study the writings of **David Hume** is made difficult by the fact that the problems recognized and the principles advocated by the author of the Essays are often contradicted or ignored by the author of the History of England. A sentence from his essay, 'Of the Rise and the Progress of the Arts and Sciences', expresses a feeling evidently basic to the Scotch philosopher and historian, that "what depends upon a few persons is in a great measure to be ascribed to chance or secret or unknown causes: what arises from a great number may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes." Again, in words which are reminiscent of Voltaire (though opposed to the theories of the students of the reason d'ttat) and which reveal his skeptical approach, Hume declares "that the domestic and the gradual revolutions of a state must be a more proper subject of reasoning and observation, than the foreign and violent, which are commonly produced by single persons, and are more influenced by whim, folly or caprice, than by general passions and interests." But one has only to glance over the table of Contents of his writing to observe how he neglects the problems.

Again in his essays, Hume readily acknowledges the problematic in history: "History may contain certain questions as uncertain as any to be found in the most abstract sciences." But as historian, he does not care to face the problematic or the contradictory. With human individuals, too, he recognizes that "the most rational principles are often a weak counterpoise to passion." But when he has to deal with individuals in whom the conflicting trends of reason and passion are powerfully represented, as in his portraits of Elizabeth and Cromwell, he cautiously refrains from penetrating near the core of the personality. Hume's utter failure to grasp the essence of an individuality was perhaps partly due to his concern with the fixed ideal of "a perfect character," which prevented him from gaining insight into the real motivating forces of human beings. It could be said that as a philosopher, Hume had destroyed even the theoretical possibility of grasping and enjoying a human individuality; his skepticism did not allow him to believe in the reality of such an entity. And Hume's failure to seize the whole of an individuality, his tendency to add together separate features, unassimilated, is also characteristic of his general approach to history. He had none of Montesquieu's flair for grasping the esprit general of an epoch and, contrary to his own admonitions, he was mainly concerned with the single events of history. It has been said in criticism of Hume that he "keenly perceives the foreground of the moved events,

but fails to grasp the background with its moving forces." As regards his attitude toward the problem of development, so important to the historians of his period, Hume's skepticism did not prevent him from perceiving progress in history. According to him, advances have been made from dark beginnings. So it was with political history. The enlightened liberty of the English, which Hume called the "perfection of civil society," was, as one learns in his History of England, a result of the stubborn religious enthusiasm of the Puritans, which he despised, as he did every form of irrational fanaticism. Deism was the religion professed by Hume; and he regarded its spread as evidence of "progress from dark beginnings," for Deism was an outgrowth of religious feelings born, as he says, "chiefly from an anxious fear of future events."

As for general intellectual progress, Hume at one point expressed his confidence that Europe had attained an intellectual status never before reached: "Europe is at present a copy, at large, of what Greece was formerly a pattern in miniature." Hume had much of Voltaire's feeling of joy and pride in the community of the varitables savants which he believed had developed in Europe, though there is lacking in his writings, if not in his Essays, a recognition of the spiritual individuality of such a community. However, his feeling of confidence was tempered by a fear that the peak might already have been passed; he discerned both in France and England some symptoms of a degeneracy similar to those which existed in the later periods of Greece and Rome[12]. The confidence of Hume, tempered by resignation and a balanced skepticism, was carried further; and the way to an optimistic belief in progress was definitely cleared by **Adam Smith**[13], whose famous work, The Wealth of Nations, was published in the year in which Hume died. Smith saw human nature as wiser and more powerful than all the conscious planning of men; it was not from "any human wisdom which foresees and intends" human development, but by a "necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain human propensity in human nature" that progress is carried out. Again, "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages." It is the very "Natural inclination of man" which leads to social progress; even when a class favors "the most childish, the meanest and the most sordid of all vanities," this too must serve the common goal of human advances. It is not without sig-nificance for the historical writing which was to come, that the emphasis had now been shifted to the urban branches' of the social structure. Development in the sense of general progress seems

by this time to have become the one great idea in historical writing. Turgot, who has often been called the predecessor of Comte and Positivism, is a most impressive example of this trend despite all his caution. The title *Sur les progrgs successifs de l'esprit human* could already have been given to his survey of history. Although Turgot saw a general breakdown of society from the Augustan age to the end of the Roman Empire, he traced the steady advance which began with the rise of the medieval towns. Even before the rebirth of the ancient spirit, the image of Greece, from a political point of view, was reflected in the cities of Italy; and with the Renaissance, *"les temps sont arrives!",* he cried in an excitement similar to that of Montesquieu. "The time has come; awake, Europe from the night which has covered thee.... Salute to thee, Italy ... for the second time Fatherland of letters and taste." Finally, he considered the century of Louis, the age of great men, the age of reason. With Newton, the key to the universe is found. For Turgot the shadows had vanished. He exclaimed, "what a perfection of human reason"

Although it is true that in the arts, there is a fixed point beyond which development is impossible, **Turgot** even more narrowly than Voltaire, regarded the age of Augustus as a model[14] However, sciences are subject to progress; and Turgot perceived humanity as progressing slowly but steadily towards a greater perfection. He realized that there existed an infinite variety of circumstances and, consequently, there had to be inequality in the progress made by the different nations. He admitted that such progress was due to the achievements of the few, those gifted with real genius; nor did he deny that throughout history there had been evil forces at work. But, finally, "like the forces which have agitated the waves of the sea, so the evils inseparable from the revolution disappear." [15] The good remains and humanity grows towards perfection. Turgot reminds us that, outside the science of mathematics, the human mind must take its starting point from nature as it is, from the infinite diversity of the results. But he insists that "all is linked together; in spite of the diversity of their course, all the sciences bolster each other," [16] and there exists in the way of mankind, a trend of almost super- historical uniformity. "The same senses," says Turgot, "the same organs, the aspect of the same universe, have everywhere produced the same ideas with men, just as the same needs and the same inclinations have always instructed them in the arts." The current trend to see progress in history was attended at this time by a waning interest in empirical research; the time had come for sweeping, general surveys; and the concrete was abandoned to an increasing degree. The abstract proposition of classical mathematics had become the ideal method for history; there were

indications that the hope was nourished of finally disposing of historical problems by a method of subtle deductions. Turgot inquired wistfully: "why is the course of men, so sure from the very starting point in the study of mathematics, so wavering in all the rest, so liable of going astray?" [17] The most advanced phase of an optimistic rationalist approach is embodied in the writings of *Condorcet*. The theme of his Outlines of a Historical Picture of the Advances of the Human Spirit (than which there have been few more biased and one-sided writings in historiography until Treitschke) is the great progress based on the un- limited perfectibility of mankind. This is the only historical thesis Condorcet emphasized, though in his Outlines he signaled out one great period of retrogression. In his sweeping survey of the world, there is scant mention of single individuals; the single nationalities- the histories of which are outlined here much more thoroughly than with Voltaire, Turgot, or Hume - are not perceived as collective individualities, as Montesquieu had attempted to see them. But this does not mean that he failed to see an Esprit General of the various periods; indeed, he went even further than Montesquieu in grasping the common denominator of the trends of an epoch. But this reduction to a common denominator, by which each epoch is assigned its place in the scheme of things, served mainly the purpose of plotting the curve of universal progress. And this progress is, to Condorcet, intellectual progress, *les Progre's de l'Esprit Humain*; thus, nations appear in the Outlines only when and insofar as they have con- tributed to this intellectual progress. Politics, in Condorcet's opinion, is of little importance, and this point of view influenced his judgment in the case of single individuals. In his history the greatest men are neither Caesar nor Charles V, but Aristotle, Newton, Leibniz, -in the company of whom he would not even admit the great artists - a Dante or a Michelangelo. As we turn to Lessing, we may be reminded of a remark of Turgot who said that he saw the hand of God every-where in history, and that even the work of evil passions was a means by which nature and its creator guided the childhood of the human race[17] .The sentiment expressed in the first part of this statement was to become of great importance with the German historian Ranke; the second idea was to become a basic point of view in the rationalist approach of Lessing, who saw in the age of enlightenment the progressive stages of the moral education of mankind. To him, progress is an advance toward morality, an advance furthered by education; mankind is led to social morality by the work of secret societies, especially Freemasonry, and to private morality by God, the great pedagogue.[18] In both spheres alike the goal is reached at the moment when education becomes superfluous; history is seen as the preparatory development towards

individual autonomy-and herein lies its sole significance to **Lessing**. As regards the human individual, he is important only insofar as he belongs to the moral sphere, to which all the other realms of life should be subordinated in interest by the historian. If it be asked, how may one know that "education" can ever attain the goal proposed, Lessing can answer only that he is confident of this possibility because of his secret, yet basic and even metaphysical belief in the educability of human nature - if not of any given individual; did he not say in his essays on dramatic art that men wish to be told, not what a single individual had once done, but what a certain human type would do in certain circumstances?

Thus history in the age of Enlightenment became empirical,positivists,inductive,individualists and scientificSignificant scientific advancement also was made during the enlightenment phase, which can be traced from the scientific advancement from Bacon to Newton.

Sir Francis Bacon

In 1620, around the time that people first began to look through microscopes, an English politician named Sir Francis Bacon developed a method for philosophers to use in weighing the truthfulness of knowledge. While Bacon agreed with medieval thinkers that humans too often erred in interpreting what their five senses perceived, he also realized that people's sensory experiences provided the best possible means of making sense of the world. Because humans could incorrectly interpret anything they saw, heard, smelled, tasted, or felt, Bacon insisted that they must doubt everything before assuming its truth[19].

Testing hypotheses

In order to test potential truths, or hypotheses, Bacon devised a method whereby scientists set up experiments to manipulate nature and attempt to prove their hypotheses wrong. For example, in order to test the idea that sickness came from external causes, Bacon argued that scientists should expose healthy people to outside influences such as coldness, wetness, or other sick people to discover if any of these external variables resulted in more people getting sick. Knowing that many different causes for sickness might be missed by humans who are unable or unwilling to perceive them, Bacon insisted that these experiments must be consistently repeated before truth could be known: a scientist must show that patients exposed to a specific variable more frequently got sick again, and again, and again[20].

We still utilize Bacon's 1620 method of proving knowledge to be true via doubt and experimentation. Bacon's philosophical work marks a very significant breakthrough for the study of the world around us, but it is important to stress that this method of investigation was not conceived in a vacuum. Rather, Bacon's work should be seen as a part of a widespread cultural revolution accelerated by the rise of the printing press in the 15th century.(Mary Augusta Scott 'The essays of Francis Bacon', New York:Charles Scribner's sons;1908)[21].

Issac Newton

In 1642, the year Galileo died, Isaac Newton was born in Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire, England on Christmas Day. His father had died three months earlier, and baby Isaac, very premature, was also not expected to survive. It was said he could be fitted into a quart pot. When Isaac was three, his mother married a wealthy elderly clergyman from the next village, and went to live there, leaving Isaac behind with his grandmother. The clergyman died, and Isaac's mother came back, after eight years, bringing with her three small children. Two years later, Newton went away to the Grammar School in Grantham, where he lodged with the local apothecary, and was fascinated by the chemicals. The plan was that at age seventeen he would come home and look after the farm. He turned out to be a total failure as a farmer. His mother's brother, a clergyman who had been an undergraduate at Cambridge, persuaded his mother that it would be better for Isaac to go to university, so in 1661 he went up to Trinity College, Cambridge. Isaac paid his way through college for the first three years by waiting tables and cleaning rooms for the fellows (faculty) and the wealthier students. In 1664, he was elected a scholar, guaranteeing four years of financial support. Unfortunately, at that time the plague was spreading across Europe, and reached Cambridge in the summer of 1665. The university closed, and Newton returned home, where he spent two years concentrating on problems in mathematics and physics. He wrote later that during this time he first understood the theory of gravitation, and the theory of optics (he was the first to realize that white light is made up of the colors of the rainbow), and much mathematics, both integral and differential calculus and infinite series. However, he was always reluctant to publish anything, at least until it appeared someone else might get credit for what he had found earlier. On returning to Cambridge in 1667, he began to work on alchemy, but then in 1668 Nicolas Mercator published a book containing some methods for dealing with infinite series. Newton immediately wrote a treatise, De Analysi, expounding his own wider ranging results. His friend and mentor Isaac Barrow communicated these discoveries to a London

mathematician, but only after some weeks would Newton allow his name to be given. This brought his work to the attention of the mathematics community for the first time. Shortly afterwards, Barrow resigned his Lucasian Professorship (which had been established only in 1663, with Barrow the first incumbent) at Cambridge so that Newton could have the Chair. Newton's first major public scientific achievement was the invention, design and construction of a reflecting telescope. He ground the mirror, built the tube, and even made his own tools for the job. This was a real advance in telescope technology, and ensured his election to membership in the Royal Society. The mirror gave a sharper image than was possible with a large lens because a lens focusses different colors at slightly different distances, an effect called chromatic aberration. This problem is minimized nowadays by using compound lenses, two lenses of different kinds of glass stuck together, in opposite directions, and thus tend to cancel each other's shortcomings, but mirrors are still used in large telescopes. Later in the 1670's, Newton became very interested in theology. He studied Hebrew scholarship and ancient and modern theologians at great length, and became convinced that Christianity had departed from the original teachings of Christ. He felt unable to accept the current beliefs of the Church of England, which was unfortunate because he was required as a Fellow of Trinity College to take holy orders. Happily, the Church of England was more flexible than Galileo had found the Catholic Church in these matters, and King Charles II issued a royal decree excusing Newton from the necessity of taking holy orders![22]

In 1684, three members of the Royal Society, **Sir Christopher Wren**, **Robert Hooke** and **Edmond Halley**, argued as to whether the elliptical orbits of the planets could result from a gravitational force towards the sun proportional to the inverse square of the distance. Halley went up to Cambridge, and put the problem to Newton, who said he had solved it four years earlier, but couldn't find the proof among his papers. Three months later, he sent an improved version of the proof to Halley, and devoted himself full time to developing these ideas, culminating in the publication of the Principia in 1686. This was the book that really did change man's view of the universe, as we shall shortly discuss, and its importance was fully appreciated very quickly. Newton became a public figure. He left Cambridge for London, where he was appointed Master of the Mint, a role he pursued energetically, as always, including prosecuting counterfeiters. He was knighted by Queen Anne. He argued with Hooke about who deserved credit for discovering the connection between elliptical orbits and the inverse square law until

Hooke died in 1703, and he argued with a German mathematician and philosopher, Leibniz, about which of them invented calculus. Newton died in 1727, and was buried with much pomp and circumstance in Westminster Abbey—despite his well-known reservations about the Anglican faith.[23]

ENLIGHTENMENT AND RATIONALITY

In modern Europe, enlightening (aufkldrendes) thought has always been set in opposition to orientations toward the world which are based on tradition. The concept of "Enlightenment"-whether understood as historically designating a movement in thought in the 18th century, or as a concept delineating a process, namely, a trend in the development of the history of civilization-has always been linked to the idea of the overcoming of dogmatic traditions by means of rational insights.' Enlightening thought claims to liberate the thinker from the spell of handed down traditions by subjecting to rational, universally re-constructable examination that which had previously been valid solely by being socially binding. Thus, from the outset, what is unique to enlightenment is its immanent relation to a criterion of rational validity which acts as a standard against which opinions and convictions can be upheld by rational examination. Although it is hardly possible to develop a concept of enlightening thought without such a relation to rationality, ever since the days of that "Enlightenment" epoch, thinkers have nevertheless strongly contested the manner and possibility of pro- viding the foundations of a meaningful concept of human rationality. Even within the innermost circles of the Enlightenment movement, a form of the critique of reason (Vernunftkritik) arose in Rousseau's, Jacobi's, and Herder's writings, and in still sharper form during the early Romantic period-which destined enlightening thought to enlighten itself forever about the concept of reason. Enlightenment has been unfolding ever since as a process of enlightenment about the boundaries and limitations of human rationality; as it feels its way forward, every new step of the critique of reason has been followed by a further stage of the self-restriction of rationality.[24]

Background of Enlightenment

In the perspective of social history the Enlightenment is a historically important stage in the development of western bourgeois thought, which, as a whole, constitutes a unique and vital part of human intellectual history. To understand the essential ideas of the Enlightenment, one must accordingly start by analysing the activity that was most important to the bourgeoisie and most influenced its social and intellectual evolution. This was the

development of the economy, and above all its essential element, exchange. In sociological terms, the history of the bourgeoisie is primarily economic history. The word is used here in a narrow sense, in which there is not an 'economy' in all human societies, at all times and in all places; it is used only of those groups in which the production and distribution of goods are not in any way controlled-no matter whether the control is rational, authoritarian, religious or traditional. Thus there is no economy in this sense in a medieval peasant family growing food for its own consumption, nor on a feudal estate living on its own produce and on natural abundance obtained without cultivation, nor in a large-scale system of planning like that of the present-day Soviet Union. In all these instances the commodities are produced and distributed-fairly or unfairly, in humane or barbarous manner-on principles governed by the use-value and actual qualities of the goods. An economy in our sense exists only where economic activity is not governed by the use-value of the goods produced-the use of the goods to people, individually or socially-but by the possibility of selling the goods on the market and realizing their exchange-value. Now as the organization of production and distribution based on exchange-value develops within the previously established framework of production and comes to supersede it, a progressive change in the people's manner of life and thought sets in. It is not easy to list the main features of this process of change, as the causally determined historical order in which they appear does not correspond with the systematic arrangement of their essential qualities. It is necessary to adopt a systematic enumeration and begin with a characteristic that appears on the surface only in developed exchange economics but forms the basis of all the others, and thus offers a direct means of making the intellectual history of the western European bourgeoisie comprehensible[25].

The most important consequence of the development of a market economy is that the individual, who previously constituted a mere partial element within the total social process of production and distribution, now becomes, both in his own consciousness and in that of his fellow men, an independent element, a sort of monad, a point of departure. The social process of course continues and implies a certain regulation of production and exchange. This process was not only objectively present in the earlier social structure but also realized in the traditional, religious and rational rules governing people's behaviour . These rules now begin to fade from consciousness. The regulation of the market is now implicit, governed by the blind forces of supply and demand. 'The total social process is seen as resulting mechanically and

independently of the individual will from the action of countless autonomous individuals on each other and in response to each other, behaving as rationally as possible for the protection of their private interests and basing their actions on their knowledge of the market with no regard for any trans-individual authority or values. It was thus inevitable that the development of a market economy, starting as early as the thirteenth century, should progressively transform western thought. This development seems to be the social foundation of the two great world visions characteristic of the European outlook, that dominated it up to the time of *Pascal*, of *Kant*, and even longer, and have persisted alongside the tragic, the romantic and the dialectic visions. They are the rationalist and the empirical traditions, and their synthesis, the French Enlightenment. At first glance rationalism and empiricism seem to be so opposed in their philosophical approach, and to give such opposite answers to every philosophical question, that one may well ask how they can possibly both be derived from the development of the bourgeoisie, and how most of the eighteenth century writers of the Enlightenment in France managed without any special difficulty to adopt a position half-way between the two extremes. The answer seems to be that these two philosophies share the same fundamental concept: the treatment of the individual consciousness as the absolute origin of knowledge and action. Pure rationalism finds this origin in clear innate ideas existing independently of experience; pure empiricism, rejecting entirely the notion of innate ideas, finds the origin in sense-perceptions more or less mechanically organized into conscious thought. The majority of the thinkers of the French Enlightenment occupied a third position, intermediate between rationalism and empiricism. They were sharply anti-Cartesian, laughed at *Descartes*' physics (his 'romance of vortices', as they called it) and found their great examples in Newton and Locke, denying, with the latter and all the empiricists, the existence of innate ideas, and holding that individual consciousness is invariably based on experience. None the less they generally acknowledged, expressly or by implication, the active role of reason in collecting the knowledge which has been acquired through perception and preserved in the memory, organizing it in the form of thought and science, and directing action, under the influence of feeling, towards the greatest satisfaction and happiness of the individual. For all the differences between these three philosophical systems, it is none the less clear that we have before us three forms of the same individualism, and that the temporary dominance of one form or another was determined largely by the objective social situation in different countries at different times. It seems self-evident that there is a close relation between the development of the

market economy, in which every individual appears as the autonomous source of his decisions and actions, and the evolution of these different philosophical visions of the world, all of which treat the individual's consciousness as the absolute origin of his knowledge and action. Likewise, the disappearance from human consciousness of all trans-individual authority regulating production and distribution is matched by the fundamental claim of all the writers of the Enlightenment that individual reason must be recognized as the supreme arbiter and subjected to no higher authority. This is by no means the only relation between the Enlightenment and the bourgeoisie. All the fundamental categories of Enlightenment thought have a basic structure analogous to that of the market economy, which constitutes in its turn the social basis of the evolving bourgeoisie. It will be enough to mention the most important of them. Every act of exchange requires the participation of at least two parties[26]. There is a set abstract relation between them which may be defined as follows: the agreement of two autonomous individual wills creates a mutually binding engagement; this engagement may be altered only if a new agreement is made, or if it is proved that the will of either of the parties was not autonomous at the time of the agreement, as a result either of deception (causing a hindrance to knowledge) or of physical constraint (restricting action). This relation is inherent in every act of exchange and constitutes the sole interpersonal relation implied by the transaction. This is the relation of contract. It is natural enough, then, that all individualist thinkers, and particularly those of the Enlightenment, should think of society as a contract between large numbers of autonomous individuals combining to establish a community, a nation, a state. The contract is the basic mental category in which the Enlightenment thought of human society and especially the state. We meet this concept in a succession of entirely diverse thinkers stretching from Hobbes and *Locke* to *Grotius* and *Diderot*, and above all in Rousseau's Social Contract. This is the place to ask why Rousseau's concept of the social contract put all others into the background; why, since its publication, other versions of the theory have been relegated to academic study. The answer to this question lies in the historical and political ideas of the Enlightenment. For the moment we may say that most of the other theories of social contract, both those deriving from seventeenth-century politics and those originating in the Enlightenment's preference for monarchy in the eighteenth century, regarded the social contract as a contract establishing the state by the subjection of its members. Rousseau, by contrast, saw the contract from the start as bound up with the other basic value of the Enlightenment, that of equality. In his view the social contract is

an agreement between free and equal individuals, all undertaking to put themselves entirely under the general will. The essence of the social contract is defined thus: 'Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole' (Book I, chapter 6). The social contract creates the general will in which 'all citizens are equal' (Book III, chapter 6), and the general will then determines the form of government. Furthermore Rousseau was the first to relate (though only in abstract terms) the theory of social contract with the distinction between the individual will and the general will. (This distinction becomes fundamental in Hegel and Marx in the analysis of the private and state spheres of social life, and of their relations in modem society.) To continue our analysis of the act of exchange: the transaction of course postulates equality between the parties as an essential condition of the contract. However great the differences· in rank or wealth that distinguish them in the rest of their social life, in the act of exchange, as sellers and buyers of goods (also when the goods are in the abstract form of money), the parties to the transaction are strictly equal[27]. The act of exchange is essentially democratic. Needless to say, its democratic element is purely formal, and implies nothing as to the real content of the exchange. (This is why the Marxist critique of formal democracy fastens chiefly on a privileged act of exchange, the sale and purchase of human labour.) But within the framework of the transaction all economic distinctions between the parties are disregarded. The equality of all actual and potential parties to a contract is a fundamental condition of its mere existence. Universality Next, exchange generates the idea of universality. The buyer uses the market to find a seller, and vice versa, but is not concerned with the personal character of the other. In principle, if the conventions of the exchange are sufficiently developed, the behaviour of the parties towards each other is fixed by general rules completely independent of whom the parties actually are. Thus the category of universality (which is implicit in any catalogue offering goods for sale at stated prices to any customer) increasingly becomes the effect as well as the condition of the exchange of goods. Toleration, A fourth category of thought which is both produced by exchange and furthers its development is toleration. It is hardly necessary to justify the assertion. Exchange entirely disregards the religious and moral convictions of the parties just as it disregards their other objective qualities. These convictions are irrelevant to the act of exchange, and it would be absurd to take them into account. Whether the other party is a Christian, Jew or Mohammedan makes no difference to his ability to transact the exchange

validly. This analysis is confined also by the historical fact that the development of commercial relations has always worked against fanaticism and wars of religion. This of course is valid only for a liberal economy and not for a monopoly economy, in which claimants of collective planning are beginning to appear. We now come to the two most important categories which, like the others, are both the condition and the result of the development of exchange: freedom and property. Exchange is possible only between 'parties that are equal and free. Any restriction on freedom of will or action automatically destroys the possibility of an act of exchange. A slave or serf cannot of course sell his possessions on his own account. On the other hand it is unthinkable for a merchant, every time he makes a sale or purchase, to be obliged to inquire into the previous life or civil status or rights of his client. This problem arose in a concrete form in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries at the high point of the agricultural period of the European economy, when the towns were beginning to develop; and it brought legal complications in its train. The commercial activity which provided the foundation of the newly growing towns was very frequently held back by the feudal structure of the countryside. For example, it became increasingly difficult to accept that purchases or sales made in the town could suddenly be declared null and void simply because the client was a runaway serf who did not possess the right to buy or sell. In this way the towns began to gain their freedom, though often only after a long and bitter struggle. This freedom is implied in the words 'There is freedom in town air', meaning that in general all trace of previous serfhood could be eliminated by the acquisition of citizenship of a town or sometimes merely by sufficiently long residence within its boundaries. Lastly, an exchange can take place only if the two parties have rights of disposal over the goods they intend to exchange, or, more precisely, if they enjoy the unlimited rights or" ownership under the law. With this we conclude the list of the principal mental categories necessary to the development of a society founded on exchange, categories which also acted to further its development: individualism, entailing the disappearance of all trans-individual authority; the contract, forming the basis of all human relations; equality; universality; toleration; freedom; property[28].

<u>Features of Enlightenment</u>

In the West, this vision was put into place through a variety of economic, political and societal approaches such as the scientific and technological revolutions; the development of entrepreneurial capitalism and person-centered humanism; the emancipation of women; as well

as through the corresponding public discourses of rationalism and liberalism. Philosophers, scientists and politicians like Denis Diderot, Voltaire, Adam Newton, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, Benjamin Franklin, Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and Thomas Paine propagated public education, independent and critical mass media and democracy to increase social participation and justice by providing equal chances, making society thus more open and productive. Artists like Gotthold Ephraim Lessing or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe insisted upon religious and cultural tolerance. The Enlightenment also laid the foundations for the separation of state and religion, and thus for the institution of the modern state. The respective ideas found expression in the American Constitution of 1776 and in the French Revolution of 1789 which proposed liberty, equality and brotherhood as ideals to pursue by the means of the rule of law and cultural and social pluralism. In 1948, these principles inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and since then most of the differing attempts to theorize and implement forms of international and global government[29].

As the interweaving ideology underlying all these aspects which together constituted (and still drive) modernity as we know it, the Enlightenment stays until today at the center of the modern Western mindset and of the knowledge societies produced by it. Insofar as it gave origin to most of the characteristics which defined modernity throughout the past two centuries, the Enlightenment remains the embodiment of four core features which are still at the center of contemporary post-industrial societies: (1) technological modernization, (2) secularization, (3) pluralization, and (4) multiculturalization. They are kept together by the practice of public rational critique as demystification, i.e., by Enlightenment as an ethics and politics of public discourse specific to democratic communities (*Jürgen Habermas*). Taken as a whole, the term Enlightenment comprises three meanings historically closely connected with each other: (1) the - mainly Western - utopia of a open, participatory and free society, driven by technology and a rational, secular and tolerant mindset, (2) a stage of development (i.e., the epoch of modernity) of Western civilization, (3) a specific state of mind of individuals or groups. As Michel Foucault has pointed out, "the conditions under which mankind can escape from its immaturity, (in Kant's approach) are at once spiritual and institutional, ethical and political" (1984, p. 35). And as W. J. Hanegraaff, Helmut Reinalter and Lorenzo Ravagli have shown, "secular religion"—including the Templar tradition since the 12th century, Freemasonry, and experiential Christian currents—

played a decisive role in forging the contextual political implications of Enlightenment. The critical re-appropriation of these pluri dimensional, i.e., simultaneously secular and spiritual characteristics of Enlightenment, may become a bridge between its rational and spiritual traits within globalization, and thus a platform for globalized approaches for the future. Since the 1980s, the discussion about how to move the ideas of Enlightenment forward into the age of globalization has ignited a vivid debate between modernists and postmodernists if Enlightenment is an unfinished project that can be further developed and adapted to globalization by working on a meta-cultural ethics of discourse and communicability, as well as on the idea of world citizenship (Habermas); or if its adaption requires overcoming most of its basic features by "deconstructing" its foundations and moving towards an "aesthetics of the Self" oriented rather towards basic traits of the Greek civilization than to modernity (Foucault) or towards an alleged "other" of the implicit Eurocentrism and Logo-centrism (i.e., one-sided rationalism) of Enlightenment that has still to be defined (Jacques Derrida)[30].

Enlightenment For Many

The diverse and contradictory nature of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, commonly known as the Age of Reason, pays homage to the tremendous intellectual ferment of the previous century. In the seventeenth century, the Scientific Revolution had provided a new model for how problems could be solved through rational thought and experimentation, rather than on the authority of religion or the ancients. In fact, the French philosopher, mathematician and scientist René Descartes had seen man's ability to reason as the very proof of his existence, declaring Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am), in his Discourse on Method in 1637. Descartes rejected all forms of intellectual authority except the conclusions of his own thought, which he then used to prove the existence of God. The Scientific Revolution had actually begun in the mid-16th century with Copernicus' new theory of the sun as the center of the universe, replacing Ptolemy's earth-centered model, accepted since antiquity. This revolution culminated in the seventeenth century with the publication of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia in 1687, in which a thoroughly mechanical universe was explained through universal laws of motion. Newton, like Descartes, presented a vision of the universe whose most basic workings could be calculated and understood rationally, but which was also the work of a Creator. The triumph of Newtonian science coincided with and helped to produce a fundamental intellectual change. By the early eighteenth century, the focus of speculation was shifting from theological to secular concerns.

This change is at once evident when we compare two rulers who exemplify the old and new outlooks. Louis XIV of France (1643-1715) was a typical seventeenth-century sovereign, in that he had seen his primary duty to the State as a religious leader. His revocation of the 'Edict of Nantes in 1685', which forced tens of thousands of Protestants to flee France, was an example of his concern with the religious unity of his country. In contrast, the eighteenth-century ruler Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740-86) was basically a secular leader. He described his own role as that of 'first servant of the state'. To Frederick, his subjects'' religions were their own affair, a matter of private conscience, and not a public matter of state. Frederick's overriding concern instead was with building an army and a stable bureaucracy, and putting in place a tax structure to fund them. His rationally organized state machine would assure the security and prosperity of his subjects. The old religious hostilities that had divided Europe since the Reformation no longer preocuppied him. Science and rational inquiry now came to be seen as the common ground which reunited men, previously polarized into Catholic or Protestant, in what the Declaration of Independence would call 'the pursuit of happiness' to be achieved in this world, not the next. Reason provided a unifying doctrine, and the key to increasing human happiness taking over the position once held by religion. With the right use of reason, all society's problems could be solved and all mankind could live prosperously and contentedly[31].

This optimism reflected a sense of growing economic opportunity. Europe in the eighteenth century was richer and more populous than ever before. Steady economic growth seemed to bear out the notion that the new key of scientific method could unlock the answers not only to the physical world (as Newton had done), but to theology, history, politics and social problems as well. Using the advances made possible through rational scientific inquiry, farmers pioneered improvements in agriculture and entrepreneurs experimented with new technologies and products. In England, the seminal political theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were in the spirit of the same rational approach to problem solving, but had also been influenced by the dramatic conflicts that unfolded in Britain between the 1640s and the 1680s. Hobbes wrote in his masterwork, the Leviathan (1651), that men were motivated primarily by the desire for power and by fear of other men, and so needed an all powerful sovereign to rule over them. He characterized their lives without a strong ruler as solitary, nasty, poor, brutish, and short. For Hobbes, the English Civil War, which began in 1642, and ended with the execution of King Charles I in 1649, was convincing evidence that men were ultimately selfish and competitive. In

addition, Galileo's ideas concerning the nature of the physical world, led him to reason that only matter exists, and that human behavior could be predicted by exact, scientific laws. In the Leviathan, he attempted to turn politics into a science, in which the clash of competing material bodies (men), could be predicted with mathematical accuracy, and thus regulated. John Locke, a generation later, developed an entirely different notion of the basic nature of humankind, which he saw as innately good. While attending Oxford in 1666, he became friends with the first Earl of Shaftesbury, and in 1679, when the Earl was implicated in plots against King Charles II, Locke was also suspected. He fled to the Netherlands, where he met Prince William and Princess Mary (Mary Stuart) of Orange. Locke ultimately enjoyed a favored position at court after William and Mary were invited to invade England and assume the throne in 1688. They came and conquered, but real power was now in the hands of Parliament, representing the propertied classes, which granted them the throne in 1689. Locke then, witnessed this almost bloodless, so-called Glorious Revolution, and became convinced that people could live amicably together, after discovering God's law through the application of reason. In Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1690), he outlined a theory of politics based on people's natural rights: life, liberty, and the ownership of property. To Locke, the task of the state was to protect these rights. Government was a contract between ruler and subjects, as the events of 1688-1689 had demonstrated: rulers were granted power in order to assure their subjects′ welfare. His writings were seminal for the American revolutionary leader Thomas Jefferson, who closely followed Locke's ideas in the Declaration of Independence[32].

In the early eighteenth century, this early critical inquiry into the nature of man and society, spurred by events in England, influenced a group of French thinkers who came to be known as the Philosophes. Many French thinkers came to admire the economically advanced country across the channel with its unique form of representative government. In the first generation of French Philosophes, one of the most important contributions to Enlightenment political thought was made by Charles de Secondat, the Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755). This French nobleman came to respect the British political system after a stay in England from 1729-1731. In his masterwork The Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748, he developed the notion that human, natural and divine laws guide all things, including forms of government, and can best be discovered by empirical investigation. Another of the early Philosophes who wrote on the nature of government was the author and poet Francois Marie Arouet, better known by his pen name of

Voltaire (1694-1778). He was famous in his younger days for his acerbic and witty poetry and plays, but after personal troubles forced him into exile in England in 1726, he came into contact with the ideas of Locke and Newton, and took up weightier concerns. England became for him a model of religious and philosophical freedom, and greatly affected the course of his work, culminating with the publication of his Philosophical Letters Concerning the English Nation in 1733, in which he praised the customs and institutions of English life. In his native France, Voltaire's work was seen as a direct rebuke to French mores and government, and after being condemned by local authorities, Voltaire was once again forced to flee abroad. In 1749, Frederick the Great of Prussia, who admired Voltaire's political views, invited him to come to his court in Potsdam as his royal writing teacher. After three years of what Voltaire saw as intellectual tyranny by the monarch, however, he fled to freer circumstances, settling for some time in Switzerland and eventually returning to Paris, to a hero's welcome, at the end of his life in 1778. Rousseau (1712-1778) and Diderot (1713-1784), born a generation later, continued the *Philosophe* tradition. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was an outspoken critic of the French social and political order. In his landmark work, The Social Contract, written in 1762, Rousseau rejected existing forms of government in favor of a community based on the choice of all its citizens, and their democratic participation in every major decision. These ideas were to be of central importance after the outbreak of the French Revolution. Diderot's Encyclopédie, to which Rousseau contributed, was a wide-ranging attack on the irrationality of contemporary society and political institutions. Despite being banned, it continued to be published; its last volume was issued in 1772.[33]

The Enlightenment was a cosmopolitan movement, not restricted to England and France. In Germany, Italy and Spain, thinkers similar to the French *Philosophes* pursued their campaign against outmoded ideas and political and religious obscurantism. In colonial America, men like Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), corresponded with European thinkers on political and scientific topics. Through Franklin and Jefferson-to name only the most prominent the critical, rationalist thought of eighteenth-century Europe exercised a decisive influence on American political and social theories.. The work of the Swedish scientist Linnaeus (Carl Linné, 1707-1778), provides an excellent example of the growing refinement in science, which was summarized for the general reader in Diderot's Encyclopédie. For the men of the Enlightenment the basic question of the age was: how does one make mankind happy and rational and free?

Their basic answer was: by discovering the underlying laws which would organize all knowledge into a clear, rational system, enabling individuals to become enlightened, and the societies in which they live to progress. It was a goal seen as obtainable to the people of the eighteenth century. Science and reason seemed to offer the key to the future, to a kind of paradise which would be realized not in the next world, as the theologians asserted, but in this world, here and now. [34]

The trends of Enlightenment brought with newer threads of modernization mainly in the form of Universities, emphasis on learning, art and music became more widespread, especially with the growing middle class. Areas of study such as literature, philosophy, science, and the fine arts increasingly explored subject matter that the general public in addition to the previously more segregated professionals and patrons could relate to. The music of Handel and Mozart, with their Viennese Classical styles, are usually regarded as being the most in line with the Enlightenment ideals.[35]

As the economy and the middle class expanded, there were an increasing number of amateur musicians. One manifestation of this involves women; this movement allowed women to become more involved with music on a social level. Though women were not yet in professional roles (except for singers), they contributed to the amateur performers scene, especially with keyboard music. The desire to explore, record and systematize knowledge had a meaningful impact on music publications. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Dictionnaire de musique* (published 1767 in Geneva and 1768 in Paris) was a leading text in the late 18th century. This widely-available dictionary gave short definitions of words like genius and taste, and was clearly influenced by the Enlightenment movement. Additionally, music publishers began to cater to amateur musicians, putting out music that they could understand and play. The majority of the works that were published were for keyboard, voice and keyboard. Rose Rosengard Subotnik's *Deconstructive Variations* (subtitled *Music and Reason in Western Society*) compares Mozart's *Die Zauberflöte* (1791) using the Enlightenment and Romantic perspectives, and concludes that the work is "an ideal musical representation of the Enlightenment. In Germany and Scotland, the Enlightenment leaders were based in universities. However, in general the universities and schools of France and most of Europe were bastions of traditionalism and were not hospitable to the Enlightenment. In France the major exception was the medical university at Montpellier[36].

The history of Academies in France during the Enlightenment begins with the *Academy of Science,* founded in 1666 in Paris. In England, the Royal Society of London also played a significant role in the public sphere and the spread of Enlightenment ideas. In particular, it played a large role in spreading Robert Boyle's experimental philosophy around Europe, and acted as a clearinghouse for intellectual correspondence and exchange. On one end of the spectrum was the *Bibliothèque Bleue*, a collection of cheaply produced books published in Troyes,France. While historians, such as Roger Chartier and Robert Darnton, have argued against the Enlightenment's penetration into the lower classes, the Bibliotheque Bleue, at the very least, represents a desire to participate in Enlightenment sociability, whether or not this was actually achieved. *The Tatler* and *The Spectator*, two influential periodicals sold from 1709 to 1714, were closely associated with coffee house culture in London, being both read and produced in various establishments in the city. The most popular category of books was political (319 copies ordered). This included five copies of D'Holbach's *Système social*, but around 300 libels and pamphlets.[37]

A genre that greatly rose in importance was that of scientific literature. Natural history in particular became increasingly popular among the upper classes. Works of natural history include Rene-Antoine Ferchault de Reaumur's *Histoire naturelle des insectes* and Jacques Gautier d'Agoty's *La Myologie complète, ou description de tous les muscles du corps humain* (1746). However, as Francois-Alexandre Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois's *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse* (1770) indicates, natural history was very often a political affair. As E. C. Spary writes, the classifications used by naturalists "slipped between the natural world and the social ... to establish not only the expertise of the naturalists over the natural, but also the dominance of the natural over the social". From this basis, naturalists could then develop their own social ideals based on their scientific works. Coffee houses ,debating societies, freemasonic lodges all formed the basis of the spread of environmental ideas.[38]

The Counter-Enlightenment

Opposition to the central ideas of the French Enlightenment, and of its allies and disciples in other European countries, is as old as the movement itself. The proclamation of the autonomy of reason and the methods of the natural sciences, based on observation as the sole reliable method

of knowledge, and the consequent rejection of the authority of revelation, sacred writings and their accepted interpreters, tradition, prescription, and every form of non-rational and transcendent source of knowledge, was naturally opposed by the churches and religious thinkers of many persuasions. But such opposition, largely because of the absence of common ground between them and the philosophers of the Enlightenment, made relatively little headway, save by stimulating repressive steps against the spreading of ideas regarded as dangerous to the authority of church or state. More formidable was the relativist and sceptical tradition that went back to the ancient world. The central doctrines of the progressive French thinkers, whatever their disagreements among themselves, rested on the belief, rooted in the ancient doctrine of natural law, that human nature was fundamentally the same in all times and places; that local and historical variations were unimportant compared with the constant central core in terms of which human beings could be defined as a species, like animals, or plants, or minerals; that there were universal human goals; that a logically connected structure of laws and generalisations susceptible of demonstration and verification could be constructed and replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, mental laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, the 'interested error' maintained by the rulers of mankind and largely responsible for the blunders, vices and misfortunes of humanity. It was further believed that methods similar to those of Newtonian physics, which had achieved such triumphs in the realm of inanimate nature, could be applied with equal success to the fields of ethics, politics and human relationships in general, in which little progress had been made; with the corollary that once this had been effected, it would sweep away irrational and oppressive legal systems and economic policies the replacement of which by the rule of reason would rescue men from political and moral injustice and misery and set them on the path of wisdom, happiness and virtue. Against this, there persisted the doctrine that went back to the Greek sophists, *Protagoras, Antiphon and Critias*, that beliefs involving value-judgements, and the institutions founded upon them, rested not on discoveries of objective and unalterable natural facts, but on human opinion, which was variable and differed between different societies and at different times ; that moral and political values, and in particular justice and social arrangements in general, rested on fluctuating human convention. This was summed up by the sophist quoted by Aristotle who declared that whereas fire burned both here and in Persia, human institutions change under our very eyes. It seemed to follow that no universal truths, established by scientific methods, that is, truths that anyone could

verify by the use of proper methods, anywhere, at any time, could in principle be established in human affairs. This tradition reasserted itself strongly in the writings of such sixteenth-century sceptics as Cornelius Agrippa, Montaigne, and Charron, whose influence is discernible in the sentiments of thinkers and poets in the Elizabethan and Jacobean age. Such scepticism came to the aid of those who denied the claims of the natural sciences or of other universal rational schema and advocated salvation in pure faith, like the great Protestant reformers and their followers, and the Jansenist wing of the Roman church. The rationalist belief in a single coherent body of logically deduced conclusions, arrived at by universally valid principles of thought and founded upon carefully sifted data of observation or experiment, was further shaken by sociologically minded thinkers from *Bodin* to *Montesquieu.* These writers, using the evidence of both history and the new literature of travel and exploration in newly discovered lands, Asia and the Americas, emphasised the variety of human customs and especially the influence of dissimilar natural factors, particularly geographical ones, upon the development of different human societies, leading to differences of institutions and outlook, which in their turn generated wide differences of belief and behaviour. This was powerfully reinforced by the revolutionary doctrines of David Hume, especially by his demonstration that no logical links existed between truths of fact and such a *priori* truths as those of logic or mathematics, which tended to weaken or dissolve the hopes of those who, under the influence of *Descartes* and his followers, thought that a single system of knowledge, embracing all provinces and answering all questions, could be established by unbreakable chains of logical argument from universally valid axioms, not subject to refutation or modification by any experience of an empirical kind. Nevertheless, no matter how deeply relativity about human values or the interpretation of social, including historical, facts entered the thought of social thinkers of this type, they too retained a common core of conviction that the ultimate ends of all men at all times were, in effect, identical: all men sought the satisfaction of basic physical and biological needs, such as food, shelter, security, and also peace, happiness, justice, the harmonious development of their natural faculties, truth, and, somewhat more vaguely, virtue, moral perfection, and what the Romans had called *humanitas.* Means might differ in cold and hot climates, mountainous countries and flat plains, and no universal formula could fit all cases without Procrustean results, but the ultimate ends were fundamentally similar. Such influential writers as *Voltaire*, *d'Alembert* and *Condorcet* believed that the development of the arts and sciences was the most powerful human weapon in attaining

these ends, and the sharpest weapon in the fight against ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, oppression and barbarism, which crippled human effort and frustrated men's search for truth and rational self direction. Rousseau and Mably believed, on the contrary, that the institutions of civilisation were themselves a major factor in the corruption of men and their alienation from nature, from simplicity, purity of heart and the life of natural justice, social equality, and spontaneous human feeling; artificial man had imprisoned, enslaved and ruined natural man. Nevertheless, despite profound differences of outlook, there was a wide area of agreement about fundamental points : the reality of natural law (no longer formulated in the language of orthodox Catholic or Protestant doctrine), of eternal principles by following which alone men could become wise, happy, virtuous, and free. One set of universal and unalterable principles governed the world for theists, deists and atheists, for optimists and pessimists, puritans, primitivists and believers in progress and the richest fruits of science and culture; these laws governed inanimate and animate nature, facts and events, means and ends, private life and public, all societies, epochs and civilizations; it was solely by departing from them that men fell into crime, vice, misery. Thinkers might differ about what these laws were, or how to discover them, or who were qualified to expound them; that these laws were real, and could be known, whether with certainty, or only probability, remained the central dogma of the entire Enlightenment. It was the attack upon this that constitutes the most formidable reaction against this dominant body of belief.[39]

A thinker who might have had a decisive role in this counter-movement, if anyone outside his native country had read him, was the Neapolitan philosopher *Giambattista Vico*. With extraordinary originality *Vico* maintained, especially in the last work of his life, the *Scienza nuova*, that the Cartesians were profoundly mistaken about the role of mathematics as the science of sciences; that mathematics was certain only because it was a human invention. It did not, as they supposed, correspond to an objective structure of reality; it was a method and not a body of truths; with its help we could plot regularities - the occurrence of phenomena in the external world - but not discover why they occurred as they did, or to what end. This could be known only to God, for only those who make things can truly know what they are and for what purpose they have been made. Hence we do not, in this sense, know the external world - nature - for we have not made it; only God, who created it, knows it in this fashion. But since men are directly acquainted with human motives, purposes, hopes, fears, which are their own, they can

know human affairs as they cannot know nature. According to Vico, our lives and activities collectively and individually are expressions of our attempts to survive, satisfy our desires, understand each other and the past out of which we emerge. A utilitarian interpretation of the most essential human activities is misleading. They are, in the first place, purely expressive ; to sing, to dance, to worship, to speak, to fight, and the institutions which embody these activities, comprise a vision of the world. Language, religious rites, myths, laws, social, religious, juridical institutions, are forms of self expression, of wishing to convey what one is and strives for ; they obey intelligible patterns, and for that reason it is possible to reconstruct the life of other societies, even those remote in time and place and utterly primitive, by asking oneself what kind of framework of human ideas, feelings, acts could have generated the poetry, the monuments, the mythology which were their natural expression. Men grow individually and socially; the world of men who composed the Homeric poems was plainly very different from that of the Hebrews to whom God had spoken through their sacred books, or that of the Roman Republic, or medieval Christianity, or Naples under the Bourbons. Patterns of growth are traceable. Myths are not, as enlightened thinkers believe, false statements about reality corrected by later rational criticism, nor is poetry mere embellishment of what could equally well be stated in ordinary prose. The myths and poetry of antiquity embody a vision of the world as authentic as that of Greek philosophy, or Roman law, or the poetry and culture of our own enlightened age - earlier, cruder, remote from us, but with its own voice, as we hear it in the Iliad or the Twelve Tables, belonging uniquely to its own culture, and with a sublimity which cannot be reproduced by a later, more sophisticated culture. Each culture expresses its own collective experience, each step on the ladder of human development has its own equally authentic means of expression. Vico's theory of cycles of cultural development became celebrated, but it is not his most original contribution to the understanding of society or history. His revolutionary move is to have denied the doctrine of a timeless natural law the truths of which could have been known in principle to any man, at any time, anywhere. Vico boldly denied this doctrine, which has formed the heart of the western tradition from Aristotle to our own day. He preached the notion of the uniqueness of cultures, however they might resemble each other in their relationship to their antecedents and successors, and the notion of a single style that pervades all the activities and manifestations of societies of human beings at a particular stage of development. Thereby he laid the foundations at once of comparative cultural anthropology and of comparative historical linguistics, aesthetics,

jurisprudence; language, ritual, monuments, and especially mythology, were the sole reliable keys to what later scholars and critics conceived as altering forms of collective consciousness. Such historicism was plainly not compatible with the view that there was only one standard of truth or beauty or goodness, which some cultures or individuals approached more closely than others, and which it was the business of thinkers to establish and men of action to realise. The Homeric poems were an unsurpassable masterpiece, but they could only spring from a brutal, stern, oligarchical, 'heroic' society, and later civilisations, however superior in other respects, did not and could not produce an art necessarily superior to Homer. This doctrine struck a powerful blow at the notion of timeless truths and steady progress, interrupted by occasional periods of retrogression into barbarism, and drew a sharp line between the natural sciences, which dealt with the relatively unaltering nature of the physical world viewed from 'outside', and humane studies, which viewed social evolution from 'inside' by a species of empathetic insight, for which the establishment of texts or dates by scientific criticism was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. Vico's unsystematic works dealt with many other matters, but his importance in the history of the Enlightenment consists in his insistence on the plurality of cultures and on the consequently fallacious character of the idea that there is one and only one structure of reality which the enlightened philosopher can see as it truly is, and which he can (at least in principle) describe in logically perfect language - a vision that has obsessed thinkers from *Plato* to *Leibniz, Condillac, Russell* and his more faithful followers. For Vico, men ask different questions of the universe, and their answers are shaped accordingly : such questions, and the symbols or acts that express them, alter or become obsolete in the course of cultural development; to understand the answers one must understand the questions that preoccupy an age or a culture ; they are not constant nor necessarily more profound because they resemble our own more than others that are less familiar to us. Vico's relativity went further than Montesquieu's. If his view was correct, it was subversive of the very notion of absolute truths and of a perfect society founded on them, not merely in practice but in principle. However, Vico was little read, and the question of how much influence he had had before his New Science was revived by Michelet a century after it was written is still uncertain. If Vico wished to shake the pillars on which the Enlightenment of his times rested, the Kdnigsberg theologian and philosopher, *J. G. Hamann*, wished to smash them. Hamann was brought up as a pietist, a member of the most introspective and self-absorbed of all the Lutheran sects, intent upon the direct communion of the individual soul with God,

bitterly anti-rationalist, liable to emotional excess, preoccupied with the stern demands of moral obligation and the need for severe self-discipline. The attempt of Frederick the Great in the middle years of the eighteenth century to introduce French culture and a degree of rationalisation, economic and social as well as military, into East Prussia, the most backward part of his provinces, provoked a peculiarly violent reaction in this pious, semi-feudal, traditional Protestant society (which also gave birth to Herder and Kant). Hamann began as a disciple of the Enlightenment, but, after a profound spiritual crisis, turned against it, and published a series of polemical attacks written in a highly idiosyncratic, perversely allusive, contorted, deliberately obscure style, as remote as he could make it from the, to him, detestable elegance, clarity, and smooth superficiality of the bland and arrogant French dictators of taste and thought. Hamann's theses rested on the conviction that all truth is particular, never general : that reason is impotent to demonstrate the existence of anything and is an instrument only for conveniently classifying and arranging data in patterns to which nothing in reality corresponds; that to understand is to be communicated with, by men or by God. The universe for him, as for the older German mystical tradition, is itself a kind of language. Things and plants and animals are themselves symbols with which God communicates with his creatures. Everything rests on faith ; faith is as basic an organ of acquaintance with reality as the senses. To read the Bible is to hear the voice of God, who speaks in a language which he has given man the grace to understand. Some men are endowed with the gift of understanding his ways, of looking at the universe, which is his book no less than the revelations of the Bible and the fathers and saints of the church. Only love - for a person or an object - can reveal the true nature of anything. It is not possible to love formulas, general propositions, laws, the abstractions of science, the vast system of concepts and categories - symbols too general to be close to reality - with which the French *lumieres* have blinded themselves to concrete reality, to the real experience which only direct acquaintance, especially by the senses, provides. Hamann glories in the fact that Hume had successfully destroyed the rationalist claim that there is an a priori route to reality, insisting that all knowledge and belief ultimately rest on acquaintance with the data of direct perception. Hume rightly supposes that he could not eat an egg or drink a glass of water if he did not believe in their existence ; the data of belief - what Hamann prefers to call faith - rest on grounds and require evidence as little as taste or any other sensation. True knowledge is direct perception of individual entities, and concepts are never, no matter how specific they may be, wholly adequate to the fullness of the individual

experience. 'Individuum est ineffabile', wrote Goethe to Lavater in the spirit of Hamann, whom Goethe profoundly admired. The sciences may be of use in practical matters; but no concatenation of concepts will give one an understanding of a man, of a work of art, of what is conveyed by gestures, symbols, verbal and non-verbal, of the style, the spiritual essence, of a human being, a movement, a culture ; nor for that matter of the Deity, which speaks to one everywhere if only one has ears to hear and eyes to see. What is real is individual, that is, is what it is in virtue of its uniqueness, its differences from other things, events, thoughts, and not in virtue of what it has in common with them, which is all that the generalising sciences seek to record. 'Feeling alone', said Hamann, 'gives to abstractions and hypotheses hands, feet, wings'; and again 'God speaks to us in poetical words, addressed to the senses, not in abstractions for the learned', and so must anyone who has something to say that matters, who speaks to another person.[40]

Hamann took little interest in theories or speculations about the external world ; he cared only for the inner personal life of the individual, and therefore only for art, religious experience, the senses, personal relationships, which the analytic truths of scientific reason seemed to him to reduce to meaningless ciphers. 'God is a poet, not a mathematician', and it is men who, like Kant, suffer from a 'gnostic hatred of matter' that provide us with endless verbal constructions - words that are taken for concepts, and worse still, concepts that are taken for real things. Scientists invent systems, philosophers rearrange reality into artificial patterns, shut their eyes to reality, and build castles in the air. 'When data are given you, why do you seek ficta ' Systems are mere prisons of the spirit, and they lead not only to distortion in the sphere of knowledge, but to the erection of monstrous bureaucratic machines, built in accordance with the rules that ignore the teeming variety of the living world, the untidy and asymmetrical inner lives of men, and crush them into conformity for the sake of some ideological chimera unrelated to the union of spirit and flesh that constitutes the real world. 'What is this much lauded reason with its universality, infallibility . . . certainty, over-weening claims, but an *ens rationis*, a stuffed dummy . . . endowed with divine attributes?' History alone yields concrete truth, and in particular the poets describe their world in the language of passion and inspired imagination. 'The entire treasure of human knowledge and happiness lies in images'; that is why the language of primitive man, sensuous and imaginative, is poetical and irrational. 'Poetry is the native language of mankind, and gardening is more ancient than agriculture, painting than writing, song than recitation,

proverbs than rational conclusions, barter than trade.' Originality, genius, direct expression, the Bible or Shakespeare fashion the colour, shape, living flesh of the world, which analytical science, revealing only the skeleton, cannot begin to do.[41]

Hamann is first in the line of thinkers who accuse rationalism and scientism of using analysis to distort reality : lie is followed by Herder, Jacobi, Maser, who were influenced by Shaftesbury, Young, and Burke's anti-intellectualist diatribes, and they, in their turn, were echoed by romantic writers in many lands. The most eloquent spokesman of this attitude is Schelling, whose thought was reproduced vividly by Bergson at the beginning of this century. He is the father of those anti-rationalist thinkers for whom the seamless whole of reality in its un-analysable flow is misrepresented by the static, spatial metaphors of mathematics and the natural sciences. That to dissect is to murder is a romantic pronouncement which is the motto of an entire nineteenth century movement of which Hamann was a most passionate and implacable forerunner. Scientific dissection leads to cold political de-humanisation, to the straitjacket of lifeless French rules in which the living body of passionate and poetical Germans is to be held fast by the Solomon of Prussia, Frederick the Great, who knows so much and understands so little. The arch-enemy is Voltaire, whom Herder called a 'senile child' with a corrosive wit in place of human feeling. The influence of Rousseau, particularly of his early writings, on this movement in Germany, which came to be called Sturm und Drang, was profound. Rousseau's impassioned pleas for direct vision and natural feeling, his denunciation of the artificial social roles which civilisation forces men to play against the true ends and needs of their natures, his idealisation of more primitive, spontaneous human societies, his contrast between natural self-expression and the crippling artificiality of social divisions and conventions which rob men of dignity and freedom, and promote privilege, power and arbitrary bullying at one end of the human scale, and humiliating obsequiousness at the other, and so distort all human relations, appealed to Hamann and his followers.[42]

But even Rousseau did not seem to them to go far enough. Despite everything, Rousseau believed in a timeless set of truths which all men could read, for they were engraved on their hearts in letters more durable than bronze, thereby conceding the authority of natural law, a vast, cold, empty abstraction. To Hamann and his followers all rules or precepts are deadly; they may be necessary for the conduct of day-to-day life, but nothing great was ever achieved by following them. English critics were right in supposing that originality entailed breaking rules, that every

creative act, every illuminating insight, is obtained by ignoring the rules of despotic legislators. Rules, he declared, are vestal virgins: unless they are violated there will be no issue. Nature is capable of wild fantasy, and it is mere childish presumption to seek to imprison her in the narrow rationalist categories of 'puny' and desiccated philosophers. Nature is a wild dance, and so called practical men are like sleep-walkers who are secure and successful because they are blind to reality; if they saw reality as it truly is, they might go out of their minds. Language is the direct expression of the historical life of societies and peoples: 'every court, every school, every profession, every corporation, every sect has its own language' ; we penetrate the meaning of this language by the 'passion' of 'a lover, a friend, an intimate', not by rules, imaginary universal keys which open nothing. The French philosophes and their English followers tell us that men seek only to obtain pleasure and avoid pain, but this is absurd. Men seek to live, create, love, hate, eat, drink, worship, sacrifice, understand, and they seek this because they cannot help it. Life is action. It is knowable only by those who look within themselves and perform the 'hell-ride [Hollenfahrt] of self-knowledge', as the great founders of pietism - Spener, Francke, Bengel - have taught us. Before a man has liberated himself from the deathly embrace of impersonal, scientific thought which robs all it touches of life and individuality, he cannot understand himself or others, or how or why we come to be what we are. While Hamann spoke in irregular, isolated flashes of insight, his disciple Herder attempted to construct a coherent system to explain the nature of man and his experience in history. While profoundly interested in the natural sciences and eagerly profiting by their findings, particularly in biology and physiology, and conceding a good deal more to the French than the fanatical Hamann was willing to do, Herder in that part of his doctrine which entered into the texture of the thought of the movements that he inspired deliberately aimed against the sociological assumptions of the French Enlightenment. He believed that to understand anything was to understand it in its individuality and development, and that this required a capacity which he called *Einfuhlung* ('feeling into') the outlook, the individual character of an artistic tradition, a literature, a social organisation, a people, a culture, a period of history. To understand the actions of individuals, we must understand the 'organic' structure of the society in terms of which alone the minds and activities and habits of its members can be understood. Like Vico, he believed that to understand a religion, or a work of art, or a national character, one must 'enter into' the unique conditions of its life : those who have been storm-tossed on the waves of the North Sea (as he was during his voyage to the west) can

fully understand the songs of the old Skalds as those who have never seen grim northern sailors coping with the elements never will ; the Bible can truly be understood only by those who attempt to enter into the experience of primitive shepherds in the Judaean hills. To grade the merits of cultural wholes, of the legacy of entire traditions, by applying a collection of dogmatic rules claiming universal validity, enunciated by the Parisian arbiters of taste, is vanity and blindness. Every culture has its own unique Schwerpunkt ('centre of gravity'), and unless we grasp it we cannot understand its character or value. From this springs Herder's passionate concern with the preservation of primitive cultures which have a unique contribution to make, his love of almost every expression of the human spirit, work of the imagination, for simply being what it is. Art, morality, custom, religion, national life grow out of immemorial tradition, are created by entire societies living an integrated communal life. The frontiers and divisions drawn between and within such unitary expressions of collective imaginative response to common experience are nothing but artificial and distorting categorisations by the dull, dogmatic pedants of a later age.[43]

Who are the authors of the songs, the epics, the myths, the temples, the mores of a people, the clothes they wear, the language they use? The people itself, the entire soul of which is poured out in all they are and do. Nothing is more barbarous than to ignore or trample on a cultural heritage. Hence Herder's condemnation of the Romans for crushing native civilisations, or of the church (despite the fact that he was himself a Lutheran clergyman) for forcibly baptising the Balts, and so forcing them into a Christian mould alien to their natural traditions, or of British missionaries for doing this to the Indians and other inhabitants of Asia, whose exquisite native cultures were being ruthlessly destroyed by the imposition of alien social systems, religions, forms of education that were not theirs and could only warp their natural development. Herder was no nationalist: he supposed that different cultures could and should flourish fruitfully side by side like so many peaceful flowers in the great human garden; nevertheless, the seeds of nationalism are unmistakably present in his fervid attacks on hollow cosmopolitanism and universalism (with which he charged the French philosophes) ; they grew apace among his aggressive nineteenth-century disciples.[44]

Herder is the greatest inspirer of cultural nationalism among the nationalities oppressed by the Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Russian empires, and ultimately of direct political nationalism as well, much as he abhorred it, in Austria and Germany, and by infectious reaction, in other lands

as well. He rejected the absolute criteria of progress then fashionable in Paris : no culture is a mere means towards another; every human achievement, every human society is to be judged by its own internal standards. In spite of the fact that in later life he attempted to construct a theory of history in which the whole of mankind, in a somewhat vague fashion, is represented as developing towards a common Humanitiit which embraces all men and all the arts and all the sciences, it is his earlier, relativistic passion for the individual essence and flavour of each culture that most profoundly influenced the European imagination. For Voltaire, Diderot, Helvdtius, Holbach, Condorcet, there is only universal civilisation, of which now one nation, now another, represents the richest flowering. For Herder there is a plurality of incommensurable cultures. To belong to a given community, to be connected with its members by indissoluble and impalpable ties of common language, historical memory, habit, tradition and feeling, is a basic human need no less natural than that for food or drink or security or procreation. One nation can understand and sympathise with the institutions of another only because it knows how much its own mean to itself. Cosmopolitanism is the shedding of all that makes one most human, most oneself. Hence the attack upon what is regarded as the false mechanical model of mankind used by scientifically minded French philosophes (Herder makes an exception for Diderot alone, with whose writings, wayward and imaginative and full of sudden insights, he felt a genuine affinity), who understand only machine-like, causal factors, or the arbitrary will of individual kings and legislators and commanders, sometimes wise and virtuous and altruistic, at other times self-interested or corrupt or stupid or vicious. But the forces that shape men are far more complex, and differ from age to age and culture to culture and cannot be contained in these simple cut and dried formulas. 'I am always frightened when I hear a whole nation or period characterised in a few short words ; for what a vast multitude of differences is embraced by the word "nation", or "the Middle Ages", or "ancient and modern times".' Germans can be truly creative only among Germans ; Jews only if they are restored to the ancient soil of Palestine. Those who are forcibly pulled up by the roots wither in a foreign environment when they survive at all : Europeans lose their virtue in America, Icelanders decay in Denmark. Imitation of models (unlike unconscious, unperceived, spontaneous influences by one society on another) leads to artificiality, feeble imitativeness, degraded art and life. Germans must be Germans and not third-rate Frenchmen; life lies in remaining steeped in one's own language, tradition, local feeling; uniformity is death. he tree of (science-dominated) knowledge kills the tree of life.[45]

So, too, Herder's contemporary, Justus Maser, the first historical sociologist, who wrote about the old life of his native region of Osnabruck in western Germany, said that 'every age had its own style', every war has its own particular tone, the affairs of state have a specific colouring, dress and manner have inner connections with religion and the sciences ; that Zeitstil and Yolksstil are everything ; that there is a 'local reason' for this or that institution that is not and cannot be universal. Moser maintained that societies and persons could be understood only by means of a 'total impression', not by isolation of element from element in the manner of analytical chemists ; this, he tells us, is what Voltaire had not grasped when he mocked the fact that a law which applied in one German village was contradicted by another in a neighbouring one: it is by such rich variety, founded upon ancient, unbroken tradition, that the tyrannies of uniform systems, such as those of Louis XIV or Frederick the Great, were avoided; it is so that freedoms were preserved.[46]

Although the influence was not direct, these are the very tones one hears in the works of Burke and many later romantic, vitalistic, intuitionist, and irrationalist writers, both conservative and socialist, who defend the value of organic forms of social life. Burke's famous onslaught on the principles of the French revolutionaries was founded upon the selfsame appeal to the 'myriad strands' that bind human beings into a historically hallowed whole, contrasted with the utilitarian model of society as a trading company held together solely by contractual obligations, the world of 'sophisters, economists and calculators' who are blind and deaf to the unanalysable relationships that make a family, a tribe, a nation, a movement, any association of human beings held together by something more than a quest for mutual advantage, or by force, or by anything that is not mutual love, loyalty, common history, emotion and outlook. This emphasis in the last half of the eighteenth century on non-rational factors, whether connected with specific religious beliefs or not, which stressed the value of the individual, the peculiar (*das Eigentumliche*), the impalpable, and appeals to ancient historical roots and immemorial custom, to the wisdom of simple, sturdy peasants uncorrupted by the sophistries of subtle 'reasoners', has strongly conservative and, indeed, reactionary implications. Whether stated by the enthusiastic populist Herder with his acute dislike for political coercion, empires, political authority, and all forms of imposed organisation ; or by Mtiser, moderate Hanoverian conservative; or by Lavater, altogether unconcerned with politics; or by Burke, brought up in a different tradition, respectful towards church and state and the authority of aristocracies and elites sanctified by history, these

doctrines clearly constitute a resistance to attempts at a rational reorganisation of society in the name of universal moral and intellectual ideals.[47]

At the same time abhorrence of scientific expertise inspired radical protest in the works of William Blake, of the young Schiller, and of populist writers in eastern Europe. Above all, it contributed to literary turbulence in Germany in the second third of the eighteenth century: the plays of such leaders of the Sturm und Drang as Lenz, Klinger, Gerstenberg and Leisewitz are outbursts against every form of organised social or political life. What provoked them may have been the asphyxiating philistinism of the German middle class, or the cruel injustices of the small and stuffy courts of stupid and arbitrary German princelings; but what they attacked with equal violence was the entire tidy ordering of life by the principles of reason and scientific knowledge advocated by the progressive thinkers of France, England and Italy. Lenz regards nature as a wild whirlpool into which a man of feeling and temperament will throw himself if he is to experience the fullness of life; for him, for Schubart and for Leisewitz art and, in particular, literature are passionate forms of self-assertion which look on all acceptance of conventional forms as but 'delayed death'. Nothing is more characteristic of the entire Sturm und Drang movement than Herder's cry 'I am not here to think, but to be, feel, live !', or 'heart ! warmth ! blood ! humanity! life!' French reasoning is pale and ghostly. It is this that inspired Goethe's reaction in the 70s to Holbach's Systeme de la nature as a repulsive, 'Cimmerian, corpse-like' treatise, which had no relation to the marvellous, inexhaustibly rich vitality of the Gothic cathedral at Strasbourg, in which, under Herder's guidance, he saw one of the noblest expressions of the German spirit in the Middle Ages, of which the critics of the Augustan age understood nothing. Heinse in his fantasy *Ardinghello und die gluckseligen Inseln* leads his central characters, after a bloodstained succession of wild experiences of more than 'Gothic' intensity, to an island where there is total freedom in personal relations, all rules and conventions have finally been flung to the winds, where man in an anarchist-communist society can at last stretch himself to his full stature as a sublime creative artist. The inspiration of this work is a violent, radical individualism, which represents an early form, not unlike the contemporary erotic fantasies of the *Marquis de Sade,* of a craving for escape from imposed rules and laws whether of scientific reason or of political or ecclesiastical authority, royalist or republican, despotic or democratic.[48]

By an odd paradox, it is the profoundly rational, exact, unromantic Kant, with his lifelong hatred of all forms of Schwarmerei, who is in part, through exaggeration and distortion of at least one of

his doctrines, one of the fathers of this unbridled individualism. Kant's moral doctrines stressed the fact that determinism was not compatible with morality, since only those who are the true authors of their own acts, which they are free to perform or not perform, can be praised or blamed for what they do. Since responsibility entails power of choice, those who cannot freely choose are morally no more accountable than stocks and stones. Thereby Kant initiated a cult of moral autonomy, according to which only those who act and are not acted upon, whose actions spring from a decision of the moral will to be guided by freely adopted principles, if need be against inclination, and not from the inescapable causal pressure of factors beyond their control - physical, physiological, psychological (such as emotion, desire, habit) - can properly be considered to be free or, indeed, moral agents at all, Kant acknowledged a profound debt to Rousseau who, particularly in the 'profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar' in the fourth book of his Emile, spoke of man as an active being in contrast with the passivity of material nature, a possessor of a will which makes him free to resist the temptations of the senses. 'I am a slave through my vices and free through my remorse'; it is the active will, made known directly by 'conscience', which for Rousseau is 'stronger than reason [i.e. prudential argument] which fights against it', that enables man to choose the good ; he acts, if need be, against 'the law of the body', and so makes himself worthy of happiness. But although this doctrine of the will as a capacity not determined by the causal stream is directed against the sensationalist positivism of *Helvetius or Condillac*, and has an affinity to Kant's free moral will, it does not leave the objective framework of natural law which governs things as well as persons, and prescribes the same immutable, universal goals to all men.[49]

This emphasis upon the will at the expense of contemplative thought and perception, which function within the predetermined grooves of the categories of the mind that man cannot escape, enters deeply into the German conception of moral freedom as entailing resistance to nature and not harmonious collusion with her, overcoming of natural inclination, and rising to Promethean resistance to coercion, whether by things or by men. This, in its turn, led to the rejection of the doctrine that to understand is to accept the view that knowledge demonstrates the rational necessity and therefore the value of what, in his irrational state, may have seemed to man mere obstacles in his path. This conception, opposed as it is to reconciliation with reality, in its later, romantic form favoured the ceaseless fight, at times ending in tragic defeat, against the forces of blind nature, which cares nothing for human ideas, and against the accumulated weight of

authority and tradition - the vast incubus of the uncriticised past, made concrete in the oppressive institutions of the present. Thus, when Blake denounces Newton and Locke as the great enemies, it is because he accuses them of seeking to imprison the free human spirit in constricting, intellectual machines ; when he says, 'A Robin Red breast in a Cage/Puts all Heaven in a Rage', the cage is none other than Newtonian physics, which crushes the life out of the free, spontaneous life of the untrammelled human spirit. 'Art is the Tree of Life . . . Science is the Tree of Death'; Locke, Newton, the French raisonneurs, the reign of cautious, pragmatic respectability and Pitt's police were all, for him, parts of the same nightmare. There is something of this, too, in Schiller's early play Die Rauber (written in I 781), where the violent protest of the tragic hero Karl Moor, which ends in failure, crime and death, cannot be averted by mere knowledge, by a better understanding of human nature or of social conditions or of anything else; knowledge is not enough. The doctrine of the Enlightenment that we can discover what men truly want and can provide technical means and rules of conduct for their greatest permanent satisfaction and that this is what leads to wisdom, virtue, happiness is not compatible with Karl Moor's proud and stormy spirit, which rejects the ideas of his milieu, and will not be assuaged by the reformist gradualism and belief in rational organisation advocated by, say, the *Aufklarung* of the previous generation. 'Law has distorted to a snail's pace what could have been an eagle's flight.' Human nature is no longer conceived of as, in principle, capable of being brought into harmony with the natural world: for Schiller some fatal Rousseauian break between spirit and nature has occurred, a wound has been inflicted on humanity which art seeks to avenge, but knows it cannot fully heal.**50**

Jacobi, a mystical metaphysician deeply influenced by Hamann, cannot reconcile the demands of the soul and the intellect: 'The light is in my heart: as soon as I try to carry it to my intellect, it goes out.' Spinoza was for him the greatest master since Plato of the rational vision of the universe; but for Jacobi this is death in life: it does not answer the burning questions of the soul whose homelessness in the chilly world of the intellect only self-surrender to faith in a transcendent God will remedy. Schelling was perhaps the most eloquent of all the philosophers who represented the universe as the self-development of a primal, non-rational force that can be grasped only by the intuitive powers of men of imaginative genius - poets, philosophers, theologians or statesmen. Nature, a living organism, responds to questions put by the man of genius, while the man of genius responds to the questions put by nature, for they conspire with

each other; imaginative insight alone, no matter whose - an artist's, a seer's, a thinker's - becomes conscious of the contours of the future, of which the mere calculating intellect and analytic capacity of the natural scientist or the politician, or any other earthbound empiricist, has no conception. This faith in a peculiar, intuitive, spiritual faculty which goes by various names - reason, understanding, primary imagination - but is always differentiated from the critical analytic intellect favoured by the Enlightenment, the contrast between it and the analytic faculty or method that collects, classifies, experiments, takes to pieces, reassembles, defines, deduces, and establishes probabilities, becomes a commonplace used thereafter by Fichte, Hegel, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Goethe, Carlyle, Schopenhauer and other anti-rationalist thinkers of the nineteenth century, culminating in Bergson and later anti-positivist schools.[51]

This, too, is the source of that stream in the great river of romanticism which looks upon every human activity as a form of individual self-expression, and on art, and indeed every creative activity, as a stamping of a unique personality, individual or collective, conscious or unconscious, upon the matter or the medium in and upon which it functions, seeking to realise values which are themselves not given but generated by the process of creation itself. Hence the denial, both in theory and in practice, of the central doctrine of the Enlightenment, according to which the rules in accordance with which men should live and act and create are pre-established, dictated by nature herself. For Joshua Reynolds, for example, the 'great style' is the realization of the artist's vision of eternal forms, prototypes beyond the confusions of ordinary experience, which his genius enables him to discern and which he seeks to reproduce, with all the techniques at his command, on his canvas or in marble or bronze. Such mimesis or copying from ideal patterns is, for those who derive from the German tradition of revolt against French classicism, not true creation. Creation is creation of ends as well as means, of values as well as their embodiments; the vision that I seek to translate into colours or sounds is generated by me, and peculiar to me, unlike anything that has ever been, or will be, above all not something that is common to me and other men seeking to realise a common, shared, universal, because rational, ideal. The notion that a work of art (or any other work of man) is created in accordance with rules dictated by objective nature, and therefore binding for all practitioners of it, as *Boileau* or the *Abbe Batteux* had taught, is rejected in toto. Rules may be an aid here or there, but the least spark of genius destroys them, and creates its own practice, which uncreative craftsmen may imitate, and so be saying nothing of their own. I create as I do, whether I am an artist, a

philosopher, a statesman, not because the goal that I seek to realise is objectively beautiful, or true, or virtuous, or approved by public opinion, or demanded by majorities or tradition, but because it is my own.[52]

What this creative self may be differs according to doctrine. Some regard it as a transcendent entity to be identified with a cosmic spirit, a divine principle to which finite men aspire as sparks do to the great central flame; others identify it with their own individual, mortal, flesh-and-blood selves, like Byron, or Hugo, or other defiantly romantic writers and painters. Others again identified the creative self with a super-personal 'organism' of which they saw themselves as elements or members - nation, or church, or culture, or class, or history itself, a mighty force of which they conceived their earthly selves as emanations. Aggressive nationalism, self-identification with the interests of the class, the culture or the race, or the forces of progress - with the wave of a future-directed dynamism of history, something that at once explains and justifies acts which might be abhorred or despised if committed from calculation of selfish advantage or some other mundane motive - this family of political and moral conceptions is so many expressions of a doctrine of self-realisation based on defiant rejection of the central theses of the Enlightenment, according to which what is true, or right, or good, or beautiful, can be shown to be valid for all men by the correct application of objective methods of discovery and interpretation, open to anyone to use and verify. In its full romantic guise, this attitude is an open declaration of war upon the very heart of the rational and experimental method which Descartes and Galileo had inaugurated, and which for all their doubts and qualifications even such sharp deviationists as Montesquieu, or Hume and Rousseau and Kant, fully and firmly accepted. For the truly ardent opponents of classicism, values are not found but made, not discovered but created ; they are to be realised because they are mine, or ours, whatever the nature of the true self is pronounced to be by this or that metaphysical doctrine.[53]

The most extravagant of the German romantics, Novalis or Tieck, looked on the universe not as a structure that can be studied or described by whatever methods are most appropriate, but as a perpetual activity of the spirit and of nature which is the selfsame spirit in a dormant state ; of this constant upward movement the man of genius is the most conscious agent, who thus embodies the forward activity that advances the life of the spirit most significantly. While some, like Schelling and Coleridge, conceive this activity as the gradual growth into self consciousness of the world spirit that is perpetually moving towards self-perfection, others conceive the cosmic

process as having no goal, as a purposeless and meaningless movement, which men, because they cannot face this bleak and despair-inducing truth, seek to hide from themselves by constructing comforting illusions in the form of religions that promise rewards in another life, or metaphysical systems that claim to provide rational justification both for what there is in the world and for what men do and can do and should do ; or scientific systems that perform the task of appearing to give sense to a process that is, in fact, purposeless, a formless flux which is what it is, a brute fact, signifying nothing. This doctrine, elaborated by Schopenhauer, lies at the root of much modern existentialism and of the cultivation of the absurd in art and thought, as well as of the extremes of egoistic anarchism driven to their furthest lengths by Stirner, and by Nietzsche (in some of his moods), Kierkegaard (Hamann's most brilliant and profound disciple) and modern irrationalists.[54]

The rejection of the central principles of the Enlightenment universality, objectivity, rationality, and the capacity to provide permanent solutions to all genuine problems of life or thought, and (not less important) accessibility of rational methods to any thinker armed with adequate powers of observation and logical thinking - occurred in various forms, conservative or liberal, reactionary or revolutionary, depending on which systematic order was being attacked. Those, for example, like Adam Muller or Friedrich Schlegel, and, in some moods, Coleridge or Cobbett, to whom the principles of the French Revolution or the Napoleonic organisation came to seem the most fatal obstacles to free human self-expression, adopted conservative or reactionary forms of irrationalism and at times looked back with nostalgia towards some golden past, such as the pre-scientific ages of faith, and tended (not always continuously or consistently) to support clerical and aristocratic resistance to modernisation and the mechanisation of life by industrialism and the new hierarchies of power and authority. Those who looked upon the traditional forces of authority or hierarchical organisation as the most oppressive of social forces - Byron, for example, or George Sand, or, so far as they can be called romantic, Shelley or Buchner - formed the 'left wing' of the romantic revolt. Others despised public life in principle, and occupied themselves with the cultivation of the inner spirit. In all cases the organisation of life by the application of rational or scientific methods, any form of regimentation or conscription of men for utilitarian ends or organised happiness, was regarded as the philistine enemy.[55]

What the entire Enlightenment has in common is denial of the central Christian doctrine of original sin, believing instead that man is born either innocent and good, or morally neutral and malleable by education or environment, or, at worst, deeply defective but capable of radical and indefinite improvement by rational education in favourable circumstances, or by a revolutionary re-organisation of society as demanded, for example, by Rousseau. It is this denial of original sin that the church condemned most severely in Rousseau's mile, despite its attack on materialism, utilitarianism and atheism. It is the powerful reaffirmation of this Pauline and Augustinian doctrine that is the sharpest single weapon in the root-and-branch attack on the entire Enlightenment by the French counter-revolutionary writers de Maistre, Bonald and Chateaubriand, at the turn of the century.[56]

One of the darkest of the reactionary forms of the fight against the Enlightenment, as well as one of the most interesting and influential, is to be found in the doctrines of Joseph de Maistre and his follower and allies, who formed the spearhead of the counter-revolution in the early nineteenth century in Europe. De Maistre held the Enlightenment to be one of the most foolish, as well as the most ruinous, forms of social thinking. The conception of man as naturally disposed to benevolence, cooperation and peace, or, at any rate, capable of being shaped in this direction by appropriate education or legislation, is for him shallow and false. The benevolent Dame Nature of Hume, Holbach and Helvetius is an absurd figment. History and zoology are the most reliable guides to nature : they show her to be a field of unceasing slaughter. Men are by nature aggressive and destructive ; they rebel over trifles - the change to the Gregorian calendar in the mid-eighteenth century, or Peter the Great's decision to shave the boyars' beards, provoke violent resistance, at times dangerous rebellions. But when men are sent to war, to exterminate beings as innocent as themselves for no purpose that either army can grasp, they go obediently to their deaths and scarcely ever mutiny. When the destructive instinct is evoked men feel exalted and fulfilled. Men do not come together, as the Enlightenment teaches, for mutual cooperation and peaceful happiness . History makes it clear that they are never so united as when given a common altar upon which to immolate themselves. This is so because the desire to sacrifice themselves or others is at least as strong as any pacific or constructive impulse. De Maistre felt that men are by nature evil, self-destructive animals, full of conflicting drives, who do not know what they want, want what they do not want, do not want what they want, and it is only when they are kept under constant control and rigorous discipline by some authoritarian Elite - a

church, a state, or some other body from whose decisions there is no appeal - that they can hope to survive and be saved. Reasoning, analysis, criticism shake the foundations and destroy the fabric of society. If the source of authority is declared to be rational, it invites questioning and doubt; but if it is questioned it may be argued away; its authority is undermined by able sophists, and this accelerates the forces of chaos, as in France during the reign of the weak and liberal Louis XVI. If the state is to survive and frustrate the fools and knaves who will always seek to destroy it, the source of authority must be absolute, so terrifying, indeed, that the least attempt to question it must entail immediate and terrible sanctions : only then will men learn to obey it. Without a clear hierarchy of authority - awe-inspiring power - men's incurably destructive instincts will breed chaos and mutual extermination. The supreme power - especially the church - must never seek to explain or justify itself in rational terms; for what one man can demonstrate, another may be able to refute. Reason is the thinnest of walls against the raging seas of violent emotion : on so insecure a basis no permanent structure can ever be erected. Irrationality, so far from being an obstacle, has historically led to peace, security and strength, and is indispensable to society: it is rational institutions - republics, elective monarchies, democracies, associations founded on the enlightened principles of free love - that collapse soonest ; authoritarian churches, hereditary monarchies and aristocracies, traditional forms of life, like the highly irrational institution of the family, founded on lifelong marriage - it is they that persist.[57]

The *philosophes* proposed to rationalise communication by inventing a universal language free from the irrational survivals, the idiosyncratic twists and turns, the capricious peculiarities of existing tongues; if they were to succeed, this would be disastrous, for it is precisely the individual historical development of a language that belongs to a people that absorbs, enshrines and encapsulates a vast wealth of half-conscious, half-remembered collective experience. What men call superstition and prejudice are but the crust of custom which by sheer survival has shown itself proof against the ravages and vicissitudes of its long life ; to lose it is to lose the shield that protects men's national existence, their spirit, the habits, memories, faith that have made them what they are. The conception of human nature which the radical critics have promulgated and on which their whole house of cards rests is an infantile fantasy. Rousseau asks why it is that man, who was born free, is nevertheless everywhere in chains ; one might as well ask, says de Maistre, why it is that sheep, who are born carnivorous, nevertheless everywhere nibble grass. Men are not made for freedom, nor for peace. Such freedom and peace as they have

had were obtained only under wisely authoritarian governments that have repressed the destructive critical intellect and its socially disintegrating effects. Scientists, intellectuals, lawyers, journalists, democrats, Jansenists, Protestants, Jews, atheists, these are the sleepless enemy that never ceases to gnaw at the vitals of society. The best government the world has ever known was that of the Romans: they were too wise to be scientists themselves: for this purpose they hired the clever, volatile, politically incapable Greeks. Not the luminous intellect, but dark instincts govern man and societies ; only Clites which understand this, and keep the people from too much secular education that is bound to make them over-critical and discontented, can give to men as much happiness and justice and freedom as, in this vale of tears, men can expect to have. But at the back of everything must lurk the potentiality of force, of coercive power.[58]

In a striking image de Maistre says that all social order in the end rests upon one man, the executioner. Nobody wishes to associate with this hideous figure, yet on him, so long as men are weak, sinful, unable to control their passions, constantly lured to their doom by evil temptations or foolish dreams, rest all order, all peace, all society. The notion that reason is sufficient to educate or control the passions is ridiculous. When there is a vacuum, power rushes in ; even the bloodstained monster Robespierre, a scourge sent by the Lord to punish a country that had departed from the true faith, is more to be admired - because he did hold France together and repelled her enemies, and created armies that, drunk with blood and passion, preserved France - than liberal fumbling and bungling. Louis XIV ignored the clever reasoners of his time, suppressed heresy, and died full of glory in his own bed. Louis XVI played amiably with subversive ideologists who had drunk at the poisoned well of Voltaire, and died on the scaffold. Repression, censorship, absolute sovereignty, judgements from which there is no appeal, these are the only methods of governing creatures whom de Maistre described as half men, half beasts, monstrous centaurs at once seeking after God and fighting Him, longing to love and create, but in perpetual danger of falling victims to their own blindly destructive drives, held in check by a combination of force and traditional authority and, above all, a faith incarnated in historically hallowed institutions that reason dare not touch. Nation and race are realities ; the artificial creations of constitution-mongers are bound to collapse. 'Nations', said de Maistre, 'are born and die like individuals. . . They have a common soul, especially visible in their language.' And since they are individuals, they should endeavour to remain 'of one race'. So too Bonald, his closest intellectual ally, regrets that the French nation has abandoned its ideal of racial purity, thus

weakening itself. The question of whether the French are descended from Franks or Gauls, whether their institutions are Roman or German in origin, with the implication that this could dictate a form of life in the present, although it has its roots in political controversies in the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, now takes the colour of mystical organicism, which transcends, and is proof against, all forms of discursive reasoning. Natural growth alone is real for de Maistre. Only time, only history, can create authority that men can worship and obey: mere military dictatorship, a work of individual human hands, is brutal force without spiritual power: he calls it bdtonocratie, and predicts the end of Napoleon. In similar strain Bonald denounced individualism whether as a social doctrine or an intellectual method of analysing historical phenomena. The inventions of man, he declared, are precarious aids compared to divinely ordained institutions that penetrate man's very being, language, family, the worship of God. By whom were they invented? Whenever a child is born there are father, mother, family, God ; this is the basis of all that is genuine and lasting, not, the arrangements of men drawn from the world of shopkeepers, with their contracts, or promises, or utility, or material goods. Liberal individualism inspired by the insolent self-confidence of mutinous intellectuals has led to the inhuman competition of bourgeois society in which the strongest and the fastest win and the weak go to the wall. Only the church can organize a society in which the ablest are held back so that the whole of society can progress and the weakest and least greedy also reach the goal.[59]

These gloomy doctrines became the inspiration of monarchist politics in France, and together with the notion of romantic heroism and the sharp contrast between creative and uncreative, historic and unhistorical individuals and nations, duly inspired nationalism, imperialism, and finally, in their most violent and pathological form, Fascist and totalitarian doctrines in the twentieth century.

The failure of the French Revolution to bring about the greater portion of its declared ends marks the end of the Enlightenment as a movement and a system. Its heirs and the counter-movements that, to some degree, they stimulated and affected in their turn, romantic and irrational creeds and movements, political and aesthetic, violent and peaceful, individualist and collective, anarchic and totalitarian, and their impact, belong to another page of history.

Growth of Nation States

The nationalist idea had a peculiar appeal because of the way in which it asks people to celebrate themselves rather than anything beyond them.Nation tend to celebrate themselves-"we English", "we Germans", "we French",-simply for their good fortune in being who they are, rather than for any cause or purpose in the world that might justify their existence.Hence the common tendency of nationalism to be intensely inward looking, to regard the world outside the nation as irredeemably alien and other nation as inevitably hostile[60].

Nation itself is centered on the notion of one culture, one state. The advent of colonialism and imperialism altered this scene and led to cultural subversion and subsequent adjustment in art, architecture, painting, sculpture and other modes of enlightenment.In fact colonialism brought the seeds of enlightenment to the Asians which transformed their culture to a great extent[61].

The Growth Of Theatres During The Enlightenment Phase

Modernist art was iconoclastic, often aiming at clearing away the debris of the past to make way for a new art of the future. In theatre, there are few playwrights apart from Brecht, who became representative of these tendencies[62].

Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956)

Brecht's theatre was influenced by Karl Marx and his idea of dialectics. He was ideologically against representation of realism on stage and aimed to provide the audience with ways of looking at bourgeois reality as unnatural . What Brecht desired was to alienate or estrange the audience, question the world created by Capitalism and the society it sustained, and encourage/force to think rather than feel. His plea was therefore to "cry tears from the brain." Brecht's "theatre of alienation" aimed to have his audience at an emotional distance from the action[63]. Also called the "the V-effect" , the idea was to make familiar strange, that is, to defamiliarize or to show everything in fresh unfamiliar light. Brecht achieved the alienation effect by the use of placards to reveal the events of each scene, and use of narration and songs during the course of the play. actors changed characters and costume on stage and simple props and scenery was used on stage (for example, a single tree would be used to convey a whole forest, or the stage flooded with bright white light whether it's a winter's night or a summer's day)[64]. Brecht's epic stage was a place for discussion, where audience was presented with a

social/political topic of relevance and asked to think. A distinct quality of this usually left bare stage was that it exposed stage machinery and exposed lighting grid above stage. The Threepenny Opera (1928) was a revolutionary piece of musical theatre adapted from an 18th-century English ballad opera, The Beggar's Opera by John Gay. Brecht wrote it in collaboration with the translator Elisabeth Hauptmann and the composer Kurt Weill in 1928 as a socialist critique of the capitalist world. Brecht also used the historical figure of the Renaissance inventor/scientist Galileo (1564-1642) in his play Galileo (1938) where he used Marxist ideology to illustrate the dichotomy between science and religion.[65]

Women, Gender, and Enlightenment

Woman serves as "a rhetorical fiction designed to hold together an Enlightenment narrative from which she herself . . . is paradoxically excluded". On one side of the line, women's "natural" cosmopolitanism—their capacity for love across cultural boundaries— makes them essential agents of the "humanitarianism" at the core of the Enlightenment's agenda. In its modern form, however, even this positive representation can turn sour; it easily elides into an image of decadent women of wealth and leisure whose "unprecedented centrality . . . threatens to reverse the process of civilization". In the counterpoint to this threat, women's natural role is a "sedentary" one, in the "sacred" seclusion of the home. Here women are the protectors not only of the structure of the family but also of the security of the community.[66]

As the chaotic years of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War passed, Western Europe entered a more rational and relatively peaceful phase in its history. Throughout the eighteenth century Western Europe experienced what is today referred to as the Age of Enlightenment. Broadly defined, the Enlightenment was a cultural and intellectual movement in Europe and America that sought to reform and improve society through the advancement of knowledge and education. Acting as a backlash, in many ways, to the religious wars and witch trials of the preceding centuries, the philosophers and thinkers of the Enlightenment advocated the use of rational thought and science over religion and superstition. Particularly in France, Enlightenment philosophes cautioned against the power and excesses of the Catholic Church, as well as any form of organized religion, as a dangerous vehicle of intolerance. During the Enlightenment, the development of ideas like individualism and rationality started to challenge women's relegated role in society[67]. Writers, such as Rousseau, wrote about this but continued to

separate women as the opposites of men. Women were still perceived to have designated roles in society, particularly as mothers and wives. Throughout the Age of the Enlightenment women found ways to combine the new intellectual movements evolving in the public sphere with their appointed place in the domestic private sphere. For example, women during this period frequently participated in the salon culture. A salon was a social and intellectual gathering of people who would meet at the house of a well-known or intellectually inspirational person to discuss the latest cultural trends, from literature to politics, from art to philosophy. Salons were meant to be social gatherings for fun and entertainment as well as sources of intellectual stimulation. Traditionally, the bourgeoisie, or wealthier segments of society, participated in salons, which typically took place in urban settings. The fact that the salon took place in the home allowed women to participate and contribute. While salons were primarily popular in Parisian culture during the eighteenth century, they were also found in cities throughout Western Europe, including England, and in the German states as well. Throughout the eighteenth century many women took advantage of new literary forms as a way to participate and contribute to society. This was especially true of the novel, which became an increasingly popular form of reading during the eighteenth century. Female authors started to emerge during this period and increased in number over the course of the eighteenth century and beyond. Additionally, a few women started to publish writings or tracts that grappled with the new theories of the Enlightenment and the subordinate position of women in society. The British writer Mary Wollstonecraft is considered one of the earliest feminists in Western history. During her lifetime Mary Wollstonecraft wrote several novels, treatises, and other works of nonfiction. She is best known for A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects (1792), in which she offered a response to the writings of eighteenth-century theorists who argued that women should not receive a formal education. She viewed female education as an integral aspect of the advancement of society as a whole. Women, according to Wollstonecraft, were important in educating children and, as a result, consequential in furthering the strength of the nation. Wollstonecraft believed that women should receive a level of education that matched their social standing, so that they could be both ornamental figures and intellectual companions for their husbands. Wollstonecraft did not call for equal rights between men and women—she still maintained that women were naturally suited for lives as wives and mothers. Today Wollstonecraft is considered a proto-feminist. She is not considered a modern

feminist, in part because the concept of feminism did not exist during her lifetime. However, Wollstonecraft did maintain that women were human beings, and thus were capable of thinking rationally and receiving a formal education. During the Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke wrote on the principles and tenets of natural rights. Wollstonecraft built on Locke's beliefs and argued that natural rights (such as life and liberty) were given to humans by God, and thus women possessed these rights as well. Ultimately Wollstonecraft was instrumental in building the foundations for future feminist writings.[68]

Andre Antoine and the Theatre Libre

Modern theatre is often seen to commence in 1887 with the founding of Theatre Libre in Paris by Andre Antoine. Theatre Libre championed the works of Zola and the naturalists and also of the first major modern dramatists, such as Ibsen, August Strindberg and Gerhart Hauptmann. Antoine's theatre served as a model for other experimental theatres across Europe and eventually in America[69].

Conclusion

In conclusion it may be pointed out that belief in purposive state action, backed by social movements and an informed, participatory citizenry, and, not to be forgotten, by education in all its dimensions, distinguishes Enlightenment from its enemies and defectors, as does the emphasis on a continued state role with regard to national and international economic management. Moreover, the concern with equity, between members of one society, and for humanity as a whole, means more today than it ever did, in the face of world inequality and appalling indices of inequality within societies, developed and developing. Finally, as Professor Kant would want to remind us, we may retain-as critics past and present of the Enlightenment do not-a faith in the ability of reason, individually and collectively, to face and influence the challenges facing humanity. Irrationalism is much a mode at the moment, be this in the form of religious fundamentalism, nationalism, neo-Nietzschean pessimism, or postmodernist self-indulgence. The Enlightenment's defenders, who have much to learn from the abuses of reason, have equally a challenge to face in making it applicable, within a democratic form, to the issues of society, domestic and international, today. Whether, how, when, we can move forward to that triumph of reason in perpetual peace, backed by democracy and prosperity, no-one can tell. It is,

nonetheless, a fitting focus for political and academic reflection, not least on the cusp of the third millennium.

<u>Notes and References</u>

1. In 1983 Michel Foucault invited a small group of friends and colleagues-Richard Rorty, Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Taylor, and Jtirgen Habermas to consider a private colloquium to be held at Berkeley on the subject of Kant's essay "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?", he was nearing the end of one of the most remarkable and, to many, incomprehensible "turns" in recent intellectual history. Throughout his career, Foucault had been at pains to reject in the most uncompromising terms Kant's account of the conditions of knowledge, the autonomy of the subject, and the universalizing rule of reason-all of which could be taken as historical errors, metaphysical masks worn by "discourse" or "disciplinary regimes." But having established himself securely in a philosophical genealogy that extended from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Lacan, Lyotard, Deleuze, Derrida, and other thinkers of the "counter-Enlightenment," Foucault sought not just to rehabilitate the chronically "incomplete project" of the Enlightenment as a subject of contemporary discussion but also to establish some positive relation of his own to that fissile and complex movement by reopening the question to which Kant had provided "An Answer."

2. When Foucault called "What Is Enlightenment?" and placed at the very beginning of The Foucault Reader being prepared by his Berkeley colleague Paul Rabinow marks a genuine appreciation of Enlightenment thinking, many of the old antipathies remain. Foucault consistently represents Kant as both indispensable and unacceptable, remaining especially hostile to Kant's anxious concern for freedom of conscience in religious matters. Religion stands as the historical locus of every mystification or idealization that Foucault sought to subvert or unmask through his emphasis on the local, the material, the historically specific, the apparently discontinuous or haphazard; he insisted on an archaeological- genealogical inquiry that "places within a process of development every-thing considered immortal in man. For further reading please see Michel Foucault,

"'What Is Enlightenment?'" The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, 1984), p.32 also see Foucault, *"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,"* The Foucault Reader, p. 87.

3. The whole epochal challenge of the state, the entire management of "the age," is effectively reserved for scholars and public officials. This creates what Foucault describes as a "political problem" that seems sharply at variance with the universalism of Enlightenment itself-which has, Foucault notes, found itself from the beginning "struggling with attitudes of 'counter modernity. For further reading please see *Foucault: A Critical Reader,* ed. David C. Hoy (Oxford, 1986), pp. 109-22.

4. John W. Thompson and Bernard J. Holm, *A History of Historical Writing* (New York, 1942), 2 Vols.

5. John B. Black, *The Art of History* (New York, 1926), p. 68

6. Ibid

7. Ibid

8. Siecle de Louis XIV, loc. cit., p. 564.

9. Esprit des Lois, Oeuvres Completes (Paris, 1876), Vols. 3-6, Bk. 19, sec. 7.

10. Ibid

11. Ibid

12. In the Essay, "*Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,"* indications are to be found that Hume attributed an active role to national character; these indications are a prelude to the ideas of Herder. "The question . . . concerning the rise and progress of the arts and sciences is not altogether a question concerning taste, genius and spirit of a few, but concerning those of a whole people, and may therefore be accounted for, in some measure by general causes and principles." Hume stated, in agreement with Winckelmann, in this essay "that it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people, unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government." P. 66. However, remembering Florence of the Medicis or France under Louis XIV, he restricted this assertion in the essay "Of Civil Liberty." P. 51. In the Essay, "Of National Character," p. 117, he declared that "a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals."

13. Adam Smith (16 June 1723 - 17 July 1790) was a Scottish economist, philosopher, and author. He was a moral philosopher, a pioneer of political economy, and was a key figure during the Scottish Enlightenment era. He is best known for two classic works: *The*

Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). The latter, usually abbreviated as *The Wealth of Nations*, is considered his *magnum opus* and the first modern work of economics.

14. Turgot, "Second Discours," Oeuvres (Paris, 1844), Vol. 2, p. 610

15. Ibid

16. Ibid ,p-605

17. "Plan de Deux Discours," loc. cit., pp. 628, 633. The starting point for this approach is the Letter to the Galatians, 3, 24 . The verses had already influenced medieval thinkers like Joachim of Flora and St. Thomas.

18. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (22 January 1729 – 15 February 1781) was a German writer, philosopher, dramatist, publicist and art critic, and one of the most outstanding representatives of the Enlightenment era. His plays and theoretical writings substantially influenced the development of German Literature. He is widely considered by theatre historians to be the first dramaturg in his role at Abel Seyler's Hamburg National Theater .

19. Mary Augusta Scott,*The Essays Of Francis Bacon*:1908,New York:Introduction part pp-xvi-xvii

20. Ibid

21. Ibid

22. Richard Westfall, *The Life of Isaac Newton* ; Cambridge; 1993

23. Ibid

24. Axel Honneth, *Enlightenment and Rationality*; The Journal Of Philosophy Vol-84:no.11:American Philosophical Association :Eastern division:pp-692-699)

25. Lucien Goldmann,*The Philosophy of the Enlightenment The Christian Burgess and the Enlightenment* translated by Henry Mass:Routledge and Kegan Paul.London.p-15

26. Ibid, p-17.

27. Ibid, p-18.

28. Ibid,p-19.

29. Lorraine , Dashton, *The Academies and the Utility of Knowledge: The Discipline of the Disciplines. Differences* vol. 10, no. 2: 1998. pp-67-86.

30. Giles MacDonogh, *Frederick the Great: A Life in Deed and Letters* (2001) p 34

31. Adorno, T. W. *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1958

32.Ibid

33.Israel, J. (2001), *Radical Enlightenment; Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 159.

34.Ibid

35. Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy*. p492-494

36.Ibid

37. Burns, William. *Science in the Enlightenment: An Encyclopædia* (2003) pp-353

38.Ibid

39. L, Kolakowski. *The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought*, Doubleday, Garden City. 1968

40.Ibid

41. John Mackie. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* , (Penguin, 1990)pp-231-232

42.Ibid

43. Simon Blackburn. *Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1998)pp-165-167

44.Ibid

45. Bongie, L. L. *David Hume -Prophet of the Counter-Revolution*. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis(1998) pp-45-47

46.ibid

47.ibid

48.ibid

49. Stephen Eric   Bronner, *The Great Divide: The Enlightenment and its Critics* pp-36-37

50.ibid

51.ibid

52.ibid

53.ibid.

54. Michel, Delon. *Encyclopædia of the Enlightenment* : New York:Taylor and Francis:2001:p.480

55.Ibid

56. Paul, Hazard, *European thought in the 18th century: From Montesquieu to Lessing* ; the University of Virginia , Peter Smith, 1973

57.Ibid

58.Ibid

59.Ibid

60. Krishan Kumar, Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: two principles, one practice? Theory and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2 (March 2010), Springer, pp. 119-143; URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40587550

61.Ibid

62. Erica Fischer Lichte, *History of European Drama and Theatre* ;transalated by Jo Riley; 2002:Routledge London and NewYork

63.Ibid

64.Ibid

65.Ibid

66. Anthony J. LaVopa,*Women, Gender, and the Enlightenment: A Historical Turn*:The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 80, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 332-357; http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/588854

67.Ibid

68 .Ibid

69. McCready, Susan. 2001. *Performing Time in the Revolutionary Theater*. Dalhousie French Studies, 55, pp.26-30

The Advent Of Renaissance In India

Introduction

The creative mentality of the Bengal Renaissance was dominated by two related but distinct and different cognitive features. The first being the ability to think, perceive, and create in a manner that entailed the melding of two traditions which were seemingly unconnected and even contradictory—one being the Indian cultural and philosophical past, the other the Western creative and intellectual tradition. The first was the cognitive feature, a cross-cultural mentality. The second was a belief in, and perception of, a fundamental unity amidst diversity and differences, even in the seeming differences manifest between certain Western and Indian concepts, percepts, and perspectives. This can be called a particular mental construct or universalism. It is, of course, no coincidence that both these cognitive features are based upon the East and the West as sources. They emerged in India's colonial encounter with the West in the nineteenth century. To some scholars, this encounter marked a huge 'cultural collision' between the colonizing West and the colonized India[1].

Understanding the Cognitive upheaval of Renaissance builders.

There are two aspects of these particular cognitive features. One is that though in principle anyone can acquire or develop them—and in this sense they are quite universal in their feature—only a few did, in fact, manifest them explicitly. One of the reasons why cross- cultural mentality and universalism interest a reader is that they were, in fact, manifested only in some people, and, yet, this cognitive selectiveness—and the creativity which they gave rise to—had significant cultural, social, and political consequences for the larger society to which these select persons belonged.

The other notable point is that, from what historians of modern South Asia denote is that, there is no evidence that Indians manifested these features before the entry of the British into India.

In other words, cross-cultural mentality and universalism as cognitive features are of great interest because of their cultural, geographical, and historical specificity. They characterized the minds of a select group of Indians across a certain period of historical time.

We may not be able to state categorically just when or in whom these twin features were first manifest. But if we suggest that by the beginning of the second decade of the nineteenth century

we see evidence of their embryonic presence, this is because of Rammohun Roy (1772—1833). There may well have been others before Roy who possessed these cognitive features; perhaps later historians will unveil their identities. But what seems certain is that in Roy's prolific writings and correspondence we find ideas and thoughts that clearly suggest the presence of both a cross-cultural mentality and a belief in the idea of universalism. Rammohun Roy is often hailed by later admirers as the 'father of modern India'[2] .The 'father' metaphor is apt in the sense that, by way of the development of a cross-cultural mentality for himself and the construction of his particular brand of universalism, Roy began a cognitive revolution in colonial India.

Cognitive Revolution only signify a radical transformation in the way one thinks, perceives, reasons, and conceptualizes. In the particular context of science, the philosopher-historian of science Thomas Kuhn famously called such a transformation a 'paradigm shift'—a shift from one (the older) 'paradigm' to another (and newer) one. He argued that scientists 'normally' do their work within the bounds of a paradigm—-a belief system—and that only when the evidence is fiercely compelling will they shift their allegiance to a new paradigm. Such a paradigm shift is the hallmark, he wrote, of a scientific revolution[3].

Some commentators pounced on the dose of non-rationality implicit in Kuhn's theory—his suggestion that what scientists believe in and practice is fundamentally a social and a dogmatic enterprise rather than a strictly logical one; science therefore, according to these critics, was a 'social construct', and no more privileged—in the sense of socially transcendent—than any other enterprise. Scientific 'facts', by this argument, are constructed, not discovered[4]. By implication, what Kuhn called scientific revolution is more in the nature of a psycho-social than an epistemic or intellectual transformation.

This view of science has, of course, not gone unchallenged. It has led to what is often called 'the science wars'[5].

The main concern here is however not to engage in any kind of controversy, but the broader cognitive import of Kuhn's notions of paradigm and scientific revolution. For, regardless of how a paradigm comes into being and how a scientist transfers her allegiance to a new paradigm, the paradigm that a scientist accepts, subscribes to, or works within when internalized becomes her scientific identity. Thus, a paradigm shift in science as experienced by an individual scientist represents a transformation in her scientific identity.

But a transformation in one's scientific identity may still leave that scientist unaffected in other respects; for instance, a deeply religious scientist may remain deeply religious even when his scientific beliefs are at odds with his religious beliefs: one's identity as a Christian may be left undisturbed even when one becomes an avowed Darwinian.

A cognitive revolution suggests something larger than a change in one's scientific identity: it marks a transformation of one's cognitive identity as a whole—and, by extension, it may represent the transformation of the shared cognitive identity of a community, a society, a culture as a whole. Thus, an individual's cognitive identity transformation, or that of a small group, may lead to a community's cognitive revolution.

Thus it may be suggested that the emergence of the creative mentality of the Bengal Renaissance marked such a cognitive revolution—that it represented a sharp transformation in the cognitive identity of a certain group of people, primarily in Bengal.

The emphasis here is on the word 'cognitive'. In recent decades, historians, economists, and sociologists of colonial and post-colonial India have argued, sometimes belligerently, that there was nothing particularly revolutionary about the Bengal Renaissance in terms of its effect on Indian society, polity, economy, and culture.[6]. A cognitive revolution need not entail a socio-economic-political transformation, for a cognitive revolution may be confined to a select few—those at the intellectual and creative vanguard in some historical time or culture.

The term 'identity' in the general psychological sense goes back to Freud and William James, but it is the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson who has made us most conscious of the concept in the past four decades[7]. Erikson speaks of identity formation as being simultaneously situated both within the individual and in the community of which she is a part[8]. Thus, for Erikson, identity is a psycho-social entity. It entails both a sense of one's personal continuity of experience as well as a sense of continuity and coherence with one's community or group[9].

But identity is not always a positive thing. Following Freud, 'Erikson has pointed out that a person or a group may harbor a negative identity—elements of one's identity that are perceived as undesirable, and which may have to do with one's gender, ethnicity, class, religion, and so on.'[10]

The notion of negative identity also has relevance to our story for, as we will see, some elements of the cognitive revolution characterizing the Bengal Renaissance entailed Indians harbouring, at least in part, such a negative identity. Indeed, the revolution itself lay in part in the identity transformation of a group from an essentially negative one to a markedly positive one.

Within the broader Eriksonian framework, 'cognitive identity' has a more specific significance. To understand what we mean by this term, let us first recognize that the phenomenon of the Bengal Renaissance became manifest in the thoughts' and deeds of a relatively small number of people. They were highly creative—writers, poets, playwrights, scientists, social thinkers, religious reformers, educationists, and so on; they were the ones who effected the cognitive revolution that produced the mentality of the Bengal Renaissance. They were instances of what they may be called creative beings.

And so, we are interested in the characteristics of these creative beings as creative beings. That is, we are interested in those aspects of their larger identity that were instrumental in their being creative beings. It is these aspects that collectively define what we may call their respective cognitive identities. And to comprehend the latter, we need to establish what in scientific jargon is a model of the creative being. Such a 'model' will give us a conceptual framework—a framework of reference to make sense of the idea of cognitive identity. Let us see the shape of this model.

Every creative being (or more simply, 'creator') possesses a belief! knowledge space—meaning an intricate web of world view, values, beliefs, philosophical doctrines, dogmas, rules, laws, sensibilities, perceptions, knowledge about the natural and social worlds, knowledge about the past, and knowledge about himself/herself. A creator's belief/knowledge space is hierarchical (or multilevelled): at one level, she shares a portion of it with people belonging to larger communities—e.g., the values and beliefs the person has acquired through her social, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds, and which are shared with others belonging to her family, her community, ethnicity, religion, country.

At another level, a part of a creator's belief/knowledge space is specific to her vocation or occupation—as a practitioner in art, science, music, literature, history, technology, philosophy, business, medicine, law, etc. These elements—values, beliefs, 'factual' knowledge—she shares with others in the domain of her practice; they reflect the experience of becoming and being an artist or scientist or musician or philosopher.

The remainder of her belief/knowledge space is private—inherently her own. This is yet another level. It includes, in particular, knowledge and beliefs and percepts about herself; and also her private beliefs, opinions, and perceptions about the world beyond herself.

A creative being's belief/knowledge space is not a fixed or immutable thing. It is constantly evolving, being revised again and again in the course of her life—by way of the creator both producing and consuming: her belief/knowledge space is altered by her producing new objects, entities, concepts, ideas; and by her consuming new objects, entities, concepts, beliefs, ideas produced by other creators. Sometimes, the change in a creator's belief/knowledge space may be very powerful, even profound, almost in the nature of an epiphany, or a gestalt switch; at other times it is subtle; on still other occasions it will be a quiet, almost muted, kind of change. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that for the young disciples of Henry Louis Vivian Derozio (1809—31) at Hindu College—disciples who were only a little younger than their teacher—their exposure to English literature and history and European philosophy, as taught by Derozio, effected a radical change within their belief/knowledge space in respect to the Hindu religion, the treatment of women, their allegiance to European Enlightenment liberalism: that was no muted change!"[11]

A creator's belief/knowledge space contains the kinds of entities the philosopher Karl Popper called 'objective knowledge"[12] —facts, theories, rules, procedures, hypotheses, philosophical doctrines, which, once produced, become public or shared within the relevant community, subject to public criticism, analysis, application, manipulation, and so on. Thus, for the Bengali intelligentsia of the early 1820s in Kolkata (Calcutta), such objective knowledge would include not only the doctrines of the Indian philosophical tradition, the Upanishads and the Vedanta, but also the arguments that Rammohun Roy was putting forth against idolatry and the practice of sati—and the educational policy that the British Government's Committee of Public Instruction had announced for its Indian subjects; for Derozio's pupils in Hindu College such objective knowledge would also include the writings of David Hume and Tom Paine.

But one's belief/knowledge space also contains certain elements— aesthetic standards, moral and ethical values, assumptions and beliefs—held subjectively by that person. For Rammohun Roy, idolatry was 'evil'; Derozio, the poet as much as the teacher, was imbued with a historical consciousness, a sense of patriotism—what one modern scholar, R.K. Dasgupta, has called his 'sense of a glorious past'.'[13] For Rabindranath Tagore (1861—194 1), there was the sense of a symbiosis, a oneness of the world with man.'[14] For Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858—1937),

contemplating and comparing plants with inorganic matter as they responded to various kinds of stimuli, there is a sense of the oneness encompassing both—a continuity of the living with the nonliving.'[15]

In sum, whatever the creator can be said to know or believe about things (including himself) in the physical world, in the abstract realm of ideas, and in his private, mental space, constitute elements of the creator's belief/knowledge space.

The elements of this space are connected to a greater or lesser degree: the space forms a multilevel, hierarchical network; a web. Individual elements such as rules, facts, concepts, theories, values, beliefs, are 'nodes' of the network (in the jargon of information technology, 'sites' on the web), while connections or links between them signify relationships that the creator knows or believes to exist between these things; or she may construct these connections. Such relationships are as much part of the creator's belief/knowledge space as the entities they connect.

Thus, for Rammohun Roy, the 'objective' fact that Hindus practise idolatry was contained in his belief/knowledge space; so was his private, subjective belief that idolatry is evil; as was his private, subjective belief of the unity of God. These elements were not isolated in his belief/knowledge space: they were obviously connected, and it was by way of these connections that he was led to produce the idea of a monotheistic, anti-idolatrous church that became the Brahmo Samaj.

For Jagadish Chandra Bose, the objective facts that living matter responds to stimuli and that inorganic matter responds to stimuli were both elements in his belief/knowledge space. So was his private, subjective belief in the Hindu philosophical doctrine of monism. Despite the seeming separateness of the last from the first two, Bose would construct a relation between them and create the Boseian thesis: that there is a continuity of responsiveness of living and nonliving things to the same stimuli.'[16]

Not all elements in a creator's belief/knowledge space are of equal importance or complexity. Of special interest are elements called 'schemata' (plural of 'schema'). The term 'schema', signifying a complex cognitive element, was first used by the psychologist Sir Frederick Bartlett in 1932.[17] In modern terms, schemata are patterns or templates that serve to represent certain stereotypical experiences or entities which a person stores in her long-term memory. Thus, when that person is confronted with a new situation, the latter is assimilated in terms of some existing

schema which tells the person how to respond to the situation or what to expect next. Beginning in childhood, and over time (as the psychologist Jean Piaget has suggested'[18]), human beings are constantly constructing, using, instantiating, and reconstructing their mental store of schemata. These schemata, stored in one's belief/knowledge space, facilitate his living and acting in the everyday world. One may call them 'commonsense schemata'.

In addition, creative people possess their own assemblage of schemata that allow them to produce creative work within their respective domains. When confronted with a new situation—for example, a desire to produce something (a poem, say), in response to some emotional experience—the creative being selects one or another of her stored schemata as a starting point and attempts to adapt—that is elaborate, transfer, refine—this schema to the new situation.

Thus, the poet Michael Madhusudan Datta (1824-73)[19] held in his belief/knowledge space the schema representing the poetic form known as blank verse, acquired through his study of English poetry, especially Milton, and a variety of other schemata representing the styles characteristic of such poets as Tasso, Homer, Virgil, Ovid, Dante, and Petrarch; these became, in part, the starting point for his own poetic compositions[20]. He was also the inventor of the sonnet form in Bengali poetry, and for this his initial schema derived from the Italian poet Petrarch whom he read while living in Versailles in 1863-5[21].

The scientist Jagadish Chandra Bose designed and invented many ingenious scientific instruments to conduct his experiments on the responsiveness of inorganic and organic matter. In designing these instruments he often drew upon a single schema—the idea of'balancing', in which the 'normal' behaviour of a plant would be recorded as a horizontal line on the recording instrument and only changes in behaviour represented by an upward or downward slope of the recording graph[22].

To be effective, schemata need to be flexible—that is, they need to be both elastic and plastic: they can be stretched, often in surprising ways; they can be reshaped, often in unexpected ways. The art historian Ernst Gombrich recognized this in the context of art when he spoke of art making as a process of starting with an initial schema and then gradually correcting or modifying it.[23] It is helpful if the initial schema selected by the artist is loose, flexible, even a bit vague, for then it can be easily modified according to need. Thus, the creative being not only adapts her

external stimuli, her percepts, her situations to a schema; she also adapts her schemata to these same entities. As a result, a schema may itself evolve continuously over the creator's lifetime.

There are times when a new experience or situation is at odds with one's stock of schemata; or the creator may be quite dissatisfied with his existing repertoire of schemata. In either case, he may radically alter an existing schema or invent a new schema. Indeed, to comprehend how a particular creative being's invented schemata are brought into existence is to gain insight into his creativity. Michael Madhusudan Datta took Miltonic blank verse as a model—his initial schema; but in writing his great Bengali epic poem Meghnadbadh Kabya (The Slaying of Meghanada) he reshaped it for his particular Bengali needs and created the Bengali blank verse form (amitraksar). And, as the scholar-translator William Radice has noted, Datta not only adapted blank verse from Milton, Paradise Lost itself became a schema which Datta drew upon for a variety of ideas that became some of the major sources of the composition of *Meghanada*.[24]

In 1869 the physician Mahendra Lal Sircar (1833—1904) proposed the building of a scientific institution that would be 'entirely under native management and control' for imparting scientific knowledge to 'the masses'[25]. His model—the initial schema—was the Royal Institution of Great Britain[26]. But in its form and function the outcome, known as the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, was never quite like the Royal Institution: it was reshaped to meet the particular needs of a scientific institution for the 'natives' of India.

A creative being is also associated with an emotion space—that is, a personal space of emotional sensibilities, the capacity to experience or feel a certain repertoire of emotions.

Some of these sensibilities are, of course, common to most human beings: anger, fear, happiness, pleasure, sadness, horror. Other emotional sensibilities are refinements of these: joy, euphoria, and ecstasy are nuanced varieties of happiness; melancholy and depression of sadness; terror of fear.

Emotions originate from perceptions of the outer world, from social and cultural interactions, or as a result of thought processes, and are accompanied by bodily (physiological) state changes[27]

Furthermore, one feels emotions: not only is one sad, one feels sad. Even though one may not be conscious of one's emotional sensibilities, the emotions that actually occur are part of one's consciousness.

The presence of certain emotional sensibilities may well be the outcome of the socio-cultural situation in which a person lives. And though it is a commonplace to oppose emotion to cognition, it is important to remember that emotions are also directed towards other things; one is fearful of something, one's anger is towards something. Thus, emotions are 'intentional' states (see Prologue), and the presence of particular emotional sensibilities in a creative being defines in part his cognitive identity.

For Rammohun Roy, the practice of sati was an empirical fact within his belief/knowledge space: this knowledge certainly contributed to his cognitive identity. But this piece of knowledge also gave rise within him to a feeling of anger and disgust—against this 'barbarous and inhuman practice'[28]. These emotions were also inherent elements of Roy's cognitive identity. As the fact of sati, they prompted him to write and actively campaign against the practice.

Likewise, for Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838—94), the inequality between men and women in his age, and the way women were treated in Hindu society, were empirical facts stored in his belief/knowledge space; so also was the fact of the plight of the Indian peasantry. These facts in turn produced within him a deep feeling of hatred against all forms of social and economic inequality[29].As we will see in a later chapter, such an emotional state played a significant role in the development of Chattopadhyay's cognitive identity and was the fount of his creativity as a writer.

Analysing The Mental Drive Of The Renaissance Stalwarts.

In psychoanalytical theory, drives are of two kinds—sexual (libidinous) and aggressive. These are, furthermore, innate—that is, genetically determined[30] .But, of course, there are other drives also, e.g., hunger aid curiosity drives, as Freud conceived them, are part of a creative being's space of needs, drives, desires, and goals which, generically, we will call a need/goal space.

Some needs and desires may be very fundamental to a particular creative being. These may have been genetically influenced, but they can also be acquired, or may develop through social and cultural encounters. These can be called as 'superneeds'. Thus, for instance, the poet is impelled to write poetry, the inventor to invent, the scholar to make sense of human thought and behaviour. Superneeds are, in a certain sense, compulsive. However, whether they are innate— as Freudian drives are, according to psychoanalytic theory—or learnt (that is, culturally

acquired) is besides the point. Jagadish Chandra Bose, was prompted to become and be a research physicist in a time and a milieu when research in modern science by Indians was virtually unknown. It was his way of disproving the British view that Indians were incapable of doing scientific research. It was, for him, a means for recovering India's ancient glory, and it became an all- embracing superneed that informed his whole life in science.[31,]

But needs may not be always of such overarching compass as superneeds. They may originate by way of the special training, education, or expertise developed by individuals. Once acquired, however, they may be as compelling as superneeds. Thus, Bose spent the second half of his life (1902—37)—which made for three quarters of his creative life—in pursuit of proving the existence of a unity of phenomena between plant and animal as manifested by their responsiveness to stimuli. This became, for him, a superneed, but it was a learnt need, a consequence of the Boseian thesis, framed in 1900—2, about the continuity in responsiveness between the living and nonliving to stimuli[32].

Needs and desires are subjective: they are elements in the individual's need space, and some that exist in one individual may be quite absent from the need space of others. But needs and desires may also be communicated, and thus transmitted from one person to another, and thereby become objective, shared by members of a community. The desire to shed the Hindu practices of polytheism and idol-worship may well have taken shape first in the mind of Rammohun Roy. But then this desire was communicated to a handful of his contemporaries, such as Dwarkanath Tagore, Kalinath Roy, Prasanno Kumar Tagore, and Ramchandra Vidyabagish[33].

In order for needs to be satisfied, they must be transformed into goals. A goal is simply an intention to do or achieve something couched in a form that is relatively tractable. The shared desire to reform Hindu practices was transformed into a goal—to establish a Unitarian Hindu Church, which was met when the Brahmo Sabha, later the Brahmo Samaj, was legally established in 1830[34].

The drives, needs, desires, and goals in a creative being's need! goal space both form a continuum and possess an organization. They form a continuum because drives, desires, and needs may be thought of as (relatively) abstract and often unconsciously held goals, and goals as (relatively) concrete and usually conscious needs. And they possess an organization within the need/goal space because the satisfaction of a desire or a need or a goal may engender the

generation of more tractable needs or goals as the means to achieve a superior need or goal or desire. Thus, in Rammohun Roy the need for establishing a monotheistic, anti-idolatrous church was conceived as a practical means—a 'subgoal'—of the 'higher' need to reform Hinduism. And Jagadish Bose's decision to undertake research on radio waves was a means—a subgoal—to achieve his deeply held superneed.[35]

These three spaces—namely, belief/knowledge, emotion, and need goal—interact with one another by way of cognitive processes. Such processes draw upon a creative being's emotions, and his beliefs and knowledge, in order to perform an organized set of mental actions intended to realize his needs, goals, and desires. These actions entail accessing and retrieving relevant elements of one's belief/knowledge space (including retrieval of schemata), forming links between them, drawing analogies, producing inferences, and so on. A large part of such mental actions may occur in the unconscious; others may be performed consciously. In general, cognitive processes entail an interleaving of conscious and unconscious actions. Even a need or a desire or a goal may be held in one's mind without the creative person being conscious of it. The neurologist Wilder Penfield has described how some of his patients who suffered from the form of epilepsy called *petit mal*—in which the seizure would render the patient entirely unconscious—would continue to manifest what normally would be considered purposive ('goal-directed') behaviour: one patient, a student of piano, would continue to play with some skill even when interrupted by a seizure in the midst of his practice[36]. Indeed, scientists, artists, and inventors frequently draw upon analogies as sources of ideas, though not always with conscious intent. In 1900, Jagadish Chandra Bose drew a remarkable analogy between the non-responsiveness of a scientific instrument after prolonged use and the phenomenon of fatigue in animal muscle; an analogy which opened up for Bose a massive new field of inquiry that would occupy him for the rest of his life. But there is no evidence that he consciously searched for the analogy; rather, the analogy appeared in his conscious mind as the outcome of some unconscious process[37].

A creative being's thought processes may themselves not be discernible because so much of them may occur in the unconscious. However, they may reveal a particular pattern of idiosyncratic features. These we will call that creator's cognitive style. In a sense, one's cognitive style is the schema underlying one's cognitive processes.

Much has been written by art theorists and art historians about the nature of style in art. For some scholars, such as Heinrich Wolfflin, the history of art is the history of style[38]—more precisely, what the theorist Richard Woliheim called 'general style', features that allow works of art to be 'placed' in their historical setting[39]. But there is also what Woliheim called 'individual style', which can be called cognitive style.

The way a creative being thinks about his work, the way he perceives nature and humanity and culture, the way he draws upon his beliefs/knowledge (including knowledge of his personal past as both human being and creator), the way in which he reacts intellectually, aesthetically, emotionally to other people's thoughts and works of past and present, the reasoning he employs, the symbols he invents and uses, the way he employs his schemata—all these contribute to a creative being's cognitive style. And while cognitive style is most easily recognized in the arts and literature, scientists, scholars and other creative beings also manifest cognitive style, though such styles in science and scholarship are more difficult to identify than those of artists, writers, and musicians.[40]

These are the main components of one's cognitive identity: a belief/knowledge space that includes, in particular, a stock of schemata; an emotion space; a need/goal space which includes, in particular, overarching needs and desires which we call superneeds; and one or more cognitive styles, that characterize the ways in which one's mental (cognitive) processes follow. The conjunction of these three spaces—and their particular contents—along with cognitive styles afford the individual creative being with those aspects of his larger identity that are instrumental in that individual becoming and being the kind of creative being she is. Furthermore, elements of individual cognitive identities may be shared within a community, either by way of communication and transmission amongst community members of beliefs, knowledge, emotional sensibilities, needs, and goals, or by the roughly synchronous individual reception of these elements from outside sources. It is in this sense that a community may manifest a shared cognitive identity.

The creative mentality of the Bengal Renaissance was dominated by two cognitive constructs: a cross- cultural mentality, and universalism. We can now claim that these twin features were the core elements of a shared cognitive identity of those members of the nineteenth-century Bengali intelligentsia who were the creators of the Bengal Renaissance.

This does not mean that cross-cultural mentality and universalism were represented in exactly the same way in all these creators' cognitive identities. Rather, they were in the nature of schemata which the individuals represented and instantiated, each according to their own needs and goals.

Rammohun Roy was a polymath, and his personal cognitive identity reflected this. He was not a scientist; and though he composed songs, he was not a poet. His cross-cultural mentality and universalism would, thus, differ from those of a Jagadish Chandra Bose or a Madhusudan Datta: not just because they were separated in time, but also because their needs and the goals they set for themselves as creators differed. As creative individuals, they were just that—highly individual beings with their own distinctive cognitive identities.

Furthermore—and this too is important—cognitive identities are not static: one's belief/knowledge space is constantly being revised with new experiences and encounters with the world; one's need! goal space also changes with new situations; and one's emotional sensibilities alter over time. New schemata are invented or learnt, old ones are discarded or recede in significance. Indeed, being creative entails a high degree of dynamism in one's identity. We would not expect Jagadish Chandra Bose's cognitive identity, circa 1882, when he entered Christ's College, Cambridge, to be the same as his identity when he began serious research in 1894; nor would the latter be identical to his cognitive identity in 1917, when he retired from his professorship at Presidency College, Kolkata, and inaugurated his own research centre, the Bose Institute. Not only would his belief/knowledge space have changed significantly over those years, his need/goal space would also have altered.

One's cognitive identity usually changes gradually over time, but it may also be transformed more abruptly, akin to a Kuhnian paradigm shift, and when that happens there is the possibility of a cognitive revolution, even at the level of the individual. In other words, whether we are considering the individual or a community, a cognitive identity may well have a history. And the more creative the person, the richer this history.

This raises the question of origin: how does a cognitive identity come into being in the first place? As Erik Erikson and others have pointed out, the process of forming one's larger, more encompassing identity begins in infancy and develops most intensely during childhood, adolescence, and youth[41] .But in the context of the adult or maturing creative being embedded in a culture, how does the first seed of cognitive identity come into existence? In the particular

context of the Bengal Renaissance, what were the principal elements of the first appearance of a shared cognitive identity at the onset of this historical period? And what were the sources that helped shape this initial identity? I will suggest that the origins of the cognitive identity of the Bengal Renaissance lay in another cognitive identity which took shape in the minds of the first British Orientalists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—and, for this reason, we term this an 'Orientalist cognitive identity'.

THE ORIENTALIST IDENTIFICATION OF INDIAN COGNITION.

Ever since the literary critic and political thinker Edward Said published his celebrated study *Orientalism* ,this word has become,in some scholarly circles,a term of *opprobrium.*[42] According to Said ,Orientalism is a 'Discourse'[43], invented by the people of the 'West' about the 'East'[44].Said admits that there are other senses of 'orientalism'. It may mean, for instance, the academic discipline concerned with the Orient. There is also a related meaning in which the 'Orient' is counterposed to the 'Occident'. Orientalism then refers to any scholarly, social, political, or imaginative writing concerning 'Orientals' that takes this dichotomy as a starting point[45].

Historically, these latter two connotations are pre-Saidian. When the historian David Kopf wrote about 'Orientalist archeological and historical studies', about the 'era of Orientalism', about the Orientalists''pioneering achievements in comparative philology', he was thinking of Orientalism (with an upper case 'o') as a field of scholarship, where the Orient is the scholar's domain and where (as it turned out), historically, the scholar happened to be from the Occident.[46] For Kopf, Orientalism was not a 'discourse'; it did not carry for him the smell of an offensively structured body of knowledge that Saidian and post-Saidian orientalism does.

Said's Orientalism is widely held to be one of the seminal texts in 'colonial discourse theory'.[47] The contrast between orientalism as a Saidian discourse, and pre-Saidian Orientalism as the systematic study of the history, literature, and culture of the Orient is clearly marked when we compare Said's views to that of Kopf on Sir William Jones (1746—94), arguably the most distinguished of the first generation of European Orientalists. Jones's larger mission, in Said's

eyes, was to 'domesticate' and 'subdue' the Orient[48]. For Kopf, Jones's scholarship enhanced our understanding of human knowledge[49].

It is no doubt coincidental that Kopf marks 1772, the year in which Rammohun Roy was born, as the beginning of the era of British Orientalism. This was the year also in which Warren Hastings (1732— 1818) returned to Bengal for a second time, eight years after his earlier departure following an Indian residence of fourteen years in which, as an agent of the East India Company he had amassed a sizeable fortune[50]. He came in 1772 as Governor of Bengal. In 1774, Hastings was appointed India's first governor general, a position he held for eleven years.

For Hastings, ruling India effectively required that the Englishman in India not only know the culture and history of his dominion, but also that he should 'think and act like an Asian[51]'. If Englishmen followed this rule, the colonizing state would flourish; but it would also be, Hastings wrote to a correspondent, humanity's gain[52]." Towards this end he assembled a small band of Englishmen recently landed in India to acquire knowledge of it, in whom he furthered a love for Indian literature and an interest in the Indian past. They became the first of the British Orientalists. They were entrusted with the translation of Hindu and Muslim laws into English for the benefit of representatives of the East India Company, and with the translation of the Company's regulations into Indian languages[53].' Their endeavours were politically purposive, true; but it is not at all inconceivable that they were also and simultaneously 'purposive without purpose' in the Kantian sense, i.e. that these intellectual endeavours were disinterested quests whose other 'purpose' was personal fulfillment.

In 1783, more than a decade after Hastings' appointment, Sir William Jones arrived in Kolkata as a judge in the Supreme Court. He would become the most famous of the British Orientalists. In 1784 he founded, with like-minded fellow 'Anglo-Indians', the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which became the hub for much of the Indological studies pursued by the Orientalists[54].' The Asiatic Society flourishes to this day.

Kopf tells us that Hastings' policy of promoting an understanding of Indian languages and literature, culture, and history contributed hugely to the awakening of the Bengali mind.'[55] If this was the case, then it gives us a point of entry in identifying both the source and nature of the Bengali cognitive identity in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. The question is: what was it about the achievements of the British Orientalists in India that may have found its

way into the consciousness of Rammohun Roy and his contemporaries within the Bengali intelligentsia—and which became the basis of a new cognitive identity?

The Orientalists who were in Kolkata between 1773 and 1785, the era of Hastings' tenure as governor and governor general, included, in addition to William Jones, such men as the Sanskritist Henry Colebrooke (1765—1836), perhaps the most eminent Orientalist after Jones; Nathaniel Halhed (1751—1830), author of the first Bengali grammar; Charles Wilkins (1749—1836), Sanskritist and translator of the Bhagavad Gita into English; and James Prinsep (1799—1840), who deciphered the ancient Brahmi script.

Kopf reminds us that these men (and there were others) were mostly products of the European Enlightenment. In his words, they were 'classicists' rather than 'progressives' in their historical outlook, cosmopolitan rather than nationalist in their views of other cultures, and rationalists rather than romantics in their quest for universal principles that might underlie human nature[56] Their's was an outlook, Kopf tells us, that was at once universalist and particluralists, seeking and finding unity in human nature but diversity in human custom.

Kopf's distinction between the classicist and the progressive is worth noting. By 'progressive' he means those who saw history as an unbroken progress towards some 'Utopian state', in contrast with the 'classicist' for whom the past is cyclical, moving between greatness and decline.'[57] For the classicist 'greatness' refers to the four historical eras of classicism, namely, Periclean Greece, Augustan Rome, the Italian Renaissance, and the eighteenth-century era of Louis XIV which, according to the historian Carl Becker, enriched 'the light and learning' of the classical world and of the Renaissance[58].

As possessors of the Enlightenment outlook, the early British Orientalists were imbued with minds that were cosmopolitan, classical, and rationalistic. Perhaps most significantly for this story, the philosopher-historians of the Enlightenment were cognizant of and sympathetic to non-European, non-Christian cultures, including those of Asia[59].

Cosmopolitanism and cultural eclecticism are but instances of a universal outlook. As Carl Becker explained it, it became the task of the eighteenth century philosopher-historians to understand the character of 'universal man' the character they supposed being common to all humanity—, as David-Hume put it in his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding(1748), 'the

Constant and universal principles of human nature'.'[60] All the manifold cultures—especially non .European cultures—were to be stimulated within a universal framework[61].

This enterprise required comparative approach to historian , an approach that would at once take a critical stance towards on own culture and a tolerant, 'sympathetic' view of other cultures. For Kopf, this comparative and realistic view of history is at the core of the mentality—the cognitive identity—of the British Orientalists[62]'Thus, British Orientalism owes its origins to the outlook of the European Enlightenment. It was this Enlightenment outlook that, in Kopf's words, 'predisposed' the young men, who went to India and rue in contact with Hasting to respond positively to the latter's call[63].

Perhaps this predisposition derived as much from their classicist influence as their cultural and ethnic eclecticism, for the lasting achievements of Orientalist scholarship lay in the discovery of the intellectual, creative, and cultural riches of India's past. It was for them, a 'discovery of India'—its Vedic literature, Sanskrit grammar, mathematics, astronomy, jurisprudence, customs, aid philology . The Hastings-generation' of scholars, to use Kopf's term, brought into being the concept of an Indian golden age.[64]

In fact, the British Orientalists, by their works of translation and scholarship, produced new empirical knowledge and beliefs that entered into their own belief/knowledge space. This same knowledge forced other, previously held beliefs and 'facts' out of their respective belief/knowledge spaces.

For Sir William Jones, for example, the structure of Sanskrit was 'more perfect' than Greek, 'more copious' than Latin, and 'more exquisitely refined than either'. Moreover, he discovered a strong affinity of Sanskrit grammar to both Greek and Latin—a stronger affinity than could be produced by chance.[65] We see here a mix of empirical (or 'factual') knowledge (the affinity of Sanskrit to Greek and Latin), and judgements of an aesthetic nature ('more perfect', 'more exquisitely refined'). We also detect in the expressing of these judgments an emotional response in Jones to his findings—a feeling admiration.

One of Jones's biographers, S.N. Mukherjee, tells us that Jones, along with his fellow Orientalists, also established the seeds of a methodology that became part of later Indological studies and researches into the history of early India.[66] It was a methodology that included the study and decoding of inscriptions written in ancient and forgotten writing systems, scripts such

as Brahmi, the study of ruins, and the identification of names, places, and persons.[67] Jones himself identified, in 1793, a prince named in classical accounts of Alexander the Great invasion of India as Sandrocotta to be the Mauryan emperor Chandragupta (flourished 321 BCE), and his capital, mentioned as Palibothra, to be Pataliputra, the site of the modern city of Patna—an identification that has stood the test of time and later historical scholarship.[68]

Indeed, the decipherment of the Brahmi script itself began with Charles Wilkins' deciphering of Gupta Brahmi script flourished (circu—eighth century CE) in 1785, while the older, original Brahmi script (circa fifth century BCE) would be deciphered by a later secretary of the Asiatic Society, James Prinsep, in 1837.

Orientalists' discovery of India included the recovery of her creative past—-in mathematics, astronomy, and lite4ture. One of the most consequential of these discoveries was the Sanskrit drama Sakuntala, or Abhijnanasakuntalam (The Recognition of Sakuntala) composed by Kalidasa (circa fourth century CE). As is well known, Sir William Jones translated the play, first into Latin and then, in 1789, into English.

The European response to Sakuntala in the nineteenth century has been documented by the scholar Dorothy Matilda Figueira[69] .She has shown that Jones's translation went through five reprints in England in the two decades immediately following its first publication, and that it was published in forty-six translations in twelve different European languages. A more lyrical tribute to the drama was paid by the German poet and dramatist Goethe (1749—1832) who, on reading a German translation of the play, wrote, in 1792, a quatrain in its praise. And, as if in further tribute, there is a striking resemblance of the 'Prelude at the Theater' in Goethe's Faust (1797)[70] to the 'Prologue' in Sakuntala[71].

What is more relevant here is the effect Sakuntala had on William Jones himself. For Jones, Kalidasa was 'the Indian Shakespeare'— as he wrote to a friend in London, the English naturalist Sir Joseph Banks;[72]' Kalidasa, Jones said, was the 'brightest' of the 'nine gems'— 'nine men of genius'—who served in the court of Vikramaditya (Chandra Gupta II, 375—415 cE)[73] in an age that had taken drama to 'great perfection', an era 'when Britons were as unlettered and unpolished as the army of Hanumat'.[74] We are left in no doubt about Jones's engagement with Kalidasa's masterpiece, and such other Indian literary works as Jayadeva's Gita Govinda (twelfth century CE), which also he translated.

In 1795 Henry Colebrooke, regarded as William Jones's intellectual successor amongst the Orientalists, published an article in the Asiatic Society's journal in which he showed that sati, the problematically voluntary immolation of widows, was not justified by Vedic precepts[75]. This was just one of Colebrooke's many articles on Vedic texts. As Kopf has pointed out, the main import of Colebrooke's researches was his discovery of monotheism in Vedic India. In other words, the people of those times were guided by precepts very different from those held by contemporary Indians.[76] Like Jones before him, or along with him, Colebrooke was constructing a belief knowledge space about India: the concept of a 'golden age' in the Indian past. Colebrooke was a universalist, in the Enlightenment spirit. He was as interested in Indian creativity as in Indian law, social practices, and the Sanskrit language. His concept of a golden Hindu age included showing how Hindus conceived the mathematical universe. We discover this in a tract on Indian algebra published in 1817 after his return to England upon retiring from administrative, legal, and Orientalist duties in India[77].

Colebrooke seemed to know his mathematics well, and he can be seen as a comparative historian of mathematics. His goal was twofold: to ascertain the antiquity of Indian algebra, and compare its age to that of the algebra developed in Hellenistic Alexandria by Diophantus (circa 200—84 cE),[78] and by the Arabs; and to compare the state of development of Indian algebra with that of the Arabs and Diophantus. His Indian mathematical sources were the treatises Vijaganita and Lilabati of Bhaskara (11 14_85),[79] and two much older algebraic works written by Brahmagupta (598—670) as chapters in his astronomical treatise Brahmasputa-Siddhanta. Colebrooke compared and collated these texts, and drew on commentaries and glosses by other scholasts of those times, and he concluded that the chapters on algebra and arithmetic written by Brahmagupta were authentic.[80] He drew on other contemporary Orientalist writers whom he believed were reliable in their estimates to conclude that Brahmagupta flourished in the late sixth or early seventh century CE. Thus, Brahmagupta's work, Colebrooke asserted, preceded the onset of scientific culture among the Arabs.[81]

But there was an Indian algebra anteceding Brahmagupta's: in Bhaskara's writings there is a passage due to the astronomer Aryabhata (476—550 CE), in which there is mention of 'Vija', the term corresponding to the Arabic-rooted 'algebra'; there is also mention of 'Kuttaka', which refers to a class of algebraic problems called 'indeterrminates of the first degree' (equations of

the form "ax + by c", where there are two unknowns, 'x' and 'y'); and to solutions of 'quadratic equations' (of the form "ax**2 + bx = c"). And so, Colebrooke tells us, 'It is presumed, therefore, that the treatise of Aryabhata then extant, included quadratic equations as also indeterminate problems of the first degree.'[82]' Colebrooke concludes that Aryabhata is the earliest known Hindu author of algebraic works[83].

As to a comparison of Aryabhata with Diophantus, for Colebrooke the Indian was more advanced of the two[84] —and he gives a litany of features of Indian algebra in support of his claim. He concedes that in the matter of the invention of algebra the 'Greeks of Alexandria' must have priority over the Indians (and both over the Arabs); but the Greeks' algebra was 'imperfect'[85], and that of the Indians more 'distinguished'[86].

To repeat, William Jones, Henry Colebrooke, and their fellow Orientalists constructed a concept of a golden age in Indian history.

The view of one eminent historian of early India, Romila Thapar, reflects the modern scepticism at the very idea of a golden age. For Thapar, a golden age—in the sense that every aspect of life had reached the highest level of excellence—was a state of affairs that scarcely prevailed in any culture in history[87]. However, here we are concerned with the minds of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars, and the kinds of perceptions, beliefs, and values they held. In cognitive terms, the concept of an Indian golden age constituted a schema which became a core element in the shared belief/knowledge space of the British Orientalists; a schema that was interpreted and instantiated by each scholar according to his particular engagement with Indology.

We can articulate some of the most prominent features of this schema: it referred to a historical period that ranged from the era of the Vedas (reaching back to the second millennium BCE to when the Rig Veda is believed to have been first composed), to about the end of the seventh century CE.[88] It possessed a rich and complex language—Sanskrit; an elaborate system of rules, moral laws, customs, manners, rites, and legal procedures; a rich poetic and literary tradition; and a highly developed mathematics and astronomy.

This schema was, of course, linked with specific interpretations, beliefs, and 'factual' knowledge located in one or more of the individual belief/knowledge spaces: about the link of Sanskrit to

the European family of languages; about the state of algebra and astronomy in the time of Aryabhatta and Bhaskara; about Sakuntala; about the practice of monotheism; about the status of Hindu widows; about the Dharmasastra (the Laws of Manu), which Jones had studied and translated.

The schema representing the golden age, and the associated specific interpretations, beliefs, and factual items of knowledge were, of course, produced by the Orientalists themselves. These were the outputs of cognitive processes which began with certain needs, desires, and goals that were held in the individual scholar's respective need/goal spaces. Furthermore, such needs and goals were connected to each other in an organized, hierarchical fashion. And finally, each of the Orientalists would have had personal and private needs and goals in addition to ones shared with their fellow scholars.

At the highest level, we find Hastings' need or desire to rule India as best he could. To achieve this need, he felt that the British in India had to know the culture and history of India—'to think and act like an Asian'. For Hastings, the latter was a means to attain the higher need: in the jargon of cognitive science, the need to know the culture and history of India became a 'subgoal' to be met in order to meet the higher need/goal to govern India effectively. It was a subgoal which he communicated to a certain coterie of Englishmen—and for them, 'to know the culture and history of India' was established, in their need/goal space, as their highest level goal. Each of them— Charles Wilkins, Nathaniel Halhed, William Hunter, William Jones, Henry Colebrooke, Robert Chambers, and others—chose to meet this goal in their respective ways. Their respective need/goal spaces would hold goals and subgoals that were in part shared with others, in part their very own.

Hastings, we are told, was also something of an Indophile: he mastered Persian, collected Indian paintings and manuscripts, and quoted from the Bhagavad Gita[89] .And so, even while his desire to know the culture and history of India may have been subservient—a subgoal— to his larger need to rule India as best he could, it was also a goal in its own, independent right. It cohered with his interest in and admiration of Indian culture and his desire to promote Oriental learning. 'Promote Oriental learning' can thus be seen as an independent goal in Hastings' personal need/goal space which, it so happened, did not contradict his other, political, aim. This goal,

'promote Oriental learning', was itself communicated to other like-minded Englishmen (as suggested at the start of section ii in this chapter).

And so, the various specific and 'low-level' goals that were produced in the minds of the Orientalists—as, for example, Colebrooke's goal to ascertain the antiquity of Indian algebra and compare its status with that of Alexandria and the Arabs—were as much subgoals of Hastings' goal 'promote Oriental learning' as they were of Hastings' goal 'rule India well'; moreover, they were more directly linked to the goal 'promote Oriental learning' than they were to the goal 'rule India well'.

Indeed, no matter what the imperial agenda which led to the rise of British Orientalism, the shared cognitive identity of the Orientalists as Orientalists was defined by needs and goals that are far more likely to have been scholarly in origin than political. It is because of this that we can make sense of Hastings' claim, in a letter, that while accumulation of knowledge about those over whom the British ruled would serve the British rulers well, such accumulation of knowledge was also, at an important level, disinterested, and therefore justifiably 'the gain of humanity'[90].

The literary critic Gaüri Viswanathan, who has examined the introduction of English literary studies into India in the nineteenth century through Saidian eyes, and who sees the whole enterprise as an exercise in Saidian orientalism, finds this conjunction of usefulness to the state and value to humanity sinister: as if, by claiming the value of Oriental studies to humanity, Hastings legitimized the political-imperial motivation.[91]

 It seems very unlikely that discovering the antiquity and state of Indian algebra were prompted by the goal 'rule India as best as possible'—or even the goal 'think and act like an Asian'. These researches were driven by something that prompts the scholar more fundamentally: a superneed to know.

Here, then, is the essence of the Orientalist cognitive identity: a belief/knowledge space dominated by a schema that represents the concept of an Indian golden age, spanning some 2000 year, circa 1200/1500 BCE to 700 CE, and an interconnected web of beliefs, facts, and values that pertain to this golden age; the comparative stance as a fundamental element of cognitive style; a need/goal space dominated by an active, hierarchical web of goals, needs, desires, and their subgoals all of which pertain to Indological scholarship and are rooted in the superneed 'to know the Indian past'; and an emotion space dominated by admiration for the schema of the

golden age and facts and beliefs linked to this schema, as well as a sense of curiosity about the Indian past.

However, as we have noted, an identity can also be negative in character. The Orientalist cognitive identity as outlined here seems positive. But there were other factors that also produced, in the belief/knowledge space of some English minds, an altogether different schema concerning the Indian past; and an emotional sensibility concerning all things Indian that was anything but admiring.

In 1817 James Mill (1773—1836) published his History of British India, a labour that occupied him for over a decade. It resulted in a book that became required reading for a generation of British administrators in India, and, thus, a massively influential historical work on the policies and practices of British governance in the subcontinent. Mill's History would go into three editions in his own lifetime, and a fourth edition appeared in 1840, edited by no less a luminary than the Orientalist and stalwart of the Asiatic Society Horace Hay- man Wilson (1786—1860).

Long before his History appeared in print, Mill had come under the influence of Jeremy Bentham (1748—1832), a founding father of utilitarianism, the major political, social, economic, and moral doctrine which proclaimed that the 'rightness' (or utility) of an action is in proportion to its promotion of 'happiness' (or 'pleasure') and in inverse proportion to its production of 'un-happiness' (or 'pain'). Mill was more than just a Benthamite. He became Bentham's interpreter and expositor. In the felicitous phrase of Elia Halevy, 'Bentham gave Mill a doctrine, and Mill gave Bentham a school'[92].

Mill's History earned him an important position in the East India Company's headquarters in London, and, while he never visited India, by way of his employment in the Company from 1818 till his death he would exercise yet another kind of influence on British policy in India.

Mill's utilitarianism was the starting point in his evaluation and judgement of Indian culture and history. The basis of 'all improvement in the condition of human life', he states in his History[93] is knowing how to enhance 'human enjoyment' and reduce 'human misery'. Accordingly, one may judge the quality and extent of a people's state of civilization. And while literature is not exactly synonymous with such knowledge, it still affords a valuable source from which very reliable conclusions may be drawn about a civilization.[94]

Mill speaks of poetry, for it was through poetry that, before the invention of writing, men recorded their ideas, historical episodes, religious precepts, and rules of law. It was through

'versification' that the 'minds of rude men' were stimulated most effectively. But eventually a people must move on to new stages.[95] It was here that the Hindus failed, Mill declares. They did not make the transition from the first stage. They have not moved beyond the 'habit' of versification. Their history is framed by way of narrative poems that have little to do with facts or truth; their laws are in verse form; as are their scriptures; and even their science.[96]

Kalidasa's Sakuntala is singled out for special disdain—perhaps because it was Sir William Jones whose translation brought it to Western eyes, and, in Mill's History, Jones is singled out as the object of particular wrath. Mill alludes to King Dusyanta's and Sakuntala's gandharva form of marriage—a secret marriage of lovers, usually by exchange of garlands, without any formal ceremony, and accepted as legal for couples in the princely classes—as a form of marriage that is incompatible with the very idea of a refined people.[97] The plot of the play, Mill notes, is simple enough, within the 'powers of the imagination in an uncultivated age'[98].He admits that some parts of the poem are 'beautiful'[99] .Dusyanta's courtship of Sakuntala is 'delicate and interesting'; the scenes portraying Sakuntala's friendship with Anasuya and Priyambada are 'tender and delightful'; there are episodes that 'breathe more than pastoral sweetness'[100].But these are precisely the kinds of 'ideas and affections' that speak of a rather rude society. Such scenes remind Mill of the 'Song of Solomon' in the Old Testament—a product of a 'simple and unpolished age'[101]. Mill takes issue with William Jones's remark that Kalidasa lived and wrote in an age and a milieu when Britons were 'as unlettered and unpolished as the army of Hanumat'[102].' For, in Britain, a century before Christ, there were the Druids—and between the Druids and the Hindus he finds a striking similarity of attainments and character.[103]

The point is, Mill notes, that a people can possess a rich dramatic tradition and yet have little to show in respect of progress in knowledge. In Mill's eyes, India failed in this realm. His examples include the recording of history—the literature of the Hindus revealed no historical accounts other than the products of mythologists and poets[104]. As for Sanskrit—the very 'niceties', 'subtleties', and 'endless conceits' of Sanskrit grammar so admired by the Orientalists are only 'frivolous refinements' appropriate for a primitive and ignorant age that takes delight as much with the 'juggleries of the mind' as with those of the body; it is this absurd passion for both that is a distinctive feature of their spirit[105].

Moreover, William Jones's view that the Sanskrit language is more 'copious' than Latin must itself be regarded as 'a defect and a deformity of language' rather than a sign of perfection. The most perfect language is one that has 'one name for everything which required a name and no more than one'[106]

As for astronomy, Mill simply cannot believe that such a poor level of civilization as manifested by the Indians could ever have produced the extent of astronomical knowledge the Orientalists claimed for it; for astronomy signified a degree of advancement which only the most highly cultivated nations have achieved[107] .Indeed, whatever the Hindus may have achieved in astronomy, Mill is sceptical that it originated in that civilization; rather, he suggests, Indian astronomy may well have been 'derived' from other, more 'advanced' nations[108] .So also must they have attained their mathematical knowledge from a culture far more advanced than their own, and possessed of a greater inventiveness[109] .The Indians must have learnt their mathematics and astronomy from the Persians, who were themselves taught by 'the Greeks of Constantinople'.[110]

At the end of the day, for James Mill it is the utilitarian principle that counts. The status of a civilization is in proportion to the utility of its various pursuits. The more a nation indulges in non-utilitarian pursuits and the more it squanders its inventiveness in inferior pursuits, the more 'barbarous' the nation is. By this principle, for Mill, Indian astronomy and mathematics must be condemned, for they were cultivated for the sake of astrology.[111]

If the Orientalist cognitive identity is one dominated by a schema representing the concept of an Indian golden age, then in James Mill's History of British India we find a 'counter-schema', a representation of an altogether opposite concept of an Indian past that is 'rude', 'unpolished', 'simple', 'uncultivated'—Mill's most favoured words. Associated with this 'rude/uncultivated India' schema are several beliefs, including ones we have already noted: Indians versify everything—including historical narratives; the features of Sanskrit grammar ('intricate subtleties', 'endless conceits', 'frivolous refinements') are characteristics of a rude and ignorant age; the redundancies in Sanskrit are expressions of a defective language; Indian civilization is incapable of producing advanced astronomy and mathematics, hence Indian astronomy and mathematics were rooted in other cultures. Indeed, we may speak of a personal

cognitive identity for Mill in respect to India in which his belief/knowledge space was dominated by the philosophical doctrine of utilitarianism, and the schema of a rude/uncultivated India; a need/goal space in which the overarching goal was to disprove the Orientalist concept of an Indian golden age; and a cognitive style which includes as a dominant element the rule 'evaluate Indian culture, society, and civilization by the criterion of the utilitarian principle'.

But, like the Orientalists, Mill was also driven to compare: the need to compare was, thus, also a prominent element in his need/ goal space—in particular, the need to compare Indian and other 'rude and uncultivated nations' of Asia with the Greeks and Romans of old and with modern Europeans.[112,] And, as a consequence, the comparative stance was an element of Mill's cognitive style. It was by exercising this strategy that he was led to generate a litany of other beliefs and 'facts' that would enter into his belief/knowledge space: the Hindus had almost no medicine to speak of; surgery was unknown to the Indians; the Indians were inferior to feudal Europe in religion, in philosophy, in the art of government, in law; the Indians were inferior to the Europeans in poetry; the Hindus were inferior in the art of war to medieval Europe; the Indians surpass the Europeans in the 'delicate manufactures' of spinning, weaving, dyeing; the Indians are inferior to the Europeans in painting and sculpture; European agriculture 'surpassed exceedingly' the agriculture of the Hindus; the Hindus are 'slavish and dastardly', hence are inferior in manners, character, manliness, and courage to the older Europeans; the Indians were effeminate, hence superior, to the Europeans in gentleness and 'the winning arts of address'; the Indians were disposed to 'deceit and perfidy'.[113] And, by virtue of all these, the most conclusively held set of beliefs: the manners, institutions, and attainments of the Indians have remained static for many ages; hence, present-day Indians are not unlike the Indians of Old; hence 'in the Hindus of the present day, we see the Hindus of the remote past; and insofar as people are curious to know more about "some of the oldest nations", conversation with present-day Indians is tantamount to conversing with the Chaldeans, the Babylonians, the ancient Persians, and the Egyptians.

Mill's is, thus, a counter-Orientalist cognitive identity that serves to subvert the Orientalist identity. It is the confluence of these two opposed cognitive identities that was received by the Indian, especially the Bengali, intelligentsia in the first decades of the nineteenth century. If there was a cognitive revolution in Bengal, it would have to transform this singular received identity deriving from opposite perspectives.

Projecting Rammohun Roy and His Brahmo Samaj as the first step to a cognitive experience

The Brahmo Samaj is sometimes called a religious movement, sometimes a society, sometimes a reformed Hindu church. Whatever we choose to call it, we must recognize that the Brahmo Samaj is the product of the human mind. It is an artifact. In common parlance, artifacts are what one sees in museums as relics of historically and geographically distant civilizations. But, more fundamentally, an artifact is something that is not part of the natural world; it is produced or consciously conceived in response to some need, want, or desire[114].

The most visible artifacts are material in nature. It is the business of technology to produce them[115]. But they do not have to be so. Such things as plans, strategies, tactics, organizations, designs, and methods are instances of abstract artifacts: they are abstract in that they are, in themselves, physically intangible. Yet they are human-made constructs, intended to satisfy human goals. They are also objectively real, for once they are created they can be used, analysed, communicated, and modified. Abstract artifacts are, thus, objective products of mental processes—they belong to the domain of what Popper called objective knowledge[116].

The Brahmo Samaj is more than 'just' an artifact; it was the result of an act of invention. The litmus test of invention as an act or process is that it results in an artifact that is original in some significant way. And since originality is intimately related to creativity, the act of invention is also an act of creation. The Brahmo Samaj was the product of a creative process.

But in what sense was the Brahmo Samaj original? To understand this we must delve a bit into the very idea of originality.

We begin by considering the following scenario. There is a 'producer' (e.g., an artist, a composer, a novelist, a scientist, an engineer, or a scholar) who brings into existence a material or abstract artifact (a painting, a symphony, a novel, a theory, a machine, a doctrine, etc.). Let us call this an 'act of production'. This act of production becomes an act of creation (and the producer is said to be 'creative') when and only when the object produced is original in some important sense.

But what is this 'important sense'?

An artifact comes into being at a particular moment in history. We normally judge the originality of the artifact with respect to what existed prior to its appearance—that is, to its antecedents: we deem it original if there is nothing in the past that corresponds to the artifact. Correspondingly, we may say that the producer of this artifact was creative. Notice that whether or not some produced object is original can only be determined after it comes into being. In other words, originality is a matter of historical judgement, and the 'fact' of creativity can only be a historical 'fact'.

Granted that a producer's creativity is closely linked with the originality of the artifact produced, there is the vexing question: who judges whether the object is original or not? Some think it is the producer's own judgement that matters[117]. This takes a distinctly producer-centered view. But it also trivializes creativity.This producer-centred view discounts the consumer: for every producer and her product there is a consumer (a reader of the novel, a listener of the symphony, a viewer of the painting, etc.). This offers an alternative consumer-centered view of originality: an object is deemed original if one or more consumers judge it so. A producer's creativity is thus a matter of (well-informed) public judgement, of broad social consensus.

The consumer-centered view poses its own problems: what if the consumer lacks the knowledge, the intelligence, the sensibility to comprehend the object's originality? Or what if the consumer is ideologically bunkered? We have seen this, in the previous chapter, in the case of James Mill and his History of British India. There, the producers were from the remote past: a Kalidasa, an Aryabhata, a Brahmagupta, a Panini. Mill was the consumer, and his utilitarian metaphysic (perhaps in conjunction with a racist belief in the intrinsic inferiority of Asians to Europeans) influenced profoundly his judgement of the originality of classical Indian literature, the Sanskrit language, and Hindi astronomy and mathematics. Likewise, for John Ruskin (1819—1900), perhaps the most influential art critic of his time in Victorian England, Indian art was full of 'doleful phantasms' and 'spectral vacancy'.[118] He saw Indian art much as Mill saw Indian civilization.

Clearly, then, in strictly cognitive terms (and with reference to the cognitive 'model' described in chapter 1) whether or not an object is deemed original (and its producer deemed creative) depends on the contents of the belief/knowledge space of the producer relevant to the object and

on the relevant contents of the belief/knowledge space of the consumer: on their respective beliefs, knowledge, perceptions, and sensibilities. Originality is not an 'absolute' or 'objective' attribute of a produced object. There is the producer's judgement and there is the consumer's judgement—and the two may cohere or they may be at odds with each other. The producer may be too 'close' to the artifact to make a rational determination of its originality. The consumer may not be psychologically or intellectually or philosophically able to grasp the significance of the object. Both the producer and the consumer may have distorted views of the producer's creativity. In sum, originality and creativity are subjective attributes.

Moreover, judgement of originality (and creativity) are not binary in nature. It is not always the case that something is original or is not. In some contexts, produced artifacts may be (subjectively) judged as more (or less) original than others. Some producers are judged as more (or less) creative than others. Or there may be complete disagreement among individual consumers or between communities of consumers as to theY extent of originality of some artifact (and, hence, the extent of that producer's creativity).

Keeping these observations in mind, let us return to the earlier question: in what sense was the Brahmo Samaj, as an artifact, original?

The literature on the Brahmo Samaj is extensive and I shall gratefully draw upon some of its well-documented history. But we must begin by identifying the nature of the artifact itself.

Almost two years after Rammohun Roy established the Brahmo Samaj, its Trust Deed was executed by him, in January 1830, in the presence of eight other trustees including, most notably, Dwarkanath Tagore, Kalinath Roy, Prasanna Kumar Tagore, and Ramchandra Vidyabagish. That same month, the premises that formed the focus of the Trust Deed were opened and consecrated as the Samaj's church.

The Trust Deed tells us that these premises would be used 'for the worship and adoration of the Eternal Unsearchable and Immutable Being who is the Author and Preserver of the Universe'[119]Furthermore, the premises would not be used to worship 'any particular Being or Beings'; nor would any 'graven image statue or sculpture painting picture portrait or the likeness of anything' be admitted.[120]

All artifacts serve functions that reflect their creators' needs, wants, purposes, or goals. The words just quoted from the Trust Deed of the Brahmo Samaj tell us its functions.

Viewed as a community of people who wished to worship in a certain way, the Samaj was a material artifact since the community, itself non-natural, is composed of human beings. But the Brahmo Samaj was also, and more fundamentally, an idea or concept. Its founder and followers carried the idea in their minds and it was this shared idea that created a community; the idea came before the community. In this sense, the Brahmo Samaj was—and is—an abstract artifact, a public, communicable, mental representation that was the product of a mental process.

The idea itself was by no means static. The Brahmo Samaj founded in 1828 by Rammohun Roy, and then renamed in 1866 as the Adi ('Original') Brahmo Samaj, was not the same as the Brahmo Samaj of India founded in 1866 by Keshub Chandra Sen, which became the Naba Bidhan (or, New Dispensation Church) in 1879. And neither the Adi Brahmo Samaj nor the Naba Bidhan was identical to the Sadharan ('Common') Brahrno Samaj that was constituted in 1878[121]. Yet they all fell within the general concept of Brahmoism, as a comparison of the 'Declaration of Principles' of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, enunciated in January 1881 at the consecration of its new temple, and of the 'Declaration of Principles' of the Brahmo Samaj of India as stated in August 1869 with Rammohun Roy's Trust Deed of 1830, makes clear.[122]

In other words, the Brahmo Samaj (without further qualifications) is really the name of a schema (chapter 1, section v) representing an entity with the fundamental functional features stated in the Trust Deed of 1830: a community; dedicated to anti-idolatry; and dedicated to monotheism, the worship of Brahman, the Supreme Being. The various versions of Brahmoism that arose in the course of the nineteenth century, as well as the minutiae of each version, are elaborations and instantiations of this schema.

As to the originality of the schema, this is revealed if we frame it against the schema which dominated the identities of most, especially orthodox, Hindus in the 1820s, which entailed, among many elements, the assumptions of polytheism and idol-worship.

The Brahmo Samaj as a schema is precisely the negation of particular—and rather fundamental—features of the schema representing Hinduism. This is hardly surprising since this was Rammohun Roy's goal. This does not mean that the Brahmoism schema replaced the totality of the Hinduism schema, in either Rammohun Roy's mind or in the minds of those who became Brahmos. The precepts of Brahmoism were meant to replace some of the beliefs and practices of orthodox Hinduism, not obliterate the Hindu religion altogether. After all, both Hinduism and Brahmoism (as invented by Rammohun Roy) take the Vedanta and the Upanishads as their

scriptural sources. We find Roy saying in 1816, over a decade before the formation of the Brahmo Samaj, that'the whole body of the Hindoo Theology, Law and Literature is contained in the Veds'; and because they are so 'extremely voluminous' and 'written in the most elevated and metaphorical style', 'the great Byas . . . composed with great discrimination a complete and compendious abstract of the whole. . . This work he termed the Vedant. . .'[123] And it is to the Vedanta that he first turns to refute certain precepts of Hindu orthodoxy. He argues that only the Supreme Being is the true 'subject of discourse' in the Vedantic texts—and, indeed, in all other theologies.'[124] These same texts also assert the unity of all worship, directed as it is to the Supreme Being; and, furthermore, the epithets 'the Supreme and the Omnipresent Being, etc., commonly imply God alone."[125] And if the Vedantic texts do refer to the worship of certain persons or objects, these are intended for those who do not have the capacity to 'adore' the unseen Supreme Being; it is then better that they concentrate on visible forms than nothing at all.'[126]

He quotes from the Vedas: 'Adore God alone'; 'Know God alone; give up all other discourse.' The Vedanta admonishes its readers, Roy says, to worship only the Supreme Being and none other.[127]

For Rammohun Roy, the Vedas and the Vedanta not only proclaim that there is only one God, one Supreme Being who is to be worshipped, but also that that Supreme Being is formless. To this effect, he quotes the Vedas,'[128] and asserts that 'accurate and positive' knowledge of the Supreme Being is beyond ordinary comprehension.[129] The Supreme Being can only be known by his 'effects and works'. By observing 'the multifarious, wonderful universe', and the birth, preservation and destruction of its elements, one must conclude the presence of one who 'regulates the whole'. And it is he who is called the Supreme Being.[130]

Here, Rammohun Roy is appealing to a form of reasoning which the nineteenth-century philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce first called abduction. It goes along the following lines.

(a) Observation: Some phenomenon P needs to be explained.
(b) Premiss: P would be explicable if hypothesis H were to be true.
(c) Conclusion: Therefore there is reason to believe H is true.

In Roy's case, P is the observation of 'the multifarious, wonderful universe, and the premiss is that this can be explained by the hypothesis (H) 'it is assumed that there is a Supreme Being or Creator'; hence the conclusion 'it is the case that there is a Supreme Being'.

Roy's basis for the premiss is another form of reasoning, namely, analogical reasoning. He draws an analogy from the commonplace world of material artifacts: much as 'from the sight of a pot we conclude the existence of its artificer?,' [131] so also, in the case of the 'multifarious, wonderful universe', there must be an artificer, the Supreme Being.

Roy's analogy reminds us of the 'argument from design' put forth by the advocates of natural theology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the doctrine which claims evidence for the existence of God from the workings of nature itself. In particular, we are reminded of the Reverend William Paley (1743—1805) and his celebrated book Natural Theology; or the Evidence of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity (1809). Paley made the point that if we come upon a watch and observe the intricacies of its mechanism, we infer that there must have been a maker of that watch.'[132] So also, Paley argued, when we examine the intricacies of a natural object, such as the eye, we must infer that there is a maker of that entity: an 'intelligent Creator'.[133] Paley's large book is 'one long argument' (to use Charles Darwin's famous expression in an altogether different and sharply contrasting context) in support of the doctrine of natural theology. He draws extensively and in great detail his evidence from the natural world, both organic and inorganic. And so, 'It is an immense conclusion that there is a GOD; a perceiving, intelligent, designing Being.. '[134]

It is tempting to speculate that Roy's analogy was suggested to him from a reading of William Paley; and though there seems to be no evidence of Paley's influence, it is quite possible that Roy had encountered Natural Theology, for it was a much discussed book in the first decade of its publication in England, and could well have drawn the attention in Kolkata of someone who was so deeply engaged in comparative religion as Rammohun Roy was.

Roy revisited the 'argument from design' in his other writings. In the 'Introduction' to his translation of the Kena Upanishad, he noted that the Vedas contain allegorical representations of the attributes of the Supreme Being, by way of mundane objects, both organic and inorganic,

with features that are analogous to those attributes[135] The main point here, however, is not so much the nature of Roy's reasoning—though this will be of interest later when we look at Roy's overall cognitive style—but to consider the originality of the schema representing the idea of the Samaj. To repeat, this schema did not replace the entire schema of Hinduism from people's minds. That was not Roy's goal. Rather, some significant components of the Hinduism schema, pertaining especially to polytheism and idolatry, were removed and the schema of Brahmoism grafted in their stead—as a sort of 'subschema'. However, this subschema and what it replaced were of such significance that the result was at great odds with the schema representing orthodox Hinduism.

We can see the general nature of this grafting from the following partial representations of the two schemata:

Name of Entity: HINDUISM[136]

Type of Entity: Religion

Primary Scriptures:

Vedas, Upanishads, Puranas, Bhagavada Gita, Dharmasastras,

Vedanta,

Objects of Worship:

Ishwara (Brahman, Supreme Being);

Trinity: Brahma, Vishnu, Maheswara (Siva);

Devi (Mother Goddess, Durga, Kali);

Associated gods and goddesses: Lakshmi, Saraswati, Ganesha,

Hanurnan,...

Means of Worship:

Individualistic;

Idols and images as physical representations

Metaphysics:

Monistic idealism; Primacy of intuition as source of knowing;

Moksha (liberation) as goal of life; Non-attachment; Karma;

Rebirth; Dharma (moral law)

Social Schemes Caste (Varna)

Social Practices

Casteism; Sati; Law of Inheritance; Women's status

Name of Entity: BRAHMOISM[137]

Type of Entity: Religion

Primary Scriptures

Vedas, Upanishads, Vedanta

Objects of Worship:

Ishwara (Brahman, Supreme Being)

Means of Worship:

Congregational; Non-Idolatry

Metaphysics

Monotheism; Monistic Idealism

Social Practice

Anti-Casteism; Anti-Sati; Anti-Law of Inheritance

It is thus that the originality of the Brahmo Samaj as an invented schema—as Rammohun Roy conceived it in the period 1828—30— becomes evident in comparison with what there was before it—the precepts and practices of Hindu orthodoxy.

The historian Tapan Raychaudhuri remarks that the fundamental creed of the Brahmo Samaj was not a religion for the ordinary people.[138]Even Rammohun Roy allowed that ordinary people needed their many deities and their physical representations. We may say that Roy's assumption was that the common cognitive identity of ordinary people was such that they could not imagine or visualize an abstract, unseeable, formless Supreme Being as an object of worship.

But originality is not necessarily a matter of mass judgement or popular acclaim. To follow this point, let us recall (from section ii above) that for every producer of an object there is a consumer (even, in the extreme case, when the producer himself is the sole consumer). We also recall that the originality of an object and the creativity of its producer are matters of subjective judgement—depending on the beliefs, knowledge, and emotional sensibilities of the producer and! or consumer.. And one's conclusion about the originality of a produced object and the

creativity of the producer depends on hether we adopt a producer-centred view ('the producer as the sole judge') or a consumer-centered view ('the consumer as the sole judge').

In other words, could not creativity be something we ascribe to a producer as the result of a psychological encounter between producer and consumer of the produced object? For instance, could it be that Rammohun Roy's creativity in the theological realm is not only because of the perceived originality of the Brahmo Samaj concept but also because of its influence on the consumer's mind?

This leads us to a different scenario. There is a producer who, in response to a goal—an expression of a need, want, or desire—brings into being an object that he believes satisfies his goal: an 'act of production'. 'There is a consumer who responds to that object: an 'act of consumption'. If this response is such that the object produced effects a change in one or more aspects of the consumer's cognitive identity, then we will say that a creative encounter has occurred between producer and consumer. In that case, the producer manifests creativity to the extent she engages in a creative encounter with one or more consumers. For, such an encounter not only entails the producer's own achievement in producing an object that satisfies the goal, but also that she has done so in a way that the object effects an alteration in one or more consumers' cognitive identities—by altering and enriching their belief/knowledge space, emotion space, or need/goal space (or all of these).

Put simply, some aspects of the consumer's way of thinking, imagining, reasoning, her capacity to respond, her sensibility, her aesthetic and other values, will have been changed by way of a creative encounter. Such is the consequence of an act of production. Hence the attribution of creativity to the producer.

The actual change to a consumer's cognitive identity might take different forms. Thus, the work of such British Orientalists as Henry Colebrooke planted a significant belief in the minds of Roy and others amongst the Bengali intelligentsia of Roy's time: belief in the antiquity and richness of Indian mathematics and astronomy. The Orientalists' creativity lay in the extent to which this (new or rediscovered) belief entered into one or more readers' belief/knowledge space; and in the extent to which this also planted a new sense of pride within their emotion spaces. Their cognitive identities were thereby changed by the perceived originality of Orientalist scholarship.

But a consumer's cognitive identity might change in other ways. The creative encounter between a producer and a consumer may produce a purely aesthetic response, an invocation of an aesthetic emotion. Or it might happen that, by an act of consumption, the consumer responds by constructing a belief system—about the produced object and about the producer's belief about the object. In general, this response may be something like: 'I believe that the producer's goal was to create an object that met such and such characteristics, and I believe the object satisfies these characteristics'— or more succinctly: 'I understand where the producer is coming from.'

Here, we may say that the consumer cognitively identifies with the producer. Such identification also evokes a change in the consumer's cognitive identity by way by of the newly constructed belief system, and speaks for the capacity of the producer to evoke in a consumer, by way of the object produced, a sense of identification with his way of thinking.

This idea of 'identification' can be borrowed from psychoanalysis, according to which it is the process by which one assumes one or more aspects of another person.[139] Such identification may occur even for a consumer who exists in time or space far removed from the producer.

This 'doctrine' of the creative encounter, as has been formulated here, can actually be found in writings on art in other guises. The psychoanalyst Ernst Kris wrote, that the study of art entails the study of communication between a 'sender' of a 'message' and a 'receiver' of that message.[140] Another psychoanalyst, Daniel Schneider, spoke of the artist inducing in others an identification with himself through his art whereby the artist may evoke his own 'interpretation' of his art in the viewer's mind.[141] And the philosopher of art Richard Wollheim talked of pictorial meaning being determined by a 'triad' of components—the mental state of the artist; the way this leads him to create the picture; and the mental state that the picture creates in the 'sensitive and informed' viewer.[142] I have enunciated the 'doctrine' of the creative encounter here to extend their common idea to all domains of creativity—including, in this discussion, the invention of a schema representing a religious movement.

The existential psychologist Rollo May writes also of the creative encounter, especially in the context of art. For him, however, the encounter is between a producer and the particular experience in the world that leads that producer to create. For instance, May speaks of an encounter between a painter and the 'objective reality' of a tree which leads the painter to paint

the tree in a particular way; the viewer or consumer enters the situation after the encounter is over— she is privileged to experience the picture that results from the earlier encounter.[143] In contrast, my 'doctrine' proposes the encounter as engaging both producer and consumer via the object produced.

Wollheim's caveat that the viewer must be 'sensitive and informed' is important, for to participate in a creative encounter a consumer must have the capacity and the sensibility to respond to a produced object. More generally, the consumer's cognitive identity at the onset of a creative encounter must be of a kind that enables him to respond to an act of production. Not all consumers possess such a cognitive identity. It is because of this that the creativity of a person is not to be judged by the extent of its large-scale or mass effect on people. If the majority of a community or even a nation lacks the requisite cognitive identity, that does not matter. Debendranath Tagore (1817—1905) would recall in 1896 that after Rammohun Roy's death in distant Bristol in 1933, the Brahmo Samaj had scarcely any congregation. If the weather was bad Ramchandra Vidyabagish would asume the role of both minister and congregation.[144] It is enough that a 'few' or even a single person can experience a creative encounter with the producer. Thus, Tapan Raychaudhuri's remark that Brahmoism is not for the masses does not dilute Rammohun Roy's creativity in inventing his schema.

Originality, there, is no longer the sine qua non of creativity; but the desire to be original is undoubtedly one of the dominant goals that initiate the act of production—as the psychologist Howard Gruber has emphasized.[145] There may also be other goals or desires, such as aesthetics; or, as in the case of Rammohun Roy, the desire to return to a more pristine state of affairs.

The doctrine of the creative encounter leaves ample room to account for disagreement and controversy among consumers of a produced object. There is room for critical argument. Furthermore— and this is important—a consumer's capacity for responding to an act of production may well develop over time. It can be learnt, and in that sense, one's cognitive identity is influenced by culture and can alter over time.

Sir Brajendranath Seal (1864—1938) was a literary scholar/critic, poet, and philosopher. He was the first holder of the King George V chair of philosophy in the University of Calcutta,1913-20;[146] for the next thirteen years he was vice-chancellor of the University of Mysore.[147] He was

knighted in 1926. Seal interests us here for the nature of his creative encounter with Rammohun Roy, an encounter in which the consumer was born over thirty years after the producer's death. In fact, in this creative encounter we see something of the subtlety of Roy's creative capacity. On the one hand, the more obvious and clearly visible evidence of Roy's ability to affect Seal's belief system lies in the fact that Seal adopted the Brahmo faith, apparently while still an undergraduate at the General Assembly Institution (later Scottish Church College).[148]

But an essay written by Seal on Rammohun Roy in 1924 reveals a deeper and more interesting aspect of Seal's creative encounter with Roy.[149] For Seal discovered in Roy's theology something more than the invention of the Brahmo Samaj: he—Roy—had drawn on his studies in comparative religion to arrive at a 'universal scripture' which underlay all scriptures.[150] There was in Roy's writings, according to Seal, a single theism but with 'historic' variations on it.[151] As for these variations, Roy had found that each followed its own path to one ideal—'the ideal of Universal Religion'.[152] Thus, for Brajendranath Seal, Rammohun Roy had arrived at a 'momentous' insight— that all religions are manifestations of a single, universal Religion. Roy had found, Seal tells us, that the canonical texts of all religions expressed this one truth—the 'Unity of God'.[153]

It can be said that cognitive identification entails a penetration by a consumer into the thought process of the producer, resulting in the belief 'Yes, I understand where he is coming from!' Seal's essay on Roy illustrates well this act of identification. Seal ascribes to Roy a goal that was the starting point of Roy's thought process which led to his belief in a Universal Religion: he tells us that the way to 'commemorate' Roy best is to 'go over in our minds' the conflict that he was posed with.[154] The 'conflict' in question, according to Seal, involved the three cultures or civilizations most immediate to the Indian experience—the Hindu, the Islamic, and the Christian,[155] and Roy's goal or desire was to discern 'a point of rapport, of concord, of unity' among them.[156]

Seal chose to trace the development of Roy's thinking—which would tell us how the latter solved or resolved his 'conflict'.[157] This 'inner history' of Roy's thinking entailed a comparative

mode and the ability to achieve, from such comparison of the 'historic' religions, a synthesis; a generalization based on abstraction. In this lay Rammohun Roy's style and his achievement.[158]

We see here a manifestation of Roy's Creativity: his capacity through his writings .Himself a man known to be of enormous learning and possessed of an encyclopaedic mind—a cognitive identification with Roy. Seal built a representation in his own mind of what Roy wanted to achieve, how he went about the task, and what the outcome was. Clearly, this representation entered into and influenced Seal's own cognitive identity, for what else would he trouble to analyse and write at length on Rammohun Roy as a Universal Man—even long after Seal's commitment to the Brahmo Samaj had diminished?[159] Roy was, in Seal's representation, one of the 'heroes of synthesis and conciliation';[160] a 'prophet of humanity' who envisioned an 'enlightened India' as a 'golden link' between East and West.[161]

Seal was not the only person who believed that Roy had created the concept of 'Universal Religion'. A significant facet of Roy's creativity lay in that there were others whose creative encounters with Roy through his writings led them to a similar belief; and that belief became elements of their respective cognitive identities. Only the terms used differed.

Thus, Kishory Chand Mitter (1822—73), a member of the celebrated group of students and disciples of Derozio known collectively as 'Young Bengal', writing in 1845, described Roy's theology as a sort of 'universal Unitarianism' or 'catholic Unitarianism'.[162] And Keshub Chandra Sen (1838--84), who in 1866 split away from the original (Adi) Brahmo Samaj to form the Brahmo Samaj of India, wrote in 1865 that Roy created an idea that was new to the world— the idea of 'catholic' or 'universal' worship.[163] This idea was inclusive of all faiths and sects.

And it was Roy's ambition to build a universal church based on this idea.[164]

'Where observation is concerned, chance only favours the prepared mind.' So said Louis Pasteur in 1854. One may turn Pasteur's maxim on its head: The prepared mind favours creativity.

For the social scientist Graham Wallas, writing in 1926 on the nature of thought, to have a prepared mind is the same as being an educated person. To become prepared is to undergo the process of education.[165] For, one who is educated can draw upon resources— knowledge—and assume the proper frame of mind in a way the uneducated cannot. Preparation entails the

capacity to frame clear, unambiguous, testable propositions. Only then can the significance of evidence or ideas in proving or disproving the propositions be noticed.[166]

Wallas viewed preparation as a kind of intellectual history of the thinking person that prepares her to take up creative work. It is a long-term affair, and entails the construction of the potential for future acts of creation—although the person may not necessarily be preparing herself consciously for creative work.

There is another kind of preparation which other writers on creativity such as the philosopher-mathematician Henri Poincaré and the mathematician Jacques Hadamard, have spoken of. This is a more short-term activity that immediately precedes creative work or is part of an act of creation.

According to Poincaré, writing in 1915 on 'mathematical creation', this sort of preparation is a (relatively) short-term period of intense, conscious, purposeful work within an act of production that is a necessary precondition for the actual production of an object.[167] Likewise, Hadamard, also writing on 'mathematical invention', viewed preparation as the preliminary, intense, conscious work that establishes the overall direction in which the unconscious mind works during an act of invention.[168]

When we say that the prepared mind favours creativity which of these two kinds of preparation are we talking about? In fact, surely, both. We are really claiming that preparedness is the state of a person's cognitive identity that both affords the potential for (possibly distant, possibly unexpected, possibly unanticipated) future acts of creation as well as the condition for immediate acts of creation.

Understanding the role of the prepared mind is essential to understanding the creative aspect of the Bengal Renaissance, and never more so than in the case of Rammohun Roy. Here, we must remember that the produced object of interest is the schema representing the Brahmo Samaj and its practical instantiation in the form of an active church. The relevant act of production was the invention of this schema. So, what was the nature of Roy's preparedness that he could initiate this invention? And where did preparedness end that invention could begin? To answer these questions, let us consider relevant aspects of the biographical material on Roy.[169]

Thus, the son of an orthodox Brahmin imbibed the poetry and philosophy of the Persian Sufis, read the Koran, and studied Euclid and Aristotle in Arabic.[170]

Roy studied Persian and Arabic in accordance with his father's wishes—adeptness in these languages was essential for those who desired to be associated with the courts of the Muslim rulers, as Roy noted in his 'Autobiographical Letter' written in 1832 and published after his death in Bristol in 1833.[171] But to appease his mother he also learnt Sanskrit and, thereby, the Sanskritic writings on Hindu religion, literature, and law.[172]

Graham Wallas saw preparation as the process of becoming educated.[173] In Roy's case, his preparation for becoming a reformer of Hinduism had begun in earnest while he was still a boy: at age sixteen he wrote a tract that challenged the 'validity' of the practice of idolatry amongst Hindus.[174] This was around 1788. Apparently this was not the first time he had publicly made his views known on this topic: the manuscript, along with his 'known sentiments on that subject' caused much distress at home. He decided to travel, mostly within India but also in some regions beyond[175]—including Tibet where he studied Buddhism and disputed with the worshippers of the Lama, a living idol.[176]

The literary scholar Sisir Kumar Das remarks that Roy's precocious anti-idolatrous stance may have had its roots in his PersoArabic education, and in his introduction to the Islamic faith,[177] a view also held by Tapan Raychaudhuri.[178] In this they echo Sibnath Sastri's comment that it was while studying the Koran in Patna that Roy first became conscious of the problem of Hindu idolatry.[179] Thus, whether or not Rammohun Roy would come to know Colebrooke's 'Essay on the Vedas' (1805) in which the Englishman 'discovered' the monotheistic tradition in ancient India; or whether or not Roy had encountered the scholar Ramram Basu at the College of Fort William in Kolkata and been exposed to Basu's tracts, circa 1800—2, containing the first awareness of the presence of a monotheism in ancient Hindu thought is irrelevant in so far as the germination in Roy's mind of an anti-idolatrous stance is concerned.[180]Simultaneous or independent discoveries and inventions do happen, and quite often in all fields of the creative tradition, especially in science, technology, and scholarship. Perhaps this was such a case. The

cognitive identity that the work of the British Orientalists would induce in the nineteenth-century Bengali intelligentsia certainly had a place in shaping Roy's developing identity, but it had no place in the 1780s, so far as is known.

Some time in his early twenties—the records are not entirely clear when Roy returned to the parental fold and began his own living as a man of property, commerce and, eventually, public administration. [181]He also spent time (and here again the records are murky as to the precise duration[182]) in Varanasi (Benares), a centre of Hindu scriptural learning where, presumably, he furthered his studies of Sanskrit and Hindu sacred writings.

In 1803—4, soon after his father's death, Roy published his first major work, Tuhfut-ul-Muwahhidin (A Gift to the Monotheists), written in Persian with an Arabic introduction.[183] This treatise, amongst other things, rejected blind faith in the authority of religious leaders and espoused reason as protection against religious prejudice and dogmatism.[184] And it espoused monotheism.[185]

The scholar Bruce Robertson finds little of consequence in Tuhfat for Roy's later theological writings.[186] From a cognitive perspective, however, we have a different view, if we hold that the contents of Tuhfat mirrored the state of Roy's mind—his system of beliefs, knowledge, and sensibility, his cognitive identity in other words, at the time. He may or may not have been a committed monotheist by 1804. We cannot say. But in the light of his later writings we can claim that Tuhfat was at the very least part of his preparedness.

But what of the influence of the British Orientalists? To what extent did the cognitive identity they projected to the Bengali intelligentsia become assimilated into and shape Roy's cognitive identity?

According to Sophia Dobson Collett, Roy began learning English in 1795[187]. The Scottish educationist and missionary Alexander Duff (1806—76), a key figure in the Bengal Renaissance, dated the start of Roy's English education to 1794,[188] and both he and Collett agree that Roy only became 'proficient' in the language around 1801—2. In fact, Roy's Western education properly began with the onset of his long association with an East India Company civil servant, John Digby. This association began in 1805, when Roy was employed by Digby as his munshi

(secretary) and remained till well after 1815. In this period Digby, the sahib employer, became his munshi's friend, admirer, and supporter. With the Englishman's help, and under his influence, Roy began the serious study of English and European thought, literature, and culture.[189] Thus, at the time of writing Tuhfat it seems unlikely that the Orientalists had any serious impact on Roy's cognitive identity.[190]

Between 1805 and 1815 Roy apparently produced no new theological works.[191] Yet, over this time retrograde Hindu practices were still in his mind, for in his last five years with John Digby—by which time Roy was a dewan (the highest ranking Indian officer in the revenue department under a district collector)—he would gather like-minded friends for religious discussions including, especially, idolatry.[192]

In the period of his association with Digby an altogether separate intellectual endeavour appeared to have started: cultivating the English language and European ideas and thought. In light of Roy's later activities this too was a new strand of preparedness.

According to John Digby, writing in 1817 in an introduction to a volume by Roy on the Kena Upanishad and the Vedanta, when Roy was first employed by him (Digby), the former could only speak English well enough for ordinary discourse but had not developed adequate writing skills in the language.[193] However, Roy's association in an official capacity with Digby, and by way of reading Digby's correspondence as well as conversing and corresponding 'with English gentlemen', paid ample dividends.[194] Indeed, we get a sense of Roy's competence in English in his letter of 1809, addressed to Lord Minto, the governor general, lodging a petition against the insulting behaviour towards him of a British district collector.[195]

Digby also tells us that, during the years of their association, Roy would regularly read English newspapers to absorb knowledge of current European affairs.[196] By 1818 Roy's mastery of the English language was such as to provoke an English journalist freshly landed in Kolkata to record that, prior to meeting Roy, he had never heard someone of 'Asiatic birth' speak English so well; Roy's 'fine choice of words', he said, were 'worthy the imitation even of Englishmen'.[197]

Later, Bentham would admiringly compare Roy's English writing style to that of James Mill.[198]

In the course of a creative life it is not uncommon that, once a certain state of preparedness is achieved and a level of apprenticeship reached, preparation and creation (that is, consumption and production) proceed in interleaved fashion. The two processes feed upon and nurture each other: the mind is prepared to a point that an act of production begins; this in turn raises new questions or points to new possibilities that demand more learning, renewed preparation; and this suggests new goals, needs, desires which produce another act of production.

Perhaps this best describes the case of Rammohun Roy from the time he befriended John Digby in 1805, through 1815, just after the latter had left for England, till 1828, the year of the founding of the Brahmo Samaj. In one sense all Roy's social and literary activities, especially from 1815 on, can be thought of as the self-construction of a prepared mind for the invention of a new monotheistic faith. Or one might see his writings on the Vedanta and the Upanishads, and on Christianity as different elements and stages of a non-Darwinian evolutionary (that is, purposive, goal-oriented but gradual) creative process,[199] the end product of which was the Brahmo Samaj schema. Or one can see these various activities as an intricate interleaving of preparation and creation.

What seems to emerge from his writings are some interesting aspects of Roy's cognitive style: a commitment to empiricism and adoption of the comparative stance.

Roy's empiricism is manifested in his repeated appeal to both history' and scriptural sources for evidence in support of or against some proposition. In a passage from Tuhfat-ul-Muwahhidin he pounces on 'the proposition' put forth by some that 'the small number of sayers' suffices for the invalidation of what is said.[200] If this was the case, then it would be 'a dangerous blow' to all religions, since all religions when founded had only a few followers.[201]

He holds empirical evidence over faith: to believe in the existence of something on the basis of evidence or proof is surely reasonable for every person; to declare faith in a thing for which there is no evidence or transcends reason is not within the capacity of 'sensible' individuals.[202]

And so Roy draws repeatedly on Vedantic and Upanishadic sources to both give definite shape to, and provide evidence—'proofs'—in support of his two basic tenets first expressed in Tuhfat' the Unity of God, and the evil of idolatry. These are his 'hypotheses', and his writings, especially from 1815 on, offer the empirical evidence for his hypotheses.

In 1815 Roy published first a Bengali commentary and then a summary of this commentary ('abridgement') on an aspect of the Vedanta. In 1816 he prepared an English Translation of an Abridgement of the Vedanta.[203] The purpose of this work was to demonstrate to his 'European friends' that certain superstitious practices—meaning, in particular, idol-worship—are contrary to the 'pure spirit' of Hindu theology.[204] It was his aim to awaken his countrymen 'from their dream of error', to acquaint them with their true scriptures so that they could witness in their minds the unity of God.[205] That same year, in a translation of a part of the Upanishads, he would remark that stipulation of this unity was the essence of the Hindu scriptures. The rituals thus practised—including, again, idol-worship— were founded on erroneous ideas, the consequences of which were profoundly destructive to the lives and well being of the Hindus[206].

Those who claim to be the guardians of the scriptures must, of course, be held responsible. Roy, a Brahmin himself, unequivocally singles out Brahmins as the culprits in yet another tract published in 1816: Brahmins are 'perfectly aware of the absurdity of idolatry', just as they are 'well informed' of the 'purer mode of divine worship'. [207] But it is to their material advantage to preserve and encourage idolatry.[208]Here, Roy harks back to a theme mentioned in Tuhfat these are the very people who practised deceit, who invent false doctrines to exercise influence on the people and bring about 'disunion' amongst them.[209] These same practices are also responsible for the weakening of the fabric of Indian society: idolatry, Roy wrote in another tract published in 1817, had seduced its practitioners into following certain dietary practices and restrictions and, consequently, to their disjunction not only from the rest of the world but also from one another[210].

The comparative stance plays several roles in human cognition and creativity. Without comparison one cannot categorize things or distinguish between them. Comparison allows the distinction between 'us' and the 'other', as James Mill demonstrates in his History of British India. It is also a prerequisite for analogical reasoning: in order to find similarities between one thing and another, and draw an analogy between them, one must compare them in the first place.[211] Constructing metaphors in turn relies on finding analogies, hence is ultimately dependent on the comparative stance.[212]

There is yet a third role for the comparative stance—perhaps its most creative role: it is the sine qua non for the kind of abstraction that leads to universalization. The comparative stance is a prerequisite for the universal mind.

We have already noted the comparative stance in Rammohun Roy's earlier thinking. As Sisir Kumar Das and Tapan Raychaudhuri have both suggested, it seems plausible that Roy's encounter with Islamic monotheism led him to examine the presence of monotheism in the Hindu scriptures.[213] The outcome of this was not only Roy's espousal of a Hindu monotheism but an abstraction to the idea of the universality of the Supreme Being and the 'unity and omnipresence of Nature's God'.[214]

We find further evidence of Roy's comparative stance in his attention to Christianity. Sometime in 1816 or 1817 (the date is uncertain) we find him writing to Digby, then back in England, 'a summary account' of what he has done since Digby's departure from India in 1814. As a result of his theological 'researches', Roy says he has come to conclude that Christ's teachings were 'more conducive and better adapted' for use by rational minds than any other doctrine.[215,] Christ's ethical precepts appeal to Roy—and against them he contrasts unfavourably the superstitions he finds in Hindu rites and practices.'[216] But this same comparative stance that pointed him to Christ's moral teachings also led him to challenge the Trinitarian doctrine in Christian orthodoxy. Roy wrote a series of tracts, begin- fling with 'the Precepts of Jesus, the Guide to Peace and Happiness; extracted from the Books of the New Testament, ascribed to the Four Evangelists' (1820), in which he questioned the validity of the doctrine of Christ's divinity and of the Holy Ghost.'[217] Elsewhere, he engages in a series of adversarial exchanges, in 1823, with Robert Tytler—a surgeon and member of the Asiatic Society and, later, lecturer in English and Mathematics at Hindu College—in which Roy speaks of the Christian missionaries' attempt 'to blind me and my countrymen' with the idea of 'a human God').[218]Christian Trinitarianism is as much anathema to Roy's universalism as Hindu polytheism and idolatry. He is thus led to Christian Unitarianism, as to Hindu monotheism, for each is a culturally, historically, and ethically determined manifestation of the Universal Religion.

Here we find further evidence of Roy's creativity: at least one prominent Baptist Trinitarian, the Reverend William Adam, so identified with Roy that he converted to Unitarianism.[219]

Traditions—that is, practices governed by rules of a ritualistic or symbolic significance—are invented, according to the historian Eric Hobsbawm.[220] Social practices fit well into this notion of 'invented tradition'. When we compare the schemata for Hinduism and Brahmoism (see section iii), we find that they differ as much in the realm of social practices as in their respective objects and means of worship. Amongst these practices was sati, prevalent in certain parts of India, especially Bengal. Being an invention, sati was also an artifact.

In inventing the Brahmoism schema Rammohun Roy also obliterated sati as an acceptable social practice; and the act of obliteration or deletion of an artifact is as much an act of production as is the creation of an artifact.

Kopf has noted that Roy's writings against sati were preceded, by more than twenty years, by those in similar vein of Colebrooke, who wrote an article in 1795 showing that the practice of sati had no basis in the ancient textual sources.'[221] It is quite possible, of course, that Roy's appeal to the scriptures to support his stance against sati was influenced by knowledge of Colebrooke's article: Roy's employer and friend Digby was a student at the College of Fort William in Kolkata, the official training ground for British civil servants in Bengal for much of the first half of the nineteenth century, where many of the Orientalists, including Colebrooke, taught in Digby's time (1801— 3) there.'[222] It is also possible that Roy's moral repugnance with 'this hideous practice'—as his address to Governor General Bentinck in 1830 would put it—led him to examine the Vedas and the Bhagavad Gita for his evidence. It is possible that both these may have been factors.[223]

The Trust Deed of the Brahmo Samaj says nothing about sati. However, insofar as Roy's arguments against polytheism and idolatry and against sati are rooted in his reading of Hindu texts, it seems reasonable to accommodate both his monotheistic and antisati stance within the same schema. It seems safe to say that the part of Roy's cognitive identity defined by the

Brahmoism schema embraced both his espousal of monotheism and idolatry, and his rejection of sati.

Thus, Roy's creativity in the matter of sati lay not in the origitiality of the discovery that the practice had no scriptural basis. Rather. it lay in the incorporation of the idea of its obliteration into the Brahmo Samaj schema; and still more powerfully in its effect on Bentinck and the British administration in Bengal, who abolished sati in 1829.

Roy's writings on sati reveal yet another aspect of his cognitive style: his first argument, published in 1818, takes the form of a dialogue—a 'conference' in his words—between a proponent for, and an opponent of, sati."[224]

This dialogue is not a Socratic one between a teacher and a pupil, but, more along Galilean lines, an encounter between an 'opponent' representing Roy and an 'advocate' or proponent representing the archetypal orthodox Brahmin. Both appeal to the scriptural and philosophical texts of old for their evidence. For the opponent the laws of Manu have greater authority than all other edicts because the scriptures tell it so.[225] And Manu, says the opponent, stipulates that after the husband's death the widow shall spend the remains of her life as ascetic[226]. When the proponent claims that Manu's laws are only alternatives to the edicts of his authorities, that they do not override the latter, the opponent dismisses the claim: they are not alternatives, he says; rather, they are mutually incompatible."[227]

Ultimately, the opponent is (of course) a monist and monotheist, one who holds in his mind the schema of Brahmoism rather than that of Hinduism. What is important is not 'future fruition' (moksha or liberation) for a person but to be 'absorbed' in Brahman, the Supreme Deity. To this effect, the opponent quotes the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita)'[228] As for Manu—thoroughly informed as he is by the Vedas—he tells widows to spend their lives as ascetics.[229]

The opponent does not depend only on what the ancients say in opposing sati. Occasionally, emotion triggered by moral outrage and common humanity intervenes: suicide is universally condemned, he points out;"[230] the practice of sati is nothing but 'deliberate female

murder';"[231]he, the opponent, can only hope that the shame brought upon his country by this 'crime' will be lifted.[232]

The proponent admits that the practice may be 'sinful', but it must still be observed,"[233] for otherwise, if women are not 'concremated' along with their dead husbands, they might go astray; 'concremation' will free family and relatives of this 'apprehension'.[234]

As in arguing against polytheism and idol-worship, Roy is not content with writing just a single tract. In 1820 a second and much longer 'conference' is published in which Roy enters more deeply into the textual sources to make his case for the opponent.[235] The argument here is unemotional, strictly text-based, and the 'conference' is almost a monologue by the opponent. Roy's commitment to empiricism (see section Ix)—providing detailed evidence from the philosophical texts of the Hindus as the basis of his reasoning—is clearly visible here, as it was in his defence of monotheism. And, ten years later, after Bentinck bans the practice of sati, Roy produces an 'Abstract of the Arguments Regarding the Burning of Widows, Considered as a Religious Rite' (1830) in which, as the title promises, he presents a concise essay on the topic so that the reader may be led to 'a just conclusion' about the Hindu scriptures' real position on the matter.[236] The tenor of Roy's argument, that sati is not sanctioned by the scriptures,'[237] is along the same lines as his argument against polytheism and idol-worship: in both instances Roy shows contempt for rites and rituals observed for 'future rewards'—for the practice of sati is as much a rite as is the practice of idol-worship. In both instances, the Vedas and the Bhagavad Gita are appealed to.

Rammohun Roy's first claim to creativity in the theological realm, as we have seen, lay in his invention of a schema representing Brahmoism. This claim lay in part in the originality of the schema with respect to what existed before. For, even if Roy was aware of Colebrooke's 1803 monograph on the Vedas in which the Englishman unveiled the monotheistic strain in those texts, even if Roy knew from Ramram Basu about this, as David Kopf has speculated.[238]neither Colebrooke nor Basu constructed a practical schema for a new monotheistic movement nor did they realize any such movement in the form of an active church.

Originality was one side of this coin. The other side lay in the consequences of Roy's invention. Others identified with him; their cognitive identities were evidently influenced and shaped by the Brahmoism schema. Amongst his contemporaries, there were those who along with him were trustees of the Trust Deed of the Brahmo Samaj; others became members of the church in the decades that followed. The schema itself, like all fruitful schemata, would evolve over time. The consequences of Roy's invention were profound.

Roy's second claim to creativity in the theological realm lay in his abstraction of Brahmoism, Christianity, and Islam into the concept of a monotheistic Universal Religion of which each particular faith was an instance, shaped by ethnicity, culture, history, and geography. One consequence of this Universal Monotheism was Roy's rejection of Christian Trinitarianism and his advocacy of Unitarianism. At least one former Trinitarian identified with Roy: some time in 1821 or 1822, the Reverend William Adam of the Serampore Baptist Mission would renounce the doctrine of the Trinity and convert to the Unitarian faith.'[239]

Creativity and cognitive identity are entwined. One's cognitive identity at any given time will afford one's creative potential; an act of creation is an actualization of this affordance. In turn, the fruits of a creative act .will enrich, inform, alter, and reshape one's cognitive identity.

What can we say of Rammohun Roy's cognitive identity in the theological realm circa 1830—the year of the signing of the Trust Deed, the year in which Roy set sail for England, never to return? He was then fifty-eight years of age. His belief/knowledge space would contain representations of over forty years of study of Hindu, Christian, and Islamic theologies—facts, beliefs, interpretations, hypotheses relating to these (and other) religions.

Almost certainly dominating this space would be a network of beliefs and schemata he himself had created—fruits of his own acts/ production/creation. This would include, most notably: (a) the doctrine of a Universal Supreme Being who is omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, formless, whose presence is known by his works, the universe itself; (b) the concept of a 'catholic Unitarianism', that all religious systems are but 'locally' determined instantiations of

one Universal Religion which worships the Universal Creator; and (c) a schema representing Brahmoism, this being one instantiation of the Universal Religion.

The contents of Roy's need/goal space will have changed over time. But the one superneed that always prevailed was the desire to demonstrate the discrepancies between Hinduism as represented in the scriptural and philosophical texts and Hinduism as practised. A second superneed that was apparently born later in his life was his desire to demonstrate the reality of a Universal Religion across faiths.

These superneeds are mirrored by an emotion that, judging from his letters and articles, was a dominant element in his emotion space, a sense of anxiety'[240]—to not only correct misrepresentations of the true doctrines of Hinduism, both to his countrymen and to the English, but also to correct misrepresentations of the 'precepts of Jesus'— the 'truths of Christianity', as he calls them'[241]—to Christians and Hindus alike. Thus, he writes to the American Unitarian, the Reverend Jared Sparks, later a president of Harvard University, of his apprehensions with regard to the doctrines preached by Christian missionaries in India: if a system of doctrines observed by a society is to be displaced by another, altogether different system, then at the very least those responsible for this must demonstrate the truth or the superiority of their doctrines.[242] And he goes on to voice his satisfaction that the teachings of Christ and his apostles are not only 'consistent with reason' but are in fact, contrary to those advanced by the Christian missionaries.[243]

We sense this same anxiety in his letter to Digby, in which he says that he had translated the Vedanta into Bengali and Hindi to convince them against the 'absurdities of idolatry'.[244] Elsewhere Roy, along with others, submits a 'petition' to the governor general, the Marquis of Hastings, sometime in 1818, in which they express their desire to convince the Marquis that, in fact, the edicts of the Vedas, the Vedanta, and Manu prohibit the self-immolation of widows.[245]

As described earlier one's cognitive style is the compendium of features that characterizes the nature of one's cognitive processes. Cognitive style is at the heart of cognitive identity; it is what

perhaps most distinguishes one individual from another; and, in particular, what establishes the uniqueness of the individual creative being.

The most visible elements of Roy's cognitive style in the theological realm are: (a) a commitment to empiricism——the appeal to evidence yielded by the textual sources of Hindu theology and philosophy as a basis for argumentation and belief construction; (b) the adoption of a comparative stance; (c) the use of analogical and abductive reasoning; and (d) the construction of dialogues— 'imaginary conversations'—-between representations of himself and his adversaries.

Let us compare this 'theological facet' of Rammohun Roy's cognitive identity with the Orientalist cognitive identity (chapter 2, section vi). The latter comprised: (i) a belief/knowledge space dominated by a schema representing the concept of an Indian golden age; (ii) the comparative stance as a main element of cognitive style; (iii) a need/goal space dominated by an active, hierarchical web of needs, desires, goals, all of which pertain to Indological scholarship, and rooted in a superneed to know the Indian past; and (iv) an emotion space dominated by a feeling of admiration concerning the schema of the golden age as well as a sense of curiosity about the Indian past.

Comparing the two cognitive identities, we see that the only meaningful point of intersection is the Orientalist superneed to know the Indian past and Roy's commitment to empiricism, his insistence on seeking evidence for his arguments in the Hindu texts. This empiricism implies that Roy too desired to know the Indian past. And while this desire is partly the scholar's desire to know for the sake of truth— as his letters to the chemist, surgeon, educationist, and Orientalist Horace Hayman Wilson concerning the age of Shankaracharya suggest'[246]—it is more a subgoal, a means, to Roy's larger goal, his superneed to correct the distorted beliefs about Hinduism.

In other words, Rammohun Roy's invention of the Brahmoism schema as a representation of a new monotheistic movement was largely independent of the influence of British Orientalists. Roy may well have imbibed the primary product of the Orientalists' researches: a schema representing the Indian golden age; no doubt this was assimilated into his belief/knowledge space. But the Orientalist cognitive identity seemed to have played little part in Roy's invention

of the monotheistic tradition; nor did it appear to effect the shaping of Roy's own cognitive identity as far as theology was concerned.

When Rammohun Roy wrote to John Digby in 1816 or soon after that he had found Christ's precepts 'more conducive' to rational minds than any other theological doctrine,[247] he was also telling his reader something new about his mentality: that he, by birth an Indian Brahmin, much steeped in the literature of the Upanishads and the Vedanta, had come to comprehend, assimilate, and even identify with, a theology rooted in, and the root of, a very different culture, history, and geography from his own. Around the same time, he published two tracts defending his thesis of Hindu monotheism.[248] .In 1820, two works on the 'Precepts of Jesus' appeared. Another 'defence' of 'The Precepts of Jesus' was published in 1821. The 'Final Appeal' defending the 'Precepts' appeared in 1823.[249]

Overlapping in time between the first and fourth tracts on Christianity, Roy wrote a 'Vindication' of Hinduism against the 'attacks' of Christian missionaries.[250] And in 1823 we find him engaged in a long and acrimonious theological controversy with Robert Tytler in the pages of the Bengal Hurkaru and the India Gazette, primarily on Roy's doctrine of Christian Unitarianism but extending into attacks by Tytler on Hindu idolatry. In these exchanges, Roy writes in both his own name and, more ironically, as the pseudonymous 'Ram Doss', posing as an orthodox Hindu antagonistic to Roy himself.[251]

Thus, between about 1816/1817 and 1823 we see Rammohun Roy first as a consumer of two theological systems native to two very different cultures, one his own and the other of the West; and then as a producer of two theological doctrines belonging also, respectively, to the same two mutually alien cultures. In other words we find here evidence of the emergence of a cross-cultural mentality as an aspect of Roy's continually evolving cognitive identity.

We can characterize 'cross-cultural mentality' in terms of the doctrine of the creative encounter (see chapter 3, section iv). It entails two scenarios.

In the first, there is a consumer who 'belongs' to a culture, say A; and a producer whose native culture is also A or, alternatively, a significantly alien culture, say B. We will say that the

consumer exhibits a cross-cultural mentality if he is able to engage in a creative encounter with the producer irrespective of the producer's native culture. More particularly, under this circumstance, we will say that the consumer is 'cross-culturally responsive'.

The second scenario is the obverse of the above. Here, the producer has a native culture, say A; and the consumer's native culture is A or an altogether distinct culture, say B. We will say that the producer exhibits a cross-cultural mentality if she can engage in a creative encounter with the consumer regardless of whether the latter's native culture is A or B. Under this circumstance, we will say that the producer is 'cross-culturally creative'.

It is possible that a person may be cross-culturally responsive but not creative. It is difficult to imagine, though, a person who is cross culturally creative but not responsive. To be the former one must first be the latter; the latter is a necessary precondition—part of what it is to be 'prepared' (see chapter 3, section vii)—for the former. In this particular sense, being cross-culturally creative is a 'superior' kind of mentality to being only cross-culturally responsive.

It is, of course, possible for a person to be responsive to, or creative in, more than two distinct cultures. Moreover, the things we call 'culture' may not be just so in the anthropological/sociolgical/historiographical sense. We are reminded of C.P. Snow's celebrated 'two cultures' of science and the arts/humanities.[252] Or the cultural distinction may be along the lines of gender, religion, or political ideology.

But the two cultures of special interest here are, of course, what we loosely call 'Indian' and 'Western'. It can be suggested that the construction of a cross-cultural mentality involving Indian and Western cultures is the most consequential creative achievement of the Bengal Renaissance. Rammohun Roy's cross-cultural mentality lay in that, as one who belonged to Indian culture, he was not only responsive as a consumer to aspects of both Indian and Western cultures (represented by Hindu and Christian theologies, and Indian and European philosophical traditions) hut also as a producer who was able to engage in creative encounters with representatives of both cultures. He was a Hindu Indian who not only consumed Hindu and Christian precepts but could engage successfully as a producer of doctrines or theses with both

Indian and Western consumers. Roy's invention of the monotheistic movement in the form of Brahmoism was one face of his cross-cultural coin; his 'primary' consumers were fellow Indians, but they also included, especially in relation to such associated social practices as sati, people of the West. His interpretation of Christianity as a monotheistic religion, and the resulting creative encounters with Christians, not only in India but also in England and America, was the flip face of the same coin.

Roy travelled to England in 1830 and spent the final; three years of his life there, with a brief interlude in France. He was buried in Bristol. His engagement with the English Unitarians is well known because of Mary Carpenter's book on his time in England.[253] Carpenter presents details of his meetings, events, and correspondences that strongly suggest the close identification of English Unitariaps with the substance of Roy's writings. She quotes a letter to Roy from Wilham Roscoe (1753—1831), a prominent lawyer, parliamentarian, abolitionist, poet, and composer of hymns in which the writer praises Roy as one who has articulated the 'true and genuine' nature of Christianity[254].

The English Unitarians' creative encounter with Roy was not only in respect to his writings on Christianity. They were also responsive to his works on Hinduism, especially its associated social practices. Meeting the London Unitarians for the first time Roy is welcomed by an address which first likens the effect of his presence amongst them to that of a Plato, a Socrates, a Milton or a Newton—were one of these to appear suddenly in their midst.[255] The speaker later goes on to say that if at the time Hindu widows are not burning on the pyres of their dead husbands, it is because of Roy's 'exhortations'.[256]

Roy's encounters with American thinkers are perhaps more surprising, hence more noteworthy, as instances of both his own and his American readers' cross-cultural mentalities, because he never lived to visit the United States. They were creative encounters conducted from a distance. And their evidence is documented by an American scholar, Adrienne Moore, who quite probably wrote the first American graduate thesis on Rammohun Roy (this appearing later as a book).[257]

Moore wished 'to show the possible influence of Rammohun Roy in the United States between the years 1816 and 1836 or 1840'[258]. She tells us that Roy was 'almost a household word' in New England when he was most active.'[259] Indeed, according to her, he was America's first 'important contact' with India.'[260] She suggests that such was his influence, he may even have introduced Transcendentalism into America. At the very least, Roy's work was known to the leading mind of the American Transcendental movement, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803—82)—perhaps not surprising since Emerson was the son of a Unitarian minister.

Moore wished to take an 'objective' approach to achieve her goal; since it was to actually prove Roy's direct influence on American thinkers, she chose to use a quantitative approach based on bibliographical and statistical evidence.'[261] She resorted to a method which later social scientists would perhaps have approved of.

The single most important source of information on Rammohun Roy in the United States was the Boston Christian Register.'[262] Apparently, it was not uncommon at the time for information to pass between periodicals, and so articles and notices about Roy would travel from the Christian Registerto other journals, where they would be republished.[263] The Christian Register also possessed a comprehensive set of Roy's English publications.[264] In addition, American periodicals drew extensively on English sources for information on Roy.'[265] There was thus, Moore suggests, sufficient opportunity for the reading public to learn of Roy through periodicals of the time that were interested in him.

Moore extended her search for sources to library catalogues for the period 1819—40 in public, religious, academic, and private collections. Based on the data she could gather from these various sources, she concluded that English and American periodicals were the most influential in making Roy known in the United States.[266] Through these publications two perceptions of Roy emerged.

One presented him as a Hindu literary man and philosopher.[267] His writings on the Vedas led one commentator to say that though Roy was not a Christian the doctrines he spoke were of very

similar in 'nature' and 'spirit' to Christian precepts.[268] Another article on Roy as a philosopher-writer drew attention to his writings on Christianity but still saw him as a Hindu and, while generally disagreeing with Roy's overall ideas, was struck by two attributes in 'this extraordinary man': his knowledge of Western thought, and his mastery of English.[269]

The second perception of Roy was as a man of religion, a 'Christian and Unitarian convert'.[270] Proponents of this view would often engage in debate on whether Roy was or was not a Christian. The vehemence with which one article published in 1820 in a periodical called the Christian Watchman attacked Roy for not believing in the revelationary aspect of the Bible was, as one of Roy's defenders in the Christian Reporter pointed out, indicative of the 'dread' with which Roy's influence was received by opponents of Trinitarianism and Calvinism.[271]

In sum, Moore suggests, Roy's writings evoked discussion, arguments, and controversy in the United States, as they did in India. Those who identified with him—and thus engaged in creative encounters with him as consumers of his work—became his defenders. Apropos this group, Adrienne Moore remarks that insofar as a person's influence is in proportion to the respect he commands, one can 'safely' speak of Roy's influence in shaping American thought. However, the Christian orthodoxy in America, as in India, responded to him without identifying with him.[272]

What aspects of Roy's cognitive identity (see chapter 3, section xiii) were instrumental in the development of his cross-cultural mentality? No single factor dominated. Rather, we can identify several connected features, each of which played its part.

Clearly, an essential component was the representation in his belief/knowledge space of Hindu, Christian, and Islamic theologies.

But there was more, of course. The American commentator's remark, cited earlier, about Roy's command of both Western learning and the English language reminds us that his acquaintance and gradual familiarity with Western thought—secular as well as sacred— could only have happened as an outcome of his mastery of the English language. Roy was among the first generation of Indians in the early nineteenth century for whom the English language and the

Western intellectual tradition went hand in hand. The knowledge of Western ideas that entered into his belief/knowledge space as 'know that' or (as cognitive scientists call it) 'declarative' knowledge was concomitant with the skills, 'know how', or (again in the jargon of cognitive science) 'procedural knowledge' of the English language assimilated by Roy, partly into his belief/knowledge space, and partly into his cognitive unconscious (and manifested in his reading, comprehension, and writing).[273] These skills came to reside alongside his other linguistic skills in Bengali, Persian, Hindi, Arabic, and Greek.

The acquisition of explicit declarative knowledge about one's own and 'other' cultures, and the absorption of implicit procedural linguistic knowledge, Roy was cross- culturally responsive; something more would be needed for him to be cross-culturally creative.

Studies of multi-disciplinary creativity—a phenomenon bearing some resemblance to cross-cultural mentality—offer some clues as to what at least one of the additional factors might be:[274]one's belief! knowledge space is not fragmented into regions by culture; rather it becomes an integrated, richly connected, network of beliefs, theories, facts, concepts, values. In such a situation the selection, retrieval, and processing of these entities in pursuit of a goal for need is determined solely by the goals and needs, and not by the culture-specificity of the entities. Thus, to possess a cross-cultural mentality, as Rammohun Roy (lid, is in part to be able to access, manipulate, and transform the contents of one's belief/knowledge space using one's repertoire of mental actions and procedural knowledge equally fluently, independent of the culture in which these contents originated. It is the goals and needs that dictate the use and processing of the beliefs and knowledge; their cultural roots become virtually transparent.

The psychiatrist Albert Rothenberg, in a study of creativity in both healthy and pathological minds, suggested that one essential feature of the creative mind is its ability to simultaneously conceive, consider, and then rationally resolve two or more contradictory or antithetical concepts. Rothenberg labelled this the 'janusian' process (after Janus, the Roman god of gates who simultaneously faced two opposite directions).[275] The cross-cultural mentality suggests the presence of janusian processes of one sort or another in one's cognitive identity. The precise way in which the opposites are resolved will differ, depending on the nature of the Opposites.

In the case of Rammohun Roy, the opposites were, of course, aspects of Indian and Western cultures. As we have seen, his belief! knowledge space simultaneously held elements of the two cultures, including aspects of their dominant religious precepts. One of the ways he was able to conceive and mentally manage these opposites was by his comparative stance which, as we have seen (see chapter 3, section ix), was an element of his cognitive style. Roy's comparative stance functioned in two ways. First, it enabled him to discover and discern similarities and dissimilarities between his two antithetical cultures, theologies, and knowledge/belief systems, to draw analogies between them, to transfer concepts from one to the other, and even to construct metaphors connecting them—e.g. the idea of the Brahmo Samaj as a 'Hindu Unitarian church'. Second, he was able to universalize—that is, unify,' synthesize, and assimilate the antithetical aspects of the two cultures into a larger concept. Roy's belief in a Universal Religion was one such universalization which resolved the apparent oppositions between Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam. Here was the resolution of a janusian conflict.

In sum, I am suggesting that the integrity and interconnectedness of Roy's belief/knowledge space, his comparative stance, and capacity to resolve the janusian aspects of Indian and Western issues through such processes as unification and universalization were significant elements of his cognitive identity that played roles in the development of his cross-cultural mentality.

These features, especially the ability to harbour and resolve opposites, may help to shed light on some of the apparent paradoxes we find in Roy's persona. For instance, he was a co-founder of a Unitarian mission in Kolkata and yet 'adopted', when in England, an Anglican clergyman as his 'parish priest';[276] a rationalist in theology, he was repelled in his later life by what he perceived as the extreme rationalism of the Unitarian faith;[277] and when the 'Anglicist_Orientalist controversy' arose over the preferred educational policy for India, Roy, the Indian who had devoted so much of his intellectual life to the study of Sanskrit and the Hindu scriptures, vigorously championed the Anglicist cause, advocating an English-based educational policy for India.[278]

The Anglicist-Orientalist debate, which peaked in 1834—5 is of course part of the lore of the intellectual history of British India. Its prolegomenon goes back at least a decade earlier. In 1823 the General Committee of Public Instruction was created with the intent of defining, enforcing,

and overseeing educational policy in India. The committee decided to introduce Western learning, including the sciences, without offending the Bengal Brahmins; the tactic was to teach Western thought—including such diverse scientific topics as mechanics, optics, electricity, astronomy, and chemistry—in Sanskrit, and also to instruct upon the indigenous Hindu sciences. This was, in effect, the Orientalist view of the matter: the secretary of the General Committee was none other than Horace Hayman Wilson, an Orientalist of considerable scholarly achievement who later, on returning to England in 1833, became the first occupant of the Boden chair in Sanskrit at Oxford.

Rammohun Roy was well acquainted with Wilson. But if Wilson the English Orientalist espoused an 'Indian path' for the future education of Indians, Roy, the Bengali theologian and reformer, championed the 'Anglicist way'.

In 1823, Roy writes a letter to Lord Amherst, then the governor general. He refers back to 1813 when a provision had been made by the government in London to allocate a substantial annual sum for the promotion of literary and scientific studies in India. 'We were filled with sanguine hopes', he writes, that these monies would be used to employ Europeans to instruct Indians in mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy and other similar sciences. Instead, a Sanskrit college was being established under Indian Sanskrit scholars—pundits. Such an institution would only fill its students' minds with 'grammatical niceties and metaphysical distinctions', with knowledge known since ancient times, augmented only with the 'vain and empty subtleties' that scholars had since produced. Thus, Roy the distinguished Sanskrit scholar shows no little distaste for the Sanskritic system of education as the wave of the future—yet another paradox—for his love of Sanskritic studies remains unchanged. A janusian situation: Roy resolves it by suggesting that if Sanskritic studies are to be encouraged, it would be more efficacious to fund the many scholars that practised their crafts in the innumerable schools—tols—across the country than create a brand new institution for this purpose. If the government's objective in allocating funds is to improve the Indian's lot, it should, he writes, 'promote a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction' embracing mathematics and the sciences, taught by European men of learning; and by creating an institution appropriate to this task.

Here is a particular manifestation of Roy's cross-cultural mentality. His own desire or goal, as far as an educational policy for India was concerned, is to 'improve the Indian's lot'. The comparative stance intervenes: the most immediate and visible evidence of how this can be achieved is seen in the West, by way of science, mathematics, and reason. Here Roy is a Baconian. The analogy and the resulting inference is inevitable for Roy: the means of achieving his goal—a subgoal itself—is science and mathematics.

Such reasoning would be quite consistent with the Anglicist thinking that followed a decade later, which is why Roy may be seen as having consorted with the enemy! The difference lies in that Roy transcended the confines of his own culture, despite the wealth of his learning on matters Indian, in order to situate himself in—identify with—what would become the Anglicist position. The reasoning differed from Orientalist thinking in that Roy's goal addressed the 'improvement of the Indian's lot'; the Orientalist's goal included the desire not to disrupt the Indian educational tradition. Thus, their goals were different. For Roy the means or subgoal to achieve his goal was to establish Western-style learning in mathematics and the sciences; he did not see the improvement of Sanskritic learning as an appropriate means or subgoal to achieve his goal. Here is an expression of his cross-cultural mentality.

In fact, Roy's plea was more or less officially ignored by the authorities. His letter to Lord Amherst was a case of his cross-cultural responsiveness as a consumer of Western knowledge. The controversy over the official educational policy for Indians prevailed into the middle of the next decade. In 1834, with the Benthamite Utilitarian Bentinck as governor general, Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800—59)—historian, parliamentarian, poet, and essayist—arrived in India as a member of Bentinck's executive council. In 1835 he wrote his famous (for postcolonialists infamous) Minute on Education in which, employing a cocktail of reason, prejudice, arrogance, ignorance, and evangelical zeal, he put forth the view that English was better worth knowing than Persian or Arabic; that he who knew English well would have immediate access to 'all the vast intellectual wealth' of the world, and thus, in perhaps one of the best-known passages within one of the most quoted documents in the history of modern India, the British objective should be to form 'a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect'.

Almost immediately after, Bentinck issued a resolution stating that the British Government would promote European literature and science in India, and that funds for higher education should be given to English education alone.' The Orientalists, including members of the Asiatic Society, protested, as did a number of orthodox Indians, and Bentinck's extreme resolution was softened somewhat by his successor (in 1836), Lord Auckland, so as to restore to some extent Indian learning. But the Anglicists had won the day.

As for Rammohun Roy, who had passed away in Bristol some eighteen months before Bentinck's resolution, whether his 1823 letter to Lord Amherst had any influence at all on the later deliberations of the General Committee of Public Instruction may be debated. Its real significance lies elsewhere. Roy was certainly preeminent as a creator of the cross-cultural mentality amongst nineteenth-century Indians; we could even claim that he was its first creator. His letter to Amherst was an especially powerful expression of this mentality. For his particular desire—to frame an educational policy that would improve 'the Indian's lot'—he identified with the Anglicist mentality. He became, for that purpose, 'English in taste'.

'Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect'! These words are breathtaking in their imperious—and imperial—arrogance. Such an Indian would in theory acquire an English mentality; or more, a cognitive identity that was at one with the English cognitive identity. The Derozians were one such example.

As the Historian of science Bernard Cohn has pointed out, the word 'revolution' has two quite opposite meanings.' On the one hand it means 'to return and repeat endlessly', as when we talk of the revolution of the planets in their orbits. On the other, the word also refers to an event that alters the normal course of history, an event that marks the beginning of an epoch or a transition from one epoch to another. In this sense, 'revolution' signifies a break in continuity, the establishment of a new order.

In the Prologue I suggested that the creative significance of the Bengal Renaissance lay in the effecting of a cognitive revolution in Bengal in the nineteenth century. By 'cognitive revolution' I mean something quite specific: the creation of a new and historically significant cognitive

identity shared by a group—a community, culture, or society. Newness of itself is not enough to bring about a cognitive revolution. It must also be historically significant in its consequences.

In the preceding chapters, we have considered the creativity and the concomitant development of cognitive identities of several individuals—Rammohun Roy, Derozio, Michael Madhusudan Datta, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, Mahendra Lal Sircar, Eugene Lafont, Prafulla Chandra Ray, Jagadis Chandra Bose, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Nivedita, and Rabindranath Tagore. What interests us now is how their respective cognitive identities pooled together to bring about a cognitive revolution in nineteenth-century Bengal and, by implication, in India.

The making of a cognitive revolution can be, and usually is, a selective, even elitist, event; it happens by way of creative work— and creativity, especially of a significantly consequential nature, is highly selective: it is the privilege of the few—those who desire deeply to deviate sharply from the norm, to be original; those who are intensely dissatisfied by the statusquo; those who are driven by intense curiosity to know; those who have the courage to create. In this sense, the making of a cognitive revolution is not unlike the making of a scientific revolution, or of a technological revolution.Indeed, scientific and technological revolutions are themselves special instances of cognitive revolutions, where the groups or communities affected are the practitioners of the relevant scientific or technological fields.

It is also important to recognize that a cognitive revolution, manifested as a massive change in a group's cognitive identity, is itself the product of much smaller, gradualistic changes: a cognitive revolution is the result of evolutionary changes, each of a more limiting scope. A revolution seems revolutionary if we only take the end points of the overall time duration of all the events we are considering: in nineteenth-century Bengal, if we consider the collective cognitive identity of the intelligentsia near the beginning of the century, and their identity at the end of the century, and if the difference is markedly significant, then the overall transformation would appear 'radical' or 'revolutionary'. But then this transformation is itself the outcome of the creative work of individuals; one should be able to explain the making of the perceived cognitive revolution in terms of the cognitive acts and processes of the makers of that revolution.

Cognitive scientists talk about a phenomenon called 'distributed cognition'. By this they mean that the overall cognitive change in any particular context is brought about by multiple, interacting cognitive 'agents' like Nivedita,Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore.At its core is a schema representing the concept of an Indian 'golden age' in antiquity, along with an interconnecting web of beliefs, facts, and values pertaining to that 'golden age'. Other particularly significant aspects of the Orientalist cognitive identity is the comparative stance as an element of cognitive style; and a feeling of admiration for this 'golden age'. In Freud's terms, the Orientalist cognitive identity was a positive one.

Counterpoising the British Orientalists, there were the British Anglicists—people like James Mill, who never set foot in India, and Thomas Babington Macaulay, who did. And they brought to the table a schema about both the Indian past and Indian present that represented— gain in Freud's term—a 'negative' identity. Together, the Orientalist 'positive' and the Anglicist 'negative' cognitive identities constituted the seed of the new shared cognitive identity for the Indian intelligentsia.

Particular cognitive identities are, thus, instantiations of this schema and, indeed, that is how the cognitive identities of the various individuals were articulated in the subsequent chapters. However, we can get a clearer sense of their shared cognitive identity by treating it much as creativity has been treated here: we saw that for each and every one of the 'subjects', creativity was a multi-levelled affair. So also, the shared cognitive identity is the basis of this particular cognitive revolution, is best described as a multi-level entity.

At the 'lowest' .or 'ground' level (level 1) are the most concrete objects of individual acts of creation; their representations entered the shared belief/knowledge space, and most prominent amongst them are such entities as: the knowledge produced by the British Orientalists about the mathematics, astronomy, science, religion, laws, and literature of Indian antiquity; the invention of the Brahmo Samaj by Rammohun Roy; the English poems produced on Indian themes by Derozio; the geodesic rules of computation by Radhanath Sikdar; the epic poem Meghnadbadh Kabya, sonnets and plays (Sermistha, etc.) written in Bengali by Michael Madhusudan Datta; the Bengali novels (Anandamath, etc.) written by Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay; and his nationalist hymn Vande Mataram; the scientific institution Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, created by Mahendra Lal Sircar; the scientific instruments invented by Jagadis Chandra

Bose, and their use in the creation of small-wavelength radio waves; the nature of the properties of these radio waves; methods for the preparation of mercurous and other nitrites by Prafulla Chandra Ray; the institution of the Ramakrishna Mission Association by Vivekananda; and the short stories, novels, plays, musical dramas, and the Rabindrasangeet songs written by Rabindranath Tagore.

None of these existed before the period of the Bengal Renaissance; and they became the common literary, scientific, and religious heritage of India in the course of the twentieth century—in that sense, they are among the core 'concrete' elements of an Indian cognitive identity—and, indeed, of an Indian identity in the more general Eriksonian sense.

At the next 'higher' level (level 2) are elements that constitute the products of the second level of creativity of the various individuals. They are more abstract, more conceptual, more ideational, in nature than the elements of level 1; as mental representations they constitute, largely, concepts and schemata of various sorts. They include the idea of Hinduism as a monotheistic tradition (Roy); schemata representing new literary styles in Bengali but adapted from Western sources—including, most prominently, blank verse and the sonnet schemata (Datta), the novel (Chattopadhyay) and the short story (Tagore); the musical style of Rabindrasangeet (Tagore); a schema for a scientific research institution (Sircar); the Brabman-schema (Ramakrishna); and the concept of monistic ethics (Vivekananda). These too enter into the belief/knowledge space of the shared cognitive identity.

At this level, we may also place certain elements of cognitive style. Most prominent of these is the comparative stance, an abstraction of more specific instances such as analogical thinking (Roy, Ramakrishna), metaphorical imagery (Tagore), and direct comparisons between East and West (Roy, Chattopadhyay, and Datta). The comparative stance as a general element of cognitive style is particularly important because it afforded the mental strategy that would lead to the two most significant elements of the shared cognitive identity—a cross-cultural mentality and universalism.

Another significant entity that must have a place in the shared cognitive identity is both a belief and an element of cognitive style. This is operationalism/experimentalism which was central to

the emergence of a scientific consciousness in the minds of such people as Sikdar, Lafont, Madhusudan Gupta, Sircar, Bose, and Ray. Not only was this a sine qua non for the development of scientific, geodesic, and medical skills, but its emergence also led to the negation of the British Anglicist negative identity, especially the belief that Indians were incapable of doing experimental ('modern') science.

We tend to associate experimentalism with science; but, of course, experimentalism as a concept and a mental strategy may prevail in all kinds of creative work. Thus, we see its presence in the literary creativity of both Datta and, especially, Tagore.

Also at this level are certain needs, desires, and affects that belong to a shared need/goal space and emotion space, and which relate to each other—the affects giving rise to certain needs, desires, and goals. Undoubtedly, the most significant of the affects is the feeling of dissatisfaction. This was manifested in more specific and individual forms as dissatisfaction with the polytheistic view of Hinduism harboured by Roy; Datta's dissatisfaction with the standard of Bengali drama and the then prevailing rules and frameworks governing Bengali poetry; Chattopadhyay's dissatisfaction with the state of Bengali literature in general and the lack of a nationalist consciousness; and Sircar's dissatisfaction with the absence of a scientific consciousness amongst Indians. These feelings of dissatisfaction were transformed into desires, needs, and goals that would negate them.

But dissatisfaction is not the only source of creative acts. The need to create is as compelling a desire and, indeed, no matter how strong one's feeling of dissatisfaction, in the absence of the need to create the former may never be acted upon. Furthermore, the need to create may serve on its own; it is a superneed that is ubiquitous in creative work. Here, we saw its very pronounced presence in the scientific enterprises of Bose and Ray, and in the literary realms of Datta and, especially, Tagore.

We must also include here, the feeling of curiosity which characterized the emergence of a full scientific consciousness in Bose and Ray.

At the next higher level (level 3), are entities that either are special instances of individual cognitive identities or encompass large parts of the latter. These include, in particular 'consciousness': a nationalist consciousness as created by Chattopadhyay and Sircar; a scientific consciousness, manifested in part by Roy, Chattopadhyay, Vivekananda, and Tagore, in more complete form by Sircar and Lafont, and in full-blown form by Sikdar, Bose, and Ray; and a historical consciousness pertaining to an Indian 'golden' age.

It seems appropriate to reserve the highest level (level 4) of the shared cognitive identity for the two entities which are the most consequential of all: cross-cultural mentality, and the outlook of universalism.

Recall (from chapter 4) that, ideally, a person will exhibit a cross- cultural mentality when one's belief/knowledge space is not fragmented into culture-specific regions; rather, it is an integrated, richly connected network of beliefs, theories, concepts, and values; in such a situation the selection, retrieval and processing of these entities in pursuit of a need or goal is determined by the need or goal, and not by the culture-specificity of the entities. It is the goal or need that dictates the use and processing of the beliefs and knowledge; their cultural traces become virtually invisible.

Impractical terms, we can distinguish between two kinds of cross cultural mentality. One is cross-cultural responsiveness, in which a person responds to, and assimilates, elements of 'other cultures' and integrates them into his or her cognitive identity. In becoming crossculturally responsive, the person is in the role of a consumer. We find its presence in most of our subjects in this work—notably, Roy, Derozio, Datta, Chattopadhyay, Sircar, Bose, Ray, Vivekananda, Nivedita, and Tagore. The other is cross-cultural creativeness wherein the product of one's acts of production or creation is assimilated by consumers of the product equally well irrespective of the cultural backgrounds of the consumers. Here, cross-cultural creativeness is an attribute of the producer. We have seen its manifestation most notably in the cases of Roy, Bose, Ray, and Vivekananda. (In the case of Tagore, his cross-cultural creativeness would manifest itself spectacularly in the twentieth century; but it was not visible in the nineteenth century—the period of the Bengal Renaissance.)

Cross-cultural mentality in either of its forms is, perhaps, the most consequential aspect of the cognitive identity of the Bengal Renaissance because it would be the principal psychological legacy of the Bengal Renaissance to colonial and post-colonial India of the twentieth century and beyond. Obviously, it owes its origins to the advent of Western education in India, but the main protagonists of the Bengal Renaissance adopted it as a schema and moulded, shaped, and instantiated it in their own distinctive ways, as we have seen in the preceding chapters. It represents what we normally call the 'modernism' of outlook that has come to be associated with the Bengal Renaissance. And the comparative stance was a vital mental strategy for the emergence of cross-culturalism.

Both cross-cultural mentality and the comparative stance were instrumental in the other level facet of the shared cognitive identity. This is the concept of universalism. Just as the cross-cultural mentality needed the comparative stance as a means, so also both the cross-cultural mentality and the comparative stance were the sources for the emergence of universalism.

Universalism is a belief that there are principles at work governing physical nature, humanity, creativity itself, and the way human beings perceive and relate to the world and to its creation that are universal in nature and in scope. This belief also translates into a variety of needs and goals that seek to elucidate the universal principles governing different phenomena—the search for unity in variety; the one in the many.

There are variety of forms of universalism: as the concepts of universal religion and the universal Supreme Being in the thoughts of Roy, Ramakrishna, arid Vivekananda; as the conccpts of universal consciousness, universal individuality and Vedantic socialism for Vivekananda; as Chattopadhyay's notion of a pantheistic humanistic 'complete' religion; as the common goal of unity in religion and in science as articulated by Vivekananda; as the dissolution of the self in nature, the integrity, and connectedness of all things in the universe, and the seeking of the Infinite in the finite—collectively, 'composing the universal song'—for Tagore. (In the case of Bose, there would emerge, just after the turn of the century, his unity of responsiveness of the living and non-living— the 'Boseian thesis'—a very universalist proposition) and Tagore's

universalism would encompass the concept of universal humanism and world literature into the construction of a 'world mind'.

The overall shared cognitive identity can, thus, be summarized as follows.

Level—4: cross-cultural mentality; universalism.

Level—3: nationalist consciousness; scientific consciousness; historical consciousness.

Level—2: monotheisrn;Bengali literary styles and forms; Rabindrasangeet as a musical genre; schema for a scientific research institute; Brahmoschema; llrahman-schema; monistic ethics; comparative stance; operajonalism/experimental5m , dissatisfaction; need to create; curiosity.

Level—It Indian astronomy, mathematics, science, religion, laws, and literature of antiquity; Brahmo Samaj; 'Meghnadabadh Kabya' and other poems; short stories and novels; plays and musical plays; 'Vande-Mataram', Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science; discoveries in physics, chemistry and geodesy; 'Rabindrasangeet' songs.

In concluding let us keep four points in mind.

Firstly, on a finer scale of 'resolution' we will find, no doubt, many other protagonists of this particular story: there were, of course, others whose creative work contributed to the Bengal Renaissance and the making of this particular cognitive revolution. The ones presented here are those, I believe, who were the most significant and interesting in terms of the richness, originality and consequentiality of their acts of creation.

Secondly, the creative acts by the individual protagonists of the Bengal Renaissance, and the cognitive revolution they brought about were the outcome of individual cognitive processes: whether done synchronically, such as by the scientists Bose and Ray, or diachronically, such as by Roy, Derozio, Datta, and Chattopadhyay, there is no reason to suppose (with one notable exception) that there was any purposive collaboration between syrichronic creators or any direct influence amongst diachronic creators. The notable exception is the obvious direct influence of Ramakrishna on Vivekananda, and Vivekananda's influence on Nivedita. Lafont did influence Bose in his preparation phase, but there was no collaboration or further influence of the Belgian teacher on his Bengali student. Tagore would come to know Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, but Tagore's creativity and his cognitive style were distinctly his.

Thus, as already noted, each was a creative being in his own right. Their cognitive identities had important elements that were distinctly their own.

Thirdly, despite this, they also formed a distributed cognition system (see section ii) in that the cognitive revolution, as represented by the construction of the shared cognitive identity described above, was richly and intimately informed by elements of each individual cognitive identity. A Rammohun Roy or a Michael Madhusudan Datta or a Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay or a Jagadis Bose or a Prafulla Chandra Ray or a Vivekananda or (even) a Rabindranath Tagore alone would not have affected the magnitude of change in the shared cognitive identity needed to deem it 'revolutionary'. It was, in all respects, a product of the union of their work.

Finally, we note that whether the new cognitive identity was so radically different from what had existed before to be called revolutionary might well be debated. My view is that not only is it the case that this shared cognitive identity was radically new with respect to the Bengali mentality that had existed prior to the nineteenth century—hence its collective historical originality is a matter of empirical record—but also that this cognitive identity was transmitted into the twentieth century, not just confined to Bengal but was propagated amongst the Indian intelligentsia at large. Thus, its consequence in shaping the Indian mind in its own time and beyond is, once again, in my view, a matter of empirical record.

Precisely how this shaping took place of the minds of a C.V. Raman, an R.K. Narayan, a Jawaharlal Nehru, a Satyajit Ray, a Ravi Shankar, a Mohandas Gandhi, a later Rabindranath Tagore, an S. Chandrasekhar, or an Amartya Sen (to take just a few obvious subjects), and what might be said about the resulting cognitive identity of the twentieth-century Indian mind—that is another story.

<u>Notes and References</u>

175

1. Deepak, Kumer. *'The 'Culture' Of Science and Colonial Culture,India 1820-1920'*,British Journal of History Of Science,vol-29 1996 ,pp-195-209

2. Satish Chandra , Chakravarty, (ed). '*The Father of Modern India: Commemoration volume of the Ranmohun Roy Centenary Celebration ,1933.*Kolkata:Rammohun Roy Centenary committee 1935

3. Thomas S. Kuhn, '*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edition).*Chicago:University Of Chicago Press:1970

4. Bruno, Latour and Steve, Woolgar,.*Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*(2nd edition).Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986.

5. Ziauddin, Sardar, '*Thomas Kuhn and the Science wars'* Cambridge: Icon Books;2000

6. Tapan, Raychaudhuri, *'The Bengal Renaissance:Reconsidering Revisions'*in Europe Reconsidered(2nd edition)New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 2002 :pp-345-362

7. Erik.H. Erikson,,.*Identity:Youth and Crisis.* NewYork: St.Martin Press:1968

8.Op.cit:pg-22

9.Op.cit:pg-209-10

10,Erik H.Erikson, '*Identity Crisis in Perspective'* In Life History and the Historical Moment. New York: W.W.Norton,pp-17-47;1975.

11.Thomas, Edwards, *Henry Derozio(*1st edition 1884).Kolkata: Riddhi India:1980

12. Karl R., Popper, '*Objective Knowledge'* .Oxford:Clarendon Press:1972.

13.,R.K, Dasgupta *'Towards A New Polity',* 1970b:Chapter 6 In Dasgupta 1970a

14.Rabindranath. Tagore, *'The Relation Of The Individual To The Universe',* in Sadhana,NewYork:The Macmillan Company,1915.pp-1-22

15. Subrata, Dasgupta, ' *Jagadish Chandra Bose and the Indian Response to Western Science'.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press:1999.pg-169 *et seq*

16.Op.cit.:pp-105-40

17. Fredrick C. Barlett, '*Remembering' ;*Cambridge :Cambridge University Press:1932.

18. Jean, Piaget, '*The Child and Reality'.*Harmondsworth:Penguin Books:1976:pg-114 *et seq*

19.Michael Madhusudan's Surname in English is traditionally spelt 'Dutt'. 'Datta'is the standard English form Of the Bengali Surname

20,Michael Madhusudan, .Datta &Seely,Clinton B.(tr.), '*The Slaying Of Meghanada'.*New York:Oxford University Press.2004:pp-31-3

21. Ghulam , Murshid, (ed.),.'*The heart Of A Rebel Poet: Letters of Michael Madhusudan Dutt'.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2004

22. Subrata, Dasgupta, '*Jagadish Chandra Bose and the Indian Response to Western Science'* .New Delhi: Oxford University Press:1999: pg-201

23. E.H., Gombrich, '*Art and Illusion'.*Princeton: Princeton University Press;1969:p-89

24. William, Radice, '*Milton and Madhusudan'*, In G.R. Taneja &V. Sena(eds),Literature East And West: Essays presented to R.K .Dasgupta.New Delhi:Allied Publishers,1995:pp-177-94.

25.Anon . ' *A Century:Indian Association For the Cultivation Of Science 1876-1976'.Kolkata*: The Indian Association For The Cultivation Of Science:1976;p-5

26.Ibid.

27. A.R., Damasio, '*Descartes'Error:Emotion,Reason And the Human Brain'.*New York:Grosset Putnam:1994.pp-127-64.

28. Rammohun, Roy, '*Address to the Rt.Hon.William Cavendish Bentick'*(16th January),In Ghosh 1885:pp-483-486

29.Raychoudhuri:op.cit;p-141

30. Charles, Brenner, ',*An Elementary Textbook Of Psychoanalysis '*(2ND edition).NewYork: Anchor Books:1973:pp-17-20

31.Dasgupta.S.Op.cit:pp-44-45

32.Ibid

33. Jogendra C. Ghose, (eds), '*The English Works Of Raja Rammohun Roy'*,Vol-1.Kolkata:Oriental Press;1885 p-ix

34.Ibid p-489-98

35.Dasgupta.S.:1999:pp-47-49

36. Wilder, Penfield, '*The Mystery Of The Mind'*. Princeton :Princeton University Press.1975,p-39.

37.Dasgupta.S.op.cit

38. Heinrich, Wolfflin,not dated. '*Principles of Art History'* (1st English edition 1932).New York: Dover Publications.

39. Richard, Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.1984

40.For a discussion of cognitive style in art,science,and scholarship,see,respectively. 'Cognitive Style In Creative Work by Subrata Dasgupta,:'Is Creativity A Darwinian Process' by Subrata Dasgupta; 'Twilight of the Bengal Renaissance' By Subrata Dasgupta

41.,Erik H*., Erikson 'Identity ,Youth and Crisis'*. NewYork: W.W.Norton.

42. Edward, Said,*Orientalism,*NewYork:Vintage Books/Random House:1979:pg-7

43.A term affected by postmodernists to mean a system of knowledge,techniques, and practices whereby one makes statements about and exercises authority ,power,and control over a particular (social or intellectual) domain.

44.Op.cit.:p.7

45.Op.:cit:pp.2-3

46.David, Kopf '*British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*.':Berkeley:University of California Press.1969.

47. David A., Washbrook, '*Orients and the Occidents:Colonial Discourse Theory and The Historiography of Modern India',*in R.W.Winks (ed),The Oxford History Of the British Empire,Vol-V;Historiography.Oxford:Oxford University Press:1999:p.183

48.Said 1979.:p.78.

49.Kopf 1969.:p.38.

50.Op:cit.:p.14.

51.Op:cit.:p.18.

52. Hasting's letter is quoted in Kopf ,op.cit.:p.18

53.Op.cit.:pp.18-19.

54. S.N., Mukherjee, '*Sir William Jones: A study in Eighteenth Century British Attitudes To India'*.Cambridge::Cambridge University Press: 1969

55.Kopf,op.:cit,:p.19.

56.Op:cit.:p.22

57.Op.:cit:p.:24.

58. Carl L., Becker, '*The Heavenly Cities Of the Eighteenth Century Philosophes. New Heaven*:Yale University Press; 1932:p-107.

59.Ibid.

60.Op.cit.:p.100

61. Norman, Hampson, '*The Enlightenment'*.Harmondsworth::Penguin Books1968:.p-107

62.Kopf.:op.cit.:p.25.

63.Op;cit.:p.26

64.Op.cit.:p.31

65. Mukherjee,op.cit.,p-95

66. see Romilla Thapar, '*Early India'*,Berkeley:2002:University Of California Press;for a modern discussion on the methodology of Historical Studies Of Ancient India.pp.xvii-xxii

67. Mukherjee:op.cit:p-110

68. Thapar;op.cit:p-177.

69. Dorothy M. Figueira, '*Translating the Orient:The Reception of Sakuntala in 19ᵗʰ Century Europe.*Buffalo:State University of New York Press.1991.

70. Jarrel,Randall(tr.) , '*Goethe's Faust* ',Part-1,New York:Farrar,Strauss & Giroux:1976.pp-5-12.

71. .Kalidasa, *'The Recognition Of Shakuntala'*(W.J. Smith,Tr.).Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001;pp.5-6

72. Quoted in Mukherjee,op.cit:p.114.

73. William Jones places Vikramaditya in'the First Century Before Christ' Kopf,op.cit:p-115

74. Quoted in Kopf,op.cit:p-115-116.'Hanumat is Hanuman,the leader of the army of Monkeys and Rama's ally in rescuing Sita In the Ramayana.

75. Henry T. Colebrook,, '*On the Duties Of The Faithful Hindu Widow'* Asiatic Researches,Vol-IV,1795:pp-209-19..

76. Kopf;op.cit.p-41.

77.,Henry.T. Colebrooke, *'Introduction To Indian Algebra with Arithmetic and Mensuration'*. 1817:Reprinted in Chattopadhyay,1982:pp-623-654.

78.Colebrooke .:op.cit.1817

79. Bhaskara was also known as Bhaskaracharya and Bhaskar II(to distinguish him from another Mathematician,BhaskaraI(CIRCA 600-80)

80. Colebrooke:op.cit: 1817:p-630.

81.Ibid.:p.630.

82. Op.cit: p-632.

83. Ibid.

84.Ibid:p.634.

85.Ibid.:p.649.

86.Ibid.:p.640.

87. Thapar.op.cit:2002:p-280.

88. Sceptical Though she is about the very concept of a Golden Age,Thapar(ibid.) notes that if there was one in Indian History,It coincided with the Gupta Dynasty,300-700 CE- a much narrower time span that suggested here as being part of the Orientalists'Schema.

89. Mukharjee:op.cit:p-79.

90. Quoted by Kopf,op.cit:p-18.

91. Gauri, Vishwanathan,*'Masks of Conquest: Literary Studies and British Rule in India'* New Delhi :Oxford University Press.1998;p-29.

92.Elie,Halevy,*'The   Growth   Of   Philosophic   Radicalism'(first   Published 1928)(M.Morris.tr.).*Boston: The Bacon Press.

93. James Mill,. *'The History Of British India'*(abridged).Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.1975.p-190.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid:pp-190-191

96. Ibid:p-191.

97. Ibid:p-194.

98. Ibid:p-196.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid;pp-196-197.

101. Ibid;pp-197.

102.Ibid.

103. Mill ;op.cit:p-197.

104. Ibid:p-199.

105.Ibid.p.209.

106.Ibid.:p.210

107.Ibid.:p.213.

108. Ibid:p-217.

109. Ibid:pp-218-219.

110. Ibid:pp-219.

111. .Ibid:p-224.

112. .Ibid:p-226:et.seq.

113.Ibid.:pp.245-247.

114.Ibid.:pp.248-249.

115..S, Dasgupta 1996:op.cit.

116. Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge.*Oxford:Clarendon Press,1972:chapter 1 section 4.

117. Robert, Nozick,*The Examined Life.*New York:Simon and Schuster,1989.

118..R.K. Dasgupta., '*Ruskin in India',*in *English Poets on India and other Essays* (1st edition1945).Kolkata:Papyrus,p.71.

119. Jogendra C. Ghose, (ed), *'The English Works Of Raja Rammohun Roy'* vol-1, Kolkata:Oriental Press.1885.pp.489-495.

120.Ibid.

121. David, Kopf, *'Brahmo Samaj and The Shaping Of Modern Indian Mind'.* Princeton;Princeton University Press:1979; pp.xxi-xxii.

122. For These 'Declarations Of Principles' see the respective entries in the official Website of the Brahmo Samaj,http; www.brahmosamaj.org.

123. Rammohun, Roy,: *'Translation of an abridgement of the Vedanta or the resolution of all the Veds'*, In Ghose 1885 p.3.

124. Ibid ;p.7.

125.Ibid; p.15.

126. Ibid:p.14.

127. Ibid:p.15.

128. Ibid:p.7.

129. Ibid.

130.Ibid.

131.Ibid:p.8.

132. William, Paley, ' *Natural Theology:Or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes Of the deity* Collected From *The Appearance Of Nature*(12th edition ,1809) p.3.Ann Arbor:University Of Michigan Humanities Text Initiatives,http:// www. Hti.umich.edu/cgi.

133. In The Twenty-First Century,especially in the United states,These arguments has been given more or less formal name 'intelligent design'

134. Paley,op.cit:p.441.

135. Rammohun, Roy, *'Translation Of The Cena Upanishad'* in Ghose :1885:p.39.

136. The Elements of the schema for Hinduism shown here are based on Radhakrishnan & Moore 1957 and Sen 1961.

137. The elements of the schema for Brahmoism shown here are based on Ghose 1885 ;Biswas 1992;Collett 1988; and Kopf 1979.

138,Tapan, . .Raychoudhury *'Transformation of Religious Sensibilities in 19TH C Bengal.'* In Raychaudhury 1999a :p.100.

139. Charles, Brenner,*An Elementary Textbook Of Psychoanalysis*(2nd edition).New York:Anchor Books.1973 p.41.

140. Ernst, Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations of Art.Madison:International University Press.1952.p.16

141. Daniel E., Schneider, *'The Psychoanalyst and the Artist'*, NewYork:Mentor/ New American Library.1961 pp.85-86.

142.,Richard, Wollheim *'Painting as an Art.*Princeton:Princeton University Press.1984.p.22.

143.Rollo, May *'The Courage To Create'* New York:W.W.Norton.1994:p.75.

144. Debendranath, Tagore. *'Reminiscences Of Rammohun Roy'*(originally written in 1896)Reprinted in Chakravarty 1935:Part II.pp.172-177

145.,Howard, E., Gruber *'The Evolving Systems Approach In Creative Work'*, In Wallace and Gruber 1989:pp.3-24.

146.,Nihar Ranjan Ray & Pratul Chandra Gupta, (eds),1957. *'Hundred Years Of The University Of Calcutta.* Kolkata:University Of Calcutta.1957.p.428.

147.David,. Kopf 1979.op.cit.p.63

148. .Ibid p.60.

149. Brajendra Nath. Seal, ' *Rammohun Roy:The Universal Man'* (originally published 1924).Reprinted In Chakravarty ,1935,p.95.

150. Ibid:p.101

151. Ibid

152. Ibid:p.103

153. Ibid:p.101

154. Ibid:p.95.

155. Ibid:p.96.

156.Ibid.

157. Ibid.p.95.

158.Ibid.

159. .Kopf,op.cit.:pp.60-61.

160.Seal,op.cit.:p.95.

161.Ibid.:p.109.

162. Kishory Chand, Mitter, *'What was the religion Rammohun Believed In?'* (originally Published 1845).Reprinted in Chakravarty,1935:pp.168.

163. Keshab Chunder, Sen,. *'The Brahmo Samaj Or Theism In India'* (originally Published 1865).Reprinted In Chakravarty,1935:p.179.

164.Ibid.p.182

165. Graham, Wallas , *'The Art Of Thought'* New York :Harcourt,Brace and Co.1926:;p.82.

166.Ibid.:p.84.

167.Henri, Poincare *'Mathematical Creation'* (First Published 1915).Reprinted In Ghiselin :1985:p.22.

168.,Jacques, Hadamard *'The psychology Of Invention In The Mathematical Field (2ⁿᵈ edition).* Princeton:Princeton University Press:1949.pp.46-55.

169. For A discussion Of The Bibliographical Material and Sources On Rammohun Roy ,See Robertson,1995 pp.1-9.

170. Sophia D. Collett,, *'The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy* (D.K. Biswas & P.C.Gamguli,eds ,4ᵗʰ edition).Kolkata:Sadharon Brahmo Samaj.1988.

171. Rammohun, Roy,Circa '*Autobiographical Letter',The Athenaeum,* London,5 October 1833,pp.666-668.

172.Ibid.

173. .Wallas:op:cit:p.82

174. Roy,op.cit

175. Roy:op.cit.p.24.

176. Sibnath, Sastri, *'Rammohun Roy :The Story Of His Life'*originally published 1911:p.10.

177. Sisir Kumer, Das, '*The Shadow of the Cross:Christanity and Hinduism in   a Colonial Situation.*New Delhi:Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers:1974.p.18.

178. Raychoudhuri 1999c :pp.99-100

179. Shastri,op.cit:p.9.

180. Kopf,op.cit:pp.40-41,p.125,p.198.

181. Dilip K, Biswas,&,P.C. Ganguli, 'Supplementary Notes',1988. in Collet *;op.cit*.. pp.22-23,p.67.

182. Ibid.pp.24-27.

183. A Bengali translation of *Tuhfat* was first published in 1821.The First English translation appeared in 1884.Collett,op.cit:pp.512-513.

184.Bruce C.,Robertson,*Raja Rammohun Roy,The Father of Modern India*: New Delhi:Oxford University Press,1995pp.27-29.

185. Ibid:p.29.

186.Ibid:p.29.

187. Collett,op.cit:p.8

188. Robertson,op.cit.:p.23

189. Biswas and Ganguli op.cit.:p.67.

190. Raychaudhuri,op.cit.:p.99.

191. Collett,op.cit.;pp.512-28.

192.Ibid.p.36.

193. Collett,op.cit.,p.36.

194.Ibid.

195.Biswas.:op.cit.pp.1-5.

196.Collett,op.cit.:33.

197.Those words were written in 1823 by James Silk Buckingham ,Editor,*Calcutta Journal*,1818-23.quoted by Home 1935.

198.Ibid.

199. .For a discussion of creativity as a non-Darwinian evolutionary process,see S. Dasgupta; 'Is Creativity A Darwinian Process?' *Creativity Research Journal* ,vol.16,no.4,pp.403-414.

200. Cited by Collett,op.cit:p.31.

201. .Ibid.

202.Ibid.

203. Ibid.:pp.512-528.

204. Roy:op.cit;p.4.

205. Ibid.:p.5.

206. Roy .:op.cit.p.40.

207. Roy.:op.cit.pp.76-77.

208.Ibid.

209. Cited in Collett,op.cit.:p.31.

210. Roy p.140.

211. Keith, Holyoak,   and Paul R. Thagard,,*Mental Leaps:Analogy In Creative Thought* .Cambridge,MA:MIT press:1995.

212.,Max, Black *,Models and Metaphors*.Ithaca:Cornell University Press.1962.

213.Das 1974:pp.99-100

214. Roy op.cit.

215. .Biswas.:op.cit.p.19.

216. Ibid.

217. Quoted in Collett,op.cit.:p.120.

218. Biswas .:op.cit.p.91.

219. Collett,op.cit.:p.91.

220. Eric, Hobsbawm, 'Introduction:Inventing Tradition' , in Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983pp.1-14.

221. Kopf 1969:p.40.

222. .Ibid:p.64.

223. Roy: op.cit.p.484.

224. Ibid

225. Ibid.

226.Ibid.p.300.

227. .Ibid.p.301

228. Ibid.p.303.

229.Ibid.p.304

230.Ibid.p.297.

231.Ibid.p.306.

232.Ibid.p.309.

233.Ibid.p.307.

234.Ibid.p.308.

235. Roy 1820.

236.Roy 1830a.p.349.

237.Ibid.

238.Kopf:1969.p.198

239. Collett;op.cit.:p.130-132.

240.For a discussion of the place of anxiety in the creative process,see May 1994:p.55

241.R.Roy to Rev. Jared Sparks ,17th October 1822.In Biswas 1992:p.66-68.

242. Ibid.

243.Ibid.

244. R.Roy to J.Digby in Biswas,op.cit.:pp.27-32.

245.R.Roy to the Marquis of Hastings,August 1818,Biswas .op.cit.:pp.27-32.

246.R.Roy to H.H. Wilson,9 August 1819,Biswas,op.cit.:pp.44-47.

247. Biswas.;op.cit.p.19.

248.Roy 1817.:op.cit.

249.Collett.1988.p.118.

250.Roy.op.cit.

251.Biswas,op.cit.pp.87-162.

252. C.P. Snow.,*The Two Cultures* (Canto edition:1st edition 1959).Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

253.Mary. Carpenter,The Last Days in England of Rajah Rammohun Roy(3rd edition:first edition 1866).Kolkata:1935.

254.Ibid.p.81

255.Ibid.p.93

256.Ibid.pp.94-95

257.Adrienne, Moore ,*Rammohun Roy and America*.Kolkata;Sadharan Brahmo Samaj.1942.

258.Ibid.p.1

259.Ibid.p.2

260.Ibid.p.3.

261.Ibid.

262. . Ibid .:pp.131-134.

 263 Ibid.pp.126-129

 264.Ibid.pp.133-134

265. Ibid.pp.134

266.Ibid.p.154

267.Ibid.p.154

268..Ibid: p.155

269.Ibid p.156

270. Ibid:p-154

271.Ibid:p-157.

272.Ibid:p.160.

273. JohnF. Kihlstrom,,. 'The Cognitive Unconscious',*Science,* vol.237,17 September 1445-52.

274..S. Dasgupta 'Multidisciplinary Creativity:The Case of Herbert A.Simon', Cognitive Science Vol.27. pp.683-707.

275.Albert, Rothenberg, *Creativity and Madness.*Baltimore:1990:Johns Hopkins University Press.

276. .Collett.op.cit:p.300

277. .Ibid.

265.Strictly speaking ,the 'Anglicist –Orientalist controversy' surfaced the year after Roy's death.Roy would ,however,both witness,and be a participant in,a prelude to the actual controversy.

266.Kopf.:pp.241-252.

269. Zaheer, Baber,*The Science of Empire:Scientific Knowledge,Civilization and Colonial Rule In India*.Albany:1996.The State University of New York Press.

270.Biswas.op.cit.

271.Ibid.

272.Ibid.:pp.190-195.

273.Ibid.

274.Ibid.:p.195.

275.Ibid.:pp.199-201.

276.Macaulay.1972.

277.Majumdar 1965.p.47.

278.Ibid.p.48.

Satyajit Ray as an icon of Colonial Modernity

Film is a legitimate child, or sibling, of traditional theater. And Indian films, definitely including the most outrageously "unrealistic" ones, are constantly revealing their relationship with classical Sanskrit *Darshakavya* (visualized poetic drama). And most probably they were the religious rites and ancestors of drama and theater. All three- theater, film and drama religious are highly projective. They use rhetoric which basically involves language, gesture, setting, and characters. The elements of this rhetoric depend on either following or evolving, and differing from, the conventions and traditions set by society for such performances. These traditions are understood and shared by the author/director, actors/actresses, and audience. Satyajit Ray weaves these elements of traditional *Darshakavya,* as well as aspects of a certain technical tact and strategy, with such skill that the twentieth- century cinematic techniques of film achieve an unique artistic achievement. There was reason for astonishment when Satyajit Ray of Calcutta a quarter century ago won international awards with his first film, Pather Panchali (Song of the Road): he had never made a film, had no experience in any branch of filmmaking, and the group working with him was almost equally innocent of experience. His cameraman had never shot a film; most of the actors had never acted. The ingredients had seemed so uncompromising to distributors and other potential backers that more than twenty had rejected his proposals. Yet he finished the film and it won wide renown and distribution. This chapter however is not a mere discussion of the achievements of Satyajit Ray but it has attempted to discuss how the renaissance ideals succeeded in creating an enlightened mentality in him and how these were reflected in his films.

Lineage Of Satyajit Ray

The family lineage begins with Ramsundar Deo, the earliest-known ancestor of Ray family, a Hindu by religion, a youth by age, moved from a village in West Bengal to East Bengal (now Bangladesh), wondering there, he reached a village called 'Serpur' where at the local zamindar's house he met the ruler of a nearby place called 'Yasodal'. He likes Ramsundar for his quick intelligence and invited him to Yasodal. There Ramsundar was given a piece of land, a house and a daughter in marriage. Ramsundar spent his life administrating the property of his in law's.

Subsequently, the generations of his family lived there in Yasodal, and later moved further deep into the east, a place called '*Masua*'. It was located on the other side of the Brahmaputra river. The family across time gathered wealth and education and also acquired the title of 'Majumdar', a common Bengali surname which means 'revenue accountant'. The actual surname which the

family uses today was another honorific title 'Ray'. The word was derived from another Bengali word 'Raja' (means king). Then in the latter half of the eighteen century the family was further divided into two branches. The reason was a flood that destroyed the Masua. As a result the family, one of which became noted for its learning, the other for its wealth and piety got separated in course of time and situation[1].

Among the two families, one was lead by Ramkanta Majundar. A man of talent, he was very fluent in several languages, an expert singer and musician. Not only that, he was a man of great physical strength and courage. It is said that he would eat a full basket of parched rice and a whole jackfruit for breakfast. In another incident it is said that once Ramkanta was sitting in his verandah, when a wild boar attacked him. He grabbed its snout and held it in his vice-like grip before shouting for help[2].

It was this particular generation that developed the verse in the family, as Ramkanta's eldest son has this habit of replying to a question in verse. Ramkanta had three sons. Among them the youngest one became a famous scholar in Persian. But the second son, Loknath, was so fluent in Sanskrit, Arabic & Persian that he was able to read aloud in one language from a book written in another so fluently that his listeners would not know that he was actually translating. But unfortunately, Loknath started taking interest in Tantric yoga in his twenties, which on the other hand was a matter of concern for his father, who thought that his son may go into sannyasi. As a result Ramkanta secretly gathered his books and other sacred objects one day and dropped them into the river. Loknath was so shattered that he took to a fast and died within three days. As he lay on his death bed he told his weeping wife, who held their only child, 'Now you have only, but from him will come a hundred!' - A famous family story often repeated in Satyajit Ray's childhood a century later[3].

Loknath's son was Kalinath, father of Upendrakisore, great grandfather of Satyajit Ray, was probably born in 1830s. He too was a scholar in Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian, but not a sannyasi. Kalinath Ray was better known as 'Munshi (Professor) Syamsundar' in his time, which was quite an unusual distinction for a Hindu in a period when Islam was in retreat all over India.

India at that time was under the British rule, and Brahmos were the most energetic group of Bengalis who evolved and reacted strongly both to Christianity, western literature and ideas such as sati in that particular period of time (around 1820s). The Ray family became associated with the Brahmos in 1880s.

Upendrakisore, Sukumar Ray's father & Satyajit's grandfather was born in 1869. Although he was born in 'Masua', a rural area in Bangladesh, but soon made a long journey to Calcutta, where he too got attracted towards Brahmoism. Upendrakisore was the fifth son of Kalinath Ray. And he was adopted at the age of five by a childless relative belonging to the orthodox, wealthy branch of Ray family. This relative, a zamindar and lawyer by profession chose Upendrakisore among his brothers due to his skin color, which was indeed really very fair. Not only that, the relative who adopted him also changed his name to Upendrakisore from Kamadaranjan, after the style of his own name, Harikisore, to which he added the honorific surname of 'Ray Chaudhuri'[4].

From a very young age Upendrakisore, was quite fond of music and drawing. Once when the Governor visited his school he saw a boy was drawing intensely in the class. With curiosity, he picked up the book to discover an amazing drawing/sketch. The Governor was a British man, and in reference to that the school teachers were quite worried as to how the 'sahib' would react. But, instead, the 'sahib' patted little Upendrakisore, and said – 'You must not let this skill disappear'.

Upendrakisore stayed in Calcutta, and kept his practice of drawing and singing. He later started practicing the Indian classical style music under the best teachers and also developed his love for Brahmo songs and hymns. His singing was so good that once at a performance at Jorasanko, the Tagore family mansion in North Calcutta, led him to the lifelong friendship with Rabindranath Tagore[5].

In the year 1884, Upendrakisore got married to the daughter of Dwarkanath Ganguli, and moved to the large family house at 13 Cornwallis Street in central Calcutta, just opposite to the main temple of the Brahmo. Upendrakisore's wife was a remarkable woman in her own right. She bore him three sons and three daughters. Among them, Sukumar, Satyajit's

father, was their second child, born in 1887. On the other hand, Upendrakisore continued his practice of drawing and music. He often used to play his Violin and sing. He was so good in it, that often listeners gathered in the street outside, just like as they did when he took his family outside to an exhibition or festival and explained things to the children.

Sukumar Ray took after his father in many ways. He was serious, lively and intensely curious and also a natural story teller. From a very young age, he would show pictures of wired and wonderful animals to his brothers and sisters from their father's storybook, and invent his own story about them. He also used to create his own creatures, with untranslatable names. When Sukumar was about eight, a new element appeared in his life, which later also influenced Satyajit Ray greatly. It was the printing press[6].

Calcutta by 1890s was well equipped with printing press technologies, but good quality printing & its illustration was seriously lacking. As a result of this, Upendrakisore's illustrations of Ramayana for children's book were totally ruined. With merely a handful of technical books published in West, Upendrakisore decided to start first Calcutta based high quality printing process. Soon his effort brought him international prizes for best quality printing reproduction. Soon he started to order cameras and various pieces of half tone equipments from British. The money for such investment came from selling most of his share in the zamindari to his foster brother Narendrakisore, who was in charge of it, following his father, Harikisore's death[7].

The printing firm of U.Ray was founded in 1895. And the experimentations began instantly. On the other side, Rabindranath was an enthusiastic advocate of Upendrakisore's writings, and encouraged him a lot to translate and adopt stories from abroad, and from the Bengal as well as from the Indian legends. It is said that Tagore was a regular visitor at Upendrakisore's house, and in that course of time Sukumar became one of Tagore's favorite young friends.

Sukumar Ray, father of Satyajit Ray, was a bright student from his very early age. At school both teachers and his class mates were highly influenced of him. They all liked him very much, especially because of his independent spirit without being rebellious. In 1906, Sukumar Ray left Presidency College, with double honours in Physics and Chemistry. The famous 'Non sense club' also began around this time. '*Sare Batris Bhaja*' (thirty two and a half delicacies) – was the name of the first play that Sukumar wrote for this club. The play was about the street cry of the Calcutta hawkers who used to sell those thirty two varieties of savoury and a half chilli. Among the other plays, '*Jhalapala*', '*Laksmaner Saktisel*' and Ramayana were some of them[8].

Sukumar Ray was also a good photographer, his first piece, '*Photography as an art'* was based on considerable practical experience. He took many photographs in his early teen age, developed and printed them all by himself. Very few people know that Sukumar Ray was the second Indian who got the Fellowship of the Royal Photographic Society in 1922.

Upendrakisore never went abroad, but he made sure that his son does so. As a result Sukumar Ray took up a scholarship in 1950 and went to London to study printing and photography techniques. Later Satyajit Ray in 1950 also went at the same, for graphics design. While his stay at London, Sukumar inhabited two distinctive worlds of specialized crafts. One was the photo-engraving and Lithography and the other was his social and artistic life.

Upendra Kishore's sons and daughters were all gifted writers and/or painters. The eldest son, Sukumar, was a genius by any benchmark one can set. The stories and poems he wrote for children—of all ages—are quite simply unparalleled for their humour, imagination and the spirit of absurd whimsy. There is not a single Bengali who has maintained some contact with his culture who cannot recite at least a few lines from one of Sukumar's poems.

A brilliant science student, Sukumar studied photography and printing technology in England after his graduation (he topped the class at the Manchester School of Printing Technology), and invented a new technique of halftone block-making that even earned him a small mention in *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Back in India, he took charge of the printing company his father had set up, U. Ray & Sons, one of the finest presses in the country, and of *Sandesh*.

Sukumar died at the age of 35, in 1923. In the introduction to his father's *Complete Works*, published in 1973, Satyajit wrote: "When my father passed away, I was two-and-a-half years old. So I never had any opportunity to know him the way one knows another through the bond of being related. I have known him through his writings and drawings. And from some notebooks, two issues of a hand-written magazine, and what I heard from my mother and other relatives about him."

Unfortunately, U. Ray & Sons was also going bankrupt, in spite of the best efforts of Sukumar's brother Subinay, another gifted writer. The company changed hands, the palatial house the family used to live in was sold, and Satyajit was brought up by his mother at her brother's home, contributing to the household expenses by teaching needlework in a widows' home[9].

The Life of Satyajit Ray

Satyajit studied science in college for the first two years—"barely surviving the onslaught of sines and cosines and the rude facts of physics and chemistry". In his third year, following the advice of his father's friend P.C. Mahalanobis, he shifted to economics. He hated that too and could only manage a second-class honours.

After graduating from Presidency College, Satyajit went to study art at Shantiniketan, because it had been his father's wish that his son would one day be at Tagore's institute. In 1972, Ray made the moving documentary *The Inner Eye* on Binode Bihari Mukherjee, his teacher at Visva Bharati, a great painter who had gone blind[10].

After Shantiniketan (one day, he simply left; he later said that he just felt that he had learnt enough and his teachers did not demur—also it was the day the Japanese first bombed Calcutta—Ray felt an urge to be where the action was), Ray joined the creative department of the British advertising firm D.J. Keymer. He also worked as an illustrator for Signet Press, a publishing house that was attempting to do to Bengali literature what Penguin Books had done to English[11].

Ray's cover designs and illustrations for Signet Press were revolutionary. They were a complete break from the usual Indian publishing approach of printing a depiction of a certain episode of a novel on its cover, or just some faces representing the principal characters (unfortunately, that approach still rules in most vernacular language publishing, and even, to some extent, in Indian-English publishing)[12].

He illustrated Abanindranath Tagore's *Raj Kahini*, a collection of tales about the Ranas of Chittor, in the style of traditional Rajasthani paintings. This may seem to be an obvious thing to do today, but it was not, in the mid-1940s. For a translation of Jim Corbett's *The Man-Eaters of Kumaon*, he did a wraparound cover of the skin of a tiger. The front cover showed a bullet hole in the skin and the back cover the exit hole of the bullet. No one, absolutely no one in India, was working at this level of creativity at that time.

Ray was, without knowing it, the first "*graphic designer*" in India. What Milton Glaser was doing in the US, Ray was doing at Signet Press. He even designed two English typefaces: Ray Roman and Ray Bizarre.

But his mind was elsewhere. From childhood, he had had two great loves in his life—cinema and Western classical music. As a school boy he avidly read the magazines *Picturegoer* and *Photoplay*, and gorged on Hollywood gossip purveyed by Hedda Hopper and Louella Parsons. He watched Hollywood films. Film favourites, in addition to Deanna Durbin, were "Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers, all of whose films I saw several times just to learn the Irving Berlin and Jerome Kern tunes by heart" (*My Years With Apu*).

In college, he was suddenly exposed to the art and craft of the film director, as opposed to the charm of the stars, when he read two books on film theory by the great Russian director *Vsevolod Pudovkin*, who, along with his contemporary Sergei Eisenstein, developed the technique of montage—using a series of connected images to express a powerful idea. He also chanced upon an issue of *Sight & Sound*, the journal published by the British Film Institute, and became a subscriber[13].

Western classical music had also become a passion. He had been gifted a toy gramophone on his birthday as a child and he spent all his pocket money buying records. Even in his two-and-a-half

years in Shantiniketan, when he was deprived of films (but he found a few books on cinema in the library and devoured them), he made friends with a German professor, Alex Aronson, and spent almost every evening in his cottage, listening to chamber music on his record player.

By the time he returned to Calcutta, the US had entered World War II, and there were a lot of American soldiers posted in the city, in readiness for a Japanese invasion through Burma. So, Hollywood films were released in Calcutta in large quantities and almost as soon as they premiered in the US. Ray had become friends with several American soldiers and he would regularly accompany them to watch the latest films.

And like in everything else he did, he dived deep. Within a year or two, he could accurately guess who the director of the film was, and even the studio—Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers and so on—which had produced it by noting the editing style of the film—how scenes were cut, intercut and mixed. This was a singular feat of code-breaking, where, perhaps, the men who edited the films themselves were not consciously aware that they were operating to a pattern or a code.

In 1947, with some film-enthusiast friends, he set up the Calcutta Film Society, the first film club of its kind in India, dedicated to watching and discussing the best of world cinema.

In 1949, French film director Jean Renoir arrived in Calcutta, for his film *The River*. Renoir, the son of Pierre Renoir, the great Impressionist painter, was already acknowledged as a master film director. His *La Grande Illusion* (1937) was the first foreign-language film to be nominated for a Best Film Oscar. His 1939 film *The Rules of the Game* (*La Regle du Jeu*), with its deep-focus cinematography and moving cameras, had influenced cinematic technique as much as *Citizen Kane* (which Ray had missed on its first release because he was in Shantiniketan), and is today regularly cited as one of the greatest films ever made[14].

Ray sought him out and accompanied him on two trips to locations outside Calcutta, serving as guide, interpreter and avid student. Renoir was, after all, the first great director he was meeting. Forty years later, receiving the Legion of Honour from the then French president Francois Mitterand, Ray told him that he considered Renoir to be his "principal mentor".

Renoir's influence on Ray is palpable. For instance, one of the most famous sequences in the Ray canon, the heroine sitting gaily on a swing in *Charulata*(1964) is obviously inspired (concept, camera positioning, the works) by a scene from Renoir's *A Day In The Country* (1936). So is the brilliant montage depicting the arrival of the rains in *Pather Panchali*.

But when Ray finally read the script of *The River*, he was quite disappointed. According to Andrew Robinson, in his biography, *Satyajit Ray: The Inner Eye*, he "tried, very tactfully, to make suggestions for improvements". Renoir would listen, would say neither yes nor no, but he did incorporate many of the changes the young man had suggested in his final script, including important alterations to the plot. However, according to Robinson, when Ray watched *The River* finally in 1967, he was not impressed.[15]

Meanwhile, other things were happening. Ray was already recognized as a star in his profession, and was perhaps one of the highest paid creative directors in the Indian advertising industry. But his heart was elsewhere: he wanted to make films (Ray was thus the first of a long line of Indian admen who left their jobs to become film directors, from Shyam Benegal to Dibakar Banerjee, many of them inspired by Ray; Benegal, in fact, has often acknowledged Ray's influence on him and made an authoritative documentary on the man in 1982).

At the same time, through his work with Signet Press, Ray was being exposed to the best of Bengali literature—quite surprisingly, Ray had read very little Bengali fiction till then, other than the works of his father, grandfather and uncles and aunts. A book that was given to him to design and illustrated was an abridged children's version of Bibhutibhushan Bandopadhyay's *Pather Panchali*.

Pather Panchali, published in 1929, was already acknowledged as a classic, but hardly anyone had shown any interest in filming it. It was the story of a Bengali family, specifically the son Apu, set in rural Bengal and then Varanasi when the family shifts there. There was no love interest, no scope for songs and dances, not even a discernably happy ending—why would anyone make a film out of it?

But Ray's imagination was fired. This was the movie he wanted to make.

(To be factually accurate, the first Bengali novel he wanted to film was Tagore's *Ghare Baire* (The Home and the World) and he even wrote a screenplay for it. His friend Harisadhan Dasgupta was supposed to direct. Negotiations with producers, however, fell through, and years later, Ray would say that that was extremely fortunate—he found the script that he had written melodramatic and "very Hollywoodish". Ray would finally make *Ghare Baire* four decades later, in 1984. It was a disappointing film, in this author's opinion.)

In 1950, Ray's employers sent him to London for a five-month stint at headquarters. Whatever they may have expected from Ray when he came back to Calcutta, the man who returned was someone who had chosen his destiny.

While working in London, Ray feasted on films (he finally got to watch Renoir's *La Regle du Jeu*, which he rated as one of the best films ever made). And then one day, he watched the Italian film *The Bicycle Thief* (or *Thieves*; strangely enough, the film goes by both names—Ray refers to it in his writings as both *Thief* and *Thieves*) directed by Vittorio De Sica. The film changed his life[16].

In a 1982 lecture, he recalled his emotions. The film had "gored" him. "I came out of the theatre with my mind firmly made up. I would become a filmmaker. The prospect of giving up a job didn't daunt me any more. I would make my film exactly as De Sica had made his: working with non-professional actors, using modest resources, and shooting on actual locations. The village which Bibhutibhushan had so lovingly described would be a living backdrop to the film, just as the outskirts of Rome were for De Sica's film."

The Bicycle Thief (1948) is routinely rated as a masterpiece and has booked its place in the pantheon of cinema for eternity. For me, personally, so tender and poignant is this film, that I look at it as a test of humanity. I believe that anyone who watches the film and doesn't get at least a lump in her/his throat at the end, if not a tear or three, is devoid of certain basic human qualities and could be a potential murderer. Yes, it is that powerful a film.

As my favourite film critic, the late great Roger Ebert put it, *The Bicycle Thief* stands outside time.

Back in Calcutta, writing a review of the film in the journal that his Film Society published, Ray wrote: "For a popular medium, the best kind of inspiration should derive from life and have its roots in it. No amount of technical polish can make up for artificiality of theme and dishonesty of treatment. The Indian filmmaker must turn to life, to reality. De Sica, and not DeMille, should be his ideal."

He may as well have been describing the film he would spend three years of his life making, against all odds, and almost pouring himself: *Pather Panchali*. He also said many years later, still talking about *The Bicycle Thief*: "One quality which is sure to be found in great cinema is the revelation of great truths in small details. The world reflected in a dewdrop will serve as a metaphor for this quality."[17]

The Films Of Satyajit Ray

Several of Ray's titles-Pather Panchali (which means "Song of the Little Road"), The World of Apu, Distant Thunder, The Home and the World suggest the pull of the faraway. And the best, it would be the tension between "home" (which is often synonymous with the domestic, with the countryside, or with old-world Indian values) and "the world" (travel, the quest, the city, politics, the new values of industrialized India). Ray's complex, ambivalent vision takes in all the implications of home and the world. He refuses to validate one to the exclusion of the other. Each seems to bring sadness and fulfillment; each is both a constriction and a ticket to freedom. Sarbojaya, Apu's mother (played by Karuna Banerjee), is limited by her lack of education, home is her whole world, so when she loses her husband and her daughter, Apu is her only lifeline, and when he grows away from her (leaving the village to attend school in the city), she dies. But home is what rescues the adult Apu (Soumitra Chatterjee) in the end, reclaiming him from his aimless wanderings. When Nikhilesh (Victor Banerjee), the liberal prince of The Home and the world (set in 1907), gives his wife Bimala (Swatilekha Chatterjee) a British education and insists on bringing her out of purdah, into society, she falls in love with another man, Nikhilesh's boyhood friend Sandip (Soumitra Chatterjee), who leads the movement calling for a rejection of all things English and an embracing of Indian culture .The tragedy of most of Ray's characters lies in their inability to reconcile home and the world, and that he sees in them the collective tragedy of a nation hauled into the twentieth century (the "world") with all the attendant

traditions of a slower, more graceful life ("home") still clinging to their backs. But in Ray's films, politics and its inevitable partner, religion, are primarily a way of looking at the psychology of his characters, whose apparent rejection of their Indian heritage is an emblem of their necessary rebellion against their parents. (His most overtly political movie, the elaborate allegory The Chess Players, is clever but not very satisfying; the political events he chronicles in Distant Thunder and The Home and the World are less interesting, insofar as they're treated in these films, than their effect on the lives of the characters.) That's true of the Calcutta businessman (Barun Chanda) in Company Limited (also known as The Target) who's embarrassed when his old-world parents intrude on the dinner party he's throwing for his friends, where golf and Rolls Royces are the topics under discussion. And it's true of Umaprasad (Soumitra Chatterjee) in Devi, whose devout Hindu father (Chhabi Biswas) disdains his "Christian" ways (the adjective is meant more as a synonym for "modern" than as a specific description of his son's beliefs) and whose desire to move out of the house attains an urgency when the old man decides on the evidence of a dream that Umaprasad's wife (Sharmila Tagore) is a reincarnation of the goddess Kali. Old Kalikinkar blocks his son's growth by appropriating his wife, first reversing the natural order by allowing her to care for him as a mother would (he calls her "Ma"-"little mother") and then removing her alltogether from the sphere of human relations specifically from the realm of sexuality, where Umaprasad is out of his father's reach by setting her up as a goddess. When Umaprasad, who has been away from home studying for his exams while this transformation has been taking place, returns to see the devotees of Kali paying homage to his wife, she looks up and smiles at him the private lover's smile we've seen only within the confines of their bedroom. It's a shocking moment, a subversive moment: the sacred is eroticized, violated. But in Ray's scheme, that kind of violation is an expression of a natural impulse. You can find a variation on this idea in Aparajito, in the scene where Apu (Pinaki Sen Gupta, the second of four actors who play the character at different ages), carrying an idol for a religious service, part of his priestly training, sees some boys playing in the distance and is drawn to their shouts .At this moment, Ray lets us know that life in its infinite variety will seduce Apu away from the ascetic future the priests have mapped out for him just as, in a very different culture, it seduces Stephen Dedalus. It is difficult to find Ray taking a stand on the side of either traditional or modern values in his country. Profoundly humanistic, he's a social commentator on the order of Chekhov aware of every thing, judgmental of no one. (Ray evokes Chekhov most strongly in his short- story films,

especially "The Postmaster" in Three Daughters and "The Coward" in The Coward and the Holy Man.) Somnath (Pradip Mukherjee), the hero of The Middle Man, grows away from his father's values, too, but the ones he takes on-the ones he needs to get ahead in business-are corrupt: he finds he's expected to pimp for his clients, and in the movie's haunting final sequence he discovers that the whore he's procured is the sister of a childhood friend. As in Devi, the traditional is violated, sacred ties are eroticized, but the impulse of the opposite response is unnatural. Nor is there any simple affirmation of independence in Mahanagar (The Big City)-a contemporary melodrama that covers some of the same ground as The Home and the World-where economic conditions force Arati (Madhabi Mukherjee) to get a job in a department store and the transition from the traditional wife's role to the modern role of a working woman alters her perception of herself and her family's perception of her. ("You wouldn't recognize me if you saw me at work," she tells her husband, played by Anil Chatterjee. "Will I recognize you at home?") is his reply. And in fact, when he spies on her one day in a restaurant, adjusting the make-up she doesn't wear in his presence, having tea with another man, it's as if he were watching a stranger-the moment is Pirandellian.[18]

Some of Ray's characters can only mature or acquire some kind of happiness and self-fulfillment when they lose "the world"-like the student Amulya, a comic version of the grown-up Apu, in the last episode of Three Daughters, who grows to deserve his bride (and she to deserve him), or the smug, ungenerous urban sport Ashim, transformed on a country vacation in Days and Nights in the Forest. (The endlessly resourceful Soumitra Chatterjee, who has appeared in thirteen of Ray's movies, plays both these roles-as well as the grown up Apu. Ray is just as inconceivable without Chatterjee as Griffith would be without Lillian Gish.) Others need to lose "home"-to look beyond the values they've accepted without question and embrace the world outside their doors. That's true of the Brahmin (Mohan Agashe) in Sadgati (Deliverance) who treats a lower-caste suppliant (Om Puri) carelessly: the man dies of a heart attack while chopping wood for the Brahmin, who's left to bury his body, literally taking on the burden of a man traditionally outside below the boundaries of his vision. And in Distant Thunder, India's "man-made" famine of 1943 (brought on by the "distant thunder" of the war: Japan's take-over of Burma has impeded India's importation of Burmese rice) creeps over the divisions between castes. At the beginning, Ananga (Babita) casually asks the devoted village girl Moti (Chitra Banerjee) not to touch her she'll have to wash all over again; much later, Moti, dying of starvation right outside Ananga's gates, repeats

that line. At the end Ray cuts from a shot of Ananga, her Brahmin husband (Soumitra Chatterjee), and half a dozen others, moving toward the city in search of food, to a long shot, in silhouette, that loses them among hundreds of Indians participating in the same exodus.

The exquisite "Postmaster," home and the world are brought closer, then split apart. The man of the world, the Calcutta bred Nandalal (Anil Chatterjee), is sent to a postmaster's position in a remote village, where, invited to musicales by the local elders, he sits, a pained smile on his face, longing for the society of the city. He grows fond of the child, Ratan, who cooks and cleans for him and nurses him during malaria; he brings a small portion of the world outside the village to her by teaching her to read and write. (Ratan is played bv Chandana Banerjee, who has a quicksilver glance and that quality s(manv of the women you see in Ray's movies share, of being deeply expressive and completely modest at the same time. In a little girl, this distinctly Indian kind of femininity is even more mysterious and formidable.) When he recovers, he applies for a transfer and gets it. It doesn't occur to him that he's taking something away from Ratan by leaving her; he shatters her world without even noticing what he's done. The episode ends in an epiphany: at the last moment, Nandalal goes to find her to say good- bye, but she passes him in the road without looking at him, and, as he hears her addressing his successor as "master," his face falls in recognition of both the pain he's caused her and the worth of the relationship he's thrown away. Of course, there are many ways of characterizing what happens in "Postmaster" that don't have anything to do with the conflict between home and the world. My point here isn't to reduce Ray's work to a single theme, only to focus on one bright thread in the weave. Nandalal's flash of tragic understanding, with its Chekhovian irony (his discovery of a human bond occurs at the moment it's severed forever), is echoed in other scenes where this theme isn't present-the realization of the protagonist Amitava (Soumitra Chatterjee) in "The Coward" that his fear of reclaiming an old love (Madhabi Mukherjee) has robbed him of the only true romance his life has ever contained; the awful moment in Days and Nights in the Forest when the reticent Sanjoy (Subhendu Chatterjee) comprehends that the lonely widow Jaya (Kaberi Bose) is making a pass at him that he can't reciprocate[19].

Nothing is simple to Ray any exchange between two human beings, any shift of a child's focus from one object to another, any application of energy to a daily task suggests innumerable frames through which we can see and understand it. Pauline Kael once wrote, "No artist has done more

than Satyajit Ray to make us reevaluate the commonplace," and in his first rate analysis of the Apu Trilogy, Robin Wood keeps returning to the multiplicity of the characters' motives; he suggests four or five reasons why Apu's mother is so hard on his sister Durga (Uma Das Gupta), why Durga picks quarrels with Apu, why, finding the necklace she was accused of stealing among her things after she dies, he throws it into the river. What makes these movies ultimately mysterious and it can be supposed, unsalable in a market dominated by movies where complexity would just get in the way- is that we can't locate the one true motive; even when the "case" of the necklace seems to be closed, at the end of Pather Panchali, Apu's action reminds us that the only mystery Ray's solved for us is the most superficial one. That's why he can't simply assign a value to "village life" or "city life," "the family" or "education," or even (as Wood points out) "death," which, when it comes near Apu, always leads past grief to some forward movement in his life. Ray knows that taking the full measure of an experience means we'll always be surprised, not only by our own response to it, but by where it's transported us.

The Cyclical movement of the Apu Trilogy is as surprising as life. These three films are, as Terrence Rafferty has written, the movies' great Bildungs- roman; they could be called The Education of Apu. Pather Panchali (Ray's first movie), set entirely in a small Bengali village, begins just before Apu's birth and ends shortly after the death of Durga, when the family packs up and moves to Benares. Its subject matter is the effect of the life of this family on the child Apu (Subir Banerjee, who has huge, glowing coal eyes); another way of putting it would be to say that it's Ray's examination of the wonder and intensity of the domestic, the extraordinary nature of the ordinary. Apu's father, Harihar (Kanu Banerjee), is a rent collector and a priest, and he dabbles in medicine; forced to travel to make the meager money they live on, he's seldom at home. So he has less direct influence on Apu than the three females in the family: Sarbojaya, Durga, and old, decrepit Auntie (Chunibala Devi), who tells the children ghost stories. Harihar's role in the boy's life is to inculcate him with the importance of education; when he's around, he teaches the boy himself, and since Apu's the only male child, Sarbojaya who feels her husband's gifts are underappreciated sends him to the local schoolmaster, a Dickensian character with a booming temper who's also the grocer (and carries on financial transactions during class time). There's a lovely shot of Sarbojaya and Durga preparing Apu for school that shows us the significance of women in Apu's life (as well as the regal treatment a male child receives in this culture). But relatively little of Apu's education occurs in the schoolroom; in every situation,

every domestic crisis, Ray shows us Apu, his eyes wide, taking it all in. And since Ray's characters always open themselves to us completely-there's an emotional fullness in his movies that seems somehow to have been achieved by the simplest possible means (as in De Sica's films)-the cut from, say, Sarbojaya's face, burning with shame after a rich neighbour has called Durga out for stealing fruit from her orchard, to Apu's as he looks on in silence, conveys the power of the experience for the young boy. We see Apu discover death (he and Durga stumble across Auntie's body in the forest), poverty (their money runs very low during Harihar's absence, and Sarbojaya's pride makes it difficult for her to accept the help of neighbors), and illness (Durga's, which leads her to death) -as well as the magic of the faraway, which tempts him through Auntie's stories, through a performance of a mythological play he attends in the village, through the images of Delhi and Bombay and Calcutta offered by the traveling "bioscope-wallah," and through the train that soars past the fields where he and Durga squat, chewing on sugar cane[20].

Apu's strongest emotional ties are to his mother, who is presented to us in all her complexity (Karuna Banerjee's performance is magnificent)-loving and shrewish, proud and apprehensive, restless and prone to melancholy and his sister, who represents for him the wild spirit of adventure (it's she who leads him into the fields to taste the sugar cane), mysteries he can't resist (the stolen necklace), and the connection with forces outside of himself (like the train, and the rain-he watches her whirl madly around in a rainstorm, as if she were possessed by a nature spirit). Her departure from his life (from a fever, the legacy of her rain dance), even more than Auntie's, means that something magical has left it; he has to seek outside himself for that force, that spirit, that mystery. For the rest of the trilogy, Apu's struggle will be between what's inside and outside him, the village and the city, the taming hearth and the wandering soul, home and the world.

Aparajito (The Unvanquished)), released the following year, 1956, centers on the way Apu's longing for the faraway distances him from his mother, after Harihar has died and they've left Benares and made a home for themselves in Apu's great uncle's village. There he trains to be a priest like his father, but his natural bent takes him away from the sacred to the secular-just as it did in Benares, where he roamed along the shores of the Ganges in the morning, turning from the holy men leading prayers (Harihar made his money in Benares translating scripture for women

by the holy river) to other, more fascinating objects (like an athlete working out with a club). He secures his mother's permission to go to school with the other boys. A brilliant student, he's given special attention by the proud schoolmaster, who lends him books and puts him forward for a scholarship to attend university in Calcutta. (By this time Pinaki Sen Gupta, who played the ten-year-old Apu, has been replaced by Smaran Ghosal as the teenage Apu, who has a modest moustache and a social reticence but whose eyes still shine with excitement at what the world has to offer.) In the scene where he tells his mother he's won the award and begs her to let him accept it, he waves a globe in front of her face he wants to show her where Calcutta is-and it glows. Earlier in the film, just after their relocation to the village, we saw him thrill as a train rushed by (it was the same look of wonder he and Durga had for the train they saw in the fields) and we saw a shadow cross Sarbojaya's face: will he long to travel away from their new home? The luminous globe, like the train, symbolizes the world Apu wants to find beyond home, beyond her[21].

Generically, Aparajito is a triumph of education movie, like The Corn Green and (perhaps the finest American example) Sounder, and maybe that's why it's not as highly regarded as the first and third parts of the trilogy. But it's much more complex than other movies in this genre; Ray keeps us acutely aware of what Sarbojaya loses when Apu gains the world. I can't think of a more trenchant examination in movies of the chasm that grows between a parent and a child as the child reaches toward adulthood. Sarbojaya doesn't accede to Apu's desire right away; she fights with him over it,she wants to know why becoming a priest isn't good enough for him, when it was good enough for his father. She gives in, of course; she's pulled between her selfish need to have him near her and her wish for his happiness (and pride in his scholarly achievements). When she packs him off to Calcutta, she tells him to make sure he comes home for the next festival; as always in this movie, his religious obligations are inseparable from his heritage (who his father was) and thus from his ties to home. But his first holiday is difficult for both of them: he's restless, clearly his heart is in Calcutta, she hasn't been well and she yearns for him to say he'll leave school to take care of her. (The first night, she asks him gently if he'd consider it, then realizes he's fallen asleep. She doesn't ask again.) Ray, with his gift for revealing the multiple layers of meaning in domestic interaction, makes a symphony out of the sequence where Sarbojaya, after much hesitation, wakes Apu for his early morning train back to the city, and then he decides at the last moment to stay one more day. And he shows us the depth of the

loneliness the mother feels during her child's absence. Apu stays away during the next holiday, to work, and when she falls ill, she doesn't write him to tell him; she dies before he can see her again. At the end, he walks away from the priest's vocation his great-uncle expects him to take up from his legacy assuring the old man that he'll perform the rites for his mother back in Calcutta. So he departs for university once again, taking his memories of Sarbojaya with him, along with the drive for education he inherited from his father the restless spirit that was his sister's particular.

Ray made the World of Apu three years later, after The Philosopher's Stone and The Music Room, and it may be his most amazing film. (It also con- tains one of the greatest performances on record Soumitra Chatterjee's, as the adult Apu.) In form, it suggests a fairy tale (or, as Robin Wood suggests, one of Shakespeare's romances, which are essentially fairy tales). Apu, now a university graduate but without employment or prospects of any, accompanies his friend Pulu (Swapan Mukherjee) to the wedding of a cousin, Aparna. The marriage has been arranged, and the bride has never met the groom; on the day of his arrival, her family discovers he's mad, and in order to mitigate their shame- and allay the bad luck that, according to traditional Hindu thought, will attend Aparna if she doesn't marry on the auspicious day assigned to her wedding. Pulu asks Apu to take the groom's place. Upon some hesitation, he agrees, and after the marriage takes Aparna back to Calcutta, to work on his novel and support them by tutoring while she makes a home for him. At first he can scarcely believe what he's done, and she, from a wealthy family, weeps when she sees the apartment house they're going to live in. But, to their mutual astonishment, they fall deeply in love with one another, and their life together is a kind of paradise. She gets pregnant and returns to her parents' home to wait for the child. But labor comes prematurely, and she dies in childbirth, while Apu is still in the city. Devastated, Apu refuses to acknowledge his son, Kajal, whom he blames for Aparna's death; he goes abroad, traveling to the ocean, through the forest, to the mountains. Eventually Pulu tracks him down and begs him to see Kajal, now five years old and living with his grandparents. When Apu sees the boy, he is moved in ways he'd never anticipated; but Kajal, feeling abandoned, refuses to believe he's his father (he throws a rock at him). Apu, defeated, sets off once more. Suddenly he realizes Kajal is following him along the beach, at a tentative distance; he turns and coaxes the boy into his arms.

In Aparajito, Apu chose the world over home. In this third film of the trilogy, these values are reversed for him. Alone in his apartment in the opening scenes, Apu pulls the shade in shyness and embarrassment when he sees a young woman, a neighbor, in the hall; Pulu castigates him for trying to write a novel when he's never experienced love. At this point in his life, Apu's scholarship is inadequate to fill his life, and- without being conscious of it-he finds himself drawn to the ancient Indian legacy he felt he left behind in the village ("home"). It's significant that he doesn't just meet a woman, fall in love with her, and marry her; he agrees to fulfill the social and religious demands of his culture by stepping into a wedding when he knows nothing of the bride- even though his initial response to Pulu's request, speaking as a university educated man, is to protest that his friend's family lives in the Dark Ages. He can't know how much joy his decision will bring him, how it will enrich his life. Ray stages the wedding night scene with Apu standing behind the bed and Aparna, her face turned away, in front of it and on the other side of the frame; the bridal bed, decked with flowers, is the obvious focus of the scene. A couple of scenes later, after they have been married for a little while, we see her awake in their bed in Calcutta, to find that her sari is tied to his sheet. The bed is the source of Apu's joy, which he feels robbed of when Aparna dies. Not until he reconciles himself to the fruits of that bed, the son she bore him, can he recover.

Ray deliberately films his hero's travels after Aparna's death as a spiritual quest. Standing on a hilltop, watching the dawn, holding up the pages of his novel,a useless remnant of a former life to the wind and letting it scatter them, the now bearded Apu looks like a doubt tormented holy man. (Chatterjee, whose depiction of the agony of grief and loss breaks your heart, conveys spiritual emptiness in this sequence without speaking a word; it's his most brilliant scene.) He returns from his journey without any answers; he has to make his way back to Aparna's parents' home, where they first met, to find them. Kajal is the answer. The scene where the boy rushes to his father's arms, turning the chaos of Apu's life to order, is as sublime an affirmation as movies have ever offered us. The last shot reveals Apu walking along the shore with Kajal on his shoulders. In this close-up, all we see is the two faces, Kajal is growing out of his father's. As the trilogy comes full circle with this generational image, the title of the movie acquires its new, complete meaning and Ray resolves the opposing forces of home and the world: for Apu, home has become his world at last[22].

Ray's Films emerging as Trend setter to Indian Cinema

When the aspirant from Bengal was just embarking on his cinematic journey, the film scene was largely dominated either by the tenets of Hollywood or by the aesthetics of neo-realism. While the former strove to establish an 'identification' with a 'concrete, a social, ideal hero placed almost 'mythically' amidst a 'concrete, ahistorical 'setting' the latter invited the audience to 'participate' in the everyday lives of 'ordinary' characters usually inhabiting an 'open space. Nearer home the film market was swamped with hackneyed imitations of the above mentioned genres-but despite the initial burst of the concept of 'man' functioning as a 'subject of history' had yet to evolve fully even in the more refined spheres of creative activity.

But Ray seemed to inform us of a different way of looking at reality. His characters appeared as thinking and feeling, 'autonomous', 'human' beings who nevertheless corresponded to a particular historical-social type or trend. This seemed very much a throw back to the principles of 19th century European realism, but Ray infused the outlines of this source with more contemporary influences. His films followed very much the Hollywoodian format of telling a story through the unfolding of plot, etc, even as they made free use of neo-realist techniques. Yet in them, elements of 'concrete setting' and 'open space' fused to form a living environment. The 'hero was replaced by central character who now enjoyed a more intimate and meaningful relation with his or her spatial surface. In this, technical elements too took on a new role: the camera for instance by literally waiting for the 'texture of a setting to unfold before moving on, in a very measured tempo, to link the inanimate objects, symbols, etc, with the actions of the character ensured that aspects of 'information' filing up the environment would throb with a life of their own. The freedom afforded by this form was used by Ray to pack a simple story line with elements of history and individual growth, the 'linear development of character' and the 'angular' probings of inner emotions; and led him to incorporate visual and thematic zigzags into a pared down overall singular movement. As a result the western divisions between physical and psychological realism, form and content seemed to dissolve in the aesthetical parameters of Ray to produce an over- reaching narrative capable of presenting a human saga existing simultaneously at various levels. In achieving this feat Ray also realised in his own way the potential of cinema to create images capable of invoking a sense of general identification with the specific locales of time and place. The heights reached by him made even the classic western and eastern divisions lose their

sway: the western attitude of a single dominant mood revolving around a perspective and the 'Indian-eastern' sense of an apparently directionless sifting through the senses amidst the natural details of life, was combined in the creation of a flowing ambience in which joys and despairs, triumphs and tragedies became a part of the natural flow of life. Simultaneously, a larger feeling about the man-environment relationship was communicated to the audience, even as the seemingly Indian view of a natural harmony emerged in the form of classical harmony now encompassing the social historical sphere as well[23].

The pattern of the self-composed musical score in his work too reflected the same approach. In it, a very singular often Indian melody emerges from or blends into the strains of a cordial composition which instead of sounding like modern fusion music appears as describing two distinct states of emotion within a single situation. Here Ray exhibits his originality in a rarely recognised sphere and interestingly appears, in spite of the obvious western and rational predilections, as a natural inheritor of the spirit normally associated with the Indian tradition, whereas his no less important counterpart Ghatak, who refers more openly to traditional myths and symbols and places a stronger premium on the instinctual emotional and non-rational' aspect, seems more like a figure responding to a much more immediate, fragmented and by implication 'modernist' experience.

More significantly, however, this aesthetics-which despite echoing the parameters of Jean Renoir in its complex packing of details and an open reading of character occupied a unique position of its own in world cinema found a new expression in the social context offered by the Indian reality. Here it was still possible for an apparently inconsequential act of a traditional woman applying a lipstick to take on the contours of a social event interlaced with a variety of meanings. And Ray by touching upon this aspect finally ended up providing a new idiom to the 'modern Indian experience'. He chose subjects rooted in Indian reality which often demanded the reconstruction of conventional situations and relations. But these were invariably infused with elements of proportion, balance, restraint and detachment which however stood on a very non-sentimental, un-Indian basis of involvement. At the same time he also marked his distance from the populist and emotional kind of 'humanist' appeals- present not only in the iconography of popular cinema but also in some respects -within the aesthetic parameters of leftist and radical

currents which usually end up portraying individuals as victims of the situation or as objects of suffering[24].

As a consequence it was usually through the soft exchange of glances, the subtle shifts in expression and the deep probings of the 'face which seemed to suggest more than it revealed, that one came to understand and 'look' at individuals in Ray's films in a humane and graceful way. In this way, the individual range of feelings of say a 19th century Bengali woman spanned a complex inter- play of several emotions which went a long way in resisting any conventional reading. On the other hand, the evolution of the characters was also conveyed in a different way. They usually emerged neither as rebels nor as conformists and it was really the change coming through an inner realisation in say a middle class Hindu housewife who otherwise may be quite well ensconced in her role to the point of being internally involved in it (Mahanagar), or the slow maturing of a 19-year-old upper class girl hitherto living under the protective shell of her family as an individual in her own right (Kanchanjunga), that interested Ray more than anything else. But in doing so Ray shifted the balance in favour of modern democratic values-departing significantly from the patriarchal-paternalistic, brahminical kind of a traditional humanism so prevalent in the Indian social framework the embodiment of his human spirit and critical values and contrasted it with the more domineering but less human tendencies of the male figure.

An example of the workings of this aesthetics is represented best by the first phase of Ray during which he made the Apu trilogy and Charulata. The trilogy conveys an almost lyrical sense of passing 'time' in which the simultaneous existence of various elements, of 'social-personal histories', is accompanied by the gradual eclipse of the 'old' in favour of the 'new'. But this change. implies a virtual 'tonic' shift in the man-environment relationship. Corresponding with Apu's growing self- confidence and self-assertion, Aparajito, the second part of the trilogy exhibits a more explicit sense of centrality. It is also marked by Ray coming out subtly in favour of a world view afforded by a knowledge of the secular 'world' of science and literature. Yet the film carries a subdued, almost nonchalant realisation of the fact that somewhere along the way Apu's 'rambling' world of childhood with its archaic but piquantly wondrous web of tradition is now a thing of the past. Even the evolution of the new is underlined by the fact of a harsher reality of city life, with a potentially hostile environment, surfacing amidst the optimism which later partly accounts for Apu's disorientation in Apur Sansar[25].

However, in Charulata, Ray is able to faintly touch Tolstoyian heights by making individual characters bear the historical contradictions of their period. Charu's husband epitomises the social archetype of the Bengali renaissance man whereas her Debar Amal, with whom she enters into a complex relationship of sorts represents the young Bengal trend of the 1880s. But while the former emerges as a liberal patriarch with little understanding of the deeper workings of the mind, the latter's sensitivity is compromised by an almost casual inability to cope either with the pressures of the 'old' or challenges of the 'new'. Only Charu, the modern Bengali woman comes through as a figure carrying the strength to face the con- sequences of her own actions. But even her assertion comes through more as part of a deep but instinctive urge and the gesture of reconciliation offered by Charu to her husband at the end is underlined by the fact of a deeper chasm appearing between them which may or may not co- exist with the premises of their marital relationship.[26]

Charulata interestingly stands midway between the Apu trilogy and the later Calcutta trilogy which marked a significant shift in Ray's approach as a film- maker. During this period the mood of his films turned dark and 'negative' even as his characters start 'drifting' in and out of situations. This was anticipated by 'Aranyar Din Ratri' (1969) itself. In it the leading characters are all rootless urban figures possessing the smug confidence and superficialness characteristic of their background. They, however, encounter experiences which lead to the exposure of certain inadequacies in their lives as a result of which the tone of the film changes from a placid observance of aimless frivolity to a subdued sombreness. But in Pratidwandi (1970), Seemabadha and Jana Aranya (1975) the contemporary setting of Calcutta becomes more impor- tant and, the themes of corruption, unemployment, etc, now loom large in the background. However, no analysis is offered and the characters are ultimately implicated in their own environment which increasingly becomes blurred. Here many things seem to happen simul- taneously. The 'universal' hero Apu finds a new context in the middle class Calcuttan life of the 60s and emerges as Sidhartha the sensitive, now stands face to face with a vaguely comprehensible fast changing situation of Calcutta. But a macabre twist allows him to finally end up as Somnath, the less sensitive but more 'simple and hideously vulnerable, average Bhadralok- brahmin boy of Jana Aranya, who enters the world of business as the only possible middleman ready to reluctantly but logically graduate into a pimp supplying human beings as well as commodities. On the other hand Ray, the genial humanist who has always tried to look at

the world from the eyes of his positive central character who in turn stood at a distance from his surroundings is suddenly confronted by a grim and grotesque reality refusing to grant the necessary autonomy[27].

At this juncture Ray strangely echoes the point reached by Chaplin, one of Ray's favourite directors, in Monseiour Verdoux (1947), where the triumphant comedian of the 1920s and the 1930s finally gets implicated in his surroundings and turns up as a tramp- murderer in the post-second world war age of cold-blooded horrors. He enacts the only possible black comedy which serves as a grotesque requiem for the final eclipse of the individual hero-society dichotomy and dies almost in a "revolutionary complicity with the proletariat". But Ray clearly was unable to go over any such similar platform: Jana Aranya despite its honest realism and denouncement of middle class values as well as its awareness of the slow slide of the society into the embrace of dubious and shady 'business' ethics ultimately allows the central character to come out unscathed from the whole experience. He still appears as the identifiable subject even though his position now approximates more that of an 'object of the situation.

After Jana Aranya Ray branched out once again into the history of films like Shatranj ke Khiladi and Ghaire-Baire a new tone is evident. But Shatranj ke Khiladi, despite rising to the heights of social comedy at times, mainly oscillates between Ray's humanist predilections (which made him look for 'redeeming" features in a historical personality like Wajid Ali Shah at one point) and his desire to comment on a larger political historical event, finally ending up as a rather ambiguous 'clash of two cultures' without any clear orientation. And Ghaire-Baire despite a dark sombre tone, exposes more the limit to which interpersonal relations can mirror socio-historical trends.

Seen from this perspective it is not difficult to understand why Ray turned to the individual hero again from Ganashatru onwards. Critics have been vocal in criticising him for turning stagey and theatrical around this time but the fact remains that the reality which Ray decides to comment upon in his 'last trilogy' cannot be expressed either with the drift of the Calcutta films or the affirmation of the Apu trilogy. A much more direct critique is needed but Ray's replacement of the man-environment relationship with the man-society conflict in which the central character looks quite at ease with his situation appears bloodless and dialectic in the Indian context. In Shakha Prosakha and Aguntak Ray's sympathy finally shifts from the

individual hero to characters on the periphery of the subject matter though now such figures appear somewhat mechanical and unable to act even as a pathetic or a comic foil to the largely deteriorating conditions at the 'centre[28].

Yet Ray's journey over the years hardly stops at this point. Indeed, by bringing his hitherto pared down postures into the open, his later films prompt a look at aspects which go beyond the framework of Ray, the film-maker. Contrary to popular perceptions Ray, in spite of being a multifaceted personality who wrote children's fiction and pioneered the art of jacket designing for books, was not strictly speaking, the last man of the Bengali renaissance. He came from a family which despite being rooted in the 19th century world of traders, aristocrats and the rising service element sections of whom provided the social basis for the Bengal renaissance was nevertheless moving towards modern entrepreneurship in the early half of the 20th century. But Ray's family business soon closed down and he became a part of the emerging middle class in the 40s. The vision which emerged from such a history had its feet firmly planted in a variety of 'worlds' and thrived on a freer intake of both western and eastern art and culture-rather than on the standard renaissance diet of philosophy, politics and religion-besides coming into touch with modern trends of Marxism, nationalism and anti- colonialism. That is why perhaps in Ray a sense of respect ,for the past, as well as an attitude of healthy agnosticism could still exist in a harmonious relationship with a rather genial belief in the virtues of individualism, liberalism and democracy an eventuality with few precedents[29].

All these factors must have combined to make Ray stand in peculiar relation to Indian reality. He came closest to invoking a liberal bourgeois affiliation of the classical variety yet he remained critical of the type of capitalism evolving here (notice the line of criticism which runs from Jalsaghar to Seemabadha) and maintained his averseness to the general qualities of greed, avarice, and to the anti- humanist, pro-technologist biases associated with the system. Not surprisingly, he occasionally gravitated towards the left and tried to locate his aesthetics within the middle classes, but here both the objective state of his society and his own history provably stood in the way of such a transformation. For, Ray remained a product of a phase in which an evolutionary, 'empirical'. and by implication an 'idealistic' concept of man, society and history drawn largely from a westernising influence could yet find a bearing in social reality and where a studied distance from the world of politics did not come in the way of an academic but honest

appreciation of pressing social and political problems. When Ray stood at a point of history where he could combine his experiences and creative insights with subjects corresponding to the rather eclectic aforementioned balance between elements of social and individual life he created unparalleled works. But such a balance was not forthcoming in the same way in a more contemporary or a concrete historical setting and the post Charulata phase of Ray can also be seen in terms of his realisation of this fact and his conscious-unconscious private struggle with the premises of his framework. Often he was able to make interesting forays: a film like Sadgati is marked by a very consistent adhorence to the hard but non-pessimistic, non- cynical realism. But as an overall aesthetical-ideological framework he could at best produce the rather atomised struggle of the conscience-stricken man amidst the backdrop of social-political events now effectively reduced to supplying the necessary, obligatory data. Even his sense of ambience started revealing some in built limitations. It was based on a sense of a priori harmony which even in more positive works made the point of change ultimately dependent on the goodwill and 'grace of the possible adversary and restricted the choice of subjects to areas excluding a more prominent emphasis on the coercive and struggle- oriented aspects of reality. However, in a more immediate setting this could afford at best a general cynical look at the decline in social values, morals, etc, though Ray's rare sense of humour and his honest realism often lifted the films beyond their obvious limitations[30].

But the real irony arose when he finally appeared to be changing his tore and turning more stern and angry towards the fag end of his career; for while in the earlier films the observation of reality devoid of direction occasionally turn in- to a drift, in the last trilogy a more conscious assertion of views turned into empty rhetoric in the absence of a living, breathing contact with reality. Eventually even Ray was not free from the paradoxes of his time. He had achieved this status of a universal humanist in his initial stage itself; thereafter in a bid to respond to the changing conditions he turned into a observer of reality and towards the end tried to emerge again in the new role of a social critic. But in the absence of a new ideological grounding he ultimately ended up in a kind of un- characteristic sentimental isolationism which however, made him appear less isolated and more outdated. Finally he was forced to take up a position of an armchair liberal functioning as a simple humanist who now viewed social reality in terms of a naive individual-society conflict and placed his hopes and disillusionments either in some

grassroots cultural activity or in the travails of innocent children, sensitive but mentally retarded figures and 'maverick-outsiders.

But this problem of Ray has much to do with the peculiarity of the modern Indian experience itself which has lacked either the sense of a living past or the confidence of a present born out of conflict common to the experience of Ray's con- temporaries and predecessors like Eienstein, Bunuel, Rossolieni and Kurosawa. In the creative sphere too, it has been a real tragedy that those more fully involved in 'experience' have been unable to construct or create consistently and those who gave one so have remained removed from an involvement with the actual workings of the social, historical processes. It needs to be recalled that most of Ray's- work has been based on novels written by others and he was unable to reconstruct an unfamiliar reality. In stature also he has quite lacked the grandeur of Tagore and as such hardly qualified for a few who mirrored or gave a direction to the contradictions of his age. He remained first and foremost an artist who epitomised the 'modernising' efforts of the mainstream healthy democratic current of post-independence India which fulfilled the important but primary role of bringing our level of sen-sibility on par with achievements already accomplished in parts of the developed world. In the process Ray gave a classical dimension to Indian reality and thus achieved something only half realised even by the literature of his 19th century press.

At another level, though he remained sympathetic to causes aiming at a more fundamental transformation of the society, his objective plank remained that of humanising the prevalent Hindu ethos and of aspiring for an indigenous democratic culture. Therefore, his greatness also lay in the fact that he stuck consistently to beliefs and dictums like the one concerning actual life and clarity of expression serving as the basis of great art, even when the reality around him resisted the minimum interpretation sought by Ray's plank. He also showed that it was only by being rooted in a particular milieu that one can relate to a variety of influences and provide an idiom for a range of experiences. It is also significant that the all- India phenomenon of New Wave cinema, despite several achievements ultimately was unable to come out from the quagmire of a kind of 'academic realism' in which it got bogged down at the end and a possible successor to Ray could emerge again only in the milieu of Kerala in the form of Adoor Gopalakrishnan. Even now it is apparent that a lot of ground is still to be explored of the agenda espoused by Ray. But for that perhaps a new milieu is needed which can also provide an idiom

for the hitherto uncharted facets of Indian reality. Till then probably Ray's will remain the Last 'holistic' word to be spoken in the annals of Indian cinema[31].

Satyajit Ray heralding a new age of Cinematic phase imbued with Renaissance Ideals

To be critical is not necessarily to be negative, but critical engagement does involve negativity and debate, a kind of dispersal of the iconic work. It involves subjecting the text to fragmentation and re-alignments, unpacking and re-assembling the elements to which the work lends unity. The elegance and nobility of Ray's cinema, the seemingly perennial quality of its content, largely discouraged such interrogation. The moment of arrival of his cinema for many reasons had to be a moment of discovery for us, of wonder and deep admiration, One learnt about cinema by appreciating Ray. It was more important for the first generation of viewers to go through this process of discovery. The distinctive restraint of that cinema was not only an aesthetic achievement, it also signified a principled stand on cultural expression, its economy being its gesture of refusal to fall in line with the convention.

On the level of content, Ray's work seemed to extend into cinema the modern traditions established in the Indian arts by the early decades of the twentieth century, especially in literature, where several phases of experimentation with modern modes had already consolidated themselves. Culturally, it was more than a matter of bringing a distinction to Indian cinema and challenging conventions. 'Humanism' has been invoked frequently in connection with Ray's work—as a matter of being both humane and democratic, of embracing a non-melodramatic celebration of common life, openness of form, and multiplicity of interpretation. It was also a matter of commitment to the scientific spirit, to a notion of progress, and to the centrality of individual conscience. The realist form was not merely an aesthetic choice in this regard; it was implicated in a worldview that staged a secular confrontation with the past even as it drew sustenance from it, confident about the tasks of new creation at hand. If there is any value in the other frequently cited aspect of Ray's work—the synthesis of the East and the West—it should be sought in the confidence that his work placed in the value of the modern tradition as it negotiated a vernacular cinema as part of a world cinema. Also western Humanistic concepts seem to feature in his cinemas more frequently.Human wishes,notion ,individual dignity,cravings all seem to be projected brilliantly in Ray's films. Ray represents the figure of an artist who was

not anxious about using his skills in the world idiom. All this came to be perceived as problematic as the binaries in question—East and West—were formulated (once again) in terms of dominance and subjugation, of 'incommensurability', and colonial rupture.

But the first moment of doubt came before this 'postcolonial' turn in cultural criticism. It came in the middle of sixties, at a time when signs of wide-scale disaffection with the dreams of official modernization became visible. A new political language appeared that showed a deep dis-identification with the discourse of nationalist idealism, a discourse that built a bridge between pre- and post-independence political cultures. Languages of dissent became creative once again as the apprehension of fractures and conflicts rather than the imagination of unity began to characterize political life. It was also a time of generational schism. Not only were there ruptures in the National Congress in the wake of Nehru's death, the Communist Party also underwent two splits in the 1960s, both of which showed a division of age in the ranks. The whole nationalist legacy, including ideas about the nineteenth-century 'enlightenment' were also to be challenged. As the moment of radical students' politics reached a climax in Calcutta and elsewhere chiming with a world-wide upsurge in 'student power"[32] the quiet dignity of Ray's evocative cinema looked quietist to many. The musical conception of contrasts seemed to act against the recognition of conflict[33] .Contrasts are captured musically in a world evacuated of personal villainy—the cruel characters from Bibhutibhushan's novels are all gone in the Apu Trilogy, even the patriarch Kalikinkar in Devi (The Goddess, 1960), a repository of values Ray seems to be fighting, evokes sympathy. Ray's Indianness itself could be seen as a source of crisis. The musical movement, what Akira Kurosawa called 'the river like flow' of Ray's early cinema, was seen as stemming from an Indian philosophic-aesthetic tradition that has avoided 'conflict and drama'[34]. By the middle of the 1960s, Indian critics were voicing serious misgivings about Ray's ability to address the contemporary—the moment that the modem Indian artist should inhabit. One of the first complaints came from his close colleague, the critic Chidananda Das Gupta, almost exactly at a time when the political turmoil took on an acute visibility.

The Calcutta of the burning trarns, the communal riots, refugees, unemployment, rising prices and food shortages does not exist in Ray's films. Although he lives in this ciEe& -no

217

uorrespondence between him and the 'poetry of anguish' which has dominated Bengali literature for the last ten years[35].

In the wake of the Naxalbari movement and the Vietnam War, in that hour of the youth, Ray seemed to be disconcertingly removed from the historical present. A left-wing critic wrote:

Thousands like myself who once adored the humanist Ray, today cannot find him the same great creator of *Pather Panchchali* and *Aparajito* . . getting alienated day by day from the people and their problems, their struggles for survival—which are becoming harsher and acute . .[36]

International acclaim continued to rise, national awards came pouring in, critical and popular success at home was by no means on the wane. Ray began what was soon to be called the film society movement, which is significant. Ray not only made the films, with his cinephile friends he had pioneered film society activity in India, contributing directly to the creation of the critical discourse on film that was crucial to the reception of his cinema. He took part in building the new audience. In the seventies, as they spread in various parts of India with great rapidity, the film societies hosted a large number of left-wing radicals. Their scepticism was aimed primarily at middle-class cultural projects, even at the kind of aesthetic education that their forebears in the film society movement had undertaken. The denunciation came in the name of committed art.

It is important for criticism to emerge, for disbelief to clear the ground. Sheer appreciation does not allow us to interrogate the work and therefore deprives us of a richer enjoyment of it. In principle, the criticism seemed to call for an avant-garde departure, a Third Cinema practice as Teshome Gabriel would conceive it—a break with both the mainstream commercial cinema and the national cinema of taste that is almost always realist in form.[37] But unlike most of the other film cultures, realism does not characterize the dominant cinema in India, it never has. The cinema of artistic intent and that of social commitment found a point of convergence in realism here; the modernist cinema in a sense was realist. What the radical critics ended up demanding in fact was a thematic extension of that realism. A political apprehension of reality was missing from Ray's cinema, they felt. Wasn't he making in 1968 a children's fantasy where kings are redeemed by the plebs, wars are stopped by pacifist crusades? Wasn't he making in the following

year a film about urban youth holidaying in the forests, narrating their moral passivity in the most indolent manner possible, aligning himself, moreover, with the literature that embraced libertarianism precisely to mark its distance from politics? Paradoxically, it is thanks to this questioning, this discomfort among the radical intelligentsia of the time that one can now read more than narrative mastery, more than formal elegance and 'human' qualities in the two great films in question, *Goopy Gyne Bagha Byne (*The Adventures of Goopy ond Bogha, 1968) and *Arannyer Din Ratri* (Days and Nights in the Forest, 1969). One can now discover, as Mihir Bhattacharya's essay in this volume attempts to do, the effects of instituting a peasant gaze at the heart of the fairy tale in Goopy Gyne, the politics of a plebian fantasy around food, music and travel, the downscaling of kings and courts into proportions fitting the frame of the workaday rural imagination, the substitution of desires of power with those of pleasure. It is not only that we now appreciate the carnivalesque promise of the peasant winning the hand of the princess in the film, and place it in contrast with the heroism of the poor in the contemporary popular film, or see the subversive potential of making an irate king break into the dialect of Birbhum, we can now formulate the problem of Ray's politics in a new way. We can ask why the world of Goopy Gyne is almost wholly devoid of female characters, a question not considered important at the time of the film (which is itself a reflection on the limits of the radical project concerned). It is possible to undertake a productive investigation of the generic limits (children's tales that exclude young girls) at work, the choice in genres exercised by Ray as a member of a family of writers and artists who have made a major contribution to children's literature in Bengal, as well as of an imagination constrained by conditions of visibility. Bhattacharya's essay presents a model of viewing that simultaneously recognizes the ideological limits of a certain 'people's imagination', its imperatives of exclusion, and finds it necessary to appreciate the artist's work as creating spaces of modern expression from within those limits.

Close to European cinema of the sixties in style and temperament, *Aranyer Din Ratri* was adored by western critics, and along with *Jalshaghor* (The Music Room, 1958) it remains a favourite with them. Ray himself considered it amongst his best works. It marks the beginning of a series of films set in the contemporary and featuring the youth in Ray's career (at a time when he was still making one film a year): Mrinal Sen launched his political series based on dissenting young protagonists and urban strife around the same time, attempting to answer the call for a political

cinema more ardently. Sen deployed Brechtian elements borrowed from Godard and the New Latin- American Cinema. Ritwik Ghatak's explicit engagement with Brecht came with his last film Jukti Tokko or Goppo (Arguments and a Story, 1974) as young radicals entered the plot, forcing the director protagonist into a fatal confession. That Tapan Sinha, Dinen Gupta, Parthapratim Chowdhury, Piyush Basu—---filmmakers from nearer the mainstream—were also working with the thematics of the disaffected youth and the idiom of anger shows a generic situation in thç making. Ray's young urban protagpnists, in *Aranyer Din Ratri*, *Pratidwandi (*The Adversary, 1970) and *Jana Aranya* (The Middleman, 1975), are decidedly indecisive about politics, sometimes plainly alienated from radical or violent action. Those who have taken the plunge are part of the surroundings, never placed at the centre of the narrative. The superb craftsmanship of *Aranyer Din Ratri* appeared more dubious to many among Ray's home audience because of the film's literal removal from the scene of historical production of the angry youth.

For today's critic, once again, the point is not to recover the universal human content that the radical in his impatience forgot to notice and that the uncritical appraisal of the director has never forgotten to mark; neither is it merely to re-discover the deft weaving of relationships, social differences, individual alienation, urban anomie and moral confusion. The point is to look for a structure of response to the times in the film, the registration of a time that was forced to reflect on its inheritances. Sibaji Bandyopadhyay places the 'memory game', a seemingly rambling moment in the film, one that appears to contribute little to the plot, at the centre for the purpose of such a reading. The idle recitation of names filling in a summer afternoon in the shade conjures up, through its very aimlessness, overlapping/diverging frames of reference. From Shakespeare and Tagore to Mao and Atulya Ghosh, the roster invokes not only 'figures' but a figure of mnemonics At one level quickness of mind is being tested, and cultural exposure, taste—to place the characters in various positions on a spectrum of sensibility, and draw a map of possible heterosexual affiliations, At another level, the game is a commentary on the task of remembering, a differential table of possible/impossible political association, even of political identification, nothing less than an inventory of the Bengali middle class at a moment in its history when one had to make known one's affiliations. More powerfully than their 'decadence' (the word most frequently invoked by leftwing critics in describing the hedonist

rebels in Bengali culture in wake of the 'Hungry Generation' writing and the kind of establishment literature exemplified at that point by Samaresh Bose's novels, *Bibar* and *Prajapati)* the moral degeneracy of our heroes is brought out through their alienation from the people of the region they have chosen to visit. The moral question, always problematic in itself, is rendered complex by its imbrication with the question of class. The chowkidar, the errand boy, the tribal girl, instead of forming a backdrop to the protagonists, come to signify their hollow insides. And this is done without a simple denunciation of the protagonists, without a moral judgement.

Bandyopadhyay claims that the critical force of the film is weakened by the one lapse into moral judgement that occurs through the character of Rini. He also traces out the metaphoric discourse on money in the film—how money is raised to its proper level of reality even as it is figured in its abstract physicality. Money connects the characters even as it separates them; as currency it returns and weaves narrative threads, its function being ironic and sad at the same time. Memory and money, Bandyopadhyay suggests, are not only objects of social interrogation, they create spaces of interrogation, for both social realities and for the mechanism of film,

Commentary on Ray's film form has of necessity locked in on the question of realism. From considering realism itself as a progressive, aesthetically and socially liberating value, critics have moved into an investigation of realism as ideology. Bandyopadhyay's essay attempts to bring back the question of naturalism, presumably to break out of the deadlock of ideological reductions. It shows how the play on memory makes possible a critical surfacing of the naturalist potential of the medium, makes it necessary for the critic to recognize the reflexive use the director was making of it—the kind of use that would affiliate the film to the world phenomenon of political cinema in the sixties and seventies. The play on money, on the other hand, makes for another reflex as it gently reminds us of the scandalous reality of cinema as an economic activity, an activity that Ray himself in his writings measured in terms of its success with the audience. Money doesn't appear only as a symbol of moral crisis; it also points to a basis of exchange and communication which in more than one sense is economic in character.

Swapan Chakravorty explores the extended meaning of economy in Jana Aranya, the last in the series of the city films. As it begins, the film visualizes the removal of the protagonist from the scene of politics. Again, there was enough in this staging of alienation to disappoint the radical critic of the time. Appearing right in the middle of the National Emergency in 1975, the portrayal of the young hero becoming a fixer was for many a baffling take on an urban reality inching towards the climax of a nationwide political crisis. Once again, to the extent that the film records the moral degeneracy of the generation, presents the metaphoric spectacle of the son becoming a pimp as the idealist father gropes in the dark for knowledge, it seems lacking in critical thrust. In late Ray this view of moral crisis and generational schism becomes naive to a disturbing point. In Shakha Prashakha (Branches of a Tree, 1990) for example, the industrialist patriarch's education in the fact of corruption leaves us incredulous and betrays a loss of contact with real dimensions of societal change. In *Jana Aranya* Ray is uncharacteristically cruel, his target is precisely the naivete of the middle class which thinks it can find a foothold in the changing world without taking part in the business of changing it. As the film moves away from the lamenting perspective of the father, the old man who wants to 'understand' the political rebels because he has respect for their sincerity, it gains, paradoxically, in critical insight. It indulges in a fascination for what stands opposed to idealism, the reality of the market. It does not perhaps debunk faith, but it destroys illusions. At one level the film certainly mourns the passing of a positive social order, a set of ideals, but at another, it clearly mocks at a social class which refuses to acknowledge the active contribution that market relations make to the very human substance, which refuses to see that the economic truth of its life cannot be comprehended sentimentally. The poet Sankha Ghosh called *Jana Aranya* the first film of protest in Ray's career since it shows how we come to stand on the brink of a disaster by following the everyday logic of making a living, by just surviving.[38] Perhaps the most memorable character in the film is the fixer Natabar Mitra, played by the great comedian Robi Ghosh. As one witnesses his dismantling of the hero's moral coordinates one senses how the political content of the film lies in its cold, non-sentimental delineation of the economic consent of human ties. Chakravorty concentrates on Ray's dialogue, a remarkable aspect of almost all his films, as he shows how deeply Jana Aranya is marked by a discourse on the market. The construction of identities (the middleman for example) takes place on a grid of market relations, something that is difficult to figure through dramatization in film. Chakravorty shows how dialogue as exchange becomes a

metonym for exchange in the larger sense in the film; how words, as they are shared between people, present the semantic tension between use and exchange values, and the changes of register embody the pulse of transactions. Words are not only symptoms, they constitute the body, which in film is never simply the physical appearance of humans, but a gathering and dispersal of effects of 'presence'. Words in the film conjure up the body through economies of more than one kind; selves are to be planted on this body that is coming into being. Chakravorty mentions *Aranyer Din Ratri* as a point of beginning in Ray's career of a mode of portrayal which is not primarily evocative as it was in his early classics, but is deeply analytical. And analysis does not so much depend upon characters as its vehicle, but figures the space between the individuals, the space of exchange.

Film society criticism in India was consistently dismissive of the industrial output because of its non-realist character, whereas the charge against Ray of 'falling short of reality' could be read in terms of a problem that the artist faced with a new political language breaking the seams of a certain consensus. When the second moment of interrogation arrived it was, however, Ray's realist conscience that came to be considered problematic. Coming in the late eighties, this moment coincided with a re-evaluation of the Indian popular cinema, and also with the Film Studies turn in Indian film criticism. The new scholarship was based in the new humanities, at a point of convergence of methods of social inquiry, semiotic textual criticism and cultural theory. The ideological analysis of texts had by then constituted realism as a 'bad object' of sorts. The latter was suspect because of its disavowal of codes of representation and narrative. The critique of positivist knowledge found fault with realism for its reproduction of prevalent orders of discourse under the guise of objective representation. A little later, postcolonial theory, as it studied the historical conditions of importation of forms from the metropolis to the colonies, found its own reason to question realist narrative's claim to privileged access to reality. It would stress that narrative's deep alliance with modernity, especially modern ideologies like nationalism. Cultural Studies demanded closer attention to popular forms on the other hand, which in Indian cinema can be seen to resist the realist paradigms. Scholarship on Indian cinema working in this intellectual climate developed an almost obsessive pre-occupation with the question of the nation. Since Ray's realist cinema came to be idealized as a form of national cinema it could now be seen as inventing the individual echoing the values of a developmental

state, as a humanist vision of individual and social destiny that does not take into account the irreducible contradictions of society. The more unsparing of these critics found Ray's rationalism and humanism to be consonant with the Nehruvian model of nation building, a model that now came under increasing attack from the critics of postcolonial modernity.

A powerful critique of Ray's cinema in terms of its affinities with the cultural project of the Nehruvian state came from the art historian and theorist Geeta Kapur. In an analysis of Devi she investigated the limits of the rationalist treatment of faith in Ray which is again a result of the influx of the ideals of colonial modernity. A comparison is drawn with the Prabhat Film Company production Sant Tukaram (V. Damle and S. Fattelal, 1936), and its popular critical engagement with institutional religion through a Bhakti worldview[39]. In a more complex and nuanced essay on the Apu- Trilogy, Kapur brings out the ideological implication of Ray's work in the post-indepencicnce project of national reconstruction[40]. Her primary target this time is Ray's vision of history. The great *bildungsroman* of Apu's life, which masters the finest resources of humanist art, ends up, according to her, prestiting a seamless narrative of the emergence of the normative middle-class citizen. One contribution of the realist cinemairi India was thought to be the introduction of the modern individual—psychologically coherent, historically set off, socially explicable—a perspectival individual of the novelistic discourse, poised against the schematic characters found in the popular cinema. Kapur finds the saga of Apu's growth into a modern individual allegorizing the history of Ray's own class in a destinal narrative. It is the organic model of development of that individuaI that she finds ideologically compromised. It does not recognize rupture; for instance, the violent break that colonialism stands for in the story of the nation's emergence. This time the critique is launched more from an avant-garde position on the artist's role in relation to his cultural inheritance.

The three essays dealing with the early films here take issue with Kapur's argument at some point or the other. Once again, it should be acknowledged that this critique has opened up new modes of engagement with the films, and shown the possibility of re-situating the films in their times, against a larger logic of inheritance. Kapur's deep appreciation of the films has not stopped her from probing their possible ideological implication and cultural politics. This is exemplary as it forces the critic to go beyond aesthetic evaluation, to look at the historical convergence of the elements that form the aesthetic in question, to look into their cultural

processing. The essays here do not simply debunk the terms of analysis proposed by Kapur, they complicate the connections further, suggest a more complex relationship between the ideology and the films in question, and re-assert their value in terms of a (relationship of) distance between the world that the films conjure up and the space of the nation and its culture that the developmental state, for instance, envisioned.

Sourin Bhattacharya's essay re-asserts the usefulness, even necessity, of locating Ray's early work, especially, the Trilogy, in the context of Nehruvian national reconstruction. He presents a description of that context in order to propose a distinction between the 'development narrative' and the 'narrative of development'. The narrative of development has a material reality of social change, of a social project in action; Ray's work of necessity lives within its ambit. But it does not have to have only one life. We would probably have forgotten the films like many others from the time if the content was circumscribed by the project in question. What Louis Althusser called the 'internal distance' of a living work of art,**41** its relationship of non coincidence with the ruling worldview, can be brought out in Ray's case as one attends to his relationship with the other narrative, the development narrative, which Bhattacharya see as a whole apparatus of identification with the state programme, a whole culture, no less. The Trilogy did not have to identify with the development narrative even as it shared to a large extent the emancipatory promise of post- independence progressivism. The internal distance with ideology becomes clear as we dismantle the self-identity of the ideology itself. It is not only that a complex and rich artistic work resists being reduced to a set of ideological tenets, the ideology, the state's view of development in this case, should itself not be taken as unitary, stemming from one dominant class interest. In its formulation of principles the state was in no way free of conflict.

I argue in my essay for the necessity for revisiting the early Ray in non-allegorical terms, that is, in terms that do not force an overlay of narratives with the narrative of the nation. On the one hand, one could remain committed to the task of opening out the text to a weave of cultural composition; on the other, it is necessary to return to the artistic process. Ray not only borrows his story from Bibhutibhushan Bandyopadhyay's novels, his cinema is deeply connected with a certain tradition of the novel. If, as the most influential theorist of cinematic realism, Andre Bazin, claimed, it is the destiny of realist cinema to become novelistic, in the Trilogy cinema was

meeting the novel in a specific language context. It was bringing on to screen a certain content, a life processed so far in a 'novel project', which cannot be understood on the grid of a nationalist conception of the nation. The modern tradition Ray imbibed reflected on social life both in historical terms using tools of positive social analysis, and in terms of recursive time and experience, with close affinity to mythical structures. Bibhutibhushan's and Ray's apprehension of the reality of Indian life does not accommodate a sense of rupture in the sense that avant-garde art does, or the cinema of Ritwik Ghatak does; its consciousness of colonialism is not direct and reflexive either. This mode, the novelistic mode as I am calling it here, did not capture a direct encounter with colonialism; if it had a response to colonialism it was in its presentation of a texture of everyday living, in the accumulation of secular details of life, the creation of a place, of the rhythm of the day. It was an extremely important task of detailing the quotidian that it set itself, to create a sense of wholeness at a non-heroic level of resistance to enforced rule and mandates of change. It is necessary to revisit the artistic process at work in the Trilogy to see how Ray has created in it not only the normative trajectory of a citizen, but a 'place', a teeming horizon, a region. This second work follows the naturalist rather than the realist impulse, something that comes to gather evidence of a 'place' rather than create a nationalist image of Naturalism, usually considered a flawed, incomplete realism, appears to constitute a fault-line in the ideology of realism here.

Ravi Vasudevan's essay reads the complex function of realism in the early films in relation to another fault-line, a formal reflex that he calls modernist. At crucial moments in the Trilogy, the realist discipline is interrupted by narrative conjunctions that are elliptical in nature, that foreground the technique, and at the same time, move the representation away from its focalization of character, This not only creates a scope for reading conflicting perceptions within a seemingly untroubled order of representation, it also allows for a creative recall of 'past' modes, including popular modes of image-making and story-telling. The emergence of a normative selfhood, to the extent that there is such a thing in the films, is complicated by a recall of selfhoods that are left behind or forgotten in the process of becoming modern. Instead of a celebration of a modern order that is accomplished at the level of national reconstruction Vasudevan notices the compulsion in Ray's cinema to create an archive of the present precisely in terms of its difficult dialogues with the past. In *Charulata* (The Lonely Wife, 1964), the

formal classicism is made to confront modes of writing and viewing which belong to the feminine, folk or popular domain. This is consonant with the sophisticated critique of the formation of the colonial subject that the film undertakes, It anticipates theoretical investigation by historians that was to come more than two decades later as it places the story of conjugality and love on the grid of a set of binaries, The story of Charu, Bhupati and Amal is mapped onto the dichotomy of the home and the world, the private and the public, literature (culture) and politics, vernacular (Charu's writing) and English (Bhupati's magazine), to set off the irony of the fundamental internal fracturing that attends the making of the modern Indian individual. Vasudevan's survey of some of the most important films in the first twenty years of Ray's career shows the range of thematic choices and formal options that the director employed, often making different generic choices within the space of a single film. The mobilization of conflicting formal options does not allow for a simple authentication of a model narrative of development or models of individuality imposed by official discourses.

In his discussion of Jana Aranya, a film that returns to focus through many essays in this volume, Vasudevan points to a certain dissociation of the narrative form. Ray allows for a dispersal of the effect of reality, for a dynamic movement of the sensory effects that narrative cinema tries to discipline. Probably this marked the definitive end of the early project in which Ray was connecting with a tradition of literature. As he comes to grips with the contemporary, tries to develop a mode of encounter with the city, Ray feels the necessity for taking risks with the form. The city films (*Pratidwandi, Seemabaddha* [Company Limited, 1971], *Jana Aranya*) abandon the formal poise of the earlier vork as if to allow the present to leave its marks on the body of the film, The time had to be perceived as an intractable present, embodying hardly anything else than a rupture, its own interruption. Historically, in such moments the photograph and film have embarked on a new engagement with the experience of the city. The city appears in filmic image as an embodiment of the present. It is possible to write a history of these moments of contact between cinema and the city where established conventions of form enter into a crisis, new possibilities of cinematic speech emerge. The question of naturalism poses itself again at this point.

In a way Supriya Chaudhuri's essay on the city films (regarded by many as another trilogy) addresses the same question. She takes her cue from Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer, who were among the first writers to regard the contact between the city and photographic representation in terms different from an object-image relationship, who saw the conjugation of the two as part of a single perceptual regime of modernity, as having a single reality, so to speak. Chaudhuri proposes a reading of the politics of these films that attends to the specificity of the medium even as she argues how the historical moment motivated an essentially extra-cinematic processing of the cinematic effect. She finds the most important political aspect of the films in their work of dispersal—the dispersed form, the stark impressionism of images, the sense of a social space itself becoming cinematic in nature. How do these films bring back the 1970s to us now? One has to look at the body, the fragmentary gestures of bodies negotiating the city, in order to arrive at an understanding of how the physical registration of a turbulent time, a time of discontinuity, is stored as memory for us. It is necessary to move back and forth between bodies captured in the films and the cinematic body, the materiality that is conjured up through film, in order to keep the critical sight trained on two questions simultaneously. How do the films become political through the very energy that circulates in them, through their convulsions, their formal instability? How, on the other hand, is the cinematic material in them constituted through a blurring of familiar distinctions between the object world and the image? What is often glimpsed in these films is a re-negotiation of realism through processes that are closer to naturalism, an opening out of the medium into the world, a propensity to treat the raw and contingent impression of the world as already cinematic in effect. Chaudhuri's invocation of Gilles Deleuze is especially relevant in this context since Deleuze looked for a model of film theory which would avoid the duality of image and referent, which would see the two as part of a single weave of reality.

As we employ the inter-disciplinary resources of new film scholarship in our effort to revisit Ray's cinema, we cannot overlook the usefulness of more familiar, time-tested methods of analysing authors and texts. Suman Ghosh and Ujjal Chakraborty demonstrate the continuing viability of textual and *auteurist* analysis of form and content in their essays. Ray's screenplays have been considered immensely readable texts in themselves. Their published versions in several issues of the Bengali little magazine, Ekshan, should be regarded as constituting an

independent oeuvre. Ghosh reads the screenplay of Ray's *Kanchenjungha* (1962, the first one to be based on his original story and published as a book) closely to test Ray's own claim that he learnt the dramatic form from western classical music, especially from Mozart. In his famous essay 'A Long Time on the Little Road' Ray complained that traditional Indian music does not offer a structural model that can be used in film. The contrapuntal moves, the symmetries and patterns of motifs that emerge from the reading of the screenplay pose interesting questions: What is the relationship between content, or the specific life being portrayed, and such form? Is it possible to cast a novelistic apprehension of life (for example, the one that Ray borrows from Bibhutibhushan) into a structure of this kind? Wasn't it necessary for Ray to write his own story, move away from a certain literary tradition, for the purpose? The success of this structural/musical experiment probably marked the beginning ol a new phase in Ray's work, so that even a film like Charulata, based on a literary classic (Tagore's 1901 story, 'Nastanir'), adopts a more discursive, analytical mode of recasting the literary material. It is not accidental that this was also the beginning of an engagement with contemporary European film styles in Ray's career. One wonders if a new conception of location wasn't necessary for this formal structure to emerge in *Kanchenjungha.* It is one of the rare instances in Ray where the location has a geometric function in the narrative, from which it can be notionally abstracted. The Darjeeling roads, with their bends and flights, their varying elevation and proximity, contribute to the destinies of the characters, lend a hand in the making and unmaking of relationships. They also provide a stage for the confrontation of ideas. Ghosh's reading also reminds us of the changes Ray had to actually undergo before he moved into the city films phase, into a new engagement with his own location.

Ujjal Chakraborty, a well-known Ray aficionado, traces a certain motif through Ray's films and fiction, which helps us return to the question of the political in a refreshingly new way. He shows the continuing validity of close content analysis as he moves from a thematic emphasis on the question of class and labour in Postmaster (part of Teen Kanya [Three Daughters, 1961) to minor, muted articulations of the question in certain later characters and situations. The truth of the relationship between the postmaster and the little girl in the film cannot be grasped only by appreciating its human content; it is not complete without an exposure, an ironic laying bare of the reality of work. Is it possible to identify the reality of the middle-class world of Ray's cinema

by the limits of it that he sometimes includes within the frame of representation? Chakraborty shows the possibility of an answer in the affirmative. He suggests a reading of the films in conjunction with the popular children's fiction that Ray wrote, the fiction that has sometimes baffled critics by its preoccupation with the supernatural and the occult, and that has led at least one critic to believe that Ray's rationalist self betrays a schism, a 'personological split' at this point. [42] Chakraborty shows how the ghost story has often appeared as a disguise for the story of labour in Ray: servants and slaves return in them to serve their masters after death, they cannot forget their deep obedience, their fear of retribution. These quietly insistent menials appear in another form as marginal, silent characters in the films. To notice them and read their untold but possible stories, is to discover the holes in the fabric of reality that we see, to remember the inevitable exclusions of which it is made. The substratum of reality is the reality of work, the bedrock, but it can only be glimpsed through a detour of the occult. Chakraborty's method is quite different from the rest of the contributors, but his reading connects up at this point with the section on labour in Sibaji Bandyopadhyay's discussion of *Aranyer Din Ratri*. It also returns us to the question of realism and liberal and humanistic question—which appears to be present in enlightened mentality of Satyajit Ray and is aptly reflected through his films.

Notes

1. Marie Seton, *Portrait of a Director: Satyajit Ray*, revised edn (Delhi: Penguin, 2003) ;pp.16-17.

2. Ibid:

3. Ibid ;p.18

4. Ibid

5. Ibid;p.19

6. Ibid

7. Ibid;p.31

8. Ibid;p.32

9. Ibid;p.35

10. Andrew Robinson, *Satyajit Ray: The Inner Eye*, 2nd edn (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).;p.46

11. Ibid;p.56

12. Ibid;p.57

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid;p.72

17. Ibid.

18. Steve Vineberg,*Home and the World: Reflections on Satyajit Ray*; The Three penny Review, No. 43 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 33-35

19. Ibid

20. Ibid

21. Ibid

22. Ibid

23. Amaresh Misra*, Precarious Social-Individual Balance*; Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 20/21 (May 16-23, 1992), pp. 1052-1054

24. Ibid

25. Peter J. Bertocci, *Bengali Cultural themes in Satyajit Ray's "The World Of Apu"* Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol. 19, No. 1, MISCELLANY (Winter, Spring1984), pp. 15-34

26.Misra,op.cit

27. Erik Barnouw, *Lives of a Bengal Filmmaker: Satyajit Ray of Calcutta*; The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, Vol. 38, No. 2 (SPRING 1981),pp. 60-77

28. Suranjan Ganguly,*In Search Of India: Rewriting Self and Nation In Satyajit Ray's Days and Nights In The Forest;* Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol. 30, No. 1/2, MISCELLANY (Winter, Spring,Summer, Fall 1995), pp. 162-172

29.Mrinalini Chakravorty, *Picturing "The Postmaster": Tagore, Ray, and the Making of an Uncanny Modernity* The Journal of Cinema and Media, Vol. 53, No. 1 (SPRING 2012), pp.118-119

30. Chandak Sengoopta,*The Movies: Satyajit Ray: The Plight of the Third-World Artist*; The American Scholar, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 250

31. Paul Glushanok, *On Ray* Cinéaste, Vol. 1, No. 1 (SUMMER, 1967),p.4

32.Radical students' politics in Bengal coincided almost exactly with the Prague-Spring, May 68, the student movements in USA, West Germany, Italy and England. Immanuel Wallerstein has seen this connection as a moment of revolution in the global modernity he calls the world system; see his '1968, Revolution in the World-system' and 'Marx, Marxism- Leninism, and Socialist Experiences in. the Modern World-system' in Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, 1991), PP. 65-83, and pp. 95-96. From the point of film history, the usefulness of seeing the moment in world perspective is that it can go some way towards explaining the crisis of the humanist-realist cinema in several national contexts which, again, more or less coincided with each other

33. 'Can a serious film maker, working in India, afford to shut his eyes to the reality around him, the reality that is so poignant, and so urgently in need of interpretation in terms of cinema? I do not think so.''Problems of a Bengali Film Maker', in Ray, Our Films, Their Films (Calcutta, 1977), p. 41.

34.Chidananda Das Gupta*, 'Satyajit Ray: The First Ten Years'*, in Talking About Films (New Delhi, 1981), p. 60, 68.

35.Ibid, p. 72. Sections of the essay were published in 1966-67 as 'Ray and Tagore' in Sight and Sound, 36:1, Winter.

36.Amitava Chattopadhyay, *'Satyajit Ray: Then and Now'*, in Chitrabikshan, Annual Number, 1975, pp. 9-28.

37. Essays by Gabriel and others in Jim Pines and Paul Willemen ed., Questions of Third Cinema (London, 1989).

38. Sankha Ghosh, *'Pratibader chhabi'*, in Subrata Rudra ed., Satyajit: Jiban shilpa (Calcutta, 1996).

39. Geeta Kapur, *'Mythic Material in Indian Cinema'*, Journal of Arts and Ideas, nos. 14-15, July-December, 1987.

40.Geeta Kapur, '*Sovereign Subject: Ray's Apu'*, in When was Modernism, Essays on Contemporary Cultural Practice in India (New Delhi, 2000); earlier version published as 'Cultural Creativity in the First Decade: The Example of Satyajit Ray', Journal of Arts and Ideas, nos. 23-24, January, 1993.

41.Louis Althusser, '*A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre'*, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, tr. Ben Brewster (London, 1971).

42.Which means both country and nation in many Indian languages.

43.Ashis Nandy, *'Satyajit Ray's Secret Guide to Exquisite Murders, Creativity, Social Criticism and the Partitioning of the Self'*, in The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves (Princeton, 1995), pp. 237-66

CONCLUSION

In the seventeen-odd years since Ray's death, the Western image of India has changed spectacularly and scholars and commentators now show a far deeper understanding of the complexities of Indian culture. Ray's reputation, however, remains largely unchanged. As the Lincoln Center retrospective opened in April 2009, Terrence Rafferty, writing in The New York Times , hailed the Indian master's "bottomless curiosity about how people negotiate the most urgent demands of nature and culture." Although sensing that some of Ray's films "might make you feel as if you needed to know a good deal more about the history and politics of the subcontinent," Rafferty swiftly dismissed such concerns. "Ray," he assured his readers, "has nuances to burn: you can miss quite a few and still feel as if you know his people intimately." Later month, in The New Yorker, David Denby had this to say about Mahanagar (The Big City), a 1963 film about a middle-class housewife going out to work: "The basic themes' are feminist... but the family situation is captured in such fleshy immediacy and psychological detail that one never thinks of the film as the demonstration of a thesis. Intimacy is Ray's natural mode.

Ray, in other words, continues to be portrayed as the gentle humanist, a superlative surveyor of nuance and emotional depth but an artist whose ideological position is of no great importance. It is certainly true that Ray always denied that he made films to change the world and, unlike his Bengali contemporaries Mrinal Sen or Ghatak, he never showed much interest in Marxism. But that should not obscure the simple fact that Ray, in his own way, was as ideological an artist as his peers. Ray's narratives might be classical and all his characters complexly delineated but that does not mean that Ray's interest in human beings is all forgiving. True, even his most negative characters are permitted to speak and act freely, out it is that very freedom that reveals their social and moral worthlessness to the viewer. Like his mentor Renoir, Ray believed that every-one has his reasons but all reasons were never equal in Ray's universe.

But before going into the projection of complex tendencies of Ray's Cinema we should try to stage Ray at the crossroads of Bengal Renaissance since we are at the postlude section of the present thesis.

The Bengal Renaissance as mentioned earlier is the glimmering phase in the mid 19th century when the cultural Flamboyancy and religious revivalism had stirred the province of Bengal. It is said to have began with Raja Rammohun Roy(1775-1833) and continued until the death of Rabindranath Tagore in 1941.Etymologically the word Renaissance(Rinascimento in Italian

means rebirth or revitalism).The term was coined by Jacob Bruckhardt in the context of Italian Renaissance of Late 14th and early 15th century. The Italian Renaissance in short as discussed in the first chapter saw the melange of the pagan old and the new of the emerging Europe. This condition prepared the base for the rise of an enlightened phase that Europe witnessed in the17th century. The rise of colonialism and more particularly the trends of Utilitarianism and Evangelicalism popularized these newer modes of western thoughts which arose in Europe as a result of Renaissance and Enlightenment in the colonies and more particularly in Bengal. The new intellectual avalanche of European knowledge particularly history,philosophy, literature and science through the medium of education in English may be said to have affected the contemporary mind and life very radically.Rammohun Roy was the morning star of the Bengal renaissance.His contribution towards social and cultural sphere was colossal. Sophia Dolson Collet lauds him as"the bridge over which India marches from her unmeasured past to her incalculable future".Subsequently,the notorious band of Henry Louis Vivian Derozio came up with an iconoclast disposition.His radical disciples Debendranath Tagore and his followers Akshay Kumar Dutta,Ishwarchandra vidyasagar, Michael Madhusudan Dutta, Bankim Chandra Chattophadhyaya, Swami vivekananda were the prominent figures of Bengal Renaissance of the 19th and early 20th cent.

But how to situate Ray within this changed socio-cultural context?.The most important ideological outcome of renaissance infused newer Bengal is the rise of Humanism and this humanistic concept can very prominently be featured in Ray's cinemas. Ray's work was rooted in a specifically Indian version of modernist, cosmopolitan liberalism that goes back at least to the nineteenth century. Liberalism in India was never the monopoly of any particular party. It was always a broad church and embraced champions of free trade as well as cultural critics who despised commerce. In the colonial era, the average Indian's prospects for participation in national politics or global trade were, of course, very limited and much liberal thought during this period was directed toward the reform of Indian society and took on strongly individualistic and moralistic overtones. Diverse reforms were called for but all Indian liberals, like their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere, emphasized the need for individuals to be rational and morally responsible for their actions. As usual in India, different regions had their own distinctive versions of liberalism and the ideological convictions . Satyajit Ray derived largely from the social and moral thought of the Brahmo Samaj, a reformist Hindu movement that began

in the nineteenth century in Calcutta and subsequently spread to other parts of India[1]. Ray's ancestors were prominent in this movement and he himself was briefly a student at the university established by the Nobel- winning poet and perhaps the most famous Brahmo of all time, Rabindranath Tagore (1861- 1941)[2]. Tagore has often been seen as Ray's most important mentor but this link has been interpreted in terms that are far too individualistic. It would be more correct to see both as representatives exceptionally able and articulate representatives, of course of the same progressive Brahmo tradition. By the middle of the twentieth century, the Brahmo movement had lost much of its intensity. Ray himself had little patience for the institutional practices of the Brahmo Samaj and acknowledged no religious influence on his work. But the Brahmo faith was not a matter of religion alone and much of its ideological and social fervor was carried forward by Ray in his cinemas.

Linking Ray's Cinema with liberal versions of Bengal Renaissance

Pather Panchali , Aparajito (1956), and The World of Apu (1959) - the three films of the Apu trilogy - comprise an epic of progress, recounted in classically liberal and linear terms. In Ray's adaptation, the consciousness of time is radically different. Except for Ravi Shankar's pastoral theme from Pather Panchali , which reappears at crucial points in the later films, there is no eruption of the past into the present. Even the ancestral village is never seen after the first film. The narrative Ray designed for Apu mirrored the progressive, nationalistic narrative that the post independence generation wished to compose for India. The constraints of history would be surmounted completely; each difficulty would be resolved by rational, secular means[3] .

 That same liberal nationalist faith in inevitable progress was also expressed in one of Ray's most misunderstood films, The Music Room (1958). A study of the decline and fall of a music-loving landowner and the unstoppable rise of his unrefined bourgeois neighbor, the film has been seen as a reactionary celebration of feudalism by Bengali critics such as *Amitabha Chattopadhyay*, while historian *Andrew Sartori* has found the film to be saturated with patrician anxieties about "the modern onslaught of materialistic vulgarity."[4] Now, it is true that Ray portrays the "self-made" bourgeois neighbour very negatively but the aristocratic connoisseur, although presented compassionately, is shown to be doomed. Indeed, the film rubs it in with a poorly- visualized final scene of the drunken, bankrupt hero riding to his death. *The Goddess* (1960), also set in an upper-class milieu, was even more harsh. A landowner dreams that his daugh- ter-in-law is the

incarnation of the mother goddess and ordains that she should be worshipped as divine. Her husband, a college- educated young man who has learnt a lot from a Christian, rationalist professor, protests his father's action but to no avail. He tries to take the "goddess" away with him to Calcutta but she is virtually insane by then and escapes into a mist-shrouded field, where, presumably, she dies[5].

The landowner does not get much sympathy from the director, nor does tradition. The tenderness with which the doomed aristocrat was portrayed in The Music Room is absent from *The Goddess*. Western modernity is presented virtually uncritically, with no allusions to the colonial exploitation associated with it. The supposedly negative representation of Hinduism troubled many at the time and the film's international distribution was held up by their protests. Reportedly, Nehru once again countermanded his bureaucrats, enabling the film to be shown overseas. Even though Ray's biographers do not endorse this story, it is easy to imagine Nehru loving the film. Here was the new India setting its own house in order, secure enough to condemn its irrational traditions and moving confidently toward a rational, modern future as visioned by Ray or more particularly his reformed enlightened notion encouraged this change[6].

The original story of *Big city* by Narendranath Mitra had ended, as Ray himself told Marie Seton, on a totally pessimistic note. "Ray, being an optimist, changed the ending so as to suggest there is hope," Seton recorded. It was not simply a matter of Ray's personal optimism or pessimism, however. The change reflected a particular ideological conviction. The sense of socio-economic possibility in modern, urban India was characteristic of liberal nationalism. The optimistic conclusion of The Big City fit neither the original story nor the times - it did, however, reveal the persistent power of liberal ideology over Ray's supposedly apolitical art. However this note of possibility is completely absent in *The Adversary*[7]

Days and Nights was but a prologue to the searing Calcutta Trilogy. Comprising *The Adversary* (1970), *Company Limited* (1971), and *The Middleman* (1975), this new trilogy, critic Suranjan Ganguly has rightly argued, chronicled "the moral and spiritual collapse of the new urban India." These films are relatively little-known in the West, and even in India, critics often dismiss them as illustrations of Ray's personal inability to cope with the radical politics of the time. The confusion, however, was not just in the mind of one artist - Ray's Calcutta Trilogy records the failure of an entire class and ideology to address the demands of the cruel new age[8].

With *Distant Thunder* (1973), Ray retreated somewhat into his old comfort zone. Based on a novel by the author of the Apu novels, it was once again a rural film, although the story was infinitely darker. Set in the early days of the great famine that consumed Bengal in 1943, the film began with shots of an idyllic rural landscape and ended with hundreds of starving people walking towards the camera. Although charting the breakdown of rural society with considerable objectivity and graced with remarkable performances, the film's heroic individualism strained credibility.

By the time he returned to Calcutta with *The Middleman* , however, the iron had entered Ray's soul. Based on a lurid novel, the film depicted the moral vicissitudes of Somenath, a talented young man, who, for reasons beyond his control, fails to get high enough grades in his college exams and has to go into business. Not having the capital to launch something big, he enters the business world of Calcutta as a humble "order supplier," a middleman who channels goods of any kind to big businesses from wholesalers, collecting a commission from the latter as his recompensation. Made during the 1975-77 Emergency, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had "suspended" democracy in India, the film explored the putrefying world of petit-bour- geois Calcutta, plagued by power cuts and darkened by economic misery, all-pervasive corruption and political turmoil. Walls were spattered with Maoist slogans, streets were full of unemployed youth and business districts seethed with unbridled greed and total disregard for morality or any kind of law. The city was a place where bright students could be graded down because examiners were too poor to afford proper glasses. "The only bleak film I have made is *The Middleman* Ray remarked in 1982. "I felt corruption, rampant corruption all around. . ."[9] In The Adversary, Siddhartha, of course, represented the rational, moral individual and even in the second, relatively weak film of the Calcutta Trilogy, *Company Limited* (1971), Ray had allowed for insight and conscience in one character. On a visit to her affluent sister and brother-in-law (whose only aim in life is to rise higher on the corporate ladder regardless of moral cost), she asks inconvenient questions and makes comments that puncture the egos of her amoral and self-absorbed hosts. Individuals and even systems might be losing their scruples, but society, Ray still believed, was not entirely bereft of people with a sense of individual moral responsibility. This individuality is a significant breakthrough and also no doubt is a noted exception in a capitalist elite society.

The old Satyajit Ray never quite reemerged after *The Middleman*. No matter what kind of film he made, his old liberal serenity was revived. The colorful, star-studded historical epic, The *Chess Players* (1977), turned out to be as much a condemnation of Indian decadence as of British colonial ruthlessness. The Indian nobles were portrayed without much sympathy the only character in the film who showed even a spark of patriotism was a peasant boy who, in the words of critic Ujjal Chakraborty, "holds the seed of the Great Indian Mutiny inside him."[10] None of this was in line with standard liberal-nationalist versions of Indian history, in which the British were unquestionably, irredeemably exploitative, and peasants, although good, needed to be led in the battle for freedom by an enlightened elite. Ray's interpretation has recently been seen as innovative and "post- colonial" but, at the time of the film's release, he was severely rebuked in India for his unflattering portrayal of the Indian elite.

Ray made a couple of children's films after The Chess Players but even those carried somber implications. The more interesting of the two, The Kingdom of Diamonds (1980), was a parable on totalitarianism and its defeat by a combination of technology and liberalism. The political content of Diamonds has often been noted, especially because of a scene alluding to forcible slum clearances during Indira Gandhi's Emergency. But the ideological meat of the film lay elsewhere. A schoolteacher, aided by a singer and drummer (both possessing magical powers), take over the brainwashing apparatus used by the evil Diamond King to keep his subjects docile - and use it on the king himself. A near-catatonic king then helps the liberators pull down his own giant statue, chanting rhymed slogans against himself. Was this a simple victory of rational, liberal, democratic, and progressive forces over tyranny? Or was Ray suggesting, instead, that whilst despotism was evil, liberalism had its own brutal and retrogressive tendencies? The use of the brainwashing device by the tyrant as well as the liberators seemed to hint quite strongly at the permeability of the boundary between totalitarianism and liberalism, a theme that would have been unthinkable for Ray in his early years. Such ambiguities were not readily apparent in Ray's next feature, The *Home and the World* (1984), based on a controversial Tagore novel about the formative period of Indian nationalism. Not only does an individual liberal die, but his whole dream of leading his wife into the world also fails. Bimala's education and brief romance do not lead to fulfillment or liberation - all she finds at the end of her passage from the home to the world is widowhood and self- mortification. A simple juxtaposition of Home with The Goddess reveals immediately how far Ray had moved from his original world-view in two decades.[11]

239

Thus while arriving at the postlude of the present thesis we are significantly turned on by the fact that Ray being at last phase of the colonial modernity was unable to disassociate himself with the parameters of modernized trends that were unleashed by Enlightened Europe into the colonized East. These are aptly reflected in his films which gives an exceptional excellence to his films. He is at the crossroads because the colonial and postcolonial trends both can be bloated out in his Cinema. He significantly utilized the noble ideals of both the ages in his Films to create a distinct generation of Films .The latter Films of Aparna Sen, Rituporno Ghosh had different facts to show and took up social cause as the main basis of their films .Ray refuses to take sides either with characters or ideologies; since he is interested above all in the complexly human... there are no real heroes or villains in his work, no simple winners and losers[12]An eminent Marxist historian from Calcutta, for instance, wrote that while history moved through class conflict, Ray's characters remained isolated, free-floating individuals[13]. This kind of statement shows how little of Ray's ideological position has been understood even by sophisticated and politically astute viewers from his own culture. The high prominence Ray gave to mavericks and off-message characters in his films stemmed not from some happy-clappy, apolitical humanism but from his ideological conviction of the autonomy, agency, and moral worth of the individual. One is under no obligation to approve of that ideology, of course, but a critic who shows no understanding of it is surely missing something crucial.

His films exposed the liberal humanism of a bourgeoisie Brahmo intellectual with all its ambivalence and contradiction.Through his films one can trace the multifaceted paradigms of colonial modernity. Technically the films are absolute super fine, but as to the themes many questioned can be raised .Technicalities of Cinematic expressions were expressed in its full strength .Some messages are distorted.Some of his contradictions have been exposed on issues of Gender,class politics and global order.His 'Ghare Baire' is an example of limitations of feminine identity from the context of patriarchy exploitation.Bimala has been projected as a stereotyped feminine with her doors closed by the ethical values of middle class.He couldnot transcend the ideas away from what Tagore had traced and Bimala faced the same tragedy after her 'mistakes'.Ray also went half way on issues of class conflict on films lie Pratidwandi,Mahanagar and Seemabaddho.The essential bourgeoisie in him never questioned any conflict within classes and there is an "all is well that ends well" ind of a solution.The politics of the contemporary society has been addressed with no conflicting resolution.It was more aesthetically rich than

being realistic.The global identity of Satyajit Ray has overshadowed his existence as a representative of the educated middle class.His Films won awards from international film festivals lie *Cann* but perhaps couldn't gain ground within the uneducated poverty stricen population Bengal.The exception was 'Sadgati'.Even a film of Famine lie 'Ashani Shanket' was portrayed in 'Eastman colour'projecting its aesthetic value more than exposing the bitter reality of village people.In him we find the ever romanticisation of Globe trotter like 'agantuk' and ever idealist like a old man of 'Shakha Proshakha'.Sometimes he failed to project the temper of the time.His Apu trilogy won best human documentary in the world of Films-but as he moved his productions faced with contradictions.His documentaries are obviously exceptionally made and it is difficult to criticize those productions from the contradictions of renaissance humanism.

Notes and References

1. David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1979

2. Andrew Robinson, Satyajit Ray: The Inner Eye , second edition (London: Tauris, 2004)

3. John W. Hood, *Beyond the World of Apu: The Films of Satyajit*: Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2008.

4. Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p.2.

5. Ashish Rajadhyaksha, "Satyajit Ray, Ray's Films, and Ray-Movie," Journal of Arts and Ideas , 23-24 (1993): pp.7- 16

6. Darius Cooper, The Cinema of Satyajit Ray: Between Tradition and Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.2

7. Letter from Ray to Marie Seton dated December 10, 1962, Marie Seton Collection, Section 2, Item 10, British Film Institute Special Collections, London.

8. Ashish Rajadhyaksha:*op.cit.*

9. Bert Cardullo (ed.), Satyajit Ray: Interviews (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007),p.50

10. Ujjal Chakraborty, "Those Who Work," in Biswas (ed.), Apu and After,pp. 296-307, at p.303.

11. Ashish Rajadhyaksha:*op.cit*

12. Marie Seton, Portrait of a Director: Satyajit Ray revised edition (Delhi: Penguin-India, 2003)

13. Gautam Bhadra, "Satyajit-Chalachchitrey Kalchetana" [Historical Consciousness in the Films of Satyajit Ray], in Sheetalchandra Ghosh and Arun kumar Roy (eds.), Satyajit Ray: Bhhinna Chokhhey [Satyajit Ray: Different Views] (Calcutta: Ajanta, 1980), pp.97-105, at p.105.

Bibliography

Primary sources:

Books

1. Antonio Manetti, *The Birth and Rebirth Of Pictoral Space* (Translated by John White,1957).

2. Adrienne, Moore ,*Rammohun Roy and America*.Kolkata;Sadharan Brahmo Samaj.1942.

3. Brajendra Nath. Seal, *Rammohun Roy:The Universal Man* (originally published 1924).Reprinted In Chakravarty ,1935.

4. Debendranath, Tagore. *'Reminiscences Of Rammohun Roy'*(originally written in 1896)Reprinted in Chakravarty 1935.

5. Federico Chabod ,*Machiavelli and Renaissance:*The Cambridge History Of Renaissance Philosophy, (trans.,1958)

6. Giorgio Vasari, *Lives of the Most Eminent Painters,Sculptors and Architects*(Everyman,1963)4 vols.

7. Henry T. Colebrook,, '*On the Duties Of The Faithful Hindu Widow'* Asiatic Researches,Vol-IV,1795

8. Henry.T. Colebrooke, *Introduction To Indian Algebra with Arithmetic and Mensuration*. 1817:Reprinted in Chattopadhyay,1982

9. James Mill,. *The History Of British India* (abridged).Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.1975.

10. Jogendra C. Ghose, (ed), *'The English Works Of Raja Rammohun Roy'* vol-1, Kolkata:Oriental Press.1885.

11. Kalidasa, *'The Recognition Of Shakuntala'*(W.J. Smith,Tr.).Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001

12. Keshab Chunder, Sen,. *'The Brahmo Samaj Or Theism In India* (originally Published 1865).Reprinted In Chakravarty,1935

13. Kishory Chand, Mitter, *What was the religion Rammohun Believed In?* (originally Published 1845).Reprinted in Chakravarty,1935

14. L.A.Ritcher(ed) ,*Selections from the Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci*(O.U.P.,1952

15. Lorenzo de Medici, *Canzona di Bacco*(song for Bacchus),The Penguin book of Italian Verse.

16. Mary. Carpenter,*The Last Days in England of Rajah Rammohun Roy*(3rd edition:first edition 1866).

17. Michael Madhusudan, .Datta &Seely,Clinton B.(tr.), *The Slaying Of Meghanada:*.New York:Oxford University Press.2004.

18. Nihar Ranjan Ray & Pratul Chandra Gupta, (eds),1957. *'Hundred Years Of The University Of Calcutta.* Kolkata:University Of Calcutta.1957

19. Rabindranath. Tagore, *The Relation Of The Individual To The Universe,* in Sadhana,NewYork:The Macmillan Company;1915.

20. Rammohun, Roy,Circa '*Autobiographical Letter',The Athenaeum,* London,5 October 1833.

21. Rammohun, Roy, *Address to the Rt.Hon.William Cavendish Bentick'*(16th January),In Ghosh 1885.

22. Rammohun, Roy,: *'Translation of an abridgement of the Vedanta or the resolution of all the Veds'*, In Ghose 1885.

23. Rammohun, Roy,Circa *Autobiographical Letter,The Athenaeum,* London,5 October 1833,Sophia D. Collett,, *The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy* (D.K. Biswas & P.C.Gamguli,eds ,4th edition).Kolkata:Sadharon Brahmo Samaj.1988.

24. Sibnath, Sastri, *Rammohun Roy :The Story Of His Life:*originally published 1911.

Secondary Sources

Books.

25. Ashis Nandy, *'Satyajit Ray's Secret Guide to Exquisite Murders, Creativity, Social Criticism and the Partitioning of the Self*, in The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves (Princeton, 1995).

26. Arup Mukhopadhyay,*Satyajit Ray:Bishwojoyi Pratibhar Barnamoy Jibon*:Dip Prakashan:Sept,2016.

27. Andrew Robinson, *Satyajit Ray: The Inner Eye*, 2nd edn (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

28. Aniruddha Dhar,Ujjwal Chakrabarty,Atanu Chakrabarty-*Panchali theke Oscar*:Pratibhash:Kolkata:January:2010.

29. Albert, Rothenberg, *Creativity and Madness.*Baltimore:1990:Johns Hopkins University Press.

30. A.R., Damasio, '*Descartes'Error:Emotion,Reason And the Human Brain'.*New York:Grosset Putnam:1994.

31. Bernard Berenson , *Italian Painters of the Renaissance* : The University of Michigan: Meridian Books, 1957

32. Bruce C.,Robertson,*Raja Rammohun Roy,The Father of Modern India*: New Delhi:Oxford University Press,1995.

33. Bruno, Latour and Steve, Woolgar,.*Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*(2nd edition).Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986.

34. Chidananda Dasgupta,*The Cinema of Satyajit Ray*:National Book Trust,India;March:1992.

35. C.P. Snow.,*The Two Cultures* (Canto edition:1st edition 1959).Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

36. Carl L., Becker, *'The Heavenly Cities Of the Eighteenth Century Philosophes. New Heaven*:Yale University Press; 1932.

37. Charles, Brenner, ,*An Elementary Textbook Of Psychoanalysis* '(2ND edition).NewYork: Anchor Books:1973:

38. Chidananda Das Gupta*, Satyajit Ray: The First Ten Years*, in Talking About Films (New Delhi, 1981),

39. Daniel E., Schneider, *The Psychoanalyst and the Artist*, NewYork:Mentor/ New American Library.1961

40. David A., Washbrook, *Orients and the Occidents:Colonial Discourse Theory and The Historiography of Modern India ,*in R.W.Winks (ed),The Oxford History Of the British Empire,Vol-V;Historiography.Oxford:Oxford University Press

41. David, Kopf *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*.:Berkeley:University of California Press.1969.

42. David, Kopf, *'Brahmo Samaj and The Shaping Of Modern Indian Mind'.* Princeton;Princeton University Press:1979.

43. David A., Washbrook, '*Orients and the Occidents:Colonial Discourse Theory and The Historiography of Modern India'*,in R.W.Winks (ed),The Oxford History Of the British Empire,Vol-V;Historiography.Oxford:Oxford University Press:1999.

44. Dilip K, Biswas,&,P.C. Ganguli, 'Supplementary Notes',1988. in Collett :Kolkata:1988.

45. Dorothy M. Figueira, '*Translating the Orient:The Reception of Sakuntala in 19th Century Europe.*Buffalo:State University of New York Press.1991.

46. E.H., Gombrich, '*Art and Illusion'.*Princeton: Princeton University Press;1969:

47. Edward, Said,*Orientalism,*NewYork:Vintage Books/Random House:1979

48. Elie,Halevy,*'The Growth Of Philosophic Radicalism'(first Published 1928)(M.Morris.tr.).*Boston: The Bacon Press

49. Eric, Hobsbawm, *'Introduction:Inventing Tradition'* , in Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983

50. Erik H*., Erikson 'Identity ,Youth and Crisis'*. NewYork: W.W.Norton:1968.

51. Erik H.Erikson, '*Identity Crisis in Perspective'* In Life History and the Historical Moment. New York: 1975.

52. E.Garin, *Italian Humanism:Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance*(transl.from Italian,1952).

53. Edward, Said,*Orientalism,*NewYork:Vintage Books/Random House:1979.

54. E.H., Gombrich, '*Art and Illusion'.*Princeton: Princeton University Press;1969.

55. Elie,Halevy,*'The Growth Of Philosophic Radicalism'(first Published 1928)(M.Morris.tr.).*Boston: The Bacon Press.

56. Ernst, Kris, *Psychoanalytic Explorations of Art.*Madison:International University Press.1952.

57. Federico Chabod ,*Machiavelli and Renaissance:*The Cambridge History Of Renaissance Philosophy, (trans.,1958).

58. Fredrick C. Barlett, '*Remembering' ;*Cambridge :Cambridge University Press:1932.

59. Gauri, Vishwanathan,*'Masks of Conquest: Literary Studies and British Rule in India'* New Delhi :Oxford University Press.1998.

60. Ghulam , Murshid, (ed.),.*'The heart Of A Rebel Poet: Letters of Michael Madhusudan Dutt'.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2004.

61. Graham, Wallas , *'The Art Of Thought'* New York :Harcourt,Brace and Co.1926.

62. Heinrich, Wolfflin,not dated. '*Principles of Art History'* (1st English edition 1932).New York: Dover Publications

63. Hans Baron,*The crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance*(revised edn.,Princeton,1966)

64. Hans Baron ,*From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni*(Chicago, 1968):

65. Henri, Poincare *'Mathematical Creation'* (First Published 1915).Reprinted In Ghiselin :1985.

66. Henry T. Colebrook,, '*On the Duties Of The Faithful Hindu Widow'* Asiatic Researches,Vol-IV,1795.

67. Henry.T. Colebrooke, *'Introduction To Indian Algebra with Arithmetic and Mensuration'.* 1817:Reprinted in Chattopadhyay,1982.

68. Howard, E., Gruber *'The Evolving Systems Approach In Creative Work'*, In Wallace and Gruber 1989

69. J.R.Hale, *Renaissance Europe 1480-1520*(Fontana,1971):

70. Jacob Buchardt, *The Civilization Of The Renaissance In Italy,* Penguin Classics,1990

71. Jacques, Hadamard *'The psychology Of Invention In The Mathematical Field (2nd edition).* Princeton:Princeton University Press:1949.

72. Jean, Piaget, '*The Child and Reality'.*Harmondsworth:Penguin Books:1976.

73. Jogendra C. Ghose, (eds), '*The English Works Of Raja Rammohun Roy'*,Vol-1.Kolkata:Oriental Press;1885

74. Johan Huizinga, *Men and Ideas*, Princeton University Press, 2014

75. Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge.*Oxford:Clarendon Press,1972:chapter 1 section 4.

76. Keith, Holyoak, and Paul R. Thagard,,*Mental Leaps:Analogy In Creative Thought* .Cambridge,MA:MIT press:1995.

77. Kironmoy Raha,*Bengali Cinema*:Nandan:West Bengal Film Centre:January 1991.

78. Louis Althusser, '*A Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre'*, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, tr. Ben Brewster (London, 1971).

79. Luciano Berti, *Florence: the city and its art*; Scala:1971.

80. Max, Black *,Models and Metaphors.*Ithaca:Cornell University Press.1962

81. Marie Seton, *Portrait of a Director: Satyajit Ray*, revised edn (Delhi: Penguin, 2003).

82. Michael Madhusudan, .Datta &Seely,Clinton B.(tr.), '*The Slaying Of Meghanada'.*New York:Oxford University Press.2004.

83. Myron Gilmore,*The World Of Humanism 1453-1517*(N.Y.,1952).

84. Nihar Ranjan Ray & Pratul Chandra Gupta, (eds),1957. *'Hundred Years Of The University Of Calcutta.* Kolkata:University Of Calcutta.1957

85. Nikolaus Pevsner,*An Outline Of* Architecture :Penguin,1953

86. Norman, Hampson, '*The Enlightenment'.*Harmondsworth::Penguin Books : 1968.

87. P.O.Kristeller,*Renaissance Thought:The Classic,Scholastic and Humanistic Strains*:Chapter on Humanism,The Cambridge History Of Renaissance Philosophy :N.Y.,1961

88. R.K. Dasgupta., '*Ruskin in India',*in *English Poets on India and other Essays* (1st edition1945).Kolkata:Papyrus

89. R.S.Lopez , *Cambridge Economic History Of Europe* volumeIII chapter II,IV.

90. Rabindranath. Tagore, *'The Relation Of The Individual To The Universe',* in Sadhana,NewYork:The Macmillan Company,1915.

91. Richard*,* Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.1984

92. Robert, Nozick,*The Examined Life.*New York:Simon and Schuster,1989

93. Rona Goffen, *Renaissance Rivals: Michelangelo, Leonardo, Raphael, Titian:*Yale University Press.2004.

94. Rudolf Wittkower , *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* : Wiley, 1998.

95. S.N., Mukherjee, *'Sir William Jones: A study in Eighteenth Century British Attitudes To India'.*Cambridge::Cambridge University Press: 1969.

96. Sankha Ghosh, *'Pratibader chhabi'*, in Subrata Rudra ed., Satyajit: *Jiban Shilpa* (Calcutta, 1996).

97. Satish Chandra , Chakravarty, (ed). '*The Father of Modern India: Commemoration volume of the Ranmohun Roy Centenary Celebration ,1933.*Kolkata:Rammohun Roy Centenary committee 1935.

98. Satyajit Ray,*The Apu Trilogy*:Seagull Books:1985.

99. Satyajit Ray(Translated into Bengali by Gopa Majumdar),*Speaking of Films*:Penguin Books:2005.

100. Satyajit Charcha:*Chattagrama Satyajit Charcher Kendrer Mukhopatra*.

101.   Sisir Kumer, Das, '*The Shadow of the Cross:Christanity and Hinduism in a Colonial Situation.*New Delhi:Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers:1974.

102.   Sophia .D. Collett.*The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy:*Kolkata:Sadharan Brahmo Samaj:1988.

103.   Subrata, Dasgupta, ' *Jagadish Chandra Bose and the Indian Response to Western Science'*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press:1999.

104.   Suranjan Ganguly,Satyajit Ray:*In Search of the Modern*:Penguin Books:Noida:2000.

105.   Tapan, Raychoudhury '*Transformation of Religious Sensibilities in 19TH C Bengal.'* In Raychaudhury 1999.

106.   Thomas S. Kuhn, '*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edition).*Chicago:University Of Chicago Press:1970.

107.   Thomas, Edwards, *Henry Derozio(*1st edition 1884).Kolkata: Riddhi India:1980.

108.   William, Radice, *'Milton and Madhusudan'*, In G.R. Taneja &V. Sena(eds),Literature East And West: Essays presented to R.K .Dasgupta.New Delhi:Allied Publishers,1995.

109.   Wilder, Penfield, '*The Mystery Of The Mind'*. Princeton :Princeton University Press.1975.

110.   William, Paley, ' *Natural Theology:Or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes Of the deity* Collected From *The Appearance Of Nature*(12th edition ,1809).

111.   Zaheer, Baber,*The Science of Empire:Scientific Knowledge,Civilization and Colonial Rule In India*.Albany:1996.The State University of New York Press.

112.   Ziauddin, Sardar, '*Thomas Kuhn and the Science wars'* Cambridge: Icon Books;2000.

E-Journals.

113.   Axel Honneth, *Enlightenment and Rationality*; The Journal Of Philosophy Vol-84:no.11:American Philosophical Association :Eastern division.

114.   Amaresh Misra*, Precarious Social-Individual Balance*; Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 20/21 (May 16-23, 1992).

115.   Anthony J. LaVopa,*Women, Gender, and the Enlightenment: A Historical*

Turn:The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 80, No. 2 (June 2008);
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/588854

116.   Chandak Sengoopta,*The Movies: Satyajit Ray: The Plight of the Third-World Artist*; The American Scholar, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 1993).

117.   Deepak, Kumer. *'The 'Culture' Of Science and Colonial Culture,India 1820-1920'*,British Journal of History Of Science,vol-29 1996.

118.   Erik Barnouw, *Lives of a Bengal Filmmaker: Satyajit Ray of Calcutta*; The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, Vol. 38, No. 2 (SPRING 1981).

119.   Geeta Kapur, *'Mythic Material in Indian Cinema'*, Journal of Arts and Ideas, nos. 14-15, July-December, 1987.

120.   Geeta Kapur, '*Sovereign Subject: Ray's Apu'*, in When was Modernism, Essays on Contemporary Cultural Practice in India (New Delhi, 2000); earlier version published as 'Cultural Creativity in the First Decade: The Example of Satyajit Ray', Journal of Arts and Ideas, nos. 23-24, January, 1993.

121.   Krishan Kumar, *Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: two principles, one practice?* Theory and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2 (March 2010), Springer,; URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40587550

122.   Lorraine , Dashton, *The Academies and the Utility of Knowledge: The Discipline of the Disciplines. Differences* vol. 10, no. 2: 1998.

123.   Mrinalini Chakravorty, *Picturing "The Postmaster": Tagore, Ray, and the Making of an Uncanny Modernity* The Journal of Cinema and Media, Vol. 53, No. 1 (SPRING 2012).

124.   Peter J. Bertocci, *Bengali Cultural themes in Satyajit Ray's "The World Of Apu"* Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol. 19, No. 1, MISCELLANY (Winter, Spring1984).

125.   Paul Glushanok, *On Ray* Cinéaste, Vol. 1, No. 1 (SUMMER, 1967).

126.   S. Dasgupta; *Is Creativity A Darwinian Process? Creativity Research Journal* ,vol.16,no.4,

127.   Steve Vineberg,*Home and the World: Reflections on Satyajit Ray*; The Three penny Review, No. 43 (Autumn, 1990).

128.   Suranjan Ganguly,*In Search Of India: Rewriting Self and Nation In Satyajit Ray's*

Days and Nights In The Forest; Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol. 30, No. 1/2, MISCELLANY (Winter, Spring,Summer, Fall 1995).