The Reality of Dream and Dreamt Objects: An Analysis from the Indian Philosophical and Contemporary Physiological Perspectives

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Certificate

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<u>Dedicated to</u>

Goddess Śrī Lalitā Tripurā Sundarī

And

Siddhi Vināyaka

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Preface

This project is a very dear one to me as I have developed it all through the past years of my study, deliberations, discussion and contemplation. Dream is such an enigma to humans that till now people are baffled regarding its status and nature. But we cannot deny its presence and influence in our day-to-day life and also on our theoretical enterprises.

Any journey begins when someone says ‘I exist’. Existence is the most fundamental essence for every living being. Every living being is struggling for their existence. For existence, ‘dream’ is felt to be a mode of being also which intrigued different philosophers of different times and cultures.

In this world, everybody is acquainted with ‘dream’. Nobody can deny its phenomenal existence but the denial of the dreaming truth is often a claim of different philosophical schools. ‘Is dream real or an illusory state?’ – since ages, philosophers, psychologists, oneirologists and scientists have been searching this issue by their different methodologies. Till now there is no strict definition of dreaming reality.

In Upanishadic period, there are lots of conversation regarding dreaming state. From the perspective of Veda’s authority, two different positions, namely, theist and atheist schools have been focused on dreaming phenomenon. Some oppose dreaming reality directly and some indirectly.

In my thesis, I will go through the quest of dreaming phenomenon to determine whether it is only illusory state or real?

I have chosen this issue because without knowing dreaming reality we cannot always explain waking reality. Both are interlinked. One is external and the other one is internal. The whole image of life is woven by external and internal perspectives.

Every Indian philosophical school considered dream as an important state whether real or unreal. In my thesis, I have introduced treatments of dream states as discussed in two systems of Indian philosophy, one is Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika (realist) and the other one is Advaita Vedānta (idealist).

Both systems have different methodologies to determine their goals but here the most interesting part is to relook dreaming phenomenon from different perspectives. I will go through all traditional issues regarding dream in the light of these schools.

In my thesis, the most fundamental postulate is 'can I say dream only as an illusory state'? If we consider this statement in affirmation, then lots of possibilities will be overlooked. For example, we cannot get solutions of waking problems, mathematical judgement, symptoms of clinical problems and various kind of innovations. Bizarre or camouflage can be a form of dreaming images but by interpretation we can get various solutions.

In science and psychology, dreaming state is one of the most pertinent and significatory states. During dream, the functions of brain and internal organs are active but some orders are different between dream and waking states. From the perspective of physiological issue, both are very much interdependent.

In the thesis, I will try to corelate cognition and physiological issues because if someone is ill, then it reflects his cognitive domain also. That is why, we need to think about dreaming reality differently.

In Indian philosophy, Advaita Vedānta proclaims monistic reality by accepting three grades of realities. *Brahman* is the only true and ultimate reality in the transcendental level but in the phenomenal level, apart from *Brahman* everything is unreal due to ignorance. Therefore, dream and waking states both are false. Both are imaginations. Through this issue, I would like to focus on dreaming phenomenon. Dream and waking states both are different states but dream is not the only illusory state. If it be so, various realms will be undetermined. Hence, I would try to ponder on this issue from the perspective of philosophy and some contemporary physiological perspectives.

I would to like express my respect to my supervisor Dr. Maitreyee Datta for her continuous support. I would also thank to my friends Sucarita Mitra Dutta, Amrita Chatterjee, Antriksh Tatia etc. for their love. I would share my love to my cousin Ankita Pradhan and nephew Dhruvajyoti Majumder for their unconventional support. I would offer my sincere gratitude to my all teachers, librarian of my department. Finally, I would give my respect and love to my parents.

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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Dreaming phenomenon is the most interesting and cryptic one in science and philosophy. This concept has been discussed since long time in several contexts but still it is a less explored, marginalized and neglected internal phenomenon. We love to focus on the waking phenomenon as a real domain because we think that in waking state, perceiving 'pot' is the real experience as we can touch or feel the pot. In dream, the perspective is different because where the perception of pot designates only the present object, dream indicates different objects which are not bound by the limitations of time and space. Sometimes, this state of dream can be used to have a clue to get solutions to problems cropped up in the waking states.

The illusion is present in waking state also but due to the lack of understanding we are not equipped to understand the dreaming state accurately.

Since long time I always think that the different objects are not always different. Maybe it seems like different from some perspectives but if we try to introspect the image deeply in a different way then we can get the innovative one. Novelty is present in every level. For example, in dream, seeing some demise does not indicate some absence of someone in a literal sense, rather we can interpret that image as some clues regarding events of the waking states.

Personally, I am facing this issue and I believe dreaming statement is true and this is logically possible. Due to some perspectives, we are bounded by waking reality. I believe both waking and dream states are true and both are real from different perspectives as though sun is always present, yet the day and night occur to persons situated in different places of the earth.

I have chosen this topic of the nature of dream for my philosophical exploration to argue in favor of the reality of it. In my whole thesis, I would like to show that the dreaming state is real. Here, this analytical discussion would be guided by Indian philosophy (Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta Schools) and some contemporary physiological perspectives like some glimpses of modern psychology and neuroscience.

I am introducing both the perspectives of science and philosophy because I think if we study the cognition and the physiological structure simultaneously, then only the understanding of dream will be complete. For example, to learn something from physiological perspective is important, because if someone is ill, then the knowledge of physiology is needed.

On the other hand, the dreaming phenomenon has been discussed in several disciplines like philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and oneirology since long time. That is why I would like to add different perspectives. We know that every discipline has unique methodology. Philosophy and science also have different methodologies. I would like to show briefly some current scientific data regarding dreaming research in one of the chapters of my thesis. Here, my main look out is to project dreaming state from the perspective of philosophy and science.

In my thesis, I am following two Indian philosophical systems, Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta. The reason for choosing these two systems is that I would like to follow both realist and idealist perspectives. Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system is a realist and Advaita Vedānta system is an idealist position in Indian philosophy. My philosophical discussion of dream will be guided by the conceptual frameworks of these systems.

I am aware that both systems have different methodologies, that is why here I am not comparing one view with the other. I would mention different classical Indian philosophical positions regarding dreaming phenomenon. These classical views consist of both epistemology and metaphysics of the philosophical systems.

In my thesis, I would mainly like to state the classical views regarding dream, then I would add some contemporary physiological issues. These different issues will enable us to locate the status of dream in both philosophy and science. Here my whole observation is primarily based on philosophical understanding.

Since ages, dreaming phenomenon has been discussed through various methodologies. Mainly, dream has been treated as an unreal or illusory domain because in dreaming state the cognition is categorized as erroneous. The main reason is that there is no physical object in dream but in waking state if perceiver utters 'pot' then perceiver can designate 'this is pot'. This is the fundamental difference between dream and waking states.

My question is – is it justified to designate dream state as unreal or false? Can waking entity is prior than dreaming entity because of physical visibility. Again, I would like to ask if we posit dreaming entity as real like that of the waking state, then is there any logical contradiction? The answer will be no. So, there is no logical contradiction of saying dreaming state as real. Now the question is - how will I say this? As a result, I have chosen this issue of the status of dream as my research topic. Hence, my research methodological question is **"***can we differentiate between dreaming and waking states?"*

Dream is the most cryptic, 'epi-phenomenon', crucial and real state. It is based on internal function but co-related with external world (waking). Dreaming state is always

considered as unreal or illusory and based on memory. Generally, when all external organs are inactive, then dream state occurs. In dream, mind is independently active. In waking state, mind is dependent on the external organs as it is connected with these.

I would like to add that I would not focus on lucid dreams in my whole thesis because dreamer is aware in lucid dreams.

My quest would be guided by analytical approach where the main intention is to locate the status of dream in our existential domain. Without dreaming phenomenon, waking phenomenon would be incomplete. They are inter-dependent.

Dream and waking both are different states. This is true but that does not indicate dream only as an illusory state. Illusion can occur in dream like waking. Why I am saying "dream is not only illusory state" that will be discussed in my thesis.

At first, I have focused on the nature of *jīva* and four stages of *jīva* because *jīva* (person) occupies the central position with respect to whom the state of dream is discussed. Then I will discuss the nature of reality and the classical view of illusion, because we have to determine whether dream state is real or not. Illusion is a complex psychosis which generates when mind is dependent on the other object whether it is internal or external. Hallucination is a single psychosis because mind is independently active.

Later, I would briefly mention the classical view of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* with *Gauḍapāda kārikā* and *Ānandagiri tīkā*. Tentatively, I would show the structure of dream as discussed here. At the last chapter, I would focus on the physiological review on dream and brain functions with current data. Finally, I would show that dream and waking both are different states but dream is not

only illusory state because if we accept dream as an unreal state then all alternatives will be overlooked. I have tried to make an open forum.

In my first chapter, I have focused on the stages of *jīva*. Four stages have been discussed to articulate the dreaming structure *in jīva's* life. Dream is an internal realm where all external organs are non-functional. All suppressed entities come to dream through memory and the differences between *ātmā* and body has also been discussed.

The necessity for the discussion of the stages of *jīva* is to understand the location of dream in this phenomenal life. Why *jīva* is a self-discloser in dream is discussed thoroughly. In *Vaiśeṣik*a system, that *ātmā* or self is always a conscious entity and the body is matter is also clearly mentioned.

Actually, the above determination is done to focus on all possibilities because *jīva* is the locus.

Why the nature of *jīva* is necessary that is also discussed following Advaita system. Ignorance is the fundamental cause for all changes. In this phenomenal world, how dreaming and waking states are working is also discussed with the respect of *jīva*. By ignorance, every individual has different *ātmā* or self. But the self-realization would be followed by the identification of *Brahman* with *ātman* because *Brahman* is one and the ultimate Self. These are the issues which I have discussed in the 1st chapter to understand the relation between *jīva* and the state of dream.

In my second chapter, I have introduced the nature of reality and the classical structure of illusion where illusion is mentioned as non-veridical cognition. In this chapter, I have shown the nature of illusion and hallucination in the light of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools.

The first section of this chapter is on the nature of reality because dreaming image is to be determined. At first, I mentioned what the nature of reality is. Then, according to these three Indian philosophical schools I elaborated it briefly. Mainly, the reason for introducing this chapter is to understand the classical views regarding the status of dream. I discussed in my last chapter why I consider dream to be real in a particular sense.

With the basis of my fundamental query, I would like to adhere dream as differently REAL. We cannot ostensibly determine dream itself is an unreal state.

If we accept dream as an unreal state, then many possibilities of truth will be undetermined and undiscovered. I think we have to re-think about the dreaming reality not as a rigorously unreal phenomenon. According to Advaita Vedānta, dream *is prātibhāsika* real. I would like to take *Gauḍapāda's* standpoint to support this claim about dreaming truth. Thus, we know that *Brahman* is the only real and the world is false in the light of transcendent reality. *Ācārya Gauḍapāda* says both dream and waking states are imaginations. Imagination is occurred by ignorance. Self-realization will come when the ultimate ignorance will be cancelled.

So, waking and dreaming both have the same status from the perspective of the only truth *Brahman*. In this respect, we can interpret all dreaming states as plausible truth in this phenomenal world. This is logically possible. Therefore, I can say dream is differently real in all realms, not as unreal.

The novelty of introducing this classical section is to relook the traditional view in the context of the determination of dream. Theories of illusion like *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda and Anyathākhyātivāda* both have been discussed thoroughly to understand the state of

dream. I have particularly added this section on illusion because dream is always considered as an illusory state. Therefore, I focus on this issue rigorously with the help of the classical frame work.

I will discuss the distinction between illusion and dream. The fundamental difference is that dreaming image is not bounded by any imposition. For example, when someone got the solution from dream, then that solution is not based on illusion. This is familiar to all of us. Some images can be true, not as illusion, like we do not recognize the person in waking state but dreaming images help us to recognize the person. If dreaming image is unreal or illusory, then why do we accept such recognition in waking state? Why is it helpful in waking state?

Illusion is always based on the form of internal -internal, external-internal or internal - external. The real object is present (rope) due to some reason and the visible object(snake) is imposed on the real object. This is occurred by ignorance. When there is no ignorance, then only real object will be present like rope. Due to some reason snake is imposed on the rope. So, the true identification of the nature of object is the main criterion in every aspect. That true identification can also be registered as a form of camouflage or bizarre. That does not mean that camouflage or bizarre form is always designating false identity. For example, in dream seeing ‘elephant’ indicates some different perspective, not the physical object always. We have to interpret it in a different way, then only we can explore the novelty of dreaming image. This is logically possible.

Perhaps, dreaming image does not always hold with the physical structure. It is true that dreaming image has been shown in a different form which is not familiar with the structure of waking image. That does not mean dreaming state itself is an illusion.

If dream is an illusion, then lots of possibilities or creations or discoveries will be undetermined like the famous example of a German chemist Friedrich August Kekule discovered the benzene molecule in dream in 1861-62. A noble laurate James Watson saw DNA in the form of spinal staircase in his dream. Sigmund Freud has started his idea of dreaming from his dream, it is called "Irma's injection".

Hence, I cannot say dreaming state as an illusory state. Illusion can occur in dream but dream is not an illusion itself. That is why I will discuss why dream is not only an illusion or hallucination.

In my third chapter, I have focused what the nature of dream is. Mainly, I studied the classical text of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, *Māṇḍukya (Gauḍapāda kārikā and ānandagiri tika) and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads.*

From Aphorism to *Vārtika,* I have discussed dreaming nature according to *Nyāya* system. Here, their methodology has been mentioned and also, I have followed some views of other alternative texts *like Nyayabhūṣanam, Tattvacintāmani, Nyāya- Maṅjarī, Nyāyasāra* etc.

On the other hand, I have focused on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra and praśastapādabhāṣya with nyāyakandalī tīkā*. Briefly, the structure has been shown. Next, I have introduced the *Upaniṣad* section where I have elaborated mainly *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Māṇḍukya Upaniṣads with Gauḍapāda kārikā and Ānandagiri tīkā.* These classical views of dream have been discussed.

The importance of this section is to understand the classical structure and review their hypothesis.

These are the fundamental tenets of my thesis. I made the whole structure of the thesis on the basis of these perspectives.

In the third section of this third chapter, I made three points where I would like to mention that dream can be real, the differences and similarities between dream and waking states.

In this section, I have shown some characteristics systematically with the support of the three above points.

Later, I will introduce my fourth chapter where I will focus on imagination model and mind-body relationship according *to Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika* and *Advaita Vedānta* schools. The reason for introducing this fourth chapter is to understand the classical view of imagination because there is a proverb that dream is based on imagination. That is why, we need to re-look on this issue. The role of *Imagination* is a very important phenomenon in epistemology and metaphysics. Without imagination, there is no creation. Each and every invention is bound to connect with the imagination. The main question is – what is imagination?

Dream is always considered as an imagination and dreaming data is based on memory because all external organs are inoperative during dream. So, someone can ask "is dream only an imagination or something beyond it?"

Here, I have followed mainly Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta models. Ācārya Gauḍapāda advocates dream and waking both states as imagination. So, is imagination

biased by memory in dream? These all possibilities will be studied in this chapter. Ācārya Srīdhara tries to explain seeing new object as the effect of *adṛṣta*. Sridhara Bhatta says "*atyantāprasiddheṣu svataḥ parataścāpratīteṣu candrādityabhakṣanādiṣu jñānaṅ, taddṛṣtādeva, ananubhūteṣu, saṁskārābhāvāt"*[1]. But, regarding this issue there is no Nyāya observation.

My question is – if someone dreams any new object, which is unseen in waking, is the new object considered as unreal? If we answer this question affirmatively, then we have to negate this statement "10 – 0 – 6 = 4" like in waking we have learnt '2+2=4' since childhood. Now someone can learn "10 – 0 – 6 = 4" during dream. Both are true statements. By imagination, we have learnt so many true alternatives by copulas in both states and we can get several solutions during dream. In *Tarkabhāṣā*, there is an example where pupil asked some question to guru and guru replied in his dream[2]. That is also based on imagination. If we deny the new possibility as unreal, then all alternatives will not be discussed.

On the other hand, we can say '*antaḥkaranavṛtti*' is present in both waking and dream states because mind (*antaḥkarana)* is active in both states. That is why illusion occurs in both states. So, there is a logical possibility of occurring new object during dream. Keeping this order in mind, I would like to say that illusion can occur in dream like waking state but dream itself is not an illusory or unreal state.

So, I would like to introduce the mind- body relationship in this chapter because if we study the relationship, then we can easily grasp the dreaming image whether it occurs

[1] *Nyāyakandalī, p 185.*
[2] *Tarkabhāṣa, edited by Gangadhar Kar, p 309.*

during the condition of illness or health. Therefore, this observation will be deeper to reciprocate the mind-body relationship between dream and waking states.

Now I will detour from cognitive to physiological perspectives. I think every discussion of dream is related to the physiological structure of a person. The notion of dream has been discussed in several disciplines like philosophy, neuroscience, psychology and oneirology.

In my last chapter, I would like to introduce the physiological nature of dream from the perspective of Neuroscience and Modern psychology. I would briefly mention the brain function during dream and the physiological relationship between dream and waking states. The relevance of introducing this chapter is to understand the contemporary issues regarding dreaming phenomenon.

Dream is the most interesting physiological domain because brain is active during dreaming. Only external organs are inactive but apart from these all functions are working during dream. Dream is associated with REM and NREM circle. This circle is consisted of 90 mins. So, in sleeping, this circle can come two or three times but there is no fixed rule for occurring of this. In this 90 mins circle, dream can occur. Till now we aware that declarative memory is coming from temporal lobe (left brain). It is applicable for dream also but from which cell the dreaming data is coming, is still unknowable and what is the source of new object or unseen object during dream is still undiscovered. Hippocampus and amygdala both are active during dream that is why we can feel the situation and incident. It is similar like waking state. The heartbeat, pulse rate, neuronal function and internal muscle movements are active during dream. As a result, heart-attack can occur during dream also.

If dream itself is an illusory state, then why dreaming data is to be taken as symptoms for any mental disorder. Sigmund Freud have introduced dreaming data as a clinical tool and he proved that we can get clue during dream for any disorder. Sigmund Freud is the first one who introduced dreaming phenomena without any religious dispositions. Before Freud the dreaming phenomenon has been studied by religious beliefs like good dreams mean God's grace and bad dreams mean God's curse. Freud is an avowed atheist. At a glance if we study pre-Socratic schools, medieval period, Socratic, Plato, Aristotle's trio articles (*De insomniis, On Prophesying by dreams and On Sleep and Sleeplessness*) and 2nd century A.D, Artemidorus's *Oneirocritica* etc, then we can realize that more or less dream is studied by some religious beliefs. Rene Descartes breaks this chain. He proclaimed in his 'First Meditation' while using his method of doubt that sometimes we cannot differentiate between dream and waking states. He studies dreaming phenomenon analytically.

In my thesis, after discussing physiological nature of dream, I would briefly mention some modern psychologists' views like Sigmund Freud, C G Jung, Alfred Adler and Norman Malcolm. I would add these scholars' views because they discussed dream both psychologically and philosophically from a modern perspective.

In 19th century, we can find 6 dream researchers in the West like Hermann von Helmholtz, Wilhelm Wundt, Alfred Maury, Hervey de Saint-Denis, Sigmund Freud, C.G. Jung and Alfred Adler. I think only Sigmund Freud, C.G. Jung and Alfred Adler discussed dreaming phenomenon analytically. There are some hypothetical differences between Freud and Jung but I have chosen them because of their new observations.

Norman Malcolm is an American philosopher. He is highly influenced by Wittgenstein's theory of structure of mental images. He discusses dreaming image through language analysis.

After that, I would introduce the physiological relationship between dream and waking states. In this section, I would add some of my current dream interpretations. I introduced the classical views and some contemporary views on dreaming phenomena where the whole investigation is done to understand dream not only as unreal state or illusory state. We can say that dream is a 'differently real' state.

At the end, I would like to mention that this investigation of dreaming phenomenon is mainly based on philosophical understanding of it. The main intention is to state that we need to re-look on the status of dream. In day-to-day life, we get different kinds of experiences. Dream state is not excluded from it. Only physical visibility cannot be the major criterion to determine real or unreal. If we accept this as the criterion of real, then what is the status of 'tranquil', 'love', 'hope' and 'hate' etc. because these are beyond physical visibility. We can feel these. That moment can be true or false but we can have the emotions regarding these. In dream, we can feel everything like waking state. In waking state, we can easily show the object uttered by the word but in dream, we cannot. We are seeing the same thing in both states but the judgement is applicable for only waking state because dream is taken to be an illusory or unreal state.

I think that we can interpret dream differently like waking state. Seeing 'pot' in waking state indicates the real physical object but seeing 'pot' in dream cancels its reality in later waking state. It is depending on the context. We can judge dream in different way by not characterizing it ONLY as an illusory state.

That is why, I am choosing Advaita model of reality to determine possibilities of dreaming truth because I think only Advaita model would help to get rid of all negations regarding dream state. According to Advaita model of reality, ultimate truth and real is *Brahman*. Apart from *Brahman,* all is false from the perspective of transcendent reality but in this phenomenal level all phenomenal entities are real from the perspective of phenomenal reality. So, dream state cannot only be unreal or illusory state. This would be my claim to determine the dreaming status as 'differently' real.

Keep this issue in mind, I would like to compose my six chapters and the conclusion. Chapter 1 and 2 will be fundamental because of discussing the nature of *jīva, jīva's* four stages, the nature of reality and classical theory of illusion. Chapter 3 and 4 are based on the classical positions about dream and imagination. Here is the novelty of introducing a section where dream is discussed as real and the similarity -dissimilarity between dream and waking states is discussed. Here, I have discussed imagination model and mind-body relationship during dream and waking states in the light of two Indian classical systems. At the end, in chapter 5 I will discuss the contemporary physiological data regarding dream, the brain function and the relationship between dream and waking states.

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CHAPTER 1

DREAM: AN IMPORTANT STATE OF EXPERIENCING SELF

Chapter 1

Dream: An Important State of Experiencing Self

Introduction

In the first chapter, I would like to introduce the nature of *jīva* and stages of *jīva*. Without the understanding of *jīva*, there is no significance to discuss any epistemological or metaphysical issues. We cannot start our discussion regarding dream without determining who will be the dreamer or who will be the waking being? Therefore, the nature of *jīva* is necessary to discuss.

Here, I would discuss it in the light of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools. I am considering particularly two schools because one (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) is realist theist school and the other one is idealist theist school. Here, I want to show *jīva's* position before entering the dreaming. My concern is to determine the structure of dreaming nature and the methodology. The two schools have different methodologies. In my whole thesis, I would try to find out the structure of dreaming phenomenon whether it is real or unreal and this discussion will be based on these schools. Before this journey, we need to know about the structure of jīva in their systems. Self-realisation is the main motivation or aim in all Indian philosophical schools. Now someone can raise a question – 'who is self?' so, the determination of phenomenal being or self is the main priority for liberation. Only phenomenal beings are guided by the ignorance like 'I am the body'. That is why the realisation is needed to identify the real nature of object. For example, 'I' is *ātmā* or self and body is matter. Matter does not have the consciousness. Due to ignorance, someone is not able to identify the real nature of self. As a result, we are saying 'I am the body' and we are suffering. Therefore, the *jīva* or phenomenal being is the main domain of study in every disciplines.

Every school has tried to find out the way of their goal. All paths are different. Mainly, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school focuses on this phenomenal reality. They do not talk about any transcendental reality. On the other hand, Advaita focuses on both the phenomenal and transcendental. Every *jīva* is different by body and mind. Every individual has different function to the external world but self is same for all. Due to the presence of self, we are conscious.

In this chapter, I would show the chronology of the stages of *jīva* and their functional process during dreaming and waking. That is why at first, I focus on the nature of *jīva* from the perspective of two schools, then I would analyse the stages. This whole discussion would be carried forward by my discussion on illusion.

Here, I am trying to figure out the position of *jīva* in their philosophical systems and by the help of *jīva*, I would focus on the dreaming phenomena.

Jivātmā (phenomenal being) and *Paramātma* (transcendental being) both will be discussed. I would mention also the transition from *jivātmā* to *paramātma*. For Nyāya, dream itself is unreal (non-existent state) and Vaiśeṣika system accepts Nyāya's position regarding dream. But in *Nyāyakandalī*, it is stated that future images occur in dream due to *adṛṣta*. In Advaita, both states have the same status from the perspective of transcendental reality. Therefore, in this chapter I would show brief images of self or *jīva* during dreaming and waking.

The nature of Jīva (Nyāya perspective)

The notion of *jīva* (embodied-self) is one of the most fundamental notions in Indian philosophy. Without determining the status of *jīva*, we cannot state the nature of liberty or self-realisation, because doer is the crucial postulate in every philosophical school.

But according to different notions of action (*kārya*), the doer's position is different in every school of Indian philosophy. In Indian philosophy, the main goal is self-realisation. Without the understanding of *jīva's* nature, we cannot explain why the liberation is important. Here, I would like to discuss the nature of *jīva* in the light of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

In Nyāya philosophy, the *prameya padārtha* has been determined after *pramāna parikkhsā*[3]. There are 12 kinds of *prameya padārtha* like *ātmā, śarīra, indriya, artha* (the object of sensual organs), *buddhi* (knowledge), *manas, pravritti* (*dharma and adharma*), *doṣa* (anger, cruelty and infatuation), *pretyabhāva* (rebirth), *fala* (pleasure and pain) *duḥkha and apavarga* (liberation)[4]. Among these, here, I would discuss the nature of *ātmā*. In *Nyāyabhāṣya*, the main debate centres around the claim whether *ātmā* is separate from form of body, sensual organ*, manas, buddhi and vedanā* or is it a combination of body parts? According to Gautama, without any prior doubt there is no theoretical discussion that is why he presented two opposing claims regarding the nature *of ātmā*?

Ācārya Gautama discussed 12 kinds of *prameya padārtha* (1/1/9). *Ātmā* is the first *prameya* among all entities. That is why at first Goutama discussed the nature of *ātmā*. This *ātmā* is eternal but it gets associated with body and sense organs and is regarded as *jīva*. This *jīva* is the enjoyer, cognisor and agent also.

In *Nyāyasūtra*, the discussion about *ātmā* has been started with the reference to the theory of *Nairātmavāda*. The colossal *naiyāyika Uddyatkara* refutes all arguments of Buddhist view regarding *ātmā*.

[3] *" parīksitāni pramāṅāni, prameyamidānīṁ parīkṣyate* " , Nyāyabhāṣya , Vol 3 , Nyāyadarśan, P 2,
[4] *ātmā- śarīrendriyārtha- vuddhi – manaḥ – pravṛtti – dośa – pretyabhāva – fala – duḥkhāpavargāstu – prameyam* ", *ibid* , p 196

In Buddhist tradition, they do not believe that *ātmā* as an eternal substance exists. They advocate that there is no *ātmā* at all because they do not accept any permanent entity. They proclaim all entities are temporary and there is no *ātmā* because *ātmā* does not have any genesis just like a barren woman. Barren woman does not have any existential value. Therefore, according to Buddhism there is no *ātmā* (self).

But *naiyāyika Vātsāyana* says in his commentary that Buddhist argument for *ātmā's* inexistence is totally wrong[5]. If *ātmā* does not exist, then why there is a *pratijñā* about *ātmā* because if barren woman's son does not exist, then what is the necessity to talk about her son. *Vātsāyan* adheres that *ātmā* exists. Buddhist philosophers refute *ātmā*'s existence. *Vātsāyan*a says that if *ātmā* is like a barren women, then why they refute *ātmā*'s existence because there is no need to discuss it ('*nirātmaka'*). In '*Vivek-vilāsa*', Buddhist philosophers said that *ātmā* is a combination form of *rupa, vijñāna, vedanā, sanjñā* and *saṅṣkāra*[6]. Each of it is called *skandha*. After that, they refute that there is *rupa*, there is *vedanā*, there is *saṇjñā*, there is *vijñāna* and there is *saṅṣkāra skandha*. It means specifically that they negate the existence of *ātmā*, not in a general way. According to Buddhism, *ātmā* means the *anātmā* of *Vaidika* tradition. However, *naiyāyika* tradition adheres that if *ātmā* does not exist then the cognition should be like 'I do not exist' or 'I don't have existence'. Actually, this kind of cognition is not possible because we know that we do exist. Rather most fundamental issue is whoever negate *ātmā*'s existence that person is also *ātmā*. Then the question is how is it possible that being existent he negates his own existence? On the other hand, if *ātmā* does not exist, then there is no cognition like 'my wish' or 'my happiness' etc. But actually, we do feel

[5] *Tatra ātmādyapavargaparyantaprameye mithyājñānamnekaprakārakaṇ vartate| ātmani tāvannāstīti , ibid ,* p 68

[6] " *duḥkhm saṇsārinḥ skandhante ca panca prakirtita| vijñāna vedanā saṇjñā saṇṣkāro rupameva ca*" *Ibid, Vol 3, p 8.*

our happiness or wish. *Sāṁkhya sutrakār* said there is *no pramāna to* determine *ātmā's* inexistence[7]. Therefore, *ātmā e*xists.

In *Nyāyabhāṣya*, it is asked now the question is if *ātmā* exists, then when we are seeing something through eyes or we know something by our intellect then is this *ātmā* a combination of body parts or something else? "*darśana-sparśanābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāt*"[8] (1/199) means the same cognition is happened by eye-perception and touch-perception. *Ātmā* is not a product of body's formation or deformation and our external sensual organs are not *ātmā*. When we are seeing some object, then touch of the object and seeing both can happen simultaneously. If someone does not accept *ātmā's* existence, then how do you explain the above-mentioned simultaneous activities without *ātmā* (doer)? Here, '*darśan*'means eye perception and '*sparśa*'means touch perception. However, the most crucial part is that every sensual organ has its own deliberation. That is why all deliberations are different. When an object is cognised by one sensual organ, then it can also be cognised by other sensory organs. It does not mean that this thing will happen in all the cases because the main obstacle is memory. Memory of visual perception only occurs depending on eye-perception, not depending on the touch perception. Memory is the cause of *pratyabhigyā (recognition).* There is no *pratisandhān (pratyabhigyā*) between eye-perception and touch perception. On the other hand, we would say that the other body parts are not the cognisor of that cognition because the cognition through body parts and the cognition through sensual organs are not same. When *pratisandhān* occurs then absence of non-*pratisandhān*a will be demolished. It is called "*apratisandhānaṅ anivṛttaṅ*"".

[7] '*astyātmā nāstitvasādhanābhāvāt', ibid, p 11.*
[8] *Ibid* , p 11

Here the most important point is that during perception *ātmā* is not completely dissociated from body parts, like sense organs because external sensory objects cannot be grasped without the help of these sense organs. *Ātmā* and eye are not the same but without eye, our visual perception cannot occur. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the light of lamp is the cause of the visual perception. Yes, it is one of the major causes to reveal the object but not *asādhrana kārana*. *Ātmā* is the *asādhrana kārana* of the perception of the object.

"*Śarīradāhe pātakābhāvāt*"[9](4/202) means body is not an *ātma* because if body could kill someone, then the effect of such an action cannot be enjoyed after death (the abolition of body). That is *why ātmā* is always eternal. '*Śarīragrahaṇena śarirendriyavedānasaṇhātaḥ pranibhute grihyate*"[10]"- *Śarīra* is the only cause of sensual pleasure and pain. Here, "*pātaka*" means the sin. This sin is happened by animal killing. Body is the cause of this sin and after death when material body will be demolished then *ātmā* with senses carried away the *saṁskāra* (positive and negative both). On the other hand, if we will not accept that *ātmā* is not body, then there will occur two kinds of fallacy. First, those people who are doing bad activity will not be sufferer after death. This is called *'kṛtahāni'*. Secondly, those who are not doing any bad activity they will be sufferer. This is called "*akṛtābhyāgama''*. "'*yasyāpi nityonātmānā sātmakaṅ śarīraṅ dajyate, tasyāpi śarīrdāhe pātakṅ na bhavadadagdhuḥ*"[11]" means eternal soul is conjugated with the material body, after destruction of the body eternal soul is not the cause of body's destruction.

[9] *Ibid , p 22*
[10] *ibid*
[11] *ibid*, p 26

"*sabyadṛśtasyetareṇa pratyabhijñānāt"*[12] (3/1/7). Here, "*sabya*" means the left eye and "*itara*"means the right eye. If *ātmā* is an eye, then we have to accept that eye is a doer of action. In a practical situation, by the division of left and right the eyes are two. Every eye's impression (*saṁskāra*) is different from the other. That is why right eye is not able to see left eye's view and cannot recognise its object. On the other hand, the left eye is not able to see right eye's view and recognition. Both are different from different perspectives. However, in fact we can view and recognise the object viewed and recognised by both the eyes. Thus, perception and recognition has been done by someone different from these eyes. Therefore, it is determined that the eye is not an *ātmā*.

In *Nyāyavārtika*, "*dehadivyātirikta ātmā*[13]**"** … there is a determination about the non-identical relationship between body and soul.

According to *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā,* there is an *anuvyāvasāya* to determine the non-identical relation… "*vyāvasāyam vajyeindriyam pratyabhijnanamaha*[14]"

The most important claim is about the reaction of external sensory organs. Every sensory organ has the reaction against the stimulus, like tongue's reaction is different when we are tasting lemon or sweet. So, it is stated that *"indriyāntarvikārāt*". But, *ātmā* is not a sensory organ. It is beyond it.

"*na smṛteḥ smartavyaviṣayātvāt*" [15](3/1/13). Here, the *purvapakhsi* can raise a question whether memory is a quality of *ātmā*. If so, then without *ātmā,* memory could not happen. *Bhāṣyakāra* replies that the object of memory is always related to things

[12] *Ibid*, p 30
[13] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p 726
[14] *ibid*
[15] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Vol 3, p 42

remembered. So *ātmā* is not related here. So, *purvapakhsis's* objection cannot take place. Therefore, *ātmā*'s existence cannot be determined by the object of memory. When we are saying that ''we have understood', 'we are happy' or ''we are unhappy' it means something has to be present which is beyond our emotions and understanding rather this is a locus of all and this locus is *ātmā.* So here also, it is determined that *ātmā* is not a body-formulation. That is why *ātmā is mahat*.

At the end of this discussion, *Naiyāyika Udyatkara* says in his *vārtika* that the Buddhist's conclusion about *ātmā's* existence is invalid because any object cannot be simultaneously negated and existent. It has to be existent or negated.

Now I would like to discuss *Viśvanāth's* (the *Navya Naiyāyika*) understanding regarding *ātmā* in *Bhāṣāpariccheda*.

Ātmā is the locus of pleasure and pain. It means "'"*Ātmatvayātistu suḥkhaduḥkhādisamavāyikāranatāvacchedakatayā siddha*ti"'"[16]. *Ātmatva* is the genus of *ātmā*. That *ātmatva jāti* indicates *jjivātmā* and *paramātmā* both. But there is a little difference between *jivātmā* and *paramātmā* because *paramātmā* is eternal. The *kāranatāvacchedaka dharma* is present in both. This causality relation does not applicable on eternal self because eternal self cannot be bounded by time. So, there is no cause and effect dichotomy.

In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, *Maharśi Kanāda* says "*tatrātmā manscāpratyakhse*"[17](8/1/2) means *ātmā* is unperceivable. Gautama and Vātsāyana both have accepted this opinion. But, Cārvāka is the only school who accepts that material body and *ātmā* are identical. They do not adhere *ātmā's* existence beyond material body. *Naiyāyikas* try to prove that

[16] *ātmendriyādyadhiṣthātā karaṅaṁ hi sakartukam (47), Bhāṣāpariccheda*, p 209.
[17] *Vaiśeṣika Darśanam*, p 158

ātmā is not identical with the material body. That is why they advocate an *anumāna* - "*cakkhurādīni indriyāni kartṛ-prajojyāni karaṇatvāt kutharādivat* [18]" means the doer has to be present apart from sense organs like eye etc. because the cause should be present just like axe etc. Without conscious being, we could not explain the activity of an object. In the stage of *suṣupti (deep sleep state)*, there is no consciousness that is why the knowledge is not possible. According to this chronology, we cannot explain the action without the presence of conscious being.

Those who believe that body is identical with *ātmā*, they adhere that body has consciousness, "*śarīrasya caitanye*". But, the main objection is that if the body and *ātmā* both are identical, then how do we explain our childhood memory? Body is always changeable. So, memory also is changeable. That is why we could not remember our experience in the above case, because the childhood soul (as body) and the aged soul (as a different body) both are not same. Hence, if we adhere this identical theory, then we cannot explain the chronology of memory. That is why some being has to be present, who controls all actions. This is called *ātmā*. On the other hand, if we accept this identical relation then we could not explain how does a baby suck the breast-milk just after its birth? According to Nyāya, there is a *smṛtijanyasyasaṇskāra*[19], due to this *saṁskāra* a child knows the way to take milk from his mother. Without *saṁskāra*, it cannot be possible. Thus, the child must have the *saṁskāra* of sucking the milk from its mother's breast, which cannot be accounted for if *ātmā* is not accepted apart from the body. The *ātmā* as distinct from body is the locus of *saṁskāra*.

In Buddhism, the *vijñāna* is of two kinds, a) *ālaya vijñāna* and b) *pravṛttivijñāna*. When *vijňāna* occurs by the attribute like blue or yellow objects, then the cognition is called

[18] *Nyāyabhāśya*, Vol 3, p 18
[19] *ibid*, p 43

pravṛttivijñāna. On the other hand, when the *vijñāna* happens by the notion of ''my (*mama*)" then the cognition is called *ālaya vijñāna*. Without external organ, the *pravrittivijñāna* cannot be possible and *ātmā* is *ālaya vijñāna. Ālaya vijñāna* is always *svaprakāśa* and that *svaprakāśa* is *ātmā*. That is why *Visvanātha* says "*tasya svatahprakāśrupatvaccetanatvam*[20]". Now the question is whether *ātmā* is of all kinds of *ālayavijñāna* or of some kind of? Because if we say all kinds of *ālayavijñāna* is *ātmā* then we have to posit that *ātmā* is omniscient but actually, it is not. The major problem is about the state of *suṣupti* because in *suṣupti* there is no consciousness. So how do we explain that *ātmā is ālayavijñāna*? We cannot say that some kind of *ālayavijñāna is ātmā* because *ātmā* is always eternal. That is why *ātmā* is completely distinct eternal entity from *ālayavijñāna*. In this order, *Visvanātha* says "*vijñānādibhinno nitya ātmeti siddham".*

In *Sāṁkhya* philosophy, *buddhi* is not the perceiver, conscious *puruṣa* is a perceiver. *Puruṣa* is *aparināmi* that is why *puruṣa* is not a doer, unconscious *buddhi* is a doer. When someone says 'I am happy', 'I know' and 'I am doing' etc. then it follows that we have feelings about action, knowing and happiness. *Buddhi* is the locus of all kinds of feelings and the relation between *buddhi and ātmā* is eternal. Actually, the dharma of *ātmā* reflects on *buddhi* and the *dharma* of *buddhi* reflects on *ātmā*. However, *Naiyāyika* negates this argument.

They advocate '*cetanā aham sukhī duḥkhī karomi'* means I do consciously feel pleasure and pain. Here the action and the cognition of pleasure and pain, *ātmā* is the locus of all *dharmas*. We cannot exclude the form of action (*kṛti*) from *ātmā* because *ātmā* is the doer and eternal too. Therefore, *ātmā* is eternal and the locus of all *dharmādharma*.

[20] *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, p 222

The nature of *jīva (*Vaiśeṣika perspective)

Vaiśeṣika philosophy is one of the most relevant theist schools in Indian philosophy. They believe Veda's authority. They adhere that the ultimate goal of knowledge is to know about the object's nature of similarity and dissimilarity. They proclaim 7 categories and substance is one of them. *Ātmā* or self is a substance and without quality substance cannot be existent that is why the second postulation of 7 categories is quality. Quality is of twenty-four kinds. Here my purpose is to study the nature of self or *jivātmā*. *Ātmā* has also 14 qualities. These are *buddhi, sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā (wish), dveṣ (anger), yatna (care), dharma, adharma, saṁskāra, saṁkhā (number), parimāna (quantity), prithakatva (separation), saṁyoga (conjunction) and vibhāga (division)*[21].

"*ātmatvabhisammandhādātmā*" means *ātmā* exists because there is a relation of *ātmatva*. We perceive the external objects through external organs and after that, we can grasp the genus of object, which is common to all. It follows that something has to be present who is the fundamental entity of all things. By inference, we can assume that the fundamental entity is subtler than all perceivable entities and the subtlest entity is called *ātmā*. We think that we are acquiring cognition by our body, mind and sensual organ but this is not true because body, mind and sensual organ all are unconscious that is why they are not locus of cognition. The locus should be conscious and eternal because otherwise our memory and cognition process would not occur. The conscious and eternal entity is *ātmā*.

[21] "*tasya gunāḥ vuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṁṣkārasaṁkhāparimanprthakatvasamyogabibhagah " , Praśastapādabhāṣya, p 145*

There are lots of examples in Vaiśeṣika philosophy to prove *ātmā's* existence. Our body is material and unconscious. That is why body itself does not have desire. But we, individual conscious beings feel our desires, attraction and distraction. The question is how is it possible for a material unconscious body to have feelings etc. So the postulation of a conscious self is needed to determine that there is someone who has desires and all the notions of attraction and repulsion and who controls the material unconscious body too. By inference we get to know *ātmā's* existence. Another example is that the blacksmith who makes or repairs something in iron by hand and when he is making the iron object at that time there is some *bastrā (which is made by cloth)* and the blacksmith blows the air into the *bastrā* after that the fire's intensity becomes too high then the iron thing is prepared. The main issue is when the blacksmith blows the air then we are seeing that he is doing the act. According to this analogy, the body function is explained. In the body, air is of five (*prāna, apāna, vyāna ,udāna and samāna*) kinds and they have different functions. The alive body is conscious due to the equilibrium of air circulation in the body. So, it follows that something has to be present in the body who controls all the air circulation in the body like blacksmith and that something (inferential entity) is *ātmā* or self. That is why Vaiśeṣika advocates "*prāṅāpānnimeṣonmeṣjivanamanogatīndriyāntarvikārāḥsukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatn āścātmanoliṅgāni "*[22]*(3/2/4).*

Someone is wounded and ill, but within a few days he got recovery and he is okay also. According to Vaiśeṣika philosophy, due to the presence of *ātmā* the wounded person got recovery and he becomes normal. It determines that *ātmā* exists and controls everything.

[22] *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, p 70*

Now the main claim is that ātmā's existence is always determined by the *Veda* and smṛti śāstra, "*tasmādāgamikaḥ*" (3/2/8). Inference cannot be able to determine ātmā' s existence because *sāmānyatadṛṣtānumāna and śeṣavatānumāna* cannot determine the specific cognition (viśeṣajñāna).

On the other hand, there is an objection about ātmā's existence that is "*ahamitiśabdasya vyātirekannāgamikām"*[23]*(*3/2/9). It means scriptures and *Veda* or *Śruti* are not the main proof for ātmā's existence because when someone is saying '*aham'*, it also proves ātmā's existence. Without saying '*aham*' no one is able to proclaim their individual existence.

Now someone may raise an objection that '*aham*' is applicable for oneself, it does not applicable for others. Vaiśeṣika replies "*ahamitipratyagātmanibhavātparatrabhavadārthāntarapratakhsah*" means the word '*aham*' does not prove the individual being, rather it explains that beyond the material body there is an entity. *Ātmā* and material body are different because the perception happens due to the presence of *ātmā* and body is the medium that is why we are saying "I am happy" or "I am unhappy". For this feeling, there is no need to connect between organ and object. Without visual perception we can say "I am happy". So, the word '*aham*' does not explain the individual being.

There is a wonderful example of ātmā's existence. When a chariot goes on the road then it states that the pilot is there who controls the chariot like body. When body moves and functions then it follows that the conscious entity is there who maintains the all equilibrium in the body.

Someone tastes some sweet and by recognition, he is saying that this is that sweet and it is so tasty. Now the question is how is it possible? Vaiśeṣika replies that without memory

[23] *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra,* p 74.

the taster cannot say 'this is that sweet' because he had a knowledge about sweet. Thus, there is an enduring entity called ātmā, which is the locus of all memories.

Now I would like to introduce *Praśastapādācārya* the great *Vaiśeṣika* scholar's opinion. He says that 'pleasure' and 'pain' are not attributes of material body[24]. He has explained it by five inferences.

1st inference – pleasure and plain are not the attributes of mind, sensual organs and body because the cognition of pleasure and pain are happened in the *ātmā*. '*Aham'* means always the *ātmā,* not body, mind and sensual organs.

2nd inference- the notions of pleasure and pain are always consisted with ātmā, not an external object. Body is the medium and the locus is *ātmā*.

3rd inference- the notion of pleasure and pain do not depend on material body because without *ātmā,* pleasure and pain cannot happen.

4th inference – the pleasure and pain are only internal feelings; these do not depend on external objects.

5th inference- the word '*aham*' does not explain all *pṛthivādi* entities because we cannot say ''I am earth" or ''I am water". ''*Aham''* only explains the internal feelings (pleasure and pain) that is why we are saying ''I am happy or unhappy".

In this phenomenal world, someone is happy, someone is unhappy, someone is rich and someone is poor etc. Why the differences are there? *Ātmā* is one or many? Vaiśeṣika philosophy replies *pṛthakatva* (division) is the one attribute *of ātmā*. Due to the rebirth system and actions, *ātmā* differs from person to person. Jivātmā is many but paramātmā

[24] *"Śarīrasamavāyinībhyāṅ hitāhita "*… pleasure and pain are attributes of conscious entity, not matter. Therefore, ātmā exists.

in one *and ātmā* and *ākāśa* are connected with all the beings that is why Vaiśeṣika says "“*vibhavānmahānākāśathácaātmā*””[25] (7/1/22). Therefore, *ātmā* exists.

Therefore*, ātmā* is a conscious entity and body is matter. The cognition is occurred by the presence of *ātmā*. As a result, we are feeling pleasure and pain. External organs, mind and body are mediums to connect the external world but mind and *ātmā* are eternal. On the other hand, according to attribute, someone is happy and someone is sad at the same time. So, without body *ātmā c*annot be work alone.

The nature of Jīva, According to Advaita Vedānta Philosophy

The ultimate goal of Advaita Vedanta is to determine the identical relation between *jīva* and *Brahman*. In Advaita philosophy, the main understanding is "*slokardheno prabakshmai yaduktang grantha kotibhi brahma satya jagat mithya jiva brahma na parah*". It means all verses of *Brahmasūtra* tries to explain that brahma is the ultimate real and the world is false and self *(jīva*) and brahma is identical. So, there are three major statements – 1) *Brahman* is the only real.

2) This phenomenal world is false.

3) The self (*jīva*) and *Brahman* are identical.

Here, my concerned domain is the concept of self (*jīva*). *Brahman* is transcendent from sense, language, thought, and non-dual eternal self, which is self-illumined and pure. This is called *śuddhacaitanya* or *Ātmā* and it is beyond nescience. This realization belongs to transcendental level. After that through maya or nescience, the consciousness reveals himself as conditioned and determinate. This is called *īśvara*(*māyopahita caitanya*). Next, the pure consciousness appears as limited by sense-organs

[25] *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra,* p 139.

(*antaḥkaranṅa*[26]) , which is always objective and limited , it is also covered by nescience. This is called jiva(self), *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya*. Now what is antahkarana? *Antaḥkarana* consists sense organs, it is kind of four like manas, *buddhi*, *citya* and *ahaṁkāra*. It is a *taijasa(*radiant) *padārtha* . The jīva is always subject-object complex and knower (*jñātā*) too. The subject form is pure consciousness, which is *Sākṣi*, who perceives the object. It is self-proved and self-luminous. But due to the association of *Upādhi*, the object is covered by ignorance. Now what is *Upādhi*? When one object imposes its nature on other object, then the second object's nature is covered by imposed object's nature. Here, the first object is called *Upādhi*. For example, '*Ghatākaśa'* , *ākāśa* is boundless but due to 'pot' we are saying ' this is the space determined by pot (*Ghatākaśa*)'. So, it seems that akas is limited by pot, but actually the picture is different. Pot is the main divider. Here, I would like to mention that avidya or *ajñāna* or *māyā* are synonymous, they are used in different manner like the concept of māyā(nescience) is used in the context of *jagat* (world). The concept of *ajñāna* is used in the context of *jīva*(self) and the concept of avidya is used in the context of feeling. According to Advaita Vedanta, locus is always real that is why Brahma is the fundamental base of all aspect. Through *māyā* transcendental illusion occurs and as a result the objective world *(jīva* or *Īśvara or jagat*) is super-imposed by *māyā*. When the realization of identity between *jīva* and Brahman will occur, then this imposition will be demolished. Actually, everything is non-different from Brahma. *Īśvara* is personified consciousness, that is why it is *saguna* Brahma. He is the material and efficient cause of the world from the perspective of phenomenal reality. According to Advaita Vedanta, the reality is of three kinds like transcendental reality, phenomenal reality and *prātibhāsika* reality. Each level of reality itself is real like *prātibhāsika* objects are real in *prātibhāsika* level. But, when

[26] The major *parināma* of *ajñāna* (nescience).

phenomenal reality will come then *prātibhāsika* reality will be demolished. Same as in transcendental level, in this level phenomenal reality is demolished by the realization of transcendental reality. So until and unless the next level reality will occur the present reality remains.

Nescience has two powers like *āvarana Śakti* (covering power) and *vikṣepa Śakti* (projecting power). Covering power always covers the real nature of object and projecting power reveals always imposed nature of nature. It all happens due to *māyā* or nescience. Brahma is *sat-cit-ānanda* that is why he is beyond from all variations. Actually, *Īśvara*, jīva and *sākṣī* are non-different from Brahman; due to association of *māyā,* it seems that all are different. *Īśvara's* existence belongs only in the phenomenal level.

Jiva or the individual self is Brahma, but due to *antaḥkarana*, *jīva* is limited and it is associated with senses, life-organs and body. *Jīva* is the empirical knower (*pramāta*), the doer and the enjoyer. The 'I' and 'mine' is the object of self-consciousness. *Jīva* suffers the miseries due to *māyā* and as a result, the cycle of birth and death occurs. Like *jīva*, *īśvara* is also limited by physical body, senses and internal organ. *Īśvara* is *māyāvacchinna caitanya* and *Īśvara* is the creator, preserver and the destroyer of this universe. While *jīva* is the combination of non-being, knowledge and ignorance. *Jīva* is designated by the notion of 'I' and 'mine' and on the other hand, *Īśvara* is designated by the notion of *śuddhacaitanya*.

Śaṁkara emphasizes on the notion of *sākṣī*, *Sākṣī* is pure consciousness, self-proved, self-luminous and the perceiver. Now someone can ask what is the difference between *sākṣī* and *Brahman* ? *Brahman* is unconditioned pure-consciousness (*nirupādhika*), *sākṣī* is *sopādhika*. *Sākṣī* is appeared always with the association of *upādhi*. *Jīva* is always

subject-object complex. *Īśvara* is associated with the notion of *māyā* and *jīva* is associated with antahkarana. *Sākṣī* is pure eternal consciousness and it appears as *Īśvara*. This is called *Īśvara Sākṣi* and the other one is *jīva sākṣī*. *Sākṣī* is '*sarvam vastu jñatatāyajñātatayā vā sākṣī-caitanyasya viṣeyaḥ*'. It means all objects are the object of *Sākṣī*. Prof. Chandradhar Sharma tried to say "'*Sākṣī* illuminates the modifications(*vṛtti*) of *citta* or *antaḥkaraṅa* in the waking state and the mental states in dream, it continues to shine even in deep sleep when there is no object and is responsible for the unity of the pre-sleep and post-sleep experience of the jiva"[27].

Now I would discuss the origin of the self in *Brahmasūtra*. *Brahmasūtra* explains " *nātmāośrutenityatvācca tābhyaḥ*"(2/3/17). It means the soul does not have birth and death, because Upanisads do not mention the origin of soul and *jīva's* eternity is knowable. *Jīva* is originally Brahma but *jīva* appears as the association of body, mind and senses Brahma is beyond all barriers. *Jīva* is limited realization but Brahman is the ultimate realization. Individual self is bounded by space and time that is why he suffers miseries. But supreme Self is beyond space and time. Individual soul undergoes the pious and impious works. As follows, he gets pleasure and pain, but not happiness or bliss because bliss is permanent, pleasure or pain is always changing with association of objects. The notion of felling is subjective but objective phenomena are always changing. Actually, the main assertion is when the ultimate is known then everything is known. In *Mundaka Upaniṣad*, the main origin is that the individual soul is like "'As from a blazing fire emanate a thousand sparks of the same nature as fire, similarly from the Immutable, O amiable one, are born different classes of creatures, and they merge their itself"[28]

[27] *The Advaita Tradition in Indian philosophy*, p 193
[28] *Brahma-sūtra- bhāṣya* , p 473.

Now someone may raise a question 'Why *Upaniṣad*s do not mention the origin of soul?' It follows that the soul is eternal and this eternality is understood from the Vedic texts. Eternality means birth less, endless and changeless too. Hence, *jīva* is identical with *Brahman.*

There are so many scriptures, which try to refer to the individual being as an intelligent and unchanging form[29] (1/2/18). In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the soul is *Brahman* and perceiver (2/5/19). As in the case of space, we are thinking that space can be divided from different perspective. Actually, space is one due to our phenomenal use we are dividing the space by assuming the object's existence in space. For space example, the room's space, pot's space etc. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* tries to determine that through mind, sense organs etc. we posit our existence and we are saying that matter is consciousness but this happens due to imposition because matter and consciousness are separate from each other. It depends on our stages of understanding (4/4/5). The *jīvātmā* is a combination of all worldly adjuncts. Why worldly ? Because, *jīva* suffers due to bondage of circularity. *Brahma*n is the denial of all worldly adjuncts. When the realizer will realize the identity between himself with Brahman then he will be beyond from it. Hence, the self or *jīva* is *Brahma*n and it has no origin.

The next verse is about the eternity of soul which is discussed in *Brahma-sūtra-bhasya*, "*jñāota eva*" 2/3/18. It means the cognition of soul is eternal. However, *Sāṁkha philosophy* does not believe this statement. *Sāṁkha* adheres that *jīva* is eternally conscious by *prakṛti*, because *prakṛti* is matter and *puruṣa* is consciousness. Creation occurs when the imbalance situation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* happens. The union of *puruṣa*

[29] *Katha Upaniṣad*, p 28.

and *prakṛti* is the cause of creation. So, there is a doubt to accept that *jīva's* eternity is knowable.

The Upaniṣads try to explain that the consciousness of the soul is always unconventional but it seems like a conventional. It is a combination of soul and mind like hot water. Water is a liquid form and water does not have the quality of hotness but when fire is associated with it, then the qualities of fire imposes on water and water's nature is determined by that intensity of warmness. Rather the warmness or hotness is the major quality of fire. The soul assumed the impermanency of matter and due to its association with matter; it seems that soul is impermanent. Actually, according to Advaita Vedanta, the consciousness of *jīva* is always accidental. This notion of accidental is questionable. Due to non-creation of soul, Upaniṣads repeatedly try to determine that soul is eternal because soul is identical with *Brahman* and *Brahman* is an eternal. Thus, the question arises as to when fire appears, then as automatically, light and heat appear, when soul exists then the eternity and consciousness also exist, but in dreaming state people though think that I have this realization, this is true and I know him or her etc. Yet later on, it appears that this is false realization, because these all are unreal. So, the question remains what is the reality?

Upaniṣads adhere that this realization of object is very much subjective in dreaming state and this feeling is perceived feeling, not real feeling. According to my understanding, an objection is these are not perceived feeling. According to our physiological structure, when someone posits these feelings in waking state then the physiological structure and neurons movement are similar with dreaming state. So, how can we define that dreaming feeling is perceived feeling or unreal?

Upaniṣads try to say that the appearance of absence of understanding is depending on the absence of object of knowledge, but not on consciousness because consciousness is a flow of light and the realization of consciousness means the endless or eternal happiness or boundless happiness where there is no misery.

Now I would like to discuss *jiva's* characteristic, which is discussed in *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, "*utkranti-gati-aagatinam*[30]" (2/3/19). It means the individual soul's form is material body, which has three dimensions like rising form, flow form and coming back form. Here, someone can raise a question that if Brahma is identical with *Jīva* or self then how can we say that soul has different dimensions? *Upaniṣads* mention that individual soul is limited, not Brahman because individuality means the association of finite objects. So, when the person departs from his body, then he left all finite objects related to body and when he comes back to the world then this form is attached to the soul. Hence, individual soul is limited, it is also accepted by *Upaniṣads*, there is no new statement in *vedic* tradition.

In this context the last verse is "*svātmanā cottarayoḥ*"[31](2/3/20). It indicates soul is atomic that is why moving. Soul is not the medium rather it has movement, death is not end point. Body is the medium and through medium this atomic flow is moving here and there and then it comes back through a new body. In scripture, they mentioned that some particular parts of the body are the place of departure of soul[32] (4/4/2). The eye, head and nose are the place of departure. So, inside the body soul is also moving that is why the movement of organs including mind are different in both waking and dreaming state (4/3/11).

[30] *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, p 478.
[31] Ibid, p 479
[32] *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Vol 2, p 529.*

In *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, *Dharmarājādharindra* mentioned *jīva* as the self-discloser. Self-discloser means *avedyatva* is the locus where indirect cognition always occurs. But, matter is always *vedya*, not *avedya*. That is why matter is not self-discloser. It does not mean that Brahma is only self-discloser rather in *Śruti*, there is an explanation that in dreaming stage *jīva* is self-discloser. Therefore, there is no argument, against *Śruti*.

Finally, I would like to conclude that this whole image of *jīva* is pertinent to understand the position in epistemology and metaphysics. Without knowing this nature of *jīva,* we cannot relate the dream reality because dreaming phenomenon occurs as *jīva's* experience.

Different states of jīva: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta systems

'I am awake' is the most crucial and important statement for every experimental discipline. However, when will I say I am awake? How do I explain 'I am awake'? Is it only depending on our regular activity or something more? Does 'awake' qualify our existence? Alternatively, 'awake' and 'exist' both can take place together.

These are plausible questions regarding the status of waking state. The identification of waking state is considering our phenomenal value. In this world, each action is happening and each of our regular activity is occurring. We can feel, we do believe and we know that without awakening, the notion of knowing cannot be justifiable.

At first, I would like to discuss the waking state from the perspective of Nyāya-Vaiśeşika. Nyāya is a realist system. It means that the object exists independently. That is why they believe only in one reality (waking state). They do not accept dreaming reality because then there will be the possibility of the second type of reality. Here, I would focus on Nyāya's view of waking state.

In Nyāya system, sensory organs (external and internal) are the cause of cognition in waking. There is no mediator to perform it. Waking state means where external organs are connecting to the external world. By *sannikarṣa* (relationship), the impression of object is coming from the external world then that impression is going to mind then to soul. This is the basic structure of knowledge acquisition process.

Soul (*ātmā*) --------- Mind (*manas*) ----------External organs----------External world



Laukika Sannikarṣa

According to *Nyāyasūtra*, *sannikarṣa* is of two kinds, like *loukik*a and *alaukik*a. *Laukika* means when external organs directly grasp the impression of object with the help of genus colour etc. The cognition is designated as loukika. *Laukika sannikarṣ*a is of six kinds, like a) *Saṁyoga* (when eyes connect to the pot), b) *saṅyukta samvāya* (when eyes connect to the attribute like red rose), c) *saṅyukta samaveta samavāya* (when eyes connect to the genus like potness of the pot), d) *samavāya* (when ear is associated with sound, the quality of *ākāśa*), e) *samaveta samavāya* (when ear is associated with soundness, the genus of sound) and f) *viśeşana-viśeşyabhāva* (the pot is absent in the floor). On the other hand, *alaukika sannikarṣa* is of three kinds, like a) *sāmānyalakşana* (someone identifies 'this is a chair' because he has universal cognition of 'chair'), b) *jñānalakşana* (in this case cognition is the first prior like sandal wood is little far from me but when I am seeing sandal wood then simultaneously I am feeling the fragrance) and c) *yogaja* (this perception is applicable for Yogi because of their mental and physical exercise they are able to see non-perceivable entity).

Apart from these, naiyāyika advocates two types of perception like

a) *Nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) (attributless, verbal modeless etc. just only observation is there) .

b) *Savikalpaka* (determinate) (when someone says 'this is pot' , in this case he differentiates between pot and non-pot).

Naiyāyika adheres four kinds of *pramāna*. These four tools are only gateway to cognise, like *pratyakşa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śavda*. Among these four, *pratyakşa* is the first.

This is the basic structure of knowledge acquisition process in Nyāya system. Later neo-naiyāyika Bhāsarvajňa accepts only three *pramānas*. He did not accept *Upamāna as pramāna*. In waking stage, this process occurs. For them mind is an *indriya (anu-parimāṇa*) and a substance.

Naiyāyikas do not accept dreaming state. They adhere dreaming state is delusional and asat too. In *Bhāşāpariccheda*, there is a discussion on the status of *ākāśa, kāla, dika, ātmā* and manas (*mind)*[33]. These are not external organs and they are not able to connect to the external world. So, there is no causal connectivity of external object in these organs.

Viswanātha, the author of *Bhāşāpariccheda* says perception means "*ātmā abṛtti-śabdabhinna-viśeşagunavatvam vā*[34]" because there is no touch and colour in air but we can perceive air. In this order, Viswanātha says "*tvaco yogo manasa jňānakaraṇam*[35]", means when mind connects to touch, that connection is the general cause of perception. But, in suṣupti state, mind locates in *puritaka nāḍī* instead of touch sensation. Here, due

[33] *Bhāşāpariccheda, p 272*
[34] Ibid
[35] *Ibid, p 274*

to the absence of touch sensation cognition does not occur. In this case, there is no causal connection.

Now the question is does any cognition occur in *suşupti* state?

At a glance, the answer is that cognition is not possible in this state due to the absence of *anubhava*. There is no connection between external organs and external object in this state that is why *manas pratyakṣa* is not possible in this state. For inference, there is no concomitant relation here that is why inferential cognition is also not possible. For *Upamiti,* There is no cognition of resemblance here so there is no *upamiti* also and due to the absence of *padajňāna*, *śāvdabodha* is also not possible in this state.

Therefore, without inductivity (*udbodhok*a) memory is also not conducted by anyone.

Usually the cognition is occurred by the relation of *tan-manosaṁyoga* and there is no *tan-manosaṁyoga* in *suṣupti* state. Desirable cognition (*icchādi jñāna*) is present and that cognition is occured by *ātma-manosaṁyoga* and as a result someone can assume that desirable cognition is plausible in suṣupti because *ātma-manosaṁyoga* is the cause of perception. Therefore, cognition can occur in *suṣupti* (assumption).

But the cognition is not possible in suṣupti because *ātmo-manosaṁyoga* is present in suṣupti, not as *tan-mano saṁyoga*. Without *tan-manosaṁyoga* (the activity of the mind), the cognition is not possible. In *suṣupti*, mind is located at *puritat nāri*. This kind of image (Cognition can occur) can be imagined for suṣupti that is why *Viswanāth*a says "*susuptiprākkālotpannecchadivyakterityadi*"[36].

According to this verse, someone can raise a question that *tan-manosaṁyoga* is the fundamental cause of perception and how do you explain the taste and visual perceptions

[36] *Bhāṣāpariccheda, p 276*

in susupti state? In susupti, *tan-manosaṁyoga* is not present and this connection is the necessary criteria for cognition. Only *ātmā-mano saṁyoga* is there in *susupti*. Therefore, the taste and visual perceptions are not plausible in *susupti*.

According to *nyāy*a system, without having the *viśeşana jňāna* (potness) the *viśişta jňāna* (pot) is not possible. The cognition structure should be like "*viśeşanatāvacchedakprakārakam jňānam viśiştavaiśiştabagāhi"*. So, in susupti, there is no testimony *(pramāṅa*) to prove that *nirvikalpaka jn̂āna* is there and without *nirvikalpaka jn̂āna*, the *savikalpaka jn̂āna* cannot be rendered. Therefore, there is no cognition in susupti (deep sleep). *Nyāya* did not advocate any theory of *turīya*.

In Vaiśeşika, system there is no separate discussion of any stage of *jīva*. They advocate only waking state in the discussion of *ātmā.* They discuss *ātmā* as a conscious being, body is matter. Body does not have this consciousness. In *Praśastapādabhāşya*, there is one example to establish the ātmā in the following manner. At first, someone sees the sweet, then his eyes connect to sweet. In the meantime, he recognises his experience about this particular sweet. Then by memory, he identifies the relation between past and present sweet. After recalling he has desire to take it. As a result, he took the sweet. Now question is about the doer. Is doer conscious being or not? According to Vaiśeşika, mind cannot be a doer because mind is *karaṅa* then body cannot be doer because body is unconscious. Therefore, someone is present who is conscious and the doer and this doer is the conscious soul or *ātmā*. This scenario occurs only in waking state. They did not focus about other states like waking state[37].

Now I would like to focus on Advaita understanding of the four stages of *jīva*. In *Vedāntaparibhāşā,* we find the following lines "*eka-jivavādehavidyā-prativimbo jivah.*

[37] *Praśastapādabhāşya*, p 154

Anek-jivavāde antahkarana-prativimbah. Sa ca jāgrat-svapna-suşusptirupāvasthā-trayavān. Tatra jāgrat-dasā nameindriyajanya-jňānāvasthā, avasthāntare indriyābhāvānnātivyāptih. Indriya-janya-jňānam ca antahkaran-vrittih, svarupa-jňānasyanāditvāt"[38].

In *eka jivavāda , jīva* is reflected consciousness (*prativimvito caitanya*) in *avidyā*.

In *anek-jivavāda, jīva* is reflected conscious in *antaḥkarana*.

This *jīva* has three stages like *jāgrata* (waking), *svapna* (dream) and suṣupti or deep sleep. *Turīya* is the highest stage or fourth stage or realisation stage. After realisation, he is able to differentiate between jīva and a-jīva stage. Mainly, waking stage means when external organs are working to get impression from external world. Waking state is depending on external organs. Nay, this stage is consisted by external sensory cognition but in dream or suṣupti, all external avenues are closed. Due to the absence of external organs, there is no *vyāpāra* in dream or suṣupti. As a result, there is no cognition in both the stages.

According to Advaita tradition, the cognition of Brahman is the highest and eternal but in phenomenal level, *antaḥkaranavṛtti*[39] is the cause of external sensory cognition.

In Advaita system, they advocate three types of *caitanya* or consciousness such as a) *viṣaya caitanya (ghatāvacchinnam caitanya*), b) *pramāna caitanya* (*antaḥkaran-vrittvāvacchinna caitanyam*) and c) *pramāṭr caitanya (antaḥkaranāvacchinna caitanya*). Actually, the ultimate conscious is one and only *Brahman*.

For example, the torch itself is *pramātri caitanya*. The light of torch is *pramāna caitanya* and visible object is *Viṣaya Chaitanya*.

[38] *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* , p 300
[39] *viṣayākāra pariṅāma of antaḥkaraṅa.*

These all differentiations are occurring due to the upādhi. *Upādhi* differentiates one object from other object. For example, *ākāśa* is one but due to some boundaries like inside the room, inside the pot etc. it seems that *ākāśa* is limited by pot or room. Here *upādhi* is boundaries of room and boundaries of pot. When boundaries will be deleted then the real realisation will come, i.e. *ākāśa* is one.

The notion of *antaḥkaranavṛtti* is the primary understanding of cognition. Without *antaḥkaranavṛtti* the cognition would not have been possible.

In this context, *Dharmarājādharindra* mentions "*tatra yathā tarāgādikam*"[40]. It means water has no shape. According to locus, the water always takes its shape. Like when water is in the pond then according to pond water is visible, when water in the pot then water is visible like the pot. On the other hand, when water goes to the lane then it takes the lane's structure. Similarly, *antaḥkarana* is one of the most important pariṇāma of ajňāna. When *antahkarana* applies itself to the body then *antaḥkarana's* structure is like body. Actually, *antaḥkarana* is *taijasa padārtha*. So, when perceiver sees the object then *antaḥkarana* comes always from the sensory organ and goes directly to the object. After that *antaḥkarana* takes the object's structure and takes the role of the object. As a result, the object is visible to the perceiver. This *viṣayākār pariṇāma* is called antaḥkaranavṛtti. Now question is about the role of *vṛtti* ? *Vṛtti* always takes the main role for acquiring cognition. *Vṛtti* always helps to negate the *ajňāna āvarana* of object for a small time period. That is why phenomenal uses occur in our daily life. So, *vṛtti* is the *avasthā* of *antaḥkarana.*

In dreaming state, there is no *antaḥkaranavṛtti.* That is why cognition is not possible in dreaming state. Now the problem is : is there any *vṛtti* in dreaming state? According to

[40] *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, p 30.

Advaita system, avidyā *vṛtti* is present in this state. We know that pleasure and pain feelings are internal and when someone feels pleasure or pain then he does not have any doubt about his feelings because pleasure and pain are '*jñātaika sat'* means pleasure or pain is itself cognised. It is internal too. Being internal, there is no *antaḥkaranavṛtti,* only *avidyāvṛtti.* Therefore, by *avidyāvṛtti* we get to know our pleasure and pain, it is true and acceptable but in dreaming state when someone has pleasure or pain by avidyā, then why is it false or non-acceptable?

Now, I would like to discuss four states of *jīva* according to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*.

In *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, there are three consecutive sections, like the first section in which they discuss the word '*AUM*' and in the second, they discuss threefold becoming in time and in third stage, they discuss the fourfold stages of *jīva*.

The fourfold are *viśva* (waking), *taijasa* (dream), *prājñā* (deep sleep) and *caturtha* (*turiya*). These three folds represent three conditions of body like gross (*sthula*), subtle (*sūkṣa*) and causal (*kāran*). The *ātmā* is completely distinct from these three several forms of jīva. In phenomenal levels, these distinctions occur to feel variety of this world.

'A' denotes *viśva* = phenomenal world, 'U' denotes *taijasa* = dreaming state and 'M' denotes *Prājña* = deep sleep[41].

"*jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro'kārah Prathamā mātrāpterādi mattvādvāpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmānādiśca bhavati ya evaṁ veda"*[42] *(Āgama prakaraṅa)*

Waking state represents *vaiśvānara* means A. This is extended forms of A. So, A represents the individual self in waking state. This is *Virāt*. That is why A indicates the

[41] *Pancikaraṅa varttika*, p 47
[42] *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's kārikā by Swami Chinmayānanda, p 84.*

whole world and all desires of world. The individual 'I' is the real seeker. Therefore, 'A' and *Vaisvānara* are representing the individual ''I'' where every possibility is there.

"*svapnasthānanastaijasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrotkarṣādubhayatvādvotkarṣati ha vai jñānasantatiṁ samānaśca bhavati nāsyābrahmavit kule bhavati ya evam veda''*[43]. *(10*)

'U'' represents the dreaming state, *taijasa,* internal consciousness. In dreaming state, there is also consciousness.

''suṣuptasthānaḥ prājñõ makarastṛtīyā mātrā miterapītēravā minoti ha vā idaṁ sarvamapītiśca bhavati ya evaṁ veda''[44]. *(11*)

'M' represents the state of deep sleep or dreamless sleep, *prajňā.* After *Viśva and taijasa* , the self can enter this state. In *suṣupti,* self can realise the glimpse of highest bliss.

"*Amātraścaturtho'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivo'dvaita evamomkāra ātmaiva saṁviśatyātmanātmānaṁ ya evaṁ veda*."[45] (12)

'*Amātra'* means limitless and 'caturtha' is *'amātra',* the cosmic Self. After *viśva, taijasa* and *prājňā*, the self can enter into this limitless stage. It is beyond any verbal mode, non-duality. Wise people can achieve this cosmic state. When the wise man enters the caturtha or *turiya* state, then he becomes free from all boundaries. In phenomenal world, due to ignorance, the diversity is there and people are suffering. ''*prapañcopaśamaḥ*'' (ceddation of this phenomenal world) is determined by the cognition of one, then all diversity vanishes and people can enter into *turiya* state.

[43] *Ibid,* p 88
[44] *Ibid,* p 91
[45] *Ibid* , p 98

After achieving turiya, the wise man can realise that this phenomenal state (dream, waking and suṣupti) is an illusion. The imposition of world happens due to ignorance, when someone is present in *turiya* then that imposition will be gone, only the oneness will remain. Then there is only joy and there is no diversity.

As a result, the wise person can know the truth and he is able to distinguish between one and many. He can realise himself as the whole world, the whole creation and the highest happiness. All is within himself. So, the journey (one to many or many to one) is important for all beings where the wise man enters from many to one. That intervention leads to get the Cosmic Self or the identical relation between *Brahman* and *jīva*.

We have to remember that this scenario will happen gradually. People cannot enter directly into *turīya or caturtha* in phenomenal level because the realisation becomes one when someone can transit from many to one. All scriptures can help to get this path but without understanding of *Brahman,* there is no joy. Only circularity of birth will be present. That is why the identical relation between one or *self* and many or *jīva* is very important for self-realisation or liberation. This projection can occur only within you, there is no need of roaming here and there. Time can help one to access the real goal. That is why realisation process is one kind of cognitive journey where joy is present, no sorrow.

Gauḍapāda was the Guru of Govindapāda and Govindapāda was the Guru of Śaṁkarācārya. Gauḍapāda's interpretation of *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* is very relevant and important in Advaita system. His target is to show that Bahman is real and apart from *Brahman,* all phenomenal reality is imaginary.

According to N. Jayashanmugam's understanding[46]

Māṇḍukya suggests two things :

1) "It regards the first three states as the triple term through which the world comes into existence from the *ātman* – while *prājñā* is the source of the world - the world in its unmanifested condition, *taijasa* and *visva* represents respectively the two conditions of the manifest world, subtle and gross ".
2) "Through a total negation of the world, *prapancopaśamam*, it arrives at its goal of realisation, namely, the *ātman, sa ātmā*".

Gauḍapāda establishes all his arguments on these two. In *Vedānta* system, all imposed objects are false and locus is always true.

In phenomenal level, waking, dreaming and deep sleep are governed by *māyā* or nescience. We know that *māyā* has two functions, like *āvarana* and *vikşepa*. *Āvarana* covers the real nature and *vikşepa* reflects the unreal nature of object. That is why we are unable to distinguish between matter and spirit.

According to Gauḍapāda, whatever we are seeing in waking or dreaming, are all projections of mind. Phenomenal objects have no real value because none is permanent. *viśva* and *taijasa* always designate our relative existential value. The *prājñā* stage is silent stage, no verbal modes, no interaction with any world, neither internal to internal nor external to internal.

We have to remember that *māyā* is an instrument for creation. Without *māyā* the creation would not have been possible because *māyā* can be distinct and it has variety. The first

[46] "*Māṇḍukya or Catuspādātmā-Siddhi " , Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol 83 (2002) , pp - 123*

three stages are true in phenomenal level but from the transcendental point, only caturtha is true, rest is false.

N. Jayashanmugam has pointed out one argument regarding imagination in his article.

"All objects have a beginning and an end. In both they have no existence. But between the two stages they have existence. Here, Gauḍapāda's point is that since they do not exist in the two stages, they cannot exist even in the middle. Hence he concludes that their existence in the middle must be imaginary and not real"[47].

According to him, existence means imagination. Therefore, *māyā* will be demolished by the ultimate negation. From the perspective of ultimate truth, three stages of jīva are imaginary but caturtha is only true and real because it is permanent.

Śaṁkarācārya discusses the nature of suṣupti in *Paṅcikaraṅa* "*sarvaprakārajñānopasaṅhāre buddheḥ kāraṅātmanāvasthānam suṣuptiḥ* [48] *"(41).*

Therefore, *suṣupti* or deep sleep is the extinction of all forms of cognition (waking and dreaming state) but Śaṁkara introduces '*buddhehkāranātmanavasthānaṇ*' because at the stage of liberation waking and dreaming all cognitions have been demolished by the cognition of one. If we accept the definition of suṣupti without "*buddheh*." then there will be a fallacy. The fallacy is "*'antaḥkarana*" does not occur at the stage of liberation but *antaḥkarana* is present in waking and dreaming states as *kārana* and it is present in suṣupti as *upādāna kārana*. That is why to resolve the fallacy, "*buddheh...*" is needed to deny the *antaḥkarana* as the cause of cognition and we could not say suṣupti means only "*sarvaprakārajñānopasaṅhāre".*

Earlier, I have mentioned the nature of suṣupti state according to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*.

[47] *ibid, p 126*
[48] *Paṅcikarana,* p 7

We have to remember that *viśva* is the first step of gross body where ātmā reveals himself as *Vaiswānara* and this waking state is the living state of his gross body. In this state, external organs connect to external world and through mind the impression of object occurs. As a result, material cognition occurs in our waking level. *Vaiśvānara or Virāt* is the combination of five elements (*pancamahābhuta*). This waking sate is the combination of five elements. '*AUM*' is the synonym of *Brahman* that is why 'A' is the first stage of ātmā (*Viśva*). Waking, dreaming and suṣupti are states, not an identical. But *tūriya* is the identical state of *Brahman*,

Actually, every state has been designated by *Brahman* but due to the stage of realisation the chronology is needed.

Svapna (dream) is the second step of *Brahmacaitanya*. Here, only avidyā is present, no *ajñāna*. Due to the absence of external organs, there is no direct cognition like waking state. Experiencing (*bhoga*) occurs with the help of avidyā. *Antaḥkaranavṛtti* is not present here. *Pancatanmātra* and the kārya of *pancatanmātra* like *pancaprāna,* ten sensory organs, mind and *buddhi* these seventeen categories have formed a subtle body and this subtle body is *taijasa* and designated by 'U'. Through mind the desirable object comes in dreaming state. That is why here *ātmā* performs as an '*antaḥprajñā*'. The subtle body cannot grasp the external impression.

Nesicence or *ajñāna* is the combination form of subtle and gross body. That is why in *Bṛhadāranyak Upaniṣad*, *ajñāna* is "*taddhedam tarhavyākṛtmāsīt*"[49] (1/4/7). It means this universe is manifested by names and forms. It is also an imposition. In suṣupti, the jiva does not have any desire like two preceding states. So, suṣupti state itself is blissful and *prajñāghana.*

[49] *The Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, Vol 1 , p 168

"*yatra supto na kancana Kāma kāmayte na kancana svapnam paśyati tat suşuptam*[50]*"(4/3/19).* In *suṣupti,* there is no desire and there is no desirable dream, it is free from all kindS of perception. It is deep sleep state.

Due to the presence of *ajñāna*, the identical relation between *jīva* and *Brahman* has not been grasped in these three levels (waking, dreaming and suṣupti). In dreaming and waking both states, *jīva* is covered by *ajñāna* that is why *jīva* is not able to cognise the real nature of object. Due to superimposition, *jīva* is imposing the opposite nature on the object. Hence, in *suṣupti*, there is no cognition and there is no consumption.

According to Advaita, when all *kāryas* are in non-manifested forms (*avyakrita*), then that state is called night or *rātri* or *pralaykāla*. That non-manifested form is also *prājñā (suṣupti*). In this stage, *prājñā* is free from any activities. Only causal body is there.

In *turīya*, *jīva* is free from all cause and effects boundary. This state is free from three types of body (gross, subtle and causal). We have mentioned that suṣupti is a bliss state (resting zone) but it is not ultimate. We have to come back from suṣupti to waking state again because until and unless the nescience will be demolished, the jīva will not be free from any boundaries. In the stage of suṣupti, avidyā occurs as a constricted form of *antaḥkarana*. After coming back into waking state, *antaḥkarana* will appear in its explicit form. But, after liberation there is no recycle. *Avidyā* always covers up the *Brahmaswarupatā* in suṣupti.

Now someone can raise a question if *suṣupti* is not the ultimate stage, then how do we explain that suṣupti is the silent stage of *jīva's* nature and *swarupsiddhi* stage?

In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Śaṁkara interprets "*nānyatra svarupāvasthā nacchramāpanodaḥ syāditi yuktā prasiddhirloukikānāṅ svaṅ hyapīto bhavatīti| dṛśyate*

[50] *ibid, p 464.*

hi loke jvarādirogagrastānaṅ tadvinirmoke svātmasthānaṅ viśramaṅ"[51] (483/1) . It means suṣupti is a relaxation zone, when jīva is tired of interacting between waking and dreaming states then *jīva* wants to take rest. That is why *jīva* is taking rest in suṣupti. But, this rest is not for all time. *Jīva* has to come back through this circle and suṣupti is *prajñānaghana* state. *Brahman* is also *prajñānaghana* but both senses are different.

In *suṣupti*, there is no emotions like pleasure and pain because there is no interaction.

Now the question remains - is there any difference between suṣupti and destruction period because avidyā is present in both the levels?

The fundamental difference is after *suṣupti*, jīva has cycle like waking and dreaming but after destruction there is no *avidyā*, it is stopped finally. After deep sleep the *jīva* can say, "my sleep was good or bad" that means he can recall but after *pralaykāla* or destruction there is no recall.

Here, I would like to mention that *suṣupti's* silence occurs in normal senseless state (*mūrchā*) and the stage of death but both silences are completely different because after any senseless position or suṣupti, *jīva* can come back but after death, it is not possible.

Here, some other possibility can occur that is if the *jīva* is dead as gross body in *suṣupti*, then can he come again in other's mind. The answer will be 'no' because that emotion is an illusion, nothing else. In waking stage, *jīva's* perception itself is a creation, similarly dreaming objects also depend on dreaming perception but in suṣupti or deep sleep state, there is no perception.

When the *jīva* transits from all three stages then he can enter the *caturtha or turīya.* Advaita accepts this state as a state of happiness. Here, the *jīva* can break the membrane

[51] "*Uddālko Hāruṇiḥ……bhavati*", p 687.

of *ajñāna* for the small time being and he can emerge himself as an identical form of *Brahman*. A true knowledge is possible only when all appearances will be negated by one. We have to remember that *turīya* state is a spark of the ultimate happiness, not as an ultimate.

Finally**,** I would like to conclude that jīva or self is the basic tool or locus for any epistemological or metaphysical discussion. Otherwise, the question will be like who is the knowledge receiver or whose experience (dream)? Alternatively, who wants to realise the transcendental reality? That is why the notion of jīva is the most important domain in Indian philosophy. In this section, I have tried to discuss the different states of *jīva* in the light of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta philosophy. Both systems have different methodology. Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika systems are realist theist schools in Indian philosophy. Advaita is an idealist theist school. Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika concerns always this phenomenal world. They do not focus on any transcendental world like Advaita. They discuss only three stages of *jīva*. They recognise dream state as *asat* or unreal state. On the other hand, Advaita advocates four states of *jīva*. Both states (dreaming and waking) are important for every being. My main concerning area is to focus on dreaming phenomenon. Two different systems have completely different methods to penetrate the notion of dream. Here, I have showed these two different perspectives regarding states of *jīva* with their verities because two schools are relevant and crucial discipline for my discussion. Hence, I have chosen particularly these schools. In this section, I am not comparing or not projecting any vice-versa theory, rather I am trying to discuss two different perspectives in the light of stages of *jīva*. It will help for my further discussion.

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CHAPTER 1

DREAM: AN IMPORTANT STATE OF EXPERIENCING SELF

Chapter 2

Different Notions of Real and Illusion

Introduction

In my second chapter, I would like to focus on the nature of reality and the nature of illusion in the light of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools and I would discuss the justification of not asserting dream is illusory or hallucinatory state.

After the discussion of *Jīva'*s position, now I am entering to the nature of reality because mainly in my whole thesis I am trying to figure out the dreaming reality is tangible or intangible. Before this understanding of dreaming reality at first, we have to focus on the background of the whole picture like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta's dogmas on reality.

In this chapter, the main concern area is to find out what the reality is. In general, the nature of reality is the most fundamental segment in metaphysics. Therefore, without knowing the background of classical view we cannot determine any statement about dreaming phenomenon.

In Indian philosophy, the main novelty is to learn about metaphysical position of reality. So, this phenomenal reality, lower level of phenomenal reality like the domain of rope-snake illusion state and beyond this is phenomenal reality. All schools of Indian philosophy do not want to focus on different shades of reality. Some schools adhere only to this phenomenal level and some schools want to go beyond this phenomenal level. All notions are depending on their methodologies but the ultimate aim is same for all systems.

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, they are concerned with this phenomenal reality. On the other hand, Advaita adheres to three grades of reality. Here, the nature of dreaming reality will be discussed from the perspective of these three systems.

If we say reality denotes only the perceivable entity then non-perceivable discussion would not have been possible or we can say ostensibly non-perceivable state is false state but actually, this is not tenable because we get different kind of solution from dreaming state. Sometimes these solutions are applicable in our waking state too. We are aware of it but behind this discussion, the most important portion is to understand about the nature of unreality. After that, we can make any statement whether the dreaming reality is real or not. Hence, all these discussions are very important in this chapter. Systematically, I am discussing these schools here.

The main reason of introducing this chapter before my fourth chapter (imagination and mind-body relation) is to know about the classical systems, then I can propagate my discussion on dreaming reality whether it is acceptable or not. Thus, I am introducing this chapter between the discussion of the position of *Jīva* and the classical view on dream whether it is considered as real or unreal.

The main significance is to understand the status of dreaming reality in our life. Without knowing this issue, we cannot determine any statement on dream. Dreaming phenomenon is a complex and epiphenomenon state. It means this state is internal. Since a long time, dreaming reality is discussed as unreal state or illusory state but in my chapter, I would like to show that illusion or hallucination can occur in dream but that does not mean dream itself is an illusory or hallucinatory or false state.

Here, I would discuss the classical view of illusion from the perspective of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta philosophical systems. My justification of this discussion

will show the brief structure of the nature of illusion. Illusion and hallucination both are very important and cryptic domains in non-veridical cognition. The wonder of studying Indian philosophy is that all schools penetrate the nature of veridical and non-veridical cognition as well. They focus on these two aspects accordingly. This critical approach is needed for analytic understanding.

In general, they advocate dream is an illusory or hallucinatory state. Illusion is a complex psychosis where two objects have to present like two mental or two external or one external and one internal. Mainly, one internal and one external are to be considered here for example. Like rope-snake or nacre-silver illusion. Complex because mind is depending on external organs. This is also cognitive state but as non-veridical. In this chapter, I am taking nacre-silver example mainly. Hallucination is single psychosis because mind independently creates false images.

In the case of illusion, the visible object is not the real object. Real object is covered by the visible object, which is unreal (not present). In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the word 'real' means existence and 'unreal' means not existence. So, the main critical aspect is to determine about the cause of imposition of visible object. Visible object means imposed object. Nyāya's theory of illusion is called ' *Anyathākhyātivāda'* which means the real object is present but the imposed object is real in some other place, not in this place like nacre is real but when perceiver sees the silver instead of nacre, it means silver is present in some other place, not in the case of nacre. By illusion, we are seeing silver instead of nacre. Here, only real entity is nacre. This classical theory of illusion shows the nature of illusion and the negation of imposed object. This whole process has to be discussed here according to their systems. That is why I would focus on it and how dreaming phenomenon is to be considered as unreal in their system that also I would mention.

On the other hand, Advaita adheres that in the case of illusion "*idamrajatam*" (this is silver) , the perception (*idam*) and memory (*rajat*) both can occur at the same time instead of nacre (*śukti*). This is illusion, it is neither true nor false because according to the system Brahman is unconditional true and 'Barren women's son', 'sky-flower' are false because they are logically contradicted, apart from that all are '*anirvacaniya*' (unspeakable). This whole phenomenal world including dreaming and waking is '*anirvacaniya*'. In this chapter, I would show the structure of Advaita's theory of illusion, which is called '*Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda'*.

In the third section, I will discuss the relationship between dream and waking states, the brief introduction of dream and why dream state is not considered as illusion only. In dream, illusion can occur like waking state but dream itself is not an illusory state. Therefore, I would consider that dream is not identical with waking state and that is true but dream is not logically contradictory state. It is real in a different way. It means we cannot negate it ostensibly like 'sky-flower' etc.

This whole picture will be discussed in this chapter and in the third chapter, I will show the classical view of dreaming phenomenon in the light of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

The Reality in Nyāya philosophy

The notion of reality is a very crucial metaphysical issue in Indian Philosophy. The reality concerns about fact, state-of-affairs also. Now what is fact and what is state-of-affairs? Fact is the state of affairs of the object. In India, philosophy always stands for intellectual analysis and rational understanding of object. The whole scenario depends on the way of knowledge acquiring process. In Indian philosophy, the thought construction always follows the deeper appreciation of reality through intuition. This deeper

appreciation comes from the mind-soul relations. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeşika philosophy, mind (manas) is *anuttvaviśişta*.

Here, I would like to examine the notion of reality from the perspectives of *Nyāya-Vaiśeşika* and Advaita Vedānta's thought. According to Nyāya, they advocate some sensible and some supersensible realities. Sensible reality means those realities where the object is grasped through experience. Super-sensible means that the object of knowledge is outside the domain of sensibility. It is beyond the physical realm of cognition. But here, the main question is what is the significance of super-sensible reality in knowledge? Object's existence is dependant on the justification of fact. One most important thing is the difference between appearance and reality. Appearance is the object as it appears to perceiver and reality is the object independent of perceiver's standpoint. Appearance is always changing, sometimes it is connected to the object and sometimes not. But, reality means the constant position of the object, it is not changing.

According to Nyāya, the knowledge (about padārtha) is objective and without any confusion they tried to introduce a form of realism by the distinction between sense and reference. Nyāya always has attempted to explain creation from the perspective of space and time. They do not explain any sensible world out of space and time. Nyāya always maintains the permanence of cause and effects in this phenomenal world. Nyaya does not directly explain the notion of reality; they explain the notion of reality as opposed to the Vijňānavādin Bauddhas. According to Vijňānavādins we cannot know the real form of object because object does not reveal the real character. But as an opponent, Naiyāyika tries to explain that Vijňānavādin's position of reality of object is wrong. Chronologically Nyāya replies to every argument. Nyāya's position is that the reality of the external world is accessible to reason. It does not belong to the outside, means

beyond the external world. Now we are going to explain the conversation between Buddhist idealists and Naiyāyikas[52].

Buddhist philosophers try to establish that we are not capable of knowing the real nature of objects. Why? It means they hold that when we analyse the object by reason then there is nothing after analysis. For example, when we talk about the notion of 'cloth', cloth is systematically conjugated yarns. Therefore, when we get yarns after analysing the cloth, then the cloth and yarns are different. We know that the cloth is made by yarns but the notion of yarns cannot indicate that yarns means cloth. So after analysing, we get only yarns and when we again analyse the yarns by reason then we get only atoms. Atoms and yarns are completely different. We cannot say they are identical because the atoms come from yarns. Again when we analyse the atoms then after analysis there is nothing. Hence, according to Buddhist philosophers, at the end there is nothing[53]. It means after analysis by reason there is nothing. So, we cannot know the reality. It is only the appearance, which we get to know. They intrinsically tried to say that it is all about apprehension.

Naiyāyikas are realists. They accept that the existence of object does not depend on perceiver's perception, it can be existing without perceiver. That is why they are realist and they also accept that we are getting knowledge by reason. Vātsāyana (the commentator of Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras*) in response to Buddhist realists states that if an object can be analysed by reason, then we cannot say that the real objects are not apprehended and on the other hand if real objects are not apprehended, then we cannot say that object can be analysed by reason[54]. This is an objection of Vātsāyana. So it is self-contradictory statement. It means that by reason when an object can be grasped, then

[52] *Indian Realism,* p 170.
[53] *Ibid*
[54] *Ibid, p 172.*

it is analysable. Thus, it cannot be said that the real nature of the object is not present. Vātsāyana, in his *Nyāyabhāsya* "*Buddhyāvivecanangyāthātmānupalabdhischeti"*[55] *(4/2/27*) explains this self-contradictory notion about Buddhist philosophers (Vijňānavadi). Naiyāyikas always believe that the nature of object is analysable and apprehended by reason. According to Buddhism we cannot say that we are not able to know that objects are real. The external objects are always existing. The external reality is always present in the object and it is knowable by reason. Nyāya posits that the external world is real and it is knowable by reason (*buddhi*). The analysis of nature does not negate the nature of reality. Rather analysis helps to find out the notion of real. Naiyāyikas are realist that is why they are judging everything through *Pramāṅa*. They advocate four sources of true knowledge such as Perception (*pratyakşa*), Inference (*anumāna*), Comparison (*upamāna*) and testimony (*śavda*). But, perception is the primary cause of true knowledge. Analysis of object always leads to the separate apprehension of real object. Analysis does not establish the non-existential entity as advocated by the Buddhist philosophers. Examination or analysis means determination of objects which do exist and which do not exist. Analysis does not establish that all objects are non-existential. According to Vātsāyana, in his *bhāşya* (4/2/30) there is no non-existent entity because there is no *pramāṅa* to prove it. He says that if someone accepts that "all objects are non-existential" then someone has to accept that there is a *pramāṅa* to prove non-existence of all objects. Then it follows that the existence of object cannot be proved by *pramāṅa* and it has to prove that all objects are non-existential. If it is proven, then one has to accept at least one *pramāṅa* is there which is supporting to prove of non-existence. If we will say at least one *pramāṅa* (object) is there, then we cannot say, "all objects are non-existential" due to the presence of one

[55] *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol 5, p 150.

pramāna (object). It is a contradiction. That is why we cannot accept negation of all objects. Hence object exists and is real.

Gautama advocates that we are always able to know the whole portion of object instead of part. Why? According to him "*Tadāśratyadprithagagrahanāt"*[56] [57](4/2/28) means *kāryadravya* has cause (*kāraṅa*) and that is why *kāraṅa* itself is the locus of object (*kāraṅa-dravyāśritattva*). There is relation between cause and effect. That is why when someone is perceiving the object as *kārya*, then *kāraṅa* (cause) is there. This relationship is called *āshray-ashrita* relationship (locus-object). *Āśraya* means locus and *āśrita* means which takes place in the locus. Due to this relation, we cannot see the object as a separate part. Due to this notion, Nyāya can proclaim that Buddhist philosopher's objection against the existence of cloth is not true because we cannot argue that the cloths and yarns are same by causal relation. Why? Cloth is made by yarns. This is true but it is wrong to argue that cloth does not exist apart from yarns. Hence, cloth exists.

Again, Vijňānavādin raises a question about the instrument of right cognition (*pramāṅa*) and object of right cognition (*prameya*). According to them, both are unreal. Why? They mention[58] (4/2/32). It means there is a non-existing myth place which is *Gandharvanagara* and the illusion of mirage is non-existent. They are trying to say that as dream *Gandharvanagara* and mirage are unreal though all of these are appearing as real, yet really these do not exist. This is a main objection about *pramāṅa* and *prameya*. In dreaming state, there is an instrument of right cognition and objects of right cognition and all are apprehended as real. Vātsāyana replies in his *bhāşya*[59] that it means there is no proof to prove the object due to the absence of *hetu.* It means we cannot say that the

[56] *Ibid, 152*
[57] "*jñānena tu svasmin…samullirvyate", Nyāyadarśana, Nyāyavṛtti, p 1074*
[58] "*jāgratapratyayā anyeyaṁvaviddhāḥ…vilakṣṅā ityartha", Nyāyadarśana, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, p 1076*
[59] *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol 5, p 159

object of dreaming state is unreal because these are all unperceivable in waking state. We have to accept that waking stuffs are real due to the capacity of perception and all are perceivable. But, we cannot say that due to perception only waking state is real. Why? If we posit that only waking state is perceivable then it follows that objects of waking state are present, means real. However, it is a contrary conclusion of Vijňānavādin. On the other hand, according to Vijňānavādin, if we will say that both waking and dreaming states are unreal, then there is no significance to discuss about real entity in waking state, because there is no uniqueness in waking state. Simultaneously, if someone says that dreaming state is unreal then it follows that there is no *hetu* to prove the objects in this state. Without *hetu* we cannot establish the existence of different objects. In dreaming state, there is diversity. However, diversity always happens due to specific *hetu*. It is a rule. According to Nyāya, Vijňānavādin cannot explain the diversity (*vikalpa)* in dreaming state without any *hetu.* Then, Vijňānavādin has to accept that due to the presence of some *hetu*, there is diversity and the dreaming stuffs are real. Thus, Vijňānavādin does not accept this theory. Therefore, according to Nyāya, due to the absence of *hetu*, there is no proof to prove that objects are non-existent. On the other hand, if someone raises another alternative to prove non-existence as a whole that is all dreaming objects and waking objects are equally unreal, then they cannot prove separately that dreaming stuffs are unreal.

Ācārya Gautama posits that the dreaming reality is based on memory. On the other hand, during dream vividness comes from the data of memory[60]. Here, my observation is that dream is not only illusion because illusion is complex psychosis. Now what is complex psychosis? It means when illusion happens then two objects are always present, one

[60] *atha vijñānasya…..vaktvya' , Nyāyadarśanam, Nyāyavārtikam* , p 1044

internal and one external. It is all about mental game. For example, in the case of rope-snake, the rope is always external and snake is internal. It means that the internal object imposed on the external object due to some reason and here mind is not independent. That is why it is complex psychosis. In dreaming state, the picture is completely different from illusion. Why? In dreaming state, all objects are internal according to every school and mind is independent. If we will say that dreaming state is an illusion, then we have to accept waking state as well because that complexity is also present in waking state. On the other hand, it is very crucial if we think about dreaming object not like barren woman's son or sky-flower etc. then we can consider a separate state as real (this state exists) whether it is false or true but not like sky-flower. This is determined. So, now I can say that we can think about the dreaming object like waking state. It does not mean both objects are different. It means dreaming pot is true in dream and waking pot is true in waking otherwise we cannot explain about dreaming objects. When we are comparing dreaming objects and waking objects then we are saying that dreaming objects are not present in waking state because both states are different. Dreaming state has its own intrinsic value. Normally we are pushed to think that dreaming object has to be present in waking state as 'real agent'. Agent means participation. In yogācāra philosophy, there is no difference between waking and dreaming state. Dreaming reality is present.

After that, Goutama says, "*tattvapradhānabhedācca mithyāvuddherdvaividhyopapattiḥ*"[61] (4/2/37), means in the stage of illusion, the imposed object is always illusory object and the locus is real. According to this notion, two objects are present in this stage. The Buddhist idealist argues that the object of right cognition also has to be non-existent and the cognition is wrong. However, in wrong cognition (illusion), the dual characters are present. Hence, Nyāya raises a question

[61] *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol 5, p 183

about Buddhist's wrong cognition. In the case of wrong cognition, if we will say that wrong cognition must be non-existent, then how is it possible to say that the snake is wrong and rope is true. If we accept the non-existence of both snake and rope (imposed object and locus) following the Buddhist idealists, then it follows that snake and rope both are non-existent. However, the question is why perceiver is afraid to see a snake instead of rope. There is always a pre-cognition of snake. Without this pre-cognition, perceiver cannot leave the place out of fear. There is cognition about snake which consists of structural similarity and that the snake is harmful in perceiver's mind. If we accept the notion of non-existence of both snake and rope, then the above thing cannot happen. However, dream is completely different from it, which I already mentioned.

Now I would like to concentrate on the meaning of 'reason'. Here I am following Prof. Pradyot Kumar Mukherjee's understanding of 'reason'. He mentions "The question was raised with a view to clarify the exact role reason is supposed to play in human knowledge or exact nature of the awareness reason is supposed to yield"[62]. It means we have to locate the exact role of reason. Here he told that 'reason' is an ambiguous word because, sometimes reason depends on the experience and sometimes does not. So what is the main role of reason in Vaiśeşika Philosophy from the perspective of theory of knowledge? In Nyāya-Vaiśeşika philosophy, the main purpose is the establishment of universal knowledge. Without the application of reason, one cannot define the universality of knowledge. Following this notion, he told that he has failed to create a distinction between categories and concepts because sometimes both can be used in same sense. In Indian philosophy, there is one word '*padārtha*' to clarify this distinction. Why I raised this view? Because the position of categories and concept are important phenomena in the context of reason. That is why according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy at

[62] *Indian Realism: A Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics*

first they advocate seven types of categories and the knowledge of *sādharmya* and *vaidharma* is the way of salvation. Again, Yogācāra advocates that dreaming reality is also real like the reality of waking state. For them, consciousness, i.e. *vijňāna* is only real. Apart from it, all are unreal. They held that waking and dreaming stuffs could not be determined as distinct because cognition is same in both the states.

Finally, I would like to state my latest observation on the notion of Prof. Jadunath Sinha. He wonderfully analysed the conversation between Yogācāra and Nyāya-Vaiśeşika schools on reality. Yogācāra believes the subjective idealism. According to them, there is no external objects as real. Dreaming phenomenon and waking phenomenon both can be real if we accept that external objects are not only real. Now, I will discuss his observations[63].

a) Yogācāra explained that the object of cognition and the apprehending cognition are same. Nyāya replied that if the object is apprehended, then what is the fundamental reason to raise about cognition? According to Nyāya, object of cognition and apprehending are not same because if they are same then why do we differentiate between these two ? In another part, J. N. Sinha mentioned that if objects are not real then object of cognition must not be real also. But Nyāya told that objects exist and they are real.

b) Yogācāra advocates that the only real is momentary cognition. Nyāya replied if momentary cognition were real then self-contradiction would occur. Why? Momentary cognition means that the cognition always exists for one moment and when the moment will be gone, then the cognition also ceases to exist. So, past cannot explain present because the present becomes immediately past. That is why Yogācāra's notion cannot be accepted.

[63] *Indian Realism*, p 181-186

c) Yogācāra mentioned that waking and dreaming cognitions both are real from the perspective of cognition because in both states we are saying that we have a cognition. Nyāya replied dreaming stuffs are coming through reproduction of waking state. Without external objects dreaming phenomenon would not be possible and external objects are coming from external world means waking state.

Here, I have one comment on a particular Nyāya observation on dream. My question is in dreaming state, we find many unknown pictures which are either known or unknown but there are some examples in dreaming level which are totally distinct pictures from waking state. However, there is cognition and the perceiver is aware of it. In this case, how does Nyāya explain the dream state? In modern psychology and neuroscience, they explained that there is no physical difference in dreaming state when we are saying that "I am watching a movie". So if we accept the possibility of dreaming reality, physiological perspective and cognitive level both can take place,. Modern psychology explains that unknown stage is premonition stage in dreaming state.

d) Yogācara admits that we are not able to know the cognition of object. Now main objection is that if cognition is not possible then there is no necessity to accept instrumental cause of knowledge. Here Nyāya replied that Yogācāra's opinion also depends on the instrument like inference. Without inference, they cannot say that all objects are unreal but they advocate that cognition is there. So, they accept inference as an instrumental cause. However, perception is superior among all instrumental causes of knowledge. According to Nyāya, external objects are perceived by perception as an instrumental cause. Therefore, external objects exist and are real.

The Reality in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy

Vaiśeṣika School is one most eminent theist school in Indian philosophy. Theist means he who believes in the authority of Veda. Here this paper would focus on the notion of reality from the perspective of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. *Sattā* (reality) is "*dravyaguṇakarmabhyorthāntaraṅ sattā*"[64](1/2/8). It means Sattā is different entity from *dravya*, *guṅa* and *karma*. Now I would discuss what is *dravya*? *Dravya* is "*kriyāgunṅabat samavāyikāranmiti dravyalakhsanam*"(1/1/15). *Dravya* means who is defined by the notion of *kriyā(*activity), *guṅa*(attribute) and *samavāyīkāraṅa* (material cause). *Kriyā* is the locus of *karma*. Then the notion of use is determined as *dravya* because *karma* exists in all *dravya*. Without *karma,* the *dravya* does not exist. Next, the notion is attribute. Attribute and *dravya* both are co-existent. Without attribute, the *dravya* is not definable. Hence, attribute is one major definable character of *dravya*. Then *samavāyīkāraṅa* (material cause) is the cause of '*jnya'* object because *jnya* object always is located by the relation of commitance (*samavāya*) and the relation between genus and *dravya, guṅa* and karma are eternal. Therefore, *dravya* is the *samavāyī kārana*.

Then I would discuss the notion of *guṅa*. In Vaiśeṣika-darśanam, the *lakṣana* of *guṅa* is ' *dravyāśryaguṅavān saṁyogbhageṣvakāraṅamanapekṣa iti guṅalakṣanam'*[65](1/1/16). *Guṅa* means whose existence always occurs in *dravya(*substance), it is non-attribute and it is not the cause of *saṁyoga* and *vibhāga*. After that, karma is '*ekadravyamguṅaṇ saṁyogvibhāgeṣvanapekṣakāraṅamiti karmalakṣana'*[66]. One Karma simultaneously does not occur in many *dravyas*. It occurs only in one *dravya*(*ekaikamatravṛtti)*. Then karma is attribute less and the independent cause *of saṁyoga* and *vibhāga*.

[64] *Vaiśeṣika-darśanam* , p 21
[65] *Ibid, p 10*
[66] *Ibid, p 11*

So, *sattā*(reality) and *sat*(real) are not different. It is denoting one object but separately the realisation of sattva or sat do not occur because when we are saying that this pot or red colour pot then if we accept sattva and sat both have the same realisation then it would be possible to say 'pot(substance) and red colour(attribute)' are same. Actually pot and red colour are different entities. Therefore, the notion of sattva (reality) is different from *dravya, guṅa* and *karma*. If *sat*(real) and *sattā* (reality) are same then it is posited that *dravya,* guṅa and karma are same. As a result, we have to adhere to *dravya's* notion of real and *guṅa*'s notion of real are same. Both can be real but the notion of reality (*sattā*) is not same for all. Hence, *sattā* is different from *dravya, guṅa* and *karma*.

There is another verse in Vaiśeṣika-darśanam that is "*guṅakarmasu ca bhāvānna karma na gunaḥ*"[67](1/2/9). It means there is a *hetu* of *guṅa* and *karma* which have the notion of reality(sattva) and *karmavṛtti* is a *dharma* of *sattā,* not for *dravya*. It is applicable for every entity like guṅa and *karma*. That dharma is different for three entities. That is why diversity proclaims sattva and *dravya*, guṅa and karma are distinct.

There is another hetu to determine the sattva's separate existence that is "*sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvena ca*"[68]. it means *parāpar yāti* (the genus is depending on other genus). Therefore, there is an absence of *sāmānya-viśeṣa*. *Dravya, guṅa* and *karma* are *parāpar yāti*. But *sattā* is different from these entities because if *sattvā* (reality) depends on three entities then it has to adhere to *dravyatva, guṅattva* and *karmatva* and dravya's reality, *guṅa*'s reality and the notion of use is same. It does not happen. Hence, sattva is different from them.

[67] *Ibid, p 22*
[68] *Ibid, p 23*

Next the most important verse is "*anekadravyavatvena dravyatvamuktam*"[69](1/2/11). It means sattva and *dravyatva* are different because sattva is present apart from *dravya* but *dravyatva* is only present in *dravya*. Sattva is applicable for several entities but *dravyatva* is applicable for only *dravya*.

According to Praśastapādbhāṣya, the knowledge of similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) is the way of salvation. The aim of this book is to get ultimate truth, which is free from miseries. The eminent interpreter Praśastapāda explained that if people are able to know the similarity and dissimilarity forms of seven categories like *Dravya, Guṅa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣ, Samavāy* and *Abhāv*a then people will get liberation. The main intention is to locate the similarity and dissimilarity forms of categories.

In the *sādharma-vaidharmaprakarana* of Praśastapādbhāṣya, "*dravyādīnāṅ trayāṅāmapi sattāsamandhaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṅ svasamāyarthaśavdābhidheyatvaṅ dharmādharmakartritanca*"[70] (11). It means 1)*sattāsamandha*, 2) *sāmānyaviśeṣvattva*, 3) *svasamayārthasavdābhidheyatvam*, 4) *dharmādharma kartrittva* are *sādharmya* of *dravya*, *guṅa* and *karma*.

Sattāsamandha means the relation between the notion of reality and *samavāya*. Nyāyakandalikāra proclaims it. Then Kiranāvalīkara mentions *sattāsamandha* means the samavāya. Here, the relation between sattva and *samavāya* means *sattāpratiyogīka samavāya. Sattāpratiyogīka* means sattva is *pratiyogī* who takes place in *anuyogī*. Now the questions are what is the relation between real object and the notion of reality? Or, is there any relation between unreal objects and reality? Opponent can raise these questions because before the relation of *sattā* (reality), the object is itself real that is why there is

[69] *Ibid*
[70] *Praśastapādabhāṣya, p 11*

no need to adhere that after the connection between the sattva and object, then the object is real. Object is real and it is proved by intellect or cognition (*vuddhi*). Again, if we accept the relation between unreal object and reality then it has to posit that unreal objects are real like golden-mountain is real. But, it is not the fact. Hence, there is no need to advocate *sattāsamandha* of *dravya*, *guṅa* and *karma* as similarity form (*sādharma*). This is the objection.

Praśaṣtapāda replies in his *bhāṣya* that non-eternal *dravya*, non-eternal guṅa and non-eternal karma happens due to the *sattā samavāya* because their relation of object is related by the relation of *samavāya* and that is real. In order to prove this notion the realisations are ' *Ghata* (pot) is real', 'the colour is real' and 'the *gamana* is real' with the help of intellect. Otherwise, that cognition could not be possible. For eternal *dravya*, *guṅa* and *karma*, the *samavāya* relation is there that is why 'space (*ākaṣa*) is real', 'sight (*dika*) is real' and 'time (*kāla*) is real'. For unreal entities, there is no question to establish as real.

Again, there is another question by opponent. Before creation the object is unreal, after creation we posit that the object is real. That is why *sattāsamavāya* is only present after creation, not before. The main objection is after creation the object is real and apart from it due to *sattāsamavāya* the object is real. So what is the necessity to accept *sattāsamavāya*? Hence, there is no need to adhere to *sattāsamavāya* for the notion of real.

Praśaṣtapada replies that object is created due to some cause, that is why the capability of cause after creation object is bounded with the relation of *sattāsamavāya*. After creation every object has this *sattāsamavāya* form. Due to *sattāsamavāya* form, there is *satvuddhi* (positive intellect). So it is needed to adhere to this *sattāsamavāya*.

Another objection is positive intellect (*satvuddh*i) is present in sāmānya,viśeṣa and *samavāya*. Why do we accept *sattāsāmāya* for *dravya*, *guṅa* and *karma*? Because positive intellect is also present in *dravya, guṅa* and *karma.*

Praśaṣtapāda advocates that there is a basic relation between *pratiyogī* and *anuyogī.* That relation is different for *sāmanya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* because the *dharmas* of *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya* are different and if *anuyogī* is *sāmānya,viśeṣa* and *samavāya* then due to *samavāya* relation *dravya, guṅa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa* are *pratiyogī.* But it is not possible because *sāmānyatva* , *viśeṣatva* and *samavāyatva* are not *dravya,guṅa* and *karma*. That is why *sattāsamavāya* is only present in *dravya*, *guṅa* and *karma*. For *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya,* there is no need to accept *sattāsamavāya* as external entity because there is positive intellect (*satvuddhi).*

Now I would like to explain on the notion of reality from the perspective of Jadunath Sinha's observations[71].

According to him, at first I would like to raise problems, then I will focus on the prescribed solution.

In Buddhist philosophy, the subject and object both are momentary. They believe that the object exists only in the first step (kshana). Here the main objection is about the theory of knowledge. We are able to know only the object's appearance form. That is why we cannot cognize the object's real entity because the object is 'non-existent'. Therefore, we are apprehending that object is real. We cognize object by sense organs but sense organ and the cognition both are not perceivable because of non-existence. By the association of causal condition, we are able to know the nature of object but not as real, as apprehending character.

[71] *Indian Realism, p 210*

Yogācāra claims that the cognition apprehends itself as the nature of object. According to Law of Nature, the cognition is produced by an object, rather it does not apprehend it as of separate character. When someone says, this is a cognition of 'A' object. It means the property of a cognition is itself, neither the property of both object and cognition nor the object itself. Here is the mutual relation of cognisor (*grāhaka*) and cognized (*grāhya*) between cognition and object. The notion of cognisor and the cognized entity are not different but it is different from the traditional subject-object relationship. *Grāhaka* means cognisor and the cognisor and cognition both are interdependent, that is why this relation is different from subject-object relation (*viśeṣya-viṣaya bhāva*). Therefore, the first argument is that cognition is not produced by any object's property, rather cognition presents itself in the object.

On the other hand, Yogācāra's second argument is about the relationship between cognition and the object. When someone talks about the cognition of blue then this cognition is not different from cognition itself because different entities do not have identical relation. Here, Yogācāra proclaims that cognition is identical with own self. So, here there is no apprehending relation between them. Here the relation is identical relation between cognition and object. The distinction between cognition and object is illusory.

Yogācāra asserts that without foundation means there is no cognition. Dream and waking both have the same foundation, which is external world. On the other hand, the identical or non-difference relation happens between apprehending cognition (*vedaka*) and apprehended cognition (*vedya*) because blue is not similar to yellow at the same time. That is why the blue object and the cognition both are non-different or identical.

Here, I would like to ascribe Srīdhara's objection as Vaiśeṣika's view on Yogācāra's arguments[72].

Yogācāra's opinion is that the object cannot be apprehended by cognition because the object and the cognition are identical and the cognition is not perceivable, it is self-luminous. Srīdhara's objection is if the object and the cognition are identical then how do they explain the form of cognition? According to Srīdhara, it is not identical, otherwise nobody cannot explain the form. Rather the form of a cognition is manifested. Due to manifestation, the object appears as a cognition. Srīdhara also said that external objects exist, that is why the notion of acceptance or rejection occurs. The cognition always is manifested and it is perceivable and the object is cognizable, otherwise the notion of acceptance or rejection could not have occurred.

The second objection of Srīdhara is about the relationship of subject and object. Srīdhara said that the object is cognised by cognition not because of the notion of non-difference or identical relation. Object is cognised by sense organs due to sense organs; all cognitions are different and distinct from each other.

Vācaspati proclaims that object is apprehended by the cognition not because of the law of nature. It happens because of the nature of object. That is why particular object is apprehended by particular cognition, it does not depend on any other cognition to prove their relation. Here, the *releta* and *relatum* are fixed. According to law of nature, the cognition is analysable. Udayana asserts *svarupasamvandha* between cognition and object. By this relation, the notion of objectivity is different for all cognition and the relation of cognition and object. This *svarupasamvandha* is unique relation because for one cognition, the subject- object relation has been fixed. Yogācāra holds that the

[72] *Ibid, p 215.*

cognition is unconscious and not apprehended. Srīdhara's argument is unconscious and apprehended object can be manifested.

The third argument is about the notion of non-existence. Yogācāra believes that object is non-existent. Srīdhara replies that any colour of object and the cognition of particular coloured object present means that object definitely exists. Srīdhara shows that object and the cognition of same object is not identical because when someone says 'the red object' it means the object is external and when someone says 'the cognition of red' it means the cognition is internal. So, the object and the cognition cannot be identical. Otherwise we would say 'I am red' and not 'this is red'. Yogācāra can define this argumentas the notion of 'I' that has no fixed value system. It means from different angle 'I' can be used as 'you' or 'you' can be used as 'I', so the notion of 'I' is not fixed. Here Srīdhara also said that this argument of Yogācāra is true but when someone says about 'red' cognition then there is fixed notion. Therefore, there is no identical relation between object and cognition.

Yogācāra says that waking state like dreaming state does not have foundation and both states have the same cognitive value. Srīdhara replies it is false because dreaming state has real counterparts in waking state. Otherwise, if waking state does not occur then how could you explain the dreaming foundation? Srīdhara also explains external objects have space and time from the perspective of cognition but in dreaming state, there is only present imagination or *vāsanā*. That is why in dreaming state, there is no space and time. Hence, waking state has foundation in external world. On the other hand, cognitive status is different between two states.

The Reality in Advaita Vedānta

Here this paper concerns the notion of reality from the perspective of Advaita Vedānta philosophy. All Vedānta schools accept the notion of *Brahman*. Perhaps, Śaṅkara in his commentary introduced the concept of super-imposition or *adhyāsa* before discussing the *Brahmasūtra*. His speciality and novelty is the discussion of superimposition. Without superimposition, people could not relate or understand the inner meaning of *Brahmasūtra*, written by Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vedavyāsa. At first, I would like to discuss the concept of *adhyāsa*, then I would analyse the notion of reality according to Śaṅkara. *Adhyāsa* is really the very vast and crucial epistemological notion in Advaita Vedānta philosophy. Here I would discuss this notion elaborately.

In general, *adhyāsa* means that the real entity is not present, due to some reason the other entity has occurred instead of the real one. That imposition is called *adhyāsa* or super-imposition. This imposition is not created by other self rather it is created by every individual 'I'. It means that the subject always imposes different notions of the object, which is totally distinct from the object. However, people do not realise the real fact or nature. According to Advaita Vedānta, the difference is created by ignorance. Actually, there is no difference in respect of *Brahman*. We are different in name and colour. Due to ignorance, people always think that the object is mine. It means the super-imposition between soul (*ātman*) and non-soul (*anātman*) entity. After that, as a result, miseries occur in our life. Now I would discuss critically the notion of super-imposition or *adhyāsa* in the light of Śaṅkara's commentary.

Śaṅkara says "*Yuṣmadasmadpratyagocarayoḥ viṣayviṣayiṇoḥ tamaḥprakāśviruddhasvabhāvayoḥ itaretarabhāvanupapattau siddhāyaṅ taddharmāṇām*

api sutaram itaretarobhāvanupapattiḥ."[73] in his commentary. This is the first line of his commentary. Here Śaṅkara proclaims that the notion of 'I' and 'you' are totally distinct from each other like light and dark. That is why the viṣayi ('I') or subject's nature is not the same as the object 'you' or viṣay. The next line of this commentary is "*ityataḥ asmadpratyayagocare viṣayiṇi cidātmake yuṣmadpratyagocarasya viṣayasya taddharmāṇaṅ ca adhyāsaḥ, tadviparyayena viṣayanaḥ taddharmāṇaṅ ca viṣaye adhyāsaḥ mithyā iti bhavituṇ yuktam*"[74] means when someone cannot differentiate between *ātmā* and *anātmā* rather they impose the nature (*dharma*) of one object on another. After that, they do think that *anātmā* is similar with *ātmā*. This is called *adhyāsa* or super-imposition. In the super-imposition, the *dharma* is imposed on another object as a different entity. That is why we are not able to know the real *dharma* of an object.

Śaṅkara introduces the definition of *adhyāsa*, "*smṛtirūpaḥ paratra purvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*"[75]. He adheres that the *ātmā* is real and apart from *ātmā* everything is unreal. *Ātmā* reveals itself through the body that is why the body also seems real. But here the most important part is that the body is phenomenally real. Now I would discuss all the terms of this definition from the perspective of *jñ̃ānadhyāsa* and *arthādhyāsa*. In *arthādhyāsa*, "*smṛtirūpa*" means which are memory, "*paratra*" means another place. "*purvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*" consists of two parts, '*avabhāsa*' means appearance and the inner meaning is that the appearance entity has been identified by the previous cognition. The whole meaning of this sutra is that the object's character appears due to my memory and that comes from another place which is totally different from the object's real character. For example, in the rope-snake example, the snake appears instead of rope due to memory. This is called *adhyāsa* from the perspective of viṣaya (snake).

[73] *Vedāntadarśana,* Vol 1, p 14
[74] *Ibid, p 15*
[75] *Ibid, p 29*

In *jňānādhyāsa*, "*smṛtirūpa*" means the form as remembered in the memory. Here the memory as cognition is important. "*paratra*" means also another place and "*purvadṛṣtāvabhāsa*" is denoted by the notion of '*avabhāsānāmavabhāsa*' means know the appearance cognition occurs by the previous cognition. The whole meaning is due to the memory, cognition occurs which is guided by the previous perception and after that, imposition occurs like one imposes on another. This is called super-imposition or *adhyāsa* from the perspective of *jn̂ānādhyāsa*.

In *Bhāmati*, there is another explanation through *anulom* (this chronology starts from behind). Here I would like to discuss this definition in the light of *Bhāmati*. The word '*avabhāsa*' has different meaning. Here *Bhāmati* has taken *avayavartha* meaning. It is kind of two like *avasada* and *avamana*. *Avasada* is the cognition of locus by non-indirect prception (*aparoksa*). For example, by the cognition of nacre the appeared snake will be destroyed. *Avamana* is the cognition of concept by logical cognition (*yauktika jňāna*). For example, by the cognition of astronomy, it is knowable that there is a structural difference between the sun and the moon. Now the definition is "*avabhāsa adhyāsa*". Why '*purva*' word is needed and after that '*dṛṣta*' in "*purvadṛṣtāvabhāsa*"? If we accept this definition, "*avabhāsa adhyāsa*" then there is no consistency means the cognition is depending on the previous cognition or post cognition ; it is not cleared by the taking of ' *avabhāsa adhyāsa'* definition. That is why '*purva*' is needed because it is related to our previous cognition and '*dṛṣta*' is needed because it is perceivable. But this definition is not sufficient because the true cognition (*pramā*) is also covered by *purvadristāvabhāsa*. There is the fallacy of too much wideness (*ativyāpti*). This is why '*paratra*' is needed because when someone says '*paratrapurvadṛṣtāvabhāsa*' then this is not *pramā*. It is not covered by the definition of *adhyāsa*. Thus, the definition of *adhyāsa* is "*paratrapurvadṛṣtāvabhāsa*". Now the question is about the word '*smṛtirūpa'*. *Smṛti*

(memory) is '*saṅskāra sahakritasannikarsajanyajṅāna*'. It means smriti is caused by only *saṅskāra*. Here there is no necessary connection between *sannikarṣa* and smriti because when there is no *sannikarṣa* then also *smṛti* occurs and that is real.

Hence, according to *arthādhayāsa*, *adhyāsa* occurs when the snake which is in a different place appears instead of rope due to the memory due to some structural similarities. On the other hand this is called *adhyāsa* from the perspective of *jn̄ānadhyāsa*.

In the 6th chapter of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, there is an explanation about reality (*sat*) because Āruni told his son Śvetaketu that when the world does not reveal itself then also reality is present. This chapter starts with the conversation between Āruni and Śvetaketu about reality. At first, Āruni tried to show the chronology of creation. Āruni says "*sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam*" (6/2/1)[76]. It means when the world does not reveal itself then the reality is present. But someone can proclaim that before the creation of the world it is unreal (Buddhism). Vaidāntikas replied that this is not true that the notion of reality comes from the notion of unreal. According to Advaita Vedānta, real (*sat*) means existence. Then Āruni describes the chronology of creation to his son. The one *Brahman* becomes soil, water, fire, air and space (*vyoma*).

"*tāsāṅ trivṛtaṅ trivṛtamekaikāṅ karavāṅītī seyaṅ devatemāstisro devatā anenaiva jīvenātmananupraviśya nāmarupe vyākarot*"[77] (6/3/3). Here this verse shows that the gross (sthula) fire, water and earth divide themselves into three categories. After that these categories reveal themselves by the form of name and colour. Now I will show that '*trivṛtkāranam*'.

gross fire = ½ subtle fire + ¼ subtle water+ ¼ subtle earth.

[76] *Upaniṣad, Vol 2, p 250*
[77] *Ibid, p 255*

gross water= ½ subtle water+ ¼ subtle fire + ¼ subtle earth.

gross earth = ½ subtle earth + ¼ subtle fire + ¼ subtle water.

These material entities are created by the combination of subtle proportions. After that phenomenal body is created by these material entities with the forms of name and colour.

After that, Śvetaketu raises the main fundamental question about the composition of water, fire and earth. Āruni replies "*yadādityasya rohitāṇ rupāṇ tejasastadrupaṇ yacchuklaṇ tadapāṇ yad kṛşnaṇ tadannasyāpagadādityādādityatvaṇ vācārambhaṇa vikāro nāmadheyaṇ trīṇi rūpāṅītyeva satyam*"[78] (6/4/2) . It means the red colour of sun because is the colour of for fire is red, the white portion of sun is the water and the black portion is part of earth because earth is black. Here most significant notion is every colour is real. After that Āruni explains the proportions of fire, earth, water and air in our body. Here Āruni tries to show that mind and body both are interdependent. So 'real' means the existent. Existence posits the presence of the object towards the perceiver.

Again Āruni told his son that 'sat' (real) means ultimate reality, *Brahman*. The whole universe, the seed, the temperament inside the seed, each and every abstract or concrete entity 's fundamental base is sat (6/8/4)[79], the real and ultimate.

Śvetaketu asked a question, what is the form of real in verses (6/9/1) and (6/9/2). Āruni replied to his son in the following way: " *yathā somya madhu madhukṛto nistiṣthanti nānātyayānāṅ vṛkṣāṅāṅ rasānasamavahāramekataṅ rasaṅ gamayanti*"[80]. It means bees are collecting honey from various flowers. There is no discrimination between flower and honey because honey is same for all. We cannot discriminate that this particular portion of honey comes from that flower. This analogy we can use over our existence. It

[78] *Upaniṣad*, Vol 2, p 257
[79] *Ibid*, p 274
[80] *Ibid* , p 279

states that we cannot differentiate this portion as real from it is not real. It is nothing like that. Rather the whole universe, the plants, all physical entities are real because all are existing in that Real. Due to ignorance, the *jīva* does not realise that he is real. Vedānta advocates that plants are alive. They have also life force.

Again Śvetaketu asked Āruni when the person dies, then where is the body? Āruni replies that after death the body becomes a material. It means there is no life force. But the jivātmā is alive because *jivātmā*' is the real. The identification of real is the highest realisation of the *jīva*. Because there is no difference between jivātmā and sat. Jivātmā is always subtle.

After that the most relevant question is raised by Śvetaketu. The question is where is the soul in our body? Then Āruni said that before sleeping you have to put some particles of salt in the water. In the morning Āruni asked his son, could you tell me where are the salt particles? Śvetaketu could not find the exact particles. Then Āruni says if you drink the water then the taste is salty from every angle and Śvetaketu cannot differentiate between water and saltness because salt is dissolved in the water. Similarly, the locus of the soul is the whole body. We cannot say that soul exists in this portion and another portion is empty. The eternal real soul always is present in the body but the perceiver does not realise that soul exists in the body. The destruction of the body means the chronological connection of *vāka* (sound), mind, breath (*prāna*) and fireis disturbed. When death comes then sound is ceased by the mind, mind is corrupted by breath, breathing is corrupted by fire and after that fire does not work. In the Upaniṣad, the soul is real and the highest entity. From soul, fire, breath, mind and sound derive.

At the end of the 6th chapter of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Śvetaketu realised that the jivātmā is only real. Apart from it all are unreal and real means eternal. He realised that there is

no difference between jivātmā and his soul. 'idam sarvam' is the ultimate because 'idam' means this phenomenal world and '*sarvam*' means all. This phenomenal world is unreal. When the perceiver will understand that this phenomenal world is unreal then he will realise that *Brahman* is only Real (3/3/16)[81]. There is one argument of *Purva pakşa* (opponent) that the word '*Sattā*' is not identical with the word '*ātmavācaka*' because '*Sattā*' does not denote ātmā literally. However, Advaita Vedāntins state that locus and locator both are identical like '*hasanti vālikāh*'. It means the laughing is the locator and the girl is locus. Without the notion of girl, the notion of laughing could not be analysable and realizable. That is why locus is important for locator and vice-versa. Hence, the word '*sattā*' is identical with *ātmavācaka* (subjective identifier).

Now I am trying to determine the way of cognition in the light of *ratnaprabhā tīkā*[82] of Advaita Vedānta. Vedānta advocates that in valid cognition (*pramā*), *pramā* reveals itself, the object and the locus. When we are talking about ignorance then we are seeing the same thing in a different nature (imposed object). In the stage of ignorance the pramā is there, the object is there, the locus is there and the doer is also there like nacre-silver illusion. The valid cognition of nacre is there, imposed object silver is present, the locus of the nacre is there. But the cognition is not valid due to ignorance. This is similar to an illusion. That is why pramā is not specified. It can be *apramā* also. Then Advaita Vedānta claims that pramā is specified in the specific domain like phenomenal real means it can be real until and unless the phenomenal reality is destructed by transcendental reality. Apart from it, a phenomenal reality is always real. In *prātibhāsika* level, the *prātibhāsik*a real is destructed only by phenomenal reality. *Prātibhāsika* level is real until it has been cancelled by phenomenal reality.

[81] *Vedanta Darśana*, vol 3, p 299
[82] '*Bahusutrāṅāṁ…śakyate', Ratnaprabhāvimarṣaḥ,* p 20

In Advaita metaphysics, the notion of reality itself is always transcendental which is totally distinct from any kind of internal or external sanctions and that transcendental real is permanent and beyond all phenomenal boundaries. It is cognised by its own nature. It does not depend on any object or concept. It is pure. Here this notion is separate from any kind or relation, distinct - '*sajātiya-vijātiya-svagata-bhedarahitam'*. J. S Mackenzie says "the pure Self-consciousness of which they speak is rather like the pure Being of Hegel, which cannot be distinguished from non-entity" [83]. It means the pure Self-consciousness is always absolute. Human consciousness is always bounded by spacio-temporal relation, but the notion of reality is totally different. It is beyond any external sense organs.

Śaṅkara distinguishes two kinds of *parināma,* first, *parināma* and secondly, *vivarta*. *Parināma* means the evolution, the evolution processes in a changing form like milk turns into curds, seeds become the plants etc. and that process is ongoing process. Here always the consciousness reveals itself in different manners, always changing. It is a flow. Here, *adhisthāna*, the substrate is always real. In Advaita Vedānta, locus is always true. For example, moon is the one but the reflections are different in pond, lake etc. By virtue of reflections, appearances are many.

Secondly, the other unique phenomenon is vivarta. It means transfiguration. For example, the snake becomes rope but the snake is not present. Similarly, due to ignorance, we impose the unreal thing on the real thing. It is an illusion and the ignorance or *avidyā* or nescience is the material cause of illusion. The nacre transforms into silver by illusion. It is *parināma* and the nacre transfigures into silver means silver

[83] *Elements of Constructive Philosophy, p 485*

changes the reality. The silver is a product of *avidyā*. It is a *vivarta*. Here, reality does not evolve rather it is transfigured.

Śaṅkara lays down in his commentary of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, "*anekā hi vilakṣaṇascetanārupaḥ sāmānya viśeṣaḥ. teṣāṁpāraṁparyagatya ekasmin mahāsāmānye antarbhāvaḥ prajñ̃ānaghane*."'"(2/4/9)[84] there are lots of diversity in universal notion; the cognition of *Brahman* is the ultimate and universal. Appearances are always extraneous to reality. Śaṅkara uses the term *brahmavyātirekana*, it means the world does not exist, *Brahman* is beyond the world. Here, reality is not situated in all cases, it is not *anekātma* rather it is ultimate and one.

The phenomenal world is the projection of *māyā. Māyā* is the cause of all diversity of existence. *Māyā and Brahman* are the material cause of the world. All kinds of elements derive this phenomenal reality from it. *Māyā* is a potency of *Brahman* and *Brahman* is the substrate of *māyā*. Actually, in Advaita frame, *māyā and Brahman* are conjoined in one rope like the imposed entity (snake) is occurred by *māyā* or nescience and the real is rope which is covered by illusion of snake, so *Brahman* is all but due to ignorance we are categorising for our uses. The existence of *Brahman* does not depend on any object but the existence of the world depends on *Brahman*. This unique relation of world to Brahman is described by māyā and that is indeterminate. This notion is posited by the negation of absolute pluralism. It negates the differences of the objects like the nacre-silver example, appearance silver is always false, not real.

The Advaita lays down three degrees of Reality. First, the illusory (*prātibhāsika*), secondly, the empirical (*Vyāvahārika*) and thirdly, the ultimate real (*pāramārthika*). Illusory state, *prātibhāsika* level refers to the nacre-silver example. Empirical state, the

[84] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* Vol 2, p 627

phenomenal level (*vyāvahārika*) refers to the world and the ultimate real, transcendent level refers to *Brahman*. The empirical stage is not an illusory one like dream-object. In illusory stage or *prātibhāsika* level, the *prātibhāsika* silver is manifested by the perceiver which is imposed on nacre. On the other hand, the empirical silver is known as phenomenally real. So, here the notion of 'silver' is used in two senses. The silverness is common in both 'silver's and both are real to perceiver. But here the problem is about the superimposition and the meaning of derivative reality because in empirical level, the silver is derivatively real. But in illusory level, the silver is derivatively unreal, because it is cancelled by empirical nacre. Empirical silver is not cancelled by empirical nacre.

Advaita holds that both empirical and illusory levels are subtle. This distinction can take place on the basis of *māyā and avidyā*. We used the term *māyā* as that which covers *samaṣti caitanya* and the term *avidyā* as the coverer of *vyāṣti caitanya*. *Māyā* denotes the empirical level. *Avidyā* denotes the illusory level. In dreaming stage, the water quenches thirst like empirical level but illusory water and empirical water are different. The empirical level always differs from the *prātibhāsika* because the existential values are different in both levels. According to Advaita, the phenomenal world is indeterminable because it is governed by ignorance. Due to ignorance, there appear different worlds. This difference is perceived only in the realm of nescience. That is why the world is only phenomenal but not real because of differences. *Brahman* is permanent and is unchangeable. The world consists of change, origination and destruction.

"*kasminnu bhagavo vijñāte sarvamidaṁ vijñātaṁ bhavatīti*"(1/1/3)[85]. It means when *Ātman* is known then there is nothing left to be known. The cognition of *Ātman* is the ultimate cognition.

[85] *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, p 35

Māyā itself is the plurality. This phenomenal world has own principle and regulations. The consistency and diversity are based on *māyā* where the locus is *Brahman*. However, all diversities are relative to the object that is why there is no permanency. This consistency continues for the time being, after that it changes. The realisation of *Brahman* is real because this is the ultimate bliss, the ultimate truth and the one.

The Nature of Illusion: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta Philosophy

At first, I would discuss the nature of illusion in the light of Advaita Vedānta philosophy then I would mention Nyāya-Vaiśeşika perspective of illusion.

Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda -

Now I am going to discuss about an intermediate composite between *satkhyāti* and *asat-khyāti*. This middle course is introduced by Śaṅkara. He composed *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* in his commentary. After that, he proclaims *Anirvacaniya-khyāti* and this is the middle course. It is a dialectical composite form. Those theories discard the psychological being with the help of logical being and the middle course advocates the logic of illogicality from the perspective of *Brahman.*

In Advaita Vedānta doctrine, the main well-known feature is the concept of nescience (*māyā)* because the whole thesis seeks to state how do we realise the notion of truth? The prime inscrutable thing is the phenomenal world on the ground of phenomenal reality. *Brahman* is always the locus and the *māyā* is always the substratum. It is always imposed on *Brahman.* According to Advaita Vedānta, the locus is always true and imposed thing is always false. The nature of *māyā* is a logical puzzle because it defies all logical analysis. It distorts the reality and presents opposite characters which seem like a real. But both courses are logically possible because these are not contradicted. All

schools of Vedānta accept the concept of *māyā*. It is neither *sat (real)* nor *asat (unreal),* neither empiric nor meta-empiric. *Māyā* is not a negative concept and it is not the antipode of pure consciousness. The concept of *māyā* co-exists with the pure consciousness. The whole confusion comes from the subject-object relationship (*yuṣmad and aṣmad*). Due to ignorance, we cannot identify the real entity, we always describe the appearing entity as real entity and after that we impose the notion of subject over the notion of object and vice-versa. *māyā* or *ajňāna* has two different potencies, first potency is '*āvarana*' and second one is '*vikşepa*'. These two potencies work simultaneously according to Advaita Vedāntin, *Padmapādācārya*, the author of *Pancapādikā*, who told that there is no distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. The main dilemma is the relationship between *jīva* and Brahman. According to Advaita Vedānta, *jīva* and Brahman are identical but due to subject-object dichotomy we do not realise the notion of identity. The relation of māyā and Brahman is conceived in different ways.

a) *Māyā* and *Brahman* entwine each other like two pieces of rope. Here, *māyā* is *upādhi*. *Upādhi* means that which distinguishes second object by the nature of first object. First object is imposed character on second object.

b) *Māyā* is the force of *Brahman.*

c) *Brahman* is the ground of māyā, which is the material cause of the world.

It can be mutative or non-mutative. This is *vivarta*. *Brahman* is the non-mutative material cause and unqualified. *Māyā* is the mutative cause of the world. But there are different opinions of māyā-Brahman relationship because some hold that Brahman is the material cause as well as efficient cause. Some others hold that Brahman is only material cause. Vidyāranya asserts that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause related to

'*tāmasi māyā*' and '*Śuddhasattva māyā*'[86]. '*Tāmasi Māyā'* is related to jīva and '*Śuddhasattva Māyā*' is related to Brahman. *Māyā or ajňāna* both are synonymous. When we are discussing collective consciousness then the notion of *māyā* is applicable as ignorance. When we are penetrating subjective consciousness then the notion of *avidyā* is applicable as ignorance.

Antaḥkarana is one of the *pariṇām*as of *ajňāna*. *Antaḥkarana* is of four kinds such as *manas (mind)*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *ahaṁkāra*. In Advaita epistemology, there are three kinds of *Caitanya* :*Viśva-caitanya, antaḥ-karana-caitanya and vṛtti-caitanya*[87]. Viśva-caitanya means the object, which we perceive. *Antaḥ-karana-caitanya* means the subject who perceives. Finally, *vṛtti-caitanya* is *pramānacaitanya*. Now I would like to show an example according to Advaita Vedānta. Someone takes a torch light. Torch light itself is the subject (*Pramātṛcaitanya*). The way of light is the Vṛtti-caitanya and finally, the focusing point is the *viśva-caitanya*. Every perception is ontologically the perception of *caitanya*.

Now I would like to discuss what is '*sat' and 'asat*'. Sat is always unconditionally true. It can never be contradicted in the past, present and future. The *'sat'* is Brahman. '*Asat*' objects can never be true. It can never be immediately apprehended such as sky-flower, barren woman's son. *Asat* objects are always contradicted in our thought-activity. It is always a-psychological and a-logical. Hence, rest of all the objects are neither *sat nor asat*. They are *anirvacaniya*. That is why Advaitins proclaim another status of validity in phenomenal world.

[86] "*Jagato Yadupādānaṇ māyāmādāya tāmasīm /*
Nimitta śuddhasattvāṅ tamucyate Brahma tadigrā"| (44), Pancapādikā, p 18.
[87] *A Critique of The Theories of Viparya, p 205*

Advaitins advocate that there are three grades of reality and they are relatively true. Brahman is '*pāramarthika sat' (transcendental reality)*, the phenomenal world (*jagata*) is '*vyāvahārika sat' (phenomenal reality)* and the knowledge of nacre-silver is '*prātibhāsika sat'*. From the perspective of transcendental reality, Brahman is the only real and sat. It is '*abāngmanasagocara*' because this realisation stage is unspeakable. The whole entities of the world are 'anirvacaniya' because we cannot say that it is either *sat* (*Brahman*) or *asat* (like Barren women's son). Finally, the view point of Advaitins, everything is utter naught *(tuccha)* and *anirvacaniya*. According to this notion, they put forward their doctrine of error called *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda*.

In the example of nacre-silver, we always use the similarity factor. This whole process is happening by virtue of the connection between perception (*idam, not nacre*) and memory (silver). We do not identify the nacre just because of our illusion. Illusion phenomenon happens by our error, ancillary factors and adventitious variables where the imposed object is present but the original object is covered up by the imposition. Now I would like to add the *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika* notions. *Sopādhika* refers to the red crystal (stimulus) which is conditioned by imposed colour of red. Other one, '*nirupādhika*' means there is no indispensable and invariable antecedent to the entity. The main error takes place due to the commonness or similarity, which helps to go from the known field to unknown field. Hence, nescience (*māyā*) is the main material cause of error. So, the beginning-less nescience penetrating a nacre is the material cause and silver the fundamental cause of nacre-silver illusion. Advaitins advocate that this nacre-silver phenomenon explains psychophysical process, which leads to an illusory cognition.

When eyes and an object are related to each other, then two notions which evolve are '*this'* and '*glitter*'. Then we are saying ostensibly 'this'. After that, we are supposed to

identify the notion of 'glitter'. Then we recognise the imposed object (silver). This consciousness is delimited by *'idam'(this*). When we perceive the objective silver, during that time we have the impression of silver. By vṛtti (the object who negates the imposition for the small time being), we are having the form of silver, but *vṛtti* is not *antaḥkarana*. *Antaḥkarana* is one of the *parināmas* of *ajñāna* (nescience). Nescience is the main ground of error. Those transformations are revealed by witness-consciousness (*Sākṣi-caitanya*). Witness-consciousness reveals itself (*svaprakāśa*). The perceiving silver is actually apprehended silver. Apprehended object that is silver appears as *Viśva-caitanya*. But '*idam'*(silver) is the false cognition. It is called *prātibhāsika* silver which is not made of the stuff of ordinary silver. But, it is made of the stuff of avidyā itself. We know that there are two potencies of avidyā, which are '*āvarana-śakti' and 'vikşepa-śakti'*. By virtue of *āvarana-śakti*; the nacre is covered up by the illusory silver and due to *vikşepa-śakti,* the apprehended silver appears as the object silver. The whole process is regarded as *adhyāsa*. Here, the witness-consciousness reveals the apprehended silver with the help of *avidyā-vṛtti*. The apprehension of silver happens when *vṛtti* goes outside because of the identity *(abheda*) between pramānacaitanya and *viśva-caitanya,* then perceiver says 'this or idam' and we see 'silver' at that time the structure of perception is '*idamrajatam*'. Then it represents two separate v*ṛttis,* namely *idam-vṛtti (antaḥkaranavṛtti*) and *rajatākāra-vṛtti (avidyā-vṛtti*). Now I discuss these two *vṛttis.* Firstly, when we perceive the '*idam'*(this) at that time our cognition happens through perception. After that, the cognition of '*rajat*' happens due to memory. We are psychologically associated to silver due to the commonness between nacre and silver. We just recall the similarity by their glitter. Actually, the difference between phenomenal objects and *prātibhāsika* objects are caused by avidyā only. Hence, the dream objects are formed by *avidyā*. These are *prātibhāsika* entities. According to Advaitins, the dream

objects come from the mind by the direct transformation of nescience (*māyā)*. This is called phenomenal psyche.

Here, I would like to concentrate on the notion of *prātibhāsik*a phenomena. The nacre-silver example belongs to the *prātibhāsika* level. This stage is not real or unreal because it is different from truth and falsity. The Advaitins do not accept the immediate apprehension of the non-existent. That is why it cannot be taken as real. Hence, the cognition of nacre-silver is *anirvācya* or neither true nor false and it cannot be apprehended at all. Advaitins do not take reality or unreality as mutually contradictory but they propose a third category, which is '*mithyātva'*. The cognition is always depending on the cognitum. According to Advaita Vedānta, the whole world is pervaded by the notion of '*mithyātva'* except Brahman and sky-flower because *Brahman* is sat and sky-flower is *asat*. They proclaim that nescience is kind of two which are '*mulāvidyā*' (primal nescience) and '*tulāvidyā*'(individual nescience). The world is the architecture of '*mulāvidya*' and the notion of nacre-silver is the creation of '*tulāvidyā*'. Individual nescience is temporal and it has beginning but due to the ground consciousness it seems like beginning less and seems like a real.

Advaitins advocate the notion of '*mithyā*' as a third category. They do not accept reality and unreality as mutually exhaustive. This is logical. Madhusudan Saraswati denotes '*mithyā*' as a *Prātibhāṣika* entity like nacre-silver[88]. In the example of nacre-silver, where the cognition is false *or mithyā*, then it implies that the cognition must be *mithyā* because they assert it has no cognitive value. According to this notion, this universe is like that. It means the one and only truth is *Brahman* and rest of all are false. The world is the architecture of *mulāvidyā* (primal nescience) and the nacre-silver is the creation of

[88] *A Critique of the Theories of Viparyaya*, p 214

tulāvidyā (individual nescience). The Universal nescience is beginningless because it is grounded in consciousness which is eternal. We cannot realise the real notion that is why we fall in the wrong situation and accept the unreal things as real.

Now arises the important question as to whether the notion of '*mithyātva'* is real or unreal (*mithyā*). When we are in the substantive world, being itself '*mithyā*' it cannot have any attribute, then 'the notion of *mithyātva'* is real. All references are coming from cognoscibility (*driśyatva*). Cognition has two attributes; these are '*satyatva'* and '*mithyātva*'. The negation of one does not imply affirmation because they are opposite. Hence, according to advaitins the world and nacre-silver examples are mithyā because the negation would have occurred in our cognitive domain.

Now I am to discuss the notion of '*bādha'* (contradiction). We have to focus why super-imposition is not a '*bādha'*. *Bādha* is an apprehension of the substratum of super-imposition. It is not a negation, but the cognition is embedded by the notion of the 'non'' entity and logically impossible. Contradiction means an object's existence and non-existence are present at the same time (p .$\widetilde{p}$). *Bādha* is of two kinds. First, direct apprehension of substratum and the second one is '*nivṛtt*i'; it is a cessation of ignorance. Already mentioned that *bādha* is cognition, so universally it is called the *''bādhaka-jñāna'*. A contradictory statement cannot reveal an entity because it has no own status. *Bādhaka* statement can never be contradicting statement because it always negates the veil of nescience. It is logically contradictory of *vṛtti-jn̄ā̃na* because it reveals simultaneously 'P'' and ''not P''. Here Vṛtti goes externally. The nacre appears as an illusory silver and cognition also is of silver. The notion of illusory silver is true in *Prātibhāṣika* level and cognition of illusory silver is also true in that level. Now the question is what is the verbal form of contradictory judgement? According to Advaita

Vedānta, there are three forms. They are "*nedamrajatam'', ''mithyaiva rajatam abhat'' and " nāsttyatra rajatam"*[89]. The first form is *anyonyābhāva* means by nature nacre is very different from silver. So illusory silver is not the appearing silver and it is different from nacre. Secondly, appearing silver is not true from the perspective of nacre-silver cognition. Third one is '*nāstyatra rajatam'* which denotes the *atyantantābhāva* means extremely different (air has no colour) , there negation is applicable in all levels. Second and third stages advocate direct negation of illusory silver. Both first and third forms negate the phenomenal silver and it is negatum of both forms of negation. So we could say that phenomenal silver is a negatum and the negation is of *anyonyābhāva* (the pot is not the cloth) type.

Now Madhavamukunda[90] asserts that *adhyāsa* or super-imposition is false and the world cannot be super-imposed on *Brahman.* He describes the arguments behind his assertion. Following him here I would analyse the arguments.

First, *Brahman* is completely distinct from all kinds of being who are universal or particular. According to Advaitins, the world is not the substratum of super-imposition on Brahman because here super-imposition could not be possible due to two different objects, one is real and the other one is unreal.

Secondly, imposition of an object could not be possible without pre-cognition of that object except Brahman. The cognition of silver is the cause of illusory silver because it is already pre-cognised. That is why we are imposing silver upon nacre. Brahman is the sole reality and devoid of all differences (*svagata, sajātiya and vijātiya*). The world-illusion is not possible without the cognition of world. Hence, the same notion is applicable for Brahman. If the cognition of *Brahman* is present, then why people are

[89] Ibid, p 217
[90] Ibid, p 221

looking for it. So advaitin's assertion is not true about the notion of super-imposition or *adhyāsa*. According to him, advaitins cannot argue that adhyāsa is the main impression of objects and reality.

Thirdly, *saṁskāra, sādriśya, samprayoga* are conditions of *adhyāsa.* When these conditions are present then illusion occurs. These notions are not applicable upon Brahman but *jīva* is bounded by those notions. If we accept this, then it follows that these notions must be beginning less because of nescience. *Adhyāsa* is caused by nescience or ignorance. Advaitins cannot apply '*adhyāsa' of 'mulāvidyā*' because we cannot cognise 'this is nescience' like the example of 'this is silver'. Therefore, according to him, the notion of *adhyāsa* is impossible in Advaita tradition.

Some philosophers try to show that the super-imposition upon nacre is not possible separately like the world is not imposed upon self separately. The illusion is happening due to the presence of both nacre-silver and nacre like world and self both are present in the stage of super-imposition.

Venkātanāth[91] in his *Nyāya-siddhāñjanā* proclaims that Advaitin defines the world as sat and asat. The phenomenal world is beyond *sat* and *asat* as a universal cognition through the cognition of one because Brahman is a sat. Advaitins already have told that the world is different from *''sat'' and 'asat''*. So how do they define the world as an illusion like the example of nacre-silver? According to him when the nacre-silver illusion is false then it follows that the illusory world will be false because the reality is one and that is only real. Hence, the invalid cognition of nacre-silver is real in *Prātibhāṣika* world like dreaming stage and it is distinct from phenomenal world and transcendental world. If we accept this hypothesis, then the reality is also there in *Prātibhāṣika* level because the

[91] *Ibid, p 224*

cognition of silver is present in dreaming stage like waking stage. Thus, this reality is totally different from phenomenal and transcendental reality. So according to him, if someone admits one reality, then infinite regress will necessarily follow. Brahman is ultimately real and true (*sat*). That is why Advaitins accept three degrees of reality.

The imposition would happen when two components are present in common stage. Like nacre-silver example. By character they are different from each other but imposition is happening due to similarity of transparency. That means two variables are important for imposition like bamboo and rope, they are variable and still real from perspective of their forms. But rope and snake are not same variables in the ground of rope-snake illusion. Therefore, Advaitins define *anirvacaniyatva* by virtue of the notion of ultimate reality. The real form is indefinable because indefinable entity is attribute less. Advaitins cannot define the notion of definability. He proclaims that world remains definable.

Jayatirtha in *Nyāyasudha* asserts that Advaitin cannot prove the illusoriness of nacre-silver. The invalid cognition of the nacre-silver cannot be proved by the notion of nescience because the negation of '*sat*' and '*asat*' would not be possible. Thus, how do they prove the notion of reality in the light of *'sat' and 'asat'*. According to him, the cognition of silver ('this') is valid due to the substratum of ostensive denotation (nacre-silver illusion) and the cognition of silver is generated by *avidyā-vṛtti* (internal process). The illusory 'silver' is apprehended by *avidyā-vṛtti*. Vṛtti always goes internal to external but the position of *avidyā-vṛtti* is reverse. According to him, nacre-silver example is the transformation of avidyā because when perceiver sees the nacre as silver then the cognitum is effected by *avidyā-vṛtti*.

So if perceiver says 'I am the silver' due to *avidyā-vṛtti* then someone raises a question what is the problem to get a cognition of silver? If someone doubts then illusory silver

(ajñāna) is negated by the cognition of nacre and the identical silver (I am the silver) is not negated by the phenomenal silver because *avidyā-vṛtti* is there. Now question is what is the main reason of nacre-silver cognition? If this apprehension is accepted by the presence of *Sākṣi* and eye perception, then it would be similar to the notion of '*Prabhākar-akhyāti'*[92]*,which is undefinable*. .But we cannot accept this operation of *Sākṣi* because if we accept this identical relation between *Sākṣi ('I'*) and the silver with nacre then the relation would be undefinable. Both are completely different cognitions. Finally, it will not be accepted by Advaita system because Advaita does not adhere any identical relation like 'I am the silver'. So, this assertion is not possible.

The later advaitin Nṛsiṅha Bhatta[93] disowns the ostensive denotation before the invalid notion of silver because here the subject cognition (silver) is not possible without the presence of predicate which is nacre. In such case, the perceiver sees the object, which is conch-shell and it's yellow. He cannot dissociate the colour from the object. Therefore, for him, the ostensive denotation is the conch-shell is yellow but actually, conch-shell has different colour. Hence ostensive denotation ('*idam' or 'this'*) is not the primary source of cognition.

Now the question - is 'illusory silver' illusion or real? If we say illusory silver is illusion, then it will bring the fallacy of infinite regress like why is it illusion and finally the justifier will be infinite. So, the notion of 'illusory silver' is real. The notion of ' *anirvācya* ' proves that there is no logical dichotomy between real and unreal because in the perspective of transcendental level the reality is one and all the rest of phenomena are '*mithyā*'' neither *sat nor asat.*

[92] *"....akhāyatimatānumati-prasaṅgena pravṛttyādyanu-papattiḥ*", *Ibid,* p 230
[93] *ibid,* p 231

Hence, according to Advaita Vedānta, the negated objects cannot be *sat* because it is always negated by negatum. Hence, cognition of silver is always false cognition but neither sat nor asat, it's indescribable. Negation means the object is negated by negatum in both waking and dreaming states. Dreaming state has also some degrees of reality like waking reality. Indeed, the only real and ultimate reality is *Brahman*.

Anyathākhyātivāda -

Theory of *Viparya* (error) is the most apposite domain in Indian epistemology. *Viparya* itself is one part of non-veridical knowledge. '*Viparya*' means that kind of knowledge, which is always regulated by non-apposite stuff. The A object is there but for some reason the object A appears as a B object. But the main cryptic domain is that the B object actually is not present, perceiver imposes the notion of B object over the notion of A object(locus). Now the question is why the object A appears as a B object? Why not C,D,E,F etc.? So, here, main issues are two, 1) the source of B object and 2) the notion of imposition. In particular, in Indian philosophy, every school advocates the theory of *Viparya* according to their logical structure. If we concentrate on the core of Indian Philosophy, then the actual notion is self-realisation which is proclaimed by all Indian philosophical schools, but their arguments are different regarding status and apposite phenomena of life. The main issue is suffering. Why people are sufferers? In order to grasp this notion, the epistemological value, i.e. the value of knowledge acquiring system id necessary. The cognition (*anubhava*) is of two kinds, a) veridical knowledge (*pramā*) and b) non-veridical cognition (*apramā*). Both phenomena are relevant for self-realisation process. The speciality of Indian philosophy is the acceptance of non-veridical cognition as a co-relate of veridical knowledge. These Indian philosophical schools advocate theories regarding '*viparya'* by names of *Akhyātivāda, Anyathākhyātivāda, Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda, Viparita-khyātivāda etc.*

Here, I would like to discuss *Anyathākhyātivāda*. This is a theory of psychological realism from the perspective of self-conscious rumination of thought. This theory was advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *Patanjal*, the *Rāmanuja School* and the Bhāttas etc. Sometimes this theory is called *Viparitakhyāti*. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools both accepted the notion of imposition in the stage of illusion. However, the most important phenomenon is that both entities are real (*sat*). Real means that they do exist. In particular, in this stage, the external object is there but internal object is in mind. The internal object is imposed by the mind on the external object. Here, the phenomenon is complex psychosis and that is illusion. Illusion means a complex psychological process between external and internal stuff. If any stuff is not present, then it will not be possible for the psychological process to happen. When the illusion happens, then someone sees the external object but for some internal or external reason cannot identify the object and after that he imposes another object on the external object which is actually present in his mind. Now the issue or methodological quest is why this is happening? Or how do we analyse the imposition? Since both objects are real, we have to follow the way of arguments, which have been introduced by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy regarding illusion or *Viparya*. *Anyathākhyāti* means the connection of psychological realism between external and internal objects. The most knowable example of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is the cognition of nacre-silver. Here, I would analyse by this particular traditional example. Nacre is a sea product and silver is a material. There commonness is the 'glitteriness'. When someone says that '*idam rajatam'*(this is silver) after seeing nacre, not silver then *'idam'* is a nacre and '*rajatam*' is an attribute of nacre, which is imposed on it. Here *'idam'* is nacre and '*rajatam*' is also nacre but due to illusion, we cannot differentiate between attribute and attribute less forms. That is why illusion is always subjective phenomena (*viśiṣhta jñāna*).

Now someone raises a question what is the source of the attribute, which is imposed on the '*idam'* and why silver is imposed over the nacre? In order to clarify this notion we could say when someone sees the nacre by *loukika sannikarṣa* (ordinary perception), then the notion of glitteriness arises due to some light effect and similarities are there, that is why the perceiver remembers the silver due to similarity, after that he imposes over the nacre. But here the notion of *'rajatatva'*(silverness) is reflected by *Jñānalakhṣana sannikarṣa* and this is extraordinary perception. This kind of extraordinary perception is called *jñānalaksana sannikarsa*[94]. Now the question is what is *jñānalakhṣana sannikarṣa*? In order to clarify this notion, the example is 'ice looks cold'. This coldness of ice expression is already perceived by us with our eyes. Nyāya system advocates that the past sensory experience of coldness is associated with the visual appearance of ice. Both sensations are simultaneously happening. Due to the revived past knowledge of coldness it has been called *Jñānalakhṣana perception*. One is not ordinarily capable of perceiving coldness. Now the nacre-silver example is like this. Nacre is actually present in front of the perceiver. Due to *Jñānalakhṣana sannikarṣa*, the notion of silver and the notion of silverness both are appearing. After that, the nacre appears like silver due to the universally accepted similarity due to the glitteriness. That is why the perceiver says 'this is silver' (idam rajatam). This is a cognition, because it leads (*pravṛtti*) to do this action. So, this cognition is an illusion.

Udayanācārya, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Srīdhara and other great Nyāya scholars have discussed the variant theory of *Anyathākhyātivāda*. Vācaspati in his '*Nyāya-Vārttika-tātparya-tīkā*' advocates all kinds of erroneous cognitions. Nobody can superimpose the notion of '*rupa*', or elephant upon a fly because there is no similarity between '*rupa*' and elephant and fly. So, the stage of 'similarity' plays a role for superimposition which brings about

[94] *A History of Indian philosophy, Vol 1, p 342*

an invalid judgement. Similarity is the root of all error. According to Vācaspati, similarity is '*tad-bhinnatve sati tadgata-bhuyodharma-vattvam*'[95]. That means, the different forms occur instead of the actual form. According to Vācaspati, the erroneous mentation is happening due to *'sambandhāgraha'* because the notion of 'similarity' is the cause of superimposition.

Now the (Nyāya) neo-logician Gaṅgeśa advocates that there is a little difference between the subject and object relation regarding invalid judgement. Older *Naiyāyikas* advocate the notion of *Asat-khyāti* as a theory of error. Thus, neo-logicians are not ready to accept illusion as a verbal knowledge. Jagadisa Tarkālankar in his ṭīka " *Vyāptipañcaka-didhiti*" advocates " *Saduparāgeṇāpyasataḥ saṁsarga-mary-ādayā bhānānaṅgīkārāt*"[96]"(that means the object appears as a real towards perceiver but actually it is not) . Gaṅgeśa tries to say that this psychological phenomenon is happening due to the erroneous intercourse between the silver and the nacre. This is not a verbal dispute. This is a dispute of imposition. Due to superimposition and the cryptic intercourse, when perceiver sees a silver in every aspect which is real then there is no normal silver over the nacre. Here people cannot deny that ''this is silver'' cognition is wrong and 'the silver' and ''the nacre'' both are present simultaneously. This cognition is called *Anyathākhyātivāda*. The eminent scholar Nanilal sen says "the neo-logician avers that pravṛtti cannot be explained unless a qualified unitary cognition is assumed as the propelling force as evidence in all valid cognitions"[97]. Therefore, the notion of qualified unitary cognition is the propelling force but the most important thing is the identification. In order to clarify this notion, we have to accept that error reveals the non-existent object. According to neo-logician Bimal Krishna Motilal , the notion of non-existent does not mean that the

[95] *A Critique of The Theories of Viparya, p 184*
[96] *Ibid, p 186*
[97] *Ibid*, p 161

object is indescribable or not present. Because when the error object (silver) is present, then the perceiver can describe the object so this is describable and when the error is removed then it is also describable as a non-existent object. Therefore, now the resultant position is arrived at which is that the error object (silver) is real and the actual object nacre is real. Someone may raise a question that are both notions REAL? According to Nyāya, nacre is real because it has 'use'' (*arthakriyā*). But, silver is real when perceiver sees the silver but it has no 'use' or pragmatic value because the phenomenal silver and appearing silver both are different.

The eminent Nyāya neo-logician Gaṅgeśa wrote '*Tattvachintāmani*". I would like to discuss the notion of Anyathākhyātivāda in the light of Tattvachintāmani. According to this book, I will discuss the opinion of *purvapakṣa* regarding this phenomenon then I would discuss my observation in the light of *siddhāntapakṣa*.

Now on behalf of my understanding according to Visvabandhu Bhattācārya, I would like to discuss '*Tattvacintāmani'*. Here in the first verse, the author has presented the position of the opponents of Nyāya, the verse is as following "*nanu sarvajñānāng yathārtvat pramālakhsane biśeṣanbyābarttaprasiddheḥ viśeṣanabaiyartham anyathākhyātau mānābhābat* "[98] meaning that there is no testimony for proving *anyathākhyāti*. All cognitions are true, that is why though the definition of veridical knowledge has the notion of attribute (*viśeṣana*) yet the notion of attribute is insignificant in this definition. In order to clarify this understanding of Prabhākara the following analysis is done. According to Prabhākara, there are two notions like *'idam rajatam'. 'Idam'* is perceived and *'rajatam'* is grasped through memory. But the most important phenomenon is that due to the absence of veridical knowledge someone cannot differentiate between nacre (*idam)* and silver. Everybody knows the distinction between nacre and silver. Here the

[98] *Tattvachintāmani (Anyathākhyātivāda*), p 1

crucial part is why someone sees the silver instead of the nacre. Do people face the problem due to some fault? or Is there any other reason? If we accept the '*suktiviśeṣyak rajatattvāprakārak' jñāna*'[99], then this cognition is not veridical because there is no real connection between '*śukti*' and '*rajatattva*'. Thus in the case of illusion, those who are not accepting the knowledge of '*tadbiśeṣyakattva*', they advocate that this is not a proper separator in illusion.

That is why this adjective is not relevant. Later, an interpreter Mathurānāth Tarkabāgisa tries to state that there is no testimony to prove that *anyathākhyātivāda* is a method because in this theory, the object (*raja*t) is not present but due to association of mind, the perceiver imposes the remote object on the present substratum (*idam*). Now someone may raise a question that why silver? Answer could be that the *upādhi* is silverness. Due to the memory of silverness, perceiver sees the silver. But here, the silver and the nacre both are desirable. Now main issue is when perceiver sees a silver in a general way then his structure of cognition is '*idam dravyam*' and when perceiver sees a nacre as silver then perceiver's cognition structure is different (*idam rajatam*) than before because in the way of *'idam dravyam'*, the locus is substance but in the case of '*idam rajatam*', the locus is nacre. Both loci are different. According to Prabhākara, there is no illusion. When perceiver says that 'idam rajatam' then there are two cognitions, first perception (*idam*) and second one is memory (*rajat*). Due to laws of association of mind, the cognition of silver comes instead of nacre. In the example of nacre-silver, the silver is not the general silver.

'*rajatattvaprakārakatvāvacchinna-jñānaviśeṣyatāśrayatva*'[100] is a general silver. It has the ability for phenomenal use. That means the silverness is only present in the silver and

[99] *Ibid, p 9*
[100] *Ibid, p 20*

then silverness is the adjective (*prakār*a) of silver. In this case, the cognition that has the subject and locus is the attribute also. This happens when the phenomenal silver substance is the subject of the silverness, which is ascribed on it. Therefore, the main issue is the relation between subject (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣana*). According to Naiyāyika, the perceiver sees the nacre as a silver; here the illusion of silver occurs due to some misapprehension. In this case, silverhood is the qualifier of nacre and it becomes possible due to *jñānalakhṣana sannikarṣa* (extraordinary perception). Before we discussed what the extraordinary perception is. According to Prabhākara, the nacre-silver example is due to two separate cognitions (perception of '*'idam''* and memory of '*'rajatam'*) and not any illusion. In the context of illusion, nacre is the locus and the main intention of the knower is to achieve silver. Here, the cognition of silverhood is the cause of the desire to achieve silver but the locus is qualified by nacre. Now the opposition provides an argument, which is *'pitah sankho na sveta'*, that means the conch is yellow, not white. When someone perceives the conch shell then he knows the identical relation between white and the conch shell. That is why they have no intention to achieve yellow conch shell because they know due to some reason they perceive yellow conch shell . Therefore, we can say that 'the conch shell is not white' is not the separator of the yellow conch shell . According to Naiyāyika, we could not impose this notion on nacre-silver example because in the case of yellow conch shell, we already know the difference between yellow and conch shell, that is why 'the conch is not white' cognition is not the separator of the yellow conch. But, in the case of nacre- silver, we actually don't know that the nacre is present instead of silver. Nyāya proposes one argument on this issue. The argument is when people see the man (*puruṣa*) instead of the standing object (*sthānu*) then the cognition is happening due to some imposition. Then the people usually say '*ayam puruṣá*'. So, we have to accept that there is doubt. The perceiver cannot differentiate between 'standing object' and '*puruṣa*' due to the absence of

knowledge of difference (*bhedāgraha*). Prabhākara says when people see the '*sthānu'* then we cannot say that the *sthānu* is not a proper *sthānu* (*bhedāgrah*a). According to Nyāya, we cannot separately accept *bhedāgraha* between *sthānu* and *puruṣá*, because if we say that then we have to accept that the imposition is there, without imposition we cannot identify the *puruśa* instead of *sthānu*. Due to the specific knowledge of *puruṣá dharmi* , perceiver says '*ayam puruṣa'*. Here the main illusory statement is that '*puruṣá eba ayam na tu sthānu'* means *puruśa* is there, not *sthānu*. This is *Viparya*.

Again opponent of Prabhākara says that in the case of illusory perception, the notion of releta are important phenomena. We cannot say that the actual relation between two relata is the cause of illusion because in the case of inference, two relata appear as the subject and object, both are the cause of one inferential knowledge. So we cannot say that the relation between fire and smoke can be observed in the lake. This is the cause of fire-smoke coherent knowledge. Then Nyāya replies that when people see smoke in the lake then there is a doubt whether there is smoke because there is no fire. Thus in the lake, there is the doubt of illusory smoke. So here the main problem is the inference of fire in the lake. Because if perceiver would have known that in the lake there is no fire, then the inferential knowledge would not happen. At the end Nyāya advocates that *Anyathākhyāti* is the theory of illusion, not any inference.

The identical notion between object and desire (*iṣtabheda*) is the cause of achievement. In this nacre-silver example, *rajat* (silver) is always desirable stuff of perceiver. When perceiver says '*idam rajatam'* after seeing, then the perceiver wants to achieve the silver due to the resemblance between silver and the desirable stuff. But we cannot accept the cause of achievement because if we say this then we have to accept that the notion of 'this' (*idam*) of nacre is identical with the notion of 'this'*(idam*) of silver. Prabhākara tries to say that if we will accept it then we have to posit the identity between the notion

'this' of nacre and 'this' of silver. Here, nacre is always locus and silver is an imposed object. Locus and imposed object cannot be same at all. According to Prabhākara, here absence of nacre's cognition is the main cognition in this nacre-silver example. Prabhākara claims that the undesirable object's cognition is *Nivartaka* (destroyer) which is not present in this case. Here, the cognition form is *'idam rajatam na śuktih*' means this is not a *śukti*. When perceiver sees the substance then he cannot find the identity between *śukti* and the cognition of *śukti*. We can say this kind of statement. After that, someone raises a question when a perceiver sees the nacre then his cognition form is '*idam na śukti'* means there is no nacre, but how could he say that 'this is silver'? Prabhākara posits that the absence of identical cognition between *śukti* and the cognition of *śukti* is the main reason of this nacre-silver example. They propose that the notion of *Anyathākhyāti* is unnecessary. All illusions are depending on the absence of coherence between ś*ukti* and the cognition of śukti. The notion of '*na*' is coming due to this absence. People usually say *' idam na śukti'*, when he cannot identify the notion of śukti object and the cognition.

Nyaya replies to Prabhākara's argument. Prabhākara posits that the absence of the difference is the cause. According to Nyāya, if we accept it then '*nedam rajatam'*(there is no silver) is not a Nivartaka because when perceiver says that there is a silver means he desires it that is why he imposed. So, the main *nivartaka* is '*nedam rajatam'*, not 'the difference of undesirable object's cognition'. Hence, we have to accept the notion of *Anyathākhyātivāda*.

The genus of the cognition of silver is silverness, without having the notion of silverness people cannot say that I have the cognition of silver. So the notion of silver is always depending on the qualified silver (*rajatviśeṣyaka*) and the illusion of silver is always demolished by the veridical cognition of silver. That is why the cognition of silver is

very crucial for nacre-silver example. At last, they try to establish that illusion happens when *Upekshātmak jñān*a is possible. *Upekshātmak jñān*a is one kind of cognition where people have neither desire nor undesired cognition. If we take 'warm water' as an example, then the notion of warmness is not in the water. Warmness is a nature of fire and coldness is a nature of water. However, when people use the term 'warm water' for their use then it posits that they consciously do this imposition. So, this imposition is *saṁvādi*. Naiyāyika advocates a problem that is *"upekshājnane tu tadvyāpadesa tayogyatoyāt*" means when people fall in undesirable situation then also *Visaṁvādī pravṛtti* happens and without illusion it cannot happen. Therefore, illusion is there and we have to accept the *Anyathākhyātivāda* theory.

Here, I would like to concentrate on the conclusion part (*siddhāntapakṣa*) of *Anyathākhyātivāda*. This will be the final argument of Nyaya. The objectified silver (*rajatatvaprakāraka*) is imposed on nacre (*śuktiviśeṣyaka*). It is the easiest (*lāghav*a) conclusion of *Anyathākhyātivāda*.

When perceiver says that '*idam na rajatam'* then there is difference between desirable object(silver) and ostensive object (idam). The cognition of 'idam rajatam' does not follow the present reality, it depends only on desire. It indicates the absence of *śukti*(nacre). Here the causal connection is between silverness and brightness. When perceiver sees the nacre, then due to the brightness the perceiver sees the silver. The desire of getting silver forces him to go there. In the locus (nacre), there is silverness which is imposed by the perceiver. Specific cognition is the cause of the absence of difference (*bhedāgraha*). Absence of difference is the precondition of desire. According to Prabhākara, if *'idam'* is identified by the nacre, then there would be no cognition of silver. Hence, '*idam rajatam'* (this is silver) is a specific cognition. The nacre is cognised as silver due to their similarity. The same scenario happens in illusory stage

also. Someone can raise a question, when the absence of the cognition occurs? In the locus of nacre, the alleged cognition of 'non-silver' does not arise. If someone accepts that, there is the cognition of 'non-silver' in the locus (*idam*). If someone has the cognition of silver in the alleged locus of silver, then he has illusion, which the Naiyayikas explain by their theory of *Anyathākhyāti*.

According to Nyaiyāikas, we have to admit that the *pravṛtti* (tendency of desire) to have rajat occurs if and only if in the locus (idam) he has the cognition of *rajatatva* instead of nacre hood. It means in the case of nacre-silver example, always the cognition of silver (*rajata*) occurs instead of the cognition of nacre because silver is a desirable object and there is some specific resemblance between silver and nacre. Hence, this specific subject and object relation (*viśeṣya-prakāraka sammandha*) happens only in this case(nacre-silver). That is why in this example *pravṛtti* arises to get silver and no other object.

Saṁvādipravṛtti is the result of *yathārthajñāna* and *Visaṁvādipravṛt*ti is the result of false cognition. Now Acharya Gaṅgeśa provides an inference. False *pravṛtti* is due to determinate cognition (*viśiṣta jn̄ān̄a*) and it is a *pravṛtti,* as for example, true *pravṛtti* is also a pravṛtti. As false *pravṛtti* is also a *pravṛtti*, it is due to a determinate cognition, which is the cause of any *pravṛtti* just like a true *pravṛtti*. In other words as any *pravṛtti* is due to a determinate cognition, false *pravṛtti* is also due to a determinate cognition, just like a true *pravṛtti*.

Someone may object that it is possible that *rajatatva prakāraka rajata viśesyaka pravṛtti* arises in the absence of *rajatattva prakāraka rajat viśeṣyaka* determinate cognition. Thus, it cannot be said that determinate *pravṛtti* is due to determinate cognition. By anticipating such an objection, Gaṅgeśa has said that the effect can never arise in the absence of its cause. Therefore, *tatprakāraka tatviśeṣya pravṛtti* (the effect) can never

arise in the absence of *tatviśeṣyaka tatprakāraka* cognition (the cause). Thus, if there arises *rajatattva prakāraka rajat viśeṣyaka pravritti*, then prior to this there must be *rajatattva prakāraka rajatviśeṣyaka* cognition (‘*klriptakāranang bīna anupapattve*[101]*’*).

Now someone can raise an objection in the case of ''*idam rajatam raṅga (foil)*. The cognition of the form whether the rajat is *raṅgattvaprakāraka* and whether the *raṅga* is *rajatattvaprakāraka* are the causes of doubt. But this doubt is not the cause of pravritti and nivritti(rajat). Here, *'raṅga''*(foil) is a product and the colour of *raṅga* is like silver. Thus, here there is no difference between silver and *raṅga* in the presence of nacre. Here mainly the glossy part is the common character for rajat and *raṅga*. That is why people can relate *raṅga* with rajat. After that, people can say that ‘ *ime raṅgarajate*[102]’ means this *raṅg*a is present in rajat. The specific cognition(*raṅga*) is not the cause of doubt. Hence, specific cognition of nacre is a real. In the case of nacre-silver example, the cognition of nacre is a specific knowledge but when perceiver sees a silver instead of nacre, this perception causes the *pravṛtti*.

Pravṛtti is of two kinds like *Saṁvādī* and *Visaṁvādī*. For *Saṁvādī* , specific knowledge (*viṣiśtajñāna)* is the cause of nacre-silver example and for *Visaṁvādī*, the absence of the cognition of *bheda* (difference) is the cause of nacre-silver example. *Saṁvādī* cognition is ‘*istatāvacchedaka rajatvādi prakāraka dharmajñāna’* means the silverness which qualifies the dharma is determined by the desire of object (silver). Then according to *dharmijñāna*, by the desire of object perceiver always sees the silver instead of nacre because he always wants to achieve the silver. Visaṁvādī means ‘*iṣtadharmī bhedāgraha’*. It means desire is the main subjective notion that is why the absence of cognition of *bheda* is caused by the intention of desire.

[101] *Ibid, p 95*
[102] Ibid, p 98

According to Nyāya, due to false cognition, there is a silver instead of nacre but perceiver sees silver instead of nacre and he desires to get silver. Therefore, right cognition is possible when the nacreness would be perceived instead of silverness in the locus of nacre and therefore, the rajat is not *raṅga*.

Now someone may raise a question if specific cognition of nacre is not relevant for the cognition of silver, then when the inference is constructed, *hetu* (nacre) is there, then sometimes the effect (*kārya*/silver) is not caused due to the absence of specific cognition. So how do you explain this situation?

Now I would like to state that if we would not accept the specific cognition of nacre then we have to accept that the blind man can feel the moonbeam[103]. Hence, in the level of cognition, there must be a specific cognition of nacre because universal cognition of nacrehood is presupposed in the case of nacre cognition. Without specific cognition, universal cognition would not have been possible. For the cognition of moonbeam as tactile, in which there is no real relation between touch and moonbeam, there has to be a prior specific cognition, which is the connector between moonbeam and the touch sensation. Without having the touch sensation, the blind man cannot say 'I feel the moonbeam' because he does not have the tactile specific cognition of moonbeam. If we do not accept the specific cognition, then we have to posit that the blind man can feel the moonbeam without visual perception (eyes). Hence, the specific cognition is there and relevant. Now we would discuss the importance of the specific cognition for nacre-silver example in the light of this argument (moonbeam). Specific cognition is also relevant for nacre-silver. Why? Because, when perceiver sees the silver instead of nacre, then there is the specific cognition of silver. Without having this specific cognition, the perceiver

[103] "*anyathā andhasya tvaksammandhe mahatyudbhutarupavati candramahasi pratyakṣatapattiḥ, dravyasākṣātkārhetoḥ sattvāt "* (61), Ibid, p 118

cannot say 'this is silver'. Therefore, there is a silver (specific cognition) but not a real one. It is the memory of silver, which acts as a relation (*sannikarṣa)* for the silver cognition.

Every cognition is determined by the notion of *Pravartaka* (doer). Now the main issue is when shall I say *pravartaka* is there? According to Nyāya, *Pravartak*a is always present in the case of true cognition, not *iṣtajñāna*. If we accept that doer is also present in *iṣtajñāna* then we have to accept that silver is real because according to Nyaya, *pravartaka* is only applicable for the case of true cognition and when we define the cognition of silver as a '*rajatatva-prakāraka-jñāna-jnya-pravritti-viśeṣyattva*' then we have to consider that '*rajatattva-jñāna-viṣayatver niyāmak'* is present but this *niyāmaka* is not present in nacre because for nacre, the doer is different, not like silver.

According to Nyāya, '*jñānanam yathārthameva'*. They proclaim a wonderful example of it. When perceiver says that '*Soaham Devadattaḥ'* then there is recognition of Devadatta. It means there is another experience which is already present in perceiver's mind. There is a necessary connection between '*sah*' and '*ayam*'. Both are denoting one phenomenon and 'sah' is the object of memory and '*ayam*' is the object of perception. That is why there is cognition of two kinds of objects grasped from two different forms of cognition. But when perceiver says 'idam rajatah' , there is no connection between '*idam*' and '*rajataḥ*' because idam denotes nacre and *rajata* denotes silver, the silverhood cannot be there in the nacre . From the perspective of quality, nacre and silver both are different. Here there is no connection between '*idamrupa śukti viṣayatā' and 'rajata viśayatā*'. Hence, '*jñānanṁ yathārthameva'*[104] statement is relevant in the light of '*Soahaṁ Devadattaḥ'* because '*idam rajatam'* is not a '*yathārtha jñānaṁ'*.

[104] *Ibid, p 148*

For specific cognition (*viṣiśta pratyakṣa*), *sāmānya nirvikalpaka*(*saṁskāra*) is *vyāpāra* for memory and mind is *kārana*. Now the issue is that people are supposed to know that '*rajata*' and '*raṅga*' are objects and both have common features, then automatically the imposition of one on the other comes to human mind. That is why the present object (*idam)* is projected as rajatam which is not present here. Hence, this is *Anyathākhyātivāda*.

Again, someone can say when a perceiver sees a silver instead of *raṅga* (foil) there is a *pratibandhaka* for the genesis of the cognition of foil. That is *'rajatabhedāsaṁsargāsaṁsargāsaṁsarga'*[105].

Gaṅgeśa said that for recognition (*pratyabhigyā*) in normal situation, the direct cognition occurs only in one portion of the object. In the case of nacre-silver example, the recognition does not occur through direct cognition, because in this is a part of the object (of cognition), i.e. *idam* is directly connected to the sense organ, whereas the *prakāra*, i.e. *rajatatva* being absent is connected through *alaukika sannikarṣa*. Therefore, due to no direct *sannikarṣa,* the object is not present.

Finally, according to Gaṅgeśa and Vācaspati, the imposition is present and when imposition is there, then the object of the cognition is covered by the imposed character that is why nacre is always present but the silver is imposed on it.

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[105] *Ibid, p 158*

CHAPTER 3

DREAM: REAL OR ILLUSION

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Dream: Real or Illusion

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss the classical view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedanta philosophy regarding the nature of dream. Here, I focus on mainly *Nyāyasūtra*, *Bhāṣya* and *vāritaka* in Nyāya system. On the other hand, in Vaiśeṣika system I would discuss the sutra and *Nyāyakandalī tīkā.* Later I will be discussing briefly some glimpses *of Māṇḍukya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* where dreaming notion has been discussed. At the end of this chapter, I will discuss three issues: 1) dream is real, 2) similarities between dream and waking and 3) dissimilarities between dream and waking states.

The main reason of the introducing this chapter is to make an understandingof the structure of dreaming phenomena. Before I have discussed *jīva* or self, then I focused on the notion of illusion and some traditional views on illusion. After that, I have mentioned briefly, why dream itself is not an illusory or hallucinatory state. Here, the main intention is to find out or to locate the structure of dream from the perspective of classical systems. Mainly I have chosen these schools because my intention is to discuss the nature of the state of dream as treated in two rigorous schools of idealism and realism. Their systems and methodologies are completely different from each other. However, these are most relevant and analytical till date.

In the second section, I introduce Upaniṣads because in *Vaitathya prakarana* of *Māṇḍukya,* verses are based on dreaming phenomena and Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* are also relevant to my discussion. Then I discuss the conversation between Janaka and

Yāj̃ñavalko of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* regarding the nature of dream. These features will be discussed in this chapter.

In Nyāya system, dream itself is an illusory state and unreal (false).

In Vaiśeṣika system, dream has mainly three reasons. Apart from these reasons, the colossal scholar Srīdhara adheres the cause of premonition dream as adṛṣta but Nyāya did not say anything on this issue.

In Advaita system (Upaniṣads), dreaming and waking both have the same status from the perspective of transcendental reality because in their systems, *Brahman* is the only real and true. Apart from Brahman, all is unreal.

In *Māṇḍukya*, there are verses on this issue. Thus, this section and Gauḍapāda's *kārikā* both are important.

Chronologically, the whole nature of dream will be discussed here because without knowing the classical view we cannot determine any proper structure of dream. That is why I am focusing on these issues.

The nature of Dream in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy

Dreaming state is always an important phenomenon in Indian philosophical system. More or less all schools of Indian philosophy accept the state of dream but the main controversial issue is about the nature of dreaming state. Some schools advocate the nature of dream, which is tenable and some of them do not accept the dreaming state as real. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is one of them. They are realist and theist schools in Indian philosophy. They do not differentiate stages of reality like Advaitin. For them reality means only this phenomenal state. They always concern about this phenomenal state.

Dreaming state is one of them but they consider waking state only as real. Waking reality is the prior among these. For example, waking elephant is real and tangible rather than dreaming elephant. Now the question is how do they define the process of cognition in dream?

In Nyāya-Vaiśeşika system, five external organs (eyes, ears, tongue, nose and touch) are connected directly to the external world and mind is connected indirectly. Cognitive structure is '*ātmāsaṅyuktaḥ manaḥsaṅyuktaḥ'* as conjoined with external organs and external objects. So, if the external avenues to the external world are closed, then there is no way to connect the external world. Thus, only when the *sannikarṣa* or connection takes place between external sense organs and external objects, perception occurs. This perception can occur only in waking state. They also advocate the *alaukika* perception (*sāmanyalakşana, jňānalakşana* and *yogaja*). This *alaukika* perception is possible in waking state also. The Nyāya-Vaiśeşikas discussed about the state of dreaming or deep sleep during the conversation with Mīmāṁsaka and Mādhyamika Buddhists. Otherwise, there is no independent theory of dreaming in their system. They discussed the dreaming phenomenon with the help of *jñānalakkhsanasannikarṣa* and for them dreaming objects are illusory or hallucinatory objects. These objects do not have waking existential value. Now the question is if dream itself is an illusory state then how do we get new messages from this state? Alternatively, what does someone feel when he sees the tiger in dream? If it is really illusion, then why is the statement helping to get some other clues? For example, someone identifies the murderer in dream but in waking he did not. Such incidents happen in our day-to-day life. Before entering to deal with these crucial questions, at first, I would like to discuss the classical view of dream in the light of Nyāya and Vaiśeşika philosophy.

After discussing the classical view on dream, I will focus on these problems. Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school advocated that dream is actually the product of memory. It is based on representative theory. When someone is seeing something in dream that means the object is coming from the memory. That is why we are seeing the object as real. Like rope-snake illusion. In rope-snake, the main issue is about 'this'. According to Janakiballav Bhattacarya, "…in the case of illusion there are two distinct types of consciousness, 1) apprehension and 2) remembrance"[106]. The main substratum is 'this' because we say during illusion 'this is snake instead of rope'. The subject term is always qualified by predicate term, which is snakehood. That is why someone got scared and left the place. But the actual fact in the case is that we are observing the object referred to as 'this' (rope) through perception and with this apprehension we also remember the *snake hood* which we have perceived previously due to its structural similarity with the object present. Here, we just impose the *snake* on the *rope*. We have to remember that the cognition of rope (perceptual) and the cognition of snake (memory) both are correct but the problem is the wrong imposition of the latter upon the former. So, when the imposition has gone, then only rope is there and the perceiver realises that rope is only real HERE. Thus, the cognition of snake itself is not false (during the occurrence of it), that is why someone is scared at the time of cognition. But, that the nature of two cognitions is different is not known by the cognisor.

Janakiballav interprets in his commentary "…It should not also be held that it is a piece of vague consciousness which fails to reveal an object since it is introspected by self-consciousness and suggests, this consciousness cannot be identified with that of a person in dreaming state"[107].

[106] *Nyāyamanjari* , Vol 1, p 380
[107] *Ibid, p 381*

Here at first, I would start my discussion on dream in the light of *Nyāyasūtra*.

"*pramāṅānupapattupapattibhaṅ*"[108] (4/2/30)

The *pramāna* is the cause of *vastusiddhi* (the establishment of the existence of object). It means every cognition of object is justified by *pramāna*. In the above verse, Gautama (the author of *Nyāyasutra*) said that *pramāna* has *upapatti* (origin) and *anupapatti* (non-origin). So, the question is if all cognition of object is justified by *pramāna* then why *anupapatti* is there? When we are saying "object exists" or "object does not exist", both are justified by *pramāna*.

The origination of *pramāna* affirms that an object exists. Therefore, the existence of objects falls within the domain of *pramāna*. Everything is within otherwise the justification of object is not possible. Here, the *sutrakāra*, Gautama introduces the next verse with this reply, "*svapna-viṣayābhimānavadayampramāna-prameyābhimānaḥ*"[109] (4/2/31). It means in the stage of dream, there is also an illusion about *pramāna* and *prameya* object.

According to Nyāya, there is no real object in dream but it seems like real. That is called '*abhimāna*'. The unreal object is apprehended as real in dream and when someone is identifying the object like 'this is tiger', then that cognition of tiger (*prameya*) seems true and the means of cognition (*pramāna*) also seems true but they are not actually true in the real sense (in comparison to waking reality). Dreaming realisation is '*abhimāna*'. Actually, there is no real *pramāna* or *prameya* in the dream state. For them dreaming objects are imaginable. That is why after dreaming the perceiver can identify the real *pramāna* and *prameya* which is acceptable for all, but the cognition of the object of

[108] *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol 5, p 156
[109] *Ibid, p 157*

dream is not justified by waking *pramāna*. In dream, all cognitions are illusory and baseless (without any real *pramāna*). According to Nyāya, 'real' object means it has to exist in the waking state and 'unreal' object means the opposite one.

So, here we are seeing waking state as the fundamental state among all states. Waking reality is the only reality. If the object does not exist in waking but it exists in dream, that existence is not granted as real by Nyāya system. That is why waking cognition is not an illusion but dreaming cognition is.

The opposition is raised against the above view as illusion occurs also in waking state and this is well accepted. In waking state, due to ignorance the illusion occurs like mirage, nacre-silver illusion and seeing '*Gandharvanagara*'. According to these facts someone can argue that illusion does not occur only in dreaming state, it also occurs in waking state. So, all types of cognition can be illusory. So, if the cognition is found false, then the alleged *pramāna* is not a real one. Thus, Gautama says "*māyā-gandharvanagara-mṛgatṛshnikāvadvā*"[110] (4/2/32).

Gautama replied against the above argument of the opponent that the adequate *hetu* is the cause of cognition. It means that illusion occurs in both dream and waking states but in dream, there is no adequate *hetu* to determine the dreaming entity as real as in the case of waking. But in waking state, there is an apposite *hetu* to determine that waking illusion is false and behind this illusion there is a 'waking' negation which is real. "*hetvābhāvādasiddhiḥ*"[111] (4/2/33)

Therefore, illusion could occur in both the states, but waking state is the fundamental state to determine the existence of object. Someone sees an unconventional entity like a

[110] *' na pramāṅāni na prameyāni sandhi atha ca pramānḥaprameyābhimāna', Nyāyadarśanam, Nyāyavārtikam, p 107*6
[111] *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol 5, p 159.

new object, in dreaming state and after dream when we are finding that object in waking, we would not find it. So, my question is why does a meaningful object of dream appears as unreal in waking state just because it is non-existent in this state? Here, I am not talking about any bizarre entity and why always the cognitive journey is from waking to dream, why not from dream to waking?

In dream, there are many examples where people remember the dreaming object as real in waking state also. There are many instances of dreaming images like someone saw the object in dream for the first time and they believe that dreaming object is real in waking state. For example, someone is alone in waking state but he meets with someone in dream regularly and he is happy with that. After meeting, he starts his journey in a new way. Now he is surviving in waking to think that someone is waiting for him in dream. Hence, is this surviving wrong in waking state? Alternatively, is it not justified in waking?

In dream, lots of variety (like different kinds) of emotional images come. These pictures also occur in waking state. But the problem is about negation of object. In dream, the existence of object has been negated by waking object. Here, there is a problem, which is: 'in waking state the *pramāna* and *prameya* are real, but in dream the alleged *pramāna* and *prameya* are illusion from the perspective of waking state' - in *bhāsya* there is no *hetu* to determine this statement. As a result, *bhāsyakāra* adheres *svapnānta* and *jagritānta*, it means the stage of dream and the stage of waking. Here, '*anta*' means *avasthā*. It designates inherently that '*svapnāvasthā*' itself is an illusory state. All entities are unreal in illusory state. On the other hand, someone can show to others what he is seeing in the waking state.

According to *Praśastapādabhāsya*[112], dream has three causes such as 1) *Sanskārajnya*, 2) The fallacy of *dhātu* and 3) *adṛṣta*. Dream always comes by our desire, disease and undesired entity or absolutely unknown entity comes due to *adṛṣta*. They gave one example to establish their theory that is proclaimed by the famous poet Śrīharṣa in *Naiṣadhacarita* "*adṛstampyarthamadṛṣtavaibhavāt karoti suptirjjanadarsśanātithiṅ*"[113] (1/39). In his poem, the queen Damayanti did not see his king Nal before but she heard about him. After that she saw him in her dream and that image is perfect as real in waking state. According to Nyāya system, this image does not designate any real existence of dream object because she saw his king due to memory. By memory the remembrance and association work and after dream in waking state when someone would realise dreaming object is not there, then it is cognized as unreal or '*alika*'.

Later Gautama says "*smṛti- sanṅkalpavacca svapnaviṣayābhimānaḥ*"[114] (4/2/34). It means dreaming data are coming from memory and it is pre-cognised. So, all dreaming entities are coming from waking state. On the other hand, there is a difference between dream and waking states[115]. In both states, objects are same but the main issue is to determine the reality of the object. In Nyāya system, they adhere that dream state is fundamentally unreal state that is why all products of dream are also unreal and false. When someone sees the dreaming object then after dream they are saying 'I was seeing something in dream'. It is happened just because of their memory. Mind creates an image with the help of memory data. Otherwise, that image would not have been possible.

[112] *Ibid, p 161*
[113] *Ibid, p 162*
[114] *Ibid,*
[115] *'dṛṣta vijñānabhedamnuyoktavya', Nyāyadarśana, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā,* p 1083

Now someone raises a question as to if dream is based on unreal entity, then hypothetically unreal data will come but if dream is based on real entity (sat) then can we say dream is an illusion? According to Nyāya system, yes, dream is an illusion after that also, because after dreaming there is a strong *hetu* (reason) to negate the dreaming object.

Here, I have a question as to if the dreaming object is unknown or first time seen object, then how do they explain it through memory? It is not accepted then that someone is saying "after dreaming it is already determined that dreaming object itself is an illusion" because when unknown object or undesired entity is coming in dream, then how do they examine their status by waking reality?

In *Aiteriya Āranyaka*, there is an example of bizarre entity like seeing black teeth man is bad sign of dream and seeing elephant is a good sign of dream "*atha svapnāḥ | puruṣaṅ kṛṣnaṅ kṛṣnadantaṅ paśyati, sae nan hanti, varāha*"[116] (3/2/4).

Advaita Vedānta and Bhātta Mīmāṁsaka did not accept that dreaming phenomenon itself is an illusion. They oppose Nyāya theory regarding dream because if dreaming data is always coming from memory then why we are saying after dream 'I was seeing pot or any object', why not 'I was memorising pot or any object'. Therefore, this argument differs from Nyāya position. According to a Vedāntin, dream is not always '*alika*'.

Thus, vaiśeṣika system adheres that unknown entity or *alaukika* object is coming in dream due to *adṛṣta*[117]. *Adṛṣta* can control the dreaming image. Thus, it is still debatable. The followers of Gautama did not accept this argument.

[116] *Vedgranthamālā, Vol 16, Aitereyāranyakam*, p 105
[117] '*atyantāprasiddhaṣu' , Nyāyakandalī* , p 185

In *Nyāyasūtra*, there is another verse on dream where Naiyāyikas explain how dreaming phenomena themselves are false after waking.

"*mithyopalabdhervināśastvattva - jñānāt svapnaviṣayābhimānapranāśavat pratibodhe*"[118] (4/2/35)

Here, it asserts that after illusion when perceiver realises illusory object or imposed object is false through veridical cognition in waking state, perceiver can realise his dreaming cognition is non-veridical cognition.

In Vācaspati's commentary, in the case of '*sthānu-puruṣa*' (man- long stand) example, when perceiver doubts as 'whether this is a man or long stand (*sthānu*)', then the cognition is not also specified. Later by the help of true cognition (*tattvajñāna*) the real object (long stand) is identified by validating the false cognition (this is a man). But we have to remember that validation is possible only on the subject of illusion, not for general entity of dream (*visayasāmānya*). According to Vācaspati Miśra, after waking, by the help of waking cognition only dreaming illusion is negated, not any fabled entity (*alika*). Negation of illusory cognition means illusory object does not exist after veridical cognition. There is no negation of fabled entity. So, illusory object is not fabled. It is true that after *tattvajñāna* or veridical cognition, false cognition or illusory object is not there but the subject of dream is not negated wholly and it does not mean to say that dreaming object itself is fabled.

In the above discussion, I have mentioned that in dream, the imaginary object can occur like '*gandharvanagar*' (the imaginary city). After waking when someone says that the imaginary city does not exist in waking state that means the imaginary city is false. It does not mean that imaginary city's absence exists in waking state that is why dreaming

[118] *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol 5, p 172

image is false. So, the fabled entity will not be entertained for dream. The true cognition is always a negation of false cognition but not the subject (*viṣaya*). If dreaming entity itself is fabled (*alīka*), then we could not say or assert that dreaming cognition is false. False cognition or non-veridical cognition is also cognition but not fabled. Therefore, in the case of *alika*, the veridical cognition is not possible. Therefore, we can say that in dream the cognition is possible whether false or true.

Vācaspati says *Māyā* is the locus of false cognition[119]. It occurs when perceiver imposes a different entity on the right entity due to the cognition of some similarities and this is called illusion. For example, mirage, '*gandharvanagara'* etc.

Dreaming cognition is an opposite cognition, not contradictory. Like there is a wonderful example given by Vācaspati, when magician shows something in front of the spectators, then magician knows that showing object is false but simultaneously spectators think this is true. Similarly, in waking state, the perceiver realises dreaming cognition is false. Thus, in waking state, he knows the difference between dreaming object and waking object.

Now my question is if dreaming object is not true, then when someone got solution for waking problems from dream states, then that solution will not be granted. If we do not accept dreaming solution as real, then lots of waking problems will be unsolved. On the other hand, if we accept dreaming solution is possible for waking problems, then we cannot say dreaming object ALWAYS is false.

Now I would like to mention the nature of doubt ('*Saṅśayaparikṣāprakaraṇa')*.

"*Samānānekadharmadhyavasāyādnyataradharmādhyavasāyādvāna saṅśaya*"[120] (2/1/1)

[119] *upādānavacca māyādiṣu mithyājñānaṅ, ibid, p 172.*

In general, doubt is not any universal imposition on any universal object. There is no imposition of *dharma* (nature). There are three major criteria to learn Indian scriptures like ''*uddeśya*''(motive), "*lakṣana*"(definition) and "*parīkṣā*" (judgement). In *Vādī* tradition, there is a main thing to negate the doubt because to locate the veridical cognition is the main issue.

Doubt is ""*viruddhavyābhicāridharmadvaisannipāte*" like *Prakaraṇsame*. it means when doubt occurs then the same nature of two objects occurs at the same place, then due to some difficulty (internal and external both) the perceiver cannot identify the real one. In the case of doubt, there is no cognition. This is an in between stage of true and false. Sometimes the *vipratipattivākya* can take part to get conclusion. *Vipratipatti* means when the middle man or third person can help to get solution. That can be a statement or person (*vipratipattivākya* or *vyākti*).

On the other hand, in '*Saṅśayaparikṣaprakaraṇa*'[121], doubt "*samānamanayoriti*" occurs. It means same condition occurs in the stage of doubt. For example, in the case of ''man- long stand'', the perceiver cannot identify the real long stand at first because the same structural similarity takes place at the same locus. "*ekavrittitvacceti*" occurs. It means the perceiver says after entertaining the doubt ''is this man or long stand". "*Sārupyabhāvāt*" is the main cause of doubt. In the case of doubt *"anyavadhāraṅenaivatatvānupalavdheritiprayuktam*" is happened, different similar entities are occurring in doubt.

[120] *Nyāyabhāṣyavārtikam, p 174.*
[121] *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā* , pg-311.

"*aśarīraṁvāvasantaṁpriyāpriyenaspriśataḥ*"[122], without *sthulaśarīra* liberation is not possible. Physical body is needed to get pleasure and pain and without these feelings, perceiver cannot go through the essence of liberation.

"…athatattvajñānātsavāsanmithyājñānāśedośābhāvenapravṛtyāddabhāvāndharmādharmayornutpādeprācindharmādharmaśryāduḥkhasādhanaśarīrādināśaevataṅeturataravatasyānanyenābhivyāktipravāhotpannaiticet…"[123]

After *tattvajňāna*, the material body, namely, a combination formed out of *dharma* and *dharmi* will be demolished, because the material implication (where body is ultimate) is the false implication. Without the presence of material body (*sthulaśarīra*) liberation or self-realisation is not possible.

Now my point is if the relation of *dharma-dharmi* is the cause of false cognition or *mithyājňāna*, then we have to accept that dream and waking both states have the same status because in dream state there is also *dharma-dharmijňāna*. Pleasure and pain - these emotions are there because of material body that is why the realiser wants to get rid of from all boundaries but in dream also, pleasure and pain are there. Otherwise, in dream, the notion of 'desirable' or 'non-desirable' will be overlooked.

Nay, we are saying, "suppressing desired entities are coming during dream". My question is if and only if desired entities are coming in dream, then why are we also seeing undesired entity in dream? Both can come in dream. There is no necessity that desired entity has to come in dream. Otherwise, we could not explain the premonition state (when perceiver sees the object and on the next day, it happens) or future aspect in dream.

[122] '*Iśvaranumāna' of 'Anumāna Khanda', Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p 178
[123] *Ibid*

"*athātmābhinnāṅnityasuḥkhamanubhuyatevasukhatvamtattranānubhuyata-iticet*"[124] means without *ātmā*, there is no eternal happiness and we can assume that this eternal happiness is not bounded only in waking state. It can occur in any level.

"*evaṅsukhatvādāvapisādhyanantenasakolācchedemoksa*"[125], liberation means where the ultimate happiness is there and there is no negation.

Doubt is "*nānvevamatiriktaśaktausādhak-vādhakapramānabhāvānnityaṁsaṁśayaḥ*"[126]. So, doubt occurs when there is no *sādhaka* or *vādhaka*. The perceiver cannot differentiate between *sādhaka* (the real object) and *vādhaka* (the obstacle).

Now the question is can we say *mukti* or liberation occurs only in waking state? because in dream, perceiver has feeling and the cognition is there with the help of *dharma-dharmi* like waking state. On the other hand, during dream the *sādhaka* and *vādhaka* both can be present as a form of doubt. So can we say dreaming doubt is not real like waking one? If we say dreaming doubt is not similar with waking state, then the possibility of every understanding will be overlooked. For example, in waking state, sometimes we do not identify the nature of object but during dream, we can identify. Hence, can we negate the dreaming state as a form of unreal state?

Svapna means when all external organs are unable to connect with external world then mind is situated in *medhyanāḍī*[127]. After that mind creates image which is appeared as real and this appearing reality is dream and according to Nyāya, dream does not have waking reality. It is actually *mānasa jňāna*. In dream, mind is associated with soul where locus is void and that association is called '*svāp*'. Dreaming phenomenon is based on waking phenomenon.

[124] *Ibid, p 181*
[125] *Ibid, p 177*
[126] *Ibid, p 156*
[127] *Tarkabhāṣā, Vol 2 , p 305*

Dream is not like memory because memory has been guided by only *saṅskārajñāna* and dreaming structure is also different. According to Nyāya, dreaming perception and waking perception both are completely different. For example, in dream someone can say "he was in Vārānasi" but in waking state he is present in Kolkata. In Nyāya system, there are three types of error in dream like time, space and the nature. Dreaming time, dreaming space and dreaming nature (dharma) are different from waking time, waking space and waking nature.

In Vaiśeṣika system, they advocate dreaming notion by three characteristics like a) imbalance situation of the body (*vāyu, pitta* and *kaph* problem), 2) Due to *saṅskāra* and 3) *adṛṣta*.

In *Tarkabhāsā*, it is stated that when external organs are unable to connect the external world, then the *pralinmanaṣka* person enters to the dream and he thinks that dreaming objects are real as waking. For Nyāya, dream is like a memory and dreaming objects are coming from memory but dream itself is not memory.

Janakiballav interprets in his commentary, "It should not also be held that it is a piece of vague consciousness, which fails to reveal an object since it is introspected by self-consciousness and suggests, this consciousness cannot be identified with that of a person in dreaming state"[128].

Now someone can raise questions like:

1) Do dream cognitions appear as perception, which is based on memory-images only?
2) Are dream-cognitions illusion of memory?
3) Do memory images appear to consciousness as perception in dream?

[128] *Nyāyamaṅjarī*, Vol 1, p 381

Udayana replies, if by illusions of memory someone means the illusory cognitions of the object of memory, then dreaming cognitions are not the illusion of memory.

On the other hand, if memory images of dream are illusorily cognized then we should never have a direct cognition like 'I am seeing this pot' rather the structure should be 'I am seeing that pot' (based on memory). But in dream, we have direct and immediate presentation like 'I am seeing this pot'. 'Thisness' is the special characteristic here and not 'thatness' as in memory. We are not always saying in dream that 'I am seeing **that** pot', we are saying 'I am seeing **this** pot'. Therefore, memory is not always the fundamental source in dream.

According to Nyāya, External / Internal image + Memory = Perception (Dream)

Later, the dreaming discussion has been started with one pre-supposition i.e. dreaming image is an opposite form of waking image?

In dream, there is no *sannikarṣa* between external sensual organ and external world like waking. For example, dreaming picture would be like this "someone sees his father died" but in waking state his father is alive, "*someone sees that he is present in Vārānasi* " but in waking state he is present in Kolkata.

"*atitānāgatasvapnādijñānanāmvidyamānātharlamvanatvāviśeṣāda,bhrāntābhrāntaviśeṣ āānupapattiriticet*"[129]. It means unseen and future objects of dream are coming due to *nirālamvana* (objectless) and dreaming image is illusory. Due to the absence of real cognition, dreaming cognition seems to be real. When perceiver realises that dreaming image itself is unreal, then he gets to know that it is coming because of *avidyā* (ignorance). Dreaming image and waking image are different because waking image has

[129] *Nyāyabhūṣaṅam, p 33*

existential value like during waking someone can show the perceived object to other but during dream; dreamer is the only viewer in his dream. If someone is saying he is in Vārānasi and actually he is in Kolkata in waking state, then as a result his waking perception would be granted, dreaming perception would be rejected. This is the basic structure or status of dream.

The Naiyāyika, Bhāsarvajňa advocates three types of *pramāna* like perception, inference and *āgama* (verbal testimony). Akṣapāda rejected Upamāna as a separate pramāna. Bhāsarvajňa adheres that yogic practices are the necessary causes of salvation. He mentions three kinds of *kleśa* like *rāga* (desire), *dveṣa* (hatred) and *moha* (illusion), *avidyā* and *asmitā* (illusion).

Bhāsarvajňa explains that *pramānas* should be free from doubt and error. Error is always false determination like rope-snake illusion or nacre-silver illusion and he mentioned dream is false determination. Dream is based on re-collective cognition (*smaraṅajñāna*) but re-collective cognition is not *pramāna*. He adheres that dreaming cognition is always based on illusory cognition[130]. For example, he mentions '*gajādidarśanaṁ'* during dream itself is false.

Jaina philosophy accepts re-collective cognition as *pramāna*. In *Rasasāra,* dream is a determinate cognition.

According to the previous discussion, we can assume that intrinsically dream has two aspects like cognitive and physiological. Here, I would like to include psychological portion in cognitive domain that is why separately I did not mention it. Since long-time, dreaming phenomenon has been designated as an unreal state. Maximum Indian philosophical systems would like to admit dream as a false state or illusory state, but

[130] *saṅśayviparyapramitismaranebhyo vilakṣnaṁ svapnajñānaṁ manyate' , Nyāyasāraḥ, p 211*

some of them, mainly idealist schools do not want to stop their discussion of dream after identifying it as an illusory state. Mainly, the realist school Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika always oppose to accept dream as real state. Now the question is can we identify dream as a clairvoyant state? Because there are lots of superstitious theories or telepathic theories to explain dream. Everybody is aware of this situation. If dream itself is an unreal state, then can we stop our discussion or skip this notion from our cognitive domain?

Jadunatha Sinha mentions, "What is this that men call a dream and who is it who dreams it? It is a suggestion coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream"[131].

Now someone can ask what is the status of dream during dream?

In Jadunatha Sinha's book, we got some answers regarding this issue, namely, "*Svapnāntika-jñāna*", Dr. Ganganath Jha coins this issue. Dreaming phenomenon has been designated as vague consciousness.

Vaiśeṣika philosophers tried to solve the future aspect in dream to adhere the notion of *adṛṣta*.

Now the question is whether dream cognition is a combination of *savikalpaka* (determinate) and *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate). In Nyāya system, *nirvikalpaka* is "*nisprakārakamjñānaṅ nirvikalpakaṁ*"[132] and *savikalpaka* is "*Saprakārakamjñānaṅ savikalpakaṁ*"[133]. So, *Nisprakāram* is an antecedent and attribute less state. *Savikalpaka* is a state consequent and with attribute. In the state of *nirvikalpaka*, we cannot define the object of cognition but immediate after it, we can determine it by the help of the

[131] *Indian Psychology, Cognition, Vol 1 , p 323*
[132] *Tarkasaṅgraha, p 313*
[133] *Ibid*

attributes in *savikalpaka* state. Therefore, there is a chronology of cognition. In dream also, there is chronology like this otherwise we could not determine the object of cognition.

Nyāya adheres that dreaming phenomenon as an illusory state and memory is the foundation of dream. Now someone can raise a question if dream itself is an illusory state, then why 'dream within dream', 'telepathic dream', 'Unseen object', 'future object' are appearing in dream? Because according to Naiyāyikas, without precognition or memory, it is not possible to determine dreaming object. Then can we neglect this domain of dream due to the lack of *pramānas*? We need to think again.

In *Nyāyamanjari*, Jayanta Bhatta tries to explain knowledge as non-erroneous. He held that "non-erroneous" means the object of cognition is to be justified by true-sense perception. In the case of true perception there is no appearance or any apprehended entity, only real entity would be there. For example, when sunbeam reflects on the sand and as a result, it looks like ocean of waves, this appearance is false because it is directly negated by our sensory perception. In dream, the image is not guided by true sensory perception that is why dreaming phenomenon is false and unreal.

In *Tattvacintāmani*, Gaṅgeśa says, "*Yattubhramaviṣayaviṣayakatavenanabhramatvam Bhramaviṣayāṅāmsiddhyasiddhiparāhatatvātiti*"[134]. (13)

The cognition itself is not false. Rather the imposition is based on false belief and belief and cognition both are not same. Therefore, in the case of dream, dream cognition itself is not false, rather the perspective of the comparison is false because if we say dream itself is a false cognition state, then many possibilities will be overlooked in our cognitive domain.

[134] *The Nyāya theory of Linguistic Performance* , p 225

Therefore, after all these discussions, we can assume that dreaming state is always a necessary state in our cognitive domain whether it is true or false. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeşika, dream is based on representative theory or memory that is why the dreaming object is coming from our memory and it is an unreal state because waking state is the first cognitive state for any explanation. As a result, the new object or first seen object of waking state is always welcome to our cognitive domain as true sensory perception of reality. If in dream one cognizes some object for the first time, then this dreaming object would not been granted the same status as that of the first seen object of perception in the cognitive domain.

Now my concern is that we need to think or redefine this perspective again. I am not opposing the position of Nyāya-Vaiśeşika system. I just would like to mention that these crucial things have been overlooked in their system. Therefore, if we do not redefine this dreaming reality or phenomenon, then maybe it would not be the right explanation for the dream state. I would like to conclude here by stating that dream can be found to be false later, but it is not an illusory state rather it is very crucial and cryptic state of consciousness. Therefore, it is another important state we witness like that of waking state.

Now I would briefly discuss the nature of dream from the perspective of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's kārikā.*

The Perspective of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad on Dream

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is not just a scripture of a religion. It is a philosophy and it helps to get knowledge of realisation (not necessarily religious practices). It helps to understand the natural contemplation on reality. When we focus on the BU, then we have the real understanding regarding self-knowledge. The philosophical crux within BU

explains in authentic logical terms that due to ignorance we get all miseries and forget the real existence of non-dual entity, which is *Brahman*.

Here, I would like to discuss and focus on the philosophical conversation between king Janaka and the great sage Yājňavalkyo about the reality of life[135]. They have discussed different types of notions such as soul, states of life, light and self-realisation. At first Janaka asked, Is soul identical with the body? Yājňavalkyo replied that soul is different from the body. Here it is claimed that dream state is the individual state like waking state. We know that all dreaming stuffs come from the waking state and in waking state all stuffs come from the external world through sense organs. According to BU, now the point is that external sense organs are not mandatory causes of the perception because if external sense organs are the main causes, then we have to accept that dead body also perceives the things because it has sense organs. Actually, it cannot. Something more powerful and the light of all things which is always present in all conscious objects, which is absolutely different from the body is the cause of perception. We know that eye is the source of light, ear is the source of sound, tongue is the source of taste, nose is the source of smell and finally skin is the source of touch. Dead body also has the five organs but does not have the actual pulsation or spirit.

Through this conversation, they pointed out and accepted that we perceive the foreseen stuffs in dream state[136]. When they have started the conversation, then Janaka has accepted the ability of perception through sense organs because all sense organs are related to our body. Later, Janaka realised that body is different from soul, due to ignorance we are considering body as soul. According to this notion, if all external stuffs

[135] *'Janakaṅ ha vaidehaṅ yājňavalkyo jagāmetyasyābhisammandhaḥ'* (4/3/1*), Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Vol* 3, 1009.
[136] *'vandhusangamana-viyogadarśanaṅ deśāntaragamanādi ca'*(4/3/257), *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Śaṅkarbhāṣyam, p 1024.*

are related to body, then all possibility will not be entertained, i.e. if body is the cause of perception, then how do the blind men perceive? Because of his or her memory before blindness, after blindness he or she says, 'I had seen the flower which is of blue colour'. Therefore, body is not the cause of perception. Hence, we can say in both the states the one and only active source is soul because according to the notion of Advaita Vedānta, soul is eternal. Just like the sun. Sun is always present in the solar system but sometimes we can see and sometimes we cannot because of the system. Once, a cloud covers up the sun and during that time, we cannot see the sun but sun is always present. However, we have to understand and realise that soul is always present in ourselves. Simply we cannot recognise the positive entity due to ignorance.

According to BU, all material objects are revealed by conscious being, simultaneously Buddhi(being) is also revealed by conscious being[137]. In addition, all stuffs are governed by buddhi. When we are in the waking state, then all stuffs are governed by buddhi and in the dream state also. So, from the perspective of buddhi's activity both states are same. When we have seen the abnormal activity in the dream state, then those not being related to 'practical life' do not come from the external world through sense organs. The pulsations are same in both the dream and waking states. Again, Yājňavalkyo said that when *puruṣa*[138] (*ātmā*) acquires the body, then he or she carries the negative and positive energy simultaneously. Hence, we would like to conclude that body is present in both the states, feelings are present in both the states but sometimes differences occur due to ignorance. Ignorance is also present in both the states. After that we get all miseries and errant incidents. In this context, some opponents argued that body has different activities in both the states and also are differentiated by first body and 2nd body. Again, Janaka

[137] '*ātmaivāsya jyotirbhavatīti', Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Vol 3, ānandagiritīkā,* p 1024.
[138] '*Hṛdyantaḥsthitoyamātmā sarvāvabhāsakatvena jyotirbhavatiti yojanā| padāntaramādāya vyācaṣte-puruṣa iti' , ibid, Śaṅkarbhāṣyam , p 1081*

asks, "Does circularity of life and death are applicable in the dreaming state?" Yājňavalkyo said to Janaka that yes! applicable. Then Janaka replied that both states have the same status in the light of cognition and recognition. Dream stuffs are not irrelevant because if we say dream stuffs are illusory objects, then we have to say waking stuffs also are illusory objects too, because illusion is also present in waking state but the modes can be different. Therefore, we cannot say that all dreaming stuffs must be illusory objects. Sometimes we cannot say ostensibly 'this is the real entity' and 'this is not' in dreaming state. However, this problem occurs also in waking state. After that, Janaka said "Yājňavalkyo! I will give you thousand cows. Please instruct me further about liberation itself". Yājňavalkya replied that entity or *puruşa* enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state and in the waking state. Both states are same. If we will talk about the detachment, then the intrinsic value system of detachment is applicable in both the states. In this conversation, Yājňavalkyo has given an example that a large fish swims alternately to both banks of a river – the east and the west – so the infinite being moves to both these sates: dreaming and waking.

In this context, the opponent, *Vijňānvādi* Buddhist said that all things are regulated by *vijňāna*[139]. *Vijňāna* is the only cause and effect of creation. Due to the advocacy of *vijnana,* we can recognise the objects in both the states. Buddhists do not accept the permanent soul. They try to give all answers by the advocacy of *vijňāna*, not soul.

After that, Janaka asks Yājňavalkyo if both the states give the same sensation and pulsation, how do we think that in dream state all organs are inactive? Again, Yājňavalkyo replied that all external avenues are closed in dream state. In dream state, it seems like that we are perceiving but actually it is not. Again, Janaka has raised a

[139] *'buddhyavabhāsakaň jyotirātmetyuktaň śrutvā śākyaḥ śankate- nanviti'* (14*), ibid*, 1044.

question, "What is the difference between the waking state and dreaming state?" Then Yājňavalkyo said to him that difference is the following: There is no ability for perceiving in dreaming state because in dream state when we are seeing chariot, then only the notion of chariot is similar like waking chariot and all things are imaginations, because in dream state there is no real road, real warrior and the real battle-ground.

Now, my point is that if only *Brahman* is real then how can we say the waking stuffs are real? Then we have to say both stuffs are not real. We can say it seems like real in both the states.

After that, Yājňavalkyo also mentioned waking state is present life (*ihaloka*) and dream state is after present life (*paraloka*)[140].

Then Yājňavalkyo said that waking state is present life *(ihaloka*) and dreaming state is after life, (*paraloka*) because it is already presupposed that all waking entities are unconditionally real, it can be positive or negative or whatever it is. Whereas it seems that, we are relating all waking entities with our life and we cannot relate dreaming entities with 'real' entity. Now the question is why do we presuppose? If we say that the criterion is important for making a judgement, then we have to say a criterion is also important in dreaming state because judgement is also there. Criterion is necessary for countering the infinite regress. Infinite regress is a fallacy. When a segregate entity is present then for accepting this entity raise a question which is why do we accept this? The answer to this question is this entity comes from another entity and if we accept the process then we never find a route. So, it is an endless process. For accepting an entity or anything, we have to consider the criterion. Hence, this endless process is infinite regress, which is a fallacy.

[140] '*tasya vā etasya puruṣasya dve…paralokasthānaṅ ca'(4/3/260), Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Vol 3,* p 1073.

Now, Yājňavalkyo has proposed a new notion which is that body is present in both states. It (body) is compared with a 'Swan', here 'swan' denotes a *puruṣa*. After that, I would like to focus on the statement of Yājňavalkyo to Janaka which is when *jīva* cannot fulfil his or her wishes in waking state, then that person presents herself as a dreamer in dreaming state for wish fulfilment. He or she also inculcates herself by different modes. According to Advaita Vedānta, we can also say that *antaḥkaranavṛtti* is also present in both the states. Now the question is what is *antaḥkaranavṛtti*? The answer is that *antahkarana* is the effect (*parināma*) of ignorance and it is of four kinds (*mind, buddhi, citta and ahaṁkāra*). *Antaḥkarana* is *taijasa* (fiery) object. When we are seeing the object (*ghata*) on that time *antaḥkarana* comes out from the eyes and go to the object. Then *antaḥkarana* acquires the object (*ghata*) and after that *antaḥkaran's* shape becomes the object's shape and *vṛtti* is the destructive entity which destructs the ignorance for a small time period. Hence, we recognise that 'this is *ghata*'. Here, perceiver is *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya*. Object (*ghata*) is *ghatāvacchinna caitanya* and in between process (perceiver and object) is *antaḥkaranavṛttyāvacchinna caitanya* which is testimony (*pramāṅa*) of cognition of object (*ghata*). These terminologies are the Advaitin's terms. Already I have mentioned that soul is eternal, light of all entities and pure conscious being.

There is one conversation regarding sin and virtue and a question is raised like where is hell and heaven? If someone does any bad *karma*, then he is going to hell. It is true. But, is this notion applicable in dream state too? because in dream someone can perceive the object and the dreamer can feel that he is doing *karma*.

Yāgjñavalkyo replied to Janaka that sin and virtue are not applicable for dream state, because there is no physical activity. Even dreamer cannot be considered as '*saṅga*'

(seeker of sex). In dream, all people are '*asaṅga'*, it means there is no real sex in dream and *ātmā* is asaṅga[141].

Śaṅkara says in his *bhāṣya*[142], *ātmā* is free from all desires (*asaṅga*). *Asaṅga* is applicable in three stages (waking, dream and deep sleep) because *ātmā* is not guided by any '*vuddhānta'*. *Vuddh*i is *upādhi* (external cause).

Śaṅkara interprets that according to '*dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva*[143]*' śruti*, *ātmā* is not the cause of anything. Due to *buddhi* (*upādhi*), it seems like *ātmā* has *kartṛtva* but *kartṛtva* is attached with the body. So, in dream *karmafala* (effect of karma) cannot be applicable because of the absence of activity (there is no *bhoga*).

If someone is associated with any unethical or ethical karma, then the doer will be benefited or punished in waking state only. It won't be carried forward in dream state. That is why ethical judgements will not be applicable in dream state and deep sleep too.

Now I would mention the three types of body; gross, causal and subtle body. In dream and waking states, three kinds of body are present but in deep sleep, only subtle body is there. Śaṅkara mentions in his commentary[144] that *linga śarīra* (subtle body) is consisted by seventeen components (five *prāna*, five sensory organs, five *karmendriya*, mind and *vuddhi*) which is similar like the hundred break particles of the hair. In dream, *antaḥkaranavṛtt*i is there because of *dhrama* and *adhrama* of the desires. As a result, image is created by *vṛtti*.

[141] *"tasmādasaṅga evāyaṅ puruṣaḥ; yadi svapne saṅgavān syāt kāmī, tatastatsaṅgajairdoṣairvuddhāntāyay pratyāgto lipyata', ibid , p 1105.*
[142] *sa vai eṣa etasmin vuddhānte…', ibid,* p 1107.
[143] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Vol 3, p 1107.*
[144] "*nāḍīṣu vālāgrasahasrabhedaparimāṅāsu śuklādirsapurnasu sakal dehavyāpinīṣu saptadaśakan lingaṅ vartate", ibid, p 1118.*

We have to remember that ignorance is not the nature of *ātmā* because after realisation of the *ātmā* ignorance will be gone. If ignorance is the nature of *ātmā*, then it will be similar like heat of the fire but *ātmā's* nature is not like that. Heat and fire both are consisted by the concomitance relation but ignorance is the *āguntuka dharama (auxiliary dharma*) of *ātmā*, not the nature of *ātmā*. Hence, ignorance is always delimited by the true nature of *ātmā*. Due to ignorance, we do suffer in both the dream and waking states.

Here, Yājňavalkyo told Janaka that dream is the way of wish fulfilment of *jīva*. After that, he said to Janaka that self-manifested *jīva* acquires various types of appearance such as she stays with her boyfriend, she is laughing, she is getting afraid because of tiger etc. According to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, everybody sees various things in dreaming state but nobody realises the nature of object. Now, the question is that if I cannot recognise the nature of object, then how could we say that 'this is *ghata* or *pata* etc.' This utterance implies that we can recognise the object. Then, Yājňavalkyo said that according to physician's opinion when someone enters in the dreaming state, then her body has left all external organs. At that time body wants to fulfil her wishes. That is why all stuffs are related to one's own wish fulfilment process. The physician said that if somebody violently or suddenly call the dreamer in the dreaming state, then there may be mental or physical difficulties. Here, I would like to say that in waking state, we fulfil our wishes and those wishes are like dreaming wishes and there are also significant or insignificant stuffs like waking state. Hence, all incidents are happening for wish fulfilment. In the dream world, we are attaining higher and lower states revealing innumerable forms. She seems to be enjoying herself, roaming various place. During that time, they destroy their inhibitions spontaneously. It follows that she is the soul and soul has no barriers. Yājňavalkyo said that soul is the light of all phenomenal beam. So, we try to realise the spirit. In waking state, we are seeing, roaming, feeling etc. and due to consciousness, we

get all things. Pure consciousness is soul. We get the same cognition in dream state means consciousness is there also. Then, Yājňavalkyo tries to say that according to *Śruti*, our misfortune is that we cannot realise the spirit but the spirit is within us and due to the absence of knowledge (pure being) we suffer miseries. When someone is in dreaming state, then one should not call him suddenly, because body's all external avenues are closed and only consciousness is present. That is why we cannot differentiate randomly between both states. If we suddenly or loudly call the dreamer, then she feels internally awkward to accept the present time for a fraction of a second. Therefore, it is not desirable to wake her up suddenly. But the question is how is it possible? The answer is that I already mentioned that in dreaming state all external avenues are closed and those organs are not functional in dreaming state. Then due to the internal function of the body, our body cannot quickly grasp the external sense order after the sudden wake up call. Therefore, if I will call loudly or suddenly, then physical body suffers major problem like blindness and dumbness.

Now we have to accept that consciousness is present in both the states. We cannot say that dreaming state is segregated but if we would say it, then we have to say that soul is also segregated. Dreaming entity and waking entity are same like we are seeing the elephant and in dreaming state also we are seeing the same thing but waking elephant and dreaming elephant are different because of spatio-temporal relation. But how do we feel the same cognition? In the dreaming state, consciousness (soul) is strongly present. Yājňavalkyo has already mentioned the terms "present life *(ihaloka*)" and "after life (*paraloka*)". Hence, he concludes that soul is roaming in both lives (present and after present) but different from both states and due to ignorance, we recognise present and after life by the presence of external organs. Now, Janaka said to Yājňavalkyo that he has realised the original spirit of life, which is soul or pure consciousness, which also is

present in both states. Then happily, Janaka has given innumerable gold coins to Yājňavalkyo as a reward. Now Janaka wants to know about inhibitions of reality and why do we suffer miseries repeatedly? Janaka proposed himself as a learner and call him as 'Oh lord '. Therefore, by the illustration of dream, it has been proved that there is the self-luminous *Ātman*. Now the point is that if we accept that there is no nature in dreaming state, then we have to accept the same issue also occurs in waking state because sometimes we cannot cognise the nature of object, the assumption is that she does good or evil work in waking state and the same incident also happens in dreaming state but the result is same. But now the statement is that self is untouched by the results of good or evil in dreaming state. If he actually does something in dreaming state, he would be bounded himself by it and the process will continue still he would wake up. According to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* actually this incident does not happen in dreaming state. Here, I already discussed the good or evil notion in the perspective of dream but my question is: is soul free in dreaming state? because Yājňavalkyo mentioned that in dreaming state he or she would not be bounded by it due to absence of activity. So, why are we feeling or suffering or getting a turmoil situation in dreaming state? As a result, we are saying "I am sad", "I am happy" etc. If soul is free in dreaming state, we will feel always happy in this state. But it is not happening. If we say that she is only appearing herself as a doer, then I would like to say that if there is no activity, then why we are suffering sorrow in dreaming state? Here the question is what is activity? The answer is that according to Yājňavalkyo, the activity is the process between body and organs. Then he said to Janaka that in dreaming state soul is only present as conscious being and soul is untouched. That is why we cannot impose the attribute on soul because attribute comes from activity.

Here, I raise a question as to if soul is untouched in the dreaming state, then how do we suffer the problem like waking state here also? If I would say it appears in dreaming state, we also ask how do we say? because appearance and reality are different. Hence, activity is there also. Then Yājňavalkyo told Janaka that soul is infinite being, eternal and untouched. After that, Janaka is pleased and given him thousand cows as reward.

The perspective of Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's kārikā regarding Dream

Upaniṣad itself is the way of salvation. *Upaniṣad* is not only the scripture but it also negates the notion of duality. It leads the human thinking process from the objective orientation to the subjective. All phenomenal objects are appearing as real, but actually these are not. The whole process is depending on our perception or how do we perceive the object. After that we are saying that this is 'A' object and this 'B' object. The human self contains the clue of nature because all energy from the soul is the source of all activities. The quantity of energy is fixed. 'It' only transmitted here and there. The universe is reflected in the soul. Hence according to this issue, if we know the soul, then simultaneously we can know the universe. In some way, *Upaniṣads* provide the inner path and help one to look inward from the outward because the search is for the ultimate truth. Truth is within us. The only truth is self-realisation and all the rest of the notions are temporarily true.

Upaniṣad is the spiritual text and also the way to happiness where there are no barriers and no miseries. If we look inward towards the identity, we will be free from all miseries. Now someone may raise a question why should it be important to read the *Upaniṣad*? The answer is that we want to be free from all pains and want to attain the happiness. We are suffering lots of pain in our daily life due to ignorance. In this

phenomenal world, the concept of 'mine' is the effect of ignorance. Ignorance is not present outside it is present within us.

In Upaniṣad, there is no contradiction. It has logical explanations and has a value system. In mundane world, value systems are imposed entities. We are only nurturing here and there, and relatively judge the situation. That is why one state of mind is morally good with respect to A situation. Again, the same state of mind can be morally bad regarding the B situation. Hence, the notions of good and bad are depending upon the situations. However, the notion of truth or the reality is beyond all phenomenal systems. The only truth is *Brahman*. It is not changeable. If we will focus on internal source of reality, which is always present in ourselves comes from the pure consciousness. The *Upaniṣad* itself tells us about the *Brahma-vidyā* for attainment of Reality. The *Upaniṣad* draws a clear demarcation between lower and higher cognition. Lower cognition is used to deal with dos and don'ts from the perspective of *Vedas*. Now the question is why cognition is taken to be of two types, if there is only one supreme Reality? In order to answer this question, I would like to say that due to veil of ignorance, knowledge is appeared to be divided.

So, what is ignorance? Ignorance happens due to *adhyāsa* or super-imposition. Next question is what is *adhyāsa*? *Adhyāsa* is always false that which is not real but appears as real. It always represents the nature of other object. After that imposition, it seems a true entity. As a result, we say that 'it is mine'. We consider all physical stuffs of the world as real due to the *adhyāsa*. That's why we suffer.

Now, I would like to state that higher cognition is the realisation of highest goal. *Upaniṣads* focus on the highest cognition. We know that total 112 *Upaniṣads* are there. Here, I would like to focus on the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*. *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* is listed as

number 6 among the *Upaniṣads*. This *Upaniṣad* is the part of *Atharva Veda* and this is the shortest among all *Upaniṣads*. It is consisting of twelve verses. It discusses the state of consciousness, *Aum* and the nature of *ātmā*. Here first of all the meaning of 'Aum' is discussed then the states of consciousness. According to the historical background, the time of *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* is before 5th century.

Now I would like to introduce as an interpreter of *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad,* Gauḍapāda. He is the teacher of Govindapāda and Govindapāda is the teacher of Śaṅkara. The interpretation of *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* is also named as *Gaudapādakārikā*. The *kārikā* states that there is nothing, only self is present because the self is only real. Otherwise, all phenomenal stuffs are temporarily real in respect to mundane world. In *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad,* we have discovered a very self-contained structure. It is logical and argumentative. It does not accept the duality because the notion of duality happens due to ignorance. According to Gauḍapāda, Buddhism also represents the notion of non-duality. But the question is what is this notion of duality in Buddhism? In order to answer this question, it is stated how the notion of duality arises due to the concept of *pratityasamutpāda*. If we are concentrating on the concept of *pratityasamutpāda,* then we understand that all miseries are happening due to causal relation. *Pratityasamutpāda* is a causal relation. We are bound by this relation. So, we are suffering. Buddhism tries to solve this problem by the notion of non-duality. Here, this non-dual concept is similar with Gauḍapāda's non-dual concept. But this debate is an ongoing one.

This *Upaniṣad* is fourfold. It states that *Brahman* is *ātmā*, so, *ātmā* is also fourfold[145] (*catuspāt)*. It has four quarters as *viśva, Taijasa, Prājña* and *Cathurtha*. While the first three represented the world as gross, subtle and casual conditions, the last one not only

[145] "*sarvaṁ hyetad brahmāyamātmā brahma so'yamātmā catuṣpāt*" (2) , *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, p 8.*

exceeds the world but exists as the supreme source of the world. Specially, this *Upaniṣad* presents itself as a symbol of reality or the way of ultimate truth. Every *Upaniṣad* has one or more stories in the perspective of their development but here, this *Upaniṣad* deals with symbol. For example, when someone worships a stone as God then the stone itself is not the God, but it is a symbol of God and just like that *aum* is the symbol of *Brahman*. At first, this Upaniṣad deals with the notion of *aum*. '*Aum*' word itself is inclusive. When someone pronounces '*Aum*' then for the pronunciation, all the points in our mouth are touched. When phenomenal world is negated by pure knowledge, there only '*Aum*' is present. When someone belongs to waking state then he is *Virāt* that is the sum total of all physical bodies[146]. This is represented by 'A', the first letter of *Aum*. Next, someone belongs to the dreaming state is *Hiranyagarbha*, that is 'U' *of Aum*. After that he is in the deep sleep state, in this state *Brahman* is associated with the *Māyā*. This state is 'M' of *Aum*[147]. Here, self is connected with *Isv̄ara*. All things are controlled by ignorance. If someone would go beyond the three states, then he is identical with or realises the pure consciousness which is *turīya* state and the state is absolutely non-dual state and there is only boundless happiness.

Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad has four sections which are '*Āgama-prakaraṇa'*, '*Vaitathya-prakaraṇa'*, '*Advaita-prakaraṇa'*, and '*Alātsv̄ānti-prakaraṇa'*. Now, I am concentrating on the '*Vaitathya-prakaraṇa'* regarding the real notion of dream.

My research question here is "Can we actually differentiate between waking state and dreaming state?" *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* has discussed different states of life. Now if we are talking about the waking state then all waking stuffs are real and it is already presupposed. On the other hand, all dreaming stuffs are unreal and fallible. But

[146] *Ibid, p 10.*
[147] " *Yatra supto na kaṅcana kāmaṁ kāmayate…..suṣuptam*" (4), ibid, p 18.

Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad pointed out that this view is not correct because if we say dreaming state is unreal then we have to posit waking state also as unreal because the only real being is Brahman. When we are belonging to dreaming state or waking state, the object of knowledge seems true because if it is not true at least for the time being, then we cannot identify or recognise the object, but we can recognize. Simultaneously, we have to consider that both states give the same feeling because in effect of actions in both the states, we are saying that 'we are happy', 'we are crying', 'we are loving each other', 'I have touched your hand' etc. If dreaming stuffs are unreal, then why do we get the same cognition of these as the waking ones? How do we have the same feeling? What is reality? If we say that the waking state is only real, then the question is why are dreaming components important in waking state? If we say dreaming state is only illusion, then we have to accept waking state also as illusion. Therefore, according to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* the main issue is the relevance of dreaming state from the perspective of reality which is also relevant for my research issue.

Here, I would like to discuss the '*Vaitathyaprakaraṇa*'. The word '*vaitathya'* means unreal. '*Tathya*' means real. The first verse of '*Vaitathyaprakaraṇa'* proclaims that wise person says that dream stuffs are unreal and false because suppose when someone sees the train on the track, then actualy it does not present inside the dreaming state[148]. When we are seeing that stuff in waking state, then this is present outside. But, how is it possible? We can say that this is train and right now I am in the train. From the perspective of awareness, both states have the same status. Something is not regarded as real because it is present in this universe but sometimes, we cannot refer 'this' or 'that' but the object exists. It is logically possible because logically one state is not denying

[148] "*Vaitathyaṁ sarvabhāvānaṁ svapna āhurmanīṣinaḥ*
Antaḥsthānāttu bhāvānāṁ saṁvṛtatvena hetunā." (1), Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, p 116.

other - (P. –P). Hence, both states have the same status. That is why we cannot say that only dreaming stuffs are unreal. According to this verse in dreaming state, this train is not physiccaly present in front of ourselves. But my point is that in the waking state also sometimes we cannot identify the object. It does not matter where the object is present, inside or outside, the most important thing is the knowledge of the object. We have the knowledge that is why we are saying 'this is train' or 'train is running on the track'. When we are seeing mountain, pot, train etc. in dreaming state, then, we do not ask whether these objects are real or not? The random answer to this question is 'NO'. We cannot observe dream's place in waking state. For example, someone thinks that in dream state he stays in Bānāras and visits some places. But after waking up he is present in his previous place. How is it possible? Or what is the actual place? In waking state, he stays at Dumdum. Therefore, the question is that Dumdum or Bānārasa which one is the actual place? According to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, the knowledge of Bānārasa is real but existentially unreal and the knowledge of Dumdum is existentially real because after waking up we are saying that we stay in Dumdum. In dreaming state, knowledge acquisition process is different from that of the waking state.

According to Advaita Vedānta, the reality is *nitya* (eternal). *Nitya* is applicable to that which exists in all time which is *Brahman.* From the perspective of *Brahman*, both states, dreaming and waking present distorted reality. But it is not possible that dreamer goes to dreaming place and leaves his body. After that, he came and again acquires his body. It is not real because of physical distance. If we say that, someone is present in Banaras in dreaming state, then how is it possible to come from Banaras by the short time? As after waking up he is on his bed. The main issue is the distance between Banaras and Dumdum. When someone meets friends in dreaming state, then after waking up where are they? Hence, reality is not in the dream state.

All dreaming stuffs are false because it has no real positions in space and time. When we are seeing or cognising something in dreaming state, then it is not present within our body. For example, when someone dreams that he is riding in a chariot. The scripture and the wise man do not consider the real existence of chariot because these are not present in waking state. However, Gauḍapāda says that this argument is depending on the nature of the waking state, which is existentially real by assumption. Now the question is why do we compare between two states? According to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad,* both states are not same but similar. Therefore, now my question is if we already know about the distinction, then why are we depending on dreaming images for getting the whole perspective of waking problems? Actually, the main issue is that dreaming state is not clearly distinct from waking state. Both are interlinked. One is external and other one is internal. Besides, any kind of comparison would be happening on their same base. Here, I would like to focus on the reality. The only reality is *Brahman* or pure consciousness. From this perspective, the self is always luminous and real in both states.

Now I would like to focus on the 'inside and outside'[149] notions and 'subject and object relationship'. According to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad,* when someone sees something in the waking state, then an object is outside. Besides, when someone sees something in the dreaming state then an object is inside. Thus, both objects are same. If we consider the inside object as unreal or false, then we have to acknowledge outside object also as false or unreal because whether someone is experiencing something in waking or dreaming state, the experience itself is intrinsically false because of ignorance. All circumstances are there due to the subject-object relationship. When we are seeing the *ghata* (pot), the seer is subject and the *ghata* is an object. The knowledge is only possible when seer

[149] "*Svapnavṛttāvapi …vaitathyametayoḥ*"(9)
and *" Jāgradavṛttāvapi…vaitathyametayoḥ*" (10), *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda Kārika, p 101-102.*

connects himself with the object by sense organs. If it is not happening, the knowledge is not possible. Knowledge is a kind of process. In phenomenal world, there is no permanent knowledge or cognition. All is temporarily real. In addition, we think that all cognitions are permanent due to ignorance, and this notion is the main cause of all miseries. The subject-object dichotomy cannot happen without the presence of knower. On the other hand, if an object is vague and irregular then seer does not recognize the object. So, how the knowledge of an object is possible? The subject-object relationship is important and inter-dependent. According to Gauḍapāda, this subject-object relationship is connected to the notion of *pratityasamutpāda* (cause and effect relationship)[150]. When we are cognizing something, then we notice some characteristics of an object. We see only the appearing portion. After that, we say this is 'A' object. But we cannot get all the features of the object at a time. We can do some generalization and claim that this is 'A' object. Now the object is present but sometimes our perception deceives us, then how do we recognize the object in waking state? Hence, we have to say that the main issue is perception and it deceives us because this is not real. It is a quasi-perception (illusion). Actual perception is not changeable but an illusion is always changeable and deceives us. Hence, we have to admit that if we say that the object of dream is illusory, simultaneously we have to accept the object of waking state also as an illusory, because real thing is always true in all stages. The process involved in the subject and object relationship is present in both the states. If the process is different, then we get different knowledge for the same object. Actually, it does not happen. All incidents are happening due to illusion of duality, which is present in both the states. Illusion has no beginning. It looks like real but actually is not. Therefore, all phenomenal experiences are illusion. Someone sees some object in the dreaming state and after waking up, he understands that

[150] *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, translated by Swami Lokeswarānanda, p 93.*

the object is false. However, the question is when he is in dreaming state, then if someone asks him, 'are you in dreaming state?', 'Do you think that whatever you see in the dreaming state, are unreal?' In dreaming state, he says 'NO' because at that time of dream, all entities seem real to him. Here, we are seeing the nature of an object and that is why are saying 'this is A' but the main problem is the acceptance of the fact because in waking state someone can see the fact with various witnesses but during dream only dreamer is the witness. Nobody can see except the dreamer. Hence, it would be better to say that both states have different dimensions but from the standpoint of pure being, both the states are same. If A is real, then 'A' must be real in all the cases. We cannot say right now this is unreal but in future, it will be real.

Now, the next issue is a utility. For example[151], someone is hungry in waking state, he takes some food and he will satisfy himself. On the other hand, someone is hungry in dreaming state, then he takes some food and also will satisfy himself. Now the main point is that for the same individual, he had a big meal in his dinner and after that, he has taken a nap. During the nap in dreaming state, he is again hungry then he eats something. Now the question is for this individual, why does he hungry again? Is the hunger different in both the states? According to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, 'dreaming hunger' is illusion and 'waking hunger' is real because it has utility. Gauḍapāda did not accept this view. He says that both are temporary and both have beginning and end. Now, my point is if dreaming hunger is illusion, then how are we satisfied by taking food in dreaming state like waking state? Is this satisfaction false? According to my understanding, both feelings are real in their respective states because of our feeling and satisfaction. Maybe, that hunger indicates different thing (camouflage), it does not indicate the literal sense. Here, opponent may raise a question: can we feel hungry within a short time after taking

[151] '*Saprayojanatā…smṛitaḥ"* (7), *Gauḍapāda Kārikā, translated by Swami Chinmayānanda, p 127.*

a big meal? However, it can be logically possible. May be in the later time, we are taking small quantities of food.

Now we are going to discuss about an issue which is abnormal or special activity. In dreaming state, we see that we have four arms and we stay in heaven etc. Here, the question is how do we explain this kind of phenomena? According to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, this is the nature of all dreams. All impossible things can be happening in dream and happen without effort. Next, I would like to discuss the issue of 'four arms' and 'heaven'. These notions are happening due to imagination and imagination is present in waking state also. In waking state, we also think that right now we are in Taj Mahal or in Himalaya but it is an imagination. If we say dreaming state is false, then we have to consider that waking state equally as false.

In dreaming state, all incidents are happening due to mind's creation. That is why they are all false. According to '*Vaitathyaprakaraṇa*', it is asked without mind can ever there be any kind of creation?[152] The answer is 'no'. Hence, we cannot say that or impose that all abnormal incidents or fictitious incidents are happening only in dreaming states due to mind because these stuffs can also be present in waking states. Gauḍapāda says that whether someone sees things externally or internally, objectively or subjectively, both categories of experiences are unreal. If the dream is unreal then all things are unreal because this dichotomy is also present in waking states. This is also a very important one. Here, Gauḍapāda logically claims[153] that if someone imagines he is going to Banaras then the question remains as to is this real? The answer is 'No'. It is just a passing thought. But when he is talking with his friends then is this real? Answer is also 'No'. But it has external experience. According to Gauḍapāda, both experiences have

[152] *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad,* translated by Swami Lokeswarananda, p 101.
[153] *Ibid, p 102.*

beginning and end. Therefore, dream is not only an illusion. Imagination is different from illusion. All incidents are happening by the projection of mind whether these are in dreaming or in waking states. Hence, by imagination, mind creates the facts which we have seen or cognized.

Now, I am concerning about reality and also explain the philosophical standpoint regarding this notion. Someone may raise a question 'what is Reality?' If we understand this notion from the perspective of Indian philosophical systems (mainly Advaita Vedanta), then we can make distinction between dreaming state and waking state in the phenomenal world.

The 'Philosophy' itself proclaims the journey of wisdom where we can find our route and ourselves. Philosophy does not mean that it always posits the rational insight but implies a more profound sense of the intuition of truth. The rational insight may not be developed if philosophy neglects the deeper characteristics of the soul, then many possibilities will be omitted. This problem occurs due to ignorance. Due to ignorance, we are choosing the wrong way. That is why we cannot recognize the right way and simultaneously due to all negative vibes (ignorance) we are suffering lots of problems in our everyday life.

Now, we know that matters of fact occur. We have to accept that something really happens in both the states. Again, the question - why are we considering the fact as reality? Because the main criterion is to determine the truth and false. We cannot ignore the situation because due to actions, we get results as good or bad. Sometimes, we identify wrong objects (imposed). Therefore, we can say objects are appearing. Now we can include that appearance as the part of our understanding. Experience cannot give us the knowledge of metaphysical entities and in empirical world, the existence of object is

pseudo-existence. Identity is the law of ultimate being and contrariety is the law of appearance. Reality and appearance appear as fundamentally the same but they are really different. The result is that reality does not defeat us but appearance does. Appearance seems like real but actually it is not because it is always changeable.

Now, if we go through the notion of reality on dreaming and waking states, then we would have found the same effect from both states. When we are talking beyond both the states, then we always realize the permanency, eternity and happiness. Both states have the appearance. We cannot say waking state is real and dreaming state is unreal.

Rather I would like to say both states appear as real because the process of knowledge is same in both the states. Hence, appearance is the part of reality but reality is not appearance. When there is no ignorance, then there is no appearance. According to Advaita Vedānta, reality is *Brahman* and *Brahman* is only true.

So, now I am discussing about the reality from the perspective of *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*[154]. The Self is luminous but due to the ignorance, it appears like bound. By the power of ignorance, body represents himself as a doer and receiver. Gauḍapāda introduced the notion of imagination in kārikā. He has mentioned that the whole world is *Brahman's* imagination. The *Self* is always luminous and effulgent. He reveals himself as this universe. The Self is always eternal and is the perceiver. But the question is how? When he plays a role as the cause of creation, then he is the material cause. The creator and the cause of creation are the same.

[154] "*Prāṇadibhirananantaiśca…svayam", Gauḍapāda Kārikā*, p 114.

According to Advaita Vedānta, the *Brahman* perceives all diversities[155]. Due to ignorance, we are claiming that we are the causes of all things. These same feelings are applicable for both the waking and the dreaming state.

Here, I would like to add the different notions of creation discussed by Swami Akhandānanda Saraswati[156]. We are always claiming all waking stuffs as unconditionally real and dreaming stuff appears as real but not real. He tries to establish in our conceptual domain that *Brahman* creates all things such as river, mountain, human being etc. Here actually we do not have any contribution. We are just manifesting ourselves in the unconventional system, because all positive energy is within us. Rather, we do contribute in dreaming state. In this state, we have created all this by our imagination. Gauḍapāda says that if we say dreaming stuffs are imaginary, and then we have to accept that waking stuffs are also imaginary[157] because reality is one, it has no diversity or distortion. It is the source of all energies and cause of happiness. Main issue is that some things are perceived by external organs and some are only through mind. But both are the parts of *Brahman*. Some are internal and some are external. According to *Upaniṣad,* when we see the iceberg in sea, then we see the upper portion of ice but lower portion is inside the water. We are seeing only the manifested portion. Here the main thing is that the object is one, but due to ignorance, we do not see the whole of it. All diversity, variations are happening due to ignorance. Wise person is not doing this. They realize the real notion. He understands that due to mind it happens.

We are talking about the concept of inside and outside of the mind. Inside the mind, objects exit because we think that objects exit. Outside the mind objects exist because we

[155] '*Na nirodha…paramārthatā' (32), Gauḍapāda kārikā,* p 127.
[156] *Māṇḍukyakārikā, Vaitathyaprakaraṇa*, p 189.
[157] '*avyaktā eva yeontastu …viśeṣatvindriyāntare'* (14), *Gauḍapāda kārikā,* p 109.

are conscious about them[158]. However, these two categories are simultaneously false. So, why are we claiming this? The real notion does not change and does not represent the diversity. Here, mind creates the diversity in both the states.

We are assuming that dreaming stuffs are happening due to imagination. That is why these are changeable and false. Gauḍapāda does not accept this view only for dreaming state because this imagination is also applicable in waking state. According to Gauḍapāda, all waking stuffs are also changeable because these are conditional. This dependent origination can never be real.

Hence, both states are momentary and depend on imagination because mind is always active. Mind creates all things. The main difference is that someone is experiencing something through the external organs in waking state and someone is experiencing something only through the mind in dreaming state. In the waking state, mind is dependently active and in dreaming state, mind is independently active because in dreaming state all external avenues are closed. Gauḍapāda says that all these experiences, external and internal, are imagination and false. The doer is the main cause of imagination in both the states that is why he feels happy or unhappy. Internal and external objects are same. Differences are depending on the acquisition of object. But doer is one in both states. In 17th verse[159], Gauḍapāda pointed out why snake-rope illusion is happening? He replies that due to the absence of light, we are seeing snake but this is actually rope. Simultaneously in both the states, dreaming and waking, due to darkness of ignorance we cannot realize our own self that is why we are imposing bodily happiness or pain on our eternal self. Self is eternal and luminous.

[158] *ibid.*
[159] *'anischita…vikalpitah', Gauḍapāda Kārikā, p 112.*

Actually, illusion[160] is one kind of imposition. We find that this is snake but appearing snake is for super-imposition. Appearing snake goes when light appears. By following this fact, the scripture says that we are the cosmic Self. Hence, we are always free. Now, someone may raise a question what is illusion? If the self is one, then why are we many? In order to answer this question, it is said that illusory objects are always false. It appears as real but actually is not. Due to the circumstance, we are overlapping the characters on objects. That is why illusion is happening. Simultaneously, it seems that self is many because of the notion of super-imposition. Super-imposition leads to identify the wrong objects and impose the different nature to objects. Here, *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*[161] mentioned the role of magician as an example. Magician creates the situation and consciously impose different characters on different objects. But when we are seeing the magic, then we fall in a vague situation that is why we cannot ostensibly identify 'this is an A object' and 'this is B object'. This same fact is happening in dreaming state. Therefore, self is always active and vivid.

Different philosophical schools claimed different theories of creation in their own way of understanding. The core of the notion is consciousness is there. Without consciousness nothing would happen and self is consciousness. For example, Sāṁkhya School accepts that the three *gunas* are in the body. *Lokāyātikas* claim that body is constituted by five elements (earth, water, fire, air and space). Unconsciously these elements are conjoined to each other for making a body etc. Hence, we would like to say that if consciousness is there, then we have to accept that consciousness is also present in dreaming reality. According to this, dreaming reality is 'differently' real, maybe dreaming form is not

[160] *'jīvakalpanānimittaṁ', Ānandagiritīkā,* p 81.
[161] '*…Māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayāyaṁ mohitaḥ svayam' (19), Gauḍapāda kārikā*, p 115

similar with the waking reality. That is why objects are present in both states but the way of visibility is different.

Now Gauḍapāda concerns about different notions of self[162]. It states those are worshipping (*Prānavida*) *Hiranyagarbha* as self. For them *Hiranyagarbha* is the ultimate. Those are worshipping *Īswara* as a creator. They are accepting the *viśva, taijasa* and *prājñā* as *padas*, they believe that padas are real. *Viśva* represents the waking state, *taijasa* represents the dreaming state and *prājñā* represents the *suṣupti* state. Now this *Upaniṣad* tries to say that reality presents in all the three states. After that, those who are believing that matter is reality, for them reality is only three worlds (*bhuh, bhuvaḥ* and *svaḥ)*[163].

The notion of identity depends on the notion of the highest values, which we get from the study of *Veda*. According to this understanding, the Sāṁkhya thinkers believe that the Self is *puruṣa* in their terminology. Some schools think that self is luminous like atom and Lokāyatas proclaim that the body is ultimate and the body is self. Beyond body there is nothing. They are radically materialist. Besides these some schools may claim that the structure (*ākāra*) is the ultimate reality. Now the crucial question is what is supreme? Is supreme subjective or objective? In '*Vaitathyaprakaraṇa*', some thinkers believe that time is supreme. Time is measure of all things. They claim time is reality. Again, some promulgater says the mind is the self and the highest intellect. That is why everything is our mind[164]. We are just manifestations. Next in '*Vaitathyaprakaraṇa'*, after discussing mind the next verse concerns about the theory of Sāṁkhya's creation[165]. According to them, the phenomenal world has twenty-five constituents and it is real. The

[162] *Ibid, p 116.*
[163] *ibid, p 117.*
[164] *ibid, p 120.*
[165] *'prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ' , Ānandagiritīkā, p 86.*

Pātanjali School also proclaims the number of constituents as twenty-six and according to other, thirty-one. *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* states some people are too concerned with pleasing others. Now I would like to focus on the variation of thought.

During 5th century, people were too concerned with pleasing others like now and the notion of reality is depending on different discourses such as numbers, mind, time etc. There are many dogmas. Now if we impose this thought on our society, then we find different kinds of variations. Now, the question is if truth is one, why dogmas are many? The answer is appearance. Appearance is always occurring due to imposition. If we go through the mythological theory of creation, sustenance and destruction, then we see all are real in their own ways. Thus, this real is appearing as a real. Reality is one and because of super-imposition, it seems like many. Reality is one but manifestations are different. That is why we see many variations. Now the question is how can we get free from this illusion? In order to answer this question, we can say that sometimes-competent judges solve the problem. Here, competent judge means who knows the scriptures or *Upaniṣads*. When veil of ignorance is hiding the truth, then competent judge helps us to get rid of from all barriers.

The Self is the main ground of all systems because the knowledge of self is the ultimate knowledge. Besides, the Self is the ground of all illusion. Ignorant people always think that *prāna* and self are different. Both are segregated in dreaming and waking states. It seems different due to modes of presentation. Here, covers are different but content is the same. In both states, if we take the rope-snake example, then we get the same illusion. All things are happening by people's imagination. However, a wise man does not fall in that kind of illusion because he knows phenomenal world is actually nothing. He knows all diversities are on the surface but inner part represents the unity. That is why we make

distinction between waking state and dreaming state. When people know the reality, he realizes that there is no doubt.

According to *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, suppose someone sees something in dreaming state, then he does not discriminate between dream and waking because for his understanding it seems real such as *gandharvanagaram,* a castle in the sky. Here, I want to focus on the notion of *grandharvanagaram* because this kind of perception is happening due to imagination. In waking state, we also see the same thing by imagination. When we perceive the thing then we cannot create any difference between the two. A wise man can make the difference and can understand that the reality is the rope and snake is like a world which is false. People can distinguish which one is real and which one is not real because the only real and true being is Self. The rest of these are false. Hence both worlds appear like real but actually are not.

Self is eternal, luminous. When people say that they are seeking liberation, they are bounded by obstacles. Actually, embodied self has desires and wishes and wants to get liberation and wants to be free from all bondages. According to Gauḍapāda, there is no death, no birth and no bondage of self. We are always free but we do not realize the real fact. We think that we are bound by something. People think that they are helpless and dependent. They do not identify the identity with self and Brahman. Ignorant people think that self is like any other object in the world. They do not make any difference between the world and Self. That is why both are same. According to this notion, people think that world is also real like Self. Now the question is why do we say that the world is not real? The answer is, world is always changing and it is diverse in its character, so there is no question about non-duality because diversity is the main opposition of non-duality. Non-duality is the Self.

This world has different names and forms. Names and forms make the diversity in both worlds. The diversity is the main cause of suffering. Due to diversity, it seems that all appearing entities are real. That is why unconsciously people want duality and duality is always a potential cause for suffering. Here, someone may raise a question who can realize the philosophy and feel the identity? A sage who must have controlled his emotional faculty and who achieves his own true self can understand the identity. Those persons are free from all passions such as anger, hatred, fear etc. and have studied the scriptures. They know that phenomenal world is empty and they belong to the world of ecstasy[166].

Now the question is if someone reads the scripture then will he become competent? In order to answer this question, we say that the most important thing is realization. If people realize the knowledge, then they become sages and achieve the ultimate reality. However, all these depend on exercise and meditation. People have to realize the non-duality notion. It is very difficult. But if someone exercises the way, then he understands the identity. Scriptures only help to get the way but realization is only depending on sages, depending his way of understanding. After that, the sage never is trying to please anyone and not bowing down to anyone and not entertain himself to please someone. He stays like normal and at that time external or internal factors do not effect him. He renounces the world. He lives a life of total renunciation and he represents himself always happy. He is independent and expects nothing from anybody. Here, someone can raise a question, what is the Self? Bounded people (*baddhajiva*) always think that the Self always protects the body and also think Self and body as same. Actually, world and human body both are illusory because both deceive us and distort the real fact. Both also have the diversity because these are temporary. Dreaming world and waking world both

[166] "*vītarāga…prapañcopaśamo'dvayaḥ (35), Gauḍapāda kārikā, p 131.*

are changeable and simultaneously both are false. Both states have the same phenomenal reality, existential value and epistemic value.

Therefore, according to Advaita Vedanta, when a sage realizes the identity, then he feels the transcendental happiness. There is no pain, no boundary and no discrimination etc. There is only truth or reality, which is beyond all phenomenal reality (dreaming and waking reality).

Thus, the crux of *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* and Gauḍapāda's *kārikā* is though there is a fundamental difference between phenomenal states and ultimate state of *jīva*, yet there is no fundamental difference between a waking state and a dream state, which belong to the phenomenal state. Thus, from the standpoint of ultimate reality, which only is *Brahman*, all other experiential states of an experiencing subject or *jīva* are illusory in nature. So, in this sense both waking and dream states are results of illusion and not ultimate real.

Dreaming and Waking states

Now I would like to focus on the notions of dreaming and waking states. Dream is both a metaphysical and an epistemological phenomenon in philosophy. Simultaneously it is an important postulate in psychology and neuroscience also. The most and crucial fundamental issue is about the status of dream in our cognitive domain. Why are dreaming phenomena being interesting for philosophers? From the ancient time to modern time, there are so many philosophers and Indian schools who are concentrating on this issue from the perspective of metaphysical value or cognitive values. Some philosophers and schools directly have opposed the status of dreaming phenomena and some are not. Now, the main issue is whether dreaming phenomenon exists. Here the philosophical concern is where exist and how? This is the main fundamental question.

Here at first, I would like to discuss the standpoint of neuroscience. In neuroscience, dreaming phenomenon is consisted by three elements: periodic, unrelated visual impact, emotional episodes and the cognitive tools. These three elements posit two kinds of visual imagery in dreams, one vivid, detailed, colourful and large. On the other hand, the other one is less vivid, less detailed, less colourful, smaller and vague[167]. Sometimes our mind creates various images with the help of external stimulus. However, this prediction is very much subjective because of individual differences and as a result, image varies on the fact. How many images are depending it depends on individual's wish which is conventional or unconventional too. In neuroscience, the dreaming phenomenon is linear, basically psychological differences between dreaming and waking, and REM and non-REM sleep. The most meaningful suggestion is the synthetisation between visual bursts and emotional episodes through cognition because cognition synthesis is the place of 'meaning' of dream. Neuroscientist Hobson and McCarley[168] suggested physiological basis of a dream is a periodic triggering mechanism in the pontine brainstem. Now I would discuss three elements in dream.

a) In this state, there occur various periodic visual hallucination and it is a bout of REM sleep. It is called visual bursts. For example, someone is seeing in dream that he is talking with someone or someone is standing beside him. Maybe he is knowable or unknowable person. This images begins with periodic pontine triggering and ends in the forebrain. This is actually passive motion for dreamer. Here most important issue is that all time visual hallucination is not constrained in dream. But what we will see in dream it is not knowable. We are only able to see the mind's projection hitherto. We cannot create the dreaming images. So the

[167] '*What is a Dream?', Behaviour Research and Therapy journal, Vol 25, Issue 1, p 1.*
[168] *Activation-Synthesis Model, 'The brain as a dream state generator: An activation-synthesis hypothesis of the dream process', American Journal of Psychiatry 134, p 1335-1348.*

content of visual hallucination is constrained, but not only within dream rather it depends also external factors.

b) Emotion is an important issue in dreaming. The characters of emotional episodes probably distinct from visual episodes. But they are not completely distinct. They are interdependent. The visual and emotional episodes have humoral underpinning and humoral time courses. They are relatively more enduring states. Emotional state is called 'limbic baths'. Limbic in an area of the brain that controls of our emotional life during the waking and dreaming phase. This element is the part of our experience of dream. According to neuroscience report, our dreaming experiences are highly changed emotionally. REM state is also an emotional episode.

c) This integration is the extract form of visual episodes and emotional episodes like flesh on the skeleton. The dreamer passively realises that a sequence of related or unrelated visual hallucination is embedded by emotional stuffs. For example, when someone whispers to him then the listener listens only some portion of what the other man is saying. He (the listener) can usually understand the other man's emotional state and after that, he tries to reply to him. There is some response which is happening between the listener and the other man. When someone whispers then he attempts actively to synthesize the hearing statements with the emotional state. After that he tries to fill in the blanks and creates a coherent message.

There are two basic exceptions in dream. First, the whispered material is always auditory, not visual. Secondly, the whisper message is transmitted in waking state but in dream there is not. Generally, dreamer cannot assimilate the whole story rather

something is imaginary and something is the fact. After wake up the person draws the whole picture in a one frame. Here, he mostly remembering some little bit portions of dream but rest of all thing he forgets. There is specific reason that why the person cannot have remembered the whole thing hitherto. It is cryptic also. Perhaps he has the previous visual episode in memory. The cognitive synthesis is performed largely in a visual modality and influenced by the content of sensory episodes. In neuroscience, dream theories has two varieties, a)'improvisationist' theory and b) 'movie' theory. Improvisationist theory of dream, this theory is formulated by Hobson and McCarley[169] (1977). They are stating that "there is internally generated sensory information from the pontine brainstem which periodically rises up into the forebrain where it is integrated with higher perceptual, conceptual and emotional information." B) 'movie' theory, where the dreamer first composes a story by his imagination like a movie before a passive viewer. The famous improvisationist theorists are Hobson and McCarley(1977), Crick and Mitchison(1983), Foulkes(1982), Sigmund Freud(1901), C G Jung (1916) and Allen Rechtschaffen(1978). Here I would like to introduce their notions on dream as improvisationist theorist.

Sigmund Freud (1901) – he claims that dream is the production of unconscious and unapproachable wish. This is not only depending on visual images rather dream is a symbolize latent content.

C G Jung (1916) – he asserts that dream expresses an objective reality that is a correlated form of cognitive and emotional episodes of daily life. The dream expresses images rather thoughts and these images have very strongly internal logic. At this state dreamer is always passive recipient.

[169] *Ibid.*

Hobson and McCarley (1977) – Dreaming is a psychological version where the theory is connected with the existence of visual and vivid material and the other is vague material.

Allen Rechtschaffen (1978) – For him, dream is a chronology of hallucinatory images. Due to this, the process of waking life is an opposite. He also says dream has some vivid and vague portion, which can be simultaneously wanted or unwanted.

Foulkes (1982) – His way of understanding is completely different from others. He proclaims that a dream begins with a proposition. Cognitive schemata, syntax and words are directly connected with the proposition. Image comes always at the end. Images are coherent with the propositions. After that, images come through visually and which is surprising.

Crick and Mitchison (1983) – They introduces the improvisationist theory differently. They proposed that dreaming is negation of unwanted stuffs.

Dream is an internal and extraordinary form of declarative memory and there is no watertight definition of dreaming. Rather, it is considered as the subjective experience of a complex hallucinatory period during sleep.

There are two hypothesises regarding dream,

1) The encoding of dream contents during sleep with the episodic memories of awake brain.
2) Recalling a dream after awakening from non-rapid eye movement (NREM) and rapid eye movement (REM). Both are associated with different oscillations.

There are no substantial differences in the sleep architecture of the subjects grouped as a function of sleep stage at awakening (REM/stage1) and dream recall. REM stage is the physiological concomitant of the subjective experience of dreaming.

It is posited that dreaming and REM are incompletely correlated till now.

Dream, hallucinations, delusion, disorientation, accentuated affect and amnesia are all attributed to the arrest of brain stem aminergic modulation of brain stem. Dreams are operated by brain stem and passively generated by forebrain. Forebrain is the passive participant in the REM state.

Now I would like to discuss the dreaming phenomenon from the perspectives of both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta to identify the crucial differences in their treatments of the phenomenon.

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, dreaming reality is considered as an illusion (unreal). Dreamt objects are depending on memory. Therefore, whatever we are seeing during dream are unreal or false. As this philosophical system adheres one type of reality that is why dream state is always being recognised as false. Later, I will show the reason behind this postulation.

The great Advaitin, Śaṁkarācārya interprets the dreaming phenomena in his bhāṣya. In the second section, the first verse is "*Sandhe sṛṣtirāha hi*"[170](3/2/1).

In *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, Yājñavalka and Janaka's conversation on dream is very relevant. There is an intervention stage between waking and deep sleep state which is dream. For a person, he has two spaces according to his desires that are *Eholoka (present*

[170] *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, p 588

world) and *Paroloka (future world)*[171]. But apart from it the intervening stage is the very crucial stage for everyone. When the person is in the intervening stage then he is able to see the life of *paroloka.* When the dreamer is seeing the chariot, the road and animals in the dreaming stage then there is no existential value because all are merely nescience (*māya*). But the objection is about the status of dreaming stage because all are seeming real as waking state or it is illusory.

In *Bhāṣya*, Śaṁkara adheres that the junction of the two stages ("*sandhe sṛṣtirāha hi*") is real and that creation is also occurred in this intervening stage which is also real. But the objects of the creation are not real rather they appear as real entities.

The third verse, *"Māyāmatraṁ tu kātsanyanibhivyaktasyarupatvāt"*[172]*(3/2/3*). Here, Śaṁkara says that the intervening stage is mere nescience (*māyā*) because there is no complete manifestation. Now the question is what is complete manifestation? Complete manifestation is always possessed with the notion of time, space and circumstances because these are subtle. In dreaming stage, the scenario has been changed due to the lack of specific space, time and circumstances. The notion of causality is not adequate in dreaming state. With the limitation of body, the waking structure of chariot and dreaming structure of chariot both are different because of the absence of manifestation.

Now the question is about cognition. The cognition of chariot in waking and the cognition of chariot in dreaming are different because according to Adviata Vedānta, dreaming cognition is not appropriate (*ayathārtha*) and waking cognition is apposite (*yathārtha*).

[171] *'svajāgarite iholok-parolokaviti' (4/3), Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad, Vol 3, p 1073.*
[172] *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, p 590

Now someone can say that a dreamer dreams outside the body because in Upaniṣad, there is an example "the radiant infinite being who is immortal and moves alone preserves the unclean nest (of a body) with the help of the vital force and roams out of the body. Himself immortal, he goes wherever he likes"[173] (Br. 4/3/12).

Vedāntin did not accept this argument. They told it is impossible that the dreamer is seeing something outside the body and after visiting the place he came back to the body and appear as a waking man. Vedāntin claims that in *Bṛhadāranyaka*, "Then having laid down in the country of the Kurus and fallen asleep, I went in dream to the country of the *Pāñcālas,* and woke up there"". It means the waking body is in the Kurus and the dreaming body is in the *Pāñcālas*. It is logically impossible according to them because it does not correspond each other. That is why Upaniṣad claims that dream occurs within the body. In dreaming state, the main thing is that there is no specific beginning and end. When a dreamer is seeing a chariot, then it seems like a real chariot. However, in dreaming state there is no root cause rather in waking state there is a root cause where the chariot comes from. Hence, in dreaming, the chariot does not have existential value. Not only Chariot, the road and the driver both are unreal. So, whatever is seen in a dream all are happening due to nescience.

The fourth verse is" *Sucakśca hi śruterācakṣate ca tadvidaḥ"*[174] (3/2/4). This verse adheres that dream is not itself unreal because dream itself is an indication of future and that indication must be consisted with the notion of good and evil. For example, when someone sees a woman in dreaming state, then it indicates the richness of the perceiver. On the other hand, when someone sees a black man with black teeth, it indicates the less life. So, something are auspicious and something are bad omens like seeing mounting on elephant is auspicious and seeing mounting on ass is bad omen. They think the

[173] *The Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, Vol 2, p 448-449.
[174] *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, p 592.

auspicious dreams come due to the mantras and the bad omens come due to bad karma. Thus, it is really questionable because why people are seeing the elephant mounting or ass mounting? There is no specific reason and during the ancient time when people are not familiar with elephant or ass, then was there any good or evil omens? So, all indications are depending on our day-to-day life. By the association of thought, we are imposing that seeing elephant is good omen and ass is not. Most important issue is elephant or ass are not itself good or evil, rather they are the animals like others. People are imposing their thoughts on elephant and ass as good and evil according to their need.

According to Śaṁkara, in waking stage the soul is revealing itself totally, we know that in waking state there is sunlight, the external organs and the objects are present but this is not enough to express the whole nature of soul. But "*tatra yadi rathādisristivacanaṅ śrutyā nīyeta, tadā swaṅjyotistaṅ na nirnītaṅ syāt*." It means when dreamer is seeing a chariot as waking state, it does not mean that that dreaming chariot is supported by *Śruti* and that chariot does not reveal itself totally like waking state. According to this bhāṣya, *Śrut*i does not want to entertain any unreal entity like dreaming entity. In *Katha Upaniṣad*, "*kāmaṅ kāmaṅ puruṣaḥ nirmimāṅaḥ*" (2/2/8). Therefore, it is determined that the status of reality of dream is not entertained by Śruti.

Bṛhadāranyak Upaniṣad shows that "Himself puts the body aside and himself creates (a dream body in its place), revealing his own lustre by his own light - and he dreams"[175](4/3/9). Someone can say that who is the creator of dream? If God is the creator, then dream is also true because the light, space, time and mind (*ākāṣādi*) all is created by God. So, all these have the same status. Thus, Vedāntin says that dreaming state does not have the phenomenal tranquillity and reality. The dreaming *phenomena* cannot be real in phenomenal and transcendental level because dreaming stuff is negated

[175] *The Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, Vol 2, p 426

by waking stuff and the *ākāṣādi* is negated in *mahāpralaya* if someone says that *ākāṣādi* is also real. According to Śaṁkara, the only reality in *Brahman*.

"*Parābhidhyānattu tirohitaṁ tato hasya vandhaviparjayau*"[176](3/2/5), means the God creates the universe as real form with some *saṅkalpa*. In this way the jīva creates the dreaming state as his own *saṅkalpa*. *Jīva* is the part of God like the spark is the part of fire. Someone can ask that spark and the fire both can take place in the same location because spark and the fire both have the same power and same route. In this manner, the *jīva* and the God both can take place in the same location and both have the same power of knowledge and truth. Vedāntin replies that it is true that both are related to each other but the domain of God is greater than soul and soul is conjugated with attributes but God is not like a soul. There is no freedom and bondage concept in God but for soul, it is needed because due to ignorance, soul is covered by material stuff. After that, people suffer misery. That is why freedom is needed for people. Therefore, due to *avidyā*, dream occurs and it seems like real but when it will be negated, then there is no dreaming reality or the notion of real. The only reality is *Brahman*.

"*Dehayogadwa sohapi"*[177]*(*3/2/6) says due to the connection between body and object, the jīva's *īswarbhāva* is covered. It happens due to *avidyā.* Due to the association of body, the knowledge of divinity is covered. This association takes place with body, senses, mind, intelligence, perception of objects. For example, when fire is covered by ashes, then we are not able to see the fire because of our perspective. At that time, we believe that there is no fire, only ash is present. Similarly, due to the association of body we believe that there is difference between body and soul. The knowledge of divinity is covered by the wrong conception. In bhāṣya, ""*ataśca na sānkalipkī jīvasya svapne rathādisṛṣtiḥ ghatate*" (13), means in waking state, there is a connection between object

[176] *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, p 594
[177] *Ibid, p 595.*

and the sun beam that is why there is no need to prove who is the creator because the object cannot reveal itself without sun beam. But in dreaming state, without sun beam and the connection between object and external organs, object reveals itself. Hence, this revealation is not proper. The only real is *Brahman* which is always revealed. Someone can ask why the knowledge of divinity is needed for *jīva*? The knowledge of divinity is needed for *jīva*, because of their freedom. By the association of body, we cannot think that body and soul are different. That is why, in dream, the creation of chariot occurs and we think that it is real. We do not believe that dream creation is an act of will. "Others, however, say that the dream state of a man is nothing but the waking state" (Br. 4/3/14) describes the dreaming reality is not similar to waking reality because dreaming reality is created by self-will but waking reality is not. The *ghatajñāna* occurs in material body (*sthula śarīr*a) and *svapnajñāna* occurs in subtle body (*sukhsmahśarīr*). Hence, the dream always appears as real but not real like waking state. The dreaming notion always occurs but not happened like waking state. If it is really happened like waking state, then the dreamer would not feel after dream that the chariot will be false ("*yadi ca sānkalipikī svapne rathādisṛṣtiḥ syāt, naiva aniṣtaṅ kaścit svapnaṅ paśyet*" 14). Rather when the dreamer is seeing a chariot, it means he wants or he desires to see. So, the dream is a product of ignorance.

Dharmarājādharindra discussed in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the definition (*lakhṣna*) of dream. The definition, *"Indriyājanya-viṣaya-gocarāparokhsāntaḥkaraṅ-vṛttavyasthā svapnāvasthā*"[178], means when external organs do not occur then the subject-object (*viṣaya-viṣayaka*) relationship happens due to desire, then the stage of specific direct *vṛtti* is called *svapnāvastha*. In waking state, when the external organs are present, then there is also *vṛtti* which depends on external organs that is indirect (*parokṣa)*. But in

[178] *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p 308

dreaming state, external organs do not function. Due to desire the *vṛtti* is created by *avidyā*, then dream occurs. In the waking state, *antaḥkaranvṛttavasthā* is present, but in dreaming state, due to the absence of external organs, *antaḥkaranvṛttāvasthā* (*pranāma)* is not present, only *avidyāvṛtti* is present. Here '*antaḥkaranavṛttavasthā*' means the *antaḥkaraṅa* is objectified by desires. So that objectified form is called *avidyāvṛtti*. In this definition, there is no *ativyāpti* fallacy, because the definition claims that when dream occurs then all external avenues are closed. In illusion, the cognition always occurs as "'*idam''(indriyajanya*) because there is also desire and external organs but in dreaming state, the status of cognition is '*indriyājnya*', not as *indriyajanya*. Thus, according to the above view, the statement is: dream is not an illusion. Dream is different from illusion.

Vidyāranyamuṅi defines the nature of dream in *Pancadaśī*. He discusses this notion in *Yogānandaprakaraṅa*. There are two versus in *Yogānandaprakaraṅa* on dreaming phenomenon. He asserts *"'"itthaṅ jāgarane tattvāvido brahmasukhaṅ sadā / bhāti tadvāsanājanye svapne tadbhāste tathā*"[179](132), means *pandita* also realises the *brahmasukhānubhava* in dream state because due to his desire that *sukhānubhava* appears like waking *brahmasukhānubhava*. Here, they did not negate the dreaming realisation of *brahmasukhānubhava*.

"*avidyāvāsanāpyastītyatastadvāsanotthite / svapne mūrkhavadevaiṣa sukhaṅ duḥkhṅ ca vīkhsate"[180](134*) means *svapna* always occurs due to *avidyāvṛtti*, not only *ānandavāsanā*. That is why *pandita* also feels *sukha* and *duḥkhaḥ* in dreaming state like a lay man.

[179] *Paṅcadaśī*, p 466
[180] *Ibid*

In *Nyāyakośa*, *svapna* is "*pradeśviśeṣavasthitamanaḥsaṁyogaḥ*". Dream occurs in *medhyānārḍ*. It means dreaming object occurs through representation with the help of mind.

The dreaming discussion has been started with the question "why the opposite things are coming in dream?"

"*deśakālasvabhāvānyathātvenetyarthaḥ | kālānyathātvasyodaharanam- mṛto jīvatīti | deśānyathātvasya – deśāntarastthita iheti | svabhāvānyathātvasya – anyo nāndha iti* "|[181]

In dream, there is no cognition of space and time that is why someone can see a dead person, but in waking, he is alive. In dream, the cognition occurs as appeared cognition, not real cognition that is why dreaming cognition is opposite of waking cognition. Bhāsarvajña considers dream as a *Viparya* (illusion)[182].

According to *Vivekacuḍāmaṅi*[183], in dream, *jīva* reveals himself through waking desires and the *sākṣī* of the subtle body is guided by *upādhi*. As a result, the dreaming images are different from waking images. Therefore, *antaḥkaraṅa* is present in both dream and waking states.

Svapna (Dream) = '*svap* (to sleep) + *na'*. Therefore, *Svapna* is something, which occurs during sleep**.** In English, the word 'Dream' derives – {'Droom' (Dutch) – 'Traum' (German) – 'Dream' (Joy in Old English)}. Therefore, Dream means 'series of images, events and feelings that happen in your mind while you are sleep'[184].

[181] *Nyāyabhuṣanaṁ, p 32*
[182] '*mithyāhadhyavasāyo viparyaḥ', Nyāyasara, Nyāyabhūṣaṅa*, p 28
[183] "*Svapno bhavatyasya…vasanadibhi*"[183] (98)
[184] *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, p 465.

Rāmanuja posits dreaming phenomenon as a valid cognition. *Adṛṣta* creates the dreaming images[185]. In my thesis, *'dream*' and '*svapna*' both words have been used synonymously.

Dream is not only illusion or hallucination

Dream is an internal phenomenon. In this world, every person is familiar with this term 'dream' and it is experienced. Waking and dreaming phenomena both are situated in two dimensions. One is real and the other one is seeming as unreal. Waking and dreaming phenomena both are relatively important factors in our cognitive domain. Both have epistemic and metaphysical values. But both dimensions are different from the perspectives of space and time. Dream occurs when all external organs are inactive. It means when all external organs are not connected with the external world, then dream occurs. Then mind creates the images with the help of memory. There are two kinds of memory, a) declarative memory (when a person is consciously aware of his stored information in mind) and b) non-declarative memory[186] (when a person is not aware of his stored information and that stuffs are not easily described by the person). But dream is not controlled by the dreamer's choice. Dreamer does not able to know what he will see in the dream. The things come as a form of imagination and dream creates the picture like waking state. It is not fixed what is the root cause of dream. We cannot control our three things, a) breathing, b) memory and c) dreaming. Here, I am not concerning about lucid dream because of lab-experiment. Some philosophers and some Indian philosophical schools have accepted that dream comes through our incomplete desires. We have a wish to fulfil that is why mind creates the whole expected pictures. In Indian philosophy, some schools (*Nyāya*) have accepted that dream does not have existential value (unreal), it is a projection of mind which is unreal and some school advocates

[185] *Bhāratīya Darśana kośa (Vedānta), Vol 3, part 2, p 300*
[186] *Neuroscience*, p 733.

dream also as real like waking state and sometimes we cannot differentiate between waking and dreaming objects. Both states have same intensity. In neuroscience, they talk about specific brain structure in dreaming phenomena. It is a cryptic and debatable issue whether both waking and dream states have same intensity but one is real other is unreal. If real means within the fixed binary of space and time, then dreaming phenomena also have a structure, that is why we can say the place and time of dream. But sometimes dream posits some unnatural entities. It shows different and vague pictures, which are completely different from this phenomenal world. Dreaming images show the objects in a different way. The pictures in dream have also different meanings. These are not meaningless. Mind portraits the image in a different manner in dream. The same thing also happens in waking state also. Hence, dream is totally uncontrolled biological phenomenon.

On the other hand, illusion or hallucination is also a different projection of mind. In illusion, mind is depending on external organs and mind is highly stimulated by them. Illusion is a complex psychosis where two objects are needed. One imposes on another. The objects can be both internal or one external and one internal. But two factors are needed. By imagination or memory, we are imposing something on the different object but due to imposition, we do not determine the real one, rather we realise the imposed one. After that, we determine an 'A' object but actually it is 'B' object. Due to some similarities between 'A' and 'B' objects, mind creates the picture and imposes one on the other. Here, the first step is memory and second step is 'perception'.

In Indian philosophy, we would say *'idam rajatam'* instead of nacre. Here, '*idam*' is an outcome of perception and '*rajatam*' is cognised through memory. Perception arises when the external organs and the objects are actually connected to each other.

Hallucination is not controlled perception. It means mind independently creates the whole image independent of the presence of object. In this case, mind does not want any help from other sensory organs. It is a single psychosis. There is no need of the present of two objects. It comes alone. For example, I am writing this paper and simultaneously I am thinking someone reads this paper also but actually here I am alone. In illusion, memory is playing a fundamental role but in hallucination, memory is important but not fundamental.

In both dream and waking states, illusion and hallucination occur in our daily life. But dream is not an illusion or hallucination because dream is a biological psychic phenomena like waking state. Imagination, memory both are present in both the states. May be the way of presentation is different. In illusion, two objects are needed but in dreaming, there is no such need. In dream, the object can occur as one, two, three and many. There is no strict quantity or quality like waking state. In dreaming, there is also space and time because when we are dreaming, at that time we also know the place and time, but may be these do not match with that of the waking space and time. There are so many examples about dreaming reality in several scriptures and it is true. Our mind and body work simultaneously that is why we know the nature of object and the characters. We do not identify a man instead of cow. So, we are aware of the the nature of objects. In dream, mind is dependent on various objects (both internal and external) but not like hallucination because it is single psychosis. It is not controlled perception. But in dream, we can control the perception that is why we can see several things like waking state. We are denying the whole structure of dreaming because we are comparing it with the waking reality but dreaming phenomena have also some kinds of reality. When we are in the dreaming state, we are saying ‘I am seeing’ not ‘dreaming’. In this connection we can talk about the premonition state. It means when the dreamer sees the things which

will be happened in the future and after that it happens. This state is called premonition state. Here I do not want to focus on this state because still this state is scientifically unproved.

In *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*[187], the definition of dream claims that the external organs are present in illusion (*indriyajanya*) but in dreaming state, all external avenues are closed (*indriyājanya*). So, this is a strong difference between dream and illusion. Therefore, dream is not an illusion.

Cognitive neurologist Anil Seth[188] introduces that our perception can also be hallucination. We can generate the sensory stuffs through mind. When it is compatible with our logical structure, then it will be valid but apart from that it is invalid. This is a binary evaluation. We are bounded by this binary system (valid and invalid). He claims hallucination is also controlled perception. For example, someone is seating on the chair and he is keeping his hand on the table. There is a small fake rubber hand between two hands and there is a small guard between rubber hand and the real one hand. Now someone simultaneously strokes on both hands (fake and real) with the paintbrush. After few minutes when mind is habituated with this habit then suddenly someone stabs on the rubber hand with the knife. As a result, the person removes his hand. So, here perception is controlled in hallucination. This kind of scenario can be present in dreaming state also. Therefore, dreaming phenomenon is not only illusory or hallucinatory. We are always hallucinating as the perception. After that state we are saying that this is real. So, reality does not have a fixed notion. It varies with different conceptual frameworks. That is why one object is real from a certain perspective.

[187] *indriyājanya-viṣaya-gocarāparokṣāntaḥkaraṅa-vṛttyavasthā svapnāvasthā,* p 308
[188] *youtube.com/watch?v=rcrlv-ztRWE*

Dream is not only an intrinsic function of REM sleep. Rather through it we can get many solutions as clues to waking problems. We can interpret that waking world is for external issues and dreaming world is for internal issues. Sometimes images can be different (camouflage or bizarre) during dream. That does not mean that these (objects) are illusory or unreal, may be that 'different' can lead us to get a new way of life. It depends on our interpretations.

Therefore, I would not say dreaming state is illusory or false rather I would add it is a 'differently real' state. Illusion or hallucination can occur during dream just like waking state, but 'dream is not only illusory or hallucinatory state'.

Dreaming State: A real One

Since long time Indian philosophical systems adhere the dreaming state as conscious state but it is not real like waking state because of the absence of specific space and time structure. In Indian philosophy mainly realist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not accept dream as real state. They advocate memory as the fundamental source of dreaming state and in dream only mind takes place. All external organs are closed to connect external world. They claim that dreaming images are coming due to memory or reproduction method. Dream itself is a combination and re-combination form of memory. Without memory dream is not possible.

But my question is can we break the binary of 'waking-dreaming' like 'white-black' or 'day-night' etc?

According to my understanding, we have to exceed this binary and re-look on dreaming theory. It does not mean that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is wrong and the upcoming new theory will be right. Rather I would say that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system discussed dreaming theory according to their methodology.

Here, I would like to develop this notion of dream with the help of the realist (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: they believe only one type of reality) and idealist (Advaita Vedānta: they believe three grades of reality) views.

Simultaneously, dreaming theory has also been judged as illusory or hallucinatory. However, dreaming phenomenon itself is not an illusory or hallucinatory state rather illusion or hallucination can occur in dream like waking state.

Schopenhauer says "The hypothesis of dream in order to account for the apparent reality of dream-illusion. These internal sensations may be transformed by the 'intuitive function' of the brain into quasi-realities, just as well as the subjective sensation of light, sound etc. which arise in the organs of sense in the absence of external stimuli"[189].

Now I would discuss the Advaita Vedanta's view regarding dreaming reality as real phenomenon.

In Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad[190], there is a conversation between Yājñavalka and Janaka, where they started their discussion with the nature of self. Janaka has raised a question, "What is the difference between waking state and dreaming state?" Then Yājñavalka replied the difference. There is no real function in dreaming state like waking reality because in dream state when we are seeing the chariot, then the notion of chariot is coherent and all things are imaginations, because in dream state there is no real road, real warrior and real battle ground.

Here, the main issue is about the cognition because the cognition of chariot is true otherwise in dream the nature of chariot will be unknown but actually in dream, we are

[189] *Versuch uber das Geistersehen: Werke , Vol 5,* p 244.
[190] '*asaṅgo hayat puruṣaḥ', (4/3/267), Vol 3,* p 1105.

identifying the object. So, the issue of unreality is about the location, not about the cognition.

Therefore, if we deny the cognition of chariot in dream, then in waking alos the cognition of chariot is deniable, because from the perspective of transcendental reality *Brahman* is only real. From the perspective of phenomenal level both dream and waking states have the same status.

In *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad,* I would like to discuss about *Vaitathyaprakaraṇa*. The first verse of *Vaitathyaprakaraṇa* is that every wise man knows dream objects as illusory, because of nescience. However, in waking state, the cognition is also guided by nescience. Now the basic question is what is the basic difference between dreaming and waking states? Advaita can reply with the help of '*arthakriyākārittva'*. It means 'activity'. In dream, there is no activity like if someone is saying in dream that he is in Kashi and after waking he is in Kolkata, then waking reality would be right and dreaming reality would be wrong because of the absence of activity in the dream state.

But from the perspective of transcendental reality, *Brahman* is only real and ultimate reality. Advaita system advocates three stages of reality. Each state is negated by the higher state and ultimately transcendental remains. Dreaming object's status exists in *prātibhāsika* level like nacre-silver illusion. When someone realises the ultimate reality then dream and waking both have the same status.

Therefore, from the perspective of transcendental reality, Dream is real like waking state.

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CHAPTER 4

DREAM: A MODE OF IMAGINATION

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Dream: A Mode of Imagination

Introduction

After the discussion of the classical view on dream, here I would like to focus on the nature of imagination and is dream a full of imaginary states or not? Then, I would elaborate the mind-body relation during waking and dreaming states.

The main reason of introducing this chapter is to show whether dream is imaginary state or not. If it is imaginary, then can we consider this state as unreal? Alternatively, is waking state completely beyond imagination?

Apart from these notions, in this chapter, I would like to concentrate on the mind-body relation because this binary relation is the most basic component to understand any epistemological disposition. That is why I introduce this section from the perspectives of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

Since long, the most familiar claim is that dream is an imaginary state. In this section I will be discussing can we say imaginary means always false or unreal? Or, without imagination can we explain any creation in this universe? In this chapter, I am trying to figure out whether dream is only imaginary state or something beyond.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist schools adhere dream as unreal state because after the cessation of all external organs mind creates this imaginary state with the respect to our desire. Due to the lack of spacio- temporal relationship, dreaming data are unreal or non-existent.

On the other hand, Advaita advocate *Brahman* as only real. Apart from *Brahman* all is unreal. So, dream and waking both have the same status from the perspective transcendental reality. The colossal scholar Gauḍapāda says that this phenomenal world is full of imagination, it happened by ignorance, including dream also. *Brahman* is only true because *Brahman* is permanent.

The main intention of this chapter is to state that the dreaming nature is not only imaginary state or illusory state.

This notion of imagination will be understood completely, when we will understand the mind-body relationship in both dream and waking states. When someone is saying 'I am happy' in dream and when someone is saying 'I am happy' in waking, both are true and at the same time both are interrelated. I will be focusing these issues in this chapter.

Nature of Imagination: Classical Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Neuroscience

Imagination is an incubation period between cognition and creative speculation. It is a gateway of every creation. Without the notion of imagination, this world is incomplete and we cannot survive without it. It is a fundamental need for every understanding. If we want to exceed this phenomenal level, then without imagination thinking itself is not possible. We can say imagination is an arrangement for creation. People can stroll for long and long time in their imagination. Imagination has no limitation rather it can be context based. Thus, people can invent or discover something but without imagination, it is not possible. Behind postulation, imagination is always present.

In Sanskrit '*Kalpanā' comes from 'Kalpanam* + *nā'* means 'fixing', 'Settlement', 'arranging', 'performing' and 'doing' etc. '*Kalpanā*' means "presumptive knowledge"[191].

In English, the word 'Imagination' comes from-

Latin	*Latin*	*Latin*
old French imago	imaginary	imagination- **imagination**

B K Motilal says, 'In ordinary Sanskrit, '*Kalpanā*' or '*vikalpa*' means imagination. It is a curious coincidence that just as an English word 'imagination' (or its German equivalent) has been used in the writings of two such outstanding western philosophers Hume and Kant in a philosophically technical sense different for its ordinary meaning, the Sanskrit term '*vikalpa*' or '*kalpanā*' had a comparable fate in the hands of a galaxy of Indian philosophers over the ages"[192].

By imagination, we can relate each and everything. For example, dreaming objects are based on imagination but if we focus very carefully, then we can realise that for dreaming, imagination can be an option for picturise but it is not the only reason. We can start our imagination in dream at first and then in waking state we can say that 'I saw this image in dream' and it is applicable in waking state too, vice-versa. Now I would concentrate on our conventional languages when we are saying "I am dreaming". Is it pragmatically a correct statement? The answer is 'NO' because first of all it is an assertive sentence and in present continuous tense. So, in dream we are not saying "I am dreaming" rather saying "I am seeing". Hence, the word 'dreaming' designates the state of cognition which is determined in waking state after that cognition. As it is an inconsistent statement to state that I am dead in my waking state just like that it is also

[191] *A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy*, p -157.
[192] *Perception, p 312.*

inconsistent to state during dream that I am dreaming. If the statements are taken to be true, then what is the status of the speaker?

If we accept that dream itself is an unreal state and illusory state in derogatory sense, then we cannot say that dream is based on imagination because imagination is not bound by only illusory statements. So, imagination is beyond actual experience of something.

Imagination can occur in both dream and waking states. In Indian philosophy, the concept of imagination or *vikalpa* has been discussed very profoundly. Now, I would focus on the notion of imagination from the perspective of Nyāya. Realist Naiyāyikas adheres *Kalpanā* (imagination) as *vikalpa*. They discuss this issue with the conversation with Dharmakirti, Diṅnāga and Kumārīla but here I would focus mainly on Buddhist's perspective with Nyaya's reactions.

B k Motilal says in his book *Perception* "The Sanskrit philosophy of perception is made with the help of this word '*vikapla*' and '*nir-vikalpa*' *pratyakṣa*,: 'Perception without imagination' and *sva-vikalpapratyakṣa*: "Perception with imagination". (These two terns have been variously translated in modern writings on Indian philosophy. But, I believe a literal translation could be less misleading. For the sake of perspicuity in English, however we may use 'conception-free' and 'conception-loaded' perception[193]".

Here, I would like to focus on B K Motilal's understanding of imagination. Naiyāyika uses '*vikalpa*'(imagination) for the sake of determining cognition like 'conception-free' and 'conception-loaded' perception. The notion of imagination occurs in the epistemological domain. In Nyāya, the sense data come from external world through external organs. The *vikapla* takes place due to these sense data. *Vikalpa* posits truth-value to phenomenal reality. Buddhist adheres *vikalpa* as 'given' sense data.

[193] *Ibid.* p 313.

Now I would like to mention an example of Dharmakirti[194] regarding this issue which is addressed by B K Motilal, "Two persons see at different places patches of bright glittering lustre and, taking them to be gems, run to get them, but one discovers the hidden lamp while the other gets gem. This success or failure in the activity that follows would determine which concept-application is approximately knowledge and which is not"[195].

But, Navya Nyāya does not believe on any direct perception because it is imperfect and intangible. Dharmakirti thinks that every perception (seeing) is countered by flaws because it is based on imagination and imagination is not flawless, error is there. Diňnāga's definition of veridical perception is free from imagination. Verbal explanation of veridical perception is not possible because it is bounded by error.

In *Nyāyabindu,* imagination or *Kalpanā* primarily means "arrangement" (*Yojanā*) and "*Vikalpa*". The perception is "*Sāksāt-Kāra-Vyāpāra-Vikalpenānugamyate".*

The perception should be free from *vikalpa*. Now I would like to concentrate on the notion of *apoha,* which is related, to *vikalpa* and without the understanding of *apoha*, we cannot understand Nyāya's standpoint.

In Buddhism, *'apoha'* means 'exclusion', exclusion of general image because image is always false but concept always indicates common element of object. Common element is exclusion of general image, like non-non- P is a common element of P. Images always come from external world and that is fallible. In Buddhism, words cannot indicate the real image. Nyāya believes that all words are indicating the universal. This is a counter example of *apoha*.

[194] *Ibid, Imagination is 'pratyakṣam kalpanā̄ podhaṁ'.*
[195] *Ibid, p 315.*

Jayanta Bhatta says, "… if Buddhism hold that the term 'cow' denotes only as exclusion of non-cow but does not make mention of a horse as the distinct object to be excluded then they make a wrong statement since each and every item which falls within the denotation of non-cow is incomprehensible, the range of denotation being infinitely large. There is no reason of placing them together under a single collection since the objects, which are comprised within the denotation of non-cow such as horse etc., do neither occupy the same space nor coexist"[196].

Apoha is the negative meaning of a word and imagination is like negative form of reality. It has errors. In Nyāya, they believe universal form of word or form of an object or particular. Imagination comes through this impression. For Nyāya, universal form of reality is not false. If we accept *apoha* as a negation form of universal or a word cannot denote an external object, then it does not imply that universal does not exist, because according to Jayanta Bhatta "a distinct thing-in itself is an object of pure sense-perception which is neither a doubt nor an error so we hold that a universal in an object of non-erroneous perception"[197]

According to B K Motilal, how does Dharmakirti analyses the propositional awareness regarding the notion of universality? Universality or Particularity is the fundamental cause of perception and the notion of imagination is based on this issue.

For any discussion there are two different entities a) the object and b) the concept. For example, 'Cow' and 'Cowness' both are representing the propositional awareness. Here, the object is particular and the concept 'Cowness' is universal. Both are denoting the same proposition.

[196] *Nyāyamañjarī, Vol* 1, p 635.
[197] *Ibid, p 647.*

Particular can explain whole thing, there is no need to accept universal. But, Nyāya only accepts universal to explain whole like 'cowness' as the main representational from of cow. If we accept 'cowness', then this 'ness' is by default a form of existence. Cow exists, it is already explained by saying 'cowness'.

Finally, I would like to say that in Nyāya system, dreaming phenomenon is not based on any imagination because dream itself is an unreal and false state. For them imagination is the intervention period and it is related to our epistemological domain, not any meta level.

Now I would like to focus on the notion of imagination in the light of Advaita Vedanta. To begin with, it is very clear that imagination is a process to get impression in waking and dream both states in Advaita metaphysics. There is a critical discussion on imagination in Gauḍapāda's philosophy. Here, I would not focus on Gauḍapāda's perspective because this imagination portion has been already discussed in my 3rd chapter. Therefore, here I would focus on different sources of Advaita Vedanta philosophy on imagination. Now I would like to discuss the concept of imagination in the light of *Vivekacudāmoni*. Śaṅkara says,

"asatkalpovikalpohaṇviswamityekavastuni|
Nirvikārenirākārenirviśeṣebhidā kutaḥ|| 399[198]

Brahman is always true and free from all attributes and binaries. So, someone imagines that this world is created by *Brahman* and the world is true. But this imagination is totally false because *Brahman* is *nirvikāra* and *nirviśeṣa*.

"*Drastṛidarśanadṛśyādibhāvaśunyoikavastuni |*
NirvikāreNirākāreNirviśeṣebhidā kutaḥ || 400[199]

[198] *Vivekacuḍāmani*, p 417.

There are no differences between perceiver, the perceiving object and the image. All are same and all are identical. Due to ignorance, the ignorant being creates image and thinks that perceiver, perceiving object and image are different.

"*Kalpārṅavaivātyantaparipūrnoikavastuni*|

NirvikāreNirākāreNirviśeṣeBhidā Kutaḥ || 401[200]

Finally, Śaṁkara tries to say that if *Brahman* has been designated as one, ultimate, *nirvikāra, nirākāra* and *nirviśeṣa* then why does someone imagines different entity which is different from *Brahman*?

Hence, *Brahman* is ultimate, one and formless. When someone creates any worldly image that means this image has been created by ignorance, not *Brahman* because *Brahman* is neither creator nor doer. *Brahman* is beyond everything. Now, I can say that if *Brahman* is ultimate and only real then apart from *Brahman* all are unreal and false. Now, it is followed that waking and dreaming both have the same status. The ignorant being creates image that waking is true and dreaming image is false. Actually, all are imaginations. But *Brahman* is not an imagination, it's only real.

Now I would focus the notion of *Dṛṣtisṛstivāda*, coined by Madhusudan Sarasvati. Advaitin scholar Madhusūdan Sarasvati advocates the four different models of Advaita which are[201] :

A) *Ābhāsavāda* (self is covered by bondage and bondage is the *ābhāsa* of pure consciousness, liberation is free from all bondage).

[199] *Ibid.*
[200] *Ibid.*
[201] *Seeing and Appearance*, p 28.

B) *Pratibimbavāda* (According to Prakāsatman, Iśvara is the consciousness {*bimbacaitanya*} conditioned {*upahita*} by ignorance).

C) *Avacchedavāda* (Iśvara has been objectified by ignorance).

D) *Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* (some phenomena are not objectively existent but only subjectively imagined).

Every imagination is determined by subjective *avidyā* respective to the individual. This *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* theory comes near to the *Vijn˜ānavāda* of Buddhism because they also do not admit of any permanent being. All imaginations are depending on our physical and mental phenomena and all phenomena are modified by ignorance. Here, I would like to add that this ignorance is present in both waking and dream states.

We know that consciousness is present in both states but the question is how to understand this consciousness? All *Advaitins* posit that consciousness is self-realisation and existence and consciousness are reciprocal. *Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* holds that the immediate function of consciousness is self-revelation.

Surendranath Dasgupta says, "The *Dṛṣṭisṛstivāda* theory approaches nearest to *Vijñānavāda of* Buddhsim, only with this difference that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being, Vedānta admits the *Brahman*, the permanent unchangeable reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary perceptions are but impostions on it"[202].

According to *Drstisrstivāda,* the whole world is imaginary because in waking state it seems that all objects are coming from *Brahman,* but this realisation is happened due to ignorance because *Brahman* is not the cause of anything. So, this waking state is unreal. In dream, all objects are created by the dreamer that is why due to the lack of actual

[202] *Indian Philosophy, Vol 1, p 478.*

existence, dreaming state is also unreal and in *suṣupti* or deep sleep state, the perceiver are not able to see anything due to the absence of *antahkarana* and it is present in *Brahman* also. Therefore, the phenomenal world is imaginary but the phenomenal being always thinks 'all objects are real in this state'[203]

In *Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda,* the dreaming entity is not contradicted by the entity of waking state but they are different from trifle entity (*tuccha*). Even the empirical world bears the same degree of truth. Now my question remains as to when we are in dreaming state then we see 'we are seeing or doing', 'moving to here and there'. How is it possible? Since here we have seen that both the states (dreaming and waking) give us the same kind of cognition, how come we differentiate these states? Vaidāntikās tried to resolve the problem through *Arthakriyā* (i.c someone is taking the pot and then keep it another side). But when we are in dreaming state, then also we come across the action (*arthakriyā*). *Vyāvahāra* is of four kinds, *Arthakriyā* is one of them. Hence, the problem remains and the same question occurs, how can we differentiate the waking state from the dream?

The fifth definition of falsity (*mithyātva*) is,

"*Sadviviktatvaṁvā mithyātvam*| *Sattvaṁ ca pramānasiddhatvam* | *pramānatvaṁ ca doṣāsahakṛtajñānakaranatvam* |
tenasvapnādivatpramānasiddhabhinnatvenamithyātvaṁsiddhayati"[204]|

The notion of falsity is always different from real and real means the ultimate that is confirmed by *Pramāna*. In Advaita system, *pramāna* is the finest tool of everything. Dreaming phenomenon is false because it is different from that *pramāna* and this phenomenal world is false like dream.

[203] *Vedānta Darśan, vol 1, Bhavadipika, p 735.*
[204] *Advaitasiddhi, p 163.*

In *Pancikaraṅa,* there is one verse about the nature of dream –

"*etatsukhasaṁ śarīraṁ syānmāyikaṁ pratyagātmanaḥ*

Kāranoparame jāgratsaṁskārotathāprabodhavāt "|| *37*[205]

"grāhyagrāhakarūpenasphuranaṁ svapna uccate

Abhimanī tayoryastutaijaśaḥparikīrtitaḥ "|| *3*8[206]

Actually, the *liṅga śarīra* is shaped by five sensory organs, five organs of action, five vital forces, five rudimentary elements (*tanmātra*), *antaḥkarana, avidyā*, desire and action. This is called subtle body. This subtle body takes place in both dreaming and waking states. That is why *Antaḥkarana* is present in both the states (dream and waking) as a *parināma* of *ajñāna*; *(Ignorance or Nescience)* but in *suṣupti*, *antaḥkarana* is not there. As a result, there is no imagination and there is no illusion in *suṣupti*. Imagination and illusion both can occur in waking and dreaming states. It is true that in dream, all external sensory organs are not working but the "I" (*āmitva*) is present in both the states. Dreaming objects are coming as the relation of *grāhya-grāhaka*. This relation is to be taken from waking state. Dreaming image is called '*dṛk-dṛśya*' and this is *taijasa state*. This *taijasa* is identified with *Hiranyagarbha.*

Now I would discuss some portions of *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda.

"Vahiṣprajña vibhur viśvo hy antaḥprajñas tu taijasaḥ

Ghanaprajñas tathā prājña eka eva tridhā sthitah" || *1*[207]

Brahman is one and it has three forms like the external world is *Visva*, the internal world or dream is *Taijasa* and the deep sleep state is *Prajnā*. Hence, The three forms in One. These are not different from each other rather are identical.

[205] *Pancikaraṅa,* p 42.
[206] *Ibid.*
[207] *The Āgamśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, Book 1, p 1.

There is another verse on dream,

"svapnasthānontaḥprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonanivaṅsatimukhaḥ

Praviviktabhuktaijasodvitīyaḥpādaḥ || 4[208]

Dreaming state is the second state and this state is organised by 21 organs. After waking or *Viśva*, *Taijasa* or dream state comes. Thus, it is not followed that dream itself is only an imaginary state rather it is similar with waking. As a result, imagination can come in both states or both states can be imaginary.

Here, I would like to focus on Nyāya system. We saw that their imaginary process is depending on realistic means only. They focus on epistemological value, not on any metaphysical disposition. As a realist, they believe in the truth of the objectivity. They do not mention any transcendental image or any meta-cognition.

On the other hand, as idealist Advaita system posits imagination as a platform for their goal. Like someone can create an image through imagination and that image can be explained by his acquired knowledge or insight. Nay, most important issue is why imagination is important for every image. As an idealist, Advaita explains this issue in the light of epistemological and metaphysical hypotheses. In the light of epistemology, they believe that phenomenological cognition is only true in phenomenal level and in the light of metaphysics; the whole imagination is created by ignorant being. From the transcendental level, all imaginations are false. That is why imaginations are many and many varieties are there in the phenomenal world. But the ultimate real is One and true. One is *Brahman*. It is not like that *Brahman* creates the world or there are two different worlds. Rather unconsciously the image is manifested by yourself with different forms. So that the process of manifestation is an imagination. Without *antaḥkarana,*

[208] *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's kārikā, p 21.*

imagination is not possible. This imagination is governed by ignorance, that is why ignorant being cannot able to differentiate between real and unreal things. As a result, they suffer. This imagination can come in both dream and waking states. The whole world (dreaming and waking) is an imagination. When the perceiver realises that this imagination is not real and changeable from the transcendental bliss, then the realiser would realise the ultimate happiness is One, permanent and it is free from all imaginations.

Now we have to remember that imagination is completely different from illusion and hallucination because in illusion, someone sees an unreal object instead of real object but both objects are present. Unreal object comes from mind and real object is external. It is a complex psychosis. But in hallucination, mind independently and unconsciously creates an image like now I am writing this paper. In the case of hallucination, I can think someone is whispering beside my ears apart from writing. It can be happened simultaneously but perceiver is always unaware. It is single psychosis.

In imagination, someone consciously creates image for anything. In imagination, there is no imposition like illusion or mind does not work independently. In the case of imagination, mind and external organs both are working simultaneously. In illusion, the imposed object is always false but in imagination, the truth depends on the creation. Without imagination, no creation stands but without illusion or hallucination, all creations are flawless.

That is why dreaming image is different from illusion or hallucination. It is true that in dream all external avenues are closed but there is no imposition like illusion. Illusion or hallucination can occur in dream like waking but not identical with dream. Therefore, imagination comes in dream and waking states too.

Dr. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya says, "According to Advaitins, a cognition is that which depends on the object (*vastutantra*) and not on the person's will. As such, illusion and hallucination being dependent not on a person's will, but on conditions external and internal, are cognitive. But *Kalpanā* (imagination) being entirely dependent on the person's will and mental activity is quite different from *Viparya* and *mānasa-bhrānti*, and even *from smṛti* or recollection, which is also a sort of cognition being dependent on a previous cognition and its object"[209].

In *Brahmasūtra*, "*Kalpanopadeśāccamadhvādivadavirodhaḥ*"[210] (1/4/10)

At first, we have to remember that this phenomenal world is an *ajā* but this world is being imagined as non-*ajā* (it has creation or birth**).** So**,** *ajā* means it has no birth ("*nāyamajākṛtinimittvaḥajāśabdaḥ*" in Śaṁkara's commentary[211]). This word *ajā* is coined by Advaitin. The fire, water and earth have creations. In this verse, the word 'ca' signalises this imagination in not tenable.

A story is also generated by imagination. For example, a goat is of different shapes and colours. When a goat is physically connected to another goat, then as a result a new goat comes into being and they are staying together. On the other hand, another goat can reject to be intimate to the other goat who is *bhuktabhogā* (already the goat has been intimated for reproduction). So, there are two different perspectives.

Similarly, the phenomenal body is not always waiting to connect to the other body for reproduction. There is difference between willing body (those who are eagerly waiting for self-realisation*: brahmavita*) and unwilling body (those who are guided by ignorance: *abrahmajña*). Therefore, here is also two different perspectives but the main task is to

[209] *Aspects of Indian Philosophy, p 138*.
[210] *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, p 262.
[211] *Ibid, p 875.*

define the nature of bondage and salvation, not to define different types of *jīva*. Now someone can raise a question by the help of *arthāpattipramāna* that if they are showing the nature of bondage and salvation, then they are indirectly showing different types of *jīva* also. Therefore, what is new?

Śaṁkara replies in his *bhāṣya* that these all differences of jīva are governed by ignorance. This is an imagination like goat's story because all beings are identical from the transcendental level. Due to ignorance, it seems that phenomenal beings have different willing. Actually, these are imaginations like 'the honey seems different (sun's honey-ness) for some reason. It does not mean that the honey-ness is gone from honey (*Chāndogya* U, 3/1). Due to ignorance, someone can imagine for a small time that the imposed character is true instead of unrevealed character. Finally, he concludes that this phenomenal world itself is an imagination that is why the phenomenal world has different shades and it is impermanent.

In *Pancadaśī*, *advaitānandaprakarana* –

"*nistatvenāmrūpedvejanmanāśyute ca te*|
vumbhā brahmanivīksasvasamudrevumbhudādivat "|| 79[212]

The imagination of name and colour is also false. That is why the ignorant being is bounded by name and colour. The bubbles of water is identical with sea, but for the perceiver it seems like two different things (bubbles of water and sea). Similarly, the imposed name and colour are imaginations of perceiver, nothing else. When this name and colour will be gone then the identical cognition remains like after bubbles of water

[212] *Pancadaśī, p 421,*

only sea remains. These are all imagination. It is always produced by ignorance and we do not get to know the real nature of object whether the object is material or physical[213].

Now I would discuss the nature of imagination in Psychology and Neuroscience[214]**.**

In psychology and neuroscience, imagination is mental navigation and visualization. According to Hunter Imagination Questionnaire, imagination is designed for explaining time and situation. Now what is HIQ? It is invented by Dan Hunter who is a neuroscientist. It is a method to test the imagination ability. Everyone is pursuing this imagination process. No one is excluded from this process. That is why this questionnaire helps someone to judge the rate of imagination power.

Here, I am focusing on physiological aspect because both cognitive and physiological structures are needed to access the brain capacity for imagination. Through this HIQ someone can increase or decrease his imagination process.

The imagination always implies activity. It can be relatable or non-relatable to our daily experiences. But brain works when someone imagines something in both dream and waking states. We have to remember one thing about our brain function that is hippocampus always controls the activity or incidents and amygdala controls emotions. When someone imagines or sees something, then both of these are working simultaneously as a result we can identify 'An incident as the cause of pleasure' and 'B incident as the cause of pain'. However, when brain does not work properly then hippocampus or amygdala do not respond properly. As a result, pain will come but we cannot identify the cause of this pain (if hippocampus does not work) and on the other

[213] Ibid, p 454.
[214] Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 496.

hand, when amygdala does not work then incident comes but emotion does not occur at that time. We are used to with these kinds of responds. For imagination, it is applicable.

"Imagination is a large cognitive construct"[215]. The imagination is also functioned by Default Mode Network (this is fundamental and large-scale brain network system). It occurs when someone is thinking, memorising and dreaming. So, imagination is related to thinking, memorising and dreaming.

According to this article, "We found that this complex, naturalistic, measure of imagination was related to a network of brain regions. The HIQ was found to be a psychometrically sound instrument, with a normal distribution of scores, good internal reliability…This is the first study to demonstrate such brain-behaviour relationships in a naturalistic setting (i.e., an online questionnaire), undertaken over a period of weeks, in normal human subjects…"[216]

Therefore, in science and philosophy, different methodologies are used to analyse their systems. Here, my main concern is to show the structure of physiology and cognitive portion because when someone is in happy mood then he can enjoy his choice but when someone is in ill mood, then he is unable to enjoy his choice. In our philosophical domain, both choices are needed to make the structure of imagination. At the end, I would like to say that imagination is the most important and relevant phenomenon for our phenomenal existence (both waking and dream states).

[215] *Ibid, p 2.*
[216] *Ibid, p 6.*

Section 2

Does Imagination involve both mind and body?

Philosophy displays different dimensions and shades about this phenomenal life and beyond life. It displays different approaches to life which brings about branches like epistemology, metaphysics, axiology and logic etc. However, without the admission of theories regarding mind and body no philosophical view or any kind of explanation would be possible. If we talk ontologically, then without mind-body, no ontological discussion would be possible. Now the question is whether knowledge is embodied or dis-embodied.

In Indian philosophy, mainly Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta knowledge is embodied in this phenomenal level. If we consider embodied cognition as a methodical discourse in this phenomenal level (mundane world) then we have to discuss the nature of body, the nature of mind and their relationship. Otherwise, this hypothesis of mind-body relationship will not be clear (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta). That is why it is needed to be discussed. On the other hand, it is important also to discuss for determining the dreaming phenomenon, because in dream, mind is active and causal, body and subtle body are present. Therefore, this discussion is relevant for both the dreaming and waking states.

Now I would discuss the nature of mind, body and their relationship according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. Before entering this discussion, I need to say that here I am taking the English word 'mind' instead of '*manas*', both are synonymous according to my discourse and body means *'śarīra'*.

Nyāya School is realist. Nyāya system does not believe in any grades of reality. This is the main characteristic of Nyāya system. As *pramanvādī,* they adhere four *pramānas*

(perception, inference, similarity (*upamāna*) and (*śavda*) and five external organs, one internal organ that is mind. Where is the location of mind? It is not clear in their system but mind is the main medium between external world and soul. Now the question is Does mind exist singularly in one body or not? What is the problem of the absence of mind?

The *lakṣana* of mind is -

"jñānayougapadyādekaṅmanaḥ"[217] [218] || (56 / 327)

Mind (*manas)* is one because many cognitions do not occur simultaneously with the help of external sense organs. One of it can occur at a time.

Each external sense organ has its own object like the colour has been perceived by eye only, the sound has been perceived by ear only etc. Now someone can raise a question about the nature of mind, namely whether mind is many or one?

Mind is one because of *jñānayougapadya, this is the main hetu of mind*. It means cognitions can be different with respect of several external organs but mind is not many like external organs. For each sensory organ mind works accordingly. Due to space and time, all cognitions are different from each other. We can assume that each sensory organ has each individual mind but in reality, this is not true, because mind is one and it successively connects to all external sensory organs.

"*nayugapadanekakriyopalabdheḥ*"[219] || (57 /328)

Every mind is different in every individual body because their activities are different, for example, someone is waking, seeing something, listening something, feeling something,

[217] *Nyāyadarśana,Vātsāyan bhāṣya, Vol 3, p 325.*
[218] *'śarīravyāpitvāditi na sādhanmiti', Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, p 896.*
[219] *Nyāyadarśana, Vātsāyana Bhāṣya, Vol 3, p 327.*

smelling something etc. but it seems that all activities are happening simultaneously. Actually, due to different times all are happening step by step.

"*alātacakradarśanavattadupalabdhirāśusancārat*"[220] || (58 / 329)

Alātacakra is a kind of instrument which has been used in the ancient time. It is *cakra* or wheel. When it is moving, then we cannot differentiate it's timing of every step but actually each step is individual and is coherent, that is why we cannot able to notice the different time of moving. It seems like the whole moving time is one. In reality, all steps of moving are different and due to illusion, we cannot notice the difference. Similarly, when any activity happens, then we cannot differentiate all the steps but every step works according to individual time and space.

"*yathāktohetutvāccāṅu*"[221] || (59 / 330)

Mind is like atom and one. If several minds are there to connect each sensory organ, then as a result several cognitions occur at the same time. However, this is not true. Mind is *anuparimānaviśiṣta* (like atom). Mind exists with all external organs but it works successively, not simultaneously. Its function depends on distinct temporal period. Due to the lack of subtle ability, we cannot differentiate these. We think that all activities are happening simultaneously and mind is *vibhu*.

In *Nyāyakusumānjalī,* Udayana advocates mind as an atom and he says if mind is *bibhūparināmviśista* then the problem is the following:

If mind is *vibhūparimānaviśiṣta* and mind is connected to all external sensory organs successively by the help of *adṛṣta*, (not simultaneously), then there is no problem to accept mind as *vibhūparimānaviśiṣta*.

[220] *Ibid, p 328.*
[221] *Ibid, p 332.*

But, Udayana replies that if we accept mind as *vibhūparimānaviśiṣta*, then the major problem is to locate the mind. So, due to *āśrayāsiddhi* fallacy, mind's existence would be undetermined but it is impossible to accept this. Without the presence of mind, memory and all kinds of cognitions can never happen. Therefore, Mind is like atom, one and *bhūtadravya* (phenomenal substance).

Now I would discuss the nature of *śarira* (body) in Nyāya system.

Nyāya system does not adhere that consciousness is the quality of body.

"*śarīravyāpitvāt"*[222] || (50/321)

Consciousness occupies the whole body. If consciousness occupies the whole body, it does not mean that it has to be accepted as a quality of body because someone can say that pleasure and pain are present all through the body and they occur because the body is conscious. However, here the main objection is not about pleasure and pain, rather the main issue is that every pleasure and pain is different respective to body. If consciousness is the quality of body, then pleasure and pain should be same in all bodies but actually, it is not ("*tasmānna śarīra gunascetaneti*").

In Nyāya tradition, the differences of pleasure and pain are the main criteria of differences of soul.

"*nakeśanakhādinupalabdheḥ*"[223] || (51/322)

Consciousness does not exist all over the body because hair and nail are not conscious. There is no consciousness in these at all, that is why, there is no pleasure and pain when someone cuts his hair and nail.

"*tvakparyantatvāccharirasyakeśanakhādiṣvaprasangaḥ*"[224]|| (52 / 323)

[222222] *'Cetanotpattyā', Nyāyadarśana, Vātsāyana Bhāṣya, Vol 3, p 318.*
[223] *Ibid*, p 320.

Consciousness occurs only upto the skin of the body, but not till nail and hair because till skin we can feel our pleasure and pain (*"indriyāśrayatvaṅśarīralakhsaṅ, tvakparyantam jīva-manaḥsukha-duḥkha-saṅvittayatanabhutāṅśarīraṅ*").

The definition (*lakhsana*) of *śarīra* (body) is –

"*ceṣtendriyārthāśrayaḥśarīram*"[225] (1/1/11)

Body or *Śarīra* is the locus of pleasure and pain where *indriya* or sensory organs occur. '*cestā*' means to put effort for acquiring desirable object and to negate undesired entity. Therefore, body is the locus of this effort for acquiring desirable objects.

"*śarīragunavaidharmā*t" (53/324)

To answer the question why consciousness is not the quality of the body, this verse is stated. Since consciousness is (*vaidharma*) dissimilar to body, we cannot accept it as a quality of body.

Body has two basic qualities: 1) *apratyakṣtva*, it is perceived by inference, not by perception, 2) cognized by external organs like colour (*vahirindriyagrāhya), it occurs simultaneously*. However, consciousness is totally distinct from these two qualities. These two qualities have already determined but if we accept third quality of the body, then it will contradict with previous two qualities because the cognition (consciousness) is cognized by mind (through mind external organs are active to get impression from the external world). Therefore, it is not *atīndriya* (transcendent). Therefore, if consciousness is the quality of body, then it has to be transcendent but actually, consciousness is not like that and it is not the quality of the body.

[224] *Ibid.*
[225] *' sa eṣāmāśryastaccharīramiti' Nyāyadarśana, Vātsāyana bhāṣya, Vol 1, p 211.*

"*na rupādīnāmitaretaravaidharmāt*"[226] || (54/325)

Someone can raise a question as to the previous dissimilarity between body and consciousness is not the sufficient cause because *guna* (quality) like, *rupa* (colour), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (smell) and *sparśa* (touch) are different from each other while presenting in the same body. So, dissimilarity is also there. So due to dissimilarity how can we refuse to accept consciousness as a quality of the body.

Nyāya replies,

"*aindriyakatvādrupādīnāmapratiṣedhaḥ*"[227] (55/ 326)

The above argument cannot be used for accepting the consciousness as a quality of the body. The dissimilarities are there among different *guna* (qualities) like, *rupa* (colour), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (smell) and *sparśa* (touch) but all of these are perceived by external sense organs. This is included in previously prescribed two qualities of body. But consciousness is cognised by mind like pleasure and pain, but neither is transcendent nor perceivable by external organs.

Consciousness is very distinct from the body because when ignorance of the body will be iradicated, then only consciousness will be there and it is prescribed by *Śruti*.

Now someone can raise a question about the necessity of the body. Gautama says, "*pūrvakṛta-phalānuvandhāttadutpattiḥ*"[228] || (60/331)

The new body comes due to *dharma* and *adhrama*, which are considered as *adṛṣta*. When the previous body demises, then that body perishes but only *dharma* and *adharma*

[226] *Ibid, Vol* 3, p 323.
[227] *Ibid.*
[228] *Ibid,* p 335.

exist in subtle form. These are located in *adṛṣta* and *adṛṣta* is located in *ātmā*. The *karmaphala* is determined by *dharma* and *adharma*. Due to the presence of *karmaphala*, the new body is generated to fulfil this. Accordingly, *pravṛtti* and *ākānkhā* both arise with the new body to reap the individual's previous *karmaphala*. In this order this circularity of birth occurs until and unless self-realisation or ultimate negation of ignorance takes place.

According to Nyāya, reproduction is not the ultimate cause of new body or new birth. Without *adṛṣta*, the new body does not come into this world. Someone can assume male and female intercourse is the cause of new birth but Nyāya posits that *adṛṣta* is needed simultaneously, "*prāptau cāniyamāt*"[229] (65/336).

In Nyāya system, mind and body both are working together in *laukikānālaukika* state. In waking, *ātmā* and mind are connected by the *samjoga* relation. Mind and external sensory organs are connected by the *samyoga* relation. External organs and external world are connected by five *laukika* and 3 *alaukika* relation. In dream, external organs are not working, only mind independently works. In all the above cases *ātmā* is the locus where cognition occurs. Without consciousness, mind cannot work. Therefore, cognition is always embodied in Nyāya system. This is a fundamental relationship between mind and body. Nyāya system is realist, that is why they do not offer any disembodied cognition in their system.

Śrī Keśava Miśra says**,** mind is

"sukhāddupalabdhisādhanamindriyaṁmanaḥ | taccāṇuparimānaṁhṛdayāntarvarti "[230] |

By mind, we can feel pleasure and pain. Mind is atomic and mind is located in the heart.

[229] *Ibid, p* 345.
[230] *Tarkabhāṣā, Vol 2, p 79.*

Mind is associated with the soul by the relation of *samavāya*, it is atomic and it is the only cause for the feeling of pleasure and pain. In Mind, there are eight qualities such as *saṁkhā, parimāna, pṛthaktva, saṁyoga, vibhāga, paratva, aparatva and saṁskāra.*

According to the above discussion, we have to remember that mind will be destructed when the soul will be liberated, otherwise mind exists even after death (*ātivāhika śarīra*) but after death where mind is exactly located that is not clear in this section. Mind is an internal organ and in each body, mind is always one. Only yogis can destruct his mind by creating several bodies to complete his *prārabdha karma*. This is called *kāyavyuha*. After finishing his *prārabdhakarma*, his soul will be free from all boundaries and his soul will be free and mind too.

In the section of *śarīranirupanam* body or *śarīra* is -

"*tasyabhogāyatanamantyāvayavi 'śarīram'*[231] |

Body is the locus of all. It means where all the pleasure and pain are conjoined together for *bhoga*. Without body *bhoga* is not possible. *Bhoga* means feeling both pleasure and pain.

Udayana says "*Tathāpiśarīrendriyamanasāmanyatamasminnāśritaṁbhaviṣyatītyat"*[232]

Mind is the most essential internal organ in the body.

Gaṅgeśa says mind is:

"*Gandharuparasparśasvekaikamātrasākkhātkārajanakatvenapṛthivyādibhedasiddhauniḥ sparśalāghavānnirvayavayaṁ ca manaḥ"*[233] ||

[231] *Ibid*, p 50.
[232] *Kiranāvalī, p 363.*
[233] *Tattvachintāmani,* '*manahprakaraṇam', praktyakṣa khanda , Vol 1, p 823.*

Mind is distinct from *gandha, rupa, sparsa, rasa* and five *bhuta dravya*.

According to Sarasvati Chennakesavan, "Naiyāyika says, the mind is quick moving and the action of the mind, in this case, of receiving sensations will only have a meaning when mind comes again into contact with the soul that resides in the body. So, the mind by itself without any reference to the body cannot function"[234].

He also mentions, "In inference, memory and imagination, the mind, because of its direct activity as a special cause, must necessarily be classified as an instrument. Therefore, at certain times, the mind is an instrument and at other times, it is not…In the light of this definition of perception mind acts as special instrument in the direct perception of pleasure and pain"[235].

In Vaiśeṣika system, mind is one of the major substances among nine others and body is matter.

Now I would discuss the relationship between mind and body in the light of *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

"*manstvayogānmanaḥ*"[236]

The *mindness* (*manastva*) is the cause of mind because mindness has a *samavāyī relation* with mind. Therefore, *mindness* exists always in mind.

In Vaiśesika tradition, mind has eight qualities which I have already mentioned before. Mind is atomic, material and one. Now someone can ask, why does mind exist in the body?

[234] *Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy*, p 18.
[235] *Ibid*, p 21-22.
[236] *Praśastapādabhāṣyam, Vol 2, p 159.*

We can infer that for the feeling of our pleasure and pain, there is no other organ apart from mind. Only mind can do it. By external organs, we can perceive only external objects but for emotions like pleasure and pain, we require some internal organ. Only mind can help to feel these emotions, otherwise all external phenomena are irrelevant in this body and mind is one for every individual body. Even, memory is not possible without mind.

According to them, body is matter and mind is an internal organ, atomic and one in every body.

External organs are totally distinct from consciousness or *ātmā* ("*naśarīrendriyamansāmjñatvā*t "). Body does not have feeling and any activity without the help of consciousness. If both body and mind are themselves consciousness, then they do not need to depend on each other because consciousness or *ātmā* is independent and free from all. For example, body is like a chariot and the driver is consciousness. Without driver, chariot cannot go. Similarly, without consciousness, body does not work. Mind, body and external organs all are inter-dependent. In dream, only mind can work in the body but consciousness is there.

"*ātmamanasoḥsaṁyogaviśeṣātsaṁskāracca smṛti"*[237] *(9/2/6)*

Ātmā is subtle that is why imperceptible. However, we can infer *ātmā*'s existence. Through the relationship of body and mind, we can infer 'I am a conscious being'.

Therefore, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems advocate mind as atomic, material and one in the body. Mind is internal organ and body is the material cause. Mind is connected with

[237] *Vaiśeṣika Darśanam, p 181.*

the *ātmā* by the relation of *samjoga* and mind is connected with external organs by the relation of *saṁyoga*. So, for them cognition is always embodied in both dream and waking states. In their system, waking reality is true because the functions are real but in dream, images are unreal because only mind works independently. Thus, *ātmā* is the locus of cognition; that is why in both dream and waking states, cognition is there. Someone can have feeling of pleasure and pain in both the states. But without mind-body relation, cognition cannot occur in any of the states. So, mind-body relationship is the most fundamental and crucial aspect for cognition. It is present in both the states because consciousness is present in both the states.

Now I would discuss the mind-body relation in the light of Advaita Vedānta. Ācārya Sadānanda Yogīndra says, mind is

"*mano nāma saṅkalpavikalpātmikāntaḥkaraṅavṛttiḥ*"[238] || *45*

Mind is *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpātmakāntaḥkaranavṛtti*. *Saṅkalpa* means one kind of wish like 'I want to do this' and *vikalpa* means 'I don't want to do this'. These phenomena are controlled by mind because mind is one of the major *antaḥkarana* among four (*mind, buddhi, citta and ahamkāra*). *Antaḥkarana* is a *parināma of ajñāna*. Mind is not a sensory organ rather a *vṛitti* (*kārana*). We can feel pleasure and pain through *vṛitti.*

Vaidāntika advocates four types *of śarīra* ***(****Gross body or sthula śarīra) such as 1) jarāyuja* (birth by uterus), 2) *andaja* (birth by egg), 3) *svedaja* (birth by sweat or wet) and 4) *udbhija* (plants). Human beings are *jarāyuja*. In gross body, *prāṇamaya, vijñānamaya and manomayo kośas* are there.

Every *śarīra* is *annamayakośa* because food is the necessary element of all.

[238] *Vedāntasāra, p 135*.

Advaita advocates three types of *śarira* like *sthula śarīra* (gross body), *kārana śarīra* (causal body), and *sūkṣma śarīra* (subtle body).

In waking state, gross body, causal body and subtle body are present: *Vaisvānar or virāta*, 'A'.

In dream state, only subtle and causal body are present: *Taijasa*, 'U'.

In *suṣupti* (deep sleep**)**, only causal body is present: *Prājña*, 'M'.

In *turīya*, there is no *śarīra*: *Samādhi*.

Now I would discuss the nature of three *śarīra*

*Sūkṣmaśarīra or liṅga śarīra (Subtle body**)** – Prānamaya, Vijñānamaya and Manomayokośas* are there where *indriya* is the *parināma* of *ākāśādisatvānsa* and *rajah* and *paňcavāyu* is present. These three *kośas* are the *upādhi* (the third object imposes his character on the second object and as a result second object's character has been covered by third object and this is distinct from the first object. So here the third object is the *upādhi*) of *Hiranyagarbha* (first *puruṣa* of the universe). This *śarīra* is more subtle than gross body. Subtle body has two forms: 1) *vyāsti* (*taijasa: dream*) and 2) s*amasti* (*upādhi of sutrātma*).

*Kārana śarīra (Causal body**)*** - this is also a state of ignorance where mind and *buddhi* are absent and *vritti* does not occur. It occurs in deep sleep state. It is beyond time and space, only consciousness is there that is why it does not have any activity and it is beyond illusion or hallucination.

In *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Dharmarāja says mind is not sensory organ, neither internal nor external. Naiyāyikas says if mind is not sensory organ, then how do they explain

emotions like pleasure and pain? Because mind is the only instrument for the cognition of pleasure and pain in Nyāya system. Naiyāyika asks why mind is not an internal sensual organ?

Dharmarājā says, sensual organ means '*indriyatvāvacchinnaindriyajanakatva'*, not as '*indriyajnyatva*' (*'na hīndriya-janyatvena jñānasya sākhṣatvam'*[239]) because if '*indriyajanyatva*' is the cause of perceptual cognition then there is a problem in inferential cognition. In inference, mind is the only cause for inferential cognition and mind is present in both (perception and inference). Therefore, there will be no difference between perceptual and inferential cognition if we accept perceptual cognition means '*indriyajnyatva*'. That is why Advaitin adheres for the perceptual cognition, '*indriyatvāvacchinnaindriyajanakatva' is the cause*. Now all external sensual organs have this quality except mind because in the case of inference mind is present as *manastva hetu*, not as having '*indriyatvāvacchinnaindriyajanakatva'*. So, still if we accept mind as sensual organ then there is a no problem in the case of inference (*manasta*) and perception (*indriyatva*) both. But the problem is about the '*prayojoka*' of *īśwarpratyakṣa* because *īśwarapratyakṣa* is possible. If we define perception (*pratyaksa)* means only *indriyatvāvacchinnaindriyajanakatva* then,*' īśwarpratyakṣa'* is not possible (in this case *indriyas* are not there). That is why Advaitins accept mind as non- sensual organ. They adhere, pleasure and pain cognition occur through *vṛtti*, not mind.

The definition of subtle body,

"*panca-prāna-mano-buddhi-daśendriya-samanvitam*

Apancīkṛta-bhūtothaṅsukhāṅgaṅbhoga-sādhanam"[240]||

[239] *Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p 26.*
[240] Ibid, p 278.

Subtle body is consisted by *paňcaprāna, manah (mind), buddhi and ten apancikṛtaindriyas*. Subtle body is kind of two like *para* (*samaṣti)* and *apara* (*vyāṣti*).

In Advaita system, cognition is embodied in phenomenal level. They advocate three grades of reality. In phenomenal level, perceptual cognition occurs through *antaḥkaranavṛtti.* External organ cannot grasp the cognition only. By the help of *antaḥkaranavṛtti,* cognition occurs because *antaḥkarana* like mind goes towards external object by the help of external sensual organ and *vṛtti* destructs the *ajñāna* for a minor period and cognition occurs. For example, the cognition of pot occurs when *antaḥkarana (mind*) goes towards *ghata* (pot) by eye perception then *vṛtti* destructs the *ajňāna* and as a result the cognition of pot occurs. In this case pot is *ghatāvacchinnacaitanya*, external organ (eye) is *antaḥkaranāvacchinnacaitanya* and the *pramāna* means the way cognition occurs that *pramāna* is *antaḥkaranavṛttāvacchinnacaitanya*.

This structure happens both in the waking and dreaming states because mind presents in both the states and in both the states subtle and causal bodies are present.

In this order, we have to remember that the realisation of *Brahman* is beyond this mind-body relation structure. This structure is applicable only in phenomenal level because this relation is always governed by ignorance and in transcendental level, the ultimate realisation is free from absolute ignorance (*mulāvidyā*).

Now someone can ask after death where is mind?

"*vāṅmanasi darśanācchavdācca*"[241] || 1

All organs of speech emerge in the mind after death.

"*tanmanaḥ prāṅa uttarāt*"[242] || 3

[241] *Brahmasūtra*, section 2, p 847.

After death mind emerges in the vital force or *prāṅa*.

After that *prāṅa* emerges in the soul.

There is one section about mind and intellect…

"*sodhyakṣetadupagamādibhyaḥ*"[243] || 4

"*antarā vijñānamanasī kramenatalliṅgāditicennaviśeṣāt* "[244]|| (2/3/15)

For creation or destruction, there is no problem to accept mind's position because mind is formed by food, the vital force or *prāṅa* is formed by water and speech is formed by fire (*Chāndogya U 4, v. 4*). All external senses are coming from different elements accordingly. All are distinct from each other. Mind is created by *Hiranyagarbha* after his meditation. He is the first *puruṣa*. In the time of creation or destruction, mind will be created or dissolved by *Hiranyagarbha*. It is determined. So, there is no problem about the position of mind.

Here, I mentioned this verse because there is an objection regarding the position of mind in the time of creation and destruction.

Vidyāranyamuni says,

"māyāvṛtyātmakohīśasaṁkalpaḥsādhanaṁjanau|

manovṛtyātmakojīvasaṁkalpabhogasādhanam"[245] || *19*

'manovṛtyātmakomanaso vṛtti' occurs for fulfilment of jīva's *bhogā* (reaping pleasure or pain). Here *vṛtti* is the cause of pleasure and pain but mind is necessary cause as an instrument, not as sensory organ.

[242] *Ibid, p 850.*
[243] *Ibid, p 851.*
[244] *Ibid, p 468.*
[245] *Paṅcadaśī, p 102.*

In the case of body,

"*svaṁparaṁ ca navettyātmā vinaṣṭaivakāraṅe* |

Āgāmiduḥkhavījamcetyetadindreṅadarśitam" || 226

In the *tūrīya*, the causal body dissolves in the consciousness or *ātmā*. So, there is no body in this state and it is beyond any phenomenal cognition.

"*etejvarāḥśarīreṣutriṣusvābhāvikā matāḥ* |

Viyogetujvaraistāniśarīranyevanāsate || 227

Three types of body are not free from disease (jvarā). This is already determined. So, these bodies have destruction.

In *Pancikaraṅavārtika,*

Sureśvaracārya defines that body has three forms which I have already mentioned before. Mind is *antaḥkarana*, not a sensory organ. Five vital forces are there in the body. These are -

According to Prof. Piyali Palit, "*Prāna* is inhaling and exhaling, *Apāna* is excreting, *Vyāna* pervades the entire body, *Udāna* is passing out from the body and *Samāna* assimilates food and drink"[246]

It is stated that, there is one objection about the nature of *Jīvanmukta puruṣa*.

"na ca kundalinaḥkundalitvābhimānanimittaṅsukhaṅdṛstam,

ititasyaivakundalitvābhimānarahitasyatadevakundalitvābhimānanimittaṅsukhaṅbhavati"

[247] 172

[246] *Paṅcikaraṅavārtika*, p 41.

When rich person has lost his property then he is sad but those who (like monk) has no inclination about property, they do not have any fear to lose. Similarly, the person who has realised his *kundalini nāri,* does not have any fear to lose his kundalini *nāri*.

Someone can assume that body's destruction is '*aśarīratva*' and it is not applicable for living being but '*aśarīratva*' means *śarīrābhimānarāhityarupamukti*[248].

Vedāntin says '*saśarīratva*' occurrs because of *avidyā*. For example, 'I am the body'. That is why it is not possible to imagine '*saśarīratva*' without body. On the other hand, '*aśarīratva*' is eternal because it does not have any causal connection and it is free from boundaries.

'*Saśarīratva'* is consisted by *dharma-adharma*. This is distinct from *ātmā* but here the relation between *ātmā* and *śarīra* happens because of *avidyā*, not *dhrama-adharma*.

When someone is *jivanmukta* then he is free from '*saśarīratva'*, his state is '*aśarīratva*' and he does not have fear to lose his body.

So, according to Advaita Vedānta we can say that this realisation (*jīvanmukta*) can occur in both the waking and dreaming states because the exercise of *śravana*, *manana* and *nidhidhyāsana* is applicable in both states.

In dream, mind-body relationship is also there but the gross body and external organs are absent. That is why veridical cognition or illusion both can occur in this state like waking state. Without gross body, we cannot explain volitional activity. In dream, volitional activity is absent. Here, the question is if volitional activity is the major criteria of existence, then why the cognition of pot or cloth or any movement is true in dream

[247] *Vedāntadarśanam, samanyādhikarana, P 198.*
[248] *Ibid.*

because the cognition of pot is determined by 'potness'. Since the concept of 'potness' is there in both the states, why will I say that the cognition of pot in dream is false or unreal? It can differ if someone gets result from dream and that is not a solution to waking problem but we get solution from dream for the problems of waking states. This picture is familiar for everyone. So why do I say dream itself is an illusory or unreal state different from the waking one?

Finally, I would like to conclude by stating that mind-body relation is the most essential factor in cognition. More or less every Indian philosophical school adheres this relationship according to their own conceptual framework. Here in this section, I have tried to show this relationship in the light of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools are realist and they believe in only one type of reality that is phenomenal reality. Advaita Vedāntins adheres three grades of reality and they are idealists. In their system, one state negates the other state and ultimately the transcendental state or ultimate state remains because *Brahman* is the ultimate Real. This realisation would be possible when someone goes beyond his ignorance. Ignorance always covers the real nature of object and reveals a different nature. As a result, we do suffer but this suffering is not ultimate. Ultimate is only happiness which is possible due to the realisation of the Self or *Brahman*. In phenomenal world, mind and body both are the mediums to grasp the object. The way of relationship can be different in different schools like Nyāya-Vaiśesikas advocate mind as atomic, one and internal sense organ and body is matter. They believe only embodied cognition. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also believe that when someone is able to know all *prameyavastu* by the help of *pramāna*, then he or she will be free from his or her ignorance. On the other hand, Advaita Vedānta advocates that mind is not a sensory organ, it is *antaḥkarana* but it is an instrumental cause for cognition and body is the phenomenal locus. They adhere embodied (with

body) and disembodied cognition (*jīvanmukta puruṣa*). So, the differences are there between these schools. Here, there is no motive to show which school is better or which school is not, rather it is important to focus on their understanding regarding mind-body relationship because without the understanding of this relationship, salvation is not possible and the negation of ignorance would not have been possible without knowing this relationship. It is applicable in both the dream and waking states.

For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems, dream itself is an unreal or illusory state. Without knowing this relationship, this dreaming understanding would not have been possible.

On the other hand, in Advaita system *Brahman* is ultimate and only real. Apart from *Brahman,* all is unreal and false. In this respect, dream and waking both the states have the same status because ultimately both states have been negated by the ultimate realisation. At the end, I would like to add the whole understanding that I mentioned chronologically is possible because the mind-body relationship. Otherwise, any cognition would not have been possible.

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CHAPTER 5

SOME ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF DREAM

Chapter 5

Some Alternative Accounts of Dream

Introduction

After my all-epistemological and metaphysical discussion regarding dreaming phenomenon now I would like to enter into the physiological explanation of dream. Why I am particularly introducing this chapter in my thesis because personally I feel that the cognitive process is immensely depending on our physical disposition. For example, when someone is mentally or physically healthy then he enjoys his choice but when he is not well then, he refuses to entertain his choice. So, both are inextricably inter-related. Hence, I have chosen this section on physiology. Here, I would briefly mention the physiological activity during dreaming and waking states from the perspectives of Neuroscience and Modern psychology.

In Neuroscience, I would show briefly the structure of dream. Chronologically, I will be discussing the dreaming structure in the light of neuroscience. Later, mainly I have chosen four psychologists from Sigmund Freud to Norman Malcolm. I will discuss their views on dream.

In the light of Neuroscience, I would discuss the brain functions during dream. I will be discussing how REM and NREM sleep circles occur during sleep. The most important part is how circadian clock works in our internal body function. Mainly which segments of brain are working during dream, which working intensity is similar with waking state or not that will be the most relevant issue in my thesis. I will discuss whether memory is the only source or not and the location of memory storage in the brain. How

hippocampus and amygdala consistently work in brain? These all phenomena I will focus on.

Then I will follow up the tentative physiological relationship in my last section of the last chapter. Here my whole discussion will be from scientific background, so that the dreaming notion could be more concrete. Therefore, the main intension is to show the brief structure of dream in the light of Neuroscience and Modern psychology.

5.1 *The nature of Dream: Neuroscience and Modern Psychology*

Dreaming phenomenon itself is an informative, restorative and sleep-based cognitive state. In my thesis I am introducing this physiological perspective, because I think that without physiological explanation, maybe the nature of cognition will be incomplete or incoherent. For example, when someone is not ill then he likes the ice cream but when he is not physically well, then he is not having the ice cream. The cognition is present between having ice cream and not-having ice cream. Therefore, the problem is about the acceptance whether I would have the ice cream or not. Similarly, if someone is ill or physically fit, then he is happy in every level to take something but when he or she is unhappy, then the choice would be different. Thus, the cognition is present but because of physiological disability sometimes, he is not ready to accept anything. Here, my intention is to focus on both the levels of cognition and physiology regarding dream.

Dreaming structure has been discussed in so many disciplines according to their methodology like Oneirology, Neuroscience, Psychology and Philosophy. In all disciplines, dreaming notion plays a vital role in our whole existence as veridical or non-veridical cognition. That is why in my last chapter, I would like to concentrate this physiological structure during dream. Sometimes dream varies due to our physiological structure. For example, sometimes some bizarre things are coming in dream because of

having spicy food or junk food or having black coffee etc. Food habits is one of the major causes of dreaming[249].

Therefore, in this chapter I would discuss the nature of dream, brain function during dream and waking and the physiological relationship between dream and waking state. In my last four chapters, I have discussed dreaming nature, reality, cognitive and metaphysical value in the light of Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. These are most ancient and very profound systems in Indian Philosophy. Here, I would focus on the recent neuroscientific and psychological explanation of dream.

In neuroscience and psychology, dreaming function is most crucial and relevant aspect of the body. Mainly, for them dream is sleep-based cognition. Like dream begins with the sleep. At first, I would just mention the definition of sleep:

"Human sleep is a restorative process[250] that is brain state-regulated[251], reversible[252], homeostatic[253] embedded in both circadian[254] and social-physiologic organisation[255] and involving a species-specific[256] quiescent posture[257], some amount of perceptual disengagement[258], and elevated arousal threshold[259]".

[249] *Frontier journal, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00047*
[250] *"When you have a night of hig quality sleep you wake up feeling refreshed and no longer tired", The neuroscience of sleep and Dreams, p -9.*
[251] *"The brain initiates sleep, maintains sleep, promotes transitions between one form of sleep and another, and triggers wakefulness", ibid.*
[252] *"By reversible state we mean that when you go to sleep, you are not stuck there as may be the case with an irreversible coma; with appropriate forms of stimulation such as a loud noise and a vigorous shaking you can return to wakefulness.", ibid, p 9-10.*
[253] *"By homeostatically regulated we mean that the amount and intensity of sleep you experience is controlled by a kind of internal thermostat". 'Thermostat' means measurement of temperature. Ibid, p -10.*
[254] *"It adjusts period of sleep and wakefulness to appropriate duration during 24-hour cycle of light and darkness that is fundamental to life on Earth", Neuroscience (3rd edition), P 684.*
[255] *"the social nature of human sleep include the fact that sleep deprivation is associated with diminished emotional expressivity" that is why the connection of social and natural process is needed for sleeping, The neuroscience of sleep and Dreams, p -15.*
[256] *It means when human being sleeps then their eyes are closed but some birds or animals cannot close their eyes like one eye close or half close during sleep.*
[257] *"Quiescent state simply means reduced physical activity relative to the resting waking state" ibid, p -17.*

When someone wants to sleep? We can say when all external organs are tired to interact with the external world and according to circadian clock human body needs sleep. Without sleep, no one can exist longer. There are lots of difficulty due to the absence of sleep like weird visions, hallucination, aggression, sex increases, fever, paranoid delusion and finally death. Sleep is the basic tool for body function. According to circadian clock body has own systems to regulate the completely physiological function. Problem occurs when someone breaks the clock schedule. At least, 7-8 hours sleep is necessary for human being. Dream is also including in the circadian clock. Now the question is when someone enters to dream through sleep?

Sleep has four stages (it is measured by EEG test) like a) stage 1 – the drowsy period, b) stage 2 – mainly sleep spindles, c) stage 3 – moderate to deep sleep and sleep spindles[260] decreases and d) stage 4 – dream occurs. Slow-wave sleep (0.5-2 Hz) or delta sleep or NREM sleep.

We have to notice that 'local sleep' is the new term of stages of sleep. It comes before stage 1 sleep.

Local sleep[261] –> stage 1 sleep –> stage 2 -> stage 3 –> stage 4 (dream occurs)

Now I would discuss the nature of dream.

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[258] *"a sleeping animal or person is that they do not respond normally to environmental stimuli. If you open the eye lids of a sleeping mammal the eyes will not see normally– they are functionally blind", ibid, p 17.*

[259] *"it is difficult to arouse the sleeping animal with sensory input that does not exceed a threshold of touch, or loudness or light, e t c.", ibid, p -19.*

[260] *"the frequency of the EEG waves and an increase in their amplitude, together with intermittent high-frequency spike clusters called sleep spindles. Sleep spindles are periodic bursts of activity at about 10–12 Hz that generally last 1–2 seconds and arise as a result of interactions between thalamic and cortical neurons", Neuroscience, p 666-667.*

[261] *"a concept introduced by Huber (2004) (in sleep) and Vyazovskiy (2011) (in waking). In its most general sense, local sleep refers to transient, regional neurophysiological states showing a mixture of features characteristic of 1) wakefulness and sleep, 2) different sleep stages (NREM and REM sleep) or 3) different sleep depths (light or deep sleep). Local sleep is local both in time and space. As a relatively new concept in the sleep literature, its precise definition is likely to evolve with time", (Frontier journal, doi: 10.3389/fnins.2019.00949)*

First, there is no concrete definition of dream. Tentatively we can characterise the structure of dream.

Dreams are a peculiar form of declarative memory , subjective, state of REM and NREM sleep, constructive , vivid image, sleep-based, mostly visual, camouflage, mind-wandering , non-derogatory, ethical, content based , metaphorical, emotion, reason, perceptual disengagement (eye closed) , internal process, automatic (we can't control) , mainly 2D, problem solving , methodical, stipulated, imaginary, mostly indirect meaning based, brain stem aminergic, hippocampus and amygdala based, forebrain is there, immersive spatiotemporal hallucination, active, not clear state as waking, DMN based, transitional period between sleep and wake , DRF based and consciousness based state.

Now I would discuss all characters one by one.

Declarative memory – Memory is kind of two, declarative and non-declarative memory. Declarative memory is a storage of material and conscious. It is expressed by language (conventional and unconventional both). For example, remembering mobile numbers, songs and images etc. Dreaming data is based on declarative memory. Non-declarative is skill-based memory. So, this is not quite associated with dream.

Subjective – it means dreamer can see her own dreams alone. Apart from her, no one is able to see her dreaming cognition and her neuropsychological activity works according to her physical structure.

REM and NREM sleep are very important sections in dream.

a) **REM sleep** – The neuroscientific approach to dreaming occurs in 1950s with the discovery of REM during human sleep (Aserinsky and Kleitman, 1953; Dement and Kleitman,1957a). This sleep comes mostly late at night, with low amplitude

EEG as in wake, presence of theta activity (4–7 Hz), involuntary. It is rapid, eye movement based, pupillary construction, inactive of many muscles during dream, twitching fingers and toes. Spontaneous penile erection[262] occurs during REM sleep. During REM sleep, increases blood pressure, heart rate and metabolism rate like waking state. During REM sleep, some muscles are active and some are not. The motor responses to dreams are relatively minor. Sleepwalking, which is most common in children from, ages 4–12, and sleepwalking actually occurs during non-REM sleep and are not usually motivated by dreams (Purves, Augustine, Fitzpatrick, Hall, LaMantia, McNamara and Williams, 2004). REM sleep is more conscious than NREM sleep. REM sleep is based on brainstem, which entails mostly visual hallucination and increased emotion and lack of self-reflection and volitional control. According to EEG, REM images are similar to waking state.

b) **NREM sleep** – it is slow wave state. During NREM, dream also occurs before awakening and body functions are like slow rolling eyes, decrease muscle tone, body movements, breathing and blood pressure. It is not usually related or motivated by dreams. It is controlled by spindles by EEG[263]. It is considered as deepest sleep state.

Adding to this uncertainty about the purposes of REM sleep and dreaming is the fact that depriving human subjects of REM sleep for as much as two weeks has little or no obvious effect on their behaviour. The apparent innocuousness of REM sleep deprivation contrasts markedly with the devastating effects of total sleep deprivation mentioned earlier. The implication of these findings is that we can get along without REM sleep but

[262] *It is sexual arousal, Neuroscience, chapter 27, p 671.*
[263] "*Dreaming and the Brain: from phenomenology to neurophysiology", Elsevier journal, doi:10.1016/j.tics. 2009.12.001*

need nonREM sleep in order to survive. In summary, the questions of why we have REM sleep and why we dream basically remain unanswered (Purves, Augustine, Fitzpatrick, Hall, LaMantia, McNamara and Williams, 2004).

Most conscious or explicit memories are consolidated in the NREM phase and consolidation of non-conscious or implicit and procedural memories (e.g., cycling, typing) occurs during REM sleep. During NREM sleep, the role of sleep or dreams in memory consolidation is unclear[264].

Constructive – dreaming image has forms like waking. It can be illusion or hallucination but not without any construction like golden mountain, sky flower etc. It has subject-predicate form.

Vivid image – when we are seeing something during dream then we can recognise what we are seeing like 'man', 'cow' and 'water' etc. During dream we are not saying 'this is a man instead of cow' etc. So, this dreaming image is mostly vivid.

Sleep-based- dream always comes when external organs are closed to connect with the external world

and stage 4 of sleep occurs. Without sleep we cannot say 'he is dreaming in the waking' like saying 'I am dead' etc. If we say like this then it is error of language also. Therefore, dream always occurs during sleep.

Mostly visual – during dream we are mostly dreaming visual images rather than tactual, taste or listening. It does not mean that tactual, taste or listenting sensations do not occur in dream.

[264] *Tucker MA, Hirota Y, Wamsley EJ, Lau H, Chaklader A, Fishbein W. A daytime nap containing solely NREM sleep enhances declarative memory but not procedural memory. Neurobiol Learn Mem 2006;86(2): 241-247*

Camouflage – during dream, the image does not come as direct form like 'water means water' rather it's more symbolic like dreaming 'river' or 'water' means maybe it denotes thirsty but it is not universal statement. It depends on interpretation. The seeing man actually is not the man rather this is a combination form between man and ghost like this. It can happen. So, interpretation or physical explanation depend on the situation of dreamer.

Mind-wandering – "The timing and anatomical sources of local sleep intruisions could be responsible for both the behavioural consequences and subjective content of attentional lapses and may underline the difference between subjective experience such as mind wandering and mind blanking"[265].

Non-derogatory – it means during dreams someone is seeing that he is killed by someone but actually it is not happened or he is hurting someone but actually it is not. Simultaneously, dreaming crime is not legal like punishable. It can be dangerous for mental health but not like any crime. Dreaming image is not to be taken as witness source.

Ethical – someone got ethical solution in dream like dreamer can differentiate between 'ought' and 'is'.

Content based – dreaming data is based on experience. It has shape and colour. The story is based on dreamer's experience. Sometimes we are seeing very unusual or bizzare things that has also content whether it is true or false.

Metaphorical – Dreaming images are maximum metaphorical like projecting picture always indicates different meaning. It has good texture and varity.

[265] '*Does the Mind Wander When the Brain Takes a Break? Local Sleep in Wakefulness, Attentional Lapses and Mind-Wandering", Forntiers in Neuroscience, doi: 10.3389? fnins.2019.00949 Content*

Emotion – during dream emotions are present that is why we are happy, sad, angry etc. most of the dreams are based on desire. Amygdala controls our dreaming emotion in the brain.

Reason – dream has own judgement like if we do not get solution in waking problem, we get solution in dream. This is very familiar. Dreams can help to find solutions and segregating emotions from problems are impossible during awake, dreams do it for us during sleep. We can say that dream is a natural psychotherapy (Badgaiyan, 2019).

Perceptual disengagement – during dream eyes must be closed or half closed. Some birds or animals can sleep or dream with open eyes. But mammals compulsorily closed their eyes. It is not their choices rather it is by default. If someone opens his eyes during sleep or dream, it does not mean he is seeing something. Whether his internal functions are working differently during dream.

Internal process – dream itself is an internal process. During dream the circadian clock is working differently, not like waking.

Automatic – We cannot control our dreaming image. This is automatically coming. Here, I am not considering lucid dream at all.

Mainly 2 Dimensional – Dreaming image is controlled by brainstem and higher brain areas (coined by Prof. Mark Solms, South African Psychoanalyst and dream researcher), hippocampus and amygdala. Like waking, in generally we are seeing the image in dream.

Problem solving – There are lots of examples. I am giving two famous examples.

A German Chemist Friedrich August Kekule discovered the structure of 'Benzene molecule' in dream.

James Watson saw first time DNA in the form of spinal staircase during dream.

Methodical – Dream has its own methods for projecting images. That is why we can see two or three stories in one dream or separate or dream within dream etc. All have different interpretations. It is really methodical.

Stipulative – during dream the new image or new object can occur to solve our problem. This is neither true nor false. It depends on various interpretation. Like waking ostensively we cannot show dreaming image. For example, 'this is a' etc. It is possible only in dream.

Imaginary – Dreaming images are imaginary. It does not mean that waking state is excluded from imagination. We can say both states are imaginary.

Mostly Indirect meaning based – Maximum times dreaming images have indirect meaning or indirect connotations.

Brain stem aminergic[266] - the key biogenic animies[267] in the aminergic system include serotine (5-HT), norepinephrine(NE).

Hippocampus – it is located beneath portion of the brain. It records impression of incident and it plays very important role for recall memory.

Amygdala - The amygdala is a complex mass of gray and located in the frontal-medial portion of the temporal lobe (Purves, Augustine, Fitzpatrick, Hall, LaMantia, McNamara

[266] *It designates neurons.*
[267] *Neurofunctional systems*

and Williams, 2004). It records our emotions. During dream hippocampus and amygdala both are playing very important role.

Fore-brain - Dreaming is controlled by dopaminergic forebrain mechanisms involving at least the Temporal Parietal Junction (TPJ)[268].

Immersive spatiotemporal hallucination – The philosopher Jeniffer M. Windt coined dream as 'immersive spatiotemporal hallucination'. She is a Professor of Johannes Gutenberg-University, Mainz, Germany. Dreams are based on spatiotemporal veridical cognition based. 'Immersive' denotes that dream has own spatiotemporal domain. Like waking state, dream has own world. It is already taken for granted that two worlds have boundaries, one is real, and the other one is hallucinatory.

Active – dream state is active state means neuronal functions are present, some muscles are working and finally brain is active during dream rather we cannot say it is a passive state.

Not clear state as waking – it is highly controversial hitherto but randomly we can say physical activity (e.g. doing some work or keeping something one place to another) is present but dreaming structure is different.

DMN based - dream occurs when Default Mode Network[269] (DMN) and temporal lobe (memory) are active. But DMN and temporal both are active in dream and waking state also.

[268] Where temporal and parietal lobes meet in the brain.
[269] *This is large brain network.*

Transitional state between sleep and waking - Dream occurs between sleep and waking. Stage 4 sleep is the locus of dream and waking state means dreaming state is gone.

DRF based - Aristotle claimed that we cannot always recall our dreams. DRF means dream recall frequency. Usually, we can recall our 2 or 3 our dreams in a week. DRF has three methods like questionnaire scales, dream diaries, and laboratory awakenings (Schredl, 1999)

Consciousness based - The mechanisms of sleep and wakefulness occurs in a continuum[270], which resides at stage IV sleep to high alert. So, "wakefulness" has been designated as consciousness[271]**.** Consciousness means awareness. It means body is differently conscious during dream, not like waking. For example, external small decibel sound does not help you to awake rather the big horn helps you more. So, the intensity is the main prior stimulus for become waking conscious. Neuroscientist do not accept mind-body dualism, they believe mind and brain are same as per my understanding.

At the end, I would like say, In a normal life span of seventy years, an individual devotes at least 50,000 hours to dreaming: that is, 2,000days or 6 full years of dream time. Dreaming must therefore be not only psychologically intriguing but biologically important (Hobson, 1988)

Now I would briefly mention the dreaming nature in the light of modern psychology. Mainly, I am taking three psychoanalysts such as 1) Sigmund Freud, 2) Mary Whiton Calkins 3) Carl Gustav Jung, 4) Alfred Adler and 5) Norman Malcolm.

[270] *The boundary of memory state.*
[271] *Purves, Augustine, Fitzpatrick, Hall, LaMantia, McNamara and Williams, 2004.*

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)

He is a founder of psychoanalysis theory and practice. The main reason for his interpretation of dream is his father's death in 1896. Because of his father's death he was depressed and sad. After so many months, he realised something and he was decided to play self-analyst's role like he is a patient and he is using dreams as a tool for mental recovery. This is called "royal road to the unconscious"[272]. He discovered that dream has two different contents like manifest (where the image is superficial) and latent (the image is symbolic).

According to my understanding, he is not the first dream interpreter, rather his way is the turning point for 20th century. Much before that if we look upon mesopotian civilization, Egyptian civilization and medieval period, then we can see there are lots of interpretations about dream but all interpretations were based on religious beliefs like God and demon. In Greek, Morpheus is the God of dream. Dreams had been designated as demon's will.

But Freud had interpreted dream beyond any religious dispositions. He destroyed all religious belief systems regarding dreams. He was an avowed atheist. He explored dream as clinically and physiologically in the western tradition. That was a big challenge for him. He discovered that dream could be the new gateway for solving clinical problems. He hypnotised and invented a new theory of dream, "*The Interpretation of dream*" which was published in 1899.

On the other hand, I would like to mention Freud's famous dream which is called "Irma's injection". The dream was – Freud met his friend Irma (who lived at Austria) at some party in 23rd July, 1895. He told Irma that she did not follow his suggestions and

[272] *The Psychology Book, p 152.*

her health was not good. She had some throat infection. For her poor health, Freud's one friend gave her injection which carried bad chemical with dirty syringe. Then Freud woke up and sent a letter to Irma and he explained that story.

But the fact was – on the next day this story happened with Irma. Therefore, Freud's dream was true.

According to Freud, dream is formed by four different aspects like

1) Dream is a significant mental event.
2) Dream does not depend on one or two events rather it is a combination form of several events.
3) Memory is one of the major sources of dreaming.
4) Recent experience is important for dreaming.
5) Clinically and physically dream is the most important phenomenon for mental health.

Dream occurs through symbolic form and it is the locus where someone can fulfil his incomplete desires. It is based on mainly biological need like sexual desire. He differentiates mind into three types like conscious, sub-conscious and unconscious. We are not able to know the object of Unconscious state because it is like the invisible snow under the water which holds small visible ice and which is floating in front of our eyes. Like Floating ice consists conscious and sub-conscious states.

According to Freud, 'dream in a dream', someone is dreaming in the dream that his child was ill since long time and father was watching his son from the next door. One day child died and father is seeing the body is lying down with surrounded by candles. An old man who sat beside the dead body and was praying. Then father slept and dreamed again that his child was saying "Father, don't you see that I am burning?"

Then father woke up and saw the old man was sleeping and the bedsheets of the body both burnt by falling candle (Brill, 1938).

Freud's interpretation was "the bright light shining through open door on to the sleeper's eyes gave him the impression which he would have received has he been awake: namely, that a fire had been started near the corpse by a falling candle and 'I am burning' which was associated by fever and child died"[273]. That dream was based on true incident.

Another famous dream is 'the uncle with a yellow bird'[274] , this dream is not quite clear. Maybe Freud did not want to share the whole story. Actually, this dream had two pictures. One, Freud had a friend who liked him, R. R was his uncle but actually in the dreaming the uncle was with yellow beard. Second, his uncle had been cheated by illegal business and Freud's father told Freud that his uncle Joseph was not a bad man. Freud realised that his uncle was 'a simpleton' and yellow was the 'simpleton' of his character.

Mary Whiton Calkins (1863- 1930)

Mary Whiton Calkins was a philosopher and psychologist in the America. She was the first lady who was a president of American Psychological Association. She was the only female psychologist in 19th century who focused on dreaming phenomenon.

Dreaming phenomenon is an internal phenomenon which occurs during sleep. It is based on memory. It is a described form of consciousness. She thinks dream is always a conscious material, sensational, attributive and relational[275].

After her experiment, she thinks that visual images (85.0%) are more prior than other sensory forms.

[273] *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, p 436-437.
[274] Interpretation of Dreams, Chapter 4.
[275] *An Introduction to psychology*, p 400.

Dream is considered as illusion but the illusory contrast occurs in both dream and the waking states. She posits that dreaming illusion is related to some private, absorbed and unreal images which is quite similar with waking illusion[276].

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961)

Carl Gustav Jung was a Swiss psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. After 1910, he and Adler independently drifted out from the traditional psychological systems. Jung wanted to bring a new interpretation without sexual. That is why his concept and Freudian theory are two different poles on dreaming interpretations. He used the 'libido' term not only for any sexual starvation (Freudian connotation) rather he introduces this term as the creative force of mind.

There are mainly three points for the basis of the difference between Jung and Freud.

1) For Jung, sexual need or desire is not the fundamental desire for dreaming. Freud thinks dream occurs to fulfil our incomplete desire mainly sexual desire.

2) For Freud, unconscious state is the locus of repressed infantile wishes. Jung did not accept this notion rather he took different standpoints like infantile wish can be individual's wish but not universal. Jung admits unconscious term in a collective sense (all kinds of wishes are included).

3) The third point is symbolism. Symbols can be distinguished as material and functional. Material means external objects and functional means internal. Jung used functional symbols more because of the power of moral control. But Freud used functional symbol as sexual like 'snake' denotes sexual arousal. It can be true interpretation but it is not the final interpretation according to Jung.

[276] *Ibid, p 413.*

For Jung, sometimes thoughts, human tendencies, behaviours are ignored in waking state but it is expressed in dream. He designates Freud's interpretation as Analytical (Causal-Reductive) interpretation. Analytical interpretation is based on memory and instinctive process.

According to Jung, "my first deduction was that the dreamer had a strong resistance because he put so much energy into protesting that the dream was meaningless"[277].

Jung adheres the justification of dreams significance is based on fantasy. It does not mean that there is no fantasy in waking but in dream the fulfilment of fantasy is more deeper. It is proved deductively, not like Freud's theory which is based on only empirical truth. There is one famous example Aesop's fables[278]. The story is between a lion and as ass, these are symbols but the inner moral meaning is children are kind and happy very quickly.

Therefore, Jung always thinks that every dream has analytical expression which is based on our regular activity. It does not only depend on our un-fulfilment physical desires.

Alfred Adler (1870 – 1937)

He was an Austrian psychotherapist. One time he was a colleague of Freud. He was also independently formed a system about dream which was distinct from Freudian school. His expression of dream is mainly depending on regular predominant experiences.

Adler thinks that libido is not only based on sexual starving. It is the lack of striving of power. That power designates to our social restriction and moral dilemma. That is why libido occurs in a normal life to get success.

[277] *Dreams by Jung, edited by R.F.C. Hull, p 9.*
[278] *Ibid, p 27.*

The other point is inferiority complex. When someone is unable to do something then he is suffering inferiority complex.

These are two reasons for the understanding of libido.

Adler says "in particular, those two factors which influence the dreamer in his relationship with the world and reality, the social feeling and the striving for power, will make themselves evident in his dream"[279].

Adler also does not believe on any religious power for dream. The ancient famous dream interpreter Artemidorus had interpreted dream in the light of religious dispositions in his *Oneirocritica* book. Adler does not accept Artemidorus's theory of dream. Adler thinks that dreams are mainly based on personality demand. He opposed Freudian understanding of symbolism. Adler adheres that sometimes really we do not understand the nature of dream and sometimes we forget. But it does not mean symbols are only indicating the one track (sex). These symbols are caused by impending decision.

Therefore, Adler's understanding of dream is mainly focused between the social construction and human personality.

Norman Malcolm (1911 – 1990)

He was a great American philosopher. He started his explanation about dream in his *Dreaming*, book where he supposed to say that how do we explain the word 'dreaming' is same for all?

If we say memory is the source of dreaming, then for Malcolm, it would be the wrong introspection because he was highly influenced by Wittgenstein's structure of mental

[279] *Understanding Human Nature*, p 117.

images and according to Malcolm, everybody is different so there is no specific rule for recalling dream. When someone explains his own dreaming descriptions, it does not entail the validity of his descriptions always. It can be wrong. Mainly the concerning area is the description of dream because when someone tells his dreaming story, then always we do compare dreaming stuffs with the waking stuffs and if it does not match, then these are false. Or we are saying 'it was a dream'. So, the main question is not to focus on the dreamer's actual dream rather we do focus on the description of dream.

Malcolm says "we speak of 'remembering' dreams, and if we consider this expression it can appear to us to be a misuse of language"[280] because we can fail to recall our memory.

He says "it is not easy to understand the relation between dreams and waking convictions of having dreamt"[281]. Here, he took example to understand these two states like morning and evening stars both are numerically same but by reference both are different. Similarly, dream and waking both are inter-dependent and two different states.

There is one beautiful example given by Malcolm. Someone utters his girl friend's name in his dream. Malcolm's concerning area is "how should we be using this sentence?"[282] His explanation is his expression of love and it is true.

On the other hand, dreaming is not only the cause of body expression or any behaviour rather it penetrates different mode of language. Therefore, I would like to conclude that Malcolm thinks when someone is saying something in dream and next day the same thing will happen to him, then that dreaming descriptions are ostensibly true and sometimes if these are false then we cannot properly designate dreaming statements itself as false because when someone is saying ' I dreamt p', it means 'non-p' as well.

[280] *Dreaming , vol 5, p 56.*
[281] *Ibid, p 59.*
[282] *Ibid, p 61.*

Brain activity during dreaming and waking states

Brain function is the most crucial function in the body. Without brain function the body does not work properly. Body functions by brain's response. Dreaming phenomenon is not independent from brain function. Brain functions are different between waking and dreaming states, but brain is active in both states. In brain, we have four lobes, Frontal, Temporal, Parietal and Occipital. During dream prefrontal cortex and occipital cortex are working. Memory data are coming from temporal lobe during dream.

Here I would discuss the brain functional process during dream and waking state.

Dream occurs mainly in medial prefrontal cortex[283]. Dream itself is a state of stage 4 of sleep. Dreaming process actually is based on pre-experience, occurring stage and the reaction of the human body. Dream mainly is situated by REM and NREM sleep circle. The whole body function is due to circadian clock. By circadian clock every physiological system occurs. Memory is one of the major dream sources. Brain function is occurred by brainstem during REM sleep (Hobson, 1998).

Jennifer W. Windt says, "Hobson does not deny that dreams can have meaning and can reflect the personality and concerns of the dreamer. He just thinks that their meaning is transparent and immediately obvious to the dreamer, rather than requiring an elaborate process of interpretation"[284]

During dream, REM sleep is not the measurement for dream report because 20% awakening forms are not related with the dream report[285]. Dream can come in any sleep

[283] " *A specific area in the front of the brain that is associated with dream recall but also has a role in memory and decision-making" , The Science of Dreams , Frontier journal , doi: 10.3389/frym.2010.00140*

[284] *Dreaming: A conceptual framework for philosophy of mind and empirical research. MIT Press (cit. on pp. 28, 34).*

[285] *Resting Brain Activity Varies with Dream Recall Frequency Between Subjects , Neuropsychopharamacology journal 2014.*

stage and dream is controlled by forebrain. It has been shown in this article. In waking state, the measurement of any image is scheduled but in dream, the picture is not scheduled but REM sleep is characterized by low voltage high-frequency which is similar with waking state (Hobson, 1989). In waking, the eye opening is functioned by high-frequency (15-60Hz). This is called beta activity. In dream, sleep is characterized by slow waves (0.5–2 Hz). This is called delta activity.

During sleep, REM and NREM sleep (night) are moving cycle wise. Dream stare is also included. Every 10mnts the cycle is changing. It is examined by EEG test. REM sleep is high wave sleep and NREM sleep is slow wave sleep.

Usually when we are seeing something in dream that picture is occurred by brain functional process but in waking the perceiving object is present in front of the perceiver.

Now the question is why dreaming image is vivid and emotional? During dream, hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex are working.

On the other hand, during dream occipital cortex[286], orbitofrontal cortex[287], dorsolateral cortex[288], anterior cingulate cortex[289] are working.

During dream the whole brain is not functioning rather some specific portions are working. As a result, the body movement differs from waking state for the same action. For example, in the case of watching movie, someone's body movement is different than, dreaming image of watching movie.

[286] *This lobe controls visual section.*
[287] *This lobe involves in emotion and memory.*
[288] *This cortex controls our memory and cognitive activity.*
[289] *It connects between our emotion and cognitive state.*

"Debating whether dream consciousness and waking consciousness are "more similar" or "more different" is a futile enterprise. It is clear that both differences and similarities exist, but tabulating which list has a greater number of items will not necessarily allow us to draw any strong conclusions"[290].

So, both states seem like same state but there is some fixed differences from the perspective of brain function.

"Dreaming has also been considered outside the range of normal brain function because, by all outward appearances, the brain and mind are entirely "turned off" during sleep"[291]. But through Default Mode Network, there is some structural commonality between dream and waking activity of brain. On the other hand, the mode of default activity is always changing between two states. It is not fixed.

During dream, memory data are coming from temporal lobe but there is no apposite source where we can say this area is the cause of memory in temporal lobe. This is still undefined.

When dream occurs during REM and NREM sleep cycle then through memory the data occurs and by the presence of hippocampus and amygdala we can see the incident with our emotion. That is why the dreaming image is vivid and emotional like waking but the main differences are the level of frequency of brain.

Dreaming image can be measured by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)[292].

[290] *Dreaming, waking conscious experience, and the resting brain: report of subjective experience as a tool in the cognitive neurosciences, Frontier psychology journal, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00637*
[291] *Ibid.*
[292] "*a tool used to take pictures of internal body parts" (MRI).*

I am taking one example from Rebecca Spencer's experiment (2019)[293] who is a student of neuroscience at Purdue University. She shows dreaming images are created by brain during sleep. At first, the examinee sees some images in waking state then by MRI scan, she took the impression of images. After sleeping, she took the MRI scan of the examinee during dreaming. Both images are quite similar.

She said that due to this test most images are 60% matched with both states, but these matches are not perfect always[294].

According to my understanding, I have made one structure of the function of dream

Awake – > interaction closed with external organ –> local sleep (drowsy) –> stage 1 sleep –> stage 2 –> stage 3 –> stage 4 sleep (dream occurs) –> deep sleep -> awake.

This is the tentative chronology of the way of dream but now the main philosophical issue is why dreaming phenomena are important for us? how do we consider the word 'how' in dream?

According to neuroscience and psychology we are aware about the dreaming state but, can we say is there any chronology of the image in dream? Or, we know about the concept of dream mechanism and the brain function during dream through EEG test but why are we seeing particularly one image or different images or bizarre entities during dream? Or, can we decide what will we see tonight in dream apart from lucid dream? Or, can we control our dreaming mechanism? Or, can we say dreaming images itself are future speculative forms? Or, Is there any chronology of memory data for storage in brain? Or, which memory particularly comes to our mind at night? Or, If memory data

[293] *The Science of Dreams, Frontier Young Minds Journal, doi: 10.3389/frym.2019.00140*
[294] *Ibid.*

are the only source of dream then what is the source of unseen object or first seeing[295] object in dream? Therefore, some issues are uncertain and undefinable hitherto.

These basic questions are always hammering in our day-to-day life. That is why the notion of dream is important and cryptic for various disciplines and it is needed to analyse repeatedly because interpretations are not certain. On the other hand, we cannot neglect ostensibly this dreaming state.

The physiological relationship between dream and waking states

In this section, I would mention some physiological similarities between dreaming and waking states. Mainly the basic similarities are the way of 'thinking', 'imagining' and 'attention' etc. When someone is thinking in waking state, that structure is similar with dream also. It is applicable for 'imagining' and 'attention' too. For example, the cognitive structure is same in both states like 'I am imagining you', it is true in both states. It means we cannot say if someone is thinking about his special one in dream, that thinking is false in waking.

"Not only are the cognitive process involved in dream production the same throughout the night, irrespective of the physiological characteristics of the various sleep stages, but they also seem to be the same as those operative in waking"[296] (Cavellero and Foulkes, 1993)

It is true that physiological similarities do not always occur between two states. Some portions are similar and some are not. That is why we cannot deny the dreaming state. By circadian clock REM and NREM sleep circles occur and as a result dream occurs but

[295] *Here, I would like to say if we see new object in dream and that object does not exist in waking then we do not consider that object's existence in waking generally but I want to focus on that object as 'first seen' in dream. This is also relevant.*
[296] *Dreaming as Cognition , New York: Harvester- Wheatsheaf, p 133.*

we cannot say certainly that dream comes exact in particular this position. This is still vague and uncertain. The frequency of REM sleep is very much similar with waking frequency. On the other hand, spontaneous penile erection[297] occurs in REM sleep. This sexual arousal is quite similar with waking sexual arousal.

Dream usually occurs in NREM sleep or slow-wave sleep. It does not mean that dream occurs only in NREM sleep. There is an Activation- Synthesis theory (AST) regarding REM sleep and dream. This theory is advocated by Hobson and McCarley (1977).

According to this theory, mainly noradrenergic and cholinergic networks[298] are two most brainstem based interactive components. When these networks are working then REM and NREM sleep stages periodically occur in every 90mnts. In REM dream state, this AST focuses on dreaming experiences in brain. In this state, the oculomotor and vestibular systems and occipital lobe are active. Occipital lobe controls our visual process in waking and it provides the dreaming images in dream. So, in both states (waking and dreaming) occipital lobe is active. That is why dreaming images are vivid even bizarre entity is also vivid. As a result we believe both images.

There are little bit qualitative differences between REM and NREM sleep.

"The spectrum of NREM mentations (dreamlike) is produced by a combination of NREM-specific mechanisms with different numbers of dissociated REM process"[299](Nemeth and Fazekas, 2018).

"The more REM processes occur together in NREM sleep, the more dreamlike the NREM mentation will be (Nielsen, 2014)"[300]

[297] *Sexual behaviour.*
[298] *These networks are connected with prefrontal cortex which cortex is active in dream state.*
[299] *Beyond the REM-NREM Dichotomy, journal of Consciousness Studies, No. 11-12, p 16.*

Therefore, these circles (REM and NREM sleeps) are the continuation of sleep mentation. As a result, dreams are bizarre, emotional and vivid. On the other hand, in waking, feelings can be similar with dreaming feelings but the sources are different.

Later the picture of dream has been changed. It means dream occurs beyond the REM and NREM sleep mechanism[301]. Sometimes dream occurs when REM and NREM sleep circles are indistinguishable (Nielsen, 2000)[302].

According to EEG test, REM sleep is high-wave and NREM sleep is slow-wave but dream can occur in both sleep circle with vividness and bizarreness[303].

Dreaming data are usually forgotten (85%) but we do not forget waking data. So, how do we explain this statement? Or why do we trust on dreaming report?

According to my observation, the main reason for the forgotting is dreaming functional process and waking functional process are different. Brain is active in both states. It is true, but for the action in waking state, the function occurs in a different way and in dream the function occurs in a different way. According to circadian clock, all brain functional processes are divided chronologically. Not all are working simultaneously. May be the outcome is similar between waking and dreaming but due to different functional process the sources are changed in different states. That is why we forget.

For example, in dream when we are seeing the image, that source of image may be based on memory or any other data and memory data come from temporal lobe. During this dreaming journey the heartbeat or metabolism rate differ from the waking state. So, the image source is working differently in dream but in waking state the brain functional

[300] *Ibid.*
[301] *Ibid , p 19.*

[303] *Ibid , p 26.*

process is different and brain depends on external organ's response. That is why after waking up, the image maybe same but due to different brain activity, dreaming images are maximum forgotten or we cannot remember.

If we talk about our memory power for recalling dreaming data in the waking state, then it would be wrong, because the presentation of memory is distinct between two states. Therefore, in waking we can remember very difficult thing but we are unable to recall very small dreaming image.

Now **the second issue is about the trust on dreaming report.** Whether we should follow it or not.

This notion of trustworthyness is important for every domain. In our phenomenal world, without this notion there will be no equilibrium. Now the issue is about dreaming data. We are quite familiar about our dreaming state but unaware about the fact of dreaming like why dreaming images are similar like waking image? Or why dreaming images are true?

Without the notion of trustworthyness, we could not explain dreaming phenomenon as true phenomenon.

Mainly this issue is raised by Jennifer windt who is a philosophy professor. According to her, there are three basic assumptions[304] for scientific dream research.

1) *Experiential assumption* – dreaming images appear always real, subjective and conscious experience.

[304] *Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be sceptical about dream reports* , Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , doi : 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00708

2) *Transparency assumption* – dreaming images or data are transparent when these appear in sleep, because more and less dreaming data are useful or trustworthy for our experience.

3) *Reportability assumption* – dreaming images have been designated as a report of waking perception or report for our existential value. As a result, after dream, we say "I am alive".

The notion of trustworthyness regarding dream came to human mind after 20th century. Before the dreaming interpretation was guided by religious disposition like bad dream means effect of demon and good dream means effect of God. Mainly, Freud has changed this structure. He introduced dreaming phenomenon as the solution of mental health problem. He interpreted dream in a different way. So, the importance of trustworthyness of dream has been started from Freudian time.

Now the question remains as to are all dreams trustworthy? The answer is not all dreams can be trustworthy. Trustworthy dreams mean mainly experiential assumption based dream.

Now I would focus on emotional aspect of dream. We do feel emotion in both states, namely, dreaming and waking. The question is why do we feel the emotion in dream just like waking?

Dreams are always emotion based. Psychologist coins "hyperassociative"[305] because these emotions are guided by cholinergic or aminergic chemicals[306] (Hobson, 2002). As a result, we know that in dream what thing we have to do for respond like run, crying, smiling etc.

[305] *Dreaming, J Allan Hobson, oxford press, p 78.*
[306] *It is one kind of neurotransmitter who controls various nervous systems like dopamine, serotonin etc. this is related to our sleep.*

Now I will discuss total five dreams of different people in my life. I personally interpreted all five dreams which are related to our waking problems.

My friend Christopher Zieske is pursuing graduation in Psychology at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas, USA. I am sharing two of his dreams.

1. ***23rd April, 2020:*** He says "he went for vacation with family. This trip was family get-together. After reaching the destination, he stayed at motel. He saw one little girl (around 6/7 years) met an unwanted guy and later she was sexually molested by the unwanted guy. When Christopher got to know the story then he was fallen in a dillema, because that unwanted guy was his friend of friend and the little girl was sufferer. Then he saw his sister's blue colour face in his bathroom mirror" (dream is finished).

My interpretation – Vacation means he usually wants to break from his regular life. He is staying alone in Texas. So, family get-together is needed for him. That is why he saw that he went for vacation with family. Now the next point is about little girl, it means little girl is actually his sister who is 20 years old. Why Christopher saw his sister as little girl in his dream because her behaviour was immature and childish. In waking state, since long time she is committed to a wrong guy (according to Christopher's term). Christopher does not like that guy, because his characterless behaviour. In waking state, he tried to tell his sister about his boyfriend's behaviour but she does not bother. Actually, my friend got to know that his sister's boyfriend did very wrong activity with another girl and now the other girl is suffering. So, in dream, Chirstopher saw his sister as a little girl (for childish behaviour) with the unwanted guy (Christopher knows the guy but he does not like him that is why it came as 'unwanted'). Sexually molested means that unwanted guy can harm his sister. As an awareness Christopher saw that that little

girl is sexually molested by the unwanted guy. It means in waking state, it can happen with his sister. If Christopher cannot save her, then she will be the sufferer like that another girl. Now the issue is about friend of friend, it means Christopher says that dreaming guy is unwanted but he is not actually unwanted (Christopher knows him but does not want to consider). Here, 'friend of friend' is metaphor. Now, why bathroom mirror? It means bathroom mirror is a very private display. He is seeing his sister's blue colour face and here blue means Christopher imagines that his sister's boyfriend can harm her. A sister is always close to a brother that is why he saw his sister's face in the bathroom mirror.

Christopher's dream says that he has to save his sister's life from that guy.

This dream is based on the awareness of waking problem.

2. ***27th May, 2020***: He says "he went to the movie theatre alone. He was watching the movie. During the movie he felt uneasy about the darkness of the movie theatre. He was not comfortable with darkness usually. He knew that during the movie, all lights should be off but suddenly he was feeling suffocating. In the meantime, suddenly he met one girl inside the theatre. Both were feeling unwell. That anonymous girl suddenly told him 'I can't bear it any more'. Then they came outside and they decided to go to the rooftop for fresh air and they went. After that he was happy" (dream is finished).

My interpretation – the movie theatre is representing the whole world. The darkness represents the pandemic situation of COVID-19 what the whole world is feeling right now. All are symbols. Inside the movie theatre, at first, he was alone. Actually, at Texas he is staying alone. Suffocation or unwell signifies his loneliness and frustration as the effect of COVID-19 pandemic situation. He was feeling unwell inside the movie theatre

means he is the representative of all individual beings. Everybody is locked in their house as the prevention of this COVID-19 situation. My friend was not exceptional. That is why he is not feeling well and wants to get rid of this pandemic situation like others. As a result, he came outside.

Now I will explain about the anonymous girl. Suddenly he met with her but he is committed to another girl in waking. He did not see his girlfriend in his dream. He saw another girlfriend and they spent good time. During their meeting, he forgot about his girlfriend. He talked and went to the rooftop with the anonymous girl. But, why he did not see his girlfriend in his dream? It means their relationship is not quite well right now. His girlfriend is usually saying to him 'I can't bear it anymore' (I got to know after my interpretation). After that I am relating this statement between dreaming girl and waking girl. Both are saying the same statement. So, I relate with this statement that he wants to be free from his girlfriend as well as this pandemic situation (the darkness of the movie theatre). That is why they went to rooftop. 'Rooftop fresh air' means my friend wants to get back his previous normal life and maybe right now he wants to enjoy his singlehood rather than any complications.

***This dream is based on COVID- 19 pandemic situation and conscience*.**

3. ***The third dream of my bosom friend Rituparna Roy*** who is a doctoral student of my department at Jadavpur University Kolkata, India.

Her dream - Her story is very different. I know her personally. Since 4 years she told me repeatedly that she did not see any dreaming image in dream. According to her concern, once or twice in a year she saw dreams. But, she shared with me that story which is really interesting for all of us. When she saw dream then that image was the future prediction for her. That image is highly correlated and true in waking state according to

her. Mainly, she saw death incident like family or any known person. The dreaming image does not indicate the direct person's death story, it is camouflage. Like she saw death incident of someone who is known to her in her dream but in waking on the next day death incident happened. The dead body is not similar with her dreaming image but it is true that on the next day someone is dead in waking state. She saw only death incident whenever she dreamt.

She shared this story long time ago and she told me this dreaming story almost 10 mnths ago. (More and less, this is her structure of the dream).

My interpretation – in general she is very bold, confident, more practical and spontaneous lady. When I usually meet her, then I notice that every time she wants to take decision more practically than me. She takes decision very boldly and she can handle her problem easily without any hesitation or without any help at known or unknown place. She is independent and she is staying alone. It reflects on her behaviour, costume, presentation and everything. She usually does not want any help from other.

Now I am relating this above structure with her dream. Dreaming phenomenon is always a reflection of our whole experience whether it is seen or unseen, good or bad, pleasure or pain etc. It is based on our experience but sometimes it penetrates our future image. So, without waking image, dream cannot happen or without dream, waking state is incomplete.

The main reason of her rare dream is that she can handle her every problem in generally, in waking state. She does not believe any future tale. She is an atheist. She is realist also. Maybe these reasons are the main components of her rare dreams. That is why she does not believe any imaginative story or fictitious elements.

Death itself is a very concrete and real phenomenon for every living being. Nobody can deny it.

So, her dreaming story (death story) that immediately connects the next day with her waking image and she sees the extreme image of life and coincidentally it happened.

But why every time the dreaming image is matched with her waking image. That is inexplicable and this is still vague for me.

According to my observation, these are the cause of her rare dreams.

This dream is typically rare. I would say 'rare dream'. This dream is one of my friend Neetu Bhandari's who is doctoral student of department of philosophy at Punjab University, Chandigarh, India. Her hometown is Rohini, New Delhi.

Now I will interpret her dream.

Her dream (12th February, 2020) – "she is in the kitchen and cooking something with her boyfriend. Boy friend helped her for cooking. They are enjoying their conversation" (dream is finished).

My interpretation – this is very lovely and romantic dream. They are together in the kitchen. This dream explains that they are not always staying together that is why both of them are enjoying their presence. Usually, when people are staying together, then always they do not want to focus on their conversation, means conversation is like regular process. When someone says conversation is important and enjoying their cooking. It means there is some gap between them like they are staying outside separately that is why after long time they meet each other and cook together. Usually, we do not see any regular activity (cooking, cleaning etc.), but when we are seeing this images that means

they want to make more their presence special. Here the most important factor is that she did not see the location where she is cooking. Maybe they went somewhere for vacation or boyfriend's place. Finally, I would say this dream is lovable which explains their bonding.

This dream is based on love.

Now I will share my dream. This dream, particularly I have been seeing since a long time, before COVID-19 pandemic situation. I could not remember the exact date or time but this dream is old and repeatedly I am seeing.

I am staying at Sinthi, north Kolkata, India. My nearest railway station is dumdum. This is one of the main railway junctions of north-eastern railways and metro railway station.

My dream – I am seeing that I came from somewhere. I got down from the metro railway and took the escalator. I, the only person is standing in the platform. All machines, fans, digital clock are working properly. When I take the escalator, I saw ticket machines are working, escalator is working but the whole station seems like as if almost 2 or 3 years back people have left this place. Dry leaves, dust are everywhere. I am coming at the daytime. When I come outside the station. I am seeing only two people are seating in front of the pavement. When they saw me, they are calling me by my nickname. I do not know them. Even I did not see them before. Outside the station, only two people are waiting for me. The outside scenario seems like the silent place and that silence is there since long time. Then I woke up.

My interpretation - Now all over the world there is pandemic due to COVID-19. The regular picture has changed. All people are locked down forcefully by the government

order. Trains, buses and every essential vehicle are closed for long time. The number of death and affected people are increasing regularly. Whole world is devastating.

I tried repeatedly to find out the source pf this problem but could not find. Now we are in the pandemic situation. Maybe my dream was the future prediction. This is my tentative interpretation. Someone can interpret it in a different way or deny the interpretation with opposite arguments. It is open for all.

This dream is based on future prediction.

Therefore, maximum waking phenomena are connected with dreams and sometimes dream can solve our waking problems. Both are interrelated (physically and mentally) but dreams can be our future prediction (debatable) also or I can say that dreaming experience can go beyond from any waking experience.

Finally, I would like to conclude my fifth chapter where I have tried to show different levels of sleep, tentatively dreaming source, brain activity during dream, the nature of dream and some physiological similarities between dreaming and waking states. After all the above discussion, I have seen that dreaming phenomenon itself is a most important , most relevant, most contiguous and most coherent one with waking phenomenon. In this chapter, I have mentioned dreaming aspect in the light of Neuroscience and Modern psychology. Both states are equally important for our existence. We cannot deny ostensibly this dreaming state. Here, I have interpreted five different dreams of my friends where I found that both states are interdependent. We can get solution from dreaming state as well. In neuropsychological aspect, dream is also a concrete state where brain is active and nervous systems work differently like waking. There are some structural differences between two states but that difference does not indicate any rival method of each other.

In my thesis, I have an intention to show some basic physiological activity during dream because if we discuss the notion of dream from the perspective of internal and external mechanism regarding science and philosophy, then the discussion would be more concrete, understandable and relatable for everyone. That is why I took this standpoint. Here, I am not showing the whole physiological mechanism during dream. I just mentioned some sources of dream.

That is why, the notion of dream is most debatable, crucial, cryptic and relevant domain in science, philosophy and psychology as well.

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CONCLUSION

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The word ‘dream’ itself is the most significant term in epistemology and metaphysics. It is studied in the domains of philosophy, psychology and science. Mostly, it is considered as an unreal realm or false domain, but nobody can neglect this dreaming state. The validation of dream is discussed in several disciplines according to their methodology. Each of the above disciplines has different methodology to study the dreaming phenomenon, which is also important as waking phenomenon. From the time of *Upaniṣads*, dreaming phenomenon has been discussed. In Advaita tradition, dream is considered as *prātibhāsika* real and *Ācārya Gauḍapāda* proclaimed dream and waking states both as imaginations with respect of *Brahman* because *Brahman* is only admitted as real and true.

In psychology, dream has been discussed as a suppressed form of emotion where camouflage is an example. In Neuroscience, dream is considered as an ‘epi-phenomenon’ and functional state where brain is active. Therefore, dreaming phenomenon has been rendered in all most four to five disciplines. In all these disciplines it is posited as an internal state where image has been revealed inherently. Lucid dream is discussed in psychology and neuroscience but here I personally would not focus on it because it is lab-based experiment where dreamer is aware about the situation. In science, Oneirology is the separate domain only for dream.

In my thesis, I discuss dreaming phenomenon from the perspective of philosophical investigation. The whole discussion is rendered by analytical approach. Here, the main purpose is to determine the dream as real or unreal. Perhaps, it is being recognized as an internal and wish fulfillment gateway.

My whole study of dream is done from the perspectives of philosophy and some contemporary branches of knowledge. Every tentative current issue has been mentioned in my thesis.

My research question is: "*Can we differentiate dream from waking states*?"

This is the fundamental quest in my whole thesis. I have tried to determine whether the dreaming reality itself is false or it is true in different senses. This study is governed by *Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika* and *Advaita Vedānta* philosophy.

I have chosen particularly these two systems because Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika itself is a radical realist system and Advaita Vedānta is a radical idealist system. These are two extreme positions. On the other hand, I have added some contemporary issues regarding 'dream' from the perspectives of science and psychology.

We are all aware of the ultimate goal of Indian philosophy, namely self-realization and liberation from suffering. The main goal is to negate the ultimate misery. Self-realization will occur when the Self is to be considered as free from all boundaries. In Advaita Vedānta dreaming phenomenon has been given some degree of reality in the process of realization of *Brahman*. Realist, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas critically opposed dreaming state as real, which they interpreted in a unique way. For them, unreal means false or non-existent entity. It cannot be true anymore.

Advaita system is free from this radical step. They advocated three grades of reality. They denied the position that dream state completely is a false state and admitted it as having some kind of reality. Waking and dreaming states both are unreal from the perspective of the transcendent *Brahman*.

Here, I have introduced two positions, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta not as comparative formats. Rather, the main issue is to locate the classical structures of dreaming phenomenon with philosophical explanations.

On the other hand, I have tried to determine the physiological structural similarity between dreaming and waking states because both states are inter-related. Without dream or the different stages of sleep, waking state could not have been discussed.

There is a possibility that someone exists who is not familiar with a dreaming image, but I personally would not accept the claim, 'dreaming phenomenon does not exist', because maximum dreaming images are reflections of the waking state. Dreaming can be rendered as the 'first impression' as someone sees the image for the first time in dream. That is true and acceptable. It depends on our introspection measure because maximum images can be camouflage. For example, someone can understand the object of dream like seeing pot is the indication of something or someone can realize the divinity energy in dream.

In my thesis, I wanted to show that we cannot deny dream as an illusory or hallucinatory state, because I have showed that illusory state and dream both have different structures. Illusion can occur in dream like waking state but it is not an illusory state. This is the main objection against the claim that dream is illusory in my thesis.

The basic structure of illusion is that it is based on imposition of one entity upon the other. For example, rope and snake both are true individually but in the case of rope-snake illusion, snake is perceived instead of rope. In this case, rope is true but the mind due to some conditions, projects some other object on it. As a result, the identification is wrong.

On the other hand, for dream the impression is not same always. Like, when someone sees a new object in dream as 'first seen' and it is also true in the waking state, then how do we define dream as illusory? For example, in dream state any new message, any mathematical solution and any judgement can appear.

I have come across all these possibilities and mentioned the same in my thesis. I have no objection to accept the possibility of illusory objects in dream but my main look out is to determine that dream is not only illusory state.

If we accept dream is an unreal state then all possibilities of truth will be overlooked and undiscovered. I think we have to reconsider the dreaming reality not as a rigorous unreal phenomenon. According to Advaita Vedānta, dream *is prātibhāsika* real. I would like to take *Gauḍapāda's* standpoint to support dreaming truth. Thus, we know that *Brahman* is only real and the world is false in the light of transcendent reality. *Ācārya Gauḍapāda* says dream and waking both states are imagination. Imagination is occurred by ignorance. Self-realization will come when the ultimate ignorance will be diminished.

I have particularly added this illusion section because dream is always considered as an illusory state. Therefore, I focus on this issue rigorously with the help of the classical frame work. I have made the distinction between illusion and dream. The fundamental difference is that dreaming image is not bounded by any imposition. For example, when someone got the solution from dream then that solution is not based on illusion. This is familiar to all of us. Some identification can be true, as if we did not recognize the person in waking but dreaming images help to recognize the person.

If dreaming image is only illusory state then why do we adhere these solutions, recognition in waking? Why is it helpful in waking? Illusion is always based on two entities like internal -internal, external-internal or internal - external. One given object is

present due to some reason the visible object is imposed on the given object. This happened in ignorance. When ignorance will be gone then only given object will be present like rope is always present, but due to some reason snake is imposed on the rope. But when perceiver will realize the true entity then there is no snake.

Dreaming image does not always posit this structure. It is true that dreaming image is projected in a different form, which is not familiar with the structure of waking image. That does not mean dreaming itself is an illusion.

If dream is an illusion, then lots of possibility or creation or discovery will be false. The famous example is that a German chemist Friedrich August Kekule discovered the benzene molecule in dream in 1861-62. A noble laureate James Watson saw DNA in the form of spinal staircase in his dream.

On the other hand, we can't decide who is real or unreal? According to Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi (4^{th} century BC). His famous argument – there are two statements regarding dream, 1) Zhuangzi dreams butterfly and 2) butterfly dreams Zhuangzi. If dreamer is only true then we have to accept that 'butterfly dreams Zhuangzi' statement is true but from the perspective of waking reality second statement is false. Now the problem is if we believe dreamer is only real then Zhuangzi will be false or unreal in the second statement whereas he is already real as a dreamer in the first statement. So, contradiction is present. Therefore, we cannot say always dreamer is only real.

Hence, I would not say dreaming state is an illusory state. Illusion can occur in dream but not in itself. That is why I discussed why dream is not only an illusion or hallucination.

These are the fundamental issues of my thesis. I have studied the whole dreaming structure on the basis of these perspectives.

So, waking and dreaming both have the same status from the perspective of only truth *Brahman*. In this respect we can interpret all dreaming states as plausible truth in this phenomenal world. This is logically possible. Therefore, I can say dream is differently real in all aspects, not something unreal.

There are many statements regarding dreaming phenomenon where dream is considered as an imagination. That is why I mentioned briefly the imagination model and simultaneously I mentioned that imagination could occur in both the states. Without the understanding of imagination, there is no invention. This is fundamental to all. So, we have to know the imagination model in the case of dream. Perhaps, I have mentioned that dreaming imagination is based on any presupposition or not. It can come independently in dream. As a result, we can see the object or incident as 'first seen' (without any previous association). Like someone sees 'Z' in the first time in dream then the perceiver uses 'Z' in waking life. It can be possible. That has happened. Someone sees a new place in dream first time. In waking state, next day or later the perceiver visits the place and realizes she is familiar with the place. It is difficult to say ostensibly that dream is the only source of this new place. Now we can consider this possibility (dream can be imagination but not like any fairy tale) with the current fact without negation. This is true fact. We have to think again of it.

There are lots of example regarding this issue where the perceiver sees that the deity came to her dream and said to find her with mentioning the location. When the perceiver found the place then he saw the exact image of the deity. This kind of incident happens all over the world.

For example, in Kolkata there is one temple of Goddess *Ādyā Kālī*. One day someone saw her in dream with an exact form and location. Next day, the realizer found the goddess *Ādyā* on the same exact location. There is no dissimilarity. This kind of incidents are associated with several temples in India.

If dream is only imagination and based on illusory perception then how do we explain these cases? Thus, we are already aware that dream is an internal process where all external organs are inactive. Only mind is active. Perhaps, the function of the physical body is performed by mind or brain that is why the relationship of mind and body is necessary here. So I mentioned briefly the classical structures (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta schools) of this relationship because then only it can be easier to formulate the dreaming phenomenon.

I have added some contemporary physiological ideas because I wanted to look for the parallel ideas between cognition and physiological issues. For example, if someone is ill then she is not able to acquire cognition. Both are interdependent. As a result, in my last chapter I just mentioned some glimpses on it for comparative understanding.

I have mentioned some similarity and dissimilarity between dreaming and waking states. I have also focused on the contemporary issues regarding dream and sought to show that dream is not only unreal state or illusory state.

Therefore, I am *taking Advaita position (Gauḍapāda's*) to determine all possibilities of dreaming truth because if we accept *Brahman* is the only truth and apart from Him all is false, then dream and waking states both are false from the ultimate perspectives but are real phenomenally.

Finally, I would like to mention a few doubts which I entertain regarding dream. These are as follows.

If we believe that dreaming objects are the products of representations like memory, then how do we explain a completely new object appearing in dream? Generally, new data or products are not always outcome of memory in a waking state, why is it that in dreaming state a new object is always explained in terms of memory? If dream means image based on suppressed desired entity, then why are we sometimes seeing undesired entity in dream? Why is dreaming image appears as camouflage or bizarre?

In the dream of a chariot, we cannot have the physical presence of the *chariot* itself, it is true during the time of dream, but in the waking state '*chariot*' means the whole object, not any particular segment like wheel or flag etc. When the cognition of chariot occurs in the waking state, we are identifying the image '*chariot*' with the present object. But the chariot experienced during dream is not ostensibly identical with the waking one. That does not mean that dreaming chariot designates an actual chariot of the waking state. It can express a different meaning in somewhat different form. Thus, during the dream state we have the image of a *chariot* in the absence of an actual one. The cognition of chariot during the dream state appears in the absence of the actual chariot and it is regarded as an embodied cognition. So here the main issue is about the embodied cognition. Since in both the waking and the dreaming states, we find embodied cognition, why are we claiming the dreaming chariot ONLY as unreal or illusory?

The acquisition process of cognition is one of the main components for cognition. In dream, the cognition is there, it can be false also but can we say ostensibly that dreaming cognition itself is an illusory state? If we consider it as false, then this claim can lead

towards a dogmatic statement that it is by nature false which will overlook all other alternatives.

We are aware that there is no temporal relation in dreaming structure. Nay, if spacio-temporal structure is not present in dream, then without this structure the feeling comes to us and we realise 'this' or 'that', is it possible?

How do we say dreaming 'chariot' is false and waking 'chariot' is true? What is the basic criterion to claim dreaming state is tacitly false? Can we consider that for justifying dreaming phenomenon, memory or any representative theory is the fundamental one? If we say dreaming objects are inherently already presupposed, then can we say rigorously that dreaming objects are pre-supposition less?

If the ignorance is present in our whole phenomenal world, then 'how can we designate 'this is dreaming ignorance' and 'this is waking ignorance'? …. Is it possible?

If dream is guided by *avidyā* and pleasure and pain are also are guided by *avidyā,* then for pleasure and pain, these feelings are immediately cognized (*jñātaika sat*) but dream state is illusory……how is it possible? If dreaming pleasure and pain are false, then why these emotions affect our body in waking and dreaming both?

According to my understanding causal connection is also present in dreaming state because otherwise how do we explain the object recognition in both the states? Does emotion occur in any state without causal connection?

For each and every stage of life the physiological structure is an important clue to the reaction towards external world. So, the physiological stage is necessary to determine each situation in both dream and waking states.

Can we define which cell is the exact source of dreaming data?

If dreaming state itself is an illusory state then why people are suffering physiological difficulties in dream and problems seem real? Why cannot we control dreaming image? (Here, I am not concerning about lucid dreams in my thesis).

According to J. Allan Hobson, "…in a normal life span of seventy years, an individual devotes at least 50,000 hours to dreaming: that is, 2,000 days or 6 full years of dream time."[307]

My question - if dream state itself is an unreal or illusory state, then can we negate the whole 6 years of dream from our life?

Therefore, I think that all dreaming images are phenomenally real and meaningful too. Due to lack of understanding we do not realise the camouflage and bizarre forms of dream. If we *consider the Advaita model* of reality, then all possibilities of dreaming truth will be determined as justified phenomena by not saying dream is only an illusory state.

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[307] *The Dreaming Brain*, p 5.

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