

The *Navya-Nyāya* Concept of *Jāti*: A Fundamental Tool in Linguistic Operation

*Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment for the Degree of
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By

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
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The Navya-Nyāya Concept of *Jāti*: A Fundamental Tool in Linguistic Operation

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
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INTRODUCTION

Jāti has long been recognized as one of the most discussed and fundamental concepts of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. The notion *Jāti* has been primarily known as '*Sāmānya*' in *Vaiśeṣikas* or *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* technical terminology. This very notion of '*Sāmānya*' has emerged through *Vaiśeṣikas* or *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*' ontological view of world where they talked about seven '*padārthas*' or '*tatvas*' (ontological realities) of the universe and '*Sāmānya*' has been considered sequentially as the 'fourth' ontological reality amongst them. Maharṣi Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* first introduces this notion of '*Sāmānya*' as '*Jāti*' whereas from western terminology it has got its English equivalent as 'Universal' which has been safely adopted by the Indian philosophers as well in their translated works. It is noteworthy that though the notion of '*Sāmānya*' had been introduced by the early *Vaiśeṣikas*, it was early *Nyāya* or Maharṣi Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* which initiated a linguistic approach of this notion '*Sāmānya*' or '*Jāti*' apart from considering and explaining it as only an ontological entity. In *Nyāya-sūtra* we see that Maharṣi Gautama brought forth the notion of *Jāti* in the context of discussing meaning of word and considered *Jāti* as one of the meanings of word along with *ākṛiti* and *vyakti*. Now, as we know word, meaning etc these are discussion regarding language, henceforth consideration of '*Jāti*' as meaning of word surely broadens the range of its (*jāti's*) discourse in terms of be able to enter into the sphere of linguistic discourse apart from ontological one. However, later on, following the foot step of Maharṣi Gautama, his ancestors or astute commentators of *Nyāya-sūtra* such as Vātsyāyāna, Uddyotakara, Udayanācārya, Bācaspati Miśra, only to mention a few, continued to proceed further ahead in this regard considering '*Jāti*' as meaning of word. On the other hand, On the

Vaiśeṣikas or early *Vaiśeṣikas* end, they continued with the ontological approach of discussion on the notion of '*Jāti*' until the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* tradition (where both of the views of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣikas* have been attempted to merge into one) introduces. While going through the different phases of writing of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* school (from the first period or pre- Diṇṇāga period or early *Nyāya* and early *Vaiśeṣika* period which started with *Vaiśeṣika-sutra* and ended in 5th century with the advent of the famous Buddhist logician Diṇṇāga to the ultra-neo period or the recovery period of *Navya-Nyāya* in 19th century), it seemed in my observation that just like *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* both individually have early and later phase, in the same way the collaborated phase or '*Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*' phase has its early and later period of writings as early *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*' period and later *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*' period.

8th century might be called as the starting point of Early *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* period. It was Vācaspati Miśra who through his writings in late 8th century or since the beginning of 9th century had been appeared as the initiator of the amalgamation or synchronization of the two individual schools *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* as '*Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika*'. And after him this early period continued up to near about 10th or 11th century with the writings of Jayanta Bhatta, Bhāsarvagyaṇ, Shivāditya, Vyomshivācārya, ShridharBhatta ,Udayanācārya ,etc to mention a few. Then, with the advent of Gangesh Upadhyaya in 14th century through the magnum opus *Tatva-chintāmani* the enriching *Navya-Nyāya* period has started when *Nyāya* epistemological discussion has been seen as reaching at its peak. Raghunāh Siromoni, Mathurānāth Tarkabāgish, Jagadish Tarkālankār, Gadādhara Bhattācārya and so forth all these eminent *Naiyāyikas* contributed their works in this period of *Nyāya* which carried on up to around 17th century. With the beginning of 18th century

or late 17th century again there had been found another attempt to synchronize the two systems *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* or as referred above as later *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* period. In this later period we got *Tarka-bhāṣa*, *Tarka-saṁgraha*, *Bhāṣā-parichheda* and so forth all these inestimable *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* texts.

Now, it is to note that, in the context of presenting the notion of *Jāti* from linguistic standpoint, except the early *Vaiśeṣikas* almost all scholars from the different phases as shown above from the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* system have considered *Jāti*'s role in language usages. And in all places of their discussion with regard to this they have shown *Jāti* basically as one of the primary meanings of word (*mukhyārtha/śakyārtha*) which is subjected to be denoted or referred by the word itself in terms of its(word's) significatory relation(*vṛitti-sambandha*) with meaning. Apart from *Jāti* there are two more meanings (*vyakti and ākṛiti*) which have been considered by them as meanings of a word simultaneously. We find exact in this context a very debated issue on which language philosophers of India have been arguing over since years that is, which meaning amongst these three aforesaid meanings should actually be taken as the primary one? Not very surprisingly, we got to see many different views with one considering only *Jāti* as primary meaning of word whereas other one considers *Vyakti* as the primary one or *ākṛiti* as the primary meaning of word And that's how evolved '*Jātiśaktivāda*', '*Vyaktiśaktivāda*' and '*ākṛitiśaktivāda*' these three doctrines in Indian philosophy of language. *Vaiyākaraṇ Vyādi*, *Navya-Naiyāyika* Raghunāth Shiroṃṇi are known as *Vyākti-śaktivādiṇs*. *Vaiyākaraṇ Vājapāyana* and *Mīmāṃsakas* are identified as *Jātiśaktivādiṇs* But very unlike to all these three views early *Naiyāyikās*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās* went on considering '*Jātyākṛitivyākti- śaktivāda*', though *Navya-*

Naiyāyikas are found to accept *Jātivīśiṣṭa-vyākṛti-śaktivāda* in this regard. However, *Jātyākṛtivyākṛti- śaktivāda* entails that all of the three meanings (*jāti*, *vyakti* and *ākṛiti*) should be considered as meaning of a word with one condition added to it that given a specific context one meaning would be prevalent over other two. Thus, the word 'cow' according to them though has got three primary meanings (*śakyārtha*); *Jāti*(universal), *Vyakti*(individual) and *ākṛiti*(configuration) as in cow-hood, the individual cow and the pattern or configuration of cow, in the context of sentence like 'bring the cow', the meaning as individual cow will prevail ,or when someone asks 'make a cow using clay' then the word cow prevalently denotes the configuration of cow ,and in another context if it is said 'one should not touch cows with feet' then here cows will mainly denote the meaning as cow hood or *jāti*. In this regard *Naiyāyikas* firstly assuming the main *purvapakhsin* presented the two thesis of *vyaktiśaktivādins* and *ākṛitiśaktivādins*, then have shown the refutation of these two by the another *purvapakhsin* *Mimāmsakas* through their *jāti-śaktivāda* and finally they refuted this *jātiśaktivāda* and established their own doctrine as '*jātyākṛiti-vyākṛtiśaktivāda*'.

Thus, in Indian tradition whenever philosophers attempted to discuss the notion of *Jāti* from the standpoint of language they ended it with discussing these doctrines and continued debating on whether *Jāti* should be considered or prioritized as meaning amongst the three meanings of word? But somehow it seemed that as *Jāti* unlike the other two (*vyakti* and *ākṛiti*) is not a concretely existent entity (*murta-dravya-viśeṣ*), hence there should be detail discussions on how *Jāti* is meant to be a 'meaning' of word in a sentence. And moreover, as it(*jāti*) indeed has been considered as meaning of word in a sentence then there should also be discussions on how it

performs its function as meaning in sentences for a successful sentential understanding or linguistic communication. To put it more simply, we got the point that *Jāti* should be regarded as meaning of word but being a meaning how does it help or contribute in the entire mechanism of cognizing sentence-meaning(*Vākyārtha*)? As far as my observation goes, we can not find an overall discussion or initiative been taken to find *Jāti*'s specific roles or actions as primary meaning of word (*śakyārtha*) in the causal mechanism or process of a fruitful sentential understanding, rather through the discussions of *śaktivādins* doctrines we got partial views regarding this. Hence, I would like to put forth this particular query on *Jāti*'s contribution in sentential cognition as the focal point of this present work. And moreover, I will be particularly dealing with *Nyāya* or *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* and *Navya-Nyāya* perspectives on this, hence understanding the procedure of our language usage or language mechanism to meet this particular query will be elaborated based on the said system of philosophy mainly. My chief concern shall be to explain *Jāti* and its functions from the perspective of language but at the same time keeping in mind its ontological approach as the broader range of it.

For an appropriate and structuralized presentation I will be discussing the entire matter of this work segregated into four chapters. Let's move on to discuss in brief the way all the four chapters have been planned to accomplish the work.

In the First chapter, titled as 'Word, Meaning and *Jātyākṛitivyakti*' as meaning of word, I will be discussing first the idea of 'word'(or 'Vāk' as mentioned in the ancient texts) to begin with the references from Veda, Upaniṣda, Vyākaraṇa and then will bring forth its(word's) concept in accordance with the Indian philosophical schools. After that, concept of 'meaning' will be

discussed since the ability to denote meaning has been regarded as the main characteristic feature of word or *śabda*. In Indian tradition, three types of meaning of word have been accepted, they are *Vyakti* (individual), *Aākṛiti* (configuration) and *Jāti* (Universal). And amongst these three meanings *Jāti* as meaning of word will be elaborated from the perspective of Indian philosophy of language along with the views of *Vaiyākaraṇas*. And moreover, in the context of discussing *jāti* as meaning I will be discussing *jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivāda* with reference to the refutation of *vyaktiśaktivāda*, *jātiśaktivāda* and *ākṛitiśaktivāda*.

In the Second chapter, 'Concept Of Universal in *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy' as the title suggested, concept of *Jāti* or Universal in accordance with *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* system will be elucidated. Here, concept will refer to the ontological concept of *Jāti*. How *Jāti* as one of the seven '*padārthas*' is being ontologically understood with all its features, classifications in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* terms will be discussed. Since, Buddhist system of philosophy completely denies *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*' view on existence of Universal hence, a critical aspect of analysis between these two systems with regard to Universal's ontological existence will also be included in this chapter.

Third chapter, that is 'Cognition, Language and its process of functioning in *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* framework' will bring forth the main backdrop of this work. Before demonstrating the verbal cognition and its process considered in *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* system I will elaborate a little on cognition (*jnāna* in *Nyāya* terms), its nature, distinct nature of *jnāna* and *pramā* (valid cognition). In the final section of this chapter, I will be focusing on the entire process and causal mechanism

required for sentential understanding (*Vākyaṛthabodha* or *Shābdabodha*) according to the said system.

Fourth chapter has been entitled as ‘Understanding *Jāti*(Universal) in *Navya-Nyāya* method of linguistic operation’. After putting forth the elaboration on the process of language usage and linguistic framework of *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* system, in this chapter I will be making an attempt to show *Jāti*’s indispensable and fundamental role in this previously mentioned process of understanding or cognizing from words. *Navya Nyāya* is eminently known for their methodology on language by which they introduced an all new, reformed, meta-language or artificial language equipped with technical terms and process. In the course of time they came to realize that most of the disagreement, misunderstanding regarding any specific subject matter of scriptures occurs because of the ambiguous usage of language or ambiguity of the natural language. Hence, this initiative of the *Navya-Naiyāyikas* was to keep language free from ambiguity and more importantly for a better and successful understanding of the ancient scriptures so that valid and appropriate argumentations amongst the scholars can be carried on. Now, in this chapter in the context of fulfilling the main objective or to get an appropriate resolve to the main query of this present work (that is to say, *Jāti*’s function in verbal understanding), I will be mostly relying on this *Navya-Naiyāyikas* methods and technical analysis of language. Following the renowned *Navya-Naiyāyikas* text *Navya-Nyāya Bhāṣā Pradīpa* by Shri Mahesh ch. Nyāyaratna I will be making an attempt to demonstrate using diagrams how *jāti* serves as one fundamental linguistic tool in sentential understanding.

First Chapter

Word, Meaning and *Jātyākṛitibyakti* as meaning of word

Idam andhaṃ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṃ jāyeta bhuvanatrayam /

Yadi śabdāhvayaṃ jyotir āsaṃsāraṃ na dīpyate // 1.4 //

- *Kavyādarśa*: Dandin ¹

(This entire triad-of-worlds would have become blind – dark if the light of word had not been shining all through the saṃsāra.)²

It is universally acknowledged that the main and most important element of our language i.e. Word has its own worldwide existence as if the whole world is expressed through words and hence this worldwide existence of Word is inextricably associated with mankind as well. All objects or things in this world are inevitably entitled by words. To express or to make others understand our exact feeling we, the entire mankind, use nothing but words. Hence, *Śabda* or Word is considered to be the main resort for exchanging all of our thoughts with one another. And this kind of unique and extraordinary power of *Śabda* or Word has been acknowledged in all our ancient scriptures like Veda, Smṛiti-śāstra, Vyākaraṇa, different philosophical schools and even in poetics. In ‘*Rgveda*’ to establish the unique existence of *Vāk* with all its greatness it is said “*Aham*

*rūdrebhirvasubhiścharāmyahamādityairūtaViśvadevaiḥ / Aham mitrāvarūṇobhā
bibharmyahamindrāgniahamaśvinobhā*” – *Vāk-sūktam, Rgveda,10/125/1* (I, here ‘I’ means the
supreme power ‘devī’ identified with *vāk*, ‘I’ travel with the *Rūdras* and the *Vāsus*. ‘I’ wander with
the Adityas and the Viśvedevās, ‘I’ hold aloft Mitra-Varūna and Indra-Agni and the Aśvin twins
–*Rgveda*, tr.by Ralph T.H. Griffith, p-489)³. And again there is another hymn in *Vāk-suktam*,
Rgveda that says it is actually the eternal vibration of *vāk* through which the entire world begins.
It says “*Ahameva vāta iva vatha yiva pravāmi/aṛabhamāṇā bhuvanāni viśvā/par divā para enā
pṛithivyā etāvatī mahinā saṃ babhūva*” – *Vāk-sūktam, Rgveda,10/125/8* (‘I’, breathe a strong
breath like the wind and tempest, while ‘I’, hold together all existence beyond this wide earth and
beyond the heavens, ‘I’ have become so mighty in my grandeur.-*Rgveda*,p-489)⁴

But it is to be noted here that the word which we utter to express our thought is not the very first
level or form of *Vāk* or vibration of sound rather it is the final form of sound that covers previous
three levels to get its ultimate spoken form that emerges from our speech organ or articulators.
Hence it is rightly said in *Rgveda* “*Chatvāri vāk parimitā padāni /tāni vidurbrāhmanā ye
manīṣiṇḥ.Guhā trīni nihitā nengayanti turīyam vācho manuṣyā vadanti*”-*Rgveda*, 1. 164.45 ; it
means, speech had been measured out in four divisions, the first three forms (*Parā*,
Paśyanti,*Madhyamā*) are hidden ,only the fourth one i.e. *Vaikhari*, is the articulated, audible
sound, is what we speak.

Now to talk about the views in Upaniṣads regarding this, it is observed that the basic intention of
accepting the vast and universal entity of *vāk* is mainly for its pragmatic excellence; hence, it has
been said in *Chāndogyoponiṣad* “*yadvai vān nābhaviṣyanna dharmo nādharmo vyjñāpayiṣyanna
satyaṃ nānṛtm na sādhu nāsādhu na hṛdayajño nā hṛdayojño/ vāgevaitatsarvaṃ vijñāpayati*

vācamupāśveti”-7/2/1⁵ intends that *Vāk* is through which we express and understand everything in the world, it is the cause for which everything exists whether it is merit or demerit, true and false, good and bad ; It is because of *vāk* that language has evolved. In every practical usage *Vāk* is inevitably associated.)


In *Bhagavad Gitā Parā-vāk* is compared with the highest and pure form of consciousness and *Vaikhari-vāk* is said to be the manifestation of that pure consciousness.

Now, let’s find out *Vaiyākaraṇās* take in this regard. Grammar (traditionally known as *Vyākaraṇa*) was one of the most essential parts amongst the *Vedāṅgas* to study and preserve the pristine purity of the scriptural texts or the *Vedas* (that is completely linguistic in nature or a body of statements). As it (*Vedās*) is infact a body of statements and we know very well that words or *śabdas* or *padas* are the fundamental or primary element of a statement and as well as of language, hence to secure its (*Vedas*) purity, it was necessary to use pure or correct form of words and also to follow the apt syntactical principles to get an appropriate (or pure in this context) formation of that very statement. And this is where *Vyākaraṇa* and *Vaiyākaraṇas* played its inevitable role whether it is by differentiating correct forms of word (*Sādhu śabda*) from the incorrect forms of word(*a-sādhu śabda*) or by constructing all the principles on syntax and semantics at the same time. Hence, it might be needless to say that word or *śabda* is actually the thing *Vaiyākaraṇās* are concerned about. Pāṇini in his major work *Aṣṭādhyāyī* defines word in *saṃjñasūtra*,1.4.14 as ‘*suptiṇantam padam*’ i.e. anything that ends in an inflectional suffix.⁶ A case ending indicated as *sup* and a finite verb ending referred to as *tin*. These two terms (*sup* and *tin*) are basically regarded as *Pratyāhāras* or abbreviate designations that provides the *śabdarūpam* or word-form. Patanjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*, commentary on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* justified the word ‘*anta*’ that has been used in the referred aphorism.

He clarified that although by the rule of ‘*tadanta*’(1.1.72) it means and includes all that which ended with a *sup*-affix but still the word ‘*anta*’ used in this *sūtra*(1.4.14) is needed to imply that *tadanta* sutra does not apply to rules of *saṃjñā*(definition) made with regard to affixes.⁷ Thus Pāṇini and the commentators after him with their utmost acute analysis brought about all the rules on linguistics, syntax and semantics. Another monumental work in the history of *śabdatatva* is Bhartṛhari’s treatise *Vākyapadiya* where we find his unique interpretation of *śabdatatva* that explains there is no dichotomy between *śabda* and *brahma*, but there is only one reality i.e. *śabdabrahma* from which the universe emerges, manifestation of objects occur (“*Anādinidhanam Brahma śabdatatvam yadaksaram / bibartate arthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ*” – *Vākyapadiya*,1/1)⁸ Apart from discussing on this divine aspect or origin of *śabda* Bhartṛhari also noticed that words or sentences have three other aspects too as *vaikṛta-dhvani*, token of every utterance; *prākṛta-dhvani*, sound patterns or the name of the class of which the previous various tokens are members. And the third one is the internal aspect or the integral meaning-bearing symbol *Sphota*.⁹ However, it has been observed since ancient times that while describing the nature of ‘Word’, there has been always a trend to describe ‘Word’ as an entity which has its own eternal, unitary nature and existence as Brahman, and also this unitary entity can manifest itself into meaning bearing unit and also as uttered words and at the same time everything referred by words existing in the world. Thus it is to note that whether it is the era of *Rgveda* or Vyākaraṇa word has been accepted as having transcendental and empirical both of the existence.

In Indian Philosophical schools we firstly find that the basic division of Indian Philosophy i.e. *āstika* and *Nāstika* comes from the fact of accepting or denying the authenticity of *Vedās* or *śruti* which is purely verbal in nature, hence scriptural testimony gets the highest priority from the very beginning of Indian philosophy. And not only that, while discussing their respective

epistemological views where they seek the means or source of our valid knowledge, most of the schools (except Cārvāka from Nāstika school and Vaiśeṣika from Astika school) have placed *Śabda* as one of independent sources of our valid knowledge or *Pramā* and consider it as one of the *Pramāṇas* i.e. the source or means of *pramā*. One thing needs to be clarified that although Cārvākās and Vaiśeṣikās do not accept *śabda* as an independent source of knowledge, that does not mean *śabda* is not at all a source of valid knowledge for them. Their main intention is to reduce *śabda* to other accepted *Pramāṇas* basically either in *Pratyaksa*(perception) or in *Anumāna*(inference). Hence, it can be rightly said that there is no school in this world, who might be sceptic about *śabda* as a source of valid knowledge. Now, *śabda* as a source of valid knowledge is understood as *śabda-pramāṇa* by the Indian philosophers. *Śabda* or a meaningful utterance by derivation is always able to deliver some meaning but that doesn't mean that it will be a source of valid knowledge at the same time. That is why most of the Indian philosophers mainly Naiyāyikās develop the definition of *śabda-pramāṇa* as ' *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* '¹⁰ as the standard definition of *śabdapramāṇa*. ' *āpta-uchharitatva* ' that is utterance by *āpta* happens to be the source of valid knowledge i.e. *pramāṇa*. However, in this context 'Vaiyākaranās differentiates *śabda-pramāṇa* from *pramāṇa-śabda*. They think *śabda* in its existential level is expressed in its very pure form that is eternal(*nitya* or *siddha*) and *sādhū*(well-formed) and it maintains this status through all the three levels of speech i.e. *parā, pashyanti, Madhyama*. For the Vaiyākaranās this existential state of *śabda* should be considered as *pramāṇa-śabda*. On the other hand, when this *pramāṇa-śabda* is uttered by an speaker in its fourth level (that is *Vaikhari*) which is the functional state of *śabda* and where at the same time *śabda* made itself capable of being an instrument or means of a valid knowledge or *pramā* of a hearer, it is only then that it should be regarded as *śabda-pramāṇa*. We can understand this more clearly with the following diagram:



Now let's see in brief what different philosophers or their schools have to say on *Śabda* as *pramāṇa*. Except the Mimāṃsakas, mainly prābhākaras (who regard *vedic* scriptures or *vedic* authoritative instruction as *apauruṣeya* that is not written by anyone and has an intrinsic value of its own and hence the only reliable words or testimony), all of the others philosophical schools were quite liberal in accepting human authoritative instruction also (though with some required criterion of that authority) as a valid source of knowledge or *pramāṇa*. To begin with the Jaina epistemology, the Jainas classify mediate or indirect knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*) into *Mati* and *śrūta*. *Mati* is knowledge through intellect while *śrūta* is that knowledge acquired through *aptopadeśa*, hence in Umāsvāti's *Tattvādihigama-sūtra*; *śrūta-pramā* or knowledge is defined as '*aptopadeśad bhavati*'; means that which is the result of communication from reliable authority.¹¹ Sāṃkhya philosophers define *śabdapramāṇa* as '*Aptaśrūti bachanam tu*', means word or sentence communicated by a trustworthy authority is what considered as

śabdapramāṇa.(*Sāṃkhya-kārika*,5) ¹² Yoga school in this context is of the same opinion and defined *āgama* or *śabda-pramāṇa* as ‘*āptavacanam*’(yoga-sutra,I.7).¹³ Now, let us talk about another two of the similar philosophical schools, i.e. Mimāṃsa or Purva-Mimāṃsa and Vedānta or Uttar-Mimāṃsa. In Purva-Mimāṃsa school, we find that to establish the authenticity of Veda greatest importance has been given to *Shabdapramāṇa* in essence and the knowledge we get from verbal testimony. In *Prakaraṇa-pancikā* of Shālikanātha Miśra we find the definition of scriptural testimony as a cognition of object by means of the knowledge of words, not through sense-object contact (‘*sāstrantu śabda-vijñānāt-yad-sannikṛstārthe-vijñānam*’ p-11) ¹⁴ Prābhākara school admits only the word or testimony of *vedic* scriptures as reliable (since words used by human being convey fallible informations, they reduce human testimony to inference) while Bhāttas divide verbal testimony into two personal or human (*pauruṣeya*) and impersonal or non-human (*apauruṣeya*) and they consider both as trustworthy. And in fact, Bhatta School regards that each and every object can be referred by words hence it has been rightly said ‘*Atyantasyapi jñanam arthe śabda karoti hi*’(Shloka-Vārtika, Aphorism-5,109-113,P-137)¹⁵ means we have verbal cognition (śabda-jñana) even of the things which are non-existent like hare’s horn, sky-flower etc. Moreover, we also find that while talking about the functional aspect of *śabda* Mimāṃsakās consider the structure of the uttered word or sound (*Dhvani*) as a mere aggregate of letters (*varṇa*) and not a whole or *Avayavi*. For them, *varṇa* or letters are eternal and they are manifested through sound or *dhvani*. Now, Vedāntins while explaining the phenomenal world and its usage, accept six *pramāṇas* and *śabda* or verbal testimony is one of them. And following the Mimāṃsakās, Vedāntins (advaitins) defined *śabda* as ‘*varṇa eva śabda*’: the word is a collection of letters. The early Nyaya in this context provided a syntactical definition as a sequence of phonemes which ends in term with *vibhakti* or inflection is considered as *pada* (*te vibhaktantaḥ padam*.N.S-

2/58/187) ¹⁶or *śabda* that seems to be quite close with Paninian definition. While this early definition focuses on the formal or syntactical aspect of pada or *śabda* on the other hand the Navya Nyaya came up with a definition of pada as *śaktam padam*¹⁷ which is compatible with its meaning aspect or semantic approach. But it is also noteworthy here that apart from the differences they remain same in accepting *śabda* as an independent source of knowledge or *pramāna*. Gautama in his Nyāya-sūtra defined *śabda* as a means of valid knowledge as “*āptapadeśa śabda*”, N.S-1.1.7. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on Nyaya-sutra explained *āptaḥ* as the person who has distinct knowledge of *Dharma* or the principles on which all the human actions and universe rests on and the *āptaḥ* is also one who knows the ‘categories’ (*padārthas*) of the reality and the relations among them at the same time. And apart from that he (*āpta*) should always have an intention of communicating nothing but the truth and he should also be well learned on his specific subject, hence, it is said in commentary ‘*cikhyāpayisayā prayukta upadeṣṭā ceti*’¹⁸.

So far we have got an idea of word or *śabda* mainly from its metaphysical world-wide existence that is followed by an obvious epistemological enquiry. Now as we know the most essential and unique feature of word is to signify meaning that enables the world to communicate thoughts hence ‘word’ in its semantic aspect too is capable of maintaining its mightiness. Meaning of word in Indian tradition technically named as *Artha* or *śabdārtha* or *Padārtha*. In Vaiyākaraṇās tradition we find Yāska and his followers concerned with the etymological meaning of word. In Philosophy it is the Mimāṃsakās school who initiated the detail study on sentence and all its structural parts that includes both word and its meaning. The thing that is signified or referred or intended by a word, is what generally understood to be the meaning of that word. we find that there are several different meanings of the word ‘meaning’ which is technically known as ‘*Artha*’. It says “*Arthahabhidheye shabdanam dhana-karan-vastusu prayojone nibrittou ca bisaye ca*

prabartate”¹⁹ it means we use the word ‘*Artha*’ with different meanings such as appellative, wealth, ability, necessity, cause, thing etc. But amongst the meanings mentioned philosophers take the meaning as appellative (*Abhidheya-Artha*) that is inclined to giving of names or meanings of words as per dictionary (*abhidhān*) or some other authentic source like *Vyākaraṇa* etc. Moreover, these appellatives or *abhidheyārtha* are regarded to be of two kinds depending on their sources: appellatives that has etymological source, is taken as scriptural (*śāstriya-abhidheyārtha*) and the others apart from having etymological source, is thought to be as practical (*Laukika-abhidheyārtha*). And apart from these one of the most important views in this regard is considering ‘*Pravṛttinimitta*’ (cause for volition or motivation) as meaning of a word. In simple words, the thing that actually triggers person’s volition before using a word is considered to be the meaning of word. And we find in *Vaiyākaraṇās* tradition that it is the ‘*Viśeṣaṇa*’ depending on which we name the ‘*Viśeṣya*’, should actually be accepted as ‘*Pravṛttinimitta*.’ Now there are four kinds of *pravṛtti* and its cause or *Pravṛttinimitta*: *Jāti*, *Guna*, *Kriyā* and *yadrrichhā* (*vyakti*) (‘*Chatuṣṭayi śabdam pravṛtti jātiśabda gunaśabda kriyāśabda yadrichhaśabdasca*’ -*Astadhyayi Pratyahar sutra 2, Mahabhasya*.)²⁰ But amongst them ‘*Jāti*’ is the one of the *viśeṣanas* which can only be taken as the exact or more appropriate *pravṛttinimitta* of word since it is the *Jāti-dharma* which lasts with the object (object that is referred by word) all throughout the object’s living subsistent and it is true that while cognizing an object we need to know the object as substance, the qualities the object possesses, the action performed by that object and so on but the point is we can get an overall picture or entire knowledge about that object including all these aspects automatically once we get to know its *jāti-dharma*. Hence that is why *jāti* or *sāmānya* or universal property of the *viśeṣya* or an object should only be considered as the meaning. And this is the point of discussion from where begins a very much debated issue on Indian theory of meaning since all of the

Vaiyākaraṇās and also the philosophers from different schools have not agreed in this matter of accepting *Jāti* or universal property as the exact meaning or connotation of words. There are *Vyakti* (Individual) and *Aākṛiti* (form/shape or in some cases it is regarded as the relation between individual and universal) that are accepted at the same time as meaning of words. Therefore, we now have three concepts (not in the sense of mental concept) as meaning of words to deal with; concept of *Vyakti*, concept of *Jāti* and concept of *Aākṛiti*. Now let's find out what philosophical explanation exactly these three concepts extend towards understanding of *śabda*.

Individual as meaning

To begin with *Vyakti*, in the texts of Vyākaraṇa (especially early Vyākaraṇa) we find two other synonymous terms of it; *Sattvā* and *Dravya* which were basically used in ontological or metaphysical sense. *Sattvā* is referred there as Being, Existence etc but later they explained this term also as the locus of qualities, actions and generic properties (just like the way we understand *Dravya* or substance). Moreover, to explain a semantic sense of substance or *Dravya* they termed it as '*Vyakti*' and interpreted as '*idam tvat, iti sarvanāma-pratyavamarsa-yogyam vastu dravyam iti artaḥ*' 'MB-P, Vol. II',²¹ it can be explained as substance or *Dravya* which can be indicated by a pronoun like 'this' or 'that'. And this interpretation of substance is regarded as semantic definition in grammarian method.

In 'Mimāṃsa śāstra' *Vyakti* is defined as '*sāmānyasya viśeṣanam ca āśrayah sa vyāktir iti*'²² that which is the locus of generic and differentiating properties is to be considered as *vyakti*. And Śābara also defines *Vyakti* almost in the same manner i.e. '*a-sādhāraṇa-viśeṣa-vyaktih*'²³ means that which has differentiating properties, is individual or *vyakti*. Now to talk about Maṇṇīśa Gautama's view on this, in his *Nyāya-Sūtra*, Gautama defines *Vyakti* as '*vyāktir guṇa viśeṣāśrayo*

*murtiḥ*²⁴ i.e., *vyakti* is that which possesses certain particular qualities and has a specific form or utterance or *uccārya mānyatā*. Now from the above different interpretations it may first of all be assumed that *Vyakti* as a meaning of word is actually considering an entity as a meaning of word that is the locus of some qualities and properties and also at the same time that can be referred by pronouns. However, it seems that accepting *Vyakti* as the meaning of word is more like a Realistic approach of the theory of meaning.

Configuration as meaning

Let's now find out *Aākṛiti* or form or configuration as meaning of words. Whether it is the view of Vaiyākaraṇās or any Philosophical schools regarding *Aākṛiti* as meaning of word, they first argue over the nature of *Aākṛiti*. Some of them accept '*Aākṛiti*' as a specific pattern or configuration or shape and the rest take *Aākṛiti* to be same as generic property or *Jati*. Vaiyākaraṇa Patanjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* refers *Aākṛiti* as an eternal or permanent entity and also at the same time as a non-eternal entity, in its eternal form it may refer as a generic property and the non-eternal form like shape or configuration.²⁴ Hence it may be assumed that in Patanjali's view if word denotes *Aākṛiti* as its meaning then whether it would refer generic property or configuration, which totally depends on the context. Now to move on with Mimāṃsa we find a similar kind of notion as they also mention *Aākṛiti* as a generic property (*Dravya-guna-karmanam-samānyam matra ākṛitihh*)²⁵. Naiyāyikās in this regard do not identify *Aākṛiti* as generic property or *jāti* rather they differentiate both of the terms very well. To define *Aākṛiti* Maharṣi Gautama in his *Nyāya-Sūtra* says '*āākṛitir jātiḥ lingākhyā*'²⁶ means *Aākṛiti* is that which helps to indicate *jāti*'s existence. And Naiyāyikās also mention *Aākṛiti* as '*avayava-samsthān-viśeṣa*' i.e a specific structural pattern or configuration of the parts of an object. However, Naiyāyikās' interpretation in this regard can

be explained by an instance i.e. a specific form or shape of a cow helps us to recognize the presence of cowness in that cow. And thus according to Nyāya view the first assistance we get to name a particular thing to be that same particular thing, is its form or shape or configuration. That's how we call a cow or a horse after seeing their particular different shapes or structural patterns. A person who is well aware of an object's form, only can differentiate it (the object) from the other things or objects. And the very reason for it, is that form or shape actually reveals the existence of generic property present in that object. Now, it is noteworthy here that Naiyāyikās do not accept *Aākṛiti* alone as the meaning of words rather for them word denotes altogether three meanings *Vyakti*, *Aākṛiti* along with *Jāti*.

Universal as meaning

We have so far discussed *Vyakti* and *Aākṛiti* in terms of their defining characteristics. We now in this regard proceed to discuss *Jāti* or generic property or universal(whatever we may name it) and it is to note that this is the focal point with which we are mainly concerned here in this thesis. The first and foremost concern while discussing *Jāti* seems to get a proper interpretation of the term '*jāti*'. In Vaiyākaraṇa tradition we find Pāṇini along with other commentators kept the term '*Jāti*' to refer the notion of class but in some places though they synonymously used the term '*Jāti*' and '*Aākṛiti*'. However, Pāṇini while using the term *Jāti*, he emphasized the term *Jāti* as a class notion rather an abstract generic property, the later commentators took it as a generic property as we find it in Patanjali's *Mahābhāṣya* '*jāti akhayam ekasmin bahu Bachanam anyatarasyam*'²⁷. However, amongst the Vaiyākaraṇās we see a strong acceptance of *Jāti* as meaning of words in Vājapyayanā's theory, though he didn't differentiate *Jāti* and *Aākṛiti* and named *Jāti* as *Aākṛiti* in his thesis. He proposes four arguments²⁸ also in support of his view regarding *Jāti* as meaning and

also claims there that we don't need to accept *Vyakti* as a separate meaning of words since we can get the cognition of *Vyakti* as soon as we acknowledge *jāti* as meaning. Hence it has rightly said in *Aśtādhyāyī* '*ākṛityābhidhānād aikam shabdam bibhaktou vājapāyan*'-1/2/64, *Vārtik*. The first argument, for accepting *Jāti* as meaning of words is '*Prakhyā-abiśeṣa*' (*prakhyā* means understanding or buddhi and *abiśeṣa* in the sense of identity or *abheda*); explains that though there is different particular things (different individual cows) in this world in terms of form or shape or configuration, yet we have an identical cognition or understanding (as cow) for each class of things since *Jāti* such as cow-ness is always one and present in all the cows though there are different particular cow *Vyakti* expressed by the same word 'cow'. And, *Vājapāyana* thinks that this uniformity of our cognition or understanding could be an evidence for accepting *Jāti* as the meaning of words since without accepting *Jāti* this uniformity wouldn't have been possible. The second argument in this regard is '*Abyapabarga gati*' (*abyapabarga* meant almost same as identity or generality and *gati* refers cognition). The interpretation is that in our cognition we don't cognize *Jāti* and *Vyakti* individually. After hearing the uttered word 'cow' we don't think of blue cow or red cow rather think of cow in general and that is what *Vājapāyana* has meant by '*abyapabargagati*'. In his third argument he says '*Jnāyate ca eka upadiṣṭam*' means we don't need to hear the same word many times for having a general cognition rather we do have general cognition after hearing the word uttered for only once. And the last but not the least argument in support of this view is '*Dharmaśāstra*' that says if we understand *Jāti* as the meaning of words then there would remain a possibility of a valid explanation of the scriptural statements. It can be explained as we find different positive injunctive statements (*vidhi Vākya*) like 'maintain your forsaken wife' and also negative injunctive statements (*niṣedha Vākya*) like '*na kalanjam bhakshayet*' i.e. 'do not eat fermented food' etc and all these statements are meant for general

usages, not for any particular purpose or not applicable on any one person or thing, hence for providing an apt explanation of these scriptural statements we inevitably need to accept *Jāti* as meaning of words. Thus, Vājapyāyana argue over the issue on meaning theory and it is also noteworthy here that in support of his view i.e. '*jāti* should be considered as meaning of words'; In one pāṇiān famous sūtra i.e. '*swarupanamekaśeṣa ekbibhaktou*', it has been expressed that *śabda* though one and only by nature it is related to a particular form in a particular *vibhakti* and thus looks like formally various and different. For example *nara* + *sup*(*vibhakti*) denotes a singular first case ending and renders meaning of *karṭṛtva* to the *prātipadika* – '*nara*'. Now, the question is whether the word '*nara*' invariably refers to '*naratva*', a *jāti* and '*karṭṛtva*' in *karṭṛkāra* as stated in this case or not. Hence, any word likewise whenever used with any *pratyaya* be that *sup* or *tin* etc invariably have the concept of *jāti* at the background. So, it can not be said that Vājapyāyana opposed the Pāṇiniān view in this respect. Moreover, he says that if we accept *Jāti* as meaning of words then we can accomplish our intention uttering only one word instead of many since *Jāti* is one. Hence, that is how Vājapyāyan interprets and at the same time defends *Jāti* as meaning of words.

Just like the Vaiyākaraṇās, many of the philosophers from different schools prioritized *Jāti* as meaning of words though their approaches might have differed from each other.

In Nyāya philosophy the notion of Universal has been introduced as meaning of word. In *Nyāyasūtra* 2/2/69 it is said that word does not signify any single meaning but an amalgamation of three; *Vyakti*(individual), *Aākṛiti*(configuration) and *jāti*(universal) ('*byāktyākṛitijātayāstu padārtha*', *N.S*, 2/2/69). The Vaiśeṣikās considered seven fundamental categories or *padārthas* and *sāmānya* is one of them. Now as '*padārtha*' means meaning of word, so in literal sense here

sāmānya also considered to be as meaning. But moreover, it is noteworthy that according to vaiśeṣikas all entities which exist and can be cognized (*jneya*) and nameable (*abhidheya*) at the same time, are taken to be as *padārthas* and all the *padārthas*/categories have their own ontological status as well. Hence, in this sense, *sāmānya* occupies an ontological status also that paved the way further for the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika realism. Purva-mimāmsa school in this regard was very clear from the beginning. While ascertaining meaning of word both branches of Mimāmsa school (prabhākar and Bhāṭṭa) consider that word means primarily universal and individual is denoted by implication. Jainas being relativist always tend to accept various perspectives of a thing, so in this context also Jainas would prefer to consider universal and particular both as meaning of words. Talking about Advaita Vedantin's take on this we need to remember first that for them the issue related word, meaning of word, language usage etc comes in the domain of practical level of existence (*byābahārik sattā*). In their approach there is another transcendental level of existence (*pāramārthik sattā/Nirguna brahman*) beyond it(practical level) that is the ultimate, absolute reality and it is though out of the reach of communicative language but considered to be the universal object/denoted(*vācya*). Now, here in the context of meaning in language communication they accept universal as primary meaning and for them this universal as meaning is actually the determinate form or potency of that universal existence. Hence, in this sense Advaitins are also said to be in support of the view that accepts universal as meaning of word.

In Indian Philosophy those who consider *Vyakti* as the meaning of word, are called *Vyaktiśaktivādins* such as early Vaiyākaraṇ Vyādi, Navya-Naiyāyika Raghunāth Śiromaṇi. Indian Philosophers who think of *Aākṛiti* as meaning of word are called *Aākṛitiśaktivādins*. Mimāsaka Śabar Swāmi is considered to be *Aākṛitiśaktivādin*. Whereas, those who think that word denotes *Jāti* as its meaning, are identified as *Jātiśaktivādins*. Early Vaiyākaraṇa Vājapāyana, Mimāsakās'

views are *Jātiśaktivāda* in this regard. But unlike these three views Naiyāyikās uphold an amalgamation of meaning consists of all of the three meanings; *Vyakti*, *Aākṛiti* and *Jāti*. Thus, Naiyāyikās are identified as *Jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivādins* in this regard. When speaker utters a meaningful word, hearer cognizes all of the three meanings(*vyakti, ākṛiti, jāti*)together according to this view.

Now as we know in Indian tradition philosophers or specific schools of philosophy adapt a very unique method of establishing their own view and that is to say they first establish their opponents view and then refute it to establish their own view. Thus, Naiyāyikās follow this method as well for establishing their own doctrine i.e. *Jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivāda*. Naiyāyikās initially presented *vyaktiśaktivāda* and *ākṛitiśaktivāda*. Then they refute these two views by presenting the doctrine of *jātiśaktivāda* and finally by refuting *jātiśaktivāda* they establish their own doctrine which is *Jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivāda*. Let's find out first how they presented the *Aākṛitiśaktivādins* view –

Aākṛitiśaktivāda:

Maharṣi Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* presented this view saying '*Aākṛitistadapekhsatvāt sattvabyabasthānsidhhe*'²⁹ which intends *Aākṛiti* should be considered as the meaning of word since it is the *Aākṛiti* or configuration/form of individual things by which it can be determined that each thing has different essence. Cow is not horse, horse is not cow as well. It is by their different configuration/form which enables us to identify them as two different individual thing. This is how Maharṣi shown *Aākṛitiśaktivādins* view on *sattvabyabasthān-siddhi*. After seeing the configuration/form of cow one can recognize a cow and similarly configuration of horse enables us to recognize a horse as 'it is a horse'. Anyone who does not know this different arrangement of configuration or form of two individual things such as cow and horse, he would not able to

recognize the things differently as ‘this is cow’, ‘this is horse’. Thus, in accordance with this view hearer after hearing the word ‘cow’ cognizes or understands the *avayava-samsthān*(combination of all its parts) or *Aākṛiti* of cow.

Refutation of *Aākṛitiśaktivāda* by *Jātiśaktivādīns*:

Maharṣi in this regard presented *jātiśaktivādīns* view saying ‘*Vyaktyākṛitīyukte pyaprasangāt prakṣaṇādīṇām mṛidgabak jāti*’³¹ which intends if *Aākṛiti* is being considered as meaning of word leaving behind *jāti* and *vyakti* as its meaning as well then ‘cow made of clay’(*mṛidgaba*) would be the denotation or denotative meaning of the word ‘cow’. Though it(cow made of clay/earthen cow) has not cow-hood(*gotva*) inheres in it but it has the configuration/form (*Aākṛiti*). But the thing is considering *Aākṛiti* as the meaning of word would not serve the appropriate purpose of successful understanding hence in some sentences where *Aākṛiti* can not be the accepted as meaning; some such sentences are ‘donate a cow’, ‘bring the cow’ etc. As it is known that no one donates an earthen cow in the matter of donating a cow. Hence, the word ‘cow’ used in all these sentences does not mean earthen cow. And as *jāti* never resides in earthen cows hence earthen cows can not be considered as meaning of the word ‘cow’ in all the above instances of sentence. The word ‘cow’ in these sentences are meant to mean or denote cow-hood or *jāti* as the meaning.

***Vyaktiśaktivādīns* view:**

To present *vyaktiśaktivādīns* view Maharṣi says ‘*ya-śabda-samūha-tyāg-parigraha-samkhyā-briddhyapachay-varṇa-samāsānubaddhānam-vyaktyabupacārādvakty*’³² that is to say, when we

indicate something or some object using ‘this’, ‘all’, ‘number’, ‘letter’ etc then *vyakti* should be taken as the intended meaning in all these sentences. In his *Nyāyabhāṣya* Vātsyāyana explained this matter by giving some examples like ‘*ya gostiṣṭhati*’ ‘*ya gauriṣṇṇeti*’. His intention was when we say all these sentences like ‘this cow is sitting’ or ‘this cow is sleeping’, ‘all cows’, ‘black cows’, ‘blue cows’, ‘a cow is giving birth to another cow’ then the word ‘cow’ used in all of these sentences must denote the meaning as ‘cow’ *vyakti* and not anything else.

Refutation of *Vyaktiśaktivādīns* by *Jātiśaktivādīns*:

In various Nyāya texts we find Naiyāyikās’ attempt of refuting *Vyaktiśaktivādīns* view by *Jātiśaktivādīns* view. First of all let’s see how Maharṣi Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* presented *Jātiśaktivādīns* view for this refutation. Maharṣi said in this regard ‘*na tadanabasthān*’³³ which intends to say that *vyakti* should not be considered as meaning of word since *vyakti* or individuals are many in numbers and there is no specific method of selecting one from the myriad of individuals. There are innumerable cows exist in this world hence which one should be denoted after hearing the uttered word ‘cow’ this has not been clarified by the *vyaktiśaktivādīns*. Thus it will be appropriate to accept that word denotes individuals qualified by universal. So, the meaning of the word cow is actually the *jāti* that is cow-hood. Now, in *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalīkā* Acārya Visvanāth has given arguments for refuting *vyaktiśaktivādīns* view saying ‘*tatra jātābeba śaktigraha natu vyaktyau, byabhicārād ānantyācca*’³⁴ it intends that there arises two fallacies if *vyakti* is being regarded as meaning of word; *ānantya doṣa* (fallacy of infinite regress) and *byabhicāra doṣa*. In the first case, if individual cow (*go-vyakti*) is being accepted as the meaning of the word ‘cow’ then we need to accept different significatory power in each context of comprehending the meaning ‘cow’ after the utterance ‘cow’ to denote all the cows of past, present

and future. But acceptance of many and different significatory power of word(*padaśakti*) would lead an infinite regress which needs to be avoided.

Moreover, if *vyakti* is being considered as meaning of word accepting *vyaktiśaktivādīns* view then the word ‘cow’ by its significatory power would mean only one individual cow from the innumerable individual cows. But it will go against the rules of sentential understanding where utterance of a particular word would mean all the individuals of same sort. Thus, *byabhicāra doṣa* observed in this way.

Hence, looking into this difficulties *jātiśaktivādīns* would say that acknowledging *jāti* as meaning of word would be more appropriate than it. And their basic argument for this would be we can never find or can have the knowledge of any individual or *vyakti* without cognizing its generic property or *jāti-dharma*. One can have the cognition of *vyakti* automatically as soon as he or she has cognized *jāti*.

In *Tarkasamgrahadīpikā* Acārya Annam Bhatta brought forth *Jātiśaktivādīns* view against *Vyaktiśaktivāda* saying ‘*gabādisabdānām-jātābeba-śakti-viśeṣaṇatayā-jāte-pratham-upasthita tvāt.vyakti lābhastvā khhepāditi kecit*’³⁵ which intends that as qualifier(*viśeṣana*) is necessary cause for having a qualified cognition(*viśiṣṭa-pratīti*) hence it is impossible to have the knowledge of qualificand(*viśeṣya*) like *gau*(cow) etc without having the knowledge of qualifier like cow-hood(*gotva*) etc so it is recommended and more appropriate to consider *jāti* as meaning of word.

Now Navya Naiyāyika Shrī Jagadīsh Tarkālaṅkāra in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* to refute the *Vyaktiśaktivādīns* view referred to both of the views of Prābhākara Mimāsaka and Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakās. While presenting Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakās view in this regard Jagadish said ‘*gāmānayetyādaḥ gotvādikarmatāketvaina.....hetutvāt*’³⁶ According to the Bhāṭṭas word primarily

signifies *jāti* as its meaning and secondarily signifies *vyakti* through the process of *ākhsepa* (which they meant '*arthāpatti-pramāṇa*') as meaning. Through *arthāpatti-pramāṇa* Mimāṃsakās attempt to resolve or remove inconsistency between two situations or two statements and then show that the inconsistency was apparent, and moreover, proper linguistic interpretation can remove it. *Arthāpatti-pramāṇa* does this function of proper interpretation to resolve inconsistency. We see a famous example in the context of explaining *arthāpatti pramāṇa* where it has been shown when there arises a confusion or inconsistency between two statements a. 'one person named Devdatta who is gaining fat'. and b. 'he doesn't eat anything during the day'. So, in this case although both statements are true but looks inconsistent. Thus for removing this apparent inconsistency Mimāṃsakās employed *arthāpatti pramāṇa* and a proper linguistic interpretation in this case goes like 'Devdatta must be having food during the night time'. Thus in the same way in any sentential understanding we can have the knowledge of *vyakti* through the knowledge of *jāti* with the help of *arthāpatti-pramāṇa*. Let's see this using an example. '*Gāmānaya*' (bring the cow) this sentence consist of 'go', 'am', ā-nī, hi all these padas or linguistic elements.

gām - *ānaya* (syntactically related words)

*go** *aṃ** *ā***nī** *hi** (recollected meanings attached with the syntactically related words)

'Go' refers to the object 'go', 'aṃ' refers to objecthood (*karmatva*), 'ā' and 'nī' these two verbal stems refer to action of bringing (*ānayan*) and 'ti' is verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*) which refers to the effort or kriti. Now all these meanings have each specific relation [referred as '*anvaya*' in Nyāya terms] with each other. The '*anvaya*' amongst meaning of words along with the meanings include as the objects in the sentential understanding of the mentioned sentence '*gām ānaya*'. The relation that has been shared by the first two meanings as object 'go' and '*karmatva*' [object-hood] is of

superstratumness or ‘*ādhāratva*’ since object is the locus or substratum of object-hood. Next there is the relation of describing or ‘*nirūpakatva*’ between objecthood and the action of bringing. After that conduciveness [*anukultva*] between action of bringing and *kṛiti* or effort. And finally ‘*ādhāratva*’ should once again be accepted between effort and the agent of this action that I ‘*tvam*’ or ‘you’ since ‘bring the cow’ actually means ‘you bring the cow’ [‘*tvam gām ānaya*’]. So, in this case knower firstly gets the knowledge of *gotva jāti* in its *āśraya go-vyakti* through the relation called ‘*sāśrayavṛittitva*’(that which is located in its *āśraya*) but the thing is at the time of this cognition the knower has to have the cognition of *go-vyakti* as located in *karmatva*(object-hood) in the relation of *ādhāratva* (superstratumness). Hence if we interpret the whole sentence properly with all its linguistic elements we get to know that as soon as knower cognizes *jāti*, the knowledge of *jāti* itself reveals the knowledge of *vyakti*.

Next, Shri Jagadish Tarkālaṅkāra referred to Prābhākara Mimāṃsaka’s view saying ‘*vastutastu gotvaśābham prati gotva-śaktijnyānmeba heturna tu gotvamapi, jātibyaktayostulyabittibedyatva-niyamādeva*’³⁷ it implies that we have knowledge of *jāti* and *vyakti* together, hence having the knowledge of any one of it, reveals the knowledge of the other one. And thus though word directly denotes the meaning as *jāti* but at the same time this same knowledge reveals *vyakti* as meaning as well.

Mimāṃsaka Mandanācārya’s view in this regard went almost same like Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka’s but the only difference that has been observed is that Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka’s explained ‘*ākḥsepa*’ as *arthāpatti-pramāṇa* whereas Mandanācārya explained it as *lakṣaṇā*(secondary meaning). As we know Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas talked about two types of signifiatory relation(*vṛitti-sambandha*) : *śakti* (primary meaning) and *lakṣaṇā*(secondary meaning). *Lakṣaṇā-vṛitti* or secondary relation

signifies meaning in terms of the meaning obtained through *śakti* or primary relation. Naiyāyikas defined *lakṣaṇā* as '*śakya-saṃbandha-lakṣaṇā*' that is to say, the meaning that has been presented by *śakti-vṛitti* is called '*śakya*', the meaning closely related to this *śakya* or primary meaning is understood as '*lakṣaṇā*' by the Naiyāyikas. On the other hand, the primary relation or *śakti-vṛitti* does not need any other medium to signify meaning and that is why it is considered as the primary relation or *mukhya-saṃbandha* between word and meaning. Thus, when Navya Naiyāyikas are talking about another way of twofold distinction of relation as *sākṣāt-saṃbandha*(direct-relation) and *paramparā-saṃbandha*(indirect-relation), in that case it will be in accordance with Nyāya view if we look on *śakti-vṛitti* as direct relation between word and meaning while *lakṣaṇā-vṛitti* as the indirect one. So, in this context Mandanācārya meant to say that *jāti* should be considered as the primary meaning of word whereas the meaning as *vyakti* can be comprehended as secondary meaning of the word. Thus, *vyakti* is considered to be meaning of word as it is related to *jāti*.

Naiyāyikas thus refuted both of the previous views (*vyaktiśaktivāda* and *ākṛtiśaktivāda*) of meaning of word through presenting the view of *Jātiśaktivādins*. And finally they will refute this *jātiśaktivādins* view regarding this to establish their own view that is *jātyākṛtivyaktiśaktivāda*.

In *Nyāyasūtra* Maharṣi Gautama for establishing their own view said '*nā kṛiti vyaktya pekhsatvājjātya bhibyakte*'³⁸ which intends to say that no one can comprehend only *gotva* (cowhood) *jāti* as meaning of the word cow without associating it with *vyakti*(individual cow) and *ākṛiti*(configuration of cow). If we consider only *gotva jāti* as the primary meaning of the word 'cow' then as we know *jāti* is eternal by its very own nature so the word 'cow' would naturally

denote ‘eternal cow’ then but we do not observe this to happen ever. In every place we comprehend this amalgamated meaning (*‘jātyākṛitivyakti’*) as the meaning.

In *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali* to refute *jātiśaktivādins* view ācārya Viśvanāth said *‘yadi tu gotvam śakyāmiti śaktigrahastadā gotvaprakāraka padārthasmaranam śābdabodhaśca na syāt, samānaprakāratvena śaktijnyānasya padārthasmaranam śābdabodha prati ca hetutvāt’*³⁹ that is to mean if we do not consider *jāti* as meaning then we do not have verbal understanding in real or practical terms, because in practical usage the way or under which mode or qualification an object is cognized the same qualification has been revealed in the verbal understanding of the object as well. In the verbal cognition of ‘pot’, pot-ness will be the object of this cognition as ‘qualifier’(*viśeṣaṇa*) and ‘pot’ will be cognized as ‘qualificandum’(*viśeṣya*) only if in the previous cognition before its verbal understanding it(pot) is cognized in the same way i.e. considering ‘pot-ness’ as qualifier and ‘pot’ as the its qualificandum.

Ācārya Annam Bhatta for refuting *jātiśaktivādins’* view intends to say that not all Mimāmsakas accept the qualifier being the reason for qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jnyāna*) and they argue that while perceiving cow perceiver or knower gets to make his eyes contacted(*samyoga-sannikarṣa*) with the *vyakti* or cow-individual and after that cow-hood located in *vyakti* cognized as soon as his eyes contacted with cow-ness through the relation of *samyukta-samavāya*. Thus, it is clear *samyugta samavāya sannikarṣa* can occur only after *samyoga-sannikarṣa* occurs or both of the *sannikarṣas* can occur at the same time. But, it can never happen that *samyukta-samavāya* happens before *samyoga-sannikarṣa*.

Shri Jagadish Tarkālankār in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* has argued against all the views provided by the Mimāmsakas in support of *jātiśaktivāda*. Firstly to refute the Bhāṭṭa Mimāmsakas

Jagadish's opinion was *jāti* can never be considered as meaning. In sentences like 'cow goes' the verbal understanding does not occur as cow-hood goes. In sentential understanding when the meaning of words get related with each other then before the relation occurs all the meanings need to be qualified by one specific property or qualifier. And that is why if *jāti* or cow-hood in this case is considered as meaning then we need to accept cow-hood ness(*gotvatva*) as its qualified property which doesn't present in practical usage of the term. On the other hand to refute Prābhākara Mimāsakas view Jagadish expressed his intention saying '*paśvādipadanamapi lomaballāngulādiparyabasite.....vṛittigrahottabang....*'⁴⁰ implies that if we consider *jāti* as meaning of word in every place comprehending meaning then how will we be able to seek the meaning of the word *paśu*(beast) ?since *paśutva* (beast-ness) is not a *jāti* but a *upādhi*. As we find in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas texts that according to their view general characteristics which although exclude one another in some examples but co-located in some other instances are called *upādhis*. In this case '*paśutva*'(beast-ness) and *taijasatva*(fire-ness) between these two properties *paśutva* can be seen being located in *paśus*(beasts) but not in *taijas ghata*(fiery pot). Whereas, fire-ness can be seen being located in fiery pots but not in beasts. But having said that, both these properties can be seen located or co-existed in one same locus that is Sun's horse(in mythology we find existence of seven horses of sun) which has both the fire-ness of sun and beast-ness of horse.

And finally to refute Mandanācārya's view he intends to say that *jāti* only can not be considered as meaning discarding *vyakti* entirely. So, *jāti* is not the only primary meaning and hence it won't be a help to get *vyakti* as secondary meaning through *lakhsaṇā* since it is that thing which is closely related to the primary meaning, is regarded as secondary meaning or *lakhsārtha*.

Thus, Naiyāyikas discarded the *Jātiśaktivādins* view of acceptance of *jāti* as the primary meaning of word. And now finally they referred to their own view *Jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivāda*. In *Nyāyasutra* Maharṣi Gautama initiated this view saying ‘*Vyaktyakṛitijātayastu padārtha*’⁴¹ which indicates that *vyakti*, *ākṛiti* and *jāti* all of these three are meaning of word because they share an inextricable relation with each other, none of which can stay alone discarding the other two.

Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparyatikā* attempted to explain Maharṣi’s intention. In his opinion when speaker utters any word like ‘cow’ then hearer has the verbal understanding of cow individual, cow configuration and cow-ness *jāti* all these three at the same time. And all of the three are primary meanings and not one is primary and then others two are implied through *lakhsaṇā*.

In this context we find an unique view upheld by Jayanta Bhatta in his *Nyāyamanjari*⁴². He though considered *jāti*, *ākṛiti* and *vyakti* all the three as meaning but with addition he referred that according to the context the meanings become prominent and subordinate both. He shares some examples to establish his opinion. When someone says ‘*piṣṭakamajyo gāba kriyantām*’ or ‘*gau padā na spaṣṭarbyeti*’ or ‘*gāmānaya*’ all these are actually different contexts and that’s why we will have different understanding of the meaning of the word ‘cow’. Let’s explain in the first example when someone says ‘make a cow using powdered rice’ then the word ‘cow’ in this sentence refers to the configuration(*ākṛiti*) of the cow as the primary meaning and the other two meanings here expressed here secondarily or subordinately. Now, when someone says ‘don’t touch the cow with feet’ then here in this sentence the word ‘cow’ primarily or prominently refers to the cow-ness *jāti* since here speaker utters this sentence addressing to all the existent cows in this world. Whereas, when it has been said that ‘bring the cow’ then here the word ‘cow’ refers to the cow individual as the action of bringing can only happen to the individual.

It is noteworthy here in this context that although most of the Naiyāyikas are unanimous upholding the view of *jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivāda* but there are some of them who disagreed and upheld a little different opinion over it. Such as Navya Naiyāyika Jagadish Tarkālankār opined that word denotes *vyakti* qualified by *jāti* and not *vyakti* qualified by *ākṛiti* and *jāti* both. And his argument for this had been we find some words which do not refer to things that have configuration or *ākṛiti* like *ātman*, *manas* etc. As *ātman*, *manas* all these things do not have any *ākṛiti* hence they refer to only *vyakti* and *jāti* as its primary meaning.⁴³

Now, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in this regard though accepts *jāti*, *ākṛiti* and *vyakti* all of the three as the primary meaning of word but his disagreement with the previous thinkers was over the point that he considers *ākṛiti* in the sense of relation and not in the sense of configuration. Navya Naiyāyika Raghunāth Śīromoṇi in this regard considers only *vyakti* as meaning of word. However, except all these few opinion almost all of the Naiyāyikas or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the same opinion or doctrine that is *Jātyākṛitivyaktiśaktivāda*.

SECOND CHAPTER

Concept of Universal in *Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy

In Indian tradition, the idea of Universal or *Jāti* or *Sāmānya* has been first come up with the *Vaiyākaranās* notion of it which is termed as '*ākṛiti*'. In Vāṇapāyana's writing we got introduced with this notion of '*ākṛiti*' that has been explained and placed in such a manner which is quite same like the notion termed as *Jāti* in Indian tradition. And moreover, *Vaiyākaraṇa* like Patanjali also used the term '*ākṛiti*' quite often for comprehending the idea of *Jāti*. It is important here to note that we find this idea of '*ākṛiti*' or *Jāti* there in the context of meaning of words. So, in the very initial phase the idea of Universal in Indian tradition has been recognized as an instrument or a tool (linguistic tool) of our language usage. Now, as we know in Indian tradition discourse on language and reality is inextricably related with each other and amidst all the queries regarding this cohesion, most intriguing one is whether the linguistic tools have any real existential status in reality or they are confined in the sphere of language usage only? And more interestingly, whether Universal has any existential status or not apart from being recognized as meaning of word? this has been a perennial topic of discussion since ages in the history of philosophy. Amongst all the Indian philosophical schools *Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsa* are those three schools who have explicitly given a positive response to this question saying Universals(*jāti*) do have an ontological existence in reality. Now, in this chapter I would like to make an understanding on the ontological concept of Universal in *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy.

Nyāya system of philosophy is closely akin to the *Vaiśeṣika* system which is why they have been regarded as ‘*Samāntantra*’ or Similar philosophy. *Vaiśeṣika* is known for its metaphysics and ontology, *Nyāya* mainly known for its logic and epistemology but both (*Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*) agree in observing worldly mundane life as suffering and bondage which happens due to ignorance of reality. And leaving behind the mundane life of bondage one can attain liberation if the individual person gets the right knowledge of reality. Both of these two systems said to accept each others view in maximum number of contexts. Thus, these two systems had continued as being called similar philosophy for several years but later on when the *Navya-Nyāya* or the modern school of *Nyāya* system begins with the inestimable *Tattva-Chintāmani* of Gangesha, the similar tradition of *Nyāya* system with *Vaiśeṣika* had been discontinued because *Navya-Naiyāyikās* discussions were centered around the *Nyāya* epistemology only. But then finally some of the philosophers of *Nyāya* system like Annaṃ Bhatta, Viśvanātha etc., had tried to develop a consistent system by combining the ancient and the new schools, Prācīna-Nyāya, Navya-Nyāya and *Vaiśeṣika* to develop the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. We will see their approaches in describing the ontological concept of Universal accordingly.

In the context of ontological or metaphysical concept of Universal the starting point and even the discussion underlying is being provided by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. It is found in *Vaiśeṣikas* ontology that while narrating this world they classifies the world into seven fundamental real entities, they named them as ‘*padārthas*’ (*Dravyaṃ gunasthatā karma sāmānyam sabiśeṣakam. Samabāya sthath abhāva padārthā saptakirtitā. - Pratyakhsakhandā, Bhasaparichhed*).¹ Now, *Jāti* or Universal is one amongst these seven *padārthas*. Etymologically ‘*padārtha*’ means *pada-artha* (meaning of word). The concept of ‘*padārtha*’ in Indian philosophy has been discussed in different ways. It is

assumed as an intricate reality; it has different stages of existence like absolute existential level that is beyond our reach(when it is called as '*tatva*'); diverse, detached material things that exist in world(they are named as *vastu*),but when Vaiśeṣikas are using the term '*Padārtha*' they are not separating it with ultimate essence or *tatva* rather for them the same '*padārtha*' is an absolute real essence and also a cognitive or cognizable reality and also it is nameable. That is why it is rightly said by the Vaiśeṣikās '*jñeyatvaṁ abhidheyatvaṁ padārtha sāmānya lakhsanaṁ*'.² And moreover, it was also added in this regard that whether it is the object of individual self's (*jivātmā*) cognition or object of *Īśvar*'s cognition; both will be given the status of '*padārtha*'. Hence, it is now quite clear what does it mean when we are considering universal or *Jāti* a '*padārtha*' in Vaiśeṣikās context.

However, now let's go into more detail and as we know in Indian philosophical tradition there comes '*Uddesh*'(mentioning), *Lakhsan* (defining), *Parikhsā* (evaluating) respectively so after *Uddesh* has been done it is time to check the definition and what are the features and characteristics the *padārtha sāmānya* or *jāti* possesses. In the context of defining the concept of universal Maharṣi Gautama became the spearhead of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition followed by the commentators like Vātsyāyan, Uddyotkara, Bācaspati Mīśra and the rest from the Prācīna-Nyāya. But it is noteworthy, although we did not find any specific definition of *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* in *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* yet the root of the concept of Universal or *Sāmānya* as a distinct ontological entity has been provided by *Kaṇāda* in his *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* with this aphorism '*Sāmānyam-viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*'(I, ii,3,V.S)³. We will see the detail explanation of this later.

As we looked for the general meaning of the word Universal, it is like to mean something that is admitted or experienced by everyone or something that remains or obtainable for everyone. And

in this sense, the word ‘universal’ seems to mean some common characteristic or property belongs to many individual thing or people or it can also be said that Universal is such property which is shared by many people or groups. And since, a property can be used in common parlance, hence the word universal has a global or worldwide appeal too, involving the entire world. Such as, we talk about universal harmony, universal sovereignty and so on where this word ‘universal’ carries a common significance. Moreover, the etymological meaning of the term ‘universal’ is almost similar with the meaning stated above. It comes from the latin word ‘universālis’. ‘Universe’ means entire or all or one and ‘-al’ is a latin suffix with the general sense of ‘the kind of’, ‘pertaining to’, ‘having the form of or character of’.⁴ So, etymologically it means that which is associated to or belonged to all or whole or the entire things on the world. Besides, the lexicon meaning also of the word ‘universal’ is involved with all people or things in the world.

Analysis of the definition of *Sāmānya* in Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika system:

However, let’s try to find and interpret the philosophical definition of it. From the definition of ‘*padārtha*’ we already have known that *sāmānya* or *Jāti* being a ‘*padārtha*’ is itself an object of cognition but it is also interesting to note that this *padārtha* ‘*Jāti*’ or *Sāmānya* also helps in producing cognition of the various numerous particular things existing in the world. Now, what kind of cognition does it produce? This is one important question that has been tried to answer with different definition of universal by Indian philosophers. In Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika tradition we find different opinion regarding whether *Jāti* is the foundation of identical cognition only or identical or dissimilar both of the cognition at the same time. Starting from Prācīna-Nyāya, Maṇḍana-Kaṇva in his *Nyāyasūtra* while discussing on meaning of word referred the notion of ‘universal’ and defined *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* as ‘*Samānaprasabātmikā Jāti*’(N.S-2/2/69).⁵ It implies, that which

yields similar or identical cognition in individual selves (*jivātmā*), is known as *Sāmānya* or *Jāti*. Tablehood, is such a general characteristic or general property of all tables existing in this world, that incurs all of them (tables) within its sphere. Seeing a table somewhere we acquire a general notion of tables (i.e., derive knowledge of tablehood). This general notion enables us on all subsequent occasions to recognize the individual tables. Now, from this definition given in *Nyāyasutra* we see that *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* was considered to be only as the cause of identical or similar cognition. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāyasutra* explained Maharṣi's aphorism as '*jā samānam budhhim prasute bhinnesvadhikaraneṣu Na byābarttante*' (NB,II,ii,69),⁶ that which is the cause of identical conception of different particular things and for which they are not regarded as different but identical and moreover, referred it (*jāti*) as the basis of similar and dissimilar both of the cognition while commenting further on the same aphorism as '*Yacca Keṣānchidvedam kutaścidāvedam karoti,tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātiriti*' , which implies the same property when produces similar cognition establishes non-difference of some objects among themselves and also their difference from some other objects, then it should be considered as *Sāmānya-viśeṣa*. So, *Jāti* needs to be addressed as the reason for *sāmānya* i.e. *anubṛittipratyaya* or similar cognition and *viśeṣa* or *byābṛittipratyaya* or dissimilar cognition as well. Vātsyāyana's illustration seems quite significant here in this context because we do get both of the said cognition from one such property like tablehood or cowhood etc; if we can be able to classify or generalize or bring all the tables under one shade through the property called table-hood, we also can have the cognition like 'tables are different or dissimilar from other things' as well with the help of the same property called 'table-hood'. It seems that Vātsyāyana here interpreted *Jāti* in this way keeping in mind Kaṇāda's aphorism (*sāmānya iti buddhāpekṣam*) where he (Kaṇāda) actually intended to say whether *Jāti* is the reason for synthetic cognition or differentiating cognition, it is completely based

on individual thought. So, Maharṣi Kaṇāda was first to admit *jāti* as having the ability of producing both of the cognitions. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's metaphysics another *padārtha* i.e. *Viśeṣa* has been regarded as having the specific ability to produce dissimilar cognition, so while recognizing *sāmānya* also as having this ability of differentiation then it seems like they (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) are somehow undermining the image of *Viśeṣa* in this context and appreciating *sāmānya*'s image to some extent. However, although there remains much debate in this issue of universal's ability of producing two-fold cognition but it is realized after going through much discussions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that universal has been considered mostly and fundamentally as the basis of producing similar cognition and moreover, in many places we got to see that universal has been referred as the basis of recurrence, resemblance, grouping which are quite consistent with the notion of similarity or identity.

But anything or any property that is eventually producing the notion of commonness similarity or identical cognition, can it be considered as Universal or *Jāti*? This same question has been raised by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-Vārtika*. He points out that when the universal is defined as the cause of generalization or uniform cognition, what is meant is not that all uniform conceptions are depended on universals because an identical conception in the Nyāya view may arise come up even without the presence of the universal concepts ('*tat samāna-pratyaya utpatti-kāranam jātiriti jātau niyāmo na samāna pratyaya utpattau, jātīmantare nāpi drṣṭatvāt*').⁷ And we find Uddyotakara himself gave the reply of this by presuming two notion of common property or character; one is this *sāmānya* or *Jāti* that is the eternal (*Nitya*) and natural (*Svābhāvik*) characteristic or property (*Dharma*) of particular things and on the other hand, *Upādhi* that is non-eternal (*Anitya*) and adventitious (*āgantuka*) characteristic of things. Hence, if something may happen to produce the cognition of commonness but recognized as a non-eternal, adventitious property of

the given particular thing, then naturally it would fail to qualify as *Jāti-dharma* rather it would be considered as *Upādhi*. Some examples can be shown here. ‘The character of being a teacher’ (*śikhsakatva*) may produce notion of similarity but it can not be regarded as *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* because ‘*śikhsakatva*’ is not a natural and eternal property of human beings, it belongs in them only for the time being they are teaching, hence ‘*śikhsakatva*’ is considered as *Upādhi*. In the same way, ‘citizenship of any city’ say ‘citizenship of kolkata’ (*Kolkata-Vāsitva*) although produce a notion commonness yet can not be granted as *Jāti* but *Upādhi* as anyone, who is presently a citizen of Kolkata, may leave the city and can settle in another place. Here in this connection we find a more prominent and logical basis and an important feature of the theory of universals that is the notion of *Jāti-bādhakas* by Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvali*, the commentary on *Praśastapada-Bhāṣya*. In Udayanāchārya’s arguments given in his *Kiraṇāvali* he talked of six barriers called *jāti-bādhakas* subsistence of which is inevitably adequate to incapacitate a characteristic from being known as a Universal or *jāti*. He stated six *jātibādhakas* as ‘*vyakter-abhedas-tulyatvaṁ-saṅkaro’thānavasthitih. Rūpahānir-asambandho jātibādhaka-saṅgrahaḥ*’.⁸ A little detail discussion of it, is needed here to know all the negative conditions that stops a characteristic to be recognized as *jāti*.

1. ‘*Vyakterabheda*’ indicates the character of being connected to a single individual thing. It is said in *Kiraṇāvali* ‘*Na ekabyaktikam samanyamstityakashadou bakhsate*’ (*Kiraṇāvali*, p-225)⁹ implies, the character which keeps relation to a single thing such as ‘*akāśatva*’ is not a universal. Here Udayana has emphasized on this point that universals are such common properties that are inherent in ‘many’ or ‘more than one’ individuals. In this regard, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya said ‘*svāshrayabhedasāmānādhikaranya*’ (*Kiraṇāvali*, p-227) implies that universals are that properties which co-locate themselves in more than one identical locus at the same time. But as the property

called ‘*ākāśatva*’ has only one ‘*ākash*’ as its locus, so ‘*Vyakterabheda*’ denies the claim of *jātitva* of *ākāśatva* by showing that one of the important parts of the defining property is absent in it. ‘*Anekasamavetatva*’ or being common to many individuals is that part of the definition of *jāti* and that is absent in *ākāśatva*.

2. *Tulyatva*: The second *jātibadhaka* is *tulyatva*. Udayana explains it as ‘*nanyunanatiriktabyaktikamiti*’ (*Kiranāvali*, p- 225) that intends, two general names having the same meaning do not indicate different universals, e.g., *ghatatva* and *kalasatva*. *Budhhitva*, *jnyānatva*, *upalabdhitva* etc. For being considered to be two different *jāti* each one should possess different locus like *ghatatva* and *patatva*. The *jāti*s such as *sattā* and *dravyatva* which though have one similar locus but have different locus as well, they have co-exist in *dravya* but in *guna* though there exists *sattā* but not *dravyatva*. It is therefore rightly said in *kiranāvaliprakāśh* ‘*svabhinnājātitvashrāyabaisamya*’

3. *Sānkarya*: Udayana has described *sānkarya* as ‘*Na mitho byabhicariti niskramanatvaprabeshnatvadou jatisankarapattou*’ (*Kiranāvali*, p-225). Here he intends to mean that the uniform properties which although eliminate one another in some instances yet co-habit in others, are failed to be considered as *jāti*. Udayana here gives an example *Niṣkramanatva* and *praveśanatva* as the general characteristics of *niṣkramana* (leaving from somewhere) and *praveśana* (entering somewhere) respectively. In case of the act of entering there is no existence of *niṣkramanatva* but in some specific act of *niṣkramanatva* (where it occurs after entering) there *praveśanatva* co-exist with it. Again there are also some other specific cases where *Niṣkramanatva* and *Pravesanatva* both are present relatively, such as in case of going to a house from another house, the act of leaving presence in that house which has been left by the person and the act of entering connects with the other one. In *Kiranāvaliprakāśh* Bardhamana Upādhyāya has given

another example of *sāṅkaryā* i.e. between *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva*. He also says that ‘*Byabharitve sati samandhikaranyā*’(p-228) is the characteristic of *sāṅkaryā jātibadhaka*. We call the first five substances or elements admitted by the vaiśeṣikas as ‘*bhūta*’. They are *Khsiti*, *Aap*, *Teja*, *Maruta*, *Byoma*. And the substances having finite dimension known as ‘*mūrta*’, Such as mind, earth (*khsiti*) etc. *Bhutatva* and *Mūrtatva* these two characters are cross-dividing, that is to say that they co-habit in some instances and also eliminate one another in others. In ‘*khsiti*’ there presents both *Bhūtatva* and *Mūrtatva* but there are also other instances where *bhūtatva* belongs without the *mūrtatva* i.e. *byoma* or *ākāśh* and the other place where *mūrtatva* belongs without *bhūtatva* is *manas* or mind. So, such general characters are *upādhis*, not *jāti*.

4. *Anavasthā*: To explain *Anavasthā* Udayana says that ‘*na samanyadibyaktikamanavastha*’ (*Kiranāvali* ,p-225) it implies that the character, identification of which as a universal directs to infinite regress, e.g. ,universality (*jātitva*) ,can not be regarded as a *jāti*. If universality (*jātitva*) considered to be a universal characteristic inhering in all the universals, then another universality will be required to uniform the former with the latter. Similarly, a third universality would be needed to synthesize the second with the other universals in which it inheres, and so on. Therefore, universal can not be regarded as corresponding to one more universal as its property or *dharma*.

5. *Rupahāni*: The *jātibādhaka ruphāni* is described by Udayana as ‘*Lakhsanabyaghata*’. (p-225)The character , admitting of which contradicts the self-separating (*svata-byābartakatva*) nature of *viśeṣas* or *anta-viśeṣas*. If we consider ‘*viśeṣatva*’ as *jāti* inhering in the *viśeṣas* and then tried to generalize the concept of *viśeṣa* then it would contradict their (*viśeṣas*) essential nature. The essential nature of *viśeṣas* is the nature of mutual difference, *viśeṣas* being principles of ultimate differences, they can not be differentiated from one another on the basis of any other characteristic.

Hence postulating *viśeṣatva* as *jāti* of *viśeṣas*, would contradict their self separating nature (*ruphāni*), and they will no more be *viśeṣas*.

6. *Asambandha*: The universal in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is, by definition, ‘inherent in its subjects. so, the thing in which nothing can inhere can not be the substrate of a universal. The categories of inherence (*samavāya*) and non-existence(*abhāva*) according to the nyāya-vaiśeṣikas view can not have anything inhering in them. If *samavāyatva* is regarded as a universal inhering in inherence, then it would have to inhere in both its substrate and its relation with it, which is absurd. Such a position would also lead infinite regress. Hence nothing can be conceived as inhering in inherence. Similarly no universal can be conceived to inhere in negation because it is not a positive entity. Therefore, *Samavāyatva* and *abhāvatva* are not to be regarded as universals.

So, it can be said from the above illustration that any attribute which is subject to one or more of these *jātibādhakas*(negative conditions) can not be recognized as *jāti* but as *upādhi*. This problem of *jātibādhakas* in the theory of universal originated because of the way the definition of universal was put forth as ‘it is the basis of identical cognition’, so it is quite natural that Naiyāyikās or Vaiśeṣikas would definitely try to revive their theory of universal from this fallacy and that could only be possible by giving another definition of *Jāti* or *Sāmānya*. The definition given in *Praśaṣṭapādabhāṣya*, commentary on *Vaiśeṣika-sutra* has successfully brought the image of the theory of universal back and that is why Bācaspati Mīśra referred this as the actual definition of universal and also said that the previous definitions were to differentiate universal from individual and configuration (*Vyaktyākṛtibhyām bhedakatvamātreṇa caitallaksanam na tu sarvathā veditavyam.*)¹⁰. Śāṅkar Mīśra in his *Upaṣkāra Bhāṣya* explained the definition of *sāmānya* as ‘*nityamekanekabyāktivṛttiḥ sāmānyam*’,¹¹ it implies *sāmānya* is such a characteristic which is

nitya(eternal), *eka*(one) and *anekavṛttih*(resides in many particular objects). With the help of these two terms ‘*eka*’ and ‘*nitya*’ the definition could successfully supersede the fallacy of *ativyāpti*. *Samyoga*(conjunction) and *Bibhāga*(disjunction) these two relation though can exist in many particular objects but both can not be taken as numerically one(*eka*) as they varies in each instances like relation of conjunction between hand and pen is different from tree and bird or relation of disjunction between table and bag differs from table and chalk; on the other hand both of these relation have origination and destruction in time and hence not eternal as well. To elaborate the term ‘*eka*’ further more Vardhamāna Upādhyay in *Kiranāvaliprakāśh* said ‘*aneka vṛttitvam anekādhāratvaṃ taccābhāva samavāya yorapyastityata uktameka masahāyam. Abhāva samavāya yōśca pratiyogi sambandhinou sahāyāvityapare*’.¹² Prof. Sushanta Sen in his book ‘*A study of Universals*’¹³ explained this verse in a very lucid manner. He began his elaboration asking whether ‘*eka*’ means *advitiya* (unique one that is opposed to any kind of duality)? If so then the definition of universal would adjunct *atyantābhāva* (non-existence) and *samavāya*(relation of inherence) within its scope and could not avoid the fallacy of *ativyāpti* since both of these(non-existence and inherence) are accepted as eternal and one(in the above sense). And they are related with many particulars (*anekavṛttih*) as well. To avoid this fallacy Vardhamān Upādhyaya suggested the meaning of ‘*eka*’ as ‘*asahāya*’. Prof. Sen explained the term ‘*asahāya*’ as that which is not logically dependant on and determined by anything else other than itself (*anyānirūpya*). And we do know that non-existence is always depends on the prior knowledge of its counterpositive (*pratiyogi*) and on the other hand, knowledge of inherence is determined by the knowledge of its relatum. But in case of universal and particular, though particular table is the revealer (*abhibhānjak*) of universal tablehood still it (particular table) can not be the determining factor in the knowledge of tablehood). There is no such dependency with each other in terms of determined-determining factor (*nirupya-*

nirupaka). We get simultaneous knowledge of these two instead of logically dependent on each other. One thing is needed to mention here that, Jayanta Bhatta in his *Nyayamanjari* and Shridhar in his *Nyayakandali* pointed out an exception by saying there are some cases where knowledge of universal is logically determined by some other thing instead by itself such as in case of caste-universals. We can not immediately able to recognize a *brāhman* to be a *brāhman* without prior knowledge of his family and ancestors. Hence, it is rightly said in *Nyayakandali* ‘*yadā tu mātā pitros tat pūrveṣaṁ ca vṛdhha-paramparayāviśuddham brāhmaṇatvam...tada brāhmaṇo yam iti pratyakṣaṇaiva pratīyate*’.¹⁴ And Jayanta Bhatta said ‘*upadeśa-sahāya-pratyakṣa gamyatvāt*’¹⁵ which implies caste-universals are known by perception assisted with one’s declaration. This is a case of exception and apart from this exception in all other places universal is considered as having the feature ‘*eka*’ in the sense *asahāya* which non-existence and *atyanta-bhāva* both lack. But Moreover, the fallacy of *ativyāpti* involving non-existence and inherence again referred to happen in the definition for putting the term ‘*anekvṛttih*’. ‘*Anekvṛttih*’ means having the characteristic of existing in many individuals; now non-existence and the relation of inherence both possess this and so naturally they come within the scope of universal’s definition. And to avoid this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas offered another revised definition of universal replacing the term ‘*anekvṛttitva*’ with ‘*aneksamavetatva*’. With reference to *Nyāyasiddhanta-muktāvali* of Visvanath we find the definition as ‘*nityatve sati aneksamavetatvam*’¹⁶(this definition has also been found in Annambhatta’s *Tarkasaṁgraha*). Non-existence and the relation of inherence though can exist in many particular things but the relation by which they are related with each particulars is not ‘*samavāya*’ or the relation of inherence but *svarupa*, a distinct kind of relation accepted in Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika system. And thus it is naturally excluded from the scope of the revised definition. The term ‘*aneka*’ in this definition has been added to avoid the involvement of ‘*gagan-*

parimāna (size of *akāśh*) within the scope of the definition for which there could have occurred *ativyapti*. Although ‘*gagan-parimāna*’ is said to have relation of inherence with *gagan* or *akāśh* and it is also eternal but since *akāśh* is one, hence its *parimāna* is related with only one substance *akāśh*, not many or *aneka*. That is how referring the term ‘*aneka*’ helped the definition to get rid of this fallacy. It is for this reason Achārya Visvanāth said ‘*nityatve sati samavetatvaṃ gaganparimanādināmapyasti, ata uktam – aneketi*’.¹⁷ All the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accepted and referred this definition ‘*nityatve sati anekasamavetatvaṃ sāmānyam*’ as free from all the logical fallacies. Raja Ram Dravid in his book, *The problem of universals in Indian philosophy* did not think that the definition given in *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is quite precise rather he considered it as similar like the definition given in *Nyāyasūtra*. He mainly focused on this verse of *Praśastapādabhāṣya* where it has been said that ‘*svaviśayasarvagatam abhinnātmakam anekavṛtti ekadvibahuṣu ātmasvarūpānugamapratyayakāri svarūpābhedenā ādhāreṣu prabandhena vartamānam anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam*’,¹⁸ according to R.R.Dravid it implies “universal subsists identically and wholly in each of its subjects and it is the basis on which a community of nature is apprehended in numerically different things, it is the unity which is the cause of identical conception of particular things.”¹⁹ Although, He referred this verse as definition of universal given in *Nyāyakandali-tikā* but Shridhar actually did not mention this verse to define universal rather to refer some of its important features; the actual definition i.e “*nityamekanekabyāktivṛttiḥ sāmānyam*’, intended by Praśastapāda (already discussed above) has been referred in *Upaśkārabhāṣya* of Shankar Miśra another commentary on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

How far Jātibādhakas remain significant in the theory of jāti:

Though there is no doubt that the doctrine of *Jātibādhaka* is an integral part of Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of *Jāti*, but the question that has raised in the article, written by prof. Srilekha Dutta²⁰ was what is the purpose that these *Jātibādhakas* are supposed to serve? There may be doubt that the purpose which those *Jātibādhakas* serve, can be served by the definition of *Jāti* itself as offered by the Nyaya and Vaisesika, i.e, a property which is eternal and resides in many in the relation of inherence.

Now, prof. Dutta has shown in her article that if we interpret the *Jātibādhakas* in a particular way, which seems to be quite justified too, then five of the *Jātibādhakas*; namely *Tulyatva*, *Sānkarya*, *Anavasthā*, *Ruphāni*, and *Asambandha* can be replaced or rather better to say reduced to the first one i.e. the *Jātibādhaka* called *Vyakterabheda*. And then if we can show that there would be no necessity to accept *vyakterabheda*, as its function has already been served by the definition of *Jāti* then it can be said that the definition (*Nityate sati aneksamavetatvam*) alone of *Jāti* is enough to establish the *Jātitva* of a property.

Therefore, we now need to focus on that part where we are going to show how all the five *Jātibādhakas* can be reduced to *Vyakterabheda*. To explain first *Tulyatva*, Udayana regards it as two general name having the same meaning, do not stand for different Universals. So, if two properties reside in a same locus then they will be regarded as the same *Jāti* or one of them will be regarded as *Jāti*, for example as in case of *Ghatatva* and *Kalasatva*, both properties are referred to reside in the same locus i.e. jar. And exactly in this point of explanation it can be said that this *Jātibādhaka* (*Tulyatva*) is reducible to *Vyakterabheda* because both are actually referring same, i.e., various properties belonging to a single substance can not be called *Jāti*. Now come to the next *Jātibādhaka*, called *Sānkarya*. It has been described earlier as properties which though

exclude one another in the same instances, co-exist with others. Now if we emphasize in the part of co-existing in the same locus and say that here (in co-existence) lies the actual difficulty of this impediment then it will be easier for us to reduce it to *Vyakterabheda*. Though a thing can be a *Bhūta* without being *Mūrta* (*Akāsha*) and again a thing can be *Mūrta* without being a *Bhūta* (*manas*), yet they are found to co-exist in the same locus of earth, water, fire and air. So their (the properties, *Bhūtatva* and *Mūrtatva*) co-existence in same thing (that is which *Vyakterabheda* also explains) creates a hindrance to be regarded as *Jāti*s. Next there comes the *Jātibadhaka* , called *Anavasthā* which has been described as the character , recognition of which as a Universal leads to infinite regress, i.e. *Sāmānyas* can not have any *Jāti* in them. The original interpretation of it we have discussed before , now here to explain its reason in a particular way we can assume that *Sāmānyatva* can not be regarded as *Jāti* because it doesn't have locus more than one Universal (universal being one). So the same problem of *Vyakterabheda* here also is applicable, which allows us to reduce this impediment also to *Vyakterabheda*. Then there comes *Rupahāni*, the fifth *Jātibādhaka*. It has been described as the character, acceptance of which contradicts the self differentiating nature. Actually here the problem is regarding whether *Viśeṣatva* should be called as a *Jāti* or not. The original reason of cancelling *Viśeṣatva* as a *Jāti*, we have discussed before. Now here another reason we may try to place. We know that *Viśeṣa padārthas* are '*Ananta*', endless in number. And each and everyone is different from the other by their self differentiating nature. So there is differentiation (*bheda*) nature among them .Hence now if we assume *Viśeṣatva* to qualify *Viśeṣa* then it would not be regarded as self- differentiating (which is their special characteristic) anymore but recognized as unified to each other and have a common or single locus ,which is absolutely contrary with their nature (because we know that *Viśeṣas* are resided in different eternal individual).Therefore it can be inferred that the problem of being located in a

single thing here also arises ,which allows us to reduce it to *Vyakterabheda*. Finally, there comes *Asambandha*. It has been described as having the absence of the relation of *Samavāya*. *Samavāyatva* and *Abhāvatva* these two properties have been cancelled to be regarded as *Jāti* by these negative condition. We have discussed the original reason for cancellation before. Now if we look into it in a particular way the explanation would be as follows: *Samavāyatva* can not be called *Jāti* because it doesn't get more locus than one (*samavāya* being one , in principle it is not possible to get any other *Samāvaya*) to relate them. And in case of *Abhāvatva* too 'having the absence of the relation of inherence' (*Asambandha*) this negative condition can be reduced to *Vyakterabheda*. If we interpret *Abhāva* or absence in a way that there is actually one and single *Abhāva* whether in the sense of *Anuyogikabhāva* (being neither the locus of anything in the relation of inherence) or in the sence of *Protiyogikabhāva* (nor a thing located in another thing in the relation of inherence), it can be infered that as *Abhāvatva* doesn't get more locus other than one, single *Abhāva*. Suppose 'absence of 'jar' in a floor, here whether we take the absence as 'floor is not the locus of jar (*Anuyogikabhāva*)' or as 'jar is not located in the floor (*Protiyogikabhāva*)', in both cases there remains numerically the same single absence or entity. Hence *Abhāvatva* can't be called *Jāti*.

Therefore, it is quite clear that *Vyakterabheda* can serve the purpose of the other *Jātibādhakas* , so it should be better to replace this *Jātibādhakas* to *Vyakterabheda*, it will be in consistent with the law of parsimony. But now there may be objection again that there is also no necessity to accept *Vyakterabheda* as a *Jātibādhaka* as well because the purpose of it can be served well by the definition of *Jati* itself(Specially by the term *Anekasamabetatva*) We know *Vyakterabheda* cancels the claim of *Jāitva* of a property like *ākāśatva*. But if we can see in other way that in the property of *ākāśatva* there actually has the absence of a part of the definition of *Jāti* i.e.

Anekavrititva or having multiple locus, there would be no necessity to accept Vyakterabheda as *Jātibādhaka*.

And it naturally follows that the definition of *Jati* is enough to perform its role and as well as of *Jātibādhakas*, making *Jātibādhakas* redundant.

Some questions regarding the nature of Jāti addressed in Tarkasamgraha :

One of the most eminent scholars in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition Annambhatta in his *Tarkasamgraha* have done a detail inquiry into the nature of *sāmānya* or *jāti* that helped to clarify the general doubts raised by the critiques and at the same time enriched the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universal more. We are going to discuss this Following the Bengali translation of *Tarkasamgraha* by Sri Narayan ch. Goswami .²¹

a. Issue regarding eternality of jāti :

The first and foremost query in this regard was how can they be able to authenticate the eternality of *jāti-dharma*? If it can be validated through *pramāna* that *jāti* doesn't have origination and destruction in time then its eternality would be well established. So, let's see whether *jāti*s like *ghatatva*(pot-hood), *gotva*(cow-hood), *bṛikhsatva*(tree-hood) are originated and destructed or not? If '*ghatatva*' is to be accepted as having origination then we must accept numerous '*ghatatva*' exists in each '*ghatas*' from past, present and future world since there would definitely originate a '*ghatatva*' whenever a potter produces a '*ghata*'. But if '*ghatatva*' originates then what would be its cause for originating? The causes by which '*ghata*' produces can not be taken as the causes of origination of '*ghatatva*' because then there remains no difference between '*ghata*' and '*ghatatva*'. Now, if '*ghatatva*' originates from any other different causes instead of the causes associated with

‘*ghata*’ production, then it will lead against perception because we do not find any other distinct causes at the time and place of ‘*ghata*’ production. Hence, there can occur ‘*Gaurava dosh*’ and ‘*Pratyakhsa birodh dosh*’ these two fallacies if we accept *jāti* as having origination (*utpatti*). On the other hand, if it is argued what if ‘*ghatatva*’ may originate post production of ‘*ghata*’? the reply will be like, if *ghatatva* comes after ‘*ghata*’ then ‘*ghata*’ needs to be considered as the cause of *ghatatva* and in consequence of this ‘*utpattikalin ghata*’ (the pot during origination) would possess no *ghatatva* in it and thus it fails to call as ‘*ghata*’ altogether. Therefore, in Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika’s point of view, it is better to deny the origination of *jāti-dharma*. We know it is an unanimous opinion that whatever is not originated, can not be destructible as well, hence similarly in case of *Jāti* too as it can not be considered as having origination, so no destruction at the same time. Thus, ‘*ghatatva*’ (*jāti*) inevitably is accepted as eternal.

b. Does ‘*ghatatva*’ pre-occupy the place where ‘*ghata*’ is yet to produce?:

All the produced ‘*ghata*’ anyhow needs to be associated with ‘*ghatatva-jāti*’ so that it can be recognized as ‘*ghata*’ but given the situation ‘*ghatatva*’ can not originate simultaneously with or even after production of ‘*ghata*’ and hence it is necessary to know how it (*ghatatva*) become associated with ‘*ghata*’? And in this context opponent argues (this argument seems like more of a satire one) either ‘*ghatatva*’ may pre-occupy the place or it moved from one *ghata* to another. But both of these arguments naturally rejected, in first case it can not be said that ‘*ghatatva*’ could pre-occupy the place as then *ghatatva* needs to be considered as unsheltered and in the second case, since movability is an action and only substances (*dravyas*) possess action (*kriyā*, *jāti* is a different category from substance that does not possess action. So, ‘*ghatatva*’ can not move one ‘*ghata*’ to other. But the issue, how does *ghatatva* get associated with *ghata*? remains unresolved.

c. When all ‘ghata’ destroys what shelters *ghatatva*?:

Annambhatta in his *Tarkasaṃgraha-dīpikā-Tikā* replied this question by postulating the notion of *kāla*(time). According to him when there will not be any existent ‘ghata’, ‘ghatatva’ will still remain taking resort in *kāla*(time). In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās system *kāla* is considered as *jagat-adhar*, hence all *jāti-dharmas* like ‘ghatatva’, ‘patattva’ actually reside in *kāla*. When particular ‘ghatas’ or ‘patas’ are produced, then after these particulars are associated with their specific universals, not before that. The first association between ‘*padārtha*’ and ‘*kāla*’ is regarded as ‘*utpatti*’ in this system. A pot is produced means the pot is first ever associated with *kāla*. Therefore, the issue raised above seems quite resolved after having this reply from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās.

Classification (*Bibhāga*) of Universal as demonstrated in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition:

In *Praśaṣṭapādabhāṣya*, also in *Bhāṣaparichhed* of Visvanath it is found that the whole chapter related to Universal entitled as ‘*Sāmānya-bibhāga*’ where the classification of universal has been given utmost importance of. In the very first verse of this chapter Achārya Visvanath said ‘*sāmānyam dvividham proktoṃ paranchāparamēba cha*’,²² it implies that *sāmānya* or *jāti* is of two kinds: *para* and *apara*. Though in some places we find this classification as asserting three kinds of universal like *para*, *apara* and *parāpara*, Jagadish Tarkālankār, kaundobhatta are included in keeping this opinion. However, it is mostly accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that there are two kinds of universal. Universal having highest and lower extension respectively recognized as *para-sāmānya* and *apara-sāmānya* (‘*paratvaṃ adhika deśa vṛitti*’. ‘*aparatvaṃ alpa deśa vṛittitvaṃ*’). We find some insight of Prof. B.K.Matilal regarding this classification of universals in his book ‘*Perception: An essay on classical Indian theories of Knowledge*’²³. Prof. Matilal referred this classification as sort of ‘hierarchy of generalities’, comprising of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ generalities

and it is also mentioned by prof. Matilal that this hierarchy of universal is actually dependent upon the way we understand them(*buddhy-apekṣam*). However, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās declared *Sattā-jāti* as *Para-sāmānya* or highest universal since compare to all the other *jāti*s, it(*sattā-jāti*) extends widely over highest number of categories like *Dravya*(substance), *Guna*(quality) and *Karma*/action . In *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Annambhatta has explained this classification of universal in a very lucid manner using all the instances. According to Annambhatta's elaboration *Sattā-jāti* is *para-sāmānya*, *Dravyatva*, *Gunatva*, *Karmatva* these are *parāpara-sāmānya* and whereas 'ghatatva' , 'patatva', 'tantutva' these are *apara-sāmānya*. 'Ghatatva'(pot-hood), 'Patatva'(cloth-hood), 'tantutva'(thread-hood) all these are to be regarded as '*apara-sāmānya*' as these universals do not extend over or more extended than any other *jāti*. Now, while defining *parā-para sāmānya* it has been said that those universal which possess intermediate extension (those which are more extended than any other *jāti* and also less extended than any other *jāti*). Such as, *Dravyatva*(substance-hood), *Prithivitva*(earth-hood), *Jalatva* (water-hood), *Tejatva* (fire-hood) etc; *Dravyatva Jāti* etc includes under or less-extended than *Sattā-Jāti* and at the same time it extends over or more extended than *Prithivitva* and *Jalatva*. Again in the same way *Prithivitva*, *Jalatva* these are less extended than *Dravyatva jāti* but extended over *prithivi*, *jala* these substances.

Sattā-jāti and Svarupa-sattā:

The reason behind classifying *Jāti* in this way as mentioned in *Tarkasaṃgraha* is to assert that we do not get same kind of cognition from universals, some may provide cognition of synthesis (*anugata-pratiti*) whereas other may provide cognition of differentiation(*byābhriti-buddhi*) and in some cases *jāti* may provide both of the cognition. And moreover, we also find Annambhatta

referring in this regard Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās opinion of claiming *Sattā-jāti* as the basis for synthesis cognition (*anugatapratiti*) only. Now in this context an important issue arises, prof. Raja Ram Dravid brought out that issue in his book *The problems of Universals in Indian Philosophy*. He asked “if the universal existence(it meant *sattā-jāti*) is confined to the first three categories of the Vaiśeṣikās, does it not serve as the ground of differentiation between them and the remaining four categories? and does it not also mean that objects belonging to the first three categories alone have existence ,not others?”²⁴ To put it more bluntly we need to accept then *Sattā-jāti* as the basis of both of the cognition; synthesis and differentiation but that goes against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas basic assumption. So, to resolve this issue we find them postulating one more notion relating to existence apart from universal-existence or *sattā-jāti*, and that notion has been introduced as *svarup-sattā* (Prof. R.R.Dravid translated it as self-being/self-existence). Shridhar Bhatta in his *Nyāyakandali-tikā* on *Praśaṣtapādabhāṣya* confronted the issue saying ‘*yadyapyeṣa sāmānyādibhyo vyāvartate tathāpi na tebhyaḥ svāśrayaṃ vyāvartayitum śaknoti, teṣāmapi svarūpasattāsambuddhisamvedyatvāt*’,²⁵ it implies, on the basis of existence the first three categories can not said to be differentiated from the other rest of the categories because the other rest categories(except non-existence or *abhābha*) also have existence and it called self-existence/*svarupa-sattā*. It is because of the presence of *Svarup-sattā* other rest of the positive categories (*sāmānya, viśeṣ, samavāya*) are cognized as having existence instead of being recognized as non-existents.

Now while looking for later Naiyāyikās or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās’ approach, we find Annambhatta in this regard (as explained in the Bengali translation of it by N.C.Goswami) did not talk about self-existence or *svarupa-sattā* to prove the existence of generality, particularity and inherence these three, rather he mentioned one *sattā*(existence as such) and showed how this one *sattā* or existence changes its role while connecting with different relations. According to him *sattā* (existence)

forms an awareness of existence in our experience and the form of that awareness or cognition is like '*idam sat*'(this is existent) '*idam sat*'(this is existent) and just as we experience this form of cognition in the first three of the positive category(as substance exists, quality exists, action exists) and in the same way we feel this cognition in the rest three positive category as well (like generality exists, particularity exists, inherence exists). In this context when existence cognized in the first three category, it(existence) subsists in them by direct relation of inherence and hence it is recognized *sattā-jāti*. On the other hand, in case of generality and particularity it(existence) subsists indirectly by the relation of *svasamavāyīsamavāya*(if we replace 'sva' with *sattā* which subsists in *Dravya*, *Guna*, *Karma* then its (*sattā*'s) '*samavāyī*' would mean the locuses in which it(*sattā*) resides that again refer to the first three positive category; *Dravya*, *Guna* and *Karma* .Now the final part *samavāya* indicates *sattā-samavāyī*'s *samavāya* which means *Sāmānya*, *Viśeṣ* since these two inhere in *sattā-samavāyī* or *Dravya*, *Guna*, *Karma*.) Whereas, in case of inherence (as mentioned in *Kiranaṇali-bhāṣya* and explained by Prof. Dravid) the indirect relation would be called as co-residence (*ekarthaṇṇrittiva*) as it is not capable of inhering, it(*samavāya*) will co-reside in the same substratum. Hence, later *Naiyāyikās* and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās* thus explained the presence of *sattā*(existence) in each of the six positive categories of *Vaiśeṣikās* and also attempted to resolve the issue of absence of *sattā* as *jāti* in the last three positive categories(*sāmānya*, *viśeṣ* and *samavāya*) in terms of specifying the relations by which *sattā*(existence as such) is related either with the first three (*Dravya*, *guna* and *karma* with the relation of inherence) or with the other three categories(with the indirect relation of co-inherence or co-residence) as mentioned.

Moreover, in *Annambhatta's Tarkasaṃgraha* (as explained by N.C.Goswami in the Bengali translation of *Tarkasaṃgraha*) we find one more alternative argument in support of assuming the presence of *sattā-jāti* straightway into the first three categories only and this argument seems like

a such strong argument the way Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas arguents used to be like. It implies that, since depending on sattā-jāti's special ability to produce synthesis cognition in the form of 'this is sat', 'this is sat', arose a much complexity in proving its (sattā-jāti) presence in the first three categories of Vaiśeṣikas; therefore, we need to assume any other ground in terms of which sattā-jāti can be proved straightway in the first three categories only. In *Tarkasaṃgraha* it is said, to bring out that other ground we need to consider sattā-jāti as a causal-determinant (kāranatā-abachhedaka). Amongst all the six positive categories only the first three are destructible entities, now destruction of a thing involves its prior existence. In Nyāya terminology the thing would then be considered as the primary cause of its own destruction (pratiyogi) and it is also said that causality must be determined, in this case the first three categories (Dravya, guna, karma) would be pratiyogis or primary causes that has potency of producing effect or destruction .and the determinant of this potency then in Nyāya view is nothing but sattā-jāti which ensures the existence of the said categories and existence do followed by destruction.

Now, in against of this above argument placed in *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Prof. Dravid demonstrated another argument from *Dinakari-tikā*, commentary on *Nyāya-siddhanta-muktāvali*. He writes that this argument of determinant causality 'proves the previous non-existence (prāgabhāva) of a thing also as having 'existence. Prāgabhāva of a thing in Nyāya view is destroyed when the thing is produced . If existence is the determinant of causality of destruction then prāgabhāva must be regarded as having existence. To avoid this as explained by prof. Dravid the argument of inherent causality postulated. The inherent causality of all the effects in which existence inheres is determined by 'substancehood', corresponding to this inherent causality there is 'producedness' must have a determinant which is the common attribute of all the three categories. such an attribute

can be nothing but the universal existence as there is no other attribute which is common to all these three categories.’’²⁶

Sāmānya-Parikhhā (Examining the nature of sāmānya):

At the beginning of this section one thing must need to mention that while going through the different texts of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika system it has been observed that no text added or entitled any chapter or section as ‘sāmānya-parikhhā’ whereas in case of other categories (like Dravya, Guna) we are able to see sections like Dravya-parikhhā, Guna-parikhhā, Viśeṣ-parikhhā. But it does not lead us to any such conclusion like there was no examination done relating to the nature of the padārtha sāmānya. Rather, if we properly follow the discussion method of different Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts, we will be able to find many contexts related to ‘sāmānya-parikhhā’ has been discussed though not in a very orderly manner but in a scattered way. In this section, an attempt will be made to bring those scattered arguments (along with some own observations in this regard) together.

The very first discussion which seemed to uphold an examining approach of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in this regard was when they brought forth and asked the reason of placing sāmānya in the fourth accordingly in the successive order of the seven categories. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikāś commentary texts like *Praśastapādabhasya*, *Tarkasamgraha* both can be found replying this query almost in the beginning of the texts and provided an explicit argument for maintaining such a sequence while placing all the padārthas. In order to justify keeping sāmānya in the fourth place it has been said that we always need to mention the locus(aśraya) before the located things(aśrita), in this case as Dravya, Guna and Karma these three are considered as the locus for sāmānya, hence it(sāmānya) thus become located(aśrita) in these three. It is the reason for which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintained this sequence and placed sāmānya in the number four after Dravya, Guna, Karma respectively.

Now, in this context of examining *sāmānya* I would like to place one query on the very definition of *sāmānya* which instigates my mind often. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system *sāmānya* or *jāti* is being defined as ‘*nityatve sati aneksamavetatvam sāmānyam*’ that implies, *sāmānya* is such property which inheres in many particulars and at the same time it is eternal. Now if we try to understand this definition into more detail we find out that the relation by which *sāmānya* resides in many particulars is the relation of inherence (*samavaya-sambandha*). And this *samavaya Sambandha* as we know is that which is an eternal relation. To illustrate, the relation of inherence is ‘*ayutasiddha*’ that means the two *relata* related by the relation of inherence can not be separated. Since, a specific *Jāti* or *sāmānya* is related with some specific different members of particular thing in the relation of inherence, it (*jāti*) can bring those specific different members of particular things under one shelter or class and thus become the reason for inclusive cognition (*anugata-pratiti*). Now, if we see the definition of ‘*Lakhsana*’ (one of the very important notion in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system) it says ‘*asādhāranatva lakhsyatābachhedakasamanīyatatva*’²⁷. To illustrate, ‘*lakhsya*’ means ‘the object defined’ ‘*lakhsatābachhedaka*’ refers to the regulating principle or determinant principle of that specific ‘*lakhsya*’ by which ‘*lakhsya*’ is recognized as ‘*lakhsya*’. Now as per the definition ‘*lakhsana*’ is such peculiar or specific (*asādhāraṇa*) property that is *samanīyata* with this ‘*lakhsyatābachhedaka dharmā*’ and ‘*samanīyatatva*’ actually indicates the *ayutasiddha* relation of inherence. In simple words ‘*lakhsana*’ is related with its specific ‘*lakhsya*’ in terms of relation of inherence and thus it (*lakhsana*) become capable of residing in all specific ‘*lakhsya*’ and at the same time bars itself from residing in ‘*alakhsyas*’ (other things apart from *lakhsya*). So, it is said ‘*lakhsabrīttitve sati alakhsābrīttitvam lakhsanyatvam*’ implies, ‘*lakhsyamātrabrīttitvam lakhsyanatvam*’ (‘*lakhsya*’ is recognized as ‘*lakhsya*’ when it has ‘*lakhsana*’). Hence, we should also accept ‘*lakhsana*’ as the ground for inclusive cognition since it becomes the ground of

inclusive notion amongst all ‘lakhsya’. Therefore, my insight here would be, isn’t it occurring a cumbrousness (gaurava) while accepting sāmānya as the ground for inclusive notion? Can’t we replace jāti-dharma with lakhsana-dharma? If we assume ‘dravyatva’ straightwy as the lakhsana-dharma of Dravya rather saying dravyatva jati-dharma as dravya’s lakhsana, will it be a justified issue to think about?

However, in the context of examining sāmānya the question of its existence comes naturally. The fundamental categorization of padārthas in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is basically based on the principle of ‘dhama-dharmi bheda’(differentiation between property and property holder).Amongst the padārthas some padārthas(like Dravya,guna etc) are dharmi in essence and some (sāmānya,viśeṣ etc) are dharma(property) in essence. All these are object of our cognition and according to them whatever enters into the domain of our cognition(whether it is dharma or dharmi),that must have their own existence or reality at the same time independent of their cognition. We don’t feel that much difficulty while justifying this view in terms of Dharmis like Dravya, guna, karma but to acknowledge the dharmas (properties like sāmānya, viśeṣ etc)as existent in the external world seems a little blurry in our practical experience. But surprisingly enough,the extreme realistic view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is associated with dharmi(property) where they consider sāmānya as having its own existence different from vyākṛti(particulars) and in some way related to particulars(as explained Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas extreme realism by R.R.Dravid). But this view has been vehemently opposed by the other schools like Buddhists, Advaitins... etc. and they (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) also went on replying the refutation to establish their extremist point of view. And infact, the existence of sāmānya has also been thoroughly examined through this argumentative discourse.

The Buddhist school is regarded as the main opponent of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas on this issue of existence of sāmānya, they straightway denied the existence of sāmānya in the external world and considered it as a mere mental fragment. We will be discussing in the next section some of the main arguments of Buddhist for rejecting the existence of sāmānya and how Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika defended those to re-establish the existence of sāmānya through verification.

We find in this regard Uddyotakara from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās side and Diṇṇāga from Buddhists perspective arguing over the existence of jāti.

Uddyotkara while explaining the nature of sāmānya or jāti declares it as such a padārtha which has its own positive and independent or objective existence and it resides in particular things as well. So, in accordance with Uddyotakara's view jāti is an objective property which resides in the particular objects of same sort and refers to a positive idea. Now, Diṇṇāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* vehemently opposes Uddyotkara. In his view the way realists for referring the meaning of word refers to jāti as a positive property there exists no such thing. And in his And in his opinion accepting meaning of word in such a way is nothing but a false idea. According to him at that point of time when we apply a name or word to a thing we comprehend the thing differentiating or negating it from others thing. To initiate this idea he propounded the doctrine of apoha according to which when we apply the word 'cow' to the animal cow we comprehend cow at that time as 'a-gopoha' or 'go-bhinna-bheda'(cow denotes not-non cow). This is an explanation where Buddhists tried to explain the uniform or identical cognition(anugata-pratīti) in a negative way.

On the other hand, Uddyotakara in response to the above view of 'apoha' intends how should we apprehend 'apoha'? is it only denote meaning in negative sense? If so then there occurs

contradiction because when a word denotes its meaning negating it from others then it seems that actually it is denoting the other things as meaning instead of its own meaning. Besides, there also can happen an infinite regress in this regard since comprehending meaning in negative sense or negating others indicates that the others also needs to be negated from others above than that and thus it will lead to infinite, such as if we denote cow negating it from horse then to comprehend horse we need to negate horse from others and thus fallacy of infinite regress will occur.

Diṇṇāga to refute this explained his intention saying when he said word denotes meaning in negative sense then he actually meant that word denotes meaning in a positive sense before a negative implication. So, he didn't at all meant an absolute negation while explaining the denotation of meaning through doctrine of 'apoha'. Denotative meaning of word is actually a mental image which is not entirely a negation rather it has a positive basis or implication. But the focal point of this doctrine that to keep its individually or individual image retained meaning should be expressed in a negative way. Moreover, Diṇṇāga referred to the example of arthāpatti pramāṇa to make it clear how a second meaning can be implied.

A. Context of perception: Buddhist's argument against Determinate perception

Nyāya-Vāiśeṣikas declared that the procedure of perception completes in two steps; first, Indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakhsa) and then Determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakhsa). 'Vikalpa' means Viśeṣana(qualifier). Indeterminate perception reveals only what it gets in sense-data. It reveals everything (that are essential for perception)but in pure, unmixed or unrelated form that is why it is described as '*nisprakāraḥ jñānaṃ nirivikalpakaṃ*',²⁸ the cognition that is devoid of any kind of 'vikalpa' or viśeṣana. Whereas, Savikalpaka pratyakhsa is the ultimate form of our perception, it reveals everything necessary for perception and in related form as well,

hence it is rightly said ‘*saparakāraṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ*’,²⁹ the cognition that reveals the object in perception related with prakāra or vikalpa(qualifier). In simple words, when the perceiver opens his eyes in front of an object to perceive it, his eyes get connected with that object. That first pure cognition which emerges just right after this first connection (sannikarṣa in Nyaya terminology), is taken as Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa jñāna. And the cognition that emerges right after this nirvikalpaka cognition, is called savikalpaka pratyakṣa. To illustrate with an example ‘This is a table’ it is a determinate form of perceptual statement. Now, this statement includes subject ‘this’ that refers to the particular object table in this context and the predicate ‘table’ that actually refers to the qualifier universal or ‘tableness’. Hence, the complete perceptual statement reveals a qualified object and comprises of three elements; object(table), qualifier(tableness) and their relation (inherence in this case). And moreover, all these three elements in savikalpaka pratyakṣa are recognized as like table as viśeṣya (qualified object or substantive), tableness/universal as qualifier or viśeṣana (adjective or prakāra) and the relation inherence as relation (saṃsarga or saṃbandha). But in the first step of this perceptual cognition (indeterminate cognition) though all these elements do present but in their primordial nature like table as table, tableness as tableness and inherence as just inherence instead as relation. Thus, Determinate perception is recognized as a ‘viśiṣṭa-pratīti (qualified comprehension) that is preceded by the pure sensation of its qualification.

From the Buddhists perspective Diṇṇāga defines perception as ‘*kalpanāpodham*’,³⁰ implies, the cognition which is devoid of any conceptual formation. Dharmakīrti defines perception as ‘*tatra kalpanāpodham abhīrantaṃ pratyakṣam*’,³¹ as translated by R.R.Dravid, ‘the direct sense apprehension free from conception and error’.³² For the Buddhists, an actual perception includes only the real, bare particulars (svalakṣṇas in their terminology). What is perceived does not bear

any name, qualifier or universal, identification or feature, in the perception we only get the object as such/ real particulars. Hence, in refuting the previous opinion of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Buddhist simply said that the notion of determinate perception that is in generalized form is not true rather it is unreal and imposed. Dharmakīrti said ‘*abhilāpasamśargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpana*’³³ implies, anything that is linked with words, names, is not a matter of perception but imagination or conceptualization. Buddhists straightway declares, any generalized formation is mental creation and has no connection with the perception we have. It is the notion of universal by which this generalization took place in determinate perception and even it is accepted as perceived by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Now, this is where Buddhists opposed saying any matter of generalization (notion of universal in N.V. terms) can not be an object of perception in any way, rather it can be conceived or conceptualized. Hence, in Buddhist epistemology they considered two pramāṇas; perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*) that reveals only the external real particulars/*sva-lakṣaṇas* and Inference (*anumāna*) which comprehends universals or in Buddhists term *sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*.

Moreover, they gave some arguments to discard universal as the object of perception. We find Pandita Aśoka’s elaboration in support of this Buddhist objection in the chapter ‘*sāmānyaduṣandikprasāritā*’ of the book ‘*Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts*’, where he said “*upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptatayā sāmānyasya svayameva pararūpaga-māna. Tathānuvyapagamai ba na sāmānyabalena ba kulaiyādi-nugatākārau ...syātam*”³⁴ the argument implies, anything which has not been perceived yet in spite of having perceptual features, should be considered as non-existent. Same logic goes very appropriate with universals because universals is said to be the object of perception by the realist and still never be perceived, hence it is better to deny its existence. Next, Dharmakīrti argues there is no distinct perceptual cognition of universal we find apart from the cognition of particulars. It can be perceived as nothing but as words or

names(Pramāna-vārtika). In *Tattvasaṃgraha* we find another argument in support this argument. To justify Universals as the effect of our understanding it has been implied there that suppose someone is looking at something (say, looking at a rose) but he is or his mind actually is concentrating on something else(say, remembering his beloved), so it has to be accepted that there exists no conception of the object rose in spite the presence of sense-perception and thus it is quite comprehensible that conception and sense-perception these are two different faculties and so as their comprehended objects ;universals, particulars respectively. If universals were an object of perception then it would have been cognized right after the sense perception of the object(rose in this case),but it didn't happen. Hence, it is rightly said there. '*anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam, sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravartate*'.³⁵

Thus, Buddhist discarded realist's assumption of perceptibility of universal which is being followed by its external existence has also been shown as dubious, and then naturally determinate cognition is rejected which was said to be based on objectivity of universals.

A.a. Replied the above argument demonstrating universals are perceived:

We know that determinate perception is one of the most celebrated notion in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology and it is based on the objective existence of universals, so accepting universals' objective existence has much importance in their system. Hence, Shridhar declared that '*tatra yadi śakṣyāmaḥ pramāṇena sāmānyam upapādayituṃ tadāsaty api śabda-saṃśṛṣṭa-grāhakatve tad-viśayain vikalpa-jñānaṃ indriyārthajatvāt pratyakṣam eva svāt*',³⁶ which intends if they will get success in proving the objective existence of universal then the cognition in whose object universal would be, that cognition (determinate cognition) will have to accepted in spite of its indulgence with

words, names etc. And to prove its objectivity they need to first establish that universals can be perceived.

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas contention universals also can be the content of sense-experience. If we see the Nyāya analysis of sannikarṣa, we will actually able to find in what process universals do get attached in our sense-perception. Sannikarṣa (as explained by the Naiyāyikās) is that connecting relation between sense-organs and objects, by which each sense-organ can able to perceive the specific object (indriyārtha sannikarṣa). There are six different Laukika-Sannikarṣa for each different set of objects to perceive(as explained by the Nyāya school).such as Saṃyoga,Saṃyukta-samavāya,Saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya,Samavāya,Samaveta-samavāya and Viśeṣya-viśeṣanabhābha. Saṃyoga-sannikarṣa acts while perceiving substances, say ‘someone perceives pot’(a earthly substance/pārthiba-dravya) refers to his or her eyes get connected with the pot with the help of Saṃyoga-sannikarṣa. Now, this Saṃyoga sannikarṣa is a direct sense perception but the other two right after it are indirect perceptions since both of them are depended on Saṃyoga-sannikarṣa. It is the the second one(Saṃyukta-samavāya) which assists to perceive universals(jāti)of each substances along with the qualities(gunas) and actions(karmas).To illustrate, sense-organ(in this context eyes) directly get connected(saṃyoga) with pot and indirectly it(eyes) connected with pot-hood(jāti) which inheres(samaveta) in pot. Thus, this indirect connection is called as Saṃyukta-samavāya-sannikarṣa. Therefore, Naiyāyikas will not going to accept Buddhist’s previously mentioned contention of not accepting universal as perceptible. Jayanta Bhatta also supporting Nyāya view in his *Nyāya-Manjari* said that we do have definitive and uncontradicted sense perception of universals just like particulars (‘nāpijātyāderasattvam indriyārtha sannkarṣot pannabādhasandeharahitapratyaya gamyatvāt’ – N.M)³⁷. We also find in this regard Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Shastra-Dipikā* has put forth some

instances of perceptual cognition in which one is identifying a thing as the thing. For example, When we do identify ‘this thing also is a chalk’, ‘this thing also is a duster, ‘this thing also is a projector’ in all this synthetic perceptual cognition since there is spatial and temporal differences among all the particulars we do need universal in our sense-experience .

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also did not agree in this view of the opponents that there are different set of objects to be considered for indeterminate and determinate cognition rather for them there are no difference in terms of objects of both of the cognitions. In both of the cognitions the presence of three elements (substantive/viśeṣya, adjective/prakāra, and relation/saṃbandha apprehended but the point is in the first stage of perceptual cognition it remains indefinite but in the second or determinate stage it become definite. Hence, the presence of universals in sense perception has to be accepted.

While explaining the general notion amongst distinct particulars Buddhists pointed out that general notion emerges out of recollection of conventional name, to refute this Jayanta Bhatta has argued by saying ‘*paśyatynugataṃ rūpam avijñāte pi vācaka, dākṣiṇātya ivākasmāt paśyannuṣṭraparamparām*’,³⁸ which implies that ,also without the presence of the knowledge of conventional name , universals can be seen to appear.He has shown an example of a south Indian. To elaborate, a south Indian who did not see or even heard the name of a camel ever before. He visits north India and finds somewhere many camels standing in a row. Now, in this case he will definitely get to identify that these animals belong to same class even without knowing their conventional name. Thus, it can be said that generalization occurs much before naming and to uphold this again we have to say universals must be apprehended in sensation.

When Buddhists argue saying universals can not be apprehended in sense-perception like particulars rather it arises depending on the function of our intellect in terms of comparing and contrasting, hence universals need to be accepted as mental construction, not a percept. Jayanta Bhatta again replied implying that the real nature of thing is combination of general and particular both of the characters (vastuno'ngīkṛtā prājñairata evobhayātmā,yau brūtaṣṭvekarūpatvaṃ tāvubhāvapi bālīśau'-N.M) . And the function of intellect is needed to have definite cognition of both of the characters because in the first stage or in indeterminate perception both characters(general and particular) are apprehended as unclear and indefinite. In against of this Buddhist argue that two contradictory characters can not co-exist in one thing, then Jayanta Bhatta replied '*parasparavirodh 'pi nāsthiha tadavedanāt,ekabādhena nānyatra dhih śuktirajatādivat*'³⁹ his implication was general and particular these two characteristics are not at all contradictory in nature , if so then they would not have been co-existed and perceived in the same thing or same locus.

However, thus Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās argued over to establish universals as the object of perception which is naturally followed by employing its external existence.

B. Context of the notion of generality produced by universal: Buddhist's contention goes against accepting universal as the notion of generality

i. The Buddhists are in this opinion that particular things themselves can be the basis for notion of identity. They have brought forth some similes to make it sound. Dharmakīrti explained the simile of color cognition in this context,⁴⁰ he intended to mean through this simile that for having a cognition of color there requires some important factors like sufficient light, a clear vision, cognizing mind, and the object itself. We are well aware of the fact that these elements involved

have nothing in common but still helped in production of color cognition, the identical effect. One more simile has been referred in another Buddhist text, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the simile of medicines.⁴¹ It has been said there that different herbs when mixed together, is seen to produce identical recovery from illness. These herbs though do not have any knowable unity together with but still succeed in giving an identical cognition. Taking cue from these similes Buddhist contended at once that particulars though different still can produce an identical cognition, henceforth accepting universals for the ground of identical or similar cognition, is nothing but an unnecessary assumption. Moreover, Buddhist further developed this argument by saying it is actually the recollection of conventional names that has a direct linked with general cognition, and particulars actually assist indirectly in this process of producing general cognition. Hence it is rightly said in *Tattvasaṃgraha* ‘hetāvādye pi vaiphalyaṃ samayābhogabhāvitā, teṣāmiṣṭaiva saṃsargī so’nvayavyatirekavān’⁴².

ii . Another argument which has been found in *Tattvasaṃgraha*, explains that if we minutely analyze general cognition we will only find particulars like color, shape etc and nothing related to universal like entity accepted by the realists. Hence, naturally question comes how it is significant to accept a thing in the produced effect or cognition that was not present in the producing causes?⁴³

iii. Pandita Ashoka in ‘*Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*’ for refuting Nyāya position on universal as the basis of general cognition said ‘*yad idam sāmānya....dusparihārah*’,⁴⁴ in this verse he assumed some example to place opponent’s (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) argument. To explain following Prof. D.N.Shastri’s illustration in this regard⁴⁵, the first example he gave ‘notion of garland’ and said that realists might compare the thread (that infixed many flowers into one garland) with the notion of universal as the common factor. But again discarded this argument saying it possesses the

fallacy of undistributed middle (*anaikāntikata*) since the common notion here has no mutual contact with the individual objects. The other example refers to ‘being a cook’. As explained against Nyāya contention, it says that if it is a common notion then it will refer a person as ‘cook’ even when that person is not cooking.

iv. We find Shāntarakhsit in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* ⁴⁶ further arguing in this regard that we find some concepts referred by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas which are not arisen depending on a universal such as the concept of universal or *sāmānya* itself, *viśeṣ*, *abhābha*, teacher, etc. Buddhist debated if these concept remain without having universal as their basis then why not other concepts like man, cow, table etc? In their opinion there should be a consistency placing the arguments, and if they accept this view that particulars themselves can be the basis of general concepts with the help of their own nature, then everything will consistently fall in place.

B.a. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas arguments in reply of these mentioned above: Asserting universal as the basis for general cognition

i. In reply of this argument related to color cognition, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would definitely oppose this view that particulars themselves should be regarded as the basis of general cognition. In the context of color cognition they will say (as explained by Prof. R.R.Dravid) the cognition of any color say, the cognition the color red, is distinct from the objects like a sari, a watch, a cushion cover all of which are of red color. And in the same way cognition of general property evolved on the basis of something other than particular things.

ii. while analyzing general cognition we will only get form, shape of particular things and not any general characters. Charging against this opinion Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas will say if there were no

universals as the basis of the particulars then there will be no unity in nature amongst particulars. And without unitizing particulars it is next to impossible acknowledging individually each and everyone amongst numerous particulars in this earth. And generalization particular things make us able to recognize some particular things under a one group or same class like some animals as cow, some are as dog and so on. If Buddhist won't agree then the knowledge they provided in their texts, will need to be discarded as impossible and they will also face an anarchy altogether while using words.

iii. In reply of Pandita Ashoka's above argument Uddyotkara said '*pācana-kriyāyām yat pradhānam sādhanam tat pācaka- śabdenoeyate,tac ca prādhānyam pācakāntare'py astiti na doṣaḥ*.'⁴⁷ which implied (as explained by Prof. DN.Shāstri) all generalization or the notion of generality is not solely based on universals. The general notion with reference to cooks is occurred as the principle agent of cooking is referred by the term cook and the attribute principal agent presents in all cooks. Hence, the notion of cook can be considered as a common one. But with time this view could not sustain any longer and confronted many other criticisms in terms of how they will prove that a common thing presents in all the individuals concerned. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas however did not give any suitable answer to this and rather they developed another theory regarding universals where they consider universals as the determinant of causality which goes in consistent with their law of parsimony.

iv. Uddyotkara replied this argument by saying '*viśeṣapratyayānām anāksmikativādityasya hetoḥ piṇḍapratyayavyatiriktasya prayayasya nimittāntarādupāda ityayam arthaḥ na punaḥ sarvo'nuvṛttipratyayaḥ sāmānyādeva bhavatī*',⁴⁸ it says universal is to be accepted only where it is cognized separately from particulars. To illustrate it using the example given by the opponents i.e.

the ‘notion of cook’, we can not have the cognition of cook-ness distinctly from individual cook since ‘cook’ refers to ‘the act of cooking done by an individual’. In the same we can not have cognition of ‘teacher-hood’ separately from individual teachers as teacher refers to the ‘act of teaching performed by an individual’. If teacher-hood were a universal, we will be able to cognize a teacher just right after seeing him. Again, accepting ‘universality’ as a common notion of different universals, leads to the fallacy of infinite regress. Uddyotakara in this regard commented that ‘*yathā gotvam anekārthasamavāi tathā āsvatvādītyanekārthaistatsamavāyaasya samānatvāt gotvādiṣvanuvṛttipratyaya*’,⁴⁹ he intended to mean that the notion of universal is basically applicable to universal and its inherence with the particulars. Like, Table-hood inheres in many particular tables. Hence, the notion of universals refers only the diverse universals like cowness, treehood, tablehood etc, and not any other over and above universal or universali.

Third Chapter

Cognition, Language and its process of functioning in *Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika* framework

All of the Indian philosophical schools (except Cārvāka) are of unanimous opinion regarding the ultimate end or goal of their philosophical system and that is for them ‘Mokṣa’(salvation of the individual soul), though we find difference while looking at the technical names of it(salvation) given by the different schools such as, for the Jainas, Sāṃkhyas it is ‘Kaivalya’, for the Bouddhas it is ‘Nirvāna’, for the Vedāntins it is ‘Mokṣa’ and for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas it is ‘Nisreyasa’ or ‘Apabarga’. They all have preached different means or ways for the purpose of giving guidance towards achieving that one end i.e. salvation. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika uphold that salvation or ‘mokṣa’ implies complete cessation from pain and rebirth. Ignorance or unable to get the true nature of things is the main cause of all pain and rebirth(since being ignorant, self gets connected itself with all the material things which causes pain and bondage). Hence, they have taken up the way which says for liberating one’s individual soul there is need to acquire knowledge about true nature of the categories/padārthas (tatva-jñāna).by which soul becomes able to remove its ignorance that leads to self-realization (atma-upalabdi) which results in salvation. Nyāya here referred right knowledge (tatva-jñāna) of sixteen categories¹ for attainment of salvation while Vaiśeṣika mentioned seven fundamental categories² in this context. Amongst the sixteen categories mentioned by Nyāya ‘Pramāṇa’ is the first one. ‘Pramāṇa’ refers to ‘means of right knowledge’ and there are four pramāṇas accepted in this system and they are Pratyakhsa(perception), Anumāna(inference),Upamāna(comparison) and Verbal testimony(Shabda)³. Vaiśeṣikas though do not explicitly mention pramāṇas but the concept of pramāṇa is being assumed in an implicit manner within their system, though they

consider two of the pramāṇas; Perception(Pratyakhsa) and Inference (Anumāna) as independent means of knowledge (but this seems to be applicable when we consider Vaiśeṣika as a separate system but when these two systems are being merged with each other and recognized as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, then we find four pramāṇas have been explicitly mentioned in those texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition). Thus, Pramāṇa has been one of the most important notion that is required for acquiring right knowledge in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. ‘Right knowledge’ is technically known as ‘pramā’, pramāṇa is the means or instrument of pramā(*prama-karaṇam-pramāṇam*)⁴

Jñāna and Pramā:

Now, while mentioning ‘prama’, the notion ‘jñāna’ comes in mind naturally since these two are inextricably related with each other in spite of having difference in their concepts. In different Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts we find that they brought forward the notion of jñāna, much before they had mentioned the term ‘pramā’ but in their epistemological discussion the notion of ‘pramā’ is more primordial than the notion of jñāna. ‘Jñāna’ has been defined as ‘*sarvavyābahārahetu-guna-buddhi-jñānam*’⁵ that is to say jñāna, is such a quality(guna), the other name of which is buddhi, which is considered to be the cause of our every application. As it(jñāna)is a quality then it must have its locus-substance(adhār-dravya). For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas it is atmā or the self where jñāna resides or in clear terms jñāna emerges since it is not a natural, permanent or static quality of self rather an adventitious one which emerges in the presence of all the required causes. To, put it more bluntly with an example of how ‘ghata-jñāna’ emerges. Let’s say, A ‘pot’ (ghata) has been kept in front of someone in a place with enough light. Now when that person opens his eyes and looks at the ‘pot’, his eyes (the sense organ) get connected with that pot. It happens because before eyes get connected with pot, ‘mana’(mind in psychological term) following the instruction (or may call signal) of the

atmā(self)linked itself(mana) with eyes and then eyes get itself connected with the object ‘pot’/ ‘ghata’ and in consequence an awareness of the pot or ‘ghata-jnāna’ occurs or emerges in atmā. Hence, ‘jnāna’ refers to an awareness or an understanding or an apprehension that includes all kind of cognitive awareness. As P.Bilimoria explained “‘jnāna is a mentalistic term(i.e., functional, without supposing a mentalistic ontology),that denotes any bit of awareness and by extension, ‘cognition’ , ‘judgement’ , ‘belief’ and also other kinds of cognitive awareness like ‘doubting’ , ‘remembering’ .And moreover, he also mentioned that ‘jnāna’ always involves such mental phenomena, contents of which refer to some actual objects.”⁶ Prof. B.K. Matilal also remarked the same on Nyāya concept of jnāna saying ‘to be conscious means to be conscious of something, there is no such thing as ‘pure consciousness’ ’⁷ .

Although, we have seen that ‘jnāna’ involves different kinds of cognitive awareness, but Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has classified ‘jnāna’ mainly into two types; Anubhabha(apprehension or consciousness) and Smṛiti(memory or remembering). But the point is how can anyone be aware of the fact that the cognition or consciousness he or she is having, is true or not?

While addressing this particular query Nyāya brings forth the concept of ‘pramā’ or ‘yathārtha-anubhabha’ with the definition as ‘*tadvati-tatprakāra -anubhabha –yathārtha*⁸ that is to say, a pramā refers to an exact or proper apprehension or cognition of the object with all its attributes or properties, just the way it(that object)exists in reality. Let’s say there was a ‘red pen’ in front of me and I could also able to apprehend that also as a ‘red pen’, then my apprehension will be known as pramā. To put it more clearly, we can not consider any random cognition or apprehension (jnāna in Nyāya terms) as pramā, there are certain criteria for that and an apprehension or jnāna needs to justify those criteria to be recognized as pramā. As explained in Prof.Bilimoria’s book ‘for a jnāna to be a pramā , it may require certitude(niśchoy),decisive absence of doubt and counter-instance and so forth’.⁹ The apprehensions or cognitions that fail

to rise to these certain standards, are regarded as *apramā* or *ayathārtha-anubhabha* in Nyāya terms. Hence, it is no longer difficult to understand why the notion of ‘*pramā*’(true/right cognition or valid cognition) has left more stronger impact in Nyāya epistemology than the notion of ‘*jñāna*’(cognition or apprehension). And more significantly, when Naiyāyikas are talking of ‘*tatvajñāna*’ they meant true or right cognition or *pramā* of reality obtaining of which one can able to proceed towards the path of ‘*niśreyas*’ or salvation. And it is the notion of ‘*pramā*’ and not ‘*jñāna*’ that has been considered as more like an equivalent term of the western term ‘knowledge’ (justified true belief).

Now as we have seen earlier amongst the all other instrument or means (*pramāṇa*) for acquiring knowledge, one is ‘knowing from words’ (*śabda* as the instrument for obtaining true cognition or knowledge), discussion of which paved the way of philosophy of language and linguistics in the sphere of Indian Philosophy. Although in Indian philosophy ‘perception’ has been given greatest importance amongst all other *pramāṇas* but it may not be wrong and exaggeration to say that verbal testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*) is more prevalent and pervasive than any other *pramāṇas*. As Prof. Matilal said ‘through words we acquire knowledge of things not only remote in space and time but also near but imperceptible.’¹⁰ Whether it is obtaining knowledge from our ancestors or came to know about any past events , *śabdapramāṇa* takes the pioneer role. And more importantly, unlike any other *pramāṇa* knowledge from words helps us in knowing the thoughts of other’s mind. What anyone thinks, he or she transmits it to other person or to the entire world through his meaningful utterances or words .And thus whether it is knowledge acquired through perception or inference or through any other means of knowing, ultimately needs the assistance of *śabdapramāṇa* because it is the meaningful utterance by which the cognizer (it can be perceptual cognition or any other) is going to express his or her cognition to other. Hence, the purview of ‘*śabdapramāṇa*’ is much larger than it is considered to be in Indian philosophy of language. In the context of communicating through language

human beings are like participants either as a speaker or as a hearer in each of their specific linguistic communities. Speaker speaks, hearer listens and there can also occur role reverse like a hearer in a previous usage can become speaker in other usage and thus an endless continuous process has been carrying on since the very beginning of human civilization.

Amongst the Indian philosophical systems Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is very well known for an elaborate and rich discussion on language and how it functions. The section afterwards will be an attempt to focus on the whole formulation and causal mechanism required for the analysis of language and its function in the framework of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

Shābdabodha and Shrābana-pratyakhsa:

Before entering into the focal point; one thing, needs to get clear, which abruptly comes to mind that, how does shrābana-pratyakhsa (auditory perceptual knowledge of words) differ from shābdabodha (verbal knowledge or word generated knowledge)? If we go through Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's doctrine on perception we see there that they are talking about auditory perception (shrābana-pratyakhsa), one kind of ordinary-external perception (laukika-bāhya pratyakhsa) where a hearer can hear or can have perceptual knowledge after his auditory sense organ gets in contact (sannikarṣa in Nyāya terms) with the object 'sound', now as we know in a linguistic utterance (that is the primary function of having a verbal knowledge), speech organ or articulators emit certain sounds as well. Suppose someone (a speaker) utters a word and it is meaningful sound (let's say 'table') and another person at once hears a particular sound of that particular word 'table' and able to perceive (auditory perception) the sound of that word. And this is where one may make mistake of not identifying these two (auditory perceptual knowledge and verbal knowledge) as different. Hence, an accurate understanding is much needed here in this context. While perceiving an uttered word in Nyāya view hearer hears or perceives a whole word since they do not differentiate words from the sounds (which we find

in Bhartṛihari's view. As explained by Prof. S. Bhattacharya in his article 'according to Bhartṛihari a spoken word or sentence is a type of reality different from speaking'¹¹). Word though comprises of mutually related syllables and these syllables are uttered one after another still in Nyāya envision hearer perceives the whole word at once with the help of the direct contact (sannikarṣa) between the last syllable uttered and hearer's auditory sense organ, along with memory of the other previous syllables heard and thus the perception of a whole word happened. Now, the point is through this process of perception or auditory perception (shrābana pratyakṣa) hearer becomes able to hear the word but can not able to grasp the meaning, the relation between word with its meanings etc (and in the case of a sentence there also involves the relations amongst all the words of that sentence). That means in auditory perception any word (it can be a mere utterance, it can be any noise, it can be chirping of the birds and so forth) can be the object of this perception. But unlike this, only meaningful utterances after being perceived, can be the object of knowledge generated by word (shabda-janya-bodh or shābdabodha). Hence, shābdabodha is something one step ahead than auditory perception, all the further effects like acknowledging the meaning, word meaning relation etc; after a word is being heard or perceived, come under 'knowledge generated by that word' (shābdabodha). And although auditory perception of word requires auditory sense-organ as one of its causal instrument but shābdabodha does not require auditory sense organ as one of its immediate cause rather shābdabodha involves some other specific set of causal equipments thereby and the primary one amongst is the word itself. Thus, it is no longer hard to understand auditory perception (shabda-pratyakṣa) should not be confused with shābdabodha, the first one is perceptual knowledge generated with the help of sense-object contact whereas the later is verbal knowledge which is generated from word and some other specific aids. But, it also needs to keep in mind that there is no way of denying auditory perception (shrābana-pratyakṣa) as one of the necessary assistant causes (sahakari kāraṇa) of shābdabodha or

shābdaprama(knowledge generated from words) since without having the auditory perception of the word, the hearer will not be able to proceed further with the complete knowledge of that word. We find some pertinent points in this regard in Prof. Bilimoria's book¹² where he intended to say that auditory perception (he used the term as perception of sentence) is the very earlier stage or antecedent condition of shābdabodha or shābdapramā that actuates the first mental conversance with the surface structure of sentences. All the precedent immediate functions or causes would not have been successful in providing shābdapramā, if there had not this necessary, contingent cause as shrābana-pratyakhsa before them (the immediate or non-ordinary causes) of shābdapramā. He has also given one very relatable example to make the readers understand the scenario. In that example he referred to 'a construction of a timber house'. The explanation goes like, it is true and evident that to make a timber house one needs timber as its most essential element without which the construction will not going to occur at all. But the process of producing timber (i.e. cutting off the trees from forest) requires few more causes like an axe, one woodsman, hence these direct causes of timber production, are indirectly connected with the production of the timber house as its necessary but ordinary causes denial of which does not make sense in understanding the construction of the house. Thus, in the same way shrābana-pratyakhsa plays role of the necessary indirect cause of shābdapramā.

The way Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas demonstrated the whole process of understanding from words:

Cognitive state of speaker in a linguistic exchange: We already have mentioned that in the context of linguistic understanding or knowledge from words (shābdaprama), speaker and hearer must belong to a same language user community. Now, one query needs to address here that comes very naturally in mind how would Naiyāyikas describe the cognitive state of of the

speaker just right before he or she utters any word or sentence to communicate something or some information to hearer? The first thing that comes in mind for replying this from the Naiyāyikas point of view is that, the speaker is putting effort (say, physical effort of uttering that is done by the vocal organs or when internal air hits some specific parts of vocal organ). Now, in Nyāya system we know that ‘effort’ (prayatna in Nyāya terms) has been regarded as one of the twenty four ‘gunas’, and it has also been further classified into three kinds; ‘pravṛitti’ (inclination), ‘nivṛitti’ (disinclination), and ‘jivana-yoni-prayatna’ (effort for sustaining life).¹³ Amongst these three kinds of ‘prayatna’ the ‘effort of uttering’ naturally comes under inclination or ‘pravṛitti’ since like all other inclination, it (utterance) is also caused by desire (ichha) to do. At this point we need to mention one accredited maxim of Nyāya that says ‘*jñāna-janyā-bhaveda-ichha-ichha-janyā-kṛitirbhabeta*’¹⁴, it implies that kriti or effort must be produced by desire (ichha) to produce and this desire (ichha) comes through knowledge/jñāna (jñāna of that specific action which the agent is going to put his kriti/effort on). So, in this context speaker’s ‘pravṛitti’ of ‘uttering something meaningful’ involves speaker’s ‘ichha’ or ‘desire to utter’ which is backed up by his or her previous knowledge of the fact or matter of the utterance. Any random utterance can not be taken as linguistic means or instrument of knowledge derived from words, only that person should be recognized as ‘speaker’ of a shābdapramā who utters something meaningful in terms of these mentioned (jñāna-ichha-kṛiti) cognitive procedures. In fact, this same view we find in Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, while commenting on Maṇḍiśī Gautama’s aphorism ‘*āptaḥ-upadeśaśabda*’ (N.S, 1/1/7), Vātsyāyana did refer some moral along with cognitive features of the ideal speaker/āptaḥ. As he explained ‘*āptaḥ-khalu sākṣātkṛita-dharmā yathādrīṣṭasyārthasya chikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeśa*’¹⁵, it implies, āptaḥ refers to one who has acquired proper knowledge/ ‘jñāna’ of dharma (padārthas/categories of reality or dharma can refer to his intended object of knowledge) in terms of accredited pramānas or means of knowledge and then with all his intention/ ‘iccha’ (chikhyāpayiṣayā) of

conveying only the truth to the hearer , he goes on with the effort(prayoga) of communicating his knowledge through his utterance. Vātsyāyana, to indicate the wider sense of this definition of ‘āptaḥ’ further mentioned that ‘*r̥ṣi-arya-mlechhanam samānam lakhsanam.tathā cha sarveṣāṃ byabahārām pravarttanta iti*’, intends, this definition of āptaḥ is applicable in all the communities whether the Sages or the Aryans or even in the Mlechhas or non-aryan tribes. The idea is any person who fulfills all the criteria mentioned (especially that one regard to proper knowledge of one’s own field or of the fact he is going to impart knowledge to others) in the definition, can be considered as an ideal speaker or āptaḥ of a linguistic communication. It is also noteworthy here in this context that Navya-Naiyāyika Gangesh Upādhyāya also while defining śabda-pramāna indicates the criteria of well-known/well-informed to be qualified as a speaker of a linguistic communication. The definition goes as ‘*prayogahetu-bhūtārtha-tattvajñāna-janyaḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam*’¹⁶. As Prof. Piyali Palit explained this neo definition in her book *Basic Principles of Indian Philosophy of Language* ‘*pramāna called śabda is the sequence of vocal sounds produced by (janya) such true belief (tattvajñāna)of things(artha),which is the cause (hetubhūta)of use of language(prayoga).*’¹⁷ Here, the term ‘tattvajñāna’ itself indicates the required criteria to be qualified as speaker of linguistic usage. The speaker needs to have true, non- recollective belief of all the things (artha) he is going to further communicate about to others.

Role of a hearer while listening to speaker: We have so far mentioned certain specific criteria according to the Naiyāyikas to be regarded as a speaker of a linguistic communication such as truthfulness, honesty, proper knowledge of the matter that would be spoken of and so forth. Since speaker is supposed to possess all these criteria so there naturally arises the matter of belief-claim upon speaker’s utterance from the hearer’s side. To put it more bluntly, whether the hearer’s prima-facie understanding from speaker’s utterance is straightway a belief free

understanding where hearer has no commitment for this matter or he does (hearer) require believing himself first before understanding? The way Prof. J.N.Mohanty addressed this query from Nyāya perspective, seems Naiyāyikas are in support of accepting hearer's complete belief on speaker's utterance before claiming it as understanding the utterance. As he explained 'even if utterer is competent but the auditor distrusts her, the auditor can not advance a cognitive claim on the basis of such hearing.'¹⁸ But it is also noteworthy here that although they do give importance to hearer's belief on what speaker said yet they emphasized on one more condition in this context. If the speaker utters an well-formed sentence satisfying all the required conditions (conditions for an well-formed sentence will be discussed shortly), then that will be more than enough for the hearer to judge whether speaker is conveying the truth or falsity. This view has been mainly found in Gangesh Upādhyaya's remarks. J.Ganeri seemed to differ Gangesh's opinion and expressed his own view as saying conditions for understanding a sentence does not depend only on utterance rather also on auditor's belief system and some social factors while linguistic practice, he termed linguistic practice also as linguistic labour which refers to hearer's disagreement with speaker on the meaning of utterance.¹⁹

However, in this context of understanding and commitment of the hearer we find Prof. Matilal mentioning the study of social anthropology or ethnographic view²⁰ view absolute opposed to the views where hearer's belief has been shown as necessary in understanding speaker's utterance. Ethnographer's field of work revolves around alien culture which involves alien's view on religion, their world view, their practices. Now, while doing their work or better to say collecting their data they need to come closer to alien culture for an acute understanding. And thus there remains high chances of getting influenced by their belief system and begin to think their believes as ultimate valid and even one's own belief. But if these things happen then Ethnography will loose its approach and at the same time its main objective .The purpose of Ethnography basically leads to extend our understanding of different belief systems and if one

sticks himself to one belief-system then the actual purpose definitely goes in vain. Hence, from this point of view we need a basic outlook of commitment-free understanding so that we can extend our path of knowledge. However, as far as Naiyāyika's concern over the matter of hearer's belief on speaker's utterance during their linguistic communication, they would accept speaker's utterance as valid and true in terms of all the syntactic conditions fulfilled and unless there comes any slightest doubt on speaker's attitude.

Meaningful utterances or its knowledge(shabda-uchhāritatva or shabda-jñānatva): Shabda-uchhāritatva or shabda-jñānatva - this particular quest comes in the context of determining 'karaṇa'(the efficient causal factor) of śābdabodha or knowledge derived from words. The notion of 'karaṇa' has been considered as very crucial in Nyāya epistemology. It (karaṇa) has been opted as the efficient cause or instrument in producing valid cognition or knowledge or in Nyāya terms pramā and in fact it is this efficient cause or karaṇa amongst all the causes which has also been given the status of pramāna or valid means of pramā (that's why it is rightly said '*pramā-karaṇam-pramāṇam*'). Now, the query what arises next is how would we specify one particular cause amongst manifold causes as the efficient or valid means or 'karaṇa'? The definition of karaṇa meets this query well, it says '*byāpāraviśiṣṭa-asādhāraṇam-kāraṇam-karaṇam*'²¹. We find two more new terms in this definition, they are 'byāpāraviśiṣṭa' and 'asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa'. 'Byāpāra' refers to an intermediate factor between cause and end-effect and 'asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa' does not refer to the common causes/sādhāraṇa-kāraṇa(Naiyāyikas mention eight common causes of every kārya or end-effect such as, God, God's knowledge, God's intention and so forth) rather it refers to that one specific cause meant for producing the effect. Now, that asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa or specific cause which is not directly connected with effect but with the help of an intermediate factor or byāpāra, is called or recognized as 'karaṇa' in Nyāya epistemology. To give an example, In the act of writing 'pen'

would be regarded as ‘karaṇa’ since it is connected with the end-effect ‘writing’ with the help of the intermediate factor ‘contact between pen and hand’.

In the same way, the end effect or *pramā* derived from *shabda* requires one *karaṇa*-*kāraṇa*(efficient causal factor) and one *byāpāra*(intermediate factor) for that matter. Now, one would naturally suggest ‘*shabda*’ (word) as ‘*karaṇa*’ or ‘*pramāṇa*’ of *shābdapramā* since there seems no difficulty in considering it(*shabda*) as the special and extra-ordinary cause(*asādhārana-kāraṇa*) of *shābdapramā*, *shabda* is the instrumental cause par excellence ,it is ‘*a-nanyathāsiddha*’(the utmost essential antecedent factor) without which the whole process would not move forward in intended manner and in fact it has been considered by the *Naiyāyikas* as well .They did give the status of ‘*pramāṇa*’ or ‘*karaṇa*’ of *shābdapramā* to ‘*shabda*’ since it performs its function in generating *shabdapramā* as the most specific instrumental cause and aided with an intermediate factor/*byāpāra*(will elaborate on that shortly) as well. Thus, it seems quite clear that speaker’s *shabda*/word or meaningful utterance acts as the efficient instrumental cause in generating the linguistic understanding in the hearer’s mind. But this is the exact point where *Naiyāyikas* were being asked to be more specific and minute, with the query raised as whether utterance of word/*shabda*-*uchhārana* or knowledge of word/*shabda*-*jñāna* would be appropriate for serving the purpose of *karaṇa*. Now, regarding this we observe two distinct views of *Naiyāyikas* that involves their early and later period of discourse. Early *Naiyāyikas* (*Prācīna Nyāya*) with the definition of *shābdapramāṇa* as ‘*āpta-upadeś-śabda*’ considered uttered words/*uchhārīta-shabda* or *jñāyamāna-shabda* to be the efficient instrumental cause or *karaṇa* of *shābda-pramā* whereas later-*Naiyāyikas* (*navya-Naiyāyikas*) opted knowledge of words or *shabda-jñāna* as ‘*karaṇa*’. According to the *Navya-Nyāya* opinion, each and every case of *shābdapramā* or linguistic understanding won’t be covered if we consider uttered words as the efficient instrumental cause of *shābdapramā*.

Acārya Visvanāth explained it saying “*jñāyamānapadābhābe-pada-uchhāranābhābe-maunishlokādou-ādinā*”²², it implies, any person who is keeping vow of silence and hence if he expresses his thought in writing or in gestures, then in accordance with the early-Naiyayikas’ view due to the absence of uttered words or jñāyamāna-shabda, his attempts of communication (written words or gestural expression to communicate) will not be considered as proper linguistic communication or shābdabodha. But it does not go with our common experience since we do have linguistic understanding in such exceptional cases as well. That is why Navya-Naiyāyikas said considering knowledge of words or pada-jñāna as ‘karaṇa’ or efficient instrumental cause of shābdapramā, will not bring such issue. When a person is communicating through his written words or gestures then according to the Navya-Nyāya view his writings or gestures will need be treated as written symbolic words or gestural symbolic words and through the knowledge of these words or symbolic words (here s ‘knowledge’ in the sense of conveying of ideas through gestures and writing) hearer will be able to grasp the thought expressed without hearing uttered words. And this is why Navya-Naiyāyikas observing the wider implication of pada-jñāna as karaṇa preferred to consider it as the efficient instrumental cause or karaṇa in linguistic understanding.

Notion of Byāpāra(intermediate factor) can be conceived functioning in two ways during a linguistic understanding:

The notion of Byāpāra has been briefly mentioned in the earlier section, now before elaborating its functions in linguistic understanding we need to understand the term ‘shābdabodha’ or ‘shābdapramā’ a little more clearly. Naiyāyikas applied this technical term ‘shābdabodha’ or ‘shābdapramā’ to the particular kind of cognitive awareness or understanding or knowledge, generated through word or shabda. Now, generally one may think shābdapramā refers to knowledge obtained only from words/singular words or shabda but it would be a mistake to

think so. It is because how shābdapramā or verbal knowledge has been explained by the Naiyāyikas that does not anyway make us think it(shābdapramā) as knowledge derived from single word. Rather the cognitive assimilation, inter-relation of linguistic elements, all that has been demonstrated as required function for emergence of shābdaprama, thoroughly implies that verbal knowledge for the Naiyāyikas is actually derived from vākya or sentence. And hence the term shābdabodha can safely be named as vākyaarthabodha/understanding of sentence. Speaker, in a verbal understanding then is supposed to utter sentence which comprises of words and in fact at times if the speaker simply utters a single word (a meaningful word that must consist a suffix, such as, ‘pacati’(cooks/cooking)this verbal stem refers to pac+ (a) ti)that would be considered as one-word sentence. We can rightly mention Vācaṣpati Miśra’s explicit words in this context which says “*vākya-jñāna-mapi-śabdapramāṇa-miti-tātparyaṭīkā-manu-smaran-nupajī-vakabhāvasaṃgatyā-śabda-pramāṇam-nirūpayati-padaajñānam-iti*”, it implies as explained by Prof. Palit, ‘here inclusion of the expression ‘api’ indicates that to him ‘padaajñāna’(awareness of word) and ‘vākyaajñāna’(awareness of sentence) both should be understood as śabdapramāṇa’.²³

However, let’s find out then the significant the functions of Byāpāra(intermediate factor) in linguistic understanding. ‘Byāpāra’ has been defined as ‘taj-janyatve-sati-taj-janya-janakatvam’²⁴ it implies, byāpāra refers to such an intermediate factor between cause and effect, which (byāpara) owes its emergence to the cause and simultaneously itself become the origin of end result of the cause by which it (byāpāra) originates. We already have given the example of writing where ‘contact between pen and hand’ (hasta-lekhani-saṃyoga) functions as byāpāra or intermediate factor between the cause pen and effect writing. Now, Naiyāyikas while explaining the process of linguistic understanding, they have shown this intermediate factor functioning midst pada/padaajñāna(word or knowledge of word as karaṇa) and the end-effect

vākyārthabodha or shābdabodha as ‘recollection of word-meaning’(technically named as ‘padārthadhī’ or ‘padārth-smṛiti’). Thus, it is rightly said by Acārya Visvanāth ‘*pada-jñāntu-karaṇam-dvāraṃ-padārthadhī*’²⁵, here the expression ‘dvār’ is synonymous with ‘byāpāra.’ The idea is after hearer acquires knowledge of words, a process of recollection or remembrance of meanings attached to each word of the sentence immediately gets started in the mind of hearer and this ‘recollection of meanings of each word’(padārtha-smṛiti) aided with some more assistant causes leads hearer to achieve the ultimate effect i.e. vākyārthabodha or shābdabodha. This is the basic idea on the function of byāpāra as padārthadhī that has been placed by the Naiyāyikas. But does it really seem that the functions of intermediate factor or ‘byāpāra’ in linguistic understanding enclosed with this above mentioned task (as ‘padārthadhī’) alone? The reply should be negatory, at least as per my concern. When we are talking about recollection of the meanings from words (pada-janya-padārthasmṛiti), this recollective knowledge (smṛityātmak-jñāna) occurred because word and its meaning (an existent or referent object in Nyāya view) are attached with each other with a specific relation or significatory relation/pada-padārtha-saṃbandha (Naiyāyika calls it vṛitti-saṃbandha). In terms of this specific relation between word and meaning, hearer becomes able to remember the exact meaning of a specific word. Therefore, with reference to the function of this significatory relation (vṛitti-saṃbandha) midst word and meaning, shouldn’t it appropriate to consider that, this ‘significatory relation’ (pada-padārtha-saṃbandha) is also operating as ‘byāpāra’ or intermediate function between word and meaning? If we see this observation in terms of the given definition of ‘byāpāra’ (i.e. taj-janyatve-sati-taj-janya-janaktvam) then it seems quite natural to consider so. The significatory relation owes its origin to word (pada-janya-pada-padārtha-saṃbandha) and at the same time, it(the relation) causes the effect of word i.e. padārtha or meaning . And that’s how it seems though it is not utterly claimed by the Naiyāyikas still there is no difficulty in

considering ‘significatory relation’/ ‘vṛitti-saṃbandha’ as the intermediate factor or byāpar between word and meaning.

Elucidation of the significatory relation maintained by word and its meaning:- The significatory relation or vṛitti-saṃbandha has been understood by the Naiyāyikas as a specific linguistic operation that ascertains the relational operation between word with its meaning. To make it explicit Acārya Visvanāth remarked this vṛitti-saṃbandha as ‘*tatrāpi-vṛittyā-padajanyaṭvaṃ-bodhyam*’²⁶ it implies, it is because of this vṛitti saṃbandha that we become able to understand the meaning of word by hearing the word itself. Prof. Bilimoria puts his opinion on this saying ‘the function of vṛitti is to enable the preservation of the relation between word with its meaning in each occurrence of the word but though variations of meaning may exist in such occurrences.’²⁷ It is to note that Naiyāyikas with their realist orientation, uphold referential theory of meaning according to which the meaning of word must be a referent object of the external world. And therefore when words signify meanings through significatory relations, they(words) refer meaning as referent objects.

Types of Vritti-Sambandha:

Now, this significatory relation has been classified into two types, they are śakti or abhidhā (primary relation or significatory capacity) and lakṣaṇa (secondary relation or significatory capacity). These two can also be safely rendered as designative relation and indicatory relation respectively. Word signifies its primary meaning through śakti whereas through lakṣaṇā, it(word) signifies its secondary meaning. Rather it would be better to say, lakṣaṇā-vṛitti or secondary relation becomes able to signify meaning in terms of the meaning obtained through śakti or primary relation. That is Naiyāyikas defined lakṣaṇā as ‘śakya-saṃbandha-lakṣaṇā’²⁸ that is to say, the meaning that has been presented by śakti-vṛitti is called ‘śakya’, the meaning closely related to this śakya or primary meaning is understood as ‘lakṣaṇā by the

Naiyāyikas. On the other hand, the primary relation or śakti-vṛitti does not need any other medium to signify meaning and that is why it is considered as the primary relation or mukhya-saṁbandha between word and meaning. Thus, when Navya Naiyāyikas are talking about another way of twofold distinction of relation as sākhsāt-saṁbandha(direct-relation) and paramparā-saṁbandha(indirect-relation)²⁹, in that case it will be in accordance with Nyāya view if we look on śakti-vṛitti as direct relation between word and meaning while lakhsaṇā-vṛitti as the indirect one. To make it more explicit I am trying to illustrate it with an example here; If we say ‘son of John Shakespeare’, William Shakespeare is the author of the drama ‘Julius Caesar’. Then in this case, as author William Shakespeare is directly related to the drama ‘Julius Caesar’, whereas, the relation between his father and the drama ‘Julius Caesar’ is indirect (paramparā-saṁbandha). One other famous example used by the Naiyāyikas to explain this context, can also be brought forth here. If someone utters the word ‘Ganga’ then with the help of primary relation or śakti-vṛitti the word will mean ‘the water flow of the river Ganga’ but with the use of lakhsaṇā-vṛitti or secondary relation in this case the same word ‘Ganga’ will mean ‘the banks of river Ganga’. As ‘banks of river Ganga’ is related with the primary meaning ‘water flow’ in proximity, hence it(banks of river) becomes the relatum of the śakya/the primary meaning(śakya-saṁbandhī) and thus also recognized as the secondary meaning or ‘lakhsaṇā’.

However, It is to note that since śakti-vṛitti is the primary relation or mukhya saṁbandha between word and meaning in sentential understanding, and knowledge of which (śakti-vṛitti) is also referred as an assistant cause in sentential understanding or shābdabodha(shaktidhi-sahakārini), hence it is important to elaborate about this primary relation a little further.

Significance of accepting the primary relation or śakti-vṛitti: As per one general maxim followed by the Indian Philosophers it is said that in the context of a relation between two of

its relatum, once their relation has been cognized, cognition of one relatum presents or recollects automatically the other by the mind (eka-saṃbabdhī-jñānaṃ-apar-saṃbandhī-smaraṇam)³⁰. Now one may argue in accordance with this maxim that word not necessarily requires to maintain the primary relation or śakti-vṛitti with the meaning since we can still have the cognition of the meaning even if word possesses any other relation or relation as such with the meaning. Naiyāyikas confronted this argument saying if specifically primary relation won't be considered as possessed between word and meaning and instead relation as such is accepted between them then there would be high chances of recollection of the meaning as 'akāśh'(space in western terminology)'while cognizing the word 'pot'. Since any uttered word (such as here the word 'pot') in its basic level is sound and so with the uttered word 'pot' and as we know shabda in the sense sound is the main characteristic of 'akāśh' and it(sound) is related with the 'akāśh' by the relation of inherence (samavāya-saṃbandha). And thus, any random meaning would have been understood from any word for not specifying the primary relation between word with its meaning, and we would have encountered a chaos while having linguistic usages. Hence, this is where lies the appropriateness of accepting śakti-vṛitti as the primary significatory relation between word and meaning. When one utters the 'pot'(ghata) then it refers to nothing but the object pot as meaning in terms of its(the word pot's) primary significatory relation with the 'object pot'. Now, one may ask here how will it be possible for someone to comprehend the meaning of some uttered terms like (golden-mountain, hare-horn, sky-flower etc) for fictitious object through śakti-vṛitti as there are no referents in the external world? In reply Naiyāyikas may say though there are no referent objects for fictitious terms like golden-mountain, sky-flower yet we can comprehend the meanings of these terms thinking of them in a way as each of the term like two distinct terms. And thus though the word 'golden-mountain' could not able to refer any object as meaning, yet if it(the word) is comprehended

separately as ‘golden’ and ‘mountain’ both have their referent objects as meaning present in the external world.

On Discussing the nature of the primary relation (shakti-vritti): Naiyāyikas introduces Shakti-vṛitti as pada-padārtha-saṁbandha (relation between word and meaning). We need to find Naiyāyikas answer for, how is this relation? what kind of particular features this relation possesses? As the name ‘śakti’ indicates and infact Naiyāyikas suggest as well that the primary relation or ‘śakti-vṛitti’ is in a way a power inherent in word, a signficatory power, capacity to signify meaning. The power to signify meaning makes word most essential in language usage as the basic element of language. Annambhatta remarked this śakti-saṁbandha as ‘padalakṣaṇamāha-śaktaṁ-iti-arthyasmṛityanukulaḥ-padapadārtha-saṁbandaḥ-śaktiḥ’³¹, implies, word signifies something or its meaning with its power to signify, and with help of this same signficatory power it(word) also recollects the meaning. To describe this signficatory relation furthermore Naiyāyikas explains it saying this pada-padārtha relation as śakti-vṛitti is actually a result of convention (saṁketa). Saṁketa is of two kinds nitya-saṁketa (eternal convention) and anitya-saṁketa or ādhunik-saṁketa (non-eternal convention), between which it is the nitya-saṁketa that is considered as pada-śakti by the Naiyāyikas, whereas ādhunik or anitya-saṁketa is called as paribhāṣā. Now the point is although nitya-saṁketa has been accepted as śakti yet we can see much debate between the prācina and navya Naiyāyikas regarding the the nature of this śakti-saṁbandha. According to Prācina Naiyāyikas śakti as nitya-saṁketa is actually of the nature of īswar-icchā (īswar’s will or intention)³². On the other hand, Navyas hold that it is not intention of īswar rather intention or will itself should be considered as śakti.³³

In favour of Prācina Naiyāyikas we can mention Maharṣi Gautama’s aphorism that says ‘na sāmāyikatvāchhabdārtha-sampratyaṣya’³⁴, it implies conceiving of meaning of word doesn’t

occur due to the relation between word with its meaning rather it is conventional or sāmāyika(samay or samketa plays the main function).It is to note that here Maharṣi meant ‘nitya-saṁbandha’ when refuting saṁbandha or relation. In Nyāya view ‘samay’ refers to a conventional principle which word denotes which meaning’. In *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Tīkā* Bācaspati Miśra while supporting this above view of Maharṣi said ‘jātivīśeṣe ca niyamāt’(Nyāya-sūtra), which intends that Aryās and Mlechhas understand different meanings ‘dirghashūka’ and ‘kangu’ respectively when they use the word ‘yaba’(barley). Hence, even with regard to particular caste (jāti-vīśeṣ) there applies no specific rule of relation between word and meaning, instead it is clear that shabdārthabodh is conventional here. Aryas, ṛiṣis, mlechhas they all refer objects with words in terms of their personal desire or will (ichhā).³⁵ One may argue here if human desire or will is considered in this matter then how it would be consistent with the previous view of Naiyāyikas that accepts īśwar’s will as to denote meaning of word? The reply of this from Naiyāyikas side has been like both of the above opinions are not contradictory in the sense that even if īśwar’s will to denote meaning of word is rightly accepted by them yet it does get reformed again and again all throughout different ages or contexts of language usage.³⁶ Such as in the previous mentioned case of language usage of different group of people of different castes where one word denotes multiple meanings.If we look at Prācinas view in this way that is to say accepting īśwar or īśwar’s will as the main deciding cause or agent (prayoyaka-kartā)for denoting meaning of words then there will be no difficulty to understand their view as śakti as īśwarechhā.

Navya-Naiyāyikas remark śakti as will or desire itself. This view needs to address in a way that they are not rejecting ‘īśwar’s will’ in this regard rather they actually a bit magnify Prācina view by attachment of human will (manusya-ichhā) with īśwar-will. Now it is noteworthy, it seems that with regard to this Navya-Naiyāyikas opinion ,modern and artificial language usages like all those new words for referent objects which are being used in scientific or

technological field such as ('Computer', 'Robot' etc) or different words used in artificial language like ('Byāpāra', 'Sannikarṣa' etc) can aptly be explained. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in this connection intends to say 'this word denotes this meaning' such kind of specific 'desire of īśvar' is actually śakti of word and moreover, for him 'desire of īśvar' is eternal (nitya) and eternal symbols or words (such as 'gau', 'ghataḥ', 'pataḥ') are the denotative words (vācaka-śabda) and apart from all these words, all other words are to be considered as technical terms (pāribhāṣik-śabda).³⁷ To mention Acārya Jagadish Tarkāṇkār's view, he agrees with Bhartṛhari's opinion in this regard. Bhartṛhari upholds symbol as twofold ājānik (which are the eternal words) and ādhunik (words mentioned by the authors of scriptures)³⁸ Acārya Viśvanātha in this context, remarks that it is the will itself, and not the will of īśvar, which is to be taken as signifiatory power of word ('navyastu-īśvarechhā na śaktiḥ-kintu-ichhā-eva'), it needs to keep in mind here that by this remark he does not want to restrict this usage with regard to desire of god only. But it is to note, while talking about modern terms or words he accepts īśvar or will of īśvar as the determinant cause (prayoyaka-kāraṇa) behind human will. He also provided one example later in this context saying, 'ekādasheni-pitā-nāma-kuryāt'³⁹. To illustrate, when a child is born in one's household, father of that child with his desire gives him a name suppose, the name as 'Devdatta' then the desire of the father as 'the word 'Devdatta' denotes my son' is rightly considered to be the signifiatory power or śakti of the word. But Acārya Viśvanātha pointed out that here also īśvar's desire should be treated as the prayoyaka kāraṇa (determinant reason) behind father's desire since it has been told in Vedas that it is the desire of īśvar himself that on the eleventh day after a child is born, his father would give the child a name (ekādasheni-pitā-nāma-kuryāt).

Some more necessary auxiliary factors in this process: It is known that a sentence comprises of mutually related group of words. One will not have sentential understanding if words are just being randomly juxtaposed in a sentence rather they should be mutually or syntactically

related. There are certain syntactical conditions or factors those of which determine how words needs to be situated or related syntactically in a sentence for a successful verbal understanding or communication of the hearer. Naiyāyikas have mentioned such three auxiliary conditions in this context and they are ākāṅkṣā(syntactic expectancy),yogyatā(syntactic competency) and sannidhi or āsatti(proximity).Hence, Aṇṇambhatta rightly said in his *Tarka-saṃgraha-dīpikā* that ‘ākāṅkṣā- yogyatā- sannidhiśca bākṛtyārthajñāne-hetu’.⁴⁰ Let’s find three of these a little more bluntly. ‘Akāṅkṣā’ has been defined as ‘padasya-padāntarabyātirekaprayuktānvayānanubhāvakatvaṃ’,⁴¹ which implies if any one term or word in absence of an other word can not able to form with itself an independent linguistic utterance, then we need to understand that these two terms or words have mutual expectancy(paraspara-sākankha).For instance, ‘Rāma Gachhati’(Ram Goes) these two terms are mutually expectants since if the term ‘Rāma’ heard of then there arise a natural expectancy as ‘Rāma kiṃ karoti?’(what is Rāma doing?) on the other hand , the term ‘gachhati’(goes) naturally arises the expectancy as ‘kaḥ gachhati?’(who goes?) and finally both of these expectancy appeases with the terms ‘gachhati’ and ‘Rāma’ respectively. As, Cow Horse Man Elephant these words are not syntactically expectants hence there will not be any successful sentential understanding from these group of words. ‘Yogyatā’ has been defined as ‘arthābādho yogyatā’⁴², implies, meaning of words must not lack of suitability (compatibility) amongst them, meanings have compatibility or fitness refers to satisfy the syntactical condition ‘yogyatā. One famous example of this is ‘bahninā sinchet’(‘fire dabbles’).One does not have successful sentential understanding hearing this sentence due to lack of compatibility with each other in terms of their meaning since it is known that fire doesn’t dabble rather it is capable of burning. Now, while defining ‘asatti’ or ‘sannidhi’ it has been said that ‘padānām-avilambena-uchhāraṇaṃ-sannidhi’⁴³, according to this syntactical condition the utterances of the words in a sentence must not be done in a delayed manner, rather utterances must have physical or spatio temporal

proximity with each other. If anyone who is supposed to say the sentence ‘bring the cow’, is speaking the sentence in a manner where he utters the word ‘bring’ in the morning, then the word ‘the’ in the afternoon and finally ‘cow’ in the evening, hearer will certainly not going to have understanding from this. Besides these three conditions there is one other most important factor that has also been considered as a necessary auxiliary condition in sentential understanding and that is Tātparya or intention of the speaker. ‘Bakturichhā-tāparyaṃ’, means what the speaker desires or intends to speak, that intention is regarded to be ‘tātparya’. When a word in the sentence has two or more meanings and also if the uttered sentence lacks of any such word that was supposed to be in the sentence in terms of its expressed meaning then it will get difficult for the hearer to understand the appropriate meaning of the sentence and this is where ‘Tātparya’ functions, in this case hearer needs to guess the intention of the speaker through contexts, situation or the way speaker utter the sentence. It can be made clear using famous examples of it. If speaker(suppose a house-holder) utters or speaks to his servant only the word ‘dvāram’(the door) instead of ‘dvāraṃ pidhehi’(shut the door) when he is going out somewhere, so naturally hearer of this sentence(the servant) guesses the intention of the speaker through the context of this utterance and shuts the door without hearing the word ‘pidhehi’(shut). Again, if speaker says when having a meal ‘saindhava ānaya’(bring me saindhava).Now, the word ‘saindhava’ refers two things or meanings they are ‘salt’ and ‘horse’. Now, hearer will definitely guess through the context that speaker intends to have some salt in this case and acts as it required.

Thus, Naiyāyikas specified these syntactical conditions for words to be mutually or syntactically related with each other in the sentence and not merely juxtaposed as group of words. However, as far as we have discussed till now about the process of understanding speaker’s words following all the causal mechanism behind it, can be shown in the following manner:

1. w x y z (words syntactically not related)

$\begin{array}{cccc} | & | & | & | \\ w^* & x^* & y^* & z^* \end{array}$ (meanings of syntactically unrelated words, pada-śakti functions here)

2. w - x - y - z (words syntactically related; the syntactical conditions mentioned operates her

$\begin{array}{cccc} | & | & | & | \\ w^* & x^* & y^* & z^* \end{array}$ (meanings of syntactically related words)

Relation amongst meaning of words (padārtha-sambandha): Hearer hears sentence, is actually meant to say hearer hears collection of words. After having the knowledge of each word, hearer will be able to recollect the meanings of each word and this recollection of word meanings leads to sentential understanding (vākyārthabodh). Now, it is important to note that, although meanings are being recollected but until all the recollected meaning of words are being related with each other, hearer's sentential understanding will not be accomplished. Thus, the relation [anvaya] amongst all the recollected meaning of words (padārthas-sambandha) in the sentence is the ultimate operation that is required for a successful sentential understanding. 'ghataṃ ānaya' (bring the pot) in this sentence there are five linguistic elements ghataḥ+am+ā+nī+ti .

ghataṃ - ānaya (syntactically related words)

$\begin{array}{cccc} | & | & | & | \\ ghata^* & am^* & ā^*nī^* & hi^* \end{array}$ (recollected meanings attached with the syntactically related words)

'Ghataḥ' refers to the object 'ghata', 'am' refers to objecthood (karmatva), 'ā' and 'nī' these two verbal stems refer to action of bringing (ānayan) and 'ti' is verbal suffix (ākhyāta) which refers to the effort or kriti. Now all these meanings have each specific relation [referred as 'anvaya' in Nyāya terms] with each other. The 'anvaya' amongst meaning of words along with the meanings include as the objects in the sentential understanding of the mentioned sentence 'ghataṃ ānaya'. The relation that has been shared by the first two meanings as object 'ghataḥ'

and ‘karmatva’[object-hood] is of superstratumness or ‘ādhāratva’ since object is the locus or substratum of object-hood. Next there is the relation of describing or ‘nirūpakatva’ between objecthood and the action of bringing. After that conduciveness [anukultva] between action of bringing and kriti or effort. And finally ‘ādhāratva’ should once again be accepted between effort and the agent of this action that I ‘tvam’ or ‘you’ since ‘bring the pot’ actually means ‘you bring the pot’ [‘tvam ghataṁ ānaya’].

Now, it is noteworthy here that Naiyāyikas or to be very specific Navya Naiyāyikās while giving description of verbal cognition of a sentence they prioritize the nominal stem or subject or the agent and also admit the same as ‘mukhya viśeṣya or the chief qualificand . Hence, keeping this in mind the navya Naiyāyikas representation of the above verbal cognition would be like ‘ghataḥ-niṣṭha-karmatā-nirūpaka-ānayanākula-kṛtyāśraya-tvaṁ’ [you, the kartā, are the locus or substratum of the kriti or effort which is conducive to the action of bringing which describes the karmatva located in the pot]. Thus, from the above analysis it can be said that just like the meanings, the relation or ‘anvaya’ amongst the meanings too are the object of verbal cognition or śābdabodha. But here arises one more intriguing question of Indian philosophy of language according to which it is asked how the relation amongst meanings of word has been revealed in verbal cognition? Whether it is revealed by the words or by any other way/means? In response to this particular query language philosophers mainly have given three different of opinions or theories; anvitāvidhānvāda, abhihitānvayavāda and sāmsargamaryādāvāda or anvitapratipativāda. Naiyāyikas propounded the theory of sāmsargamaryādāvāda in this regard [though there are some philosophers who think Naiyāyikas as abhihitānvayavādi just as it has been said by Tarkasaṁgrahakāra Annambhatta], but most of them consider sāmsargamaryādāvāda. In their initial explanation of verbal cognition Naiyāyikas has already shown that in sentence words denote their respective meanings which are completely unrelated with each other, so it is clear that for them the mutual relation or anvaya amongst the meanings

does not presented by the words and thus it can also clearly be said that ‘anvaya’ is not ‘padārtha’ rather ‘a –padārtha’. Moreover, Naiyāikas held that the anvaya or mutual relations amongst the meanings of words are revealed through the mutual expectancy of the meanings for relation and this expectancy has been explained by the Navya Naiyāyikas as power of the relation itself which they call ‘samsarga-maryādā’. Hence it is said ‘śābdabodhe caikapadārthe parapadārthasya samsargaḥ.samsargamaryādāya bhāsate’⁴⁵. Thus, in the context of the above example all the mutual relations such as ‘ādhāratva’, ‘nirupaktva’ ‘anukultva’ amongst the meanings has been presented in the cognition because of the mutual expectancy of the meanings [ghataḥ,karmatva,anayan,kriti]for relation.

FOURTH CHAPTER

Understanding *Jāti* (Universal) in *Navya-Nyāya* method of Linguistic Operation

The notion of *Jāti* (universal) in the context of linguistic understanding has been introduced by the Naiyāyikās (Prācīna Naiyāyikās) as meaning of word (*Śabdārtha* or *padārtha*). When word through with its primary significatory power or *śakti-saṃbandha* refers primary meanings then amongst three primary meanings (as per Naiyāyikās explanation there are three primary meanings of word; *vyakti*, *ākṛiti* and *jāti*) one primary meaning of word is *Jāti*. And in this way while Nyāya introduces *Jāti* as primary meaning of word (*Śakyārtha*), mainly the Vaiśeṣika or it's better to say the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition has provided an ontological basis for *jāti*(universal) considering it not only as sheer meaning but *jāti* as such meaning of word(*padārtha*) which has at the same time its independent ontological existence in the world (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also called *jāti* as *sāmānya*). Furthermore, apart from considering it as an independent existing entity Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regards *jāti* or *sāmānya* as *dharma* or property of particular things (*vastu*) as well. And in this sense *Jāti* as '*dharma*' or property resides in particular thing or '*dharmi*'(property-holder) in the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Since, being a '*dharma*' of a *dharmi*, *Jāti* functions as a principle of synthesis or commonness (*anugata niyama* in Nyāya terms) which brings distinct particulars under same kind or sort. However, we already elaborated on these points in the previous chapters. Here in this chapter the central focus will be on understanding the function of *jāti* in a different way (apart from its presence as a

primary meaning) in Nyāya linguistic operation. Acceptance of *Jāti* as a primary meaning of word has been indeed a matter of great importance in linguistic understanding and as primary meaning, it (*jāti*) performs its function in several other manners within linguistic understanding and that surely has a huge impact on Nyāya or specifically speaking Navya-Nyāya understanding and analysis of language and linguistic. It can also be put in this way that as primary meaning of word *jāti* performs many form of functions in sentential understanding sometimes prevailing as an adjective/qualifier (*prakāra/viśeṣana*), sometimes as a located (*ādheya*) and so forth. But it somehow seems that Naiyāyikas (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) were not very inquisitive in exploring and exhibiting at the same time *jāti*'s functions and its approach in linguistic understanding in detail rather they seemed to be more focused on its ontological elucidation. And perhaps that is why we did not find a full-fledged discussion regarding *jāti*'s role in linguistic understanding in any Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas text, instead Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas were found to refer *jāti*'s status and some of its role in linguistic understanding in a scattered and un-coordinated way as for instance we find *jāti*'s status as primary meaning of word in their discussion on theory of meaning whereas we find (while going through the discussion on determinate cognition) *jāti* functioning as an adjective or *prakāra*, or even as a located or *ādheya*. However, in this chapter an attempt will be made to throw a light on this veiled and not much observed side of *jāti*'s role in Nyāya understanding of language and linguistics.

Maharṣi Gautama in his *Nyāya-sūtra* first introduces this notion of '*Sāmānya*' as '*Jāti*' whereas from western terminology it has got its English equivalent as 'Universal' which has been safely adopted by the Indian philosophers as well in their translated works. It is noteworthy that though the notion of '*Sāmānya*' had been introduced by the early Vaiśeṣikas, it was early Nyāya or Maharṣi Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* which initiated a linguistic approach of this notion '*Sāmānya*'

or '*Jāti*' apart from considering and explaining it as only an ontological entity. In *Nyāya-sūtra* we see that Maharṣi Gautama brought forth the notion of *Jāti* in the context of discussing meaning of word and considered *Jāti* as one of the meanings of word along with *ākṛiti* and *vyākṛiti*. Now, as we know word, meaning etc these are discussion regarding language, henceforth consideration of '*Jāti*' as meaning of word surely broadens the range of its (*jāti*'s) discourse in terms of be able to enter into the sphere of linguistic discourse apart from ontological one. However, later on, following the foot step of Maharṣi Gautama, his ancestors or astute commentators of *Nyāya-sūtra* such as Vātsyāyāna, Uddyotakara, Udayanācārya, Vācaspati Miśra, only to mention a few, continued to proceed further ahead in this regard considering '*Jāti*' as meaning of word. On the other hand, from the Vaiśeṣikas or early Vaiśeṣikas end, they continued with the ontological approach of discussion on the notion of '*Jāti*' until the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' tradition (where both of the views of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have been merged into one) introduces. While going through the different phases of writing of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika school (from the first period or pre-Diṇṇāga period or early Nyāya and early Vaiśeṣika period <which started with Vaiśeṣika-sutra and ended in 5th century with the advent of the famous Buddhist logician Diṇṇāga> to the ultra-neo period or the recovery period of Navya-Nyāya in 19th century), it seemed in my observation that just like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika both individually have early and later phases, in the same way the collaborated phase or 'Nyāya Vaiśeṣika' phase has its early and later period of writings as well as 'early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' period and 'later Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika' period.

8th century might be called as the starting point of Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika period. It was Vācaspati Miśra who through his writings in late 8th century or since the beginning of 9th century had been appeared as the initiator of the amalgamation or synchronization of the two individual

schools Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as 'Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika. And after him this early period continued up to near about 10th or 11th century with the writings of Jayanta Bhatta, Bhāsarvagyaṇ, Shivāditya, Vyomshivācārya, ShridharBhatta ,Udayanācārya ,etc to mention a few. Then, with the advent of Gangesh Upadhyaya in 14th century through the magnum opus Tatva-chintāmani the enriching Navya-Nyāya period has started when Nyāya epistemological discussion has been seen as reaching at its peak. Raghunāh Siromoni, Mathurānāth Tarkabāgish, Jagadish Tarkālankār , Gadādhar Bhattācārya and so forth all these eminent Naiyāyikas contributed their works in this period of Nyāya which carried on up to around 17th century. With the beginning of 18th century or late 17th century again there had been found another attempt to synchronize the two systems Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or as referred above as later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika period. In this later period we got Tarka-bhāṣa, Tarka-saṁgraha, Bhāṣā-parichheda and so forth all these inestimable Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts.

Now, it is to note that, in the context of presenting the notion of *Jāti* from linguistic standpoint, except the early Vaiśeṣikas almost all scholars from the different phases as shown above from the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika system have considered *Jāti*'s role in language usages. And in all places of their discussion with regard to this they have shown *Jāti* basically as one of the primary meanings of word (*mukhyārtha/śakyārtha*) which is subjected to be denoted or referred by the word itself in terms of its(word's) signficatory relation(*vṛitti-sambandha*) with meaning. Apart from *Jāti* there are two more meanings (*vyākṛti* and *ākṛiti*) which have been considered by them as meanings of a word simultaneously. We find exact in this context a very debated issue on which language philosophers of India have been arguing over since years that is, which meaning amongst these three aforesaid meanings should actually be taken as the primary one? Not very surprisingly, we got to see many different views with one considering only *Jāti* as primary

meaning of word whereas other one considers *Vyākṛti* as the primary one or *ākṛiti* as the primary meaning of word And that's how evolved '*Jātiśaktivāda*', '*Vyākṛtiśaktivāda*' and '*ākṛitiśaktivāda*' these three doctrines in Indian philosophy of language. Vaiyākaraṇ Vyādi, Navya-Naiyāyika Raghunāth Shiromoṇi are known as *Vyākṛti-śaktivādins*. Vaiyākaraṇ Vājapyāyana and Mimāsakas are identified as *Jātiśaktivādins* whereas Mimāṃṣaka Shabar Svāmi seemed to uphold *ākṛiti-śaktivāda*. But very unlike to all these three views early Naiyāyikās, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās went on considering '*Jātyākṛitivyākṛti- śaktivāda*', though Navya-Naiyāyikas are found to accept *Jātiviśiṣṭa-vyākṛti-śaktivāda* in this regard. However, *Jātyākṛitivyākṛti- śaktivāda*' entails that all of the three meanings (*jāti*, *vyākṛti* and *ākṛiti*) should be considered as meaning of a word with one condition added to it that given a specific context one meaning would be prevalent over other two. Thus, the word 'cow' according to them though has got three primary meanings (*śakyārtha*); *Jāti*(universal), *Vyākṛti*(individual) and *ākṛiti*(configuration) as in cow-hood, the individual cow and the pattern or configuration of cow, in the context of sentence like 'bring the cow', the meaning as individual cow will prevail ,or when someone asks 'make a cow using clay' then the word cow prevalently denotes the configuration of cow ,and in another context if it is said 'one should not touch cows with feet' then here cows will mainly denote the meaning as cow hood or *jāti*. In this regard Naiyāyikas firstly assuming the main *purvapakhsin* presented the two thesis of *vyākṛtiśaktivādins* and *ākṛitiśaktivādins*, then have shown the refutation of these two by the another *purvapakhsin* Mimāsakas through their *jāti-śaktivāda* and finally they refuted this *jātiśaktivāda* and established their own doctrine as '*jātyākṛiti-vyākṛtiśaktivāda*'.

Thus, in Indian tradition whenever philosophers attempted to discuss the notion of *Jāti* from the standpoint of language they ended it with discussing these doctrines and continued debating on

whether *Jāti* should be considered or prioritized as meaning amongst the three meanings of word or not? But somehow it seemed that as *Jāti* unlike the other two (*vyākṛti* and *ākṛiti*) is not a concretely existent entity (*murta-dravya-viśeṣ*), hence there should be detail discussions on how *Jāti* is meant to be a ‘meaning’ of word in a sentence. And moreover, as it(*jāti*) indeed has been considered as meaning of word in a sentence then there should also be discussions on how it performs its function as meaning in sentences for a successful sentential understanding or linguistic communication. To put it more simply, we got the point that *Jāti* should be regarded as meaning of word but being a meaning how does it help or contribute in the entire mechanism of cognizing sentence-meaning (*Vākyārtha*)? As far as my observation goes, we can not find any initiative been taken to find *Jāti*’s specific roles or actions as primary meaning of word (*śakyārtha*) in the causal mechanism or process of a fruitful sentential understanding. Hence, I would like to put forth this particular query on *Jāti*’s contribution in sentential cognition as the focal point of this present work. And moreover, I will be particularly dealing with Nyāya or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas perspective on this, hence understanding the procedure of our language usage or language mechanism to meet this particular query will be elaborated based on the said system of philosophy mainly. My chief concern shall be to explain *Jāti* and its functions from the perspective of language but at the same time keeping in mind its ontological approach as the broader range of it.

However, in the context of Nyāya discussion on philosophy of language one thing must be noted that they have been dealing with two forms of language; one is the general form or the spoken form of language which is also known as ‘natural language’ and the other one is artificial form of language which has been invented by the Navya-Naiyāyikas themselves for bringing forth ambiguity free sentential understanding of the ancient scriptures. So, the point is that when it

comes to the matter of sentential understanding (*vākyārthabodha*) and the role being performed by *jāti-dharma* in sentential understanding in accordance with Nyāya thought, it is important to keep these two forms of language in mind.

With regard to the exposition of sentential understanding given before Navya-Nyāya era we find that Nyāya philosophy of language has actually been started of depending on their basic epistemological stand according to which our knowledge of object can not be differentiated from the way object has been presented in our awareness of knowledge. And moreover, it has also been seen that Naiyāyikas while explaining four kinds of *pramā* (*pratyakhsa*, *anumāna* etc) they have specified the structure in which the object is being presented in our awareness and that is ‘the qualifier-qualificand structure of cognition of object’. Whenever we are aware of an object, we are aware of the object as something which involves two elements; qualificand or *viśeṣya* and qualifier or *viśeṣana*. And thus, implicitly there involves a propositional structure as well while having knowledge of objects. To say, ‘knowledge of object a’ will presuppose a verbalized or propositional structure as F(a) which means ‘a, the qualificand is qualified or distinguished by the qualifier F-ness’. And that is how, when any verbal communication takes place between a speaker and a hearer, speaker’s particular utterance of words generates the knowledge of object which is qualified by a qualifier or property in hearer’s mind. Now, this qualifying property must be a distinguishing property as well through which the object under consideration will be cognized as that specific object only and not anything else or any other object. In accordance with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, it is *jāti-dharma* of an object which is considered to be the reason for generalized and differential both of the cognition. Hence, *jāti-dharma* is able to distinguish an object from all other things as well. Such as, it is the *jāti-dharma* ‘tablehood’, of the object ‘table’, which is able to distinguish ‘table’ from any other objects in this world. Hence,

it is *jāti-dharma* which presents as qualifier or *viśeṣana* in knowledge and accordingly in the sentential understanding of that knowledge when it is expressed through language. So, that's how in the contexts of natural language considering *Jāti* as an qualifier, early Naiyāyikas clarifies the role of *jāti* in sentential understanding for natural language. We can understand it more properly through the detail discussion of non-verbalized or *nirvikalpaka* and verbalized or *savikalpaka* cognition.

Non-verbalized and Verbalized cognition: According to Vaiyākaraṇa Bhartṛhari's claim there exists no such level of cognition without any verbal or linguistic activity. His remarks were '*na so-asti-pratyayo-loke-ya-shabdānugamadṛite-anubidhhamiba-jñāna-sarba-shabdena-bhāsate*' (*Vākyapadiya.1, ch-11, verse-123*)¹, as explained by K.Raghavan Pillai, any understanding in this whole world is not possible without association of speech. Knowledge is always accompanied by speech. Thus, in accordance with this thesis cognition refers to language-impregnated-awareness. Now if we see in terms of Naiyāyika's approach towards this view we will see they did not agree with this thesis. Rather they upheld an absolute opposite view of it accepting two levels of cognition; in the first level cognition is absolutely free from any verbalization whereas the level

followed by it, is subjected to verbalization. Hence, for the Naiyāikas there exists non-verbalized or pre-linguistics and verbalized these both kinds of cognition. Maharṣi Gautama in his *Nyāya-sutra* while defining '*pratyakhsa-prama*' (perception as valid cognition) mentioned 'non-verbalized' cognition as '*abyapadeshyaṃ*' (ashāba, that which is not subjected to any linguistic activity or element and hence it is also rendered as 'unnameable) and with the term '*byabasāyātmaka*' he referred 'definite cognition' which is a verbalized cognition

(*indriyārthasannikarsat-pannam-jñānam-abyapadeshyam-abyābhichāri-byabasāyātmakam-pratyakhsam*, N.S)² . Moreover, Naiyāyikas provided an other recognition as well of these two kind of cognition and that is they introduced non-verbalized cognition (*abyapadeshyam*) as *Nirvikalpaka-pratyakhsa*(indeterminate-perception) and verbalized cognition (*byabasāyātmakam*) as *Savikalpaka-pratyakhsa* (determinate-*pratyakhsa*). And it was Vācaspati Miśra who first introduced the distinct between these two as two kinds of perception in his *Sāṃkhya-tatva-kaumudi*. We already have started our discussion on this previously in the second chapter with the definition and a bit illustration with examples of these two kinds of cognition, now here we will be focusing only on that parts of it which will help us showing *jāti*'s function in comprehension of a cognition as verbal and even as non-verbal.

As we have seen earlier that *Nirvikalpaka-jñāna* has been explained as '*Niṣprakāraṇam-jñānam*' that is to say, it is an unqualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭa-anaba-gāhi jñāna*) whereas, *Savikalpaka-jñāna* has been regarded as like '*Saparakāraṇam-jñānam*', means it is a qualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭa- vaiśiṣṭa- abagāhi/viśiṣṭa-jñāna*). Now, here lies the exact point, which is, on account of its being a qualified knowledge *savikalpaka-jñāna*(determinate perception) falls under the domain of our language or linguistic usages whereas it is because *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* is not a qualified knowledge or *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* it does not. So, it is quite comprehensible now that language or our linguistic usages or linguistic expression, deals with qualified cognition or *savikalpaka-jñāna*; in simple words anything or any cognition that is subjected to be a qualified awareness then it must be expressed through language or in linguistic communication but an unqualified knowledge as in the case of *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* can not be expressed linguistically. Thus the queries that naturally come in mind, how and by which element and in what process

cognition becomes qualified and then assuredly be expressed linguistically and even the query also comes as why a cognition does not fall under the qualified category?

Eminent Vaiṣeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda while describing the nature of perception said ‘*dravye-tāvat-trividhe-mahaty.... .rupā...dharmādi-sāmagrye-ca-svarūpālocanamātram*’ and then furthermore, as ‘*sāmānya-viśeṣa-dravya-guna...viśeṣana-pekṣād-.ātmā-manah-sannikarṣāt-pratyakhsam-upadyate gacchatīti*’³ as explained by Prof. D.N.Shastri, the expression ‘*svarūpālocanamātram*’ refers to ‘a mere apprehension of form’ as the first step in the perception process and afterwards gradually it leads to the step further where manas gets contacted with soul and then qualified cognition or perception emerges from qualifications.⁴ Acārya Udayana in his Nyāya-kiranāvali construed the expression ‘*alocana*’ as ‘*nirvikalpaka-pratyakhsa*’ saying ‘*ālocanam-nirvikalpakam-pratyakhsam-sāksāt-kāri*’⁵ and moreover, interpreted *Nirvikalpaka* stage as ‘*gotvādy-apratītāv api-tad-āśrayasya-pratiteh*’ (*Nyāya-kiranāvali-p-278*) which describes *nirvikalpaka* stage is that very first step of perception where only the substratum of *jāti* or universal that is the individual-substance such as ‘cow’ is apprehended without apprehension of its *jāti* i.e., ‘cowness’. Vācaspati Miśra upgraded this interpretation a bit adding that substance and its universal although both are apprehended in *nirvikalpaka* stage but in a distinct manner with their own primordial pure nature or sensation such as ‘cow’ as ‘cow’ and ‘cowness’ as ‘cowness’ ; not as attached within a relation with each other(‘*jātyādi-svarūpāvagāhi-na tu-jātyādinām...viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāvāvagāhi*’, *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyatikā*,p-108).⁶

Jāti is the inherent property of an individual substance (*vyākti*). If anything or any object comes in mind in absence with its inherent property or *jāti* (as in case of *nirvikalpaka* stage of cognition) and someone wants to express it through language then apparently it feels like as if

someone (suppose person A) is asked about a person (suppose person B) whom he (A) just met or better to say just had a glimpse of that person and he knows nothing about his(B) identity and whereabouts apart from knowing him just as a person or fellow human-being. It would be so obvious that the person A will not be able to convey any particulars about person B, and so like in case of *nirvikalpaka* stage, without being qualified by qualifier or *prakāra*(*jāti* functions as *viśeṣana* or *prakāra* in a qualified cognition) at *nirvikalpaka* stage the individual substance(*Vyakti*) can not be cognized and hence can not be expressed in language either since verbal communication or linguistic usage always comprehends qualified objects, unqualified objects can never be comprehended linguistically.

On the other hand, if we see the interpretation by the Naiyāyikas done for the *savikalpaka* stage of cognition we find that at this stage universal or *jāti* of the substratum is being related with it(the substratum) in the relation of *viśesya-viśeṣana-bhava*(substantive-attribute relation) and thus this cognition takes the form of judgement as for instance ‘this is a book’. Now in this form of judgement two elements are there the substantive and the attribute (*viśesya* and *viśesana* or *prakāra* respectively in Nyaya terms). The pronoun ‘this’ refers to the *viśesya* or qualificand ‘book’ and the word ‘book’ actually refers to ‘book-ness’, the *jāti* or universal or the inherent property of the substratum or qualificand ‘book’. Thus, at this stage of cognition or in *savikalpaka* stage the *viśesya* or the qualificand ‘book’ being qualified by the qualifier or *prakāra* or *jāti* the cognizer can have the cognition and consequently can able to express this cognition through language as well. Because, it is the qualified object that presents in this stage of cognition as ‘book’ qualified by the qualifier or *jāti* ‘book-ness’, therefore language can able to grasp this mode of cognition.

Hence, from this analysis it can easily be comprehended that in the context of cognition in accordance with Naiyāyikas view, whether it (cognition) would be recognized as a verbalize cognition or non-verbalize cognition, the function of *jāti* as qualifier or *prakāra* or *viśeṣana* in the cognition is way more than important.

Now, in this context it is noteworthy that while talking about qualifier or *viśeṣana* in a qualified cognition or *viśiṣṭa-pratiti* there also other qualifiers that have been accepted by the Naiyāyikas such as substance, quality, action, name etc. And hence the definitions of indeterminate and determinate cognition were also given as ‘*nāmjātyādi-viśeṣana-viśeṣya-saṁbandha-anabagāhi-jñānaṁ*’ and ‘*nāmjātyādi-viśeṣana-viśeṣya-saṁbandha-abagāhi-jñānaṁ*’⁷ respectively. Here the expression ‘*adi*’ refers to *guna*, *karma* such other qualifications. To illustrate this point with an example, suppose ‘cognition of a pen’; along with pen-ness or universal (*jāti*) as the qualifier of the qualificand pen in this cognition, the qualificand pen has its name ‘pen’ as qualifier, next it certainly has its color or qualification in terms of ‘quality’(*guna*), furthermore, as it (pen) is meant for accomplishing some action, so that ‘action’(*kriyā*) would also be regarded as one of all its qualifiers. Thus, one may argue why we are laying stress only on *Jāti* or universal as qualifier or *viśeṣana* of qualified cognition for further comprehension of it in a linguistic communication? The answer would be like, hierarchically all the objects of verbal behavior are revealed through *Jāti* or *Sāmānya* or *Universal*, hence *Dravya*, *Guna*, *Kriyā*, *Nāma*, *Rūpa*, *Aakṛiti* etc though are imperative in verbal operations Universal lead the way to confirm the existence of all this entities through its broader aspect. We can imagine any object or pen without its color, without its name, and infact even without its specific action but would it be possible to assume it without its inherent property that is pen-ness in this context? It will certainly be not possible because in absence of the inherent property pen-ness, the thing pen would have not been recognized as ‘pen’

and so it also wouldn't have got the name 'pen' and so its quality and etc. And that is the reason for emphasizing *jāti* as the *viśesana* in *viśiṣṭa-pratiti* (qualified cognition) as the fundamental element to operate for linguistic understanding of that cognition.

The pre-condition for 'recognition of *jāti* as qualifier or *viśesana*' in the qualified cognition:

We have seen in the interpretations that *nirvikalpaka* stage has been regarded as non-verbalized stage of cognition or language can not able to grasp this stage. It is because the way and in so far the nature of objects of cognition is required to be comprehended for the objects to have their linguistic equivalent expressions, this initial stage fails to meet that, rather this stage (*nirvikalpaka*) of cognition is entirely adheres itself to reveal the primordial nature (*vastu-svarupa*) or the unmixed, pure sensation of objects; not more than that. However, still Naiyāyikas have much explicit and strong reason to show the importance and inevitability of this indeterminate stage of cognition as the necessary pre-condition for the final or determinate stage of cognition. In their view the knowledge of qualifier (*viśesana-jñāna*) is the antecedent cause of qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*). When someone or the cognizer sees an object say, 'pot' it is not the case that his eyes get contacted with only the individual substance 'pot' at that time rather it(eyes) get contacted with pot-ness(*jāti*) and also with the relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandha*) simultaneously. So, all these three are the objects of *nirvikalpaka* stage of cognition. Now, if argument comes like, as we find these three objects as the objects of *savikalpaka* stage of cognition as well, so there would be no differentiation in regard of objects (*viśayagata-bheda*) between these two stages then how come these stages be different stages of cognition since in all other cases it is seen differentiation of cognitions occur due to different objects in each cognition? Now to resolve this issue Naiyāyikas come with the opinion that the

identities of the objects in both of the cognitions are not same. In *nirvikalpaka* stage all the three objects recognized as they are; pot as pot, potness as potness, inherence as inherence whereas in the stage further they are recognized as pot as qualificand (*viśeṣya*), potness as qualifier(*viśeṣana*)of pot, and inherence as relation between them (*saṃbandha* or *saṃsarga*).

Moreover, Naiyāyikas also pointed out in this regard that through inference (*anumāna-pramāna*) we can able to know the existence of this *nirvikalpaka* stage of cognition. To illustrate they also have given an example of inferential argument that is ‘*gauriti-viśiṣṭa-jñānaṃ-viśeṣanajñāna-janyaṃ-viśiṣṭa-jñānatvāt-danditi-jñānabat*’, implies, if anyone does not know what refers to by a ‘stick’ (*daṇḍa*), then he will never going to identify ‘the person with a stick’(*daṇḍi*) just in the same way without having prior the knowledge of nature and existence of universal or *jāti* cow-hood, one can not able to have the qualified knowledge as ‘cow qualified by cow-hood’ in any way. So, before the qualified knowledge of cow, one needs to have knowledge of ‘cow-hood’ as ‘*ayaṃ gau*’. As soon as cognizer’s eyes get contacted (*saṃyoga*) with ‘*go-byākti*’, it also get connected with ‘*gotva-jāti*’; in the relation of *saṃyukata-samavāya-sannikarṣa* which helps in the perceptual knowledge of ‘*gotva*’ (cow-hood).

However, from the above analysis it will no longer be difficult to understand that it is this prior knowledge of *jāti* in the *nirvikalpaka* stage of cognition that functions as the pre-condition in recognition of *jāti* as a *viśeṣana* or *prakāra*(qualifier). Finally, it also comes in mind that just like ‘the identity as a qualifier/*prakāra* of *jāti*’, is directly necessary for a linguistic communication to happen, so as the knowledge of it(*jāti*) in the *nirvikalpaka* stage is indirectly associated for the same. It is *jāti* as object of cognition which either directly or indirectly causes cognition to express linguistically.

So far we have discussed how *Jāti* aids in sentential understanding through generalization in natural language. But the thing is that Natural language i.e. the common language used by layman involves ambiguity. It has been observed that in most of the cases dispute occurs while debating over any topic for misinterpretation or miscommunication. And this miscommunication or misinterpretation happens due to lack of understanding of what opponent wants to communicate and this kind of poor understanding comes through usages of ambiguous language. hence it has been understood that for communicating or debating on textual discourse, the communicators should not use or depend on this ambiguous natural language. And moreover, as the foundation of Indian tradition is solely based on its enriched treasure in the form of inestimable ancient texts (*śāstras*), and since the very beginning eminent scholars from different fields with different approaches started to comprehend these texts in their own. But as we know individual comprehensions may differ due to their own different understanding of it, and naturally the opposite did not happen in this case as well, while interpreting and elucidating their individual thought in natural language they faced huge difference and clash while debating on various issues from a particular text and in consequence people refrained themselves from an appropriate understanding to even out their dispute. And this is why Navya-Naiyāyikas to resolve this issue, realized the necessity of removing the usage of natural language in textual or *śāstric* discourse and thus they bring forth one technical model of language that consists of technical linguistic notions and expressions meant for having a successful or fruitful communication. And it is of great importance to note here in this context that Navya-Naiyāyikas specifically introduces the notion of *avachhedaka* to avoid ambiguity while communicating and instead to have a precise, ambiguity-free medium of communication.

Concept of *Avachhedaka* (delimiter):—The concept of *Avachhedaka* or Delimiter though has been mostly seen as an utmost important notion or element in Navya-Naiyāyikas analysis of logic, language and epistemology but we see the presence of this notion in the discussions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika period as well and in fact we also find references of mentioning this notion of *Avachhedaka* in other Indian philosophical systems of thought also.⁸ But the point is, this notion of *Avachhedaka* has been basically found to elaborate in the Navya-Nyāya tradition since we know Navya-Naiyāyikas are famous for minute analysis of natural language with the help of Navya-Naiyāyikas technical notions and expressions of language, '*Avachhedaka*' has been regarded as such an utmost useful technical expression in the domain of Navya-Nyāya sense of linguistic behaviour.


Navya-Nyāya Definition of *Avachhedaka*:

Navya Naiyāyikas in their technical sense of using the term '*Avachhedaka*' addresses that it is such a property which has a specific characteristic feature known as '*Avachhedaktva*' or '*Avachhedakatā*' (Delimiter-hood/the property which again delimited the delimiter itself). Prof. D.C.Guha elaborated in this regard saying, the way a pot is considered to be a pot in terms of pot-hood in the same way '*Avachhedaka*' is considered to be '*Avachhedaka*' in virtue of the particular characteristic '*Avachhedakatva*' or '*Avachhedakatā*'.

Thus, to know the definition of '*Avachhedaka*' in accordance with Navya-Naiyāyikas we first need to find the meaning of the term or the particular characteristic '*Avachhedakatva*' as this is what on which the definition of '*Avachhedaka*' depends on. In other words, the definition of '*Avachhedaka*' will automatically reveal once the meaning of '*Avachhedakatva*' is being comprehended.

***Avachhedaka* as Svarūpa-sambandha:**

We find that the primary meaning of ‘*Avachhedakatva*’ has been accepted by the Navya-Naiyāyikas as ‘*svarūpasambandha-rūpaṃ avachhedakatvaṃ*’⁹ which implies, *Avachhedakatvaṃ* refers to a self linking relation that is *svarūpa sambandha*. Navya-Naiyāyika Shibāditya Miśra defined this *svarūpa sambandha* saying ‘*kalaptaḥ padārthas kinchid-dharma-uparāgeṇa-samsargatābattvaṃ*’,¹⁰ he intends that *Avachhedakatvaṃ* as the self linking relation which is either identical with some object or those objects themselves and it has also got another particular attribute qualified with. With reference to this definition occasional properties of object of cognition can also be regarded as *Avachhedaka*. For example in case of absence or absence of pot, pot is the counter-positive (*pratiyogi*) of absence, this counter positive has counter-positiveness or *pratiyogitā*. Now this *pratiyogitā* is *avachhedaka* here since in accordance with the definition it (*pratiyogitā*) is identical with the *pratiyogi* or the object pot and also at the same time it is a relation between by virtue of it is being qualified by another attribute ‘*pratiyogitvatva*’.



So here as we can see *pratiyogitā* though being a contextual property (since it comes in the context of absence only) performs as *Avachhedaka* in the above sense of *svarūpa-samandha*.

‘*Pratiyogitā*’ is identical with the object or *pratiyogi* and also it is a relation between pot and its absence being qualified by another attribute ‘*pratiyogitvatva*’.

Just like in the above case ‘*pratiyogita*’ serves the function as *avachhedaka* as relation (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*) in the same way there are ‘*sādhyatāvachhedaka*’, ‘*hetutāvachhedaka*’ which are considered to be *avachhedaka* as a type of relation. With regard to relation or *saṃbandha* as *avachhedaka* it has been shown in the text *Byāptipañcaka* that there exists *saṃbandhavidhāya avachhedaka* (*avachhedaka* as a relation) illustrating those relations as ‘*sādhyatāvachhedaka-saṃbandhābachhin-sādhyatāvachhedakā-vachhinna-pratiyogitāko-bodha*’¹¹, here ‘*sādhyatāvachhedaka*’ has been referred as *avachhedaka* as a relation. And again it has been said while defining *byāpti* in the text *Byāptipañcaka* ‘*sādhyābhāvādhikaraṇa-nirupita-hetutāvachhedaka-saṃbandha-avachhinna-vṛittitva-sāmānyābhāvo byāpti*’¹² we find referring ‘*hetutāvachhedaka*’ as *avachhedaka* as relation.

Another different types of Avachhedakas:

There has also been found in Navya-Naiyāyikas texts that space, time and even *viśaya* can be regarded as *avachhedakas*. In the text *Language Of Logic Navya-Nyāya Perspective* some examples has been shown in this regard.¹³ With regard to space as *avachhedaka* the example demonstrated as *vṛikṣe shākhāyam kapiḥ upaśītaḥ* (the monkey is sitting on a branch of the tree). Here the function of *avachhedaka* has been performed by the branch of the tree (that is one specific space of tree). To put it in Navya-Naiyāyikas language ‘*br̥khsa-nirupita-kapi-niṣṭhā-āheyatāvachhedaka-shākhāyam*’. And thus specific space can be regarded as delimitor or *avachhedaka*.

While showing time as *avachhedaka* the example has been taken as ‘*Shibāji-rājyakāle-subhikhṣam āsīt*’(there was bountifulness during the reign of king Shibāji’). Here ‘*subikhṣa-niṣṭha-ādheyatā*’ is delimited by a particular time that is to say the specific time during king Sibāji’s reign.

Jagadish Tarkālankār while commenting on Gangesh Upādhyaya’s *Siddhantalakhsana* has mentioned that *viṣaya* can also be considered as *avachhedaka*. He remarked saying *anumiterviṣayāvidhayā janakatāvachhedakāda*. This type of *avachhedaka* is termed as ‘*viṣayavidhayā avachhedaka*’.

However, it seems quite clear from the above discussion that the notion of *avachhedaka* has been described by the Navya-Naiyāyikas in different manner. We have so far talked about four different kinds of explanation of *avachhedaka* which are *avachhedaka* as relation, *avachhedaka* as space, *avachhedaka* as time, *avachhedaka* as content. Now what is important to note in this context that there is one more kind of explanation is there regarding the notion of ‘*avachhedaka*’ which is more consistent with our focal point of discussion. Next section will focus on that.

Avachhedaka as Anyūna-anatiriktavṛittitva:

Navya-Naiyāyikas while talking about ‘*Avachhedaka*’ as *Anyūna-anatiriktavṛittitva* they meant that a delimitor should not be too general (wide) or too specific (narrow) to the delimited. Hence, it has been rightly said ‘*anyūnātiprasaktatvamavachhedakatvaṃ bā*’¹⁴ Acārya Jagadish mentioned this only as ‘*anyūnavṛittitva*’ saying ‘*avachhedakatvanca anyūnavṛittitvameba*’¹⁵. In *Tattvachintāmani* it has presented as ‘*atiprasaktam-avachhedakam*’¹⁶ the expression ‘*atiprasaktam*’ refers to ‘*anatiriktavṛittitva*’. And again, ‘*anatiriktavṛittitva*’ has also been termed as ‘*svavyāpakatatkatva*’¹⁷, which implies, the property that is yet to be specified by delimitor, ought always


to be the pervader(*vyāpaka*) of the *avachhedaka* itself or in other words, the *avachhedaka* will not present in those locus where the property of which the delimiter or *avachhedaka* . In some Navya -Nyāya texts to explain ‘*anativṛttitva*’ some more characteristics has been seen to refer such as ‘*samaniyatatva*’(co-extensiveness)¹⁸ according to which a delimiter should always be co-extended with the delimited. Besides, it has also been characterized as ‘*byābartakatva*’(differentiator)¹⁹ which indicates the character of differentiating by which delimiter can able to differentiate its delimited from others.

Now, the point is when we minutely see and analyze the definition and other characterization of *avachhedaka* set by Navya-Naiyāyikas we can understand that when Navya-Naiyāyiks are considering ‘*Anyūna-anativṛttitva*’ as *avachhedaka* they actually are considering *jāti* *dharma* as *avachhedaka*. We can refer *jāti*’s definition ‘*nityate sati aneksamavetatvam*’ provided in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts to justify this claim. When *jāti* has been defined as ‘*aneksamavetatvam*’ (i.e. *jāti* resides in many particulars of same sort in the relation of inherence) then by virtue of the inherent relation naturally *jāti* needs to be understood as ‘*Anyūna-anativṛttitva-dharma*’, ‘*samaniyata*’. While explaining *samavāya sambandha* we see it has been described as ‘*ayutasiddha-sambandha*’ which implies the relatum related in the relation of inherence can’t be differentiated with each other in any situation or context. Thus, *Jāti* being related with its locus in relation of inherence can not stay different from its locus as well which implicitly meant that wherever there is the particular locus, there resides its *jāti-dharma*. And from this we can definitely say *jāti* is co-extensive with *vyākṛti* where it resides and it (*jāti*) can not be too wide or too narrow from its locus as well. Now, the characteristic as ‘*byābartakatva*’ also goes with *jāti dharma* very well since when *jāti-dharma* has been explained as *sāmānya-viśeṣa* it actually emphasizes *jāti*’s characteristic as the basis of differentiating

cognition apart from identical or uniform cognition. Hence it won't be wrong to say that Navya-Naiyāyikas while explaining *avachhedaka* as '*Anyūna-anatiriktavṛitti-dharma*' they are actually meaning '*jāti-dharma*' as *avac*. To consider *Jāti* as *avachhedaka* Navya-Naiyāyikas also defines *avachhedaka* in terms of *Jāti dharma*. Navya-Naiyāyika Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in his book *Shaktivāda* defined *Avachhedaka* as '*bāchyatve-sati-bāchyabṛittitve-sati-bāchya-upasthitiprakāram*'²⁰ as it explained by Prof. D.C.Guha *avachhedaka* refers to such a thing which is being itself a primary meaning of word remains in another primary meaning of the same word and acts as a qualifier or *prakāra* in the remembrance of the primary meaning of the word. As per one other definition the notion of *Avachhedaka* has been mentioned by Navya-Naiyāyikas as '*byābartaka*' or principle of differentiator, it says '*shakyatve sati shakya-byābartakatvaṁ avachhedakatvaṁ*'²¹, implies, *avachhedaka* although being a primary meaning it also differentiates the other primary meaning of that word from other objects. As we explained in the previous chapter that Naiyāyikas consider *Jāti*, *Vyākṛti* and *Akṛiti* all three simultaneously as primary meaning of word and hence for them *Śakyārtha*(primary-meaning) or *bāchyārtha*(denoted meaning) can be all the three at the same time. But the point here to focus is that observing these Nyāya definition of *Avachhedaka* it is quite clear that amongst three primary meanings of a word Naiyāyikas accept *Jāti* as that primary meaning (*shakyārtha/bāchyārtha*) which can able to function as *avachhedaka*. It is *jāti* which resides in another primary meaning that is to say *vyākṛti* and acts as a qualifier or *prakāra* in the cognition besides it is also *jāti* as primary meaning which differentiates another primary meaning from other objects such as cow-ness as primary meaning differentiates cow-*vyākṛti* from all other objects like dog and etc.

Necessity of Jāti as Avachhedaka for eliminating specific kind of ambiguity:


In natural language one main ambiguity occurs when speaker needs to make hearer understand about object's contextual properties. In the context of qualified cognition in the previous section we have been acquainted with the qualifier or *prakāra* (that is the inherent property (*jāti*) of the object referred by the qualificand term of that cognition) which serves its function for the cognition to be expressed in language. Now as we know Naiyāyikas also have mentioned another kind of property of an object apart from inherent property (*jāti*) and that is the occasional or acquired or contextual property (*upādhi* in Nyāya terms). '*Dharmasya prathamata dvibidha jāirupādhiścheti*'²².



To illustrate this we can refer one example ²³, given by Prof. Ujjwala Jha, it says, from the very moment of time a child or a human child is being born, he or she possesses the inherent property (*jāti-dharma*) as human-hood or man-hood. And it is because inherent property or *jāti-dharma* of a thing is such a property that resides in its substratum object throughout the whole span of that object since its origination (as in this case human-hood exists in human since birth and till death). Now the thing is that the human-being who possesses human-hood as *jāti-dharma*, the same being acquires some other properties in that same life span as well such as he or she becomes brother or sister, then becomes student, afterwards professionally may become professor or nurse or engineer or shop-keeper and so forth. And thus that same human also possesses these properties like brother-hood or sister-hood, student-hood, professor-hood etc.

which all are his or her acquired or occasional properties because these are not going to stay with him or her forever, rather all these will stay till a certain period of time or temporarily (like when a person is not teaching at his college, he is staying at home, the property professor-hood does not exist in him at that moment whereas he still possesses the inherent property human-hood).

Hence, it is clear that occasional property (*upādhi*) of a thing is actually contextual property, so when the context is over the property ceases to exist.



One more example can be shown here where with reference to the cognition of any material object, suppose cognition of a table. A table with regard to its *jāti-dharma* has table-hood till it ceases to exist but at the same with regard to its occasional properties like cause-hood, effect-hood, counter positive-ness we can cognize a table as cause of something or some work, as effect of something, as counter positive of its absence, so forth. Moving on to the point with regard to ambiguity in this context, as it has been explained in the above section and with the diagram drawn above that an object (*dharmi*) of our cognition can possess multifold properties (*dharma*s) which includes inherent along with other occasional properties, hence when a speaker after

cognizing an object (needless to say that it will be a qualified cognition) engages himself for having a linguistic conversation on some of that object's occasional properties using natural language, then naturally there arises ambiguity in this regard due to lack of the specification of its(objects) properties when communicating it with the hearer. Since there happens to be present multiple acquired properties of a same object in speaker's cognition so when he tries to express it linguistically and can not utterly specify each property with each separate context then it would be obvious for a hearer to does not have a successful sentential cognition for that matter. Hearer faces the difficulty to understand speaker's words and thus communication could not happen successfully.

That is to explain with the above example, suppose the speaker talking about occasional properties of any human being in natural language, let's say the speaker is talking about him as he is being student or as brother and so forth. Each context is different and so the properties exist in that human-being at each moment are different as well like, student-hood, brother-hood respectively. And in the same way with regard to the second example given above each occasional property of the object table like cause-hood, effect-hood etc are different in each context of cognition of table, we need to specify which contextual property is being focused on at a particular context or moment. But natural language due to its scarcity of advanced causal linguistic instruments can not be able to specify a particular property for that same human-being in each context hence hearer will fail to understand or grasp on which property of that human being the speaker is speaking about and thus very naturally there occurs ambiguity in communication. So it is no longer difficult to understand that language needs any or some other linguistic instruments for this specification to happen and successful communication to happen at the same time.


And to resolve this very specific kind of ambiguity in sentential understanding Navya-Naiyāyikas introduces the concept of *Avachhedaka* or Delimiter in their technical understanding of language.

***Jāti* as *Avachhedaka* performs the function to discard this specific ambiguity:**

As it is known to us that according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas ontological doctrine *Jāti* or *Jāti-dharma* of a particular object (that is referred by a particular word) is such a property that is related with the object with the relation of inherence (*samavāya-saṃbandha*) and that is why *jāti-dharma* is known as inherent property of object concern. Since, the relation of inherence is recognized as '*ayutasiddha*' that is to say the relatum related by this relation can not be separated from each other, so an object (*vyākti*) possesses or is related to its inherent property ever since its origination to decay. And this is perhaps the very reason of the Navya-Naiyāikas to rely on *Jāti-dharma* to perform its function as *Avachhedaka* to discard this specific ambiguity occurred in sentential understanding. We have so far explained how the occasional properties creates ambiguity, now what *Jāti-dharma* does as *Avachhedaka* is to specify or regulate or to delimit an occasional property of an object of cognition within a specific context. And every time this specification happens or *jāti-dharma* delimits an occasional property, the chance of ambiguity with regard to occasional properties blurs away.

Suppose, An earthen pot can be understood in many sense. Let's take A, B and C these three contexts. In context A the Pot can be understood as the cause of bringing water, in context B Pot can be understood as just an object or object of cognition, in context C pot can be understood as the counter-positive of the absence of pot. Thus, Pot has its inherent property as Pot-hood along with other contextual properties like cause-ness(*kāraṇatā*), object-hood(*viśayatā*), counter-positiveness(*pratiyogitā*) which all have been mentioned above. Now the Pot possesses pot-ness and all these contextual properties at same time and being occasional properties these all can be found in other objects as well (like a table can also possess these contextual properties). Therefore if not specifically told which property is being focused and in

which locus that property resides at a particular context or a particular context of speaker's utterance or else hearer would definitely fail to understand. Navya-Naiyāyikas hold in this regard that the *jāti-dharma* of the object Pot that is 'Pot-hood' will do this specification as *Avachhedaka* or delimiter of all the acquired-properties of it every time or in each context of speaker's utterance of any one particular acquired property of that Pot. When in context A pot is being understood as cause then the inherent property 'pot-hood' delimits the acquired property 'cause-ness' at that context in the same way when in the context of B pot is being understood as object of cognition then 'pot-hood' delimits 'object-hood' and in context C pot-ness would delimit counterpositiveness. Thus a precise and definite understanding about that one specific acquired property and also locus of that acquired property is supposed to occur smoothly in sentential understanding. Let's check it with a diagram



As we can see in the above diagram that all of the occasional properties (cause-ness, object-hood, counterpositiveness) of the pot are specified or delimited by the *jāti-dharma* 'pot-hood'/'ghatatva' and this delimitation is shown in the above diagram through the double marked line. Hence, the way Navya-Naiyāyikas will represent this in their technical language that can be shown below. The representations with regard to speaker A, B, C will obviously differ.

For context A, specific cognition of the pot would be represented linguistically in Navya-Nyaya terms as: *Ghatatva-avachhinna-kāraṇatā*.

For context B, that would be as: *Ghatatva-avachhinna-viṣayatā*.

For context C, that would be as: *Ghatatva-avachhinna-pratiyogitā*.

Thus, Navya-Naiyāyikas would say if the aforesaid conversation of the speakers can be expressed linguistically in this manner then it will be no longer difficult for the hearer to understand the meanings of each speaker's words without any chance for ambiguity.


***Avachhedaka-Avachhinna-bhāva*(Delimiter-delimited relation):**

When property (*dharma*) X is being delimited by any other property or Y, property X would be recognized as Delimited (*avachhinna*) and property would be recognized as Delimiter(*avachhedaka*). And the relationship they will hold between each other would be known as Delimiter-delimited relation (*avachhedaka-avachhinna-bhāva*). Every single object (*viṣaya*) of our cognition possesses *viṣayatā*(content-ness ; as given the english equivalent by Prof.D.C.Guha). While cognizing a 'book' it has *viṣayatā*, cognizing a 'cloth' it has *viṣayatā*. *Viṣayatā* is such a property that is possessed by every object of cognition. So, if anyone wants to express 'book as an object' or 'cloth as an object', how will she able to do that ?What will be that deciding factor which is going to refer ' this has the content-ness of book(*pustaka-viṣayatā*) , 'this has content-ness of cloth(*pata-viṣayatā*) , so they are to be known as pot , cloth respectively? This is where it requires '*avachhedaka-avachhinna-bhāva*' to understand it specifically with regard to each object's particular *viṣayatā-dharma*. Since, *Viṣayatā* is an occasional property of an object, hence *Avachhedaka* here obviously be the inherent property or *Jāti-dharma* of that object. Let's illustrate it with example:

Pustaka-viṣayatā (contentness of book) is the occasional property of 'book' (*pustaka*), whereas 'book-hood' (*pustakatva*) is the inherent property of 'book'. So, when anyone wants to express linguistically '*pustaka-viṣayatā*' in Navya-Naiyāyikas technical language she needs to express it

in language as ‘*pustakatvāvacchhinna-pustakaniṣṭhaviṣayatā*’ which indicates the pot that has ‘*pustakatvāvacchhinna-pustakaviṣayatā*’. So, here the relation between ‘*pustakatva*’ and ‘*viṣayatva*’ is *avachhedaka-avachhinna bhāva*. *Pustakatva* being the *jāti-dharma* of the object is the *avachhedaka* or delimiter of *viṣayatā* i.e. the occasional property. It is to note that only *Jati-dharma* (inherent property) of an object can be the *avachhedaka* and can delimited the occasional property, note vice versa. Let’s see this *avachhedaka-avachhinna-bhāva* through the diagram below:

Pustaka-viṣayatā(book as having its content-ness):



In the same way, when a Book is understood as *pratiyogin* (counter-positive) of its absence (*pustakābhāva*) then it got ‘*pratiyogitā*’ (counterpositive-ness) as its occasional property since it resides in ‘book’ only in the contexts of its absence and moreover, *pratiyogitva-dharma* can be seen in case of other object’s absence as well. So, to understand the ‘*pratiyogitā*’(counterpositive-ness) of in the context of ‘Book’, again we require the inherent property i.e. the *jāti-dharma* of book (book-hood) to function as *avachhedaka* (delimiter) and to

delimit the occasional property ‘*pratiyogitā*’. And thus the linguistic expression goes like ‘*pustakatva-avachhinna-puṣṭakaniṣṭha-pratiyogitā*’.

Pusataka-pratiyogita(book as having its counter-positive-ness):

Just like *Viśayatā*, *Pratiyogitā*, there are *Kāryata*(when an object is recognized as *kārya* or effect of something), *Kāranatā*(when the object is *kāraṇa* of something)and so forth are known as occasional properties of an object; and all these occasional or acquired properties of an object of cognition can not be explained without acceptance of inherent property or *Jāti*(universal) as the *avachhedaka* of these properties.


Nirupya-Nirupaka-bhāva and jāti as avachhedaka:

In *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa* it is said that ‘*yatra yatra bartate tat tasya ādheyam āśritaṃ tadbr̥tti iti chaudhote,yatra tu yad bartate tat tasya adhikaraṇaṃ ādhār āśraya iti cha ucchate*’²⁴, it implies, something that resides somewhere, is known as located(*ādheya*) and has located-ness(*ādheyatā*), and the place where something resides is called locus(*ādhār*) and has locus-ness(*ādhāratā*).Now, between these two notions ‘locus’ and ‘located’ there exist a mutual expectancy that is to say when one has locus-ness, other one has located-ness and vice-versa (*ekasya adhikaraṇatāyāṃ aparasya vṛttitā niyatā*²⁵), in other words, if something is located somewhere then only that place will be called locus, on the other hand if something exists only in a locus then only it will be known as located. So, it is said locus and located described each other, the thing is that located-ness in located describes the locus whereas locus-ness in locus describes located. This kind of relation between two inter related properties just in this case *ādhār*(locus) and *ādheya*(located) is called *Nirupya-Nirupaka-bhāva* or Described-Describer-


relation(*vṛittidhādhī-karaṇatayo-parasparoniyatasāpekhsatayā-vṛittitādhikaraṇatayoncha-parasparam-nirupya-nirupakabhāva-asti*²⁶). ‘Nirupya’ means that which is ‘described’ and ‘Nirupaka’ is the ‘describer’ of *nirupya/nirupita*.

Acārya Mahesh.ch.Nyāyaratna illustrated this with example saying ‘*kunde badaram iti bākyasya kunda-nirupita-vṛittitābad-badaram kimbā kunda-niṣṭha-adhikaraṇatā-nirupita-ādheyatabad-badaram-ityartha-pratiyate*’, which implies, ‘there is berry in the vessel’, here ‘berry’ is ‘located’(*ādheya*) that has located-ness(*ādheyatā*) and ‘vessel’ is locus(*ādhār*)that has locus-ness(*ādhāratā*).Now, in accordance with Navya-Naiyāikas technique of language as we know ‘*dharmin*’ is known through the ‘*dharma*’, hence in this example also located-ness and locus-ness are to be understood first to know the located and locus, thus it is noteworthy that the actual relation of Described-Describer is held up between the two inter related properties, here they are located-ness(*ādheyatā*) and locus-ness(*ādhāratā*).And that is why the above example has been explained by the author in its complete format of Navya-Nyāya language as ‘*kunda-nirupita-vṛittitābad-badaram*’ or ‘*kunda-niṣṭha-adhikaranatā-nirupita-ādheyatabād-badaram*’ which means ‘the berry possesses located-ness described by the vessel or in other words ‘located-ness in the berry is described by the locus-ness in the vessel’. Let’s find this out more bluntly with the diagrams given by Prof. Ujjwala Jha²⁷

In case of Diagram 1 there we get two alternatives:




Here in this diagram it is depicted that located-ness in berry is described by vessel (*kunde badaram*)



In this alternative we get the depiction as berry describes the locus-ness of vessel being located in it(*badaravat kundam*)

Diagram 2:




Now, in this diagram the depiction implies, the locatedness in berry is described by the locus-ness in the vessel and vice versa (*kunda-niṣṭha-ādhāratā-nirupita-badar-niṣṭha-ādheyatā* or in other words, *badar-niṣṭha-ādheyatā-nirupaka-kunda-niṣṭha-ādhāratā*.)

It is claimed in Navya-Nyāya that every acquired property of an object does come with another pair property in the cognition and thus all acquired properties share this described-describer-relation (*nirupya-nirupaka-bhāva*) with each of their pair-property or interrelated property. Prof. D.C.Guha in his book *Navya Nyāya System of Logic* have mentioned almost all these properties which may be inter related with some other property. To mention some, *Viśayatā-Viśayitā* (content-ness and contentpossessor-ness), *Kāranatā- Kāryatā* (causeness and effect-hood), *Pratīyogitā-Anuyogitā* (counterpositive-ness and subjunctness), *Viśeṣanatā-Viśeṣyatā* (qualifier-ness and qualificand-ness), *Vācyaṭā-Vācakatā* (denoted-ness and denotative-ness), *Vyāpyatā-Vyāpakatā* (pervaded-ness and pervade-ness), and so on. The way the above example with diagram has been explained to show *nirupya-nirupaka-bhāva*, that same technique of Navya-Nyāya explanation will be applicable to all these inter-related properties as well. Now what is more important and also the focal point is to show in terms of Navya-Naiyāyikas meta language how *jāti* as *avachhedaka* functions onto two occasional properties at the same time with regard to this specific relation of *nirupya-nirupaka-bhāva* for the sake of ignoring ambiguity in linguistic understanding. We have explained before that *jāti* requires to delimit acquired property to avoid ambiguity, hence in this case of inter-related properties also *jāti* will function as delimitor but in a different manner. Let's find out with the help of examples. We can take example as 'thread is the cause of cloth' for demonstrating the inter related properties of *kāranatā-kāryatā*. Here in this case 'thread' refers to 'cause' and 'cloth' refers to 'effect', so both has cause-ness(*kāranatā*) and effect-hood(*kāryatā*) respectively. And as we know, these two (*kāranatā* and *kāryatā*) share the relation of described-describer as well. Now, since both of these properties are contextual properties of the two *dharmis*(thread and cloth) concerned , hence to have a fruitful linguistic understanding both of the properties need specification or

In Navya-Naiyāyikas language representation this can be explained as *Patatvāvachhinna-pata-niṣṭha-kāryatā-nirupita-tantutvāvacchinna-tantu-niṣṭha-kāranatā* or in other words *tantutvāvacchinna-tantu-niṣṭha-kāranatā-nirupaka-patatvāvachhinna-pata-niṣṭha-kāryatā*.

In the same way we can explain other paired properties also. Let's see one other instance with regard to *Viśayatā-Viśayitā*(content-ness and content-possessor-ness). Every cognition has to have an object or content (*viśaya*), in the same way there has to be content-possessor (*viśayi*) in the context of knowledge. And this '*viśayi*' of knowledge is nothing but the knowledge(*jñāna*) itself and so it(knowledge) has *viśayitā*(content-possessor-ness)for possessing *viśaya*(knowledge) just like *viśaya* possesses *viśayatā* or content-ness. And these two properties are mutually described properties that is to say each one is described in terms of the other one and thus both are known to be mutually described properties. In case of knowledge of things, say, knowledge of a pot we need to understand it with reference to both *viśayatā* and *viśayitā*. To illustrate, 'the object pot' (*ghata-viśaya*) and 'the knowledge of the object pot' (*ghata-viśaya-jñāna*) both are different. The object or content pot has *viśayata* or content-ness, whereas, as its knowledge possesses the content that's why knowledge has *viśayitā* or content-possessor-ness. And these two are mutually described. Now with regard to these two inter related properties, the delimitation will be done in the same way by the inherent properties or *jāti-dharmas* of both of the object concerned(the objects of cognition in this case are pot and knowledge) and they are pot-hood(*ghatatva*) and knowledge-hood(*jñānatva*). Let's find it out with the diagram for this below



Thus it can be seen in the diagram that *Viṣayatā* and *Viṣayitā* these properties have been delimited by the *Jāti dharmas* *Ghatatva* and *Jñānatva* respectively, so when speaker will apply this specification in her linguistic communication, there will not be certainly any issue for the speaker to make understand the hearer whether she(speaker) is talking with regard to object of knowledge or with regard to the knowledge of object.

Conclusion

In accordance with a particular query that is whether Jāti has any other role to play apart from it(jāti) being the reason for having inclusive cognition, one unique and unprecedented concept has been ascribed to Jāti mainly in Navya-Nyāya and in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas texts and that is the concept or notion of ‘avachhedaka’(delimiter). It has been claimed that the existence of Jāti can also be ascertained in terms of considering it(jāti) as kāraṇatāvachhedaka(delimiter of cause-ness), or kāryatāvachhedaka (delimiter of effect-ness), or bācyatāvachhedaka(delimiter of denotative-ness) and thus so forth. And moreover, Navya Naiyāyikas while elaborating the doctrine of Jāti-viśiṣṭa-yvyākṭi-śaktivāda they mentioned Jāti as the avachhedaka or delimiter of Vyākṭi as for them one single cognition occurred after hearing one uttered word where two meanings are being amalgamated as Vyākṭi being qualified by its delimiter Jāti and revealed one single meaning. To give an example, The word ‘cow’ would denote the meaning as individual cow qualified or delimited by the Jāti cow-ness.

However, in this context of discussing Jāti as delimiter or avachhedaka, it somehow seemed to me something or such a topic which lacks of proper explanation and elaboration from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās end. They seemed to discontinue the elucidation on this matter abruptly for some unknown reasons. We do find discussions and elaborations individually on the concept of avachhedaka or delimiter in Navya-Naiyāyikās texts. But how or in which process Jāti functions as the delimiter, has not been explained in detail so far by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. Hence this seemed to me a problem that needs to address.

In this present work I have made an humble attempt to throw light on this specific aspect of Jāti's function in accordance with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas understanding of language and linguistic behaviour. All the relevant issues (such as word, meaning, universal; metaphysical concept of universal; cognition, language and its process of functioning in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika framework and so forth) which were put forth naturally during the discussion of the focal point, are indeed appropriate in this discourse.

However, in the last chapter which has been entitled as 'Understanding Jāti (universal) in Nyāya linguistic operation' we have elaborated in accordance with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas view how Jāti plays its function as avachhedaka in sentential understanding and then went on with discussing the different concepts of avachhedaka itself. And while discussing different notion of avachhedaka we basically got to know about Avachhedaka as relation, avachhedaka as space, avachhedaka as time, also property or dharma can be regarded as avachhedaka. Now, as we have told earlier that dharma of a dharmi is of two kinds; one is the essential and primary dharma and other one is acquired or adventitious dharma. So with regard to considering avachhedaka as property or dharma two of these dharmas must be kept in mind same time. But the issue is when a dharmi possesses too many adventitious properties at the same there occurs ambiguity while trying to express the dharmi with all its properties through sentential understanding and to have successful linguistic communication. We already have illustrated about the ambiguity how it can be resolved in the last chapter. Being the essential and primary dharma of a dharmi only Jāti-dharma as avachhedaka of a dharmi can lead to a successful sentential understanding resolving the ambiguity.


In Navya-Nyāyas texts we find the definition of avachhedaka as ‘anyunatiriktavṛittitva’ which indicates a dharma that is ‘anyuna’(not too less or narrow) and at the same time ‘anatirikta’(not too more or wide) from the referred dharmi or the object of the cognition, rather it(the dharma) exactly indicates the dharmi or only resides in that Dharmi and not anywhere else. To give an example, if we are going to understand the dharmi or object of cognition ‘cow’ with its dharmas then there are many dharmas we can think of such as ‘prānitva’(animal-hood), ‘kapilatva’(kapil denotes the color which has two amalgamated color: yellow and blue), and also ‘gotva’(cow-hood). Now, ‘prānitva’ as a dharma resides in all other prānis(animals) as well apart from ‘gau’(cow) and in this sense it(the dharma prānitva) is too wide for the dharmi ‘cow’. Whereas, the dharma ‘kapilatva’ is too narrow for the dharmi ‘cow’ since apart from kapil(cows of a particular color) there are other cows of different colors also which this dharma ‘kapilatva’ does not cover. But when we are thinking of cow (gau) as that dharmi main dharma of which is ‘gotva’ (cow-hood) then this kind of difficulties do not occur in any instance since gotva(cow-hood) as dharma pervades the entire dharmi i.e. all the cows. And as we know ‘gotva’(cow-hood) is the jāti-dharma of cow, thus in the same way, all specific jāti-dharmas of specific dharmis being ‘anyunatiriktavṛitti’ dharma perform their function as avachhedaka (delimitor). Thus, it seems quite evident that considering avachhedaka as ‘anyunatiriktavṛitti’ is implied to considering jāti-dharma as avachhedaka (delimiting property) because it is none other dharma than jāti which does not extend more or less from its dharmi. We already have discussed the fundamental reason (i.e. some specific patterns of ambiguity) because of which Navya-Naiyāyikas has applied the concept of jāti as avachhedaka while

elucidating their neo techniques, notions and method of Nyāya language. Now, while going through the Navya Nyāya texts especially the renowned 18th century Navya-Nyāya text *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa* by Shri Mahesh Ch. Nyāyaratna it has been seen that there are mainly two patterns of ambiguity resolving of which this specific kind of avachhedaka i.e. avachhedaka as anyunavṛitti(or in other words avachhedaka as jāti-dharma) had been brought forward by the Navya-Naiyāyikas. So, let's see and elaborate a little on those two specific patterns of ambiguity in our next section of discussion.


In the first pattern, when an object has one or more contextual properties apart from its inherent property. In this case, delimitation occurs in one way only or in other words the contextual properties are delimited by the inherent property (avachhedaka as jāti-dharma) only. In the second pattern, an object, which resides in other object by a relation, has contextual properties apart from inherent property. Now, in this case delimitation of contextual properties of the object occurs in two way: one is by jāti-dharma and the other by that specific relation by which object resides in other locus. It will be more clear if it can be demonstrated with examples using diagrams.

To demonstrate the first pattern we can take this example 'Pot is the cause of bringing water'. In this case the dharmi 'pot' has 'pot-ness' as its inherent property and it possesses 'cause-ness' as its contextual property as well. So, 'cause-ness' is such a property which doesn't present in 'pot' all the time but it presents in pot occasionally just like all contextual properties occurs occasionally in the dharmi. And besides, 'cause-ness' can reside in other dharmis (apart from pot) as well. Hence, whenever one wants to refer any particular contextual property of a

dharmi or in this case cause-ness in a pot, then one should always specify the locus or the dharmi in which the contextual property resides at a particular context. And according to Navya Naiyāyikas' analysis of language this specification has been done with the help of avachhedaka as jāti-dharma. Jāti as the inherent property of the dharmi specifies or delimits the contextual property within a specific dharmi at one specific point of time or context. Just in this case, as soon as the inherent property of pot 'pot-ness delimits 'cause-ness', the contextual property, one successful and ambiguity free sentential understanding occurs as pot is the cause of bringing water. Let's check the diagram of it:



In the second pattern contextual property happens to be delimited by inherent property and relation both. We are taking the example as 'the pot which is on the floor is the cause for bringing water'. Let's demonstrate it using a diagram



Here in this above diagram as we can see the contextual property is being delimited by two avachhedakas; jāti-dharma as avachhedaka and Sambandha or samyoga-sambandha in this case as avachheda.

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