

**PURUṢACAITANYA REVISITED:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SĀṂKHYA
CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS**

**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (ARTS)**

**IN
PHILOSOPHY**

**BY
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aum sthāpakāya ca dharmasya sarvadharmasvarūpiṇe/

avatāravariṣṭhāya rāmakṛṣṇāya te namaḥ//

aum namaḥ śrībhagavate rāmakṛṣṇāya namo namaḥ/

aum namaḥ śrībhagavate rāmakṛṣṇāya namo namaḥ/

aum namaḥ śrībhagavate rāmakṛṣṇāya namo namaḥ//

Humblest offering to the holy spirit of my revered *mantra guru*

Śrīmat Svāmī Gītānandajī Mahārāja

Ramakrishna Math and Ramakrishna Mission

PREFACE

‘yadatra sauṣṭhavam kiñcit tad guroreva menahi/

yadatrāsauṣṭhavam kiñcit tanmaiva gurornahi//’

It is indeed due to the benevolent design of the Immanent Will that the Ph.D. research thesis entitled ‘*Puruṣacaitanya* Revisited: A Critical Study of the Sāṃkhya Concept of Consciousness’ could be completed successfully.

The Sāṃkhya philosophical system admits two distinct categories – the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, denoting consciousness and matter respectively. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is pure (*śuddha*), eternal (*nitya*), immutable (*apariṇāmī*), unrelated (*asambaddha*), not-bound (*kūṭastha*) etc. However, in the empirical realm we find *puruṣas* to be the knower, the enjoyer, the agent and the like, and hence, bound. Just like the other orthodox schools of philosophy in India, the Sāṃkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. Thus, the main contention of the Sāṃkhya philosophy is to explain the nature and the possibility of cognition and liberation in case of the *puruṣa* who is essentially of the opposite nature as experienced in the phenomenal realm. For instance, questions like, if *puruṣa* is essentially unbound, then how can we account for its propensity towards liberation, come up as intriguing issues of the subject matter. It is to be noted that such issues can render the entire tradition of Sāṃkhya philosophy as a *mokṣaśāstra*, questionable. Moreover, the issues concerning the possibility of

knowledge, enjoyment, agency *etc.* as related to consciousness pose to be matters of grave analysis and contemplation. Keeping that in mind the present research thesis has been prepared with an effort to delve deep into the above issues of significant academic concern and plausible responses have been provided as far as practicable in consonance with the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition. However, critiques against the Sāṃkhya positions have also been dealt with in order to provide a comprehensive and an exhaustive study of consciousness in the Sāṃkhya philosophy and in its competing traditions. The thesis in question has been prepared in connection to the partial fulfilment of the Ph.D. research programme at the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.

In preparing the current research write-up, the one whose unfathomable contribution and relentless effort stand undeniable is that of my revered professor and Ph.D. supervisor, Prof. Rupa Bandyopadhyay. Without her profound teachings, rigorous guidance and immense support, the thesis would not have seen the light of the day. I offer my humblest and deepest regards to her from the bottom of my heart. The clarity, authenticity, novelty if any and whatever might be considered as appreciable in this thesis is entirely due to my supervisor, Prof. Bandyopadhyay. Whatever flaws, vagueness, inauthenticity, incompetence that may have crept in, the onus is entirely on me.

I express my sincerest regards to all my teachers who have taught me at different levels of my institutional education and especially to all my

professors and the respective heads of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University who have opened up before me an entire horizon of profound philosophical thoughts at various strata of my academic interactions with them. Further I express my sincere gratitude to my teacher Prof. Proyash Sarkar, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University who has extended his kind cooperation and support on every occasion as regards the official matters and has provided extremely thought-provoking academic suggestions in the course of my research work. I also express my deep respect and fond regards to my teacher Prof. Maushumi Guha for her kind help in preparing the thesis.

I further express deep gratitude towards all the supporting staff of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University and especially to our librarian, Shri Bidyut Bihari Sarkar who has extended his unstinted help and cooperation at every single instance, whenever I have been in need of that. Furthermore, I am indebted to the Central Library, Jadavpur University for providing me with texts, references, journals *etc.* which have been of immense significance in the course of my learning and preparing the research thesis.

The empowering encouragement and the unwavering cooperation that I have received from my respected colleagues of the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling in the course of my research work requires special mention here. I express my deepest gratitude and personal regards to each one of them. I am specifically indebted to Prof. Raghunath Ghosh, Retired Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal and Prof. D. N. Tiwari, Department of Philosophy and

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I further express my gratefulness to the respective heads of the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal and the authorities of the University for providing me with immense support and cooperation as regards the official permissions and requisite matters as and when sought for, for the pursuance of my research work over the stipulated tenure. I am also grateful to the supporting staff, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal for their kind help as and when needed. I am further indebted to the University Library, University of North Bengal for providing me with the requisite books, journals, references *etc.* whenever I have been in need of those over the entire period of my research work and also to the University Grants Commission Special Assistance Programme, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal for regularly providing me with the financial assistance requisite for taking educational trips to various institutions for library purpose and procurement of original and rare texts, along with authentic references requisite for my research work.

I am especially indebted to Prof. Balaganapathi Devarakonda, Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, New Delhi for his unstinted help and kind permission in allowing me to make use of the library facilities of the University of Delhi and also for his immensely significant academic

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My students, M.Phil. research scholars, friends, well-wishers and innumerable individuals in my life-sphere who have contributed in various capacities in the pursuit of my research work are deeply loved and respected.

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Finally, I conclude by offering my Ph.D. research thesis as the humblest submission to the holyspirit of my *dikṣāguru* Śrīmat Svāmī Gītānandajī Mahārāja , Ramakrishna Math and Ramakrishna Mission.

Kolkata 700 025

Sincerely

Date:

Swagata Ghosh

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INTRODUCTION

The Sāṃkhya philosophy represents one of the oldest traditions in the Indian philosophical system. Analogous to the other orthodox schools of philosophy, the Sāṃkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. However, the uniqueness of the Sāṃkhya system lies in the nature of liberation as admitted by them and the means by which it can be attained. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, though liberation is identical with the absolute cessation of sufferings, it can only be attained by acquiring discriminatory knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. This is, however, a very preliminary manner of talking about the Sāṃkhya thesis but we would delve deeper into the depths of the subject and try to carry out an exhaustive study of the entire Sāṃkhya *śāstra* in the course of our present research work.

In order to state the layout and the course of study followed in the construction of the thesis it is important to put forward at the very outset a brief outline of the structure of the thesis before entering into the discussion of the core subject matter. It is as follows –

The thesis consists of the following parts and its component chapters:

Introduction: Here in the introduction, we primarily aim at specifying the objective of the research work along with the clarification of certain basic

notions of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition, required to delve into the study of the concerned subject matter.

Part I: It concentrates mainly on the nature of *puruṣa* and examines the arguments for establishing the doctrine of *puruṣa* (*puruṣasiddhi*).

- **Chapter 1** – The first chapter includes discussions on the nature and definition of *puruṣa*.
- **Chapter 2** - In this chapter a critical analysis of the arguments for the existence of *puruṣa* as put forward by the Sāṃkhya philosophers have been carried out.
- **Chapter 3** – The third chapter elucidates the doctrine of the multiplicity of *puruṣa* and examines the issues related to it.

Part II: This part focuses on the phenomenon of knowledge - how knowledge is produced, issues related to *puruṣābobodha*, *pramāṇa*, veracity of *pramāṇa* (*prāmāṇya*) etc.

- **Chapter 4** - In the fourth chapter detailed discussion on the number of *pramāṇas*, their definition, veracity etc. has been done.
- **Chapter 5** - Critical examination of the concept of *puruṣābobodha* in the concerned philosophical system along with the debates

between the classical and neo traditions has been carried out in the fifth chapter.

Part III: We know that the *prakṛti* is conceived of as evolving for the benefit of *puruṣā*, either its enjoyment or its liberation; yet *puruṣa* is not conceived of as the doer or the agent in the present system. This leads to a split between the concepts of the doer and the enjoyer. So it has been analysed that how far and whether at all *puruṣa* can be considered as the enjoyer. Accordingly, the concepts of bondage and liberation too have been re-examined.

- **Chapter 6** - The sixth chapter analyses and explicates the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* based on which the entire creation comes into being.
- **Chapter 7** - The issues of bondage and liberation in the light of the new findings from the previous chapters have been revisited and reviewed in the seventh chapter.

Part IV: We know that the Advaita Vedāntins pose to be the severest critics of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition. The Advaitins have tried to refute the Sāṃkhya position from quite a few perspectives. Again the Sāṃkhya philosophers too have put forward a number of objections against the Advaita Vedānta thesis, and that is why they are considered as the main opponents (*pradhānamalla*) of the Advaita tradition.

- **Chapter 8** – The final chapter of the thesis deals with the debate between the Advaita Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya philosophical traditions regarding issues on the nature of consciousness, the possibility of its bondage and liberation and also the theories concerning the creation of the world, that is, *prakṛtikāraṇatāvāda* and *brahmakāraṇatāvāda*.

Conclusion: The entire research findings, their critical evaluation, how far the objective of the work has been achieved and what new avenues have opened up in the course of the study have been comprehensively stated in the concluding chapter.

On clarifying the format of study and its presentation in the thesis, let us now delve into the discussion of the actual thesis primarily following the classical Sāṃkhya tradition. In *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, at the very beginning of the *śāstra*, we find the following invocation, - ‘*ajāmekam lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvī prajāḥ sṛjamānām namāmaḥ/ ajā ye tām juṣamāṇām bhajante jahatyenām bhuktabhogām numastān*’¹. This is an adaptation from the following verse of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, - ‘*ajāmekam lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvī prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ/ ajo hyeko juṣamāṇo ’anuśete jahātyenām bhuktabhogāmajo ’anyaḥ*’².

Vācaspati Miśra utters the above verse as an invocation to his text in consonance with the hymns from the *Upaniṣad*, and it establishes the fact that the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition is an orthodox system because the main

tenets of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are in consonance with the *Vedas*. The first verse offers salutations to the basic material principle (*tattva*) – *prakṛti*. It describes its essence as eternal, one and consisting of three qualities (*guṇa*) – *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* as indicated by the terms *śukla*, *lohita* and *kṛṣṇa* respectively. Now the second half of the first verse talks of the various evolutes of *prakṛti* and it indicates the fact that primordial *prakṛti* can only be inferred through its evolutes. In the second half of the first verse Vācaspati Miśra salutes the many *puruṣas*, the other basic principle of the Sāṃkhya philosophical system, and at the same time it expresses the essential nature of *puruṣa* as eternal. However, the verse interestingly indicates that consciousness in its purest form is one, but when delimited by a body, though apparently, appears to be many. They are termed as *baddha* or *samsārī* *puruṣas*. Vācaspati Miśra says that both the bound and the eternally free *puruṣas* should be held with regard. This is because pure consciousness is evidently the state we strive to attain, and thus it is a matter of the highest regard; on the other hand, the bound beings help *prakṛti* fulfil its ultimate end of serving the needs of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Moreover, bound beings are also essentially pure, since, the embodied consciousness is nothing but a reflection of the pure, absolute consciousness. Hence, both are to be held with utmost regard. Another important feature of the invocatory verse is that it shows reverence towards the basic principles of the Sāṃkhya philosophical system, but there is no mention of God. Thus, it indicates that the Sāṃkhya philosophy is an orthodox system, but it does not admit God as a separate category.

Now we all know that the attainment of the absolute cessation of sufferings is the highest end (*paramapurusārtha*) of human existence. So it is necessary to enquire into the means of attainment of such end. Īśvarakṛṣṇa addresses this problem in the first verse (*kārikā*), as follows – ‘*duḥkhatrayābhighātāt jijñāsā tadapaghātake hetaul dr̥ṣṭe sā’pārthā cennaikāntātyanto ’bhāvāt*’³.

In this verse, we find the term ‘*duḥkhatrayābhighātāt*’, which suggests a probans (*hetu*) because of being in the fifth case ending. Now establishing a fact with the help of probans involves an inferential method. The inference in the present case may be stated as – ‘*duḥkhāpaghātakahetuḥ jijñāsāvān (jijñāsāviṣayaḥ) duḥkhatrayābhighātāt dharmavat*’⁴. In the above inference we find that the locus (*pakṣa*) is the means of eradication of sufferings, and that in turn constitutes the essential content of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*. The probandum is the enquiry (*jijñāsā*) about such means and *duḥkhatrayābhighātātva* is the probans. This, however, is not acceptable because it involves the fallacy called *svarūpāsiddhi*. When the probans is not located in the locus, then such fallacy occurs. Here the probans refers to that which is afflicted by the three-fold sufferings; whereas the locus indicates the conditions for eradication of the three-fold sufferings. Evidently, the probans cannot reside in the locus in such a case. Hence, the revised interpretation of the probans and that of the inference as such is that the probans should be read as ‘*duḥkhatrayābhighātavat puruṣaprayojanasādhakatvāt*’⁵. Accordingly, the

inference means that which serves the necessity of the individual afflicted by the three-fold sufferings, that itself becomes a matter of enquiry, like, *dharma*.

Now Vācaspati Miśra raises an objection that before analysing whether at all there is the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi* or not, we must first look into the fact that the probans itself might face quite a few challenges as regards its plausibility. That in turn would lead to the fallacy of *sāadhanāprasiddhi*, and in such case, the question of forming an inference would not be possible at all. Now according to Vācaspati Miśra, the challenges might be as follows⁶ -

i) ‘*yadi duḥkham nāma jagati na syāt*’. That is, if there be no such thing as suffering in the world, then no individual would have any inclination to study the *śāstra* which establishes the means of eradication of sufferings.

ii) ‘*sad vā na jihāsitam*’. It might be so, there are sufferings, yet no one wants to get rid of it. Even in such cases the probandum cannot be established. That is, enquiry into the means of eradication of sufferings as stated by the *śāstra* would not be a matter of concern. In both the cases, we would find the fallacy of *sāadhanāprasiddhi*.

iii) ‘*jihāsitam vā aśakyasamucchedam*’. Again it may be claimed that even though there are sufferings, they are despised by all, yet their eradication is impossible. In such cases as well none would be inclined to study the *śāstra*. It is as if a doctor treats a headache, where there is no head at all, ‘*śiro nāsti śiraḥ pīḍā*’. Or even better, everyone knows that it is impossible to bring down

the moon on the surface of the earth. So however one might desire such an absurd thing, no one strives for it. Similarly, if it is impossible to uproot pain and sufferings, none would be interested in the subject matter of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*. Thus, again the above inference would be a case of *sāadhanāprasiddhi doṣa*.

iv) It may further be argued that if sufferings are eternal, like that of the self or consciousness, even then eradication of pain would be impossible. On the other hand, it might also be so that the exact means of eradication of sufferings is not known to anyone. In either of the cases, the inference in question fails because of the same reason.

v) One can further stretch the argument to the point that what is mentioned in the *śāstra* is not the correct means of removal of pain. In that case too one would not enquire into such futile means.

vi) Finally, one may claim that there are easier and more readily available means of eradication of sufferings, rather than as suggested by the *śāstra*. Since, the means dictated by the *śāstra* involve a lot of time, diligence and patience for complete eradication of sufferings, one might be lured by easier means, if they are capable of reaping the same result. Even then intelligent beings would not be interested any more in the teachings of the *śāstra*. Analogically, it may be said that a thirsty person would go to the nearest waterbody to quench his thirst, rather than dig up a well to procure water. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra states in his commentary (*tīkā*) that if we want

to establish the efficacy of Sāṃkhya *śāstra* and provide it with a strong foundation, then the above apprehensions should be taken care of at the very outset. This would free the inference in question from all possible fallacies and thus, Sāṃkhya philosophy could be studied with utmost care and regard.

In response to the first two apprehensions, Īśvarakṛṣṇa mentions the term ‘*duḥkhatrayābhighātāt*’ in the *kārikā*. The term indicates ‘*tatra na tāvad duḥkham nāsti nāpi ajihāsitam*’⁷. It refers to the fact that there may be doubt and uncertainties about the existence of many objects or entities, but one cannot question or deny the existence of sufferings. It is because the existence of sufferings is experienced by all in this entire world and there is not a single individual who does not want to get rid of sufferings. With respect to that Vācaspati Miśra further puts forward the categorizations of sufferings – ‘*duḥkhānām trayam duḥkhatrayam*’⁸. It indicates that all kinds of sufferings as experienced by human beings may be of three broad kinds – *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhāvika* and *ādhibhautika*. *Ādhyātmika duḥkha* is again of two types – physical (*śārīra*) and mental (*mānasa*). It is to be noted here that the term ‘*ātmā*’ indicated in the above categorization of sufferings do not refer to the self or consciousness. This is because in Sāṃkhya philosophy, the self or the pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) can never be essentially afflicted by pain or sufferings. So the said term only refers to the body and mind in this case. However, another interesting point is that sufferings are always a matter of mental experience; then what can be the logical ground for admitting a sub-categorization of pain as physical and mental? The plausible answer is mental

sufferings are those towards which no other conditions or factors are involved. They originate from the mental conditions alone (*manomātrajanya*). On the other hand, the physical sufferings are caused due to the imbalance of air (*vāyu*), bile (*pitta*) and cough (*śleṣmā*) in the body. These are called *vyādhi*. The mental sufferings, namely *ādhi*, are caused due to desires, anger, greed, delusion, fear, envy, depression and non-attainment of an aspired object or entity. However, both the above types of pain are caused internally, that is, without the influence of factors which are external to the mind-body complex. Hence, they are referred to as *ādhyātmika duḥkha*.

Now the other two broad classes of sufferings, namely *ādhidaivika* and *ādhibhautika*, are primarily caused by external conditions. Though *adrṣṭa* or *adharma*, that is, the results of one's own actions may be a cause towards such sufferings, yet there are direct causes as well, like, animals, natural elements or other human beings who are responsible for the other individual's sufferings. The term '*bhūta*' in case of *ādhibhautika duḥkha* refers to the *jaṅgama padārthas*, which here specifically means human beings, and in some cases, other animals as well. The *ādhidaivika duḥkha* is brought about by certain supernatural beings or classes of beings who are somewhat hierarchically placed than ordinary human beings. They may be the *apsarā*, *yakṣa*, *gandharva* and others; or they may be demons, spirits *etc.* as well who are radically different from human beings. The *ādhidaivika duḥkha* also include sufferings caused by natural catastrophe and calamities like, floods, excessive or no rainfall, meteorite showers *etc.* Thus, any kind of sufferings

which are either naturally caused or are due to evil spirits *etc.* are referred to as *ādhidaivika duḥkha*. However, some philosophers consider the sufferings caused due to natural calamities to be forms of *ādhibhautika duḥkha* as well.

Vācaspati Miśra, after carrying out a detailed discussion on the classification of sufferings, proceeds to establish the ontic status of sufferings. He states in the commentary, – ‘*tadetat pratyātmavedanīyaṁ duḥkhaṁ rajaḥpariṇāmabhedo na śakyate pratyākhyātum*’⁹. The experience of pain is a universal one. There cannot be and there is no individual who has not experienced sufferings in any form in one’s lifetime. Thus, the existence of pain is evidently perceptible to all. However, one might argue that pain is not a matter of universal experience, since, the Sāṃkhya philosophers themselves have not admitted pain among their enlisted twenty five principles. In response, Vācaspati Miśra mentions, – ‘*rajaḥpariṇāmabhedah*’¹⁰. It indicates that sufferings are nothing but a modification (*pariṇāma*) of the *rajaḥ guṇa* itself. For instance, desire, greed, anger *etc.* are nothing but forms of the *rajas*. Thus, the admission of the *rajaḥ guṇa* itself suffices for the inclusion of sufferings in it. The entire creation being nothing but a manifestation of the *prakṛti*, constituted of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, is inevitably related to each and every individual being in some form or the other. Hence, none can deny the existence or the experience of sufferings in their lives.

Now an interesting contrast with the Nyāya philosophy could be advanced here. In the commentary, it has been mentioned that sufferings are ‘*pratyātmavedanīya*’¹¹. From this term, one must not consider the locus of the

sufferings to be the self or *ātman*. In Nyāya philosophy, we find that the sufferings are located in the self (*ātmavṛtti*). However, in the Sāṃkhya system we find that the sufferings are a modification of and are located in the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*). Such modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, the three-fold sufferings get apparently related to the delimited consciousness in the body. It is being termed as ‘*abhighāta*’ or ‘*abhisambandha*’¹², which means the consciousness which is reflected on the modified internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*), the modifications or properties of the *antaḥkaraṇa* are also reflected on the reflected consciousness itself. Hence, they appear to be related to the consciousness, whereas in reality they are there in the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself. Thus, due to such relation, though purely apparent, the experience of sufferings and consequently, the effort to get rid of these, are observed in the individual. So the experience of pain and the feelings of aversion associated with it brings about the natural enquiries in human beings regarding its means of removal.

At this juncture another intriguing question that comes up is that the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not admit the production or destruction of any object. Then how can we achieve the aim of removal of sufferings? According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, creation means the manifestation of that which is present in a subtle form in the ingredient or the material cause, in a gross form. Again destruction means the reverting back of an object from its gross existence to its subtle form. The Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that sufferings are always existent in a subtle manner in its material cause, that is, the

buddhitattva. However, during that period it is neither knowable nor experienced. It is only when it expresses itself in the gross form, it becomes a matter of experience of the beings. This then indicates that there can neither be any prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) nor complete destruction (*vināśa*) of sufferings. Vācaspati Miśra expresses this position in his commentary (*tīkā*) as – ‘*yadyapi na sannirudhyate duḥkham*’¹³. Then the question remains that how can we attain the eradication of sufferings, which is precisely the aim of individual beings. We find the response to the above in the following form in Sāṃkhya philosophy. Destruction, in Sāṃkhya philosophy, is termed as ‘*abhibhava*’ which means nothing but the attainment of the subtle form from the gross form. Thus, it is possible to get rid of sufferings by forever reducing it to its subtle form (*duḥkhābhibhava*). Hence, it is also proved that there are sufferings, sufferings are matters of unpleasant experiences and are encountered by all, and sufferings are not such which can never be removed. Sufferings, even if they cannot be annihilated, they can be made to remain in the subtle form forever with the production of the right kind of knowledge. The above stance further shows that the probans in the previously mentioned inference is free from fallacies, and thus, Vācaspati Miśra states that – ‘*tasmādupapannam tadabhighātake hetau (jijñāsā) iti*’¹⁴. That is, in order to get rid of sufferings, one would certainly be inclined to study the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, as that can only provide the means to right cognition.

In spite of the above analysis, it however, remains a matter of further enquiry that since the empirical means of removal of sufferings are readily

available and are easy to adopt, then what can really be the ground for pertaining to scriptural means which are extremely arduous to perform and practise. The scriptural dictates are necessarily related to extreme forms of difficulties (*balavadaniṣṭānubandhī*); whereas, the empirical means are devoid of any relation to such extreme difficulties (*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhī*)¹⁵. Now such being the radical differences between the two kinds of means of removal of sufferings, can it really be meaningful to adopt the scriptural means?

In response Vācaspati Miśra states that Īśvarakṛṣṇa refutes such objection by saying - ‘*na iti*’. It means that even if there are easy and pleasant means of eradicating pain, yet the scriptural means cannot be denied. This is because the worldly means can never provide absolute cessation of sufferings. Any intelligent individual would strive to attain such cessation of sufferings which would be inevitable (*avaśyambhāva* or *aikāntika*) and that which would never be repeated (*ātyantika*). Now such cessation of sufferings is never attainable by empirical means; since, those means are not strong enough to prevent the recurrence of sufferings. Hence, prudent individuals would always adopt such paths which would lead them to their desired end. That is, adopting scriptural means, as stated in the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, would provide us with absolute cessation of sufferings.

In the second *kārikā*, we further find that even the means stated by the *Vedas* are similar to the empirical methods of pain eradication; that is, they cannot bring about absolute cessation of sufferings. There are various

sacrifices, rites and rituals mentioned in the *Vedas* which help to fulfil the different kinds of desires of beings, and thus, remove sufferings. These include sacrifices like *jyotiṣṭoma*, *aśvamedha*, *viśvajita*, *agnihotra* etc. which fulfil the purposes of attaining *svarga*, victory over enemies, acquiring huge areas of land and thus widening the territory of the kingdom etc. All these apparently are responsible for removal of sufferings, as they bring about immense pleasure as their respective consequences. However, the question remains that whether such freedom from sufferings is eternal or not; that is, whether ends like *svarga* can provide absolute cessation of sufferings or not. According to Vācaspati Miśra, - ‘*duḥkhavirodhī sukhaviśeṣaśca svargaḥ*’¹⁶. That is, *svarga* involves that state of pleasure which is not only unstinted by sufferings, rather it is contradictory to sufferings. Further, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa states that – ‘*yā prītiḥ niratiśayā, anubhavitavyā sā cā uṣṇāśītādidvandvarahite deśe śakyā anubhavitum/ asmin ca deśe muhūrtaśatabhāgaḥ api dvandvai na mucyate/ tasmāt niratiśaya-prītyanubhavāya kalpyaḥ viśiṣṭa deśaḥ*’¹⁷. It means that the unstinted and the extreme pleasure (*niratiśaya prīti*) which is to be enjoyed, can only be experienced in a place which is devoid of clashes and contradictions. In the empirical world we can never find such a place which is free from contradictions, even momentarily. Thus, the unstinted pleasure called *svarga* can only be experienced at a particular place, that is, the abode of the deities (*devaloka*)¹⁸, though it is to be noted that traditionally heaven is accepted by most philosophers as a state and not as a place, - ‘*yanna duḥkhena sambhinnaṁ na ca grastamanantaram/ abhilāṣopanītaṁ ca tatsukhaṁ svaḥpadāspadam*’¹⁹.

There is a section of the Mīmāṃsā system called the Karmavādī Mīmāṃsakas who admit heavenly bliss or *svargasukha* to be the highest end of human life. Reference to the views of these philosophers may be found in the following verses of the second chapter of *Śrīmadbhagvadgītā* –

*‘yāmimām puṣpitām vācam pravadyavipaścitaḥ/ vedavādaratāḥ
pārtha nānyadastītivādinaḥ//*²⁰

*kāmātmānaḥ svargaparā janmakarmaphalapradām/
kriyāviśeṣavahulām bhogaiśvaryagatim prati//*²¹

*bhogaiśvaryaprasaktānām tayāpahṛta cetasām/ vyavasāyātmikā
buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhīyate//*²²

However, the mainstream schools of the Mīmāṃsā system, such as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā school, do not admit this view of the Karmavādī Mīmāṃsakas. The Sāṃkhya philosophers also do not consider heaven to be eternal. The Karmavādī Mīmāṃsakas establish the eternal character of the heavenly bliss on the basis of the scriptural statement – ‘*apāma somamṛtā abhūma*’²³.

The philosophers who do not admit the eternal character of heavenly bliss establish their thesis on the basis of both inference and scriptural statements. The inference which they employ to establish their thesis is as follows – ‘*vimataḥ svargaḥ anityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat*’.

The Karmavādī Mīmāṃsakas might argue that this inference is not capable of establishing the non-eternal character of heavenly pleasure. The eternal character of heavenly pleasure is established by the scriptures themselves. It is said in the scriptures - ‘*apāma somamṛtā abhūma*’. In this statement it is said that the deities (*devatā/deva*) performed the Vedic rite called *soma yāga* and drank the extracts of the creeper *soma*, and as a result of which they attained the status called *amṛtatva*. Now the term ‘*amṛta*’ etymologically means deathlessness or going beyond death. Thus, the deities went beyond death or transcended death by performing this rite and became eternal. Since the deities are eternal, the heavenly bliss or heavenly pleasure enjoyed by them is also eternal. This scriptural statement overrides the inference by which other philosophers have tried to establish the non-eternal character of heavenly pleasure.

Against this argument of the Karmavādī Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya philosophers would point out that whenever there is a conflict or contradiction between a scriptural statement on one hand and some other valid epistemic instrument (*pramāṇa*) on the other, it cannot always be said that the scriptural statement is stronger than the other instruments. For, a perceptual cognition and an inference cannot establish its object in any way other than it actually does. Now if the scriptural statement is always considered as stronger than the other epistemic instruments, then one would have to forego or give up some other valid epistemic instrument, such as a veridical perception or a valid inference. However, if the validity of valid epistemic instruments is denied,

then the entire epistemology will lose its trustworthiness. For this reason, no orthodox Indian philosopher places any kind of blind trust or credence upon a scriptural statement, whenever there is any conflict between the scriptures and other epistemic instruments. Rather the classical Indian philosophers evaluate the relative strength and weakness of each epistemic instrument and only such assessment of relative strength can determine whether a particular epistemic instrument can override another.

To prove the eternal character of heavenly pleasure, the Sāṃkhya philosophers employ the Mīmāṃsā *nyāya* called *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya*. The Mīmāṃsā *nyāyas* are techniques evolved by the Mīmāṃsā system to interpret the scriptural statements. The *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya* states that whenever there is a conflict between two rules or two scriptural statements of which one has a greater or a wider scope than the other, the rule or the statement with lesser scope should be considered as stronger than the rule or the statement having the wider scope. For, if the rule or the statement having the wider scope (*sāvakāśaśruti/ sāvakāśaniyama*) is considered as stronger then the statement or the rule having the smaller scope would have no scope at all. In that case the rule or the scriptural statement having the smaller scope would not have any application at all, and hence, could not be regarded as a veracious statement or rule. The matter is clarified by the Sāṃkhya philosophers by referring to another employment of this *nyāya*. For instance, the scriptural statements – ‘*na himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*’ and ‘*agniṣomīyaṃ paśumālabheta*’ contradict one another. This is because the former statement

forbids violence towards any organism, whereas the second prescribes animal sacrifice for appeasing the deities *agni* and *soma*. Here the former statement obviously has a wider scope than the latter. Now if the statement with the wider scope, that is, the first statement - '*na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*', is considered as stronger than the latter statement, then the latter would not be applied at all. Hence, it cannot be treated as a *pramāṇa* or as a source of veridical cognition. Now if the validity of one Vedic statement is denied, then the entire *Vedas* might lose their acceptability. For this reason, the statement with the smaller scope, that is, the *niravakāśa* statement is considered as stronger than the statement having a wider scope. In that case, the latter statement would mean what it literally means, but the significance of the former statement would have to be restricted in conformity with the significance of the latter statement. Thus, the former statement would mean that violence is forbidden in all other cases, except in case of sacrifice. When so interpreted, neither of the two statements would lose their validity and the veracity of the entire *Vedas* also will not be subjected to doubt. Similarly, whenever a valid inference clashes with any scriptural statement, the inference is considered as having a smaller scope than the scriptural statement, because an inference establishes its probandum in the locus of the inference in a particular manner and it cannot establish the probandum in any other form. On the contrary, a scriptural statement being a linguistic entity can be interpreted in many different ways. So the scope of a scriptural statement is always greater than a veridical perception or a valid inference. For this reason, whenever a veridical perception or a valid inference comes into conflict with a scriptural

statement, the scriptural statement is interpreted in accordance with the perception or the inference. The inference which demonstrates the non-eternal character of heavenly pleasure is a valid one. So the validity of this inference cannot be denied. Hence, the term ‘*amṛta*’ occurring in the statement ‘*apāma somamṛtā abhūma*’ must carry some other sense. In fact, this other meaning is indicated by another scriptural statement in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, - ‘*ābhūtasamplavasthānamamṛtatvaṁ hi gīyate*’. This statement clearly states that the heavenly bliss lasts till the destruction of a particular creation. So compared to ordinary pleasures, heavenly bliss or heavenly pleasure lasts for a long time, but it is not everlasting or eternal. That is why, the *ānuśravika upāyas* are vitiated by the defect (*kṣaya*) or destructibility. It is to be noted here that Īśvarakṛṣṇa or the Sāṃkhya philosophers are not talking about the destructibility of the means. This is because a Vedic rite being an action is obviously of a particular duration. So Īśvarakṛṣṇa here, is talking about the destructibility or the non-eternal character of the end which is attained through these Vedic rites, and this end is nothing but heavenly pleasure. Since, the end attained through the Vedic means may be destroyed, the Vedic means are at par with the ordinary means of overcoming sufferings, such as medicines *etc.*

Now there remains an apprehension that due to the presence of the causes of sufferings, one might be afflicted by pain even after the attainment of *svarga*. In that case, the attainment of *svarga* might not be the desired end of the individual. To resolve such discomfort, Vācaspati Miśra says that – ‘*sa ca svasattayā samūlaghātam apahanti duḥkham*’²⁴. That is, *svarga* is that kind

of pleasure which is not only contradictory to sufferings, rather it destroys all kinds of pain which are impediment to it. Furthermore, it also eradicates all the causes of sufferings, including the root cause *adṛṣṭa*. He further claims that *svarga* is not something which would erode after a point of time (*‘na ca eṣa kṣayī’*)²⁵. However, the opponents might argue that *svarga* being the result of Vedic sacrifices, is a positive entity which is produced, and hence, it cannot be eternal. This is expressed as – *‘svargah kṣayī utpattimatbhāvapadārthatvāt aihikasukhavat (ghaṭapaṭādivat)’*²⁶. In refutation of the above, the Vedic tenet (*śrutivākya*) which has been cited is – *‘apāma somam amṛtā abhuma’*, which means that one who drinks the *soma*, that is, the person performing the Vedic sacrifice attains *amṛtatva*, meaning that the individual transcends death. This further establishes that whatever is produced as a result of the sacrifice, that is indestructible (*amṛta*). Thus, from the above standpoint the advocates of the Vedic means of pain eradication argue that the method of attaining discriminatory cognition (*vivekajñāna*) as held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, is extremely difficult to achieve, as it requires the effort and care on the part of the individual over multiple lives. In contrast to that the Vedic means are easier and involve much less effort as regards the performance of the sacrifices. Thus, one should adopt the Vedic means of rites and rituals in order to remove sufferings.

In response to the entire above discussion and the objection raised thereafter, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states the second *Sāṃkhyakārikā* as follows -

*‘dr̥ṣṭavadānuśravikaḥ sa aviśuddhikṣayaātīśayayuktaḥ/ tadviparītaḥ śreyān
vyaktāvyaktajñaviññānāt/’*²⁷.

The Vedic means are similar to the empirical means in terms of the fact that the Vedic sacrifices too are not capable of providing absolute emancipation from sufferings. The term ‘*ānuśravika*’ refers to the Vedic means, that is, it refers to that kind of knowledge which can be known after listening to the Vedic tenets from the teacher (*‘gurupāṭhāt anuśrūyate’*). However, the knowledge attained thereby, that is, the cognition of the Vedic sacrifices, is analogous to the empirical means of pain removal as they are neither inevitable (*na aikāntika*) nor can they assure the non-recurrence of sufferings (*na ātyantika*). Now one might argue that the notion of the discriminatory knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is also obtained from the *Vedas*, that is, it is also *ānuśravika*. Hence, similar to the other means which are *ānuśravika* in nature, *vivekajñāna* too cannot ensure the absolute cessation of sufferings. In response to the above apprehension, it is stated that ‘*yadyapi ca*’ etc. The following inference shows the inefficacy of the Vedic means – ‘*vaidikaḥ upāyaḥ dr̥ṣṭatulyaḥ na aikāntikātyantika duḥkhatrayapratikāropāyaḥ aviśuddhiyuktatvāt kṣayayuktatvāt atīśayayuktatvāt ca*’²⁸. That is, the *ānuśravika upāyas* or the Vedic means are at par with the ordinary means of alleviating sufferings, because the Vedic means are vitiated by three defects, namely, *aviśuddhi*, *kṣaya* and *atīśaya*.

In the above inference the locus is *vaidika upāya* and the probandum is *dr̥ṣṭatulyatva*, that is, *aikāntikātyantikaduḥkhatrayapratikāropāyatvābhāva*. Now the locus being *vaidika upāya*, whatever is known by the Vedic means, - the sacrifices as well as *vivekajñāna*, all get included in the *pakṣa*. Thus, the afore-mentioned apprehension gets revoked. However, an inference can only establish a probandum if it is free from fallacies. If we consider *vivekajñāna* to be included in the *pakṣa* then due to the absence of the probandum in the locus, that is, in *vivekajñāna*, the inference would consist of the fallacy of *bādha*. Hence, *vivekajñāna* cannot be considered to be a part of the *pakṣa*. Further, Vācaspati Miśra endorses the above position by stating that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has mentioned the term ‘*ānuśravika*’ in the *kārikā* to refer to the Vedic rites and rituals only. Though it is true that *vivekajñāna* is *ānuśravika* too, yet there are Vedic sentences like, ‘*ātmā vā*’are *draṣṭavyaḥ*’²⁹, which according to Vācaspati Miśra, should be interpreted as ‘*prakṛtitaḥ vivekatavyaḥ*’³⁰, and it means that the self or the consciousness is to be perceived as radically different from *prakṛti*. Once such perception is produced and is practiced over ages and through multiple lives of an individual, sufferings are eradicated in such manner that they can never recur (‘*na sa punarāvartate*’³¹).

Further, it is also to be noted that the probanses used in the inference are not to be found in the locus if *vivekajñāna* is included in it. The probans *aviśuddhiyuktatva* indicates the production of sin (*pratyavāya*) and the consequent sufferings which are produced due to the violence committed

against animals which are sacrificed in the Vedic rites. Thus, the Vedic sacrificial rites and acts involve impurity or are inflicted with sufferings due to the violent actions performed against animals. Moreover, pleasure of the form of *svarga* is bound to erode after a certain point of time, and it can be proved by the following inference – ‘*svargādikam kṣayi sattve sati kāryatvāt*’³². That is, *svarga* being a positive entity (*sattvaviśiṣṭa*) and is something which is produced (*kārya*), just like a pot, is bound to be destroyed at some point or the other. Furthermore, the results of the Vedic sacrifices vary in their quality and status. For instance, the *jyotiṣṭomayāga* merely yields the attainment of *svarga*, whereas sacrifices like, *vājapeya* helps to attain the lordship of *svarga*. Thus, there are variations in the degree and nature of the pleasure attainable through Vedic sacrifices. That is why *svarga* is attributed as *atiśaya*, like the worldly means. Evidently, such is never the case with *vivekajñāna*. It is devoid of and is essentially radically different from the above three features as we find in case of empirical pleasures and that of the form of *svarga*. Hence, Īśvarakṛṣṇa claims that the discriminatory cognition between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is more fundamental and most efficacious in terms of eradication of sufferings. The Vedic means might often bring about tremendous sufferings too in the form of *narakabhoga* due to the sin incurred by performing certain sacrifices like, *śyena*. Moreover, the sacrifices themselves are, in some way or the other, afflicted with some amount of sufferings, in spite of the fact that they produce immense pleasure by fulfilling the desired ends. However, this is never the case with *vivekajñāna*, or more specifically, *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*. Thus, Īśvarakṛṣṇa considers it to be the

most convincing and the most appropriate (*śreyān*) means of eradication of sufferings.

Now the question arises that how can one attain such cognition, or where from such cognition arises (*‘kutaḥ punaḥ asya utpattiḥ?’*³³). In response to the above, it is stated in the *kārikā*, - *‘vyaktāvyaktajñaviññānāt’*, meaning that the distinctive knowledge of the *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* is responsible for the emancipation of beings from sufferings of all kinds. Here *vyakta* refers to the worldly objects, that is, the evolutes of *prakṛti*, *avyakta* refers to the primordial *prakṛti*, that is, the original material cause and *jñā* indicates the only sentient principle – the *puruṣa*. Here one might ask that chronologically speaking, the cause should be mentioned first and then the effect. However, here we find the reverse order in case of the term *‘vyaktāvyaktajñā’*. So what can be the significance, if any, of the above order? It is important to note here that the evolutes of *prakṛti* (*vyakta*) are known through perception whereas, primordial *prakṛti* (*avyakta*) is knowable only through inference, based on the cognition of the evolutes. Further, both the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* possess the common property of serving the purpose of the other (*paraprayojanasādhakatva*), and from that notion the *puruṣa* or the consciousness is known as that ‘other’. Thus, the above order depicts the chronology in which the respective cognitions are produced. Furthermore, it is also significant to observe that the above phrase shows that the cognitions of the *puruṣa* and the *avyakta*, more specifically *sattva*, are the causes of the discriminatory cognition (*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*), and not that of *vyakta*;

but without the cognition of the *vyakta*, the *avyakta* cannot be known. Hence, the cognition of the *vyakta* has been mentioned first; and it is to be kept in mind that the above term ‘*sattva*’ is not only indicative of the *guṇa* itself, rather it indicates the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, the *buddhi* too. Thus, the efficacy and the most convincing approach to the emancipation from sufferings lies in the fact that the above principles (*tattvas*) should be known distinctly and their knowledge should be reaffirmed by applying the logical arguments as propounded in the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Further, the cognition thus attained is to be practised and meditated upon for ages and over multiple lives with utmost care, dedication and effort; then only one can achieve the *vivekajñāna* in the perfect form, and be truly emancipated from all kinds of sufferings.

The necessity, significance and the inevitable efficacy of Sāṃkhya *śāstra* being thus established, we now move on to study the twenty-five principles and their categorizations as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy. The third *kārikā* states that - ‘*mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛtivyikṛtayaḥ sapta/ śoḍaśakastu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ*’³⁴.

The twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy are divided into four broad categories based on their characteristic features, and the divisions are such that they themselves are distinguished from the others. In Vācaspati Miśra’s words – ‘*saṃkṣepato hi śāstrārthasya catasro vidhāḥ*’³⁵. The term ‘*vidhā*’ here indicates that the divisions are characterised by mutually exclusive properties. The four categories are – *prakṛti*, *prakṛti-*

vikṛti, *kevalavikṛti* and *anubhaya* (*na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ*). Now let us discuss each of these categories individually.

To ascertain the nature of *prakṛti* it is said that ‘*mūlaprakṛtiḥ avikṛtiḥ*’. Etymologically, *prakṛti* can be defined as ‘*prakaroti yā sā prakṛtiḥ*’³⁶ which means that, that which creates in the perfect manner. It is always the creator or the cause of creation, but it is itself uncaused. It consists of agency (*karṭṛtvaviśiṣṭa*) and is not the object (*karmatvāviśiṣṭa*). It is also termed as the *pradhāna*, meaning the primary or the primordial original cause. The essential nature of *prakṛti* is ‘*sattvarajastamasām sāmyāvasthā*’³⁷. That is, the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* constitute the *prakṛti*, and it is due to their equilibrium that the state is referred to as *avikṛti* or *mūlaprakṛti*. It is so called because it acts as the root cause of the world which is an effect (*kārya*) of the heterogeneous transformation (*virūpapariṇāma*) of the three *guṇas* and is such that it serves the purpose of the others (*saṃghātarūpa*). However, the *mūlaprakṛti* is itself uncaused, that is, it does not have any further root cause. It is uncreated (*akṛta*). Rather trying to determine the root of the root-cause itself would only lead to an infinite regress, and there are no supporting views which might endorse such conceptual infinite regress. Thus, it is sufficient and logical to admit the *avikṛti* or the *mūlaprakṛti* as the uncreated primordial cause.

Now moving on to the next category we find that seven principles are attributed with the property called *prakṛti-vikṛti*. These are the *mahattattva*, *ahamkāratattva* and the five *tanmātras*. These principles are so called because

they themselves are created and they act as the causes of other principles as well. Thus, they are sometimes regarded as the cause (*prakṛti*) and sometimes as the effect (*vikṛti*). *Mahattattva* is the effect of *prakṛti*. It is its first product in the course of the manifestation of the world. That *mahattattva* in turn acts as the cause of *ahamkāratattva*. Again *ahamkāra* being the effect of *mahattattva*, in turn acts as the cause of the *pañcatanmātra* and *indriya*. The *pañcatanmātras* again act as the cause of the *pañcabhūta*, itself being the effect of *ahamkāra*. Thus, the seven principles are referred to as *prakṛti-vikṛti* which means that, that which is the *prakṛti* is itself the *vikṛti* too.

The third category consists of the *vikṛti* or the *kevalavikṛti* which are sixteen in number. These are the five sense organs, five motor organs, the internal sense organ (*manas*) and the five gross elements (*pañcamahābhūta*). These principles are only the effects of their respective preceding principles and are never the causes of any other principle. Thus, they are referred to as *kevalavikāra*. Here one might argue that how can we say that the gross elements like the earth *etc.* are simply effects, and never the causes, as we find various other objects like the jar *etc.* to be produced from the earth elements? Hence, these principles should also be considered as *prakṛti*, that is, causes of the subsequent products. Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary, provides the answer to the above apprehension. It is true that the gross elements like earth *etc.* undergo transformation in the form of jar *etc.*, then milk into curd, a seed into a tree and the like, yet these transformations cannot be termed as distinct principles or as separate *tattvas*. Those principles which lead to the production

of other principles, only such principles could be considered as *prakṛti*. Here the milk from the cow or the curd from the milk are not separate principles. So their respective causes cannot be regarded as *prakṛti*. Now the natural question at this point is that, why cannot the above products be held as different principles? In response, Vācaspati Miśra says that – ‘*sarvesām goghaṭādīnām sthūlatendriyagrāhyatā ca samā iti na tattvāntaratvam*’³⁸. Here we find the core essence of *satkāryavāda*, which states that the cause is necessarily more subtle (*sūkṣma*) and more extended in its existence (*vyāpaka*), as compared to the effect (*vyāpya*). According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the term ‘*sūkṣma*’ does not mean small, rather it is used in the sense of extension and subtlety. The subtlety is again determined with respect to sense-perceptibility (*indriyagrāhyatā*). Now it is evident that there is no difference in subtlety and sense-perceptibility in case of the *pañcamahābhūta* and the products like cow, jar, milk, tree *etc.* produced thereafter. Thus, there being no difference in their subtlety, the above objects cannot be considered as distinct principles from one another. Consequently, their causes like earth *etc.* cannot be considered as *prakṛti*. Thus, the afore-mentioned sixteen principles can only be regarded as effects (*vikṛti*), and in spite of their transformations, leading to the emergence of new substances, they cannot be considered as *prakṛti* owing to their similar subtlety or grossness with their products.

Finally, we arrive at the fourth category – *anubhaya*. That is, *puruṣa* or that ‘other’ principle which is, ‘*na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ*’. It means that *puruṣa*

is neither the cause nor the effect. It is not included in the causal chain at all. It is radically different from all the above categories. It is neither the producer nor itself produced. Thus, it is the only entity which stands out of the entire system of causality in Sāṃkhya philosophy and is the only sentient principle admitted there. Hence, in a nutshell we can refer to the specific characteristics of each of the categories as³⁹ –

prakṛti: tattvāntaropādānatve sati tattvāntarānupādeyatvam

prakṛti-vikṛti: tattvāntaropādānatve sati tattvāntaropādeyatvam

kevalavikṛti: tattvāntarānupādānatve sati tattvāntaropādeyatvam

*na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ or puruṣa: tattvāntarānupādānatve sati
tattvāntarānupādeyatvam*

Thus, after elucidating the basic tenets of the Sāṃkhya śāstra and its prime contention, we now proceed towards the first part of the thesis which would focus on the nature of *puruṣa* and analyse the arguments for establishing the doctrine of *puruṣa*, that is, the objective of the first part of the thesis is to deal with *puruṣasiddhi*.

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

The Nature of Consciousness

From the third *kārikā* we have come to know that the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* along with its evolutes are characterised by mutually exclusive properties. We have also found out that the *puruṣa* is radically different from *prakṛti*. From there it becomes imperative to discuss in detail about the essential features of *puruṣa* and that too in contrast with the characteristics of both *vyakta* and *avyakta*. The above discussion is going to be carried out following the eleventh *kārikā*, as follows – ‘*triguṇamaviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyamacetanam prasavadharmi/ vyaktaṁ tathā pradhānam, tadviparītastathā ca pumān//*’¹.

The above *kārikā* expresses the common properties of *vyakta* and *avyakta* and those in turn represent the features which are absent in *puruṣa*. That is, *puruṣa* can never be attributed with those properties, it is radically different in essence. Each of the properties and their significance are being discussed as follows –

The term ‘*triguṇam*’ indicates both *vyakta* and *avyakta*. Here Vācaspati Miśra says that the term ‘*triguṇam*’ should be interpreted as that which consists of pleasure, pain and delusion (*sukhaduḥkhamohātmaka*).² The

twenty three principles as mentioned before along with the *mūlaprakṛti* are essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. That is why, the objects produced from them share the similar essence, and accordingly, when the *manas* is related to the various objects, states of pleasure, pain and delusion are experienced in the respective contexts.

Here it is important to note that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, ‘*guṇa*’ always refers to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The helper (*upakāraka*) or the one which is responsible for bondage (*bandhanakāraka*) is referred to as *guṇa*. The *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the helper of *puruṣa* in the sense that they are responsible for the production of the *mahat* etc. which act as the causes of bondage. Thus, the trio are called *guṇas*.³ However, such definition of *guṇas* are not applicable to pleasure, pain and delusion. Then the question arises that why Vācaspati Miśra admits pleasure etc. by the term ‘*guṇa*’ in this context. The reply is that the above *kārikā* indicates the common features of both the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*. Now if we interpret *guṇa* in the above verse as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, then it would indicate only the *avyakta* or the *mūlaprakṛti* based on our previous cognition of the verse – ‘*ajāmekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām*’⁴. That the evolutes of *prakṛti* too consist of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* is not clearly indicated by this statement. However, on account of the fact that the properties of the effect are obtained from those of the cause, we can claim that the evolutes (*vyakta*) being of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, their root cause (*mūlaprakṛti* or *avyakta*) too is of that nature. Further, Vācaspati Miśra states that by interpreting *guṇa* as pleasure etc., the Nyāya position is refuted

consequently. According to the Naiyāyikas, pleasure is a property of the self. Vācaspati Miśra here points out that by mentioning the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* as *triguṇa* in the *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has clearly shown that pleasure, pain and delusion are the common properties of *prakṛti* and its evolutes, and thus, they can never be the property of the self.⁵ Moreover the *Vedas* unequivocally establish the thesis that the self or consciousness is unrelated and not bound (*‘asaṅga hi ayam puruṣaḥ’*)⁶. So pleasure *etc.* cannot essentially be related to the self. Otherwise we would arrive at a contradiction with the above Vedic tenet. Hence, pleasure *etc.* has to be admitted as properties of the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*.

Now the second property is *avivekitva*, that is, both *vyakta* and *avyakta* are *avivekī*. The term ‘*viveka*’ means distinction. So the above term in the *kārikā* means that the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* are devoid of distinctions from each other. The *mūlaprakṛti* retains its essence and its evolutes like the *mahat etc.* are also essentially the same with their respective causes. Vācaspati Miśra, however, clarifies the notion of *avivekitva* in a different manner. He says that –‘*sambhūyakāritā atra avivekitā*’⁷. Both the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* require the assistance of others for the production of their own effects. For instance, *mahat* requires the assistance of *prakṛti* for the production of *ahamkāra*, *ahamkāra* depends upon *mahat* for the production of *tanmātras* and the like. Thus, none of these principles are efficient enough to produce its own effect independently. All these principles have to depend upon their preceding causes, that is, the *prakṛti* for manifesting their own effects. That is why, the

principles are *sambhūyakarī*. The term ‘*sambhūya*’ means to be united, together or dependent upon others. Thus, the category of *vyakta* includes all those principles which always act together or depend upon the other for their actions. It is interesting to note here that even the *avyakta* is *sambhūyakarī* as it also requires the assistance of *adr̥ṣṭa* for the production of its first evolute, *mahat*. Such *sambhūyakāritā* is referred to as *avivekitā* by Vācaspati Miśra.

The third property common to both *vyakta* and *avyakta* is *viśayatva*. Here, *viśayatva* or *jñānaviśayatva* refers to the fact that these constitute the objects of cognition. These are knowable objects. This further indicates that they are different from knowledge itself (*jñānābhinna*). Vācaspati Miśra here points out that such a position refutes the Yogācāra Buddhists view of *viññāna* being the only existent entity, and all the objects are nothing but forms of *viññāna*. That is, even objects like pot, cloth *etc.* are not different from their respective cognitions (*jñānābhinna*). It can be argued here that if such be the case, then *viññāna* itself is also the object of *viññāna*, which is an absurd position. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra states that ‘*viññānād vahiḥ iti yāvat*’⁸, that is, *viññānābhinnatva* is *viśayatva*. The distinction from *viññāna* constitutes objecthood. Hence, objects like jar, cloth *etc.* are not forms of *viññāna*, rather they are absolutely different from *viññāna* itself and thus constitute the objects of *viññāna*.

The next commonality between the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* is *sādhāraṇatva*. Vācaspati Miśra states that – “*ata eva ‘sāmānyam’ ‘sādhāraṇam’ ghaṭādivadanekaiḥ puruṣairgrhītamityarthaḥ*”⁹. That is, *vyakta*

and *avyakta* being distinct from *vijñāna* are knowable by many individuals, and hence, they are termed as ‘*sādhāraṇa*’. *Vijñāna* is specific to each and every individual. There is no such one *vijñāna* which is attained by all. Now if the objects like jar, cloth *etc.* would have been identical to *vijñāna*, then the same object could not have been known by many individuals. Again, *vijñāna* is nothing but the reflection of the *antaḥkaraṇa* transformed in the form of the object (*viśayākārāntaḥkaraṇavṛtti-pratibimba*). The *antaḥkaraṇa* is specific to each and every individual. Accordingly, their modifications (*vṛtti*) and the subsequent reflections (*tadvṛttipratibimba*) would be different from one another. Such *vijñāna* is known or perceived individually. The individuality of the *vijñāna* of an individual is expressed by Vācaspati Miśra as ‘*parabuddheḥ apratyakṣatvāt*’¹⁰. So *vijñāna* is always private and is not accessible to other individuals as opposed to the public character of the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*.

The final common property between the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* is *prasavadharmitva*. The term ‘*prasava*’ here refers to the transformations as undergone by the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*. However, these principles are eternally in the state of transformation. So the above term in the *kārikā* more explicitly claims that it is the very essence or property of these principles to be continually in the state of transformation in some form or the other.

Thus, from the above *kārikā*, it is evident that the said properties are the characteristic features of both *vyakta* and *avyakta* and moreover, they are markers of the fact that the consciousness or *puruṣa* is radically different from

all these principles. This is expressed by the latter portion of the verse ‘*tadviparītaḥ tathā ca pumān*’. However, the term ‘*ca*’ in the *kārikā* gives us another important insight that in spite of certain commonalities between the *puruṣa* and the *vyaktāvyakta*, they are contradictory to each other in terms of the said properties. The interesting commonalities are that both the *puruṣa* and the *pradhāna* are uncaused (*ahetumat*), they both are *nitya* as a result, and the *vyakta* and the *puruṣa* both are many in number. The main features of contradiction between the *puruṣa* and the *vyaktāvyakta* are that the *puruṣa* is *atriguṇa*, *vivekī*, *aviṣaya*, *asādhāraṇa*, *cetana* and *aprasavadharmī*.¹¹ On that note, we would next discuss about the specific essential nature of *puruṣa* or consciousness as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, following the nineteenth *kārikā*, as follows – ‘*tasmācca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvamasya puruṣasya/kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvamakartṛbhāvaśca*’¹².

The above *kārikā* is aimed at providing such knowledge of *puruṣa* which would depict its true essence and would in turn be efficacious in attaining the discriminatory cognition (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, as it would establish the *puruṣa* as radically different from *prakṛti*. The term ‘*tasmāt*’ in the above *kārikā* refers to the properties of *vyaktāvyakta* in the eleventh *kārikā*, and ‘*viparyāsāt*’ states the absence of those properties in *puruṣa*. The *atriguṇatva* etc., as mentioned earlier, of *puruṣa* helps to establish its *sākṣitva*, *kaivalya*, *mādhyastha*, *draṣṭṛtva* and *akartṛbhāva* or *akartṛtva*. The *vyakta* and the *avyakta* are insentient (*jaḍa* or *acetana*). The *puruṣa* being opposite in nature is sentient (*cetana*). The *vyaktāvyakta*, as we

have already found out, are *jñānaviṣaya*, but the *puruṣa* is never the object of cognition (*aviṣaya*). The *cetanatva* and the *aviṣayatva* of *puruṣa* help to establish its *sākṣitva* and *draṣṭṛtva*. Grammatically speaking, *sākṣī* and *draṣṭā* both are synonymous as they each indicate the direct perceiver of an event. Now it is well-known that only a sentient entity can be a perceiver, and never an insentient one. So the inference which establishes the *puruṣa* as the perceiver is – ‘*puruṣaḥ draṣṭā cetanatvāt*’¹³. The above inference is based on the negative concomitance – *yatra yatra draṣṭṛtvābhāva tatra tatra cetanatvābhāva*. However, Vācaspati Miśra points out that here the term ‘*sākṣī*’ should not be considered in the general grammatical sense, that is, as a direct perceiver of an event. Rather a witness (*sākṣī*) is one who is being shown a particular event, or to say that some phenomena is occurring in front of that individual. Here the *prakṛti*, more specifically, the *maḥat* or the *buddhi*, exhibits the objects cognized by it (*svagr̥hītaviṣaya*) to the reflected consciousness (*prativimbīta puruṣa*) in it. In this manner, the *prakṛti* serves the *puruṣa*; but in essence the *puruṣa* remains unrelated and is not bound by *prakṛti* or its evolutes. Thus, due to the essential indifference (*udāsīnatva*) of the *puruṣas*, they are considered to be the *sākṣī*.

The term ‘*sākṣī*’ is ordinarily applied to an impartial, immediate seer (*udāsīna aparokṣa draṣṭā*). In Sanskrit, it is usually said that ‘*sākṣāt draṣṭari sañjñāyām*’. That is, the term ‘*sākṣī*’ stands for the subject who immediately apprehends the objects presented to him/her. In the *Upaniṣads*, the term ‘*sākṣī*’ is frequently used to denote pure consciousness. In this connection, one may

cite the statement of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, - ‘*eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu guḍhaḥ/ sarvavyāpī sarvabhūtāntarātmā/ karmādhyakṣaḥ sarvabhūtādhivāsaḥ/ sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca/*’.¹⁴ When the term ‘*sākṣī*’ is applied to pure consciousness, it does not actually mean the subject or the knower. On such occasions, it means the pure, illuminating principle of consciousness. This consciousness becomes the knower or the subject, when an object is presented before it. In fact, this *sākṣī* is not affected by any change, and is not related to anything. For this reason, the ordinary sense of *sākṣī*, where a *sākṣin* is required to be impartial and entirely unaffected by whatever phenomena is presented before it, is retained in the Upaniṣadic use of this term. The Sāṃkhya system considers *puruṣacaitanyas* as essentially identical with pure consciousness which is eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), pure knowledge (*buddha*) and liberated (*mukta*). Since, the *puruṣas* are essentially changeless, unrelated to anything, they are called *sākṣī*, following the Upaniṣadic tradition.

Further, the *puruṣa* being of the opposite nature of *triguṇa*, its essence of *kaivalya* is established. *Kaivalya* refers to the absolute absence of the threefold sufferings. Such absence of sufferings in *puruṣa* is its inherent essence. Thus, the *puruṣa* is eternally free, and devoid of any relation to any kind of sufferings. Sufferings are nothing but modes of transformation of the *rajas*. Thus, if *puruṣa* had consisted of the three *guṇas*, sufferings would have

been a part of its essential nature. Consequently, liberation would have been impossible. However, *puruṣa* being contradictory in nature to the three *guṇas*, it is essentially devoid of sufferings. The term ‘*atraiguṇya*’ as applied to indicate *puruṣa*, means the absence of pleasure, pain and delusion (*sukhaduḥkhamoharāhitya*). Whatever pleasure, pain *etc.* are experienced by the *puruṣa* are due to mere impositions on it. Just like the moon reflected on the wavy waters of a lake, appears to be wavering as well, whereas in reality the moon remains static, similarly for the *puruṣa*. Due to the reflected consciousness in *antaḥkaraṇa*, whatever pleasure *etc.* are there in it, also appear to be there in the consciousness. Thus, the apparent sense of the respective experiences occur in the individuals. However, this does not hamper the *kaivalya* or the eternally free existence (*nityamuktāvasthā*) of *puruṣa*.

Furthermore, the *puruṣa* is referred to as the *mādhyaṣṭha*. The term ‘*mādhyaṣṭha*’ means indifferent (*udāsīna*). This is also due to the *atraiguṇya* of *puruṣa*. The non-attachment of *puruṣa* towards either pleasure or pain is natural, as any relation to such is simply apparent (*ābhimānika*) on the part of the *puruṣa*. Thus, in Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is essentially indifferent.

Finally, the *puruṣa* is never the agent (*akartā*). Knowledge, volition and desire are all modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. These are the conditions which constitute agency. Then evidently, *puruṣa* can never be the agent of an action. Moreover, the *puruṣa* being *vivekī* and *aprasavadharmī*, it is always devoid of agency. The *puruṣa* is *vivekī* because it is radically different from *prakṛti* and also it does not depend upon other principles for its function, as it is devoid of any functionality as such. This is further endorsed by the fact that it is *aprasavadharmī*, which indicates its essential immutability (*aparīṇāmitva*). These conditions establish the *puruṣa* as the non-agent (*akartā*).

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- 8 Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 120
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CHAPTER 2

Proofs for the Existence of *Puruṣa*

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, attainment of the distinctive cognition between the *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* is instrumental to the attainment of liberation. The entire Sāṃkhya *śāstra* revolves around the various issues of our phenomenal existence involving the problems of cognition, enjoyment, liberation *etc.* with respect to consciousness. Thus, it is necessary to posit the existence of *puruṣa* through the arguments provided in the system as an integral part of the thesis. In the seventeenth verse of *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides arguments and conditions to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. The term '*puruṣa*' is usually denoted by the term '*ātman*' in most of the philosophical systems. In some systems, the notion of *ātman* is also expressed by the term '*jīva*'. Again, in Śaivadarśana, the term '*paśu*' refers to *ātman*. However, though all the systems admit the existence of *ātman* in some form or the other, yet they are divided as regards the nature of the *ātman*. Usually in the Indian philosophical tradition, we find that the opponents' views are refuted first and then one's own views are established. That is, *pūrvapakṣakhaṇḍanottara uttarpakṣapraṭiṣṭhā*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, however, does not refute the other views, rather he establishes the existence of *puruṣa* after discussing the nature of the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* in the earlier *kārikās*. The *avyakta* is the cause, the *vyakta* is the effect and the *puruṣa* is neither of these;

it stands out of the causal chain. As stated earlier, we know that the issues of knowership (*jñātṛtva*), agency of an action (*kartṛtva*), enjoyment (*bhoktṛtva*) etc. could only be accounted for in relation to consciousness. Hence, it becomes imperative to establish the existence of the pure conscious as a fundamental principle in Sāṃkhya philosophy and to put forward its relation with the above- mentioned empirical states of being. The following verse establishes the existence of *puruṣa* and puts forward its essential nature; the *kārikā* states that – ‘*saṃghātaparārthatvāt triṣuṇādiviparyayādadhīṣṭhānāt/ puruṣo ’asti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteśca/*’¹.

The above *kārikā* puts forward five reasons (*hetu*) in favour of the existence of *puruṣa*. The first one is *saṃghātaparārthatva*. This probans introduces an inference of the form ‘*puruṣaḥ astitvavān saṃghātaparārthatvāt*’². However, such inference is not valid as it consists of the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi*, that is, an inference where the probans does not reside in the locus. So the inference should be reformulated as ‘*avyaktamahadādayaḥ parārthāḥ saṃghātatvāt śayanāsanābhyāṅgādivat*’³. According to Vācaspati Miśra, such inference not only establishes the existence of *puruṣa* rather establishes it as other than *vyaktāvyakta*. The inference is as follows - ‘*puruṣaḥ asti, avyaktādervyatiriktaḥ*’⁴. Now in the above inference, *avyaktamahat* etc., is the locus, *parārthatva* is the probandum and *saṃghātatva* is the probans. The terms ‘*śayanāsana*’ etc. represent the examples and the *svapakṣa* as well. We know that *prakṛti* is *triṣuṇātmikā*, that is, it consists of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So any effect (*kārya*) produced from

it would be the combined effort of the three *guṇas*. Insentient objects necessarily depend upon other objects to produce an effect, they cannot act independently. Thus, they are referred to as *saṁghāta*. Now the concomitance relation which leads to the above inference is ‘*yatra yatra saṁghātatvaṁ tatra tatra parārthatvaṁ*’⁵ or in other words, ‘*yaḥ yaḥ saṁghātaḥ sa parārthaḥ*’⁶. The concomitance relation portrays that the objects which act in a combined manner, are referred to as the *saṁghāta padārtha* and they are essentially meant to serve the purpose of the others. However, at this point, much debate arises regarding the connotation of the term ‘other’. The intended meaning of the term ‘other’ here refers to those which are distinct from the insentient or the *saṁghāta* objects themselves; and that is precisely the *puruṣa*. This is endorsed by the example given in the inference that the objects like the chair, bed, utensils *etc.* all serve the purpose of the sentient beings, namely, *puruṣas*. Now it might be argued that the servitude of objects like, bed, utensils *etc.* are acceptable as their purposefulness are directly perceived. That is, we know through direct perceptual experience that the insentient objects like the chair, bed *etc.* all serve the purposes of our daily life. But the question arises that how can we consider the primordial *prakṛti* to be an object which serves the purpose of the other, that is, it is a *saṁghāta padārtha*? We know that the *mūlaprakṛti* is beyond perception, and is only knowable through inference. Moreover, it is characterised by oneness in its nature and does not have any scope of functioning with the combined effort of other objects, as no other object exists in that state of *prakṛti*. Hence, the inference in question is afflicted by *bhāgāsiddhi doṣa*, meaning that the case where the probans

(*saṁghātatva*) does not reside in the entire locus; that is, it is partly present in and partly absent from the locus, namely, *prakṛti* or *avyakta*.

To resolve the above inconsistency, Vācaspati Miśra reformulated the inference as – ‘*sukhaduḥkhamohātmakatayā avyaktādayaḥ sarve saṁghātāḥ*’⁷. According to the inference we find that *avyakta* etc. are all *saṁghāta* in nature considering right from the *mūlaprakṛti* to all its evolutes; they all are constituted of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and delusion (*moha*) resulting from the three *guṇas*. Hence, they all serve the purpose of the entity other than these, that is, *puruṣa*, by their combined effort.

Now a pertinent issue comes up at this stage regarding the meaning of the term ‘other’. That is, whether it should signify the consciousness which is distinct from both the *prakṛti* and its evolutes, or it should denote some other object which is itself a compound product (*saṁghāta padārtha*). It may be argued that a *saṁghātapadārtha* cannot serve the purpose of an entity which is distinct from *saṁghāta*. Rather it is observed that a *saṁghāta padārtha* only serves the purpose of another *saṁghāta*. For instance, the bed serves the purpose of the body, both of which are *saṁghāta* in nature. This is further so because the self or the *ātman* does not have any requirement to sit, sleep or to lie down. Hence, such requirements are only specific to the body. This proves that the compound objects (*saṁghāta padārtha*) can only serve the purpose of other compound objects, and not that of the *puruṣa*. Thus, the term ‘*para*’ in the *kārikā*, stands for other compound objects and not *puruṣa*. The difficulty thus arrived at is expressed by Vācaspati Miśra as – ‘*syādetat-*

*śayanāsanādayaḥ saṃghātāḥ saṃhataśarīrādyārthā dr̥ṣṭāḥ na tu ātmānam avyaktādi atiriktam prati parārthāḥ, tasmāt saṃghātāntaram eva param gamayeṣuḥ, na tvasaṃhatamātmānam*⁸. That is, the above probans or the inference as such, fails to establish the existence of *puruṣa*, and rather proves the existence of other compound objects as a consequence.

In response to the above apprehensions, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states the second probans – ‘*triguṇādiviparyayatva*’. But the debate regarding the term ‘other’ is not resolved yet. It is evident that the compound objects serve the purpose of others, but the question is that what is to be understood by the term ‘other’, - some other compound object or some entity distinct from compound objects? It is accepted that the bed *etc.* serve the purpose of the body; but such admission leads to the fallacy of *arthāntaratā* of the inference. In an inference when the probans establishes some probandum other than the specified one, then the fallacy of *arthāntaratā* occurs. To resolve the above issue, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states the second probans, which Vācaspati clarifies further by stating, - ‘*ayam abhiprāyaḥ*’⁹ *etc.* As we know that the bed, chair, utensils *etc.* do not have any need of their own, they only serve the purpose of the other, so even if the term ‘other’ here signifies other compound objects, then also the servitude (*parārthatva*) of the objects like bed *etc.* are proved. Here an insight is advanced in the form of the argument that the body, sense organs *etc.* are also compound objects themselves. Thus, they must also serve the purpose of some other. Such thinking progression, however, leads us to an infinite regress.

Here one might argue that in certain cases infinite regress may not be an impediment to establish the desired aim, like in case of the seed and the sapling, yet in the present case, that is, ‘*avyaktādayaḥ parārthāḥ saṁghātāt*’¹⁰, the admission of infinite regress in no way helps to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. The admission of a chain of thoughts in the form of each compound object serving the purpose of other compound objects, only leads to an us infinite regress, and essentially does not help us in establishing our intended aim of the existence of *puruṣa*. Hence, there cannot be any justification in validating the infinite regress admitted above.

Further in clarification to the above issue, Vācaspati Miśra states that ‘*na ca vyavasthāyām satyām anavasthā yuktā*’¹¹. That is, it is only when something cannot be established by direct *pramāṇa* then we admit infinite regress. However, in the present case we find that the probans *saṁghātātva* establishes the probandum *parārthatva*. Then if we consider the term ‘*para*’ to signify the non-compound (*asamhata*), that is, distinct from the compound (*saṁghātavyatirikta*), we can prevent the possibility of infinite regress. Moreover, the admission of other compound objects to establish the servitude of the compound objects themselves also leads to logical cumbrousness (*kalpanāgaurava*) which is again a fallacy. It is further argued that the above logical cumbrousness is endorsed by *pramāṇa*. Hence, it is not a fallacy, rather an admissible position. However, Vācaspati Miśra here points out that such a position is not tenable, because the inference in question only establishes the relation between the compound nature of the object and its essence of

servitude – ‘*saṁhatatvasya pāṛārthyamātreṇa anvayāt*’¹². The concomitance relation ‘*yatra yatra saṁghātatvaṁ tatra tatra saṁghātaparārthatvaṁ*’¹³ can only establish the inference ‘*avyaktādayaḥ parārthāḥ saṁghātavāt*’¹⁴, where the probandum is *parārthatva*, and not the above logically cumbrous position. This is because ‘*saṁhatasya saṁghātasya pāṛārthyamātreṇa kevala parārthatvena anvayāt – sāmānādhikaraṇyāt*’¹⁵. That is, in the above inference the probandum is specifically *parārthatva* and not *saṁghātaparārthatva*. Hence, the intended other (*para*) whose purpose is being served, cannot itself be compound (*saṁhata* or *saṁghāta*) in nature. Hence, the *para* or the *puruṣa* thus referred to as the non-compound (*asaṁhata*) must essentially be of the opposite nature of the *vyakta* and *avyakta*, which are the compound objects. Accordingly, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has stated the second probans in the form of *triguṇādiviparyayatva*.

The *vyakta* and *avyakta* are *triguṇa*, *avivekī*, *viśaya*, *sāmānya*, *acetana* and *prasavadharmī*. Hence, *puruṣa* must be termed as exactly the opposite of or devoid of all the above attributes, that is, *triguṇādiviparyayatva*. The properties like *triguṇatva* etc. are the non-pervader (*vyāpya*) of *saṁhatatva*. Thus, considering the *puruṣa* as *atriguṇa* etc. also signifies it as *vivekī* etc. The positive concomitance is of the form – ‘*yatra yatra triguṇatvādi tatra tatra saṁhatatvam*’¹⁶. Here *saṁhatatva* is the pervader (*vyāpaka*) and the *triguṇatvādi* is the non-pervader (*vyāpya*). The inference in question establishes *puruṣa* as non-compound (*asaṁhata* or *saṁhatatvābhāvaviśiṣṭa*) by the term ‘*para*’. We know that the absence of the *vyāpaka* entails the

absence of the *vyāpya*. Thus, *puruṣa* being devoid of *saṁhatatva* is also bereft of *triguṇatvādi*. Hence, the significance of the second probans in the *kārikā* is brought out by the negative concomitance between *saṁhatatvābhāva* and *triguṇatvādyābhāva*. The inference that follows may be stated as – ‘*paraśabdavācyaḥ puruṣaḥ asaṁhataḥ triguṇābhāvavattvāt*’¹⁷. It establishes the non-compound-ness (*asaṁhatatva* or *saṁghātavyatiriktatva*) of *puruṣa* as signified by the term ‘*para*’, by the probans *triguṇābhāvavattva*. Thus, the second probans too, like the former one, is not to be considered as it is, rather the negative concomitance or the negation of the probans and the probandum are to be considered for establishing the existence of *puruṣa* by the term ‘*para*’ in the inference concerned.

The third probans employed in the *kārikā* for establishing the existence of *puruṣa* is *adhiṣṭhānatva*. It is admitted in the Sāṁkhya philosophical system that the *prakṛti*, *mahat* etc. are in a perpetual state of transformation (*pariṇāma*). Hence, the question arises that are these transformations accidental or without any cause, or not. If they are considered to be without a definite cause, then the causal chain, that is, the relation between the cause and the caused (*abhibhāvya-abhibhāvaka-bhāva*) of the infinite transformations of the three *guṇas* will not be determinate. We know that the twenty three principles (*tattva*) as produced from *mūlaprakṛti* develop in a gradual sequence. The former principle acts as the causal factor of the latter principle. The Sāṁkhya philosophers being *satkāryavādins* admit such a chain of causality where the latter principles pre-exists in a subtle form in the former

principle, and eventually gets manifested under the appropriate conditions. However, the question remains that the *prakṛti* being insentient, how can it regulate the definite order of the manifestation of its evolutes? Or, does it simply function on a clockwork principle? Such questions have been dealt with in the Sāṃkhya philosophical system, but one might argue that the explanations provided thereby are not quite satisfactory. However, according to the system in concern, we find that in order to admit the definite purpose and sequence of the transformations of the three *guṇas*, some other entity is to be admitted. The three *guṇas* are insentient in nature, and insentient objects cannot be creative on their own. Hence, the admission of sentient *ātman* or *puruṣa* is necessary as the president (*adhiṣṭhātā*) of the three *guṇas*. It is due to the presidency of the *puruṣa* simply by virtue of its contiguity that the *guṇas* undergo their perpetual transformations.

Now considering *puruṣa* as the presiding factor over the transformations of *prakṛti* etc. does not entail that the *puruṣa* has any control over the causal chain of creation. Presidency here means the proximity of *puruṣa* which brings about the transformation of *prakṛti* etc. The sentient *puruṣa* acts as the inducing cause of creation from the insentient *prakṛti*. Just as the presence of a charioteer or a horse brings about motion in the insentient chariot, similarly the mere presence of the *puruṣa* or consciousness induces creativity in *prakṛti*. Hence, the existence of such *puruṣa* is undeniable, as the creation of the world through the transformations of *prakṛti* is an established fact. Thus, *prakṛti*, *maḥat* etc. all are *sukhaduḥkhamohātmaka* in nature. That

is, essentially consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion due to their constituent factors of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and they all are presided over by the *puruṣa* or the consciousness. This may be expressed as – ‘*prakṛtyādikāṃ cetanādhiṣṭhitāṃ sukhaduḥkhamohātmakatvāt rathādivat*’¹⁸. The probandum of the inference expresses the presidency of the consciousness over all that exists and that consciousness is the *ātman* or *puruṣa*, which is again itself distinct from the three *guṇas*.

The next probans advanced in order to establish the existence of *puruṣa* is *bhokṛtṛbhāvatva*. The *vyakta* and the *avyakta* are both insentient, so they cannot be the enjoyer of each other. Hence, an enjoyer is to be admitted who is other than the *vyakta* and *avyakta*. Now one might question that the existence of *puruṣa* has not been established as yet, so how can the above property of enjoyership (*bhokṛtṛbhāvatva* or *bhokṛtṛtva*) help to establish the existence of *puruṣa*? In response, Vācaspati Miśra says that by the term ‘*bhokṛtṛbhāva*’, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has implied pleasure and pain. Pleasure and sufferings are experienced by each and every individual. Thus, if pleasure and pain are matters of experience, then there has to be an entity who experiences them. The objects of enjoyment cannot themselves act as the enjoyer, hence, there has to be an enjoyer who is distinct from the enjoyable. Such enjoyer is the *puruṣa*, and pleasure and pain are respectively enjoyed and suffered by the *puruṣa*.

Further it cannot be said that let the pleasure and pain be experienced by the intellect (*buddhi*) etc. and then there would be no necessity to admit a

separate principle as the *puruṣa*. That is, pleasure and pain are matters of experience and the *mahat etc.* are the enjoyer – such a position is inadmissible, as that leads to the subject-object contradiction (*kartṛkarmavirodha*). The intellect *etc.* cannot act as the enjoyer, as they themselves are of the nature of pleasure and pain in essence. In order to experience or enjoy (*bhoga*) something one has to be transformed according to the nature or form of the enjoyable. That which gets transformed is the agent or subject (*kartā*) and that which forms the enjoyable is the object (*karma*). Now the subject and the object cannot be in the same locus. Thus, the intellect *etc.* which are essentially of the form of pleasure and pain, cannot act as both the enjoyable and the enjoyer, nor can they act as the locus of both the enjoyment (*bhogyatva*) and the enjoyership (*bhogakartṛtva*). Hence, it is to be admitted that pleasure and pain are matters of experience of the one who is essentially distinct from the nature of pleasure and pain (*asukhādyātmā* or *sukhaduḥkhātmakabhinnā*). Thus, owing to the enjoyment of pleasure and pain, the existence of a distinct enjoyer is to be admitted, and that is the *puruṣa*. This is further established by the following inferences, where the former proves the *puruṣa* as the enjoyer and the latter further proves the non-enjoyership of the intellect *etc.* The inferences are respectively as follows – ‘*sukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ ca kiñcid bhokṛkaṁ bhogyatvāt śayanādivat*’¹⁹, which establishes an enjoyer of the enjoyable pleasure and pain; further ‘*buddhyādi na bhokṛtvavat sukhaduḥkhātmakatvāt ghaṭavat*’²⁰ proves that the intellect *etc.* cannot themselves act as the enjoyer because they themselves are of the nature of pleasure and pain. Thus, an enjoyer of the pleasure and pain is to be admitted,

who is distinct from the pleasure and pain essentially, and hence, the establishment of *puruṣa*.

Now the most important question arises that whether at all *puruṣa* can be considered as the enjoyer, keeping in mind the nature of *puruṣa* in the Sāṃkhya philosophical framework. If we admit the *puruṣa* as the enjoyer, then we also have to accept the bondage (*samsāra*) and liberation (*apavarga*) of *puruṣa*. However, in the sixty second *kārikā*, we find that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has mentioned – ‘*tasmānna badhyate’ addha na mucyate nā’api samsarati kaścit/ samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ*’²¹, that is, *puruṣa* can never be bound, nor can it be liberated. Then the question poses that how can we admit the *puruṣa* as the enjoyer. Here Vācaspati Miśra speaks in favour of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It is indeed true that the *puruṣa* is essentially free from bondages and it cannot be emancipated, since it is essentially so, yet we find that the *puruṣa* is being admitted as the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. Such apparent inconsistency finds resolution from the Sāṃkhya philosophy itself, and is going to be discussed in detail in the seventh chapter of the present research thesis in the context of the issues on the bondage and liberation of *puruṣa*.

The fifth and the final probans put forward by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in favour of establishing the existence of *puruṣa* is ‘*kaivalyārtham pravṛtteḥ*’. The inclination of *puruṣa* to attain liberation establishes its existence. The term ‘*kaivalya*’ refers to the absolute cessation of three kinds of sufferings. Now the volition towards such cessation of sufferings cannot be admitted in the intellect *etc.* Thus, if the principle called *puruṣa* is not admitted, then the above

inclination towards emancipation cannot be explained. The principles like intellect *etc.* are essentially of the nature of pain. This is because pain being a modification of the *raja guṇa* (*raja-pariṇāma-bhedaḥ*) and the intellect (*buddhi*) being the first product of the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the tendency to attain absolute cessation of sufferings can evidently not be there in the intellect *etc.*, as that would lead to the destruction of the essential nature of the intellect *etc.* itself. Thus, it is necessary to admit a principle which is distinct from pain *etc.* essentially and is other than the intellect *etc.*, and that is the *puruṣa*. Such *puruṣa* can be considered to have absolute detachment from sufferings *etc.* without its essence being hampered. Hence, it is established that there is *puruṣa*, who is of the form of consciousness, and is other than the intellect *etc.*, and such a position is endorsed by scriptures, *āgama* and the volition towards emancipation as observed in the sages.

After stating the probanses individually as put forward by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the seventeenth *kārikā*, in order to establish the existence of *puruṣa*, we now delve into an analysis of the probanses and their efficacy in establishing the intended probandum. We have found that in order to establish the existence of *puruṣa*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has employed five probanses, namely – (i) *saṃghātaparārthatva* (ii) *triguṇādiviparyayatva* (iii) *adhiṣṭhānatva* (iv) *bhoktrbhavatva* and (v) *kaivalyārtham pravṛtti*. However, Vācaspati Miśra claims that the reasons or grounds put forward are not mutually exclusive, rather each probans could be reduced to one or more of the other. To explicate he says that the first probans is reducible to the fourth one. The term

‘*saṁghāta*’ refers to that which serves the purpose of the other. So evidently that other should be attributed with the property of enjoyership, as the above-mentioned purpose here refers to enjoyment itself. Here, *prakṛti*, *mahat* etc. are referred to by the term ‘*saṁghāta*’. Thus, objects of pleasure and pain can evidently serve the purpose of enjoyment only, and nothing else. The one whose enjoyment is being fulfilled is termed as the enjoyer. Thus, it is clear that the condition *saṁghātaparārthatva* indicates that the objects like *prakṛti* etc. being either pleasurable or painful or delusional in nature, requires some enjoyer whose need or purpose of enjoyment could be served. Such enjoyer is none but the *puruṣa*. This is precisely the contention of the fourth condition too.

Further, Vācaspati mentions that the second probans *triguṇādiviparyayatva* is also not an appropriate ground for establishing the existence of *puruṣa*; but the other (*para*) that has been established by the first probans as one who is distinct from the compound or complex objects (*saṁghātātirikta* or *asamhata*), is further endorsed by the second reason. The *para* ascertained by the first condition cannot be of the nature of the *saṁghāta padārtha*, as that would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. Thus, to prevent any such fallacious state, the *puruṣa* has to be admitted as distinct from the *saṁghāta*. This is claimed in other parts of the scriptures as well, by verses like ‘*tadviparītaḥ pumān*’²², which again indicates that the *puruṣa* is essentially of the opposite nature of the *triguṇa*. Thus, attributes like *atriguṇa*, *vivekī*, *aviṣaya*, *asāmānya*, *cetana* and *aprasavadharmī* cannot act as

conditions for establishing the existence of *puruṣa*, rather they uphold the essential nature of *puruṣa* as opposed to *prakṛti*, as already discussed in the previous chapter on the nature of consciousness.

Now in order to examine the third probans ‘*adhiṣṭhānatva*’, Vācaspati Mīśra states that just as a chariot is governed by a charioteer, similarly the objects of pleasure, pain and delusion are presided by some sentient principle. That overriding conscious principle is none but the *puruṣa* or the *ātman*. However, from the above analogy it might be claimed that only a chariot which is in motion is controlled by a charioteer, and not just any chariot. From that perspective it might be questioned that whether the *puruṣa*, who is being accepted as the underlying sentient principle behind the activity of *prakṛti*, is to be admitted as the cause of those activities. Since *prakṛti* is incessantly in the state of activity, then there should be a principle to govern or to preside over that. Otherwise the actions cannot be accounted for. Here the problem arises that whether at all *puruṣa* could be regarded as the cause of all such activity or creation of *prakṛti*. If so, then the very essence of *puruṣa* would be hampered, and if not, then it is to be admitted that the insentient *prakṛti* can act on its own even without the guidance of any overriding conscious principle. However, the admission of the latter position would further lead to the questioning of the principle called *puruṣa* altogether. That is, if the *prakṛti* can act even without any sentient guidance, then why at all *puruṣa* should be admitted? The above would be discussed in the section on the relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* where we would be able to discern the necessity of the

admission of *puruṣa* in spite of its essential non-relatedness to the chain of causality.

However, in response to the above criticism, Vācaspati Miśra adheres to the views of the opponents who consider that *Īśvara* should be admitted as the supreme sentient principle behind the creativity of *prakṛti*, and further he clarifies that individual beings, being finite or having limitations, cannot be attributed with such property. In the prelude to the fifty seventh *kārikā*, we find that ‘*nahi kṣetrajñāḥ cetanāḥ prakṛtim adhiṣṭhātum arhanti*’²³, meaning that the individual human beings, in spite of having knowledge about matter and body, cannot act as the presiding conscious principle over the activities of insentient *prakṛti*. Thus, to resolve the above issue, Vācaspati Miśra ascribes the *puruṣa* as the overriding conscious principle in relation to the activities of *prakṛti*, and hence establishes the existence of *puruṣa*. It is to be noted here that if *prakṛti* refers to the objects of pleasure, pain and delusion then the one presiding over these would be ascribed as none but an enjoyer and as essentially distinct from the *triṣuṇa*. Thus, again we find that the existence of *puruṣa* is being established as an enjoyer, and the conditions thus provided, are reduced to the fourth probans.

Finally, we can say that ‘*kaivalyārtham pravṛtतेḥ*’ refers to the volition of *puruṣa* towards liberation, and we have found from the *kārikā* that the *prakṛti* becomes creative or active towards the fulfilment of such volition of *puruṣa*. Vācaspati states that according to the *āgama* or scriptures, the seers are possessed by the volition towards liberation. That is, the scriptures

establish liberation as the ultimate aim and the seers are dedicated to the attainment of liberation. Thus, *puruṣa* is to be admitted in order to account for such volition and its actualisation. However, it might be questioned here that the *puruṣa* being essentially liberated (*nityamukta*), how can its volition be considered as a ground for establishing its existence. Further it leads to an inconsistency, namely, *vyāghāta doṣa*. One who is eternally and essentially emancipated, further stating means of liberation for that principle is only superfluous. Thus, referring to the volition of the sages as a ground for establishing the existence of *puruṣa* is an inappropriate one.

Moreover, as we have already seen that grounding the existence of *puruṣa* on the property of enjoyership also leads to the disruption of the essence of *puruṣa*. Also the *puruṣa* has been referred to as non-agent (*akartā*), witness (*sākṣī*) and mediator (*madhyastha*) as we have already found in our previous discussions. Thus, referring to the *puruṣa* as an enjoyer only leads to its ascription as the agent of enjoyment, thus denying its essence of non-agency. Furthermore, a witness or a mediator cannot be considered to be an enjoyer either. Hence, the question of enjoyment in case of indifferent (*udāsīna*), self-contained (*kūṭastha*), and witness-like *puruṣa* does not arise at all in the literal sense of the term. Such issues, however, need to be delved into deeper depths, and an analysis in this area would be carried out in the context of bondage and liberation of *puruṣa* in the seventh chapter of the thesis.

Further we find that Daṇḍīśvāmī, in the context of discussing *śabda*, has stated that, - ‘*idaṁ andhaṁ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṁ jāyeta bhuvanatrāyaṁ/ yadi*

jñānāhvayaṃ jyotiḥ āsaṃsāraṃ na dīpyate/²⁴. It means that the entire world would have been immersed in darkness had it not been illuminated by the light of knowledge. Though Daṇḍīsvāmī has stated the above in the context of *śabda*, yet it may be considered to be more appropriate in the context of knowledge. A mute person, for her/his inability to utter words, might face a lot of difficulties in leading their lives, but that does not render their existence to be meaningless. However, an existence without the attainment of knowledge is nothing but a meaningless one.

Every philosophical school, and human beings in general, cannot deny the existence and the efficacy of knowledge. Even the Śūnyavādins belonging to the school of the Mādhyamika Buddhists, who refute the existence of everything in the world, and pertain to a nihilist position, admit the nature of the *śūnya* to be that of the knowledge, even though they do not admit the *śūnya* to be *sat*.

Now the notion of cognition that is admitted by all the schools of philosophy is that knowledge is of a luminous nature (*prakāśasvabhāva*). Though it is a debatable issue that whether knowledge expresses itself or not, but it is unanimously admitted that a cognition expresses its own object. That is, in case of the cognition of a jar, the object jar is manifested by the respective cognition. The advocates of the *svaprakāśatvavāda* of knowledge hold that the knowledge which can manifest the objects of cognition, can evidently express itself too. There are numerous arguments in favour and in opposition of this view, but since it is not relevant in this context, hence, we are refraining from

the detailed discussion of such. Knowledge being self-expressive (*prakāśasvabhāva*), cannot be the property of some other object. This is because, if knowledge is considered to be the property of some other object, then it could be apprehended that whether at all that object, that is, the locus (*dharmī*) of that knowledge is also *prakāśasvabhāva* or not. Now if we consider the locus of a cognition to be *prakāśasvabhāva*, then we arrive at the fallacy of cumbrous thinking (*kalpanāgaurava*). This is because if either the cognition or the locus be self-expressive, then the entire compound that is, the knowledge, its object and its locus, all are expressed by virtue of one of the components. Thus, the admission of the capacity of self-expression both on the part of the knowledge and its locus turns out to be superfluous. Again if we consider the locus of a cognition to be insentient, and hence, cannot be self-expressive, then also the cognition which is itself of the self-expressive nature cannot be considered to be a property of the inexpressive, insentient object. Thus, the admission of a locus of a cognition is not a tenable position. Rather the knowledge itself is eternal, ubiquitous, immanent yet transcendent. Such knowledge is referred to as the *ātman* in the various systems of Indian philosophy, and specifically in Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is called *puruṣa*. Thus, the pure immanent and transcendent consciousness, which is of the nature of pure knowledge (*jñā*), is both the manifestor (*prakāśaka*) and the self-expressive (*prakāśasvabhāva*) principle.

We have found that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has stated the *sattva guṇa* to be of luminous nature, yet it cannot act as the manifestor of objects. The *sattva guṇa*

might be metaphorically compared to the sun intending the luminosity of both. However, it is claimed that though the rays of the sun can manifest all the objects of the world, yet that does not express the actual state of affairs. Rather it is due to the knowledge of objects that the world gets manifested to us. Thus, it is knowledge only which could be considered as the manifestor of objects, and hence, of the world. The *sattva guṇa*, acting as the mediator, helps in establishing the relation between the knowledge and the objects of the world. Thus, it is also referred to as the manifestor in a secondary sense of the term. The pure, eternal, unvitiated cognition-like consciousness is the only manifestor in the true sense of the term.

The *sattva guṇa* helps in the production of cognition, - ‘*sattvāt saṁjāyeta jñānam*’²⁵. The cognition produced with the aid of the *sattva guṇa* is nothing but a reflection of the pure, unadulterated, supreme cognition. The *sattva guṇa*, being luminous or mirror-like, is capable of receiving reflections on it, and hence, it is referred to as the manifestor. If such reflections of the pure cognition-like consciousness is not received on the *sattva guṇa*, then *sattva guṇa* being essentially insentient does not have any capacity to manifest the objects of the world or that of the cognition. Thus, it is evident that the pure cognition-like consciousness is the only manifestor (*prakāśaka*) as well as the self-expressive (*prakāśasvabhāva*) principle. Such cognition-like consciousness is nothing but the *ātman*.

In the above context, for the sake of clarification, it is to be noted that when we refer to the *sattva guṇa* as the manifestor, it does not intend the *sattva*

guṇa in its primordial state, be it before the creation or after the attainment of *vivekakhyāti*, rather it is to imply that state of the *sattva guṇa* which is capable of receiving the reflection of the consciousness, that is, the embodied *sattva guṇa*. The *sattva guṇa* that is there in the sense organ like, eyes *etc.*, the *manas*, *ahamkāra* and the *buddhi*, that is, in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, is considered to be the manifestor, as it is capable of directly receiving the reflection of the embodied consciousness. Thus, in order to account for the manifestation of the objects of cognition like, the jar, cloth *etc.* it is impending to admit the existence of the cognition-like consciousness, referred to as the *ātman* or the *puruṣa*. Hence, there cannot be any denial to the claim that ‘*puruṣaḥ asti*’. Thus, with the above arguments the existence of *puruṣa* is established.

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CHAPTER 3

Proofs for the Plurality of *Puruṣa*

Having established the existence of *puruṣa* in the seventeenth *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa proceeds to establish the plurality of consciousness (*puruṣa*) with respect to individual bodies, as experienced in the phenomenal realm. The admission of embodied consciousness puts forth a number of apprehensions regarding the monistic or pluralistic stance that has to be considered in relation to the consciousness *per se*. That is, the statement, ‘*puruṣa* exists’, brings up the natural question that whether the *puruṣa* is one and the same in every individual body. Or, are *puruṣas* many and are they specific to the bodies themselves? In the *kārikā* we find that Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that *puruṣa* is many in number, according to the individual bodies. Thus, unlike the Advaita Vedāntins, who pertain to the monistic position regarding the admission of consciousness, Īśvarakṛṣṇa establishes the multiplicity of *puruṣa* with reference to the specific bodies of individual beings. In order to express his arguments he puts forward the eighteenth *kārikā* as follows -

‘*jananamaraṇakaraṇānām pratiniyamādayugapat pravṛtteśca/*
puruṣabahutvaṃ siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyayāt caiva/’¹.

Now before entering into the analysis of the arguments provided above, the Sāṃkhya philosophers clarify the relation between the body and

the consciousness as experienced by us empirically, specifically in the context of cognition. The issues relating to the relation between the cognition, consciousness and the body would be discussed in detail in the fifth chapter of the thesis. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers *puruṣa* being pure consciousness or pure cognition, is capable of illuminating or manifesting the entire world. However, it does not get related to all the objects of the world simultaneously. *Puruṣa* is always and essentially indifferent (*udāsīna*), and hence, cannot get actually related at all. Rather if it would not have been so, and had it been the cause of manifestation of objects, then all the objects of the world would have been expressed simultaneously to all beings and at all times. Evidently, this does not happen. Rather we find that at the same point of time different individuals experience the cognition of different objects. Say, at a particular point of time one person cognises a jar, while another knows a cloth. Again the same individual might have the cognition of a jar and a cloth at different points of time. Thus, it is to be admitted that the pure, infinite cognition or consciousness, though of an illuminating nature (*prakāśasvabhāva*), remains essentially self-contained (*kūṭasthasvabhāva*); and is neither the cause nor the effect. So it stands apart from any kind of causal chain.

Now the issue regarding the manifestation of objects requires some further discussion. We know that the *puruṣa*, though ubiquitous (*vibhu*) in nature, does not lead to the manifestation of all the objects simultaneously or at all times. When a specific sense organ gets related to a particular object,

then only that object is expressed in the form of cognition. Further it is to be noted that, though the consciousness is there in the entire body and is in proximity to all the organs of the body simultaneously, yet that does not lead to the cognition of all kinds of objects by the respective sense organs at the same point of time. This is because of the absence of the contact between the sense organs and the mind (*manas*). Thus, the embodied consciousness can only manifest objects which are related to the sense organs associated with the mind.

This problem arises in all the systems that believe in the ubiquitous character of consciousness. The problem varies depending upon whether the system believes in one or in many conscious principles. If the system upholds the thesis that consciousness is one and ubiquitous, then the problem is – why are not all objects revealed to this one, all-pervasive consciousness at the same time? If the system, like the Sāṃkhya school, upholds the thesis that there are many conscious principles but all these principles are ubiquitous, then also they are faced with the problem, – why is it the case that all objects are not revealed to a particular individual self at the same time, even though every individual consciousness is eternal and all-pervasive? So the system needs to specify the circumstances or the conditions under which alone an object may be manifested or revealed to a particular subject.

We often find that in case of dreams an individual considers oneself as a tiger and not as a human being. Here a question might arise that in such cases the human-ness (*naratva*) is there in the individual and the mind (*manas*) is

also performing its specific function, then why is it that the person does not acquire the cognition of the form ‘I am a human being’? In reply it may be stated that at that point of time there being no connection with the ego (*ahamkāra*), the above form of cognition is not produced. In case of deep sleep (*suṣupti*), though there is no connection with the ego, yet the involuntary act of breathing continues, and hence, we have to admit the functionality of the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). It can, thus, be claimed that the eternal or beginning-less, pure, infinite cognition or consciousness called *puruṣa* manifests only that object which is reflected by the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) where it is brought about by the sense organs (*indriya*).

It is to be noted here that in case of perception the object is expressed by the *antaḥkaraṇa* with the mediation of the sense organs (*indriya*). However, in case of inference, testimony and recollection, though there is no mediation of the sense organs, yet the objects of cognition are brought to the *antaḥkaraṇa* and then only they can be expressed in their respective forms through subsequent steps. The detailed discussion of how cognition takes place in case of an individual will be carried out in the second section of the thesis, namely, in the context of *puruṣāvabodha upapādana*. Nevertheless, it is clear that *antaḥkaraṇa* is specific to each and every individual, and the sense organs (*indriya*) being present in the bodies qualified by *antaḥkaraṇa*, comes in contact with the knowable entities and accordingly transmits their forms to the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The *antaḥkaraṇa* then assumes the form of the object and receives the reflection of the consciousness on it, and that eventually leads to

the expression of the cognition of the object thus produced. However, *antaḥkaraṇa* being many in number, multitude of *puruṣa* or consciousness is to be admitted. If we consider only one *puruṣa*, then only one *antaḥkaraṇa* would be capable of expressing objects. In reality, however, we find that numerous objects are manifested to different individuals at the same point of time. Thus, it is clear that *puruṣas* are many in number.

On that note, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the first argument in favour of establishing the plurality of *puruṣa* as ‘*jananamaraṇakaraṇānām*’ etc. The term ‘*janana*’ means birth, ‘*maraṇa*’ refers to death and ‘*karaṇa*’ indicates the thirteen organs, both internal and external. The intended meaning of the above phrase in the *kārikā* is that due to the specificity of the functioning of the sense organs and the individual regularity of birth and death, it is to be admitted that *puruṣa* is multiple in existence. This is further clarified by the term ‘*pratiniyama*’ which means ‘*pratipuruṣam niyamaḥ vyavasthā*’². That is, the birth, death and volition of sense organs being specific to individuals, the plurality of *puruṣa* is to be necessarily admitted.

Now a question arises that *puruṣa* being eternal, beginningless and devoid of any possibility of destruction, how can the concepts of birth and death act as grounds for establishing the plurality of *puruṣa*. To resolve such apparent disparity, Vācaspati Miśra mentions in his commentary (*ṭīkā*), - ‘*nikāyaviśiṣṭābhirapūrvābhirdehendriyamano’haṁkārabuddhivedanābhiḥ puruṣasya’abhisambandho janma, na tu puruṣasya pariṇāmaḥ, tasyā’apariṇāmitvāt/ teṣāmeva ca dehadīnāmupāttanām parityāgo maraṇam,*

na tu ātmano vināśaḥ, tasya kūṭasthanityatvāt/'³. That is, the body (*deha*), organs (*indriya*), mind (*manas*), ego (*ahamkāra*), intellect (*buddhi*) and the impressions of previous modes of *antaḥkaraṇa* (*vedanā* or *jñānākhyā vṛtti*), all of these become apparently related to the *puruṣa* (*puruṣasya abhisambandha*) and such phenomenal related state is referred to as the birth (*janma*) of *puruṣa*, in the empirical sense of the term. The term '*nikāya*' in the above commentary refers to the state when the body, sense organs, mind, ego, intellect and cognitions all act together harmoniously in order to serve the purpose of some other, that is, an individual. Now if the above state is novel (*navīna*) and unprecedented (*apūrvā*), then the first apparent relation (*abhisambandha*) of *puruṣa* with such a state of matter, is referred to as the birth. It is to be noted here that the above relation (*abhisambandha*) does not refer to any relation of contact *etc.* Rather it indicates egoistic relation (*abhimānarūpa sambandha*) and that is why such relation is not real, it is only apparent (*atāttvika*)⁴. Due to the above relation, the *puruṣa* considers the modes of matter, that is, the *nikāya* or the *saṁghāta* to be its own form of existence, and hence, provides the ground for establishing the enjoyer-enjoyable relationship (*bhoktrbhogyabhāva*), even though it is merely apparent. The *puruṣa* being essentially solitary and non-related, there cannot be any actual or real (*tāttvika*) relation between the *puruṣa* and the *nikāya*; yet the apparent relation of enjoyership occurs with only a specific material compound (*nikāya*). However, the question arises that, how does this apparent relation between a conscious *puruṣa* and a particular *nikāya* take place. Every *nikāya* is constituted of a body, a mind, an *ahamkāra*, *buddhi* and the ten

organs. The *buddhi* reflects the *puruṣacaitanya* and due to the non-apprehension of the distinction between the reflected consciousness and the original consciousness, the properties pertaining to the reflected consciousness, such as pleasure, pain, aversion, cognition of specific objects *etc.* are used as those pertaining to *puruṣacaitanya*. It is because of this non-apprehension of distinction between the original and the reflected consciousness, *puruṣacaitanya* appears as possessing the properties of the *nikāya* and the *antaḥkaraṇa*. However, the *nikāyas* are innumerable, and these individual *nikāyas* belong to different categories, like, the supra-human or the deities (*devatva*), the humans (*manuṣyatva*) and the animals or infra-humans (*paśutva*). Each category differs from the other due to the difference in the specific properties or qualities (*dharma*) of the respective categories. Each of the *puruṣa* attains a specific egoistic relation with one particular *nikāya*, though only apparently, and thus, due to the multiplicity of the *nikāya*, we have to admit the plurality of *puruṣa*.

Further when the *puruṣa* no longer remains attached to the respective *nikāyas*, such state of phenomenal detachment from the *nikāya* is termed as death (*maraṇa*). Such detachment in no way indicates the destruction of the self, since, self is devoid of any destruction, unlike the jar *etc.* The self continues to exist in its pure, non-related, isolatory state. Rather the above notion of death refers to the destruction or cessation of the apparent enjoyership of the self with the enjoyable matter. Analogously, owing to the cessation of the apparent egoistic relation of enjoyership between the

individual *nikayas* and forms of matter at different points of time, at various places *etc.*, multiplicity of *puruṣa* is clearly established.

Now an important aspect is to be noted in the above context of birth and death; that is, the entire argumentation above has been carried out in terms of the gross body of an individual. At the beginning of creation, individual subtle bodies were produced for each *puruṣa*. However, the apparent relation of *puruṣa* with the respective subtle body is not considered as the birth of *puruṣa*. Rather the body, organs *etc.* which develop in the mother's womb is unprecedented (*apūrvā*). Thus, the apparent or phenomenal connected-ness of *puruṣa* with that body is termed as its birth; and accordingly, the cessation of the above sense of related-ness with the gross body, organs, mind, ego, intellect and cognition (modes of intellect) is termed as death in the empirical sense of the term. It is, however, to be kept in mind here that according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the various forms of the body at different stages of our existence are essentially not different from each other. Hence, they cannot be considered to be novel or unprecedented (*apūrvā*). Only the body that develops in the mother's womb could be considered to be *apūrvā*, and hence, the concept of birth could be accounted for. Thus, it could be reiterated that the terms 'birth' and 'death' respectively indicate the related-ness and the non-relatedness to the gross body, sense organs, mind, ego, intellect and the modes of the intellect in the form of cognition.

Further the term '*karaṇa*' refers to thirteen principles collectively. They are – the intellect, the ego, and the eleven organs which consist of the

five motor organs and the five sense organs, and the mind. The *puruṣas* being individually related to each of these complexes, and to the specific states of birth and death, are convincingly established to be many in number. Moreover if only one *puruṣa* would have been admitted in various bodies, then the disciplined order of birth, death and the specificities of the organs of respective bodies would not have been established or accounted for. This is because the birth or death of one *puruṣa* would have led to the same state-of-affairs for all other *puruṣas*. Even the defects of an organ of an individual would have been applicable to all others as well. Furthermore, the liberation of one *puruṣa* would have entailed that of all other *puruṣas* too. Hence, the admission of plurality of *puruṣa* is absolutely necessary in order to account for the definite order of creation and its existence.

Now one might argue that the ether (*ākāśa*) is a single object, yet it is used as many by virtue of its contextual entitlements (*upādhi*), like *ghaṭākāśa*, *paṭākāśa* etc. Moreover with the annihilation of *upādhi*, we often use dicta like, ‘the *ghaṭākāśa* is produced and the *paṭākāśa* is destroyed’. So analogously it may be argued that just like the ether, let there be only one *puruṣa*, and just as the ether is termed as many owing to its various *upādhis*, similarly the *puruṣa* be considered as many by virtue of the *upādhis* like the body etc. This establishes the fact that the self is one, and is merely used as many in phenomenal terms. The opponents further claim that the admission of the above stance would even explain the ordering of birth and death, and hence, there is no need to admit many *puruṣas*. This is further endorsed by

Vācaspati Miśra's statement in the commentary as follows, - '*na ca ekasyā'api puruṣasya dehopadhānabhedādvavasthā iti yuktam*'⁵. That is, even if *puruṣa* is one, then by dint of the variety of different bodies, it is possible to explain the notions of birth, death *etc.*, and thus, it is futile to admit the plurality of selves.

In response to the above criticism it is mentioned that if we admit the plurality of *puruṣa* by considering the body as the *upādhi*, then even the organs or various parts of the body might be considered as individual *upādhis*. Consequently, we have to admit many selves in the same body. That is, if we consider the birth and death of a body to be that of the self as well, then the augmentation of an organ, or the removal of an organ might also be considered as the birth and death of the self. However, such position is absurd and untenable. This is because when an organ of an individual is removed or the hair, nails or other body parts of a person develop we do not refer to those instances as death or birth of the individuals respectively.⁶ Hence, it is not admissible that due to the differences in bodies, the same self appears to be many. Rather the logical position is that individual bodies encase individual selves, and that pertains to our understanding of the empirical as well as the theoretical conception of the relation between the matter and the self.

The next argument in favour of establishing the plurality of selves, as advanced in the *kārikā* is *ayugapat pravṛtti*. In the previous argument we have found that if the same self would have been there in different bodies, then the birth, death and the functions of the organs would have occurred

simultaneously. Accordingly, the volitions too would have been one and the same in all the bodies. However, that is not found to happen in case of the actual state-of-affairs. The volitions and dispositions are found to vary widely in different individuals, and accordingly it becomes clear that selves are many. The inference employed to strengthen the above view is as follows – ‘*puruṣaḥ pratiśarīram bhinnāḥ ayugapat pravṛttimattvāt*’⁷. In the above inference, the term ‘*pravṛtti*’ refers to volition (*prayatna*), that is, intention or effort conducive towards action (*kriyājanaka prayatna*). Sometimes the term ‘*pravṛtti*’ also refers to the merits and demerits earned through our voluntary actions, that is, *dharmādharmā*. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, we know that volition, in spite of being a mode of matter (*antaḥkaraṇa*), is imposed on or used as that of the *puruṣa*. During the state of migration, when the *puruṣa* or the embodied consciousness has not attained the discriminatory cognition between itself and the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the consciousness appears to consider itself as the agent of an action, or the locus of the various modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Accordingly, the volitions *etc.* that are there in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, get superimposed on the consciousness and seem to be located there. Consequently, *puruṣa*, though figuratively, yet in the empirical realm appears to be affected by the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This could be expressed through an analogy, as follows - just as in case of a war the victory or defeat is actually faced by the soldiers, yet the result is imposed on or is said to be borne by the king or the master of the land, similarly, the *antaḥkaraṇa* specific to an individual undergoes transformations in the form of volitions *etc.*, and accordingly those volitions *etc.* are ascribed to that

puruṣa. This would be discussed in further detail in the seventh chapter of the thesis following the sixty second *kārikā*. It is empirically known that such volitions are not the same in different individuals. It is further because the *puruṣa* or the embodied consciousness only gets apparently related to the specific *antaḥkaraṇa*, as encased in that particular body. That is, the volitions or the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* specific to the individual body only gets superimposed of the consciousness delimited by that body. Accordingly, the propensities, and the cognitive and the emotive states of that being are expressed. Evidently, such a phenomenon appears due to the non-apprehension of the discrimination between the self and the matter. Thus, due to the specific differences in terms of volition, cognition, feeling *etc.* in the different individuals, specific *puruṣas* are to be admitted for specific bodies. If such is not admitted, then there being the same self (*ātman*) in various bodies, each of the bodies will have the same tendencies and volitions at the same point of time. However, that is against our experience. Hence, to avoid the above absurdity in the state of affairs, we have to admit the plurality of selves. That is, ‘*nānātvē tu na ayaṁ doṣa*’⁸.

The third argument in favour of establishing the plurality of selves in accordance to individual bodies is *traiguṇyaviparyayatva*. The term ‘*eva*’ in the *kārikā* is related to the term ‘*siddham*’ in the verse, and not with the term ‘*traiguṇyaviparyayāt*’. Such a sense of the above verse is considered to imply that the arguments provided so far indeed establish the multiplicity of *puruṣa* and not its denial. The term ‘*traiguṇya*’ indicates the three *guṇas* – *sattva*,

rajas and *tamas*, and ‘*viparyaya*’ refers to the absence of the above three *guṇas*. It is important to note here that the term ‘*viparyaya*’ has a negative denotation and so it cannot directly establish the *puruṣa* as a distinct category from the complex (*triguṇātmaka*) entities. Thus, here the term ‘*viparyaya*’ is to be understood as *anyathātvā*, that is, diversity (*vaicitra*). So the above probans is to be understood as, due to the diversity of the three *guṇas* in different beings, multiplicity of *puruṣa* is to be admitted. In order to explicate the above, Vācaspati Miśra mentions – ‘*kecit khalu sattvanikāya*’⁹ etc. The term ‘*sattva*’ in *sattvanikāya* refers to *prāṇa*, and ‘*nikāya*’ means refuge (*āśraya*). Thus, the term ‘*sattvanikāya*’ means the refuge of life or living beings (*prāṇī*). The Sāṃkhya philosophical system admits stratification of beings on the basis of the dominance of one *guṇa* or the other in each individual being. For instance, the deities are considered to be predominantly *sāttvika* in nature and consequently, they experience pleasure and finer knowledge. Again human beings are said to be *rajoṣadṛhāna*, that is, the *rajaḥguṇa* is predominant in their nature. This results in their enhanced creativity and dynamic power. The animals or lower beings, on the other hand, possess a predominance of *tamaguṇa* which results in their ignorance and inertia. Now if the same self is considered to be there in each of the above different categories of beings, then the respective natures and potencies of each of the categories cannot be accounted for. Hence, we have to admit the plurality of self in order to avoid such inconsistency of matters.

Furthermore, birth and death being two contradictory phenomena, the pain experienced by an individual during birth and death are equally contradictory to each other. Hence, it is not possible for a being to experience the pain of birth and death simultaneously. In the world we find that some beings are born, while others are dying at the same point of time. Again some are experiencing pain, while others are enjoying pleasurable things at the same point of time. So if there would have been only one self in all these different bodies, then the simultaneous experiences would have been contradictory to each other and logically inadmissible. One self can experience either pain or pleasure at one particular point of time. It can have varied experiences at different points of time, but the same self, in spite of having different delimiting conditions (*upādhibheda*), cannot have contradictory experiences simultaneously. Even if we consider the different parts of a body to be the individual delimiting factors (*upādhi*), even then an individual never experiences pain in one part of a body and pleasure in another. Also one cannot experience different kinds of pleasure and/or different kinds of pain in the various parts of the body at the same point of time. That is, one cannot experience pleasure in one's head and pain in one's hand at the same point of time. Nor can one experience different forms of pleasure and/or pain in one's different parts of the body at the same point of time. It is evidently an absurd proposition. This is because the embodied consciousness can get apparently related to one particular mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa* at one particular point of time. Though pain and pleasure are not modes of the body rather that of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, yet in terms of being the apparent delimiters, such an argument

is not fallacious. However, on the contrary we find various contradictory experiences of pleasure, pain *etc.* to be produced in different individuals at the same point of time. Hence, it is to be admitted and rather it is clearly established that the self or the embodied consciousness as an apparent enjoyer is different in different bodies, that is, each self is specific to an individual body.

Finally, Vācaspati Miśra further clarifies the argument on the difference of simultaneous volitions by stating that we all know that different individuals do not experience similar kind of volitions at the same point of time. So the difference in simultaneous volitions show that selves are many. According to some Sāṃkhya philosophers, such is due to the absence of the volition of simultaneous production in *prakṛti* at the very beginning of creation. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *prakṛti* is responsible for the enjoyment and liberation (*bhuktimuktisahāyikā*) of *puruṣa*. So if *puruṣa* would have been one, then *prakṛti* would have created only one *antaḥkaraṇa*, one ego, one set of organs and only one gross body. However, in actuality it is not so. All the above are numerous. Now one might argue that the same self has the capacity to enjoy through different bodies; and that is why the *prakṛti* creates innumerable *antaḥkaraṇas*. In response it may be said that even if it so, then the *prakṛti* would have tended to create all the bodies together or simultaneously; however, that does not happen either. Thus, to account for the non-simultaneous volition of *prakṛti* to create, we have to admit the plurality of self. There are diversities among the different bodies, and the concept of

delimiters cannot really account for the same self in different bodies. Hence, it is clearly established that the above arguments convincingly prove the plurality of self in Sāṃkhya philosophy.

The focal point of the above discussion revolves around the issue that on principle, the pure consciousness should be one, which seems to be in accordance with the monist positions of the various schools of Indian philosophy, namely, like that of the Advaita Vedāntins. However, such a position is not admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy. It is true that they admit two categories of fundamental principles – the conscious (*puruṣa*) and the matter (*prakṛti*), but both the categories are constituted of multiplicity. The *prakṛti* manifests itself into the twenty three principles as discussed earlier, and the category of consciousness includes numerous embodied consciousness or self, which though essentially retains all the characteristics of the pure consciousness, yet acts as the apparent knower, enjoyer, agent *etc.* in the phenomenal realm. This constitutes the sense of being as individually experienced by us in our empirical existence. Thus, all these, and the arguments provided above, emphasise the fact that *puruṣa* is many in number.

In tune with the entire discussion above another argument that might be put forward is that due to the different potencies and capacities of different kinds of beings, the actions performed by them are vastly varied. Now if we consider the same self in different bodies, then the theory of *karma* cannot be accounted for. The different actions would lead to different results (*phala*) and accordingly to different *prārabdha karmas*. However, if the same self is

considered to be responsible for all kinds of actions by the different bodies, then the law of *karma* cannot be admitted, which is not a tenable position. Hence, we have to admit *puruṣabahutvavāda*.

With that we enter into the second part of the thesis which is concerned with the study of Sāṃkhya epistemology. The primary focus would be on how knowledge is produced and accordingly, issues related to *puruṣābodbodha*, *pramāṇa*, veracity of *pramāṇa* (*prāmāṇya*) etc. would come under the purview of our discussion in the respective chapters.

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PART II

CHAPTER 4

Embodied Cognition:

The Concepts of *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa* in the Sāṃkhya System

In the fourth *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, we find that the various means of acquiring valid cognition is being established and discussed about. The aim of this exercise is to provide the means of acquiring right knowledge which would lead us to our ultimate objective, namely, the liberation. Liberation is nothing but the absolute cessation (*aikāntika* and *ātyantika nivr̥tti*) of sufferings. To attain that, the only means is the attainment of a special cognition, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *sattvapuruṣānyatāpratyaya*. To attain such cognition, it is necessary to acquire the knowledge of *vyakta* (the expressed), that is, the world constituted of or transformed from *mahat etc.*, *avyakta* (the unmanifest) indicating the *pradhāna* or *mūlaprakṛti* and *jñā* or *puruṣa*, that is, pure consciousness. Now such knowledge can only be acquired by studying the *Sāṃkhya śāstras*. From there we get the cognition of all the twenty five *tattvas* or principles as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, namely, the *vyakta* (twenty three in number) comprised of seven *prakṛti-vikṛti* and sixteen *vikṛti*, *avyakta* (one in number) and *puruṣa*, essentially one in number. Attainment of the knowledge of all these principles is the primary programme of Sāṃkhya philosophy. However, all these *tattvas* should be established with

the help of *pramāṇa*, otherwise it would not be a part of any philosophical discourse. Thus, before establishing any other *tattva*, the *pramāṇatattva* is being established first. Now the *kārikā* is as follows – ‘*dr̥ṣṭamanumānamāptavacanam ca sarvapramāṇa siddhatvāt/ trividham pramāṇamiṣṭam prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi/*’¹.

Now it may be argued that the Nyāya philosophy has performed detailed and intricate discussions on *pramāṇa*, so what is the use of engaging in it again? The way Nyāya system establishes *pramāṇa*, if that is not refuted, then naturally it would be considered as accepted. This is because we all know that ‘*apratissiddham paramatam anumatam bhavati*’², meaning that if the others’ view is not refuted or contradicted, then it implies that it is accepted. Apprehending such an argument, Vācaspati Miśra states that ‘*abhimatāḥ pramāṇabhedāḥ lakṣaniyāḥ*’³. It means that only those *pramāṇas* which are essential in establishing the principles of Sāṃkhya philosophy are the accepted ones. Hence, it is important to carry out an independent discussion on *pramāṇas* in the Sāṃkhya system. However, prior to defining the specific definitions of each of the *pramāṇas* it is necessary to look into the common definition (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of the *pramāṇas*. Though it is not a compulsory condition in all cases, but in most cases it is required. Common definitions like, ‘*dravyatvajātimattvam dravyatvam*’ need not necessarily precede specific definitions like, ‘*gandhavattvam pṛthivītvam*’. However, the analysis of specific definitions requires that of the common definitions first. Hence, *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* need to be mentioned first before any discussion on the

viśeṣalakṣaṇas.⁴ Thus, Bhaṭṭapāda claims, ‘*sāmānyalakṣaṇam tyaktvā viśeṣasyaiva lakṣaṇam na śakyam kevalam kartum*’⁵ etc. Hence, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in the fourth *kārikā* gives the common definition of *pramāṇa*, its divisions and necessity. It is interesting to note here that the term ‘*pramāṇam*’ only indicates the common definition of *pramāṇa*. It stands both for the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) as well as the term that is being defined (*lakṣya pada*). The etymology of the word ‘*pramāṇa*’ shows that it is composed of the root *mā*, with the prefix *pra* and *lyuṭ* suffix in *karaṇavācya*. The entire compound conveys the meaning of *pramāṇa*, and also that it is the *karaṇa* of *pramā*.

At this point it is to be noted that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, terms like ‘*buddhi*’ etc. have not been considered in the prevalent sense of the terms or as admitted in the other schools of Indian philosophy. Each of the terms like, ‘*buddhi*’, ‘*jñāna*’, ‘*upalabdhi*’, ‘*pratyaya*’, ‘*saṃvit*’ etc. have distinct connotations. However, Gautama in his Nyāya philosophy states that – ‘*buddhiḥ upalabdhiḥ jñānam iti anarthāntaram*’.⁶ That is, terms like ‘*buddhi*’ etc. as stated above do not have any difference in their meaning. Rather they could be used interchangeably. But such a position is not accepted in Sāṃkhya philosophy.

As we know, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are the two fundamental principles. Of these, *puruṣa* is immutable, and hence of the nature of essential oneness. This is due to the pure essence of consciousness (*caitanyaśvabhāvatā*) which is the only constituent factor of *puruṣa*, or in other words, the *puruṣa* itself. On the other hand, *prakṛti* is

incessantly in a state of flux, and thus constituted of diversity. This is again due to the insentient nature (*jaḍatā*) of *prakṛti*. It is the very characteristic of an insentient object that it undergoes continuous transformation (*niyata pariṇāmaśīlā*). The first product of the insentient *prakṛti* is called *buddhi*. The other terms referring to *buddhi* are *mahat*, *sattva*, *citta* and *antaḥkaraṇa*.

The *buddhi* or the *antaḥkaraṇa* referred to above, being luminous in nature due to the predominance of *sattvaguṇa* in it, is like that of a mirror. It is clear in nature and can undergo transformations like expansion and contraction. It is due to such nature of the *buddhi* that it can reach the objects like, jar *etc.* through the passage of the eyes or that of the other sense organs, and acquire the form of the respective objects. The transformation of the *buddhi* or the *antaḥkaraṇa* in the form of the object inside the body, attained due to the assistance of the sense organs, including the *manas*, is called *vṛtti* or *jñāna*. Now when the reflection of the embodied consciousness is received on the clear *buddhi* or the *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is already transformed into the form of the external object, it gets manifested. According to Vijñānabhikṣu and his followers, the complex referred to above, that is, the *viśayākāra viśiṣṭa-buddhivṛtti* or the *caitanyapratibimbaviśiṣṭa-viśayākāra viśiṣṭa-buddhivṛtti* is again reflected on the *bimbapuruṣa*, that is, the actual consciousness, and then the entire compound gets manifested as the cognition. However, debates regarding the above two stances would be carried out in detail in the following chapter. Now whatever be the position regarding the manifestation of the cognition, namely, *ekapratibimbavāda* or *anyonyapratibimbavāda*, the above

complexes thus referred to, namely, *caitanyapratibimbaviśiṣṭa-viṣayākāraviśiṣṭa-buddhivṛtti* or the reflection of the *viṣayākāraviśiṣṭa-buddhivṛtti* on the *bimbapuruṣa* respectively, is called the *pauruṣeyabodha* or *upalabdhi*. It is then that the egoistic (*ābhimānika*) usages like, ‘*ahaṁ jñāmi*’ occurs in our everyday life. Further the internal transformations of the *buddhi* that occur in the form of pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) due to its contiguity with the respective pleasurable and painful objects, are referred to as *pratyaya*. Thus, the above discussion portrays the intricate finesse in weaving an epistemological standpoint as have been done by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. Each of the terms discussed above, indicate a distinct state of cognition, and also in a way maps the method of the production of cognition to be discussed in the subsequent chapter of the thesis. It is, thus, clear that the terms like, ‘*buddhi*’, ‘*jñāna*’, ‘*upalabdhi*’, ‘*pratyaya*’ etc. all denote distinct stages of a cognition, and accordingly, the interpretations of the terms like, ‘*pramā*’ and ‘*pramāṇa*’, as carried out in the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition, is to be understood. Detailed discussions and analysis of the terms ‘*pramā*’ and ‘*pramāṇa*’ would be carried out in the fifth chapter of the present research work.

Now as an introductory discussion on the above context, it might be stated that according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *pramāṇa* is the instrument of *pauruṣeyabodha*, and *pramā* refers to the *buddhivṛtti* or the transformation of the intellect in which consciousness is reflected. This is the intended meaning of the utterance ‘*bodhaśca pauruṣeyaḥ phalaṁ pramā*’⁷, by Vācaspati Miśra.

The instrument towards such cognition, which has been termed as *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* or *jñāna* is *pramāṇa*. The modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa* into the form of the object is termed as *jñāna* or *upalabdhi*, where the *vṛtti* itself acts as the *karaṇa*. Now according to Advaita Vedānta, any kind of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is a *pramāṇa*. In case of a false cognition, *avidyāvṛtti* is admitted. Thus, for them any kind of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is a *pramāṇa*, and there is no inconsistency in that. However, this does not fit into the Sāṃkhya model of cognition. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit transformations of the intellect which are not instruments of veridical cognitions (*pramāṇavṛtti*). Thus, Vācaspati Miśra states that ‘*asandigdḥā aviparītā anadhigataviśayā cittavṛttiḥ pramāṇam*’⁸. The first qualifier in the definition debar uncertainty from the scope of the definition, the second prevents illusions from entering within its scope and the third prevents the overcoverage of the definition into *smṛti* or memory. The term ‘*aviparītā*’ means that entity which is not denied or contradicted later on (*abādhitaviśayā*). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and others have also admitted the concept of certainty (*asandigdhatva*) to prevent overcoverage to doubts (*saṃśaya*). Vācaspati Miśra also admits such qualifiers in the definition. However, it is important to note that whenever *saṃśaya* occurs, if it be of an illusory nature, later on its object is contradicted. Thus, by the qualifier ‘*abādhitaviśayatva*’, such cases are debarred. Nevertheless to ensure clarity and distinctness, the term ‘*asandigdḥā*’ is inserted by Vācaspati Miśra in the definitional statement. Again, ‘*abādhitaviśayā asadviśayakabhinnā*’⁹ prevents the overcoverage into those fallacious cases where the locus or the relation is unreal (*asat*). The inclusion of the term ‘*anadhigataviśayā*’ in the

definitional statement prevents its overcoverage to memory. Thus, it is said, ‘*etena saṁśayaviparyaya smṛtitisādhaneṣu aprasaṅgaḥ*’.¹⁰ Hence, this compound form of *cittavṛtti* is *pramāṇa*. Further the form of the intellect along with the reflection of consciousness in the *vṛtti* is called *pramā*. The *cittavṛtti* being the instrument towards such *pramā* is called *pramāṇa*. Thus, in the fourth *kārikā* the common definition of *pramāṇa* is established by the term ‘*pramāṇa*’ itself.

We know that the different schools of Indian philosophy admit different numbers of *pramāṇa*. Among the heterodox schools, the Cārvākas admit only *pratyakṣa* as *pramāṇa*, whereas the Buddhists admit both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as *pramāṇa*. Again, among the orthodox schools, the Nyāya philosophy admits *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda* as the four categories of *pramāṇa* in their system. Further the Vaiśeṣikas admit only *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as *pramāṇa*. Next among the Mīmāṃsakas, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas admit five *pramāṇas*, namely, - *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda* and *arthāpatti*; Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers admit the above five *pramāṇas* as admitted by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and another extra *pramāṇa* called the *anupalabdhi*. Thus, they admit total six *pramāṇas*. The same six *pramāṇas* are also admitted by the Advaita Vedāntins. Finally, another class of thinkers, referred to as the Paurāṇikas, admit eight *pramāṇas* in total. Apart from the above six *pramāṇas* as admitted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and the Advaita Vedāntins, the Paurāṇikas also admit *sambhava* and *aitihya* as *pramāṇas* too. However, a detailed discussion of the number of *pramāṇas* as admitted by each of the systems is not a relevant issue

in the context of our discussion, and hence we refrain from entering into that. But the number of *pramāṇas* as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers is different from all the above schools and the respective nomenclature of the *pramāṇas* too differ from that of the other philosophical systems.

Thus, Vācaspati Miśra points out that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has resolved all debates on the number of *pramāṇas* to be admitted by stating ‘*trividham*’ in the *kārikā* which indicates that in Sāṃkhya philosophy only three types of *pramāṇas* are admitted. He emphasizes this by further stating that ‘*na nyūnam nāpi adhikam*’¹¹, meaning that the number of *pramāṇas* has to be only three, neither more nor less. That is why he says, ‘*trividham eva*’¹². The three types of *pramāṇas* that are admitted are *dr̥ṣṭam*, *anumānam* and *āptavacanam*, that is, perception, inference and verbal testimony respectively. Now the obvious or natural question would be why do we need to admit these three *pramāṇas* only, and neither more nor less? There are other *pramāṇas* which have been admitted by Gautama and others as well, as stated above. In reply to this, it is said in the *kārikā*, ‘*sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt*’. That is, *dr̥ṣṭa*, *anumāna* and *āptavacana* are such that they include all other *pramāṇas* like *upamāna* etc. as admitted by the others.

It is to be kept in mind here that the above three types of *pramāṇa* are only meant for the attainment of knowledge by the beings in the empirical realm. That is, the said *pramāṇas* are meant for the usage of individuals who are ignorant of the transcendental existence of the self. The Sāṃkhya *śāstra* being a *mokṣaśāstra*, that is, a philosophical system whose prime concern is

the attainment of liberation, provides the above three *pramāṇas* to the ordinary beings who are in the state of migration, and thus helps them to progress in the path of liberation by gradually attaining *tattvajñāna*, may it be over numerous births and deaths. This is because the *vivekakhyāti* or more precisely, *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, that is, the cognition instrumental for liberation, is eventually attained through perception. The same would be discussed in detail in the seventh chapter of the thesis.

Now apart from the above three categories of *pramāṇa* and their respective cognitions, there exists another kind of knowledge known as the *ārṣavijñāna* or *prātibhajñāna*. In the *Yogasūtra*, it has been stated that – ‘*prātibhād vā sarvam*’¹³. Such form of knowledge lies beyond the acquiring capacity of ordinary ignorant human beings. It is a type of knowledge which is only attained by the sages. The sages possess such *cittavṛtti* which always move in an upward direction, like the flame of a fire, and thus, transcends the empirical matter to get connected to the supreme sublime reality (*paratattva*). They are considered to be the possessors of *prātibhajñāna*. However, in the course of discussion of the *pramāṇas* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the above kind of cognition of the *yogins* have not been mentioned. It might be claimed that since such knowledge lies out of the purview of the commoners, and here Īśvarakṛṣṇa is concerned about the attainment of cognition of the beings in the empirical realm, hence, he leaves out the discussion of *prātibhajñāna* in this context.

At this point a pertinent question has been raised, that is the Advaita Vedānta and the *Sāṃkhya śāstras* have been considered as *prameyaśāstras*, then why at all are we discussing *pramāṇa* first instead of establishing the *prameyatattvas* from the very beginning. In reply to this Īśvarakṛṣṇa has stated in the *kārikā*, ‘*prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi*’. The cognition of *prameya* depends upon the *pramāṇa*. Though it is the task of *Sāṃkhya śāstra* to establish the *prameyatattvas*, however, that would not be a perfect one unless the *pramāṇas* are correctly established. Hence, the endeavor to establish *pramāṇas* first is of utmost necessity. Now keeping the categories of *pramāṇa* and their sequence in mind first of all perception is being defined and a detailed discussion on how it leads to the production of various cognitions including that of the self or consciousness would now be carried out. Accordingly, the other two *pramāṇas* would also be discussed in their definite order.

Perception or Dr̥ṣṭa

So far we have found that the general definition and the categories of *pramāṇa* have been discussed. Now we are about to enter into the discussion and analysis of the specific definitions of each of the *pramāṇas*. We know that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the primary and the most important of all the *pramāṇas*. The rest of the *pramāṇas* in some way or the other depend upon *pratyakṣa* to produce their respective cognitions. For instance, we know that for the inferential cognition, the cognition of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum is instrumental, but that could only be attained through perception. Hence, inference, though a distinct source of perception, is yet dependent upon perception for the production of its respective cognition. Again, in case of *upamāna*, one has to perceive the similarity or dissimilarity between the objects or entities concerned, in order to attain the requisite comparative cognition. Thus, *upamāna* too, in spite of being a separate *pramāṇa*, is dependent upon perception for the production of its respective cognition. Hence, perception is considered to be the foundational source of cognition, that is, *jyeṣṭha pramāṇa*. Moreover, it is important to note here that perception is such a *pramāṇa* which is unanimously accepted by all the philosophical traditions, and that too as the fundamental *pramāṇa*. Thus, it is to be elucidated first in the course of discussion on *pramāṇas*. However, it is to be noted that, unlike the other philosophical schools, the Sāṃkhya philosophers refer to perception as *dr̥ṣṭa*, and not as *pratyakṣa*.

We have already come to know that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, cognition is a mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Accordingly, it is important to discuss about the nature of the *citta* or the *antaḥkaraṇa*, in order to understand the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa* in the Sāṃkhya philosophical system. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, the first evolute of *prakṛti* is called *citta*. *Buddhi*, *mahattattva*, *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. indicate *citta*. *Citta* is a *taijas* element. *Taijas* elements, like water can acquire the shape of other objects. According to Sāṃkhya philosophers, such transformations (*pariṇāma*) of the intellect (*cittavṛtti*), that is, modification of *citta* in the form of other objects is termed as *jñāna*. It is to be noted that though the transformation of the *citta* occurs in the form of the object, yet the locus of transformation is the *citta* itself, since, the transformation must always reside in the transformed. Thus, in Sāṃkhya epistemology *vṛttijñāna* is not located in the self (*ātman*), as opposed to other schools, rather it is a property of the *citta*.

The transformation of *citta* in the form of *jñāna* is of two types. One kind occurs inside the body, whereas the other occurs in the external world. The transformation of *citta* in the form of object that occurs in case of inference and verbal testimony, takes place inside the body. On the other hand, when the transformation of *citta* in the form of object occurs through the eyes, that is, in case of perception, it takes place at the locus of the object itself (*viṣayadeśa*). The eyes are situated in the body, but their rays reach the object outside the body and they get related. Similarly, the *citta*, along with the rays of the eyes, reaches the object and attains its form. Thus, *cittavṛtti* or the

transformation of *citta* in the form of object, be it internal or external, is always located in the *citta* as *jñāna*, and thus, *jñāna* is essentially internal.

Now whatever be the locus of transformation of the *citta*, internal or external, then the object of knowledge must always possess a form, so that the *citta* may take up that form. So naturally the question arises that how would the *cittavṛtti* be in case of abstract or formless objects of knowledge? The Sāṃkhya philosophers reply that in those cases the *cittavṛtti* too would be formless or abstract; and that would also be termed as *viśayākāravṛtti* of the *citta*, that is, the transformation of *citta* in accordance to the object. Thus, it is interesting to note here that the term ‘*ākāra*’ in *viśayākāra*, *padārthākāra* or *arthākāra pariṇāma* or *vṛtti* stands for a relation between the transformation of the *citta* and the object of knowledge, and does not strictly restrict itself to denote distinct forms of objects only.

Now the most important discussion in any school of epistemology concentrates primarily on perception. This is because perception is the direct means of cognition and provides foundation to all other forms of knowledge, as discussed above. We too here restrict our discussion to understanding the concept of perception in Sāṃkhya philosophy in order to delve deeper into the concerned issue. We have already come to know that *jñāna* is a kind of *cittavṛtti*. Now according to Sāṃkhya philosophers, the means of cognition, that is, *pramāṇa* too is nothing but a *cittavṛtti*. Thus, to distinguish perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) from other kinds of *pramāṇa*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides the following definition of perception in the fifth *kārikā* -

‘*prativīṣayādhyavasāyodr̥ṣṭam trividhamanumānamākhyātām/ tallīṅgaliṅgī purvakamāpta śrutirāptavacanam tu/*’¹⁴. In the *kārikā*, first of all it has been stated that ‘*prativīṣayādhyavasāyo dr̥ṣṭam*’. The term ‘*dr̥ṣṭam*’ indicates the definiendum or that which is being defined (*lakṣya*), and the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) is given by the phrase ‘*prativīṣayādhyavasāyah*’. ‘*Lakṣaṇa*’ means that which distinguishes the *lakṣya* from its similar as well as dissimilar entities (*samānāsamānajātīyavyavaccheda*). Here, the similar instances are that of inference *etc.* and the dissimilar ones are the pots, jars *etc.* The intention of the definition is to distinguish *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* from both similar and dissimilar cases and establish its distinctness.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, an object (*viśaya*) is that which makes itself perceptible by bringing about a transformation of the *citta* which corresponds to the form of the object. *Pr̥thivī etc.* are the external objects of cognition, whereas the internal objects are pleasure, pain *etc.* All these are capable of imparting their own forms to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and gives rise to an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. However, there are entities which are not perceivable by ordinary human beings. They being supra-sensory or the like can only be perceived by the *yogins*. For instance, the five subtle entities referred to as *pañcatanmātra* are only perceptible to the *devatā* and the *yogins*. Hence, the term ‘*viśaya*’ is intended to include all the objects, including the empirically perceptible as well as the supra-sensory ones. From here it can be said that, the term ‘*prativīṣaya*’ means that which is directed or which intends to be transformed towards these objects. That is, ‘*viśayaṃ viśayaṃ prativartate iti*

*prativiṣayam*¹⁵. Here, the term ‘*vṛtti*’ means ‘*sannikarṣa*’, that is, relation between the sense organ and its object. Thus, the intended meaning of the term ‘*prativiṣaya*’ is a sense organ which can have a relation with each of the objects.

Such a sense organ, that is a sense organ which is directed towards and is related to its own object, first gets transformed in the form of an object and this transformation of the sense organ is called *indriyavṛtti*. This *indriyavṛtti* is the first rudimentary manifestation of the object and this initial rudimentary cognition is designated as ‘*ālocana*’ by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. This *indriyavṛtti*, in turn, imposes its own form on the intellect and the intellect assumes the form of the object. The transformation of the intellect is called *buddhivṛtti*. This transformation of *buddhi* leads to a cognition, which is called *adhyavasāya*. *Adhyavasāya* is defined by Vācaspati as ‘*adhyavasāyaśca buddhi vyāpāro jñānam*’.¹⁶ The sense organ which has assumed the form of the object is considered as the *karaṇa* or the instrument of this *adhyavasāya*. The relation (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense organ and the object is the *viṣayākāra pariṇāma*, that is, transformation into the form of the object on the part of the sense organ. It needs to be noted here that the cognition that is produced due to the *cittavṛtti* induced by the transformation of the sense organ into the form of the object is termed as ‘*adhyavasāya*’. The sense organs are specific in terms of their relation to the type of object to be known by them. Thus, when the transformations of the sense organs (*indriyavṛtti*) occur in the form of their relations (*sannikarṣa*) with the objects, the element of *tamas*,

which is one of the *guṇas* constituting the *buddhi*, gets suppressed and *sattva* predominates over the other two. The *sattva guṇa* constituting the *citta* or *buddhi* undergoes *sāttvika pariṇāma* which is then termed as *adhyavasāya*, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* and *jñāna*. This *adhyavasāya* itself is referred to as *dr̥ṣṭa* or *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. Since this *adhyavasāya* is the cognition resulting from the transformation of the sense organ, and since it is not a mere transformation of the *buddhi*, one might ask, why is this *adhyavasāya* designated as the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* instead of being designated as the *pratyakṣa pramā*? The detailed answer to this question will be given in the next chapter where we shall introduce and analyse the concept of *puruṣāvbodha*.

Now Vācaspati Miśra analyses the definition of perception and states the significance of each of the constituent terms. In the definition, ‘*prativīṣayādhyavasāyaḥ*’, the term ‘*adhyavasāya*’ is incorporated into the definition to prevent the fallacy of over-coverage to dubious cognitions (*saṁśaya*). *Samśaya* is defined as *ekadhārmikaviruddhanānādharmaprakārajñāna*,¹⁷ that is, where the cognition of various contradictory properties occur in the same locus, thus producing the cognition of the form ‘*ayam sarpah na vā*’. Thus, such cognition is always devoid of certainty. Since, ‘*adhyavasāya*’ and ‘*niḥścaya*’ are synonymous, the term ‘*adhyavasāya*’ has been included in the definition to prevent the over-coverage of the definition of a veridical perception to *saṁśaya*. This term also emphasises on the certain or non-dubious character of a veridical perception.

Now the term ‘viṣaya’ has been included in the definition to distinguish such cognition from *viparyaya*, that is, illusions. The term ‘viṣaya’ indicates the cognition of a noun qualified by an adjective. However, in case of illusions there cannot be any such cognition as it is an established fact that an illusion is always about an entity that does not exist where the illusion occurs (*asadviṣayaka*). Thus, the significance of the term ‘viṣaya’ in the definition is to keep apart illusions from valid perceptual cognitions.

Next, the term ‘prati’ has been included in the definition to leave apart *smṛti* (memory), inference *etc.* It is important to note here that in the statement ‘*viṣayaṁ viṣayaṁ prativartate*’, the term ‘prati’ does not indicate *indriyārtha sannikarṣa* (sense object contact or relation). Yet the verb ‘*vartate*’ originating from the root ‘*vṛtu*’ stands for the relation (*sannikarṣa*) and hence that being grammatically related (*samāśabaddha*) to the term ‘prati’, the intended meaning (*lākṣaṇika artha*) is the relation between the sense organ and the object (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). Hence, it is said ‘*indriyārthasannikarṣasūcanāt*’.¹⁸ Thus, it is proved that the given definition is complete in terms of being free from the fallacy of over-coverage as well as by providing the distinctiveness to perception from similar instances like *anumāna etc.* and also from dissimilar instances like *pot etc.*

According to the commentator Vācaspati Miśra, pure consciousness or *puruṣa* is reflected (*anuḡrḥīta*) by means of perception. That is, when the

conscious *puruṣa* gets reflected on the instrument (*pramāṇa*), namely, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, then the cognition of the form ‘I know’ occurs, which is also known as *abhimāna*. *Abhimāna* is the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* along with the consciousness reflected on it. According to Vācaspati, *buddhitattva* or *antaḥkaraṇa* are unconscious as they all are evolutes of unconscious *prakṛti*. Just as a jar produced from clay is unconscious, similarly, an evolute of unconscious *prakṛti*, like, *antaḥkaraṇa* is essentially unconscious too. Following the same analogy, it may be argued that *cittavṛtti* and *adhyavasāya* are also unconscious as they in turn are produced from unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa*. Similarly, the other transformations of *buddhitattva*, like pleasure, pain *etc.* are also unconscious. The only conscious entity is *puruṣa* and that is essentially unrelated to all these transformations, like, pleasure *etc.* *Jñāna*, *sukha* *etc.* are all properties of *antaḥkaraṇa* and that is their locus. However, *puruṣa* is reflected in that *citta* itself. As a result, due to the non-discriminatory cognition between *puruṣa* and *citta*, the properties like, cognition, pleasure *etc.* which are there in the *antaḥkaraṇa* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*, and thus, usages like ‘I am the knower’, ‘I am the enjoyer’, ‘I am happy’ *etc.* occur. Thus, the term ‘*anugraha*’ in ‘*anena yaścetanāśakteranugrahasatphalaṁ pramābodhaḥ*’¹⁹ as explained so far indicates the usage of the properties of the *citta* as the properties of the *puruṣa* itself.

Now here, naturally the question comes up that since *puruṣa* is essentially unrelated (*asaṅga*), then how can its *abhimāna* or I-usage be justified at all? And if we admit such usages then the essence of *puruṣa* would be contradicted. The following chapter would show how the process of cognition has been explained in the Sāṃkhya philosophical system as well as the essence of *puruṣa* has been retained.

Inference or Anumāna

In Indian philosophy, we find a methodology of argumentation where before establishing one's own view on any issue, the opponents' views are refuted, and then the views of the proponents are emphatically established. Similarly, here we find that before proceeding into the discussion on the definition and categories of *anumāna pramāṇa*, it is necessary to refute the opponents' views, namely, the Cārvākas here, on the above issue of admitting *anumāna* as a distinct *pramāṇa*.

According to the Cārvākas, perception is the only means of knowledge, and accordingly, they refute the admission of inference as a distinct source of *pramāṇa*. That is, '*na anumānam pramāṇam*'. The Cārvākas claim that if we admit inference as a separate source of *pramāṇa*, then *anumāna* being dependent upon the cognition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum, if there happens to be any sort of inconsistency in case of the attainment of *vyāpti*, there would not be any means of detecting or eradicating it. Consequently, we would arrive at a fallacious cognition. Thus, perception should be admitted as the only means of valid cognition.

However, in response to the above, Vācaspati Miśra points out that if we do not admit inference as a source of valid knowledge, then it would be impossible to discern between a knowledgeable person and an ignorant one, or one who is uncertain about her/his apprehensions. Perception can only provide knowledge about the physical aspects of a person. But it is not

efficient enough to help us determine the differences between the above mentioned individuals in case of interacting with others. This could only be understood with the help of inference by considering their gestures or linguistic usages in the different cases. Otherwise it would not be possible to carry out an appropriate communication as per the respective situations. Thus, unlike the Cārvākas, it is necessary to admit the distinct status of inference as a source of valid cognition.

Now after the deliberations on perception in the previous section, the effect (*kārya*) of perception, that is, inference (*anumāna*) is being discussed. First of all, again the common definition (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) is stated first by saying that ‘*talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*’²⁰ in the fifth *kārikā*. The term ‘*liṅga*’, defined as ‘*liṅgyatejñāyate apratyakṣaḥ arthaḥ yena*’²¹, means that by which the non-perceived or the entity which is not in contact with the sense organs, is known. So *liṅga* is the mark (*jñāpaka*) of such entities that are not in contact with the sense organs (*indriyāsannikṛṣṭa*). However, essentially *liṅga* is not the *jñāpaka* of such entities, rather such an entity is known through a concomitance relation (*vyāpti*). Thus, *liṅga* is the *vyāpya*. Now that which is known with the help of *liṅga* is termed as *liṅgī*. Thus, *liṅgī* is the *vyāpaka*. The exact connotation of the terms ‘*vyāpya*’ and the ‘*vyāpaka*’ is expressed as follows – ‘*śamkitasamāropitopādhānirākaraṇena ca vastusvabhāvapratiḥbaddhaṁ vyāpyam, yena pratiḥbaddhaṁ tad vyāpakam*’.²²

Now the locus of the concomitance relation is the *vyāpya* and the designator (*nirūpaka*) of *vyāpti* is the *vyāpaka*. The relation between the

vyāpya and the *vyāpaka* is termed as *vyāpti*, and it is a natural one. The terms like ‘*avyabhicarita*’, ‘*sāhacaryaniyama*’, ‘*abinābhāva*’, ‘*pratibandha*’ etc. are the other notes which could also be used to denote *vyāpti*. Now that the relation of *vyāpti* is a natural one, is expressed by the term ‘*vastusvabhāvapratibaddham*’ in the above definition. Thus, often *vyāpti* is defined as – ‘*anaupādhikaḥ sambandhaḥ vyāptiḥ*’.²³ That which is free from extraneous or superfluous entitlements (*upādhi*) is considered to be a natural relation (*anaupādhika sambandha*). If there be certain adjoining attributions or entitlements, then it would lead to the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* in case of the inference.

Now it be asked that to can we determine which probans is devoid of *upādhi*, and accordingly would lead to the production of a valid inferential cognition? In response it is being stated that – ‘*śamkitasamāropitopādhānirākaraṇena*’.²⁴ The term ‘*śamkita*’ means dubious or uncertain, and the term ‘*samāropita*’ refers to certainty. We know that *upādhi* could be of two types – either *śamkita* or *samāropita*. In case of the inference, ‘*parvataḥ dhūmavān banheḥ*’, the *upādhi* is *ārdrendhanasamyoga*, and it is a *samāropita upādhi*, that is, a certain one. This is because *ārdrendhanasamyoga* is certainly the pervader of the prodandum and the non-pervader of the probans, as per the precise definition of *upādhi*. In the above inference, the smoke is the probandum, and the fire is the probans. However, we are aware of a number of instances where there is fire, yet there is absence of smoke due the absence of any sort of water particles

in the air or in the logs of fire, that is, *ārdrendhanasamyogābhāva*. One such instance is a red hot burning ball of iron (*taptalauhapiṇḍa*). In such cases, though there is fire, yet we do not find any smoke due to the absence of moisture around. Thus, it is a fallacious inference due to the problem of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, and accordingly, *ārdrendhanasamyoga* is a *niścita* or a *samāropita upādhi*.

Again, in case of the inference, '*sa śyāmaḥ mitratānayatvāt*', we find a *śamkita upādhi*, that is, *śākapākajanyatva*. In ancient times it was admitted that whenever there is a person with a dark complexion that must be due to her/his consumption of lots of leafy vegetables. That is, *yatra yatra śyāmatva tatra tatra śākapākajanyatva*. This is endorsed by the following verse of the Āyurveda, - '*yādr̥gvarṇam āhāram upasevate garbhīṇī, tādr̥gvarṇaprasavā*'.²⁵ That is, whatever coloured food is consumed by an expecting lady, that complexion is reflected in her child that she gives birth to. However, we cannot convincingly claim that there is any necessary connection between the facts that another son of Mitra, who happens to be fair complexioned, yet his mother had consumed leafy vegetables before his birth, since there is no definite information in our hand regarding the above. Thus, a concomitance of the form, *yatra yatra mitratānayatva tatra tatra śākapākajanyatva*, cannot be necessarily claimed. Hence, the *śākapākajanyatva* is a *śamkita upādhi*, as it might hold true in certain cases, and not in other cases.

From the above analysis it is clear that for an inference to yield a valid cognition, it must be free from any sort of *upādhi*, either *śamkita* or *samāropita*, and that has to be ascertained by the means of favourable argumentation (*anukūla tarka*). To determine the *vyāpti* between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, we must be able to determine that they are naturally and necessarily connected, that is, *vastusvabhāvapratiḥbaddham*, and thus we would attain a valid inferential cognition, considering there being no other fallacies involved in the probans or elsewhere in the inferential form.

We know that the cognition of the concomitance relation is the necessary pre-condition of an inference. However, though the said relation is always present being a natural relation, but that does not mean that there will always be inferential cognition, since *vyāptisambandha* is not the cause of *anumiti*. Rather the knowledge of the concomitance relation is the cause of inferential knowledge. Thus, it has been mentioned in the commentary (*ṭīkā*) that ‘*līṅgalīṅgigrahaṇena viśayavācīnāviśayinām pratyamupalakṣayati*’²⁶. In the *kārikā*, it has been mentioned that ‘*tat (anumānam) līṅgalīṅgipūrvakam*’, which means that inference is preceded by concomitance relation. However, that is not the correct way of expressing. The mere precedence of the concomitance relation would not lead to inferential knowledge. Rather the cognition of concomitance relation would lead to *anumiti*. Since, this implication is not directly received from the *kārikā*, thus, with the help of implication (*lakṣaṇā*) we have to interpret it as ‘*līṅgalīṅgijñānapūrvakam*’²⁷.

Now one might apprehend that it is not sufficient to merely have the cognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. To attain an inferential cognition we must have the knowledge of the probans necessarily being there in the locus, that is, *pakṣadharmatājñāna*. However, Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not explicitly state that in the *kārikā*. In response to the above objection Vācaspati Miśra clarifies that by stating ‘*liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*’ in the *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has already implied the notion of *pakṣadharmatājñāna*. Vācaspati Miśra states that the term ‘*liṅgi*’ in the above phrase is to be reiterated twice, in the form of ‘*liṅgī ca, liṅgī ca*’, which through the rule of *samāsa* would lead to the interpretation as *liṅginau*, as we find in *guṇī ca guṇī ca guṇinau*.²⁸ Now by further applying *ekaśeṣa samāsa* and the subsequent *samāsa* we arrive at – ‘*liṅgam ca liṅginau liṅgaliṅginau/ liṅgaliṅginau pūrvam yasya tat liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam//*’.²⁹ Further on explicating the asaid statement we get, ‘*tat liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*’, that is, ‘*anumānam liṅgaliṅgijñānajanyam*’.³⁰

The above discussion shows that the first utterance of ‘*liṅgi*’ denotes the *vyāpaka*, whereas the second usage of the same stands for ‘*liṅgam asya asti*’³¹, that is, the locus of the *liṅga* or the *hetu*. We know that in an inference the probans or the *hetu* resides in the locus or the *pakṣa*. However, here it is to be kept in mind that the above term ‘*liṅgi*’, in case of the second utterance, does not only signify the locus, rather by applying implication (*lakṣaṇā*) we have to understand that the term denotes the cognition of the probans in the locus, that is, in other words, *pakṣadharmatājñāna*. Usages like ‘*parvataḥ*

dhūmavān’ etc. are instances of such cognition. Thus, it could be stated that by the utterance and the reiteration of the term ‘*liṅgi*’ we arrive at the definition, - ‘*tadvyāpyavyāpakabhāvapakṣadharmatājñānapūrvakam anumānam*’.³² Thus, it could be emphasised that apart from *vyāptijñāna*, another cause which is necessary for the production of inferential cognition is *pakṣadharmatājñāna*. It is clear that both Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vācaspati Miśra have admitted of the same, and hence, we get the definition of inference as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, and it is also consistent with the other systems of Indian epistemology.

Now Īśvarakṛṣṇa admits three categories of *anumāna* following the Nyāya system but he does not state their names. Vācaspati Miśra refers to the *Nyāyasūtra*, - ‘*atha tatpūrvakam trividham anumānamākhyātam*’.³³ in his commentary on the *kārikā*. However, he too does not explicitly mention that he is referring to the Nyāya school of philosophy, rather he only states that such a division of inference is admitted in the other philosophical systems (*tantrāntara*). Now there might be a confusion regarding the term ‘*tantrāntara*’, considering the views of Praśastapāda, the proponent of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, and Śābarasvāmī, the commentator on Mīmāṃsā *sūtras*. Regarding the categorizations of inference, Praśastapāda states that – ‘*tat tu dvividham dṛṣṭam sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca*’³⁴, and Śābarasvāmī held that – ‘*tat tu dvividham pratyakṣato dṛṣṭasambandham sāmānyatodṛṣṭasambandham ca*’.³⁵ So we find that both the systems admit only two categories of inference. Thus, when Vācaspati Miśra, in his *īkā*,

states that in *tantrāntara*, that is, in some other school of philosophy, three kinds of inference are admitted, it is evident that he is referring to the Nyāya school of philosophy.

In order to resolve the discrepancy between the admissions of either two or three kinds of inference, following the Neo-Sāṃkhya system Vācaspati Miśra initially states that *anumāna* is of two types - *vīta* and *avīta*. *Vīta anumāna* is that which establishes the probandum (*sādhya*) based on the positive concomitance relation, ‘*anvayasahacārajñānajanyavyāptijñānajanya vīta*’³⁶, and that inference which is based on negative concomitance relation is *avīta anumāna*, ‘*vyatirekasahacārajñānajanyavyāptijñānajanya anumāna avīta*’³⁷. In Nyāya system, the first kind of inference is called *pūrvavat* and the second is the *śeṣavat anumāna*. The kind of *śeṣavat anumāna* referred to in the Nyāya system is the same as the *avīta anumāna* admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy. The term ‘*śeṣa*’ or ‘*pariśeṣa*’ indicates that which is obtained as a consequence. The inference establishing such a result is called *śeṣavat* or *avīta anumāna*. In this context, Vātsyāyana states that – ‘*prasaktapraṭiṣedhe anyatra aprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ pariśeṣaḥ*’.³⁸ In order to interpret, this could further be amplified as – ‘*prasaktānām keṣāmcit sambhāvyamānānām praṭiṣedhe niṣedhe anumānena abhāvaniścaye, anyatra prasaktebhyaḥ anyeṣu aprasaṅgāt dharmigrahakāle eva abhāvaniścayāt śiṣyamāṇe - praṭiṣedhānantaram avaśiṣṭe sampratyayaḥ jñānam*’.³⁹

The following instance would help to explain the above. We receive a sound with the help of our ears (*śravaṇendriya*). Now the question arises that

in which category should we include the component called sound (*śabda*)? It is clear that *śabda* should be included either in the category of *dravya* or that of *guṇa*. This is because *śabda* being existent (*sat*) yet non-eternal (*anitya*), it cannot be included in either of the categories of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* or *abhāva*. *Sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* are both *sat* and *nitya*, whereas *abhāva* is *asat*. Hence, *śabda* cannot be included in either of these categories. *Dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* are the three categories which are *sat* yet *anitya*. Hence, it is a matter of doubt or enquiry that whether *śabda* is *dravya*, *guṇa* or *karma*?

We consider cases of doubt (*saṁśaya*) to usually consist of two alternatives (*dvikoṭika*). However, at times dubious cases could also consist of three or four alternatives (*trikoṭika* or *catuṣkoṭika*). Now it is probable that *śabda* might be considered as *dravya* or *karma*, due to the similarity in their properties, namely, *sattva* and *anityatva*. However, such entailments are eliminated due to the fact that *śabda* is located only in the *ākāśa* by the relation of inherence. An object which is *anitya*, that is, something which is produced (*janyadravya*), can never inhere in one particular locus. Thus, the admission of *śabda* as a *dravya* is rejected by the inference – ‘*śabdaḥ na dravyam ekadravyasamavetatvāt*’.⁴⁰ Further *śabda* cannot be considered as *karma* either because *śabda* leads to the production of other *śabda*; but a particular *karma* never produces another *karma*. This is expressed by the inference – ‘*śabdaḥ na karma śabdāntara-hetutvāt (samānajātīyakāryajanakatvāt)*’.⁴¹ Thus, it is evident that *śabda* could neither be considered as a *dravya* or as a

karma. The other alternatives, namely, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva* have already been eliminated as discussed above. Hence, the only alternative that remains in which *śabda* could be included is nothing but *guṇa*. This is precisely the methodology of establishing an intended issue with the help of *śeṣavat* or *avīta anumāna*. However, Vācaspati Miśra, in his *ṭīkā*, points out that in case of the above instance, it would not help to take resort to *anvayavyatirekī anumāna*, as endorsed by Vātsyāyana; rather here we need to consider *kevalavyatirekī anumāna*. This is expressed by Vācaspati as – ‘*asya ca avītasya vyatirekinaḥ udāharaṇam agre abhidhāsyate*’.⁴²

In Sāṃkhya system, *vīta anumāna* is again of two types - *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. In *pūrvavat anumāna*, the *sādhya* is an entity which is previously well-known (*prasiddha*) through perception, as the *vyāpaka*, during the attainment of the cognition of the concomitance relation (*vyāptigraha*). Thus, in cases where the probandum is established beforehand by means of perception elsewhere, that sort of inference is called *pūrvavat anumāna*. For instance, in case of the inference, ‘*parvato banhimān dhūmāt*’, the probandum fire is being inferred in the locus *parvata* with the help of the probans smoke. But before such an inference, fire has been perceived a number of times in places like, the kitchen etc. Thus, fire is a well-known (*prasiddha*) object. That is, - ‘*dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyam*’.⁴³ This could further be clarified as *dṛṣṭam (pūrvakālikapratyakṣaviśayam) svalakṣaṇam (svaviśeṣaḥ) yasya sāmānyasya*.⁴⁴ It means that an object which is a matter of general perception, is referred to as *sāmānya*. However, when particular

instances of that object, say here, fire, are considered as the probandum, then those are called *svalakṣaṇa*, like the instance of fire on the hill. Such inference becomes possible due to the perception of particular instances of fire in the kitchen *etc.* Thus, the main contention of the above discussion is that, inferential cognition could be attained considering only those objects or their alike as the probandum which are previously known as the *vyāpaka* in case of the attainment of the cognition of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. This is expressed by Vācaspati Miśra as – ‘*tasya banhitvasāmānyaviśeṣasya svalakṣaṇam banhiviśeṣo dr̥ṣṭo rasavatyām*’.⁴⁵ Such inferences are referred to as the *pūrvavat anumāna*.

Now the second type of *vīta anumāna* is *sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa anumāna*, which is referred to as ‘*adr̥ṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviśayaka*’.⁴⁶ Inferences of such kind consist of probandum whose particular instance or its alike have not been perceived earlier. But that which acts as the pervader (*vyāpaka*) in certain cases another object which is alike the previous one (*svalakṣaṇa*) is perceived in case of the inference concerned. Such inference is referred to as *sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa anumāna*. For instance in case of the inference – ‘*rūpādiṣṭhānam sakaraṇakam kriyātvāt chedanavat*’⁴⁷, the sense organs are established as the instrument of cognitive actions in case of the cognitions of colours *etc.* However, in such cases while the attainment of the cognition of the invariable concomitance, particular sense organs or their alike (*svalakṣaṇa*) are not perceived in any of the instances. The pervader of *indriyatva* is *karaṇatva*. Hence, the *svalakṣaṇa* of such *karaṇatva* is objects

like, an axe *etc.* Thus, during the attainment of the cognition of the invariable concomitance, instances of *svalakṣaṇa* like the axe *etc.* are perceived, and not the particular sense organs. The sense organs being extremely subtle (*sūkṣma*), it can never be the object of perception of ordinary beings. Hence, we have to consider such an object as an instance which could be an object of empirical perception. Hence, in spite of the fact that an axe can never be the *svalakṣaṇa* of a sense organ, yet it is considered as an instance or the *sapakṣa* by virtue of its instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) in case of an action. Thus, it is not possible for the sense organs or their alike to be an object of perception during the attainment of *vyāptijñāna*, and accordingly, we have to consider some perceptible object which are alike by virtue of some of their other properties. That is why such inferences are called *sāmānyatodrṣṭa anumāna*.

Vācaspati Miśra here points out that the Sāṃkhya philosophy primarily being a *prameyaśāstra*, further analysis regarding the instruments of cognition (*pramāṇa*) would lead to the digression from the core subject matter, and hence, we too here refrain from any further discussion on the above. However, another *pramāṇa* which is admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, namely, verbal testimony (*āptavacana*) is yet to be discussed, and we now delve into that in the following section.

Verbal Testimony or Āptavacana

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, after stating the definition and the divisions of *anumāna* in the fifth *kārikā*, proceeds to discuss about *śabda* or verbal testimony. He defines as *śabda* as ‘*āptaśrutiḥ āptavacanam tu*’⁴⁸. Now before analysing each of the terms of the definition, it is important to state that why *śabda pramāṇa* is discussed after *anumāna pramāṇa*. It is because the establishment of *śabda pramāṇa* depends upon *anumāna*. To explicate, Vācaspati Miśra states that – ‘*prayojakavṛddhaśabdaśravaṇasamanantaram prayojyavṛddhapravṛttihetuḥjñānānumānapūrvakatvād śabdārthasambandhagrahaṇasya, svārthasambandhajñānasahakāriṇaśca śabdasyārthapratyāyakatvādanumānapūrvakatvam ityanumānānantaram śabdam lakṣayati - āptaśrutiḥ āptavacanam tu*’.⁴⁹ A person efficient in using a particular language gives some sort of an introduction to another person equally efficient in understanding that language. The former individual is referred to as the *prayojakavṛddha* and the latter as the *prayojyavṛddha*. Now a child who does not know the language or has just started learning that language is standing in front of the aforesaid individuals and listens to the conversation between them. The child observes that on listening to the instruction, ‘*gāmānaya*’, from the former individual, the second person carries out the order by bringing a cow. Just as the second individual had heard the instruction of the first individual, the child too had heard and observed the same. And accordingly finds a consequent action too. From that the child infers that the second person had performed the action being preceded by

volition (*prayatna*), just as the child feels the volition to suckle her/his mothers's breast in order to acquire food for her/his own growth and sustenance. That is, '*iyam gavānayanakriyā prayatnajanyā vilakṣaṇakriyātvāt madīyastanyapānādikriyāvat*'.⁵⁰ Thus, the child infers that the accomplishment of the action by the latter individual is due to the prior production of the volition in her/him on hearing the command from the former individual. Vācaspati Miśra refers to the said volition as '*pravṛtti*'. Further the child infers the nature of the cognition attained by the latter individual due to the attainment of the volition, as follows – '*gavānayanahetuprayatnaḥ gavānayaneṣṭasādhanaatājñānajanyaḥ vilakṣaṇaprayatnatvāt madīyastanyapānaprayatnavat*'.⁵¹ From this the child cognises that the latter individual acquires the cognition of the form that it is her/his duty to bring the cow. Then the child further enquires about the cause of such cognition on her/his own and by applying both positive and negative concomitance, comes to the conclusion that the utterance, '*gāmānaya*', of the former individual, is the cause of the above cognition on the part of the latter. Further the child also comprehends that there is a connection between the said utterance and the action performed thereafter. However, the child is yet to comprehend the individual relationship of each of the terms of the sentence with their respective objects. From the above instruction the child only understands that the words have got something to do with the action of bringing a particular animal which has got horns, hooves and dewlap or sagging folds of skin beneath its neck (*galakambala*). Next the instructor (*prayojakavṛddha*) again commands that, '*gām badhāna, aśvam ānaya*'. The latter person

(*prayojyavṛddha*) too again carries out the command accordingly, by tying the cow and bringing the horse. The onlooker child then applies the method of inclusion and exclusion of terms, that is, *āvāpa* and *udvāpa*, and attains the cognition that the term ‘cow’ refers to the animal having horns, hooves and dewlap beneath its neck, and similarly for the term ‘horse’ determines its respective reference by virtue of its particular characteristics. To clarify further it could be stated that on listening to the two statements, - ‘*gāmānaya*’ and ‘*gām badhāna*’, the child learns that the term ‘*gām*’ refers to the particular animal cow, and also the terms ‘*ānaya*’ and ‘*badhāna*’ refer to different actions. Thus, by the method of *āvāpa* and *udvāpa*, the child attains the cognition of the reference of the term ‘cow’, that is, the individual cow by including the term ‘*gām*’ from both the cases, and by excluding the terms ‘*ānaya*’ and ‘*badhāna*’ from the respective utterances. Again, on listening to the utterance ‘*aśvam ānaya*’, and comparing it with the previous utterance, ‘*gāmānaya*’, the child understands the meaning of the term ‘*ānaya*’, that is, it refers to the action of bringing something. Such cognition is again attained by the method of *āvāpa* and *udvāpa*, where the term ‘*ānaya*’ is included, and the terms ‘*go*’ and ‘*aśva*’ are excluded. This entire process is called *vṛddhavyavahāra*. However, from the above it is clear that the relation between a term and its specific reference is attained by inference.

Any term as such does not render a meaning. Only the cognition of the terms which are related to the cognition of their specific references (*svārthasambandhajñānasahakārī*) yield meaningfulness to the utterances or

sentences where they are used. Here the terms ‘*sva*’ and ‘*artha*’ mean *śabdārtha*. When the cognition of the referent (*śabdārtha*) of a particular term is cognised or recalled, then only the meaning of a word or a sentence (*śābdabodha*) is attained. The former cognition, referred to above, acts as an auxiliary cause to the attainment of verbal cognition. Such cognition is attained through inference, and it is stated by Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary, as – ‘*anumānapūrvakatvād śabdārthasambandhagrahaṇasya*’⁵² etc. Thus, it is evident that inferential cognition should always precede the verbal cognition. The relation between a term and its referent is called *śakti*, and the cognition of the said relation is attained through inference. Though there are other means of attaining the *śaktisambandha*, namely, through grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), dictionary and/or thesaurus (*koṣa*), comparison (*upamāna*), description and/or analogy (*vivṛti* or *vivarāṇa*), contiguity of known terms (*siddhapada sānnidhya*) and adjoining sentences (*vākyasēṣa*), yet the most commonly used methodology is the use of *vyavahāra* or *vṛddhavyavahāra*. This process invariably involves the use of inference during the attainment of the cognition of the relation between a term and its referent (*śaktigraha*), as explained above, and it is also admitted by the other schools of philosophy, like that of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. Even in cases of *śaktigraha* through *vyākaraṇa* or other means, a person who does not have any idea of even the minimal usage of a language, cannot attain verbal cognition. Hence, the efficacy of *vyavahāra* in case of verbal cognition can never be denied. Further, since the entire process of *śaktigraha*, in case of verbal

cognition through *vyavahāra* involves *anumāna*, hence *śabda* is to be ascertained after the establishment of *anumāna*.

Now we revert back to the definition of *śabda* as put forward by Īśvarakṛṣṇa - ‘*āptaśrutiḥ āptavacanam tu*’, as stated in the *kārikā*. Here the term ‘*āptavacanam*’ indicates that which is being defined, that is the *lakṣyapada*. The term ‘*āptavacanam*’ is synonymous to *śabdapramāṇam*. The definition is stated only by the term ‘*āptaśrutiḥ*’. The said term is grammatically constituted of *karmadhāraya samāsa*, ‘*āptāścāsauśrutiśceti*’⁵³. The term ‘*āpta*’ here means attained (*prāpta*) that is, consisting of (*yukta*). ‘*Yukta*’ means possessing the capacity (*yogyatā*). Here specifically ‘*yogyatā*’ means *abādhitatva*, that is, ‘*yukta*’ here clearly means possessing the capacity of being non-contradicted. It is important to note here that the term ‘*śruti*’ usually refers to the organ of hearing, the act of hearing and the *Vedas*. However, here by means of implication (*lakṣaṇā*), it should be thought of as a verbal cognition (*vākyārthabodha*). Thus, *śabdapramāṇa* is that kind of cognition which arises out of sentences, is about the meaning of the sentences and is non-contradicted. Such sentential cognition is self-evident, and hence, *yukta*. Now since such cognition is due to impersonal or authorless *vedavākyas*, thus it is always free from errors, and hence, *yukta*. The Sāṃkhya philosophers do not admit *Īśvara*, so according to them the *Vedas* are authorless. If the *Vedas* would have been created by some agent afflicted with error, illusion *etc.*, the uttered words as well as the cognition arising out of these words would have been erroneous too. However, if there be no such

individual whose uttered words be the *Vedas*, then the question of the *Vedas* being afflicted with fallacies *etc.*, does not arise at all. Thus, the *Vedas* are authorless, there being no such being at all who has uttered it for its origination. Hence, it is always non-contradicted. Moreover in case if there would have been any possibility of any kind of challenge or refutation in case of the Vedic sentences, even then that is nullified due to the self-evidence of the *Vedas*. However, it is found that there is no possibility of any refutation at all in case of the *Vedas* or of the cognition that arises out of it. Thus, the *Vedas* are *yukta* and self-evident.⁵⁴

Further it might be apprehended that scriptural literatures like, *Manusmṛti*, *Purāṇas*, *Mahābhārata*, historical accounts *etc.* being authored texts, how can their authenticity or *yuktatva* be ascertained? In this context, Vācaspati Miśra states that literatures like the *smṛtiśāstras*, *purāṇas*, epics, historical accounts *etc.* in spite of being authored, are to be considered as veridical as the *Vedas* themselves, since the said texts uphold and establish the tenets of the *Vedas* themselves. Hence, they are to be regarded as veridical, that is, *yukta*, as the *Vedas*.

Here one might argue that sages like, Manu and others have studied and realised the *Vedas*, and accordingly they have written their texts. Thus, their works could be considered as veridical. But how can we consider the *śāstras*, as propounded by Kapila and others, to be veridical (*yukta*) too? Kapila is regarded as *ādividvāna*. That is, his knowledge has not been imparted to him from some other teacher, or from the *Vedas* themselves. Thus, his

knowledge not directly pertaining to the *Vedas*, how can his words be considered as veridical? In response to such objections, Vācaspati Miśra cites a verse from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, - ‘*ṛṣim prasūtam kapilam yaḥ tam agre jñānaiḥ bibhartti jāyamānam ca paśyet*’.⁵⁵ It states that Kapila is *ādividvāna*, and his knowledge has not been imparted to him from some teacher of the Vedic tradition, yet he had attained the knowledge of the entire *Vedas*. This is because Kapila had studied and had attained the knowledge of the entire *Vedas* in his previous birth, which he could recall in its entirety and with all its veracity in this birth of his from his awakened *samskāra* at the beginning of the creation. Thus, by virtue of his recollective knowledge of the *Vedas*, Kapila has become the *ādividvāna*. Vācaspati Miśra puts forward an analogy in consonance with the above claim. He says that just as a person falls asleep at night after the events of an entire day, and again on waking up the next day s/he can recall all the events of the previous day, similarly, Kapila could recollect all the knowledge of the *Vedas* as acquired by him in his previous birth. Thus, the philosophical system or the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, as propounded by him, is inevitably certain (*niḥsandigdha*), veridical (*yukta*) and non-contradictory (*abādhita*).

Now it may further be argued that though one can recall all the events of the previous day on waking up from sleep the following day, yet it is possible for a person to remember and recall all the events encountered and the entire knowledge attained in one’s previous life. Thus, again the veracity of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra* becomes questionable. Here again Vācaspati Miśra

cites another instance from the *Mahābhārata* which states that a sage named Jaigīṣavya had perceived his own *saṁskāras*, and accordingly, could recall ten of his previous births in their entirety and with absolute veracity. In order to verify it, another *yogin* named Āvaṭya, who always used to exist in his subtle body, had questioned Jaigīṣavya regarding his previous births. Jaigīṣavya had gone through numerous births and in various forms including animals (*paśu*), human beings (*mānava*) and even as supra-humans (*deva*). Further, he being liberated (*jīvanamukta*), and there being no fluctuations in his *guṇas*, namely, the *rajas* and the *tamas*, no part of his supreme cognition has been hampered or obliterated. Thus, Āvaṭya asked Jaigīṣavya that considering all these births, which one among pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) has he experienced more? In response, Jaigīṣavya narrated the events and experiences of his ten previous births by stating that – ‘*daśasu mahākalpeṣu viparivartamānena mayā*’ etc.⁵⁶

The above anecdote depicts that though it might not be possible for commoners to be able to recollect instances and cognitions of their past lives, but *yogins* or individuals who have attained *vivekakhyāti* can perfectly recollect all the experiences and knowledge of the previous lives. Kapila too being a *yogin* and having attained the knowledge of the entire *Vedas*, is also a *tattvajñānī*, that is, one who has attained the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*. Thus, the Sāṁkhya *śāstra*, as propounded by him, is also in consonance with the *Vedas*, and hence, veridical (*yukta*) and non-contradictory (*abādhita*).

The term ‘*āpta*’ in the definition of *śabdapramāṇa* excludes the notion of *āgama pramāṇa* as admitted by the Śākyabhikṣu of the Buddhist schools, by the Jains, by the Kāpālikas who have renounced the modes of migration and also by some other philosophical schools. The *pramāṇas* which are admitted by the above mentioned traditions as *āgama*, are actually not so in the true sense of the term. Rather those are *āgamābhāsa*, that is, those which merely appear as *āgama*. The view of the above traditions having disparity with the Vedic tenets, or pertaining to such stances which are against the *Vedas*, cannot be considered as veridical. This is due to the fact that they are authored, and hence, tainted with inauthenticities, fallibilities and uncertainties. That is, they are *ayukta*. Moreover, these traditions being bereft of their roots in the *Vedas*, often establish such theses which are contradictory to each other, since they are founded by human beings who are not enlightened by the Vedic scriptures, that is, they are not *vedajñā*. Hence, these *śāstras* cannot be considered as either authentic or reliable (*āpta*), or veridical (*yukta*) or non-contradictory (*abādhita*). Further, to emphasise on the inauthenticity of the above *śāstras*, it is stated that only the imprudent or uneducated people consider these theses to be veridical. Hence, such heterodox apparently philosophical traditions are to be rejected by the truly wise individuals.

Finally it may be said that Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the *kārikā* has used the term ‘*tu*’ in the sentence ‘*āptaśrutiḥ āptavacanam tu*’ to refute the Vaiśeṣika position who do not admit the verbal testimony as a distinct *pramāṇa*. They consider it to be nothing but a form of the *anumānapramāṇa* itself. According

to the Sāṃkhya standpoint, *śabda* can never be included in *anumāna*. This is because *śabdapramāṇa* deals with the meaning of words or sentences. The object (*prameya*) of *śabdapramāṇa* is the meaning of the sentence. For example, the meaning of the sentence ‘*gauḥ asti*’ as obtained by *śabdapramāṇa* is ‘*gauḥ astitāvatī*’. Thus, on hearing the sentence, the cognition of the form ‘*astitāvatī gauḥ*’ arises. If, however, *śabda* would have been nothing but an *anumāna*, then the cognition would have been of the form ‘*gauḥ astitāvatī gauḥ asti iti vākyāt*’⁵⁷. It is not a correct interpretation of the sentence whatsoever, since, here the sentence is not at all the property of the locus (*pakṣa*) *gauḥ*. In case of *anumāna*, the *hetu* and the *sādhya* should be in the same locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), as well as the *hetu* should be in the locus (*pakṣavṛttitva* or *pakṣadharmatā*). However, no such condition is present in the above case. Hence, the application of inference is not possible in the above case. Now it could be argued that the probans could reside in the locus (*pakṣavṛttitva*) by virtue of the the relation of potency (*śaktisambandha*). Even then that would not lead to an admissible position, as *śakti* is not admitted in a sentence. Further it could be argued that by the accumulation of clouds one infers that it is about to rain. This occurs by perceiving the probans along with its properties (*vyāpyatvajñāna*), and not by cognising the locus-located relationship (*dharmadharmibhāva*). Then in the context of the instance in question, there also being the absence of the cognition of *dharmadharmibhāva*, why would it not lead to a case of inferential cognition? In response, it is clarified that in case of inferences like, ‘*parvato banhimān dhūmāt*’, it is necessary to perceive the co-residence (*sahacāradarśana*) of the

fire and the smoke at a number of places, like the kitchen *etc.* in order to attain the cognition of invariable concomitance between the two objects. However, in case of verbal cognition, it is not so. An individual on hearing a sentence recognises the meaning of the terms by recalling its respective referents, and accordingly attains the intended sentential cognition (*vākyārthabodha*). The utterances of an efficient user of a particular language consist of terms or sentences which might be previously unlearnt or unheard of, yet we attain the intended meaning of the sentence by the various means of *śaktigraha*. So there is no scope of previously perceiving the co-residence (*sahacāradarśana*) of a term and its referent each time or a number of times before the attainment of the sentential cognition. Thus, it is evident that *śabdapramāṇa* cannot be regarded as *anumāna*, rather it is a distinct *pramāṇa*. Hence, we can claim that according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, for empirical cognitions, three kinds of *pramāṇa* are to be admitted, namely, - *dr̥ṣṭa*, *anumāna* and *āptavacana*, and the three kinds of instrument of cognition have been discussed in this chapter as far as practicable, keeping in mind not to digress from the focal issue of our research thesis. The next chapter would deal mainly with the role of perception in explaining the production and the attainment of the I-cognition as experienced by our embodied consciousness in the phenomenal realm. Also the issues contradicting with such empirical apprehensions in the context of the transcendental consciousness are going to be discussed and analysed in detail in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER 5

Puruṣāvabodha: The Genesis and Nature of I-Consciousness

Issues regarding the possibility, method of acquisition and the veracity or validity of knowledge poses to be one of the most integral issues in any systems of philosophy. It is noted in almost all the traditions of Indian philosophy that epistemology acts as the foundation of the concerned philosophical system. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, we know that the very idea of liberation, though it is a metaphysical concern, is based primarily on the epistemological effort to attain the distinctive cognition between the matter and the consciousness. Further, in the context of Sāṃkhya philosophy, cognitive usages of our daily lives too come under the purview of epistemological analysis. This is because of the fact that according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* being essentially unbound and immutable, any form of relation with the various forms of cognition, requires incisive analysis.

Considering the study of epistemology as a prime concern of philosophy we find innumerable debates among the classical and neo-Sāṃkhya traditions regarding the nature of knowledge and its method of production. To be more precise, the contention extends to the fact that what at all could be designated as knowledge. The Sāṃkhya philosophical system seems to pose as one of the most intriguing schools in this context, as its very

philosophy is founded on the fact that consciousness (*puruṣa*) is essentially non-related (*asambaddha*), immutable (*apariṇāmī*) and perpetually and universally the same (*kūṭastha*). These attributes indicate the fact that the consciousness can never be related to anything. So the question comes up that if consciousness does not relate to anything at all, then how cognition could at all be possible in case of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Moreover, the notion of liberation in the concerned system is purely epistemological. Liberation, here, is nothing but the attainment of discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) between consciousness (*puruṣa*) and *prakṛti*. However, if the attainment of knowledge itself is impossible for *puruṣa* then how can such a philosophical position be accounted for? Thus, it becomes an imperative to study the nature of cognition and its apparent connection to consciousness in order to understand the intricacies of such a profound philosophical system.

The term '*pramā*' occupies a great significance in the epistemological study of all the philosophical traditions. The same holds true for Sāṃkhya philosophy too. The etymology of the term '*pramā*' shows that it is composed of the root '*mā*' meaning knowledge with '*pra*' prefix and with suffix '*an*' added to the root and then another suffix '*ṭāp*' along with it. Thus, the meaning of the term '*pramā*' is valid or perfect cognition. The following example would help to explain the concept of *pramā*. Let us consider that there is a jar in front of us. As soon as it comes in proximity of the eyes or any other sense organ, the sense organ (*jñānendriya*) immediately takes up the form of that jar. The *manas* or the internal sense organ helps in acquiring the form of the jar.

When the complete form of the jar is acquired, the mind then transmits it to the *ahamkāra*. The *ahamkāra* then provides the form of *aham* to the jar. Consequently, the complex formed is of the form ‘*ghaṭākāra aham*’. This complex then gets associated with the *buddhivṛtti*, and the *buddhivṛtti* acquires the form of the jar. Now the property of jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) in the jar (*ghaṭa*) is initially known as a universal property and then in relation to the individual jar. Finally, the *buddhivṛtti* associates the *aham* with the intermediary complex thus formed, and the cognition of the jar is produced. Hence, the complete form of the *buddhivṛtti* is ‘I know that this is a jar’ (*‘ghaṭamaham jñāmi’*).

Now the above form of *buddhivṛtti* is essentially unconscious. However, the intellect or the *buddhi* partaking the form of the object, due to its origination from *triguṇātmikā prakṛti*, essentially consists of *sattva guṇa* (*sattvagūṇānvita*), and hence it is extremely clear (*svaccha*) in nature. According to Vācaspati Miśra, such extremely clear *buddhivṛtti* immediately acquires the reflection of *puruṣa*. Now according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is non-related (*kūṭastha*) and immutable (*aparīṇāmī*). As soon as the reflection of *puruṣa* is received, due to its clarity (*svacchatā*) the form of the object is expressed. Such manifested form of the object is called ‘*pramā*’, that is, the perfect manifestation of the object through cognition. The instrument behind this manifestation, however, does not get manifested and is called *pramāṇa*. According to Vācaspati, ‘*asandigdḥāviparītānadhigataviṣayā cittavṛttiḥ, bodhaścapauruṣeyaḥ phalam pramā*’.¹ That is, the expressed or the illumined form of object, which is free from all kinds of uncertainty,

fallacy or illusions and that which was not known before (*anadhigata*), such expression of object is called '*pramā*', and the instrument (*karaṇa*) of such cognition is called '*pramāṇa*'. However, we find that in *Yuktidīpikā* and also Vācaspati Miśra has stated that the unconscious *buddhivṛtti* is *pramāṇa*, whereas the illumined *vṛtti* of that *buddhi* itself is the *pramā*. There is no causal connection between the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa*. However, *pramāṇa* is the logical and necessary condition of *pramā*.

It may further be stated that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, the terms '*pramā*' and '*pramāṇa*' have several meanings. There are differences in views regarding the point that which is to be considered as the *pramā* and accordingly, what would be the *pramāṇa*. If we admit the *pramā* to be located in *puruṣa* only, then *buddhivṛtti* is the *pramāṇa*. Again, if *pramā* is considered to be located in the intellect (*buddhi*) only, then the relation between the object and the sense organ (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) is the *pramāṇa*. However, *puruṣa* is merely the witness of *pramā* and can never be the knower. Nevertheless, if we admit *pramā* to be both in *puruṣa* and in *buddhivṛtti*, then the *pramāṇas* would be *buddhivṛtti* and *indriyārthasannikarṣa* respectively.² That is, '*puruṣastu pramāsākṣyaiva na pramātā iti*'. In *Pātañjalasūtrabhāṣya*, Vyāsa refers to the illumined *buddhivṛtti* reflected on *puruṣa* to be the *pramā*, - '*pātañjalabhāṣye tu Vyāsaiḥ puruṣaṇiṣṭhabodhaḥ prametyuktaḥ*'. That is, according to him, *pramā* is located in *puruṣa*. Vyāsa clarifies his position by stating that since the instrument of the enjoyment of *puruṣa* is the *buddhi* then the resulting cognition, that is, *pramā* is to be considered in the *puruṣa* itself.

The *puruṣa* in spite of being eternal and immutable, it has got the passive functionality of expressing or manifesting the *buddhivṛtti* qualified by the form of the object. Such expression or manifestation of the *buddhivṛtti* by the *puruṣa* constitutes the cognition of an object. The phenomenon of cognition of an object occurs as follows – the sense organ such as the eye *etc.* comes in contact with the object through its respective outlet and acquires the form of the object. It then transmits that form to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and the *antaḥkaraṇa*, more precisely, the intellect (*buddhi*) too, due to such contact, acquires the form of the object. Just as a person suffering from jaundice perceives everything as tinged with the yellow colour, similarly the *buddhivṛtti* assuming the form of the sense organ then acquires the form of the object with the help of the sense-object contact. It is interesting to note here that *puruṣa*, though essentially inactive (*niṣkriya*) and immutable, is attributed with functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) in a certain sense. *Puruṣa* does not possess an active functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) like *buddhivṛtti*. However, when the *buddhivṛtti* that is transformed into the form of the object, is reflected on the *puruṣa* and gets manifested, that itself constitutes the passive functionality of *puruṣa* in terms of knowing the object (*viśayagrahaṇarūpa arthakriyākāritva*). It should, nevertheless, be always kept in mind that the functionality of *puruṣa etc.* are not so in the literal sense of the term, these are mere usages.

To explicate the above position an analogy has been used as follows - ‘*japāspṛṣṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ*’. That is, a crystal kept near

a red hibiscus flower reflects the colour of the flower on it. That does not mean that the crystal has become red in colour, but merely appears to be so. Thus, it may be claimed that the reflection is also a transformation of *buddhi* and the reflection of the object on *puruṣa* is simply like the reflection of an object on water or a crystal. In *Pātañjalayogasūtra* we find that, ‘*ṛttisārūpyamitaratra*’.³ That is, during the state of migration the *puruṣa* attains identity or non-discrimination with the *buddhivṛtti*. In this context, in *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* it has been stated that everything that is there, is reflected on the pure, clear, mirror-like consciousness (*svacchadarpaṇarūpa puruṣa*), just as the trees *etc.* existing on the banks of a lake are reflected on the clear and placid water of the lake.⁴

In *Yogabhāṣya* we find that ‘*buddheḥ pratisamvedī puruṣaḥ*’.⁵ That is, analogous to the transmission of the sound waves, the expression or manifestation of the objects acquired by the *buddhivṛtti*, gets reflected on *puruṣa*. Thus, it is clear that the act of reflection is a mode or transformation of the intellect, and the reception of such reflection on *puruṣa* is analogous to the reflection of an object on a waterbody.

Further in *Yogabhāṣya* we find that the non-distinctive apprehension between the perceiver and the perceived is to be rejected as it arises out of ignorance, and hence, acts as the source of all sufferings. However, the relation between the perceiver and the perceived is not that of a spatio-temporal contact. Rather the relation between them is induced by their respective properties of *draṣṭṛtva* and *dṛśyatva*. These two components of cognition get

related in the modified form of the *abhimāna*. This is because a part of the *abhimāna* consists of the *draṣṭā*, while the other part of it is constituted of the *drśya* or the *jñeya*. This, however, is not apprehended at the moment of cognition, but on post-analysis in our thoughts.

Now Vācaspati Miśra further states that when *puruṣacaitanya* is reflected on the *buddhivṛtti* which is the intellect transformed through the attainment of the form of the object, the *buddhivṛtti* does not get revealed, but a cognition of the form of the object is produced. Now the question arises that how at all the cognition of an object is produced? Even though the *buddhivṛtti* appears as conscious, but it is not capable of revealing any object. Again, *puruṣa* is ubiquitous, but it also does not possess the capability of manifesting an object on its own. For, if that would have been the case, then all the objects of the world would have been manifested simultaneously. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra claims that the object itself is always non-perceivable. To refute such a position, Vijñānabhikṣu considers *buddhivṛtti* to be instrumental in attaining the form or the reflection of the object, and the subsequent manifestation of the *viṣayākāraprāptabuddhivṛtti* could only be possible if the *caitanya* gets reflected on the *buddhivṛtti* and the entire compound thus produced, again gets reflected on the *bimbapuruṣa*. Thus, the cognition of an object gets manifested. However, on a deeper thinking it would be revealed that even in such cases the object itself remains unattained or unmanifest. It is only the form of the object that we can acquire and cognise through the various means and methods discussed above.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, in this context, we need to distinguish between two forms of attaining the cognition of an object, that is, - *buddhiviśayatā* and *caitanyaviśayatā*. Vācaspati Miśra puts forward two different forms of perceiving the reflection in this regard. One is about perceiving a part of the locus of the reflection, whereas the other is concerned with the perception of the reflection in its entirety. He has kept in mind both the cases while expressing his views. The form of the object as attained by the *buddhivṛtti* is termed as *buddhiviśayatā*. Similarly, when the *buddhivṛtti* is being reflected on consciousness (*caitanya*), then the consciousness also appears to be of the form of the *buddhivṛtti*. Hence, the attainment of the form of the reflected one is nothing but ‘*viśayatā*’. However, Vijñānabhikṣu here argues that the admission of two types of *viśayatā*, namely, *caitanyaviśayatā* and *buddhiviśayatā*, is futile, since, *viśayatā* is one. The attainment of the specific forms of the respective objects by *buddhi* and *caitanya* respectively is nothing but *viśayatā*.

From our discussion as carried out so far, it is evident that the idea of ‘*arthagrahaṇa*’ is pivotal in understanding the Sāṃkhya epistemology. There is a controversy between Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu regarding the nature of *arthagrahaṇa*. To explain the phenomenon of *arthagrahaṇa*, Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu advocate two rival theories known as *ekaikapratibimbavāda* and *anyonyapratibimbavāda*. Vijñānabhikṣu explains that ‘*arthagrahaṇa*’, that is, knowing the object can be on the part of the *buddhi* or on the part of the *puruṣa*. In terms of the *buddhi* possessing the

cognition of the object, *arthagrahaṇa* means a definite transformation of the *buddhi*. Now naturally, apprehension arises that in case of *arthagrahaṇa* of *puruṣa*, then a transformation of *puruṣa* would have to be admitted. *Puruṣa* being essentially immutable (*apariṇāmī*), it is not possible for *puruṣa* to possess the cognition of the object, if considered in the strict sense of the term. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu talks of another way of knowing an object, and that is through the reflection of the object on *puruṣa*. The objects while being reflected retain their own form.⁶ Hence, it may be claimed that ‘*viśayagrahaṇa*’ or ‘*arthagrahaṇa*’, that is, knowing an object on the part of the *puruṣa* is nothing but its reflection on *puruṣa*. It does not involve any relation like contact *etc.* Here again it has been argued that if the above claim is admitted, then *puruṣa* being ubiquitous, it would receive the reflection of all entities simultaneously. Hence, the cognition of all the objects would be produced at the same moment, but that is evidently inadmissible. However, the refutation of the above objection is not quite found in the Sāṃkhya system. Thus, *arthagrahaṇa* should indicate *ākāragrahaṇa* that is, acquiring the form of the object both in case of *buddhi* and on the part of the *puruṣa*. This, in a way, establishes the theory of mutual reflectivity (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*) as proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu.

Next, the obvious objection that springs up at this point is that if *puruṣa* is qualified (*abhimānī*) with properties like, cognition, pleasure *etc.*, which are in essence the properties of *antaḥkaraṇa*, then the true nature of *puruṣa*, that is, non-relatedness, indifference *etc.* would be hampered. According to the

Sāṃkhya philosophers, such never happens. They cite an example in favour of their position, as follows - if a person sees his reflection in a mirror which has got dirty spots on it, and says ‘*malinam mukham me*’, then the actual face does not acquire those spots in reality, it is only an apparent usage about the reflected face. Analogously, the properties of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, namely, *jñāna*, *sukha* etc. express themselves or relate themselves to the reflected consciousness or *puruṣa* only, and not with the pure consciousness itself. Thus, the essential nature of *puruṣa* is never hampered, rather it is well retained.

In this context, Vācaspati Miśra also provides an analogy in consonance with the Sāṃkhya view, which explains how the essence of *puruṣa* is maintained in spite of its *ābhimānika* cognition. He says that at night the moonlight expresses all the objects, but the moon itself does not have any light of its own. It does not have the capacity to reveal itself or other entities. However, the moon reveals itself as well as all other objects with the help of the reflected sunlight on it. Here, the material, unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* is analogous to the moon. It can neither reveal itself nor the objects like pot etc. However, when the reflection of the self-luminous (*prakāśasvabhāva*) consciousness is received on it, it manifests itself as well as the cognition of pot etc. that are related to it. Thus, the possibility of the cognitive usages and the like in everyday life are properly explained.

Further, Vācaspati explains the reception of the reflection of *puruṣa* on the *antaḥkaraṇa* from two aspects. First, the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* being

the locus or the substratum of the reflection of consciousness, it appears to behave as conscious, and its modification (*vr̥tti*), namely, the *adhyavasāya* too becomes luminous (*prakāśasvabhāva*). Secondly, due to such reflection there occurs non-apprehension of the difference between *puruṣa* and the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Consequently, the *puruṣa* appears to be related to the properties like cognition, pleasure *etc.* which are actually there in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This position is further supported by the twentieth Sāṃkhya *kārikā* – ‘*tasmāt tat saṃyogāt acetanaṃ cetanāvadiva liṅgam/guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ bhavatyudāsīnaḥ*’⁷ According to the said *kārikā*, when the *puruṣa* and the *antaḥkaraṇa* *etc.* come in proximity, the *antaḥkaraṇa* behaves as a conscious entity and properties like agency *etc.* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*. Hence, by the reflection of *puruṣa* on *antaḥkaraṇa*, the respective attributes are mutually superimposed.

In this context, Vijñānabhikṣu states that though the *antaḥkaraṇa* behaves as the conscious due to the reflection of consciousness on it, yet the reflected consciousness located in the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot lead to the I-usages of *puruṣa*, in spite of the apprehension of non-discrimination between consciousness and *antaḥkaraṇa* and the subsequent superimpositions of the properties of *antaḥkaraṇa* on the reflected consciousness. Now according to Vijñānabhikṣu, to explain the I-usages of the properties of the *citta*, the reflection of *antaḥkaraṇa* on *puruṣa* is also to be admitted. This is referred to as ‘*pratyakṣa pramā*’, that is, valid perception as discussed in detail in the previous chapter. However, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, such cognition is

located in *puruṣa* (*puruṣaṇiṣṭha*). Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu explains perception by admitting the mutual reflection between *puruṣa* and *antaḥkaraṇa*, thereby establishing the theory of mutual reflectivity (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*).

In *Sāṃkhyasūtrapravacanabhāṣya*, Vijñānabhikṣu cites the main argument in favour of his position as follows - ‘*antaḥkaraṇasya tadujjvalitatvāllohadadhiṣṭhātṛtvam*’⁸. He states that when we talk of the perception of the self, the object of that act of perceiving is the self itself. Then naturally the question comes up that who would be the agent of that action? Now the self alone can be the agent and nothing else. This, however, would produce the difficulty of *kartṛkarmavirodha* as the same entity, namely, the self would have to be considered as the agent, that is the subject as well as the object of the act of perception. When the *buddhivṛtti* is reflected on consciousness or the self, then the *buddhivṛtti* itself as well as the form of the object attained by the *buddhivṛtti*, both are manifested by the self. However, the question remains that while perceiving an object usages like, ‘I am perceiving’ occurs. Then how does an I-cognition take place? The self cannot reveal itself, since, the self being the object (*karma*) of this act, its self-revealing character (*svapṛakāśatva*) would bring about the fallacy of *kartṛkarmavirodha*. Then how is the cognition of ‘I’ or the *aham* revealed? In this context, we might refer to the view of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas with respect to the theory of self-revelation (*svapṛakāśatva*) of knowledge. According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, knowledge expresses the object of cognition (say, a jar), the locus or substratum of cognition (the self or *ātman*)

and the cognition itself simultaneously. This is called *tripuṭi pratyakṣa*. That is, a cognition qualified by three attributes, namely, the object, the subject or the knower and the cognition itself. This is further collectively referred to as *miti-mātr-meṃ*. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas also admit the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of a cognition to be self-evident (*svataḥpramāṇa*). Accordingly, the structure of cognition as per their epistemological standpoint is – ‘*ghaṭamahaṃ pramiṇomi*’. That is, ‘I know correctly that it is a jar’. Such an epistemological position entails the theory of *akhyātivāda*, that is, the theory of error where an error or illusion encountered is not attributed to the cognition, rather to the usage. That is, according to *akhyātivāda*, cognitions can never be erroneous, rather, any sort of error that we are faced with in case of communication *etc.* are actually there in our linguistic usage or any other intermediary usage leading to the production of the cognition. Such erroneous usage occurs due to our non-apprehension of the distinction between two distinct entities, depending upon the context. The same holds true for Sāṃkhya epistemology too. Now reverting back to the objection of *kartṛkarmavirodha* as raised by the opponents of *svataḥprāmāṇyavādins*, we might refer to the argument provided by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas in favour of their position. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas state that the fallacy of subject-object contradiction (*kartṛkarmavirodha*) is found only in case of causal relations. According to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, unlike the Naiyāyikas, the method of production of knowledge is not a case of causality. Rather is it an instance of the expressor and the expressed (*jñāpya-jñāpakabhāva*). Hence, it cannot be a case of *kartṛkarmavirodha*. Similarly, in Sāṃkhya philosophy too we find the

pramā and the *pramāṇa* are not causally connected. So the argument put forward by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas in favour of their position, holds true for the Sāṃkhya position too. Further in consonance with the view of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya philosophers also admit *svataḥpramāṇavāda*, *akhyātivāda* and *svaprakāśatva* of knowledge. Such a position on the part of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is impending as the pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) as admitted in Sāṃkhya system, is essentially of the nature of supreme cognition (*jñā*) and is *prakāśasvabhāva*. Hence, the cognition of I, as found in ‘I am perceiving’ etc. is revealed by the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on the self, as held by Vijñānabhikṣu. This is because, the I-cognition too being nothing but a modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, or more precisely, a state of the *aḥamkāra*, that too gets reflected on the consciousness, and hence gets revealed in association with the *buddhivṛtti* modified in the form of the object. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu pertains to the theory of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* in explaining the I-usages in our cognition and communication.

Now delving further into Vijñānabhikṣu’s theory of mutual reflectivity we find that Vijñānabhikṣu states that the reflection of consciousness that occurs on the *buddhivṛtti*, is revealed by the *puruṣa*. Hence, to establish the object-hood (*karmatva*) of ‘I’ it is necessary to admit the theory of mutual reflection, namely the reflection of consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* and that of the *buddhivṛtti* assuming the form of consciousness (*caitanyākāragrāhita buddhivṛtti*) on the *puruṣa*. Vācaspati refutes Vijñānabhikṣu’s position by

claiming that there is only one reflection, that is, the reflection of consciousness on *antaḥkaraṇa*. He puts forward an example to explain this phenomenon. We find the reflection of moon on the water of the lake, but not vice versa. The reflected moon on the surface of the water consists of wavy movements, some particles of dirt *etc.* These properties are actually there in the water which get superimposed on the reflection of the moon. Similarly, the luminosity of moon is also superimposed on the water surface, due to the same reflection. Thus, ‘the moon is trembling’ or ‘the moon is dirty’ are only apparent linguistic usages which in no way affect the actual moon and are due to the attributes of the water itself. Thus, admission of mutual reflection between water and moon is not required at all, since, only the reflection of moon on water suffices to explain the superimposed attributes of trembling and dirty appearance of the moon on the water as well as the manifesting power (*prakāśatvadharma*) of the water. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra maintains that just like the reflection of the moon on the water explains the superimposed attributes of both the water and the reflected moon, similarly, the mere admission of the reflection of consciousness on the *antaḥkaraṇa* explains the superimposition of the attributes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on the reflected consciousness. For that we do not need to admit another reflection, namely that of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on *puruṣa*. Besides if another reflection on *puruṣacaitanya* is admitted, then the unrelated, pure, unaffected nature of pure consciousness would be hampered. Both the Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems admit the principle, “*upādheḥ pratibimbapakṣapātivr̥t*”, which means that whenever one entity is reflected on another, the qualities or impurities

pertaining to the reflector vitiate only the reflection. The original entity which is reflected is never vitiated by the qualities or the impurities of the reflector. Just as the actual moon stays pure and unrelated, similarly pure consciousness remains pure and unaffected by the changes occurring in the intellect. The reflected moon gets attributed by the properties of the substratum of the reflection. Analogously the reflected consciousness acquires the properties of the locus of the reflection, that is, of the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself, although in reality it is not affected by any of those attributes. Thus, there is no need to admit mutual reflectivity, since, the admission of only one reflection (*ekapratibimbavāda*), as stated above, is sufficient to explain the thesis.

Vijñānabhikṣu further clarifies his own stance against Vācaspati's views, arguing from the Neo-Sāṃkhya position. He says that desire (*icchā*) is always on the same locus as that of the *buddhi*, that is, *buddhi* and *icchā* are co-located (*ekādhikaraṇastha*). So cognition is also the property of *buddhi*. Otherwise we would have to say that one person would be attributed with *buddhi* while another with desire. That is, however, contradictory to our experience. Thus, it is to be admitted that the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* manifests the object. However, such a standpoint goes against the theory of mutual reflectivity. Vijñānabhikṣu had apprehended such objections beforehand and has provided several arguments to nullify the other positions and thus establish his theory.

First, Vijñānabhikṣu says that if the above position is admitted, then there appears clear inconsistency between the two Sāṃkhya aphorisms

‘*cidavasānobhogah*’⁹ and ‘*akarturapiphalabhogā’nnādyavat*’¹⁰. Here, the term ‘*bhoga*’ stands for an experience of the form ‘I am the knower of this object’. Such cognition ends up in consciousness. It is a common occurrence that the chef prepares the food and the master eats it. So if we overemphasize on the fact of co-located-ness of agency (*kartṛtva*) and enjoyership (*bhokṛtva*), the above two aphorisms become meaningless. Thus, the opponents’ view is refuted. It is, however, important to mention over here that according to the classical Sāṃkhya philosophy, agency and enjoyerhood both are properties of the *prakṛti* in its different modes (*pariṇāma*), and can never be located in *puruṣa* owing to its essential indifference (*ūdāsīnatva*) and inactive (*niṣkriya*) nature. Even then there does not arise any inconsistency in explaining the I-usages and I-cognitions with the help of the reflected consciousness owing to the convincing explanation of Vācaspati Miśra’s *ekapratibimbavāda*.

Secondly, if Vācaspati’s views are admitted then it would be impossible to prove the existence of *puruṣa*. He says that if we try to establish the existence of the actual pure consciousness (*bimbacaitanya*) with the help of its reflection on *buddhivṛtti*, then inevitably there would be the fallacy of mutual dependency (*anyonyāśraya doṣa*). Vijñānabhikṣu explains the fallacy elaborately as follows - according to Vācaspati, the reflection of consciousness is received on the *buddhivṛtti*. Now if such a reflection is obtained, then there must be the existence of the actual consciousness which is being reflected. That is none but *puruṣa*. However, here an objection may be raised that if the

existence of *bimba puruṣa* is not established first, then how can its reflection arise at all. Now if it is claimed that from the reflection itself, the existence of *bimbapuruṣa* is established and vice versa, then it will be a clear case of the fallacy of mutual dependency. Thus, admitting Vācaspati Miśra's views makes it impossible to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. Vijñānabhikṣu claims that the admission of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* saves us from such difficulties. Since, the *puruṣa* is established as the knower, so to establish the existence of *puruṣa* we need not admit a converse reflection of the reflected consciousness in *puruṣa*. However, it is necessary to admit the reflection of the object of knowledge in the *buddhivṛtti* in *puruṣa* itself. We know that for the knowledge of the self, the reflection of the consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* is compulsory, otherwise there would certainly be *kartṛkarmavirodha*. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu claims his position of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* to be free from fallacies. That is, 'na ca pratibimbānyathāpapattyā bimbabhūtaḥ puruṣaḥ syetsyatīti vācyaḥ// anyo'nyāśrayāt pṛthagbimbasiddhau ca tatpratiyogitayā bimbasiddhiriti// asammate ca jñātṛtayā puruṣasiddhyānantaram tasya jñeyatvānyathānupapattyā pratibimbasiddhau nānyo'nyāśrayaḥ//'.¹¹ It could, however, be mentioned over here that the above fallacy of mutual dependency, as proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu, with regard to establishing the existence of *puruṣa*, is not a tenable one as the existence of *puruṣa* has been logically and consistently proved in the seventeenth *Sāṃkhyakārikā*¹² independent of any theory of mutual reflectivity. Thus, it is to be kept in mind that the reflection of the consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* is held in order to explain the nature

and the possibility of knowledge in the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, and not to establish the existence of *puruṣa*.

In the third argument critical analysis is carried out regarding the method of the manifestation of an object. The reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* helps to manifest the cognition of an object. This may be explained by citing an example. If sunlight is reflected on water, that does not manifest the plants and animals that are there in the water, but say if a fish enters into that part of water which is illumined by the sunlight, then it being in contact with the sunlight gets immediately manifested. Analogously, the reflected consciousness in the *buddhivṛtti*, though it may reveal the *buddhivṛtti* itself, but it cannot reveal the object of cognition. Just like the waves of water may be illumined by the sunrays themselves but it is not certain whether the same would happen in relation to the reflected sunlight. This is because, it is not that well-established that the reflected sunlight has the capacity of revealing other objects. This proves the fact that the reflection of consciousness is not the same as the consciousness itself, rather it is an insentient entity.¹³ Here again, another analogy might be put forward to show that the reflection of an illumined object could possess the capacity of revealing other objects just as the actual object itself. We know that the sunrays are capable of expressing the objects in a room. Now if we keep a tub of water in that room and make arrangements for receiving sunlight on the tub of water only, then also we would find that the other objects of the room are revealed due to the reflected

sunlight on the water. Similarly for the consciousness and its reflection on the *buddhivṛtti*.

The fourth argument of Vijñānabhikṣu establishes *anyonyapratibimbavāda*. He says that when sand particles, water vapour *etc.* come in contact with the sunrays, they are revealed in such a manner that we experience a mirage. So it is evident that the admission of reflections of *buddhivṛtti* and the object (*viṣaya*) on consciousness (*caitanya*) for their manifestation is necessary.¹⁴ We, thus find, that the third argument, as stated above, refutes *caitanya* *pratibimbavāda* and the fourth argument establishes *anyonyapratibimbavāda*, as evident from the above example. However, such contention of the Neo-Sāṃkhya philosophers is not quite accepted by the classical Sāṃkhya philosophers due to their extreme concern to maintain the non-related essence of the pure consciousness.

In the fifth and final argument, Vijñānabhikṣu again cites the aphorism ‘*akarturapiphalabhogo’nnādyavat*’¹⁵ to argue against the co-located-ness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of knowledge and desire. He says that one can be the enjoyer of the fruit of an action in spite of being not the agent of that action. Like in case of cooking, the chef is the agent of the action, while the master is the enjoyer of the fruit of that action. Thus, it is clear that even if there is non-co-located-ness (*vaiyādhikaraṇya*) in case of knowledge and desire, no inconsistency occurs. Again, in case of every individual it is equally experienced by all that during an action the *manas* plays the role of determination (*saṃkalpa*) and the body directs the movement of its parts. The

buddhi and the body are different from each other, and so one performs the task of determination while the other performs the action. So here also we find that the determination or ascertainment (*saṃkalpa*) and action (*kriyā*) are in different loci. In this way, it is possible to explain one entity as the locus of knowledge and another as that of the desire. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu's theory apparently appears to be a more logical one. However, it is to be kept in mind that if the phenomenon of cognition and specifically that of I-usage could be clearly and convincingly accounted for by considering Vācaspati Miśra's *ekapratibimbavāda*, then keeping in view the principle of logical parsimony, it is far better to admit that theory. Moreover, the admission of the reflection of the qualified *buddhivṛtti* (*caitanyapratimbaviśiṣṭa antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) on the *bimbacaitanya* itself leaves a room for considering the second-order reflection to be one kind of transformation of *puruṣa*, which is in no way consistent with the main tenets of the Sāṃkhya philosophical system. However, regarding the immutability of *puruṣa*, if one considers a somewhat less rigid view, then the mere reflection of the qualified *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* on the *bimbapurūṣa* itself might not appear to be a transformation of *puruṣa* at all. An analogy might help to clarify this point. Let us consider the case of a mirror where various things are reflected at different points of time. Those reflections, however, do not modify the nature of the mirror. It simply continues to exist as a mirror, that is, as an object which has got the power of reflecting other entities. Similarly, in case of the *bimbacaitanya*, if it is considered simply as the reflector of the qualified *buddhivṛtti* or in other terms as a mere witness of it then, Vijñānabhikṣu's position could be considered without hampering the

essence of the *bimbapuruṣa*. Thus, the theories of reflectivity as proposed by Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu in their own way try to resolve the cognitive issues related to I-usages, provided the notions are applied in a very cautious and articulate manner.

In the commentary (*vārttika*) to the *Vyāsaśāstra* on *Yogasūtra*, - ‘*vṛttisārūpyamītaratra*’, Vijñānabhikṣu uses the term ‘*sajalaghaṭa*’. By the said term he intends to mean that water when kept in a jar, acquires the form of the jar. Next, when it comes in contact with the sunrays it gets manifested. Similarly, when the *cittavṛtti* acquires the form of the object and comes in contact with the consciousness, then the illumined *cittavṛtti* is manifested. Now it might be asked that why is it necessary to admit the reflection of the *cittavṛtti* qualified by the form of the object on the consciousness itself. In *Yogavārttika* we find that, ‘*nanu svaviśayavṛtteḥ sphuraṇam cetanasamyogādeva bhavatu yathā sajalaghaṭādiprakāśaḥ sūryasambandhāt, ataḥ kimarthe caitanye vṛttipratibimbam vṛttau vā vakṣyamāṇacaitanyapratibimbam kalpyate*’¹⁶. Vijñānabhikṣu puts forward this question in order to clarify it in the further course of his discussion. In the *śāstra* of the above *Yogasūtra* it is stated that during the state of migration (*vyūththāna*), the consciousness apprehends itself as non-distinct from the various modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, *buddhivṛtti*. In this context Pañcāsikha mentions that this non-discriminatory apprehension is nothing but an erroneous one. This is stated as – ‘*ekameva darśanam, khyātireva*

*darśanam*¹⁷ Here, the term, ‘*darśana*’ means consciousness (*caitanya*) and the term ‘*khyāti*’ refers to *buddhivṛtti* or the manifestation of *buddhivṛtti*.

In the above context, Vijñānabhikṣu cites an example that just as a magnet helps in the attraction or extraction of iron nails from a place or by inducing it with the magnetic power simply by being in proximity with it, similarly, the *citta* brings about the objects of cognition and enjoyment to its proximity by virtue of acquiring its form, and helps to fulfil the need of experiential enjoyment (*bhoga*) of beings by producing the apprehension of non-discrimination between the consciousness and the *buddhivṛtti* through apparent perception (*drśyatva*).

The notion of I-ness as expressed in utterances like, ‘I am perceiving’, ‘I am listening’, ‘I ascertain’, ‘I discern’ etc. is a universal form of cognition. The fundamental cognitive being (*jñā*) in the above usages is nothing but the *draṣṭṛpuruṣa*, that is, the pure consciousness. In other words, it is none other than the mere witness-consciousness, and not the knower or the enjoyer in the literal sense of the term. The *buddhivṛtti* being in proximity of the *draṣṭṛpuruṣa* manifests the form of the object with which it is qualified. Whatever gets manifested, or is perceived, that is considered as *drśya*, that is, objects of knowledge or perception, like form, colour etc. Objects like colour etc. are externally visible. They are cognised by the *citta*. Thus, we find that in case of perception of, say, a colour, the ‘I’ acts as the knower, the *citta* associated with the sense organs acts as the instrument of cognition (*jñānakaraṇa* or *darśanaśakti*) and the object acts as the knowable entity.

Generally, it is admitted that our cognition of the *citta* or *antaḥkaraṇa* is acquired through *anuvyavasāya*. Thus, during the production of the cognition of the *manas* or *citta*, we experience it directly, and later on in case of memory, we experience it through recollection. At times, however, it could be a matter of direct perception too, say, in case of introspection. The primary component of the *citta* is *asmitākhyā abhimāna*. The objects of cognition which qualify the *citta* are nothing but modes or forms of the above *abhimāna*.

It is to be noted that when the *citta* attains its placid state, the *abhimāna* or the *ahamkāra* becomes the object of direct perception. When the ego attains its purest form, then the transformations undergone by it in the course of attaining knowledge of objects, are distinctly discernable. Then the *viṣayākāraprāpta cittavṛtti* poses to be the knowable (*dṛśya*) and the pure ego (*viśuddha abhimāna*) acts as the instrument of cognition (*darśanaśakti*). Further when *abhimāna* reverts to its pure form, namely, *asmibhāva*, mediating upon such helps us to attain the distinctive cognition between the consciousness and the ego, thus leading to the sense of rejection of the ego. Attainment of the said cognition situates the consciousness in its pure, unrelated, immutable essence. This notion would be discussed in detail in the seventh chapter of the present thesis. However, in the context of our current discussion, it is to be mentioned that the distinctintive cognition between the *cittavṛtti* and the consciousness depends on the fact that the *cittavṛtti* being insentient does not have any capacity to express itself. Thus, it depends on the other for its manifestation or knowability, whereas, the consciousness is self-

revealing (*svayamprakāśa*). Hence, it could be stated that in terms of *draṣṭṛtva* and *drśyatva*, the self-revealing consciousness acts as the *draṣṭṛpuruṣa* and the *buddhivṛtti* acts as the *drśya*. The latter being in proximity of the *pauruṣeyacaitanya* appears to be associated with consciousness.

Now again referring back to Vijñānabhikṣu's theory of mutual reflectivity, we find that Vijñānabhikṣu himself raises an objection against his own contention apprehending the same from his opponents. He says that if there is a tree at a distance and even if there is no light over there, yet we have the cognition of the form 'I am perceiving a tree'. Similarly in case of the cognition of the form 'I am happy', 'I am sad', there being no distinctive apprehension between the self (*aham*) and the happiness (*sukham*) or sadness (*duḥkham*), they are cognised to be identical with each other. So cognitions of the form 'I am happy', 'I am sad' etc. occur. That is, '*sukhyaham jānāmīti buddhipuruṣayorekatābhramastu parasparpratibimbam bināpi dūrastha vanaspatyorivadoṣavaśādeva sambhavati tat katham buddhipuruṣayorvṛttisārūpyasiddhiriti*'¹⁸. From the above position it could be claimed that there is no need to admit *anyonyapratibimbavāda*. In favour of his own position, Vijñānabhikṣu now argues that according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, consciousness is a substance and it is ubiquitous. Moreover, consciousness being eternal, it is always in contact with all the entities simultaneously. Here, it might be argued that just as the sunlight reveals all the objects that are in contact with it, all that is in contact with the ubiquitous consciousness should be simultaneously revealed too. As a matter of fact,

however, all entities are not simultaneously revealed to a conscious *puruṣa*. Thus, the issue somehow stands that how can then the *buddhivṛtti* transformed into the form of the object be manifested, and not the other things which are in contact with the ubiquitous consciousness?

According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, objects are expressed from time to time and not always, which Vijñānabhikṣu terms as '*kādācitkatva*'. The verse is expressed as - '*ato 'arthabhānasya kādācitkatvādyupapattaye 'arthākātaivāarthagrahaṇaṃ vācyam buddhau tathā dr̥ṣṭatvāt, buddhāvapi hi saṃyogamātrasyāarthagrahaṇatve atīndriyasyāpyarthasya buddhigrāhyatvaprasaṅgāt/*'.¹⁹ We know that it is essential for *buddhi* to acquire the form of the object, for its cognition to be produced. Similarly if *puruṣa* expresses the *buddhivṛtti*, then it should also be essential for the *puruṣa* too to acquire its form. But *puruṣa*, according to the *śāstras*, cannot really undergo any transformation. Yet for the sake of explaining the methodology of cognition, *puruṣa* too must receive the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti*. In this context, there are proofs from *smṛti* as well, that establishes the fact of reception of reflection by *puruṣa*; and the *smṛtivākya* is as follows—'*tasmimściddarpaṇesphāre samastā vastudr̥ṣṭayaḥ/īmāstāḥ pratibimbanti saraśīva taṭadrumāḥ/*'²⁰

Whatever has been discussed so far, from that we find that the prime concern lies in accounting for the I-usages in the empirical realm. Thus, in order to explain the I-usages in our cognition, it is necessary to analyse how actually cognitions of the form 'I know the jar' ('*ghaṭamaham jānāmi*') are

acquired. In response, Vijñānabhikṣu states that the *buddhivṛtti* acquires the form, ‘*ghaṭamaham jñāmi*’ and that is then reflected on the *puruṣa*. Thus, the illumined *buddhivṛtti* gets manifested. However, if such a proposition is admitted, then according to the classical Sāṃkhya philosophers, the *puruṣa* can no longer be regarded as immutable. Vijñānabhikṣu here cites the views of Patañjali in favour of his contention from the *Yogasūtra*, - ‘*draṣṭṛdṛśyoparaktam cittam sarvārtham*’.²¹ Vijñānabhikṣu also refers to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* ‘*tasmāt tat saṃyogādacetanam cetanāvadiṅgam/ guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ bhavatyudāsīnaḥ*’.²² In the said *kārikā* the term ‘*iva*’ appears twice and Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the usage of the term ‘*iva*’ in both the places emphasises on the above fact that it is in consonance with his view.

According to the above Yoga aphorism, it may be stated that the consciousness being reflected on the intellect appears to partake the form of the intellect. However, it is an apparent sense only. Whereas, in reality, the reception of the reflection of the consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* is nothing but a further transformation of the *buddhi* itself. Just as the *buddhi* gets transformed by the form of the object, similarly, it gets modified by the reflection of the consciousness too. That is why the *buddhi* is being referred to as ‘*sarvārtha*’, meaning that which can attain the cognition of both the *dṛśya* and the *draṣṭā*. The intellect can attain the cognition of the self in the form of the knower, as well as in the form of the body. It can cognise that there is consciousness, as well as there are objects, like, colour, taste, sound *etc.* which

are absolutely different from the consciousness. Thus, the *buddhi* is referred to as *sarvārtha*.

The said aphorism could also be interpreted in the following manner. According to the Vijñānavādins, there is nothing other than *vijñāna*. Not even *puruṣa*. It is stated that - ‘*nānyo ’anubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo ’paraḥ/ grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayameva prakāśate// avibhago ’api buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ/grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavāniva lakṣyate// ityārtha rūparahitaṁ samvinmātraṁ kiledamiti paśyan/ pariḥṛtya duḥkhasaṁsṛtimabhayaṁ nirvāṇamāpnoti//*²³ That is, according to the Vijñānavādins, the intellect cannot cognise the other, and not even itself. The *buddhi* itself acts as the knower and the knowable, and expresses itself in a mechanical manner. Though the intellect and the consciousness are not distinct from each other, yet being limited in our vision or understanding, we consider the receiver, the received and the act of reception (*samvit*) to be different from each other. Thus, perceiving the world as only *samvit*, devoid of any other qualities *etc.* leads to the cessation of our sufferings, and hence, the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Vyāsa refutes the above stance by pointing out that if the said position is admitted, then what would be the object (*ālambana*) of the intellect (*prajñā*)? The intellect itself cannot act as the object of the intellect. Thus, in order to attain the perceptual cognition of *puruṣa* with the help of the intellect attained through the course of *samādhi*, or to differentiate between the *puruṣa* and the reflection of *puruṣa* on the *buddhivṛtti*, there must be the existence of

the actual *puruṣa*. The consciousness cannot act as the object of cognition in a similar manner to the cow or the jar. But to realise the fact that the insentient *buddhivṛtti* gets manifested by the self-revealing consciousness is precisely what is meant by *pauruṣeyapratyaya* in case of *samādhi* or *vivekakhyāti*. Finally, Vyāsa establishes that those who perceive the distinctness between the receiver, the received and the act of reception (*saṁvit*), are the possessors of perfect knowledge. It is due to such distinctive cognition that they can realise the *puruṣa* as essentially different from all other principles, and hence, attain *vivekakhyāti*.

Furthermore we find that the process of the cognition of I-ness (*aham*) can be traced as follows - in case of an I-cognition the *buddhivṛtti* acts as the special cause (*karaṇa*). The reflection of the consciousness is being received by the intellect (*buddhi*). The causal efficacy (*kāraṇatā*) of *buddhi* lies in the fact of receiving the reflection of the consciousness. Now the *buddhivṛtti* which has attained the reflection of consciousness is the cause towards *ahamākāra jñāna*. Here, the cognition of the form of cognition (*jñānākāra jñāna*), that is, *cidābhāsa* is there in *buddhi* itself. The object of this *cidābhāsa* which is there in *buddhi* is *aham*. Thus, *buddhi* gets associated with attributes like *jñānāśrayatva* (*jñātṛtva*) and *ahamākāraviśayāśrayatva* in definite order. Thus, in *buddhi* we find the co-located-ness of *jñānāśrayatva* and *ahamākāraviśayāśrayatva*, and due to such co-located-ness there occurs non-discriminatory mode of cognition in *buddhi* between the *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* of the cognition. Thus, the mode of *buddhi* that is produced is I-ness-

associated-knower-ship (*jñātrtvaviśiṣṭa ahaṁ*) and accordingly the usage produced is ‘I am the knower’ (*‘ahaṁ jñātā’*).

The cognitions attained through perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*āgama*) are considered veridical. Vyāsa, in his commentary (*bhāṣya*) on *Pātañjalasūtra*, - ‘*pratyakṣānumānā’āgamāḥ pramāṇāni*’, uses the term ‘*indriyapraṇālikṣyā*’²⁴ in order to refer to the sense organs (*indriya*) as the field of activity (*sañcaraṇamārga*) of the intellect (*buddhivṛtti*). That is, the *buddhivṛtti* reaches the locus of the object through the passage of the sense organs and acquires the shape or the form of the object. Such modification of the *cittavṛtti* is called *pramāṇa*. However, at this time the *cittavṛtti* does not become a matter of cognition. That is, it remains temporarily unknown or unattained. Through the subsequent process of the generation of cognition, as discussed earlier, it attains the form of *saṁkalpātmaka jñāna*, that is, ‘*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*’ etc. Eventually, the compound thus produced gets associated with *ahamkāra*, and finally acquires the form - ‘*ghaṭamaham jñāmi*’. Cognitions of the said structure get manifested and such expressions are only considered to be *pramā* in Sāṁkhya philosophy. According to Nyāya epistemology, the above form of cognition is called *anuvyavasāya*, which is a state of cognition after the production of the determinate cognition (*vyavasāyajñāna*). According to Vyāsa, the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* are the results of the qualification of the instruments of cognition by the form of the objects. ‘*phalamaviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaścittavṛtībodhaḥ*’²⁵ Cognitive usages like, ‘I know that this is a jar’

is an instance of *pauruṣeyacittavṛttibodha*. Such cognitions can occur in two ways. In case of perception, the structure of the cognition is ‘this is a jar’ or ‘there is a jar’. It is nothing nothing determinate cognition (*vyavasāyātmakajñāna*). In the next moment, cognitions of the form ‘I know that this is a jar’ occurs which is then associated with the sense of knowership (*jñātṛtvabhāva*). The latter is post-determinate cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). However, the former actually constitutes the perceptual cognition.

The perception of the form - ‘I am perceiving a jar’, consists of three components, namely, *draṣṭā*, *darśana* and *dṛśya*. However, during the act of perceiving the jar, we cannot discern between the above three components. Rather due to the apprehension of only the jar as the object of cognition, and the non-apprehension of the ego as the perceiver in a distinct manner, there arises non-discriminatory perception (*aviśiṣṭabhāva*) between the *draṣṭṛpuruṣa* and the *dṛśya ghaṭa*. This has already been discussed earlier in this chapter in the context of the fourth *Pātañjalasūtra*.

The above phenomenon of cognition could be explained in a different manner. All cognitions are essentially modes of the *abhimāna*. Among them perception is the externally-influenced transformation of the ego. Thus, perception of a jar is nothing but a mode of the externally-influenced *abhimāna*. It should, however, be kept in mind here that the *abhimāna* includes the *draṣṭa* too. Thus, in case of the perception of a jar, the cognition of the jar as a transformation of the ego and the notion of the perceiver native to the ego, becomes indiscernable. But the two components of the cognition could be

segregated in case of *anuvyavasāya*. Though in case of the perception proper (*vyavasāyajñāna*), the two remain non-distinct.

We know that ‘*pauruṣeyacittavṛttibodha*’ refers to the manifestation of the cognition in the form of the *cittavṛtti* qualified by the consciousness or illumined by the witness-consciousness. Now if the *puruṣa* helps in the manifestation of various objects in the world through different modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, then it might be argued over here that the *puruṣa* itself is associated with varied objects, and hence, mutable (*pariṇāmī*). However, that is not the case. Whatever variations are there, those are there only in the sense organs and the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The *puruṣa* is in no way connected to such transformations in actuality. Hence, the objection of its mutability does not hold. When the objects of cognition undergo transformation in relation to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the ego (*ahamkāra*) too undergoes a momentary transformation. The consciousness manifests that momentarily transformed ego as the knower or the perceiver, thus accounting for the possibility of I-cognition.

The establishment of *puruṣa* as – ‘*buddheḥ pratisamvedī puruṣa ityupariṣṭādupapādayiṣyāmaḥ*’²⁶ is particularly significant in the context of our discussion. Just as in case of reflection we find that a light ray hits a surface and deflects back on other surface, similarly, the term ‘*pratisamvedana*’ means the production of some sensibility or apprehension from some other sensibility or apprehension. To reflect the light rays we need a mirror or a mirror-like surface. Similarly, the sensibility produced from the intellect or the empirical I-ness, is reproduced at the subsequent moment in the form of

similar I-ness. The locus or substratum of such reproduction of sensibilities (*pratisamvedana*) is regarded as the interface of the intellect which helps in sustained I-cognition. It is to be noted that the very conception of the fact that 'I exist', is a result of the above phenomenon.

Our lower vital desires and functionalities are results of *pratisamvedana* in the *buddhi*, and the empirical senses of our financial or material matters are results of *pratisamvedana* in the sense organs. However, the reproduction of sensibilities (*pratisamvedana*) required for the realisation of the pure consciousness in its essence, lies beyond the realm of the intellect. It is through mediation (*samādhi*) that we can attain the distinctive cognition between the *buddhitattva* and the *puruṣa*, and hence, attain *vivekakhyāti*.

Further analysis on the above context of the nature of cognition has been carried out in the subsequent commentaries as well, which are being stated as follows - *Viṣamasthūlaṭippaṇī* is a commentary on Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvavaiśārādī*, which is again a commentary on *Vyāsaśāstra*, written on *Pātañjalayogasūtra*. In *Viṣamasthūlaṭippaṇī*, Bālarāma Īdāsīna carries out a detailed discussion on the notion of '*pauruṣeyabodha*'. In *Sāṃkhyasūtrapravacanabhāṣya*, Vijñānabhikṣu refutes the views of Vācaspati Miśra. Bālarāma Īdāsīna, in his commentary, initially puts forward the views of Vijñānabhikṣu and also elaborates the arguments given by Vijñānabhikṣu to refute the views of Vācaspati Miśra. However, eventually he refutes the position of Vijñānabhikṣu and establishes the views of Vācaspati Miśra.

With reference to that we are going to discuss in further detail about the concept of *pramā* in Sāṃkhya epistemology. So far we have seen that according to Sāṃkhya philosophy cognition is not a property of the self and it cannot be considered to be so in the literal sense of the term even in case of the theory of mutual reflectivity. Thus, cognition is essentially a property or a mode of the *prakṛti*. Further, deeper analysis into the notion shows that valid cognition (*pramā*) is not a property of *buddhi* at all. This is because, when *puruṣacaitanya* is reflected on the *pramāṇa*, that is, on the *buddhivṛtti*, consciousness and *buddhivṛtti* are used indiscriminately. Such non-apprehension of the distinction between the consciousness and the *buddhivṛtti* acts as the root cause of all the phenomenal experiences or usages on the part of the being. That is, states of migration including cognitive usages, experiences of existential or empirical aspects of various psychological states *etc.* are all due to such non-apprehension of the distinction between the consciousness and the *buddhivṛtti*. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, in case of such erroneous usages, the properties of *buddhi* get superimposed on *puruṣa* and consciousness is also superimposed on *buddhi*. Thus, the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* appears to be the knower. An analogy has been put forward here to further clarify the notion. When the moon gets reflected on the waves of the river water, the reflection of the moon quivers on the water surface. Then ordinary usages like, ‘The moon is quivering’ (*‘candraḥ kampate’*) occurs, which shows the imposition of the properties of the reflected moon on the actual moon. Similarly, usages like knower (*jñātā*) or ‘I know’ (*‘aḥam jānāmi’*) are simply imposed on the pure consciousness. Such

usages are referred to as the '*pauruṣeyabodha*'. However, such is not an actual property of *puruṣa*, rather it is a mere imposition on consciousness. Bālarāma Ūdāsīna and Pañcaśikha also maintain that *pauruṣeyabodha* is nothing but a state of the consciousness where there is non-apprehension of the distinction between the reflected consciousness and the *buddhivṛtti*. Thus, Bālarāma Ūdāsīna states that '*buddhivṛttyāsaha aviśiṣṭaḥ*'²⁷. It means that the apparent *pauruṣeyabodha* is nothing but the *buddhivṛtti* itself.

The very term '*pauruṣeyabodha*' gives the impression that it is a form of cognition and is directly related to the *puruṣa*. We, however, know that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, that could never be an admissible position due to the essential non-relatedness and immutable nature of the consciousness. Thus, we might ask at this point that, if the *pauruṣeyabodha* is essentially the same as the *buddhivṛtti* then why is it being called *pauruṣeyabodha* at all? In this context we find the following - '*draṣṭādr̥śīmātraḥ śuddho*'*api pratyayānupaśyaḥ*'. Bālarāma Udāsīna here refers to Pañcaśikha as follows - '*prāptacaitanyopagraharūpāyā buddhivṛtteranukāramātratayā buddhivṛtavyaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛttirityā*'*akhyāyata*' iti//²⁸ Further we find that '*apariṇāminī hi bhokṛśaktirpratisaṃkramā ca pariṇāminyarthe pratisaṃkrānteva tadvṛttimanupatati tasyāśca prāptacaitanyopagraharūpāyā buddhivṛtteranukāramātratayā buddhivṛtavyaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛttirityā*'*akhyāyate*'.²⁹ In the above *sutra* we find that the essential nature of the *draṣṭṛpiuruṣa* is being elucidated. The witness consciousness in spite of being pure and unrelated to the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, acts as an

indifferent onlooker of the states of the *buddhivṛtti*. The term ‘*dr̥śimātra*’ refers to the witnessing power that is not qualified by attributes which lead to bondage or related-ness of any form. Such consciousness acts as the *pratisamvedī* of the intellect. However, this consciousness is neither similar to the intellect, nor completely different from it. This is because the intellect gets transformed into the states of the known and the unknown. Sentient entities like the cow *etc.* or insentient objects like the jar *etc.* get imposed on the intellect by virtue of their form *etc.*, and hence, becomes known through the subsequent processes. Those which are not attained by the intellect remain unknown. The intermittent modes of the intellect in the form of the known and the unknown depicts the mutable nature of the *buddhi*. On the contrary, *puruṣa* being of the nature of supreme cognition itself (*jñā*), there is nothing as such which is unknown to the *puruṣa*. Hence, there does not arise any question of transformation of the *puruṣa* in the form of either the known or the unknown. Whatever is there, remains ever-known to the *puruṣa*, and thus, in essence, the *apariṇāmitva* of *puruṣa* is established.

Further, we know that the intellect being a compound object itself (*samhata*) acts to serve the purpose of the others (*parārtha*), as we have found in our earlier discussions in the second chapter of the thesis. But the *puruṣa* is of the opposite nature. Moreover, the intellect acts as the basis of determinate cognition, and being constituted of the three *guṇas*, is insentient in nature. But the *puruṣa* is only a detached observer of all these *guṇas* and their

respective modes. Thus, the *puruṣa* can never be similar to the nature of the intellect.

However, it is important to note here that the *puruṣa* cannot be radically different from the intellect either. This is because *puruṣa* in spite of being pure, acts as the onlooker of phenomena that are there or those which occur in the intellect. Thus, the *puruṣa*, though in no way related to such transformations in the literal sense of the term, yet seems to have an apparent sense of identification with these. Thus, Pañcaśikha in his commentary states that the *puruṣa* only appears to possess a directly proportional relation to the modes of the intellect, and hence, there occurs an apparent sense of non-discrimination between the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*.

Now it is to be kept in mind that the indifferent onlooker (*draṣṭā*) and the knower (*grahītā*) are not the same. The *draṣṭā* consistently maintains its state of an indifferent onlooker, whereas being a knower is a contingent state, which is applicable only in relation to the process of knowing, and not always. However, usages like, ‘I am the perceiver’ denotes the state of a knower.

In the above aphorism, the term ‘*dr̥śi*’ refers to *jñā* or *cit* or *svabodha*. The sense or the state of cognition which does not require any instrument for its production is called *dr̥śi*. Cognitions like, ‘I exist’ require the instruments of knowledge for its production, as, such usages are actually modes of the intellect. But the deeper sense that we want to convey when we utter the term ‘I’ lies far beyond the realm of the intellect or its modes. It is precedent to any

of our cognitive or emotive I-usages, and resides at the very core of our fundamental being. Such innate sense of I-ness in us does not require the help of any cognitive instrumentation. It is stated in the *śruti* that – “*vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāt*”; “*na hi vijñātu vijñāterviparīlopo vidyate*”³⁰.

Both the *karaṇa* and the objects of *karaṇa* are *dṛśya*. So the *draṣṭā* can never be the object of the *karaṇa*. Thus, the fundamental essence of the *draṣṭā* cannot be the object of the *karaṇa*, and hence, it is *svabodha*.

Now it might be argued that as long as there is creation, and accordingly, objects of perception (*dṛśya*), the *puruṣa* might be referred to as the *draṣṭā*, but what about the designation of the consciousness when there would not be any creation, that is, after *mahāpralaya*? It is clarified that in such a state the *puruṣa* would only be referred to as the *caitanya* or the *citiśakti*. However, if we prefer to use the term ‘*draṣṭā*’ even in that state, then it would refer to the *puruṣa* as the seer of the placid, primordial state of the *citta*.

Further, the term ‘*mātra*’ in *dṛśīmātra* in case of the above aphorism refers to the absence of all sorts of attributes on the part of the *puruṣa*. This is also endorsed by the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* – ‘*nirguṇatvānna ciddharmā*’.³¹ So it might be argued that how come the consciousness is being attributed by the terms ‘*anantā*, *apratisamkramā*’ etc.? The explanation could be provided in the following manner. The term ‘*ananta*’ in reality does not refer to any attribute, rather it indicates the absence of attributes. The same holds true for the term ‘*apratisamkramā*’.³² Thus, by stating that the *puruṣa* is devoid of all

sorts of properties (*sarvadharmābhāva*), such fundamental non-attributed (*nirguṇa*) essence of *puruṣa* is established.

However, we know that in the state of migration, for the sake of cognitive and emotive usages in the empirical realm, there occurs an apparent non-discrimination between the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*, and hence, the erroneous sense of being the knower, instead of the passive onlooker, occurs. But that is nothing more than a mere usage, and has no significance with regard to the transcendental nature of the consciousness. In this regard, we find a verse from the *Ādityapurāṇa* which states that - ‘*nityaḥ sarvagato hyātmā buddhisannidhisattayā/ yathā yathā bhavedbuddhirātmā tadvadiheṣyate/*’. This has been mentioned by Bālarāma Ūdāsīna in his *ṭippaṇī* on *Pātañjalasūtra* 1/7. It means that even if for the sake of mere usage, the *puruṣa* is referred to as the knower (*pramātā*), yet it is essentially never the knower.

Now looking back at the theory of mutual reflectivity, from the above stance of the analysis it is clear that Vijñānabhikṣu’s position is not an admissible one. It is evident that the knowledge (*pramā*) is not a property of *puruṣa* and the pure consciousness can never be the knower. The property of knowership (*pramāṭṛtva*) may be admitted in *puruṣa* in a merely figurative sense for the sake of usage only, but could never be essentially admitted as an attribute of pure consciousness.

Further we may delve into Bālarāma Ūdāsīna’s views which put forward another argument against the view of Vijñānabhikṣu by stating that

there is inconsistency in some of his contentions. Initially Vijñānabhikṣu admits that the *puruṣa* is the mere witness of *pramā* and not the knower.³³ Again, while refuting Vācaspati Miśra's position he held that if we admit the *puruṣa* as a mere witness then the existence of *puruṣa* could not be established. Thus, the two views are contradictory, and hence unacceptable. Bālarāma emphasises that if Vācaspati would have admitted the actual *puruṣa* to be the perceiver, then his view too would have been inadmissible. However, Vācaspati admitted the reflected consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* to be the knower and responsible for the expression of knowledge. However, if the reflection of consciousness is to be admitted then the existence of actual *puruṣa* is automatically established. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu's objections are quite naturally nullified. Some followers of Vijñānabhikṣu have argued that the sense of the cognition qualified by I-ness that is due to the *cittavṛtti*, appears to be there in the *puruṣa*. However, others hold that the *cittavṛtti* is located in the *citta* and the cognition is there in the *puruṣa*. Accordingly, there is no co-located-ness between the cause and the effect. This explains the usage of terms like, the sense of the cognition (*cittavṛtti bodha*). However, Bālarāma, in his *ṭippaṇī* on *Pātañjalasūtra* 1/7, has strongly refuted such explanation too by stating that 'aparetu 'puruṣavartī bodhaḥ katham cittagatāyā vṛtteḥ phalam' iti vyākhyātṛśaṅkā'anusāreṇa cittavṛtteriti śaṣṭhyantaṁ pāṭhaṁ kalpayitvā pauruṣeyobodhaścittavṛtteḥ phalamityevamarthāpayanti/ parantu na sa pāṭhaḥ kutrā'apyupalabhyata ityupekṣito'asmābhiriti bodhyam//'.

Bālarāma Ūdāsīna further shows how the reflected consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* could itself be considered as the expression of the cognition. The reflected consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* is in the relation of *dharmadharmibhāva* with the *buddhi*, and the *buddhivṛtti* itself is a property of the *buddhi*. Thus, both the above are co-located; that is, it is clear that the reflected consciousness is located in the *buddhivṛtti* as well as in the *buddhi*. This does not lead to any inconsistency, rather it establishes the sense of non-differentiation between the *citta* and the *citi* (consciousness), and at the same time essentially there remains a subtle distinction between them too. It is due to the above position that we refer to such as ‘*tādātmyāpatti*’ and not *abhedāpatti*. Thus, we find that the issues of causality between cognition and its cause, their co-located-ness and the sense of cognition are clearly resolved.

Now Bālarāma analyses Vijñānabhikṣu’s main argument against the view of Vācaspati Miśra. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the term ‘*pauruṣeyabodha*’ was introduced by Vyāsa in his *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*. So the literal meaning of the term is to be accepted. The cognition located in the *puruṣa* is to be admitted as *pauruṣeyabodha*. However, we know that the *puruṣa* is devoid of any attributes. So the cognition cannot actually be located in the *puruṣa*. Thus, we have to admit that the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* is received on the *puruṣa* and thus, the cognition is considered to be there in the *puruṣa*. This explains the usage of the term ‘*pauruṣeyabodha*’. However, if according to Vācaspati Miśra, we conceive of the idea of *pauruṣeyabodha* as the compound that is obtained through the imposition of the properties of

buddhi on the reflected consciousness on it, then we arrive at an inconsistency. The reflected consciousness is not the *puruṣa* itself. Rather it being insentient, can never manifest the *buddhivṛtti*. Thus, the reflected consciousness does not have any manifesting capacity. Here Bālarāma Ūdāsīna cites various instances from the views of Pañcaśikha and others, and argues that the issue of the reflection of the consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* is an established fact, but we do not find any evidence in favour of admitting the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on the consciousness. Hence, Vijñānabhikṣu's position is inadmissible.

In the above context, we may again refer to the Yoga aphorism, - '*citer pratisaṃkramāyāstadākārāpattau svabuddhisamvedanam*'³⁴, on which Vyāsa³⁵ states in his commentary that due to the non-apprehension of the distinction between the *caitanya* and the *pratibimbitacaitanya* on the *buddhivṛtti*, we consider the *buddhivṛtti* qualified by the *pratibimbitacaitanya* to be the *jñānavṛtti* manifesting the *puruṣa*. Furthermore, the insentient *buddhivṛtti* appears to be sentient due to the reflected consciousness on it, and we fail to discern between the two. Thus, the *buddhivṛtti* being apparently associated with the consciousness appears to behave as the *jñānavṛtti* or *cidvṛtti*. In this context, Pañcaśikha states that - '*na pātālam na ca vivaram girīnām naivāndhakāram kuṣayo nodadhinām// guhā yasyām nihitam brahmaśvāsvataṃ buddhivṛttimaviśiṣṭām kavayo vedayante*'³⁶. That is, the cave where the Supreme *Brahman* dwells, that is neither below the earth (*pātāla*), nor in the mountains, nor in the depths of the sea. Rather the wise

individuals consider the *Brahman* to reside in the non-discriminatory state (*aviśiṣṭāvasthā*) of the *buddhivṛtti* or the intellect.

To explicate, it may be stated that the *citiśakti* does not reach or does not enter the intellect in actuality, rather it only appears to be so. For instance, apprehensions like, ‘I am conscious’, are results of such erroneous usage. In such cases, due to the non-apprehension of the distinction between the intellect and the consciousness the insentient part of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, the *aham* as experienced in the empirical realm, appears to be conscious. That is why, the *citiśakti* appears to partake the form of the *aham* and seems to be identical with the *buddhi*. It is interesting to note here that if we analyse the *aham* or the sense of I-ness we get two types of senses. One is the *abhimāna*, like, ‘I am the knower’, ‘I am the enjoyer’, ‘I am conscious’ etc. which is precisely the state of indiscrimination between the *buddhi* and the *puruṣacaitanya*. It is also referred to as *svabuddhisamvedana*. And the other is the realisation of the pure consciousness as distinct from the *ahamkāra* and the *buddhi*. That is, the two aspects of the I-ness are the *draṣṭā* and the *grahītā*. Thus, dichotomy involved in the realisation of the consciousness in its true essence, and the sense of being the knower due to the indiscrimination between the *buddhi* and the *caitanya*, constitute the prime concern in Sāṃkhya epistemology.

Vijñānabhikṣu further defends his position by referring to the *smṛtivākya*, ‘*tasmiṃściddarpaṇesphāre samastā vastudrṣṭayah/ īmāstāḥ pratibimbanti saraśīva taṭadrumāḥ/*’. However, Bālarāma Ūdāsīna interprets the above in a different manner consistent to the position of Vācaspati Miśra.

He states that when the consciousness is reflected on the *buddhivṛtti* then there occurs *tādātmyāpatti* between the *buddhivṛtti* and the consciousness. In such a state the forms of the objects which qualify the *buddhivṛtti* are imposed on the reflected consciousness. Thus Bālarāma, in consonance with the views of his predecessors, claims that it is inappropriate to interpret the above verse as favouring the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on *puruṣa*. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra's position is to be admitted as the most acceptable one.

We know that the term '*pauruṣeyabodha*' literally means the cognition as an actual property of *puruṣa*. However, Vijñānabhikṣu, in accordance to the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, can only admit an imposed relation between the *puruṣa* and the cognition. Thus, he too has to admit an implicative sense of the term. In the *Pātañjalasūtra*, '*draṣṭādr̥śīmātraḥ śuddho 'api pratyayānupaśyaḥ*', too it has been clearly stated that the *puruṣa* is not the knower, rather the witness only; and the incorporation of the term '*mātra*' in the above aphorism emphatically prevents the consideration of the property of knowership in *puruṣa*.

Now we further know that Vijñānabhikṣu maintains that the reflected consciousness is not like the pure consciousness itself. It does not possess any capacity to express objects. According to him, the expression of objects constitutes functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*). This is his main contention. In response to that Bālarāma Udāsīna says that the reflection of an insentient object is necessarily insentient. However, can we refer to the reflection of consciousness as insentient too? It is held that, though it can never be claimed

that the reflection of consciousness is conscious, yet it can be claimed that the reflection of the consciousness can have the capacity to express.

On the above issue, that is, whether the reflection of consciousness could be regarded as conscious, or like that of an insentient object, we find that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in the fourteenth verse³⁷ of the seventh chapter of his commentary (*tīkā*) on *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* states that the reflection of the consciousness is not like that of an insentient object. According to him, the reflected consciousness is qualified with the properties of the consciousness (*caitanyādhiṣṭhita* or *upahitacaitanyāśrita*). So it is not completely devoid of the capacities of the consciousness. The commentator, however, does not elucidate further on this point and simply states as much. In this context, we can recall that Bālarāma Udāsīna too had stated that the reflection of the consciousness is not a mere insentient reflection in nature. Vijñānabhikṣu held that such reflection of consciousness is actually a product of the transformation of the intellect (*vimbākarabuddhipariṇāmaviśeṣa*). Bālarāma Udāsīna had not further analysed it whatsoever.

Now it is to be noted that if the reflection is a mere product of the transformation of the intellect then it cannot have any manifesting capacity. Again if the reflection is of the nature of the consciousness then it being different from the consciousness itself, would certainly be reduced to nothing but a mere insentient one. Further it might be said that the reflection of the consciousness is partly insentient and partly of the nature of the consciousness. However, even then the question would arise that which part of it is insentient

and which part is conscious. Moreover, even if it is so then how would the conscious and the insentient parts of the same consciousness be related? Bālarāma Udāsīna does not refer to these issues any further. However, the refutation of Vijñānabhikṣu's theory in his commentary, *Vidvottoṣiṇī ṭīkā* on *Tattvakaumudī* is only a fragment of that carried out by him in his commentary, *Viṣamasthūlaṭippaṇī* on *Vyāsaśāstra* of *Pātañjalayogasūtra* and *Tattvavaiśārādī* of Vācaspati Miśra.

From this part, we enter into our final discussion on *pramā* following the neo-Sāṃkhya philosophers namely, the followers of Vijñānabhikṣu. According to them, *pramā* is of two types — the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of object (*viśayākāra buddhivṛtti*) and the reflection of that *buddhivṛtti* on *puruṣa*.³⁸ The instrumental or specific cause (*karaṇa*) towards the first kind of *pramā* is the eyes or other sense organs while that of the second part is the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. In this context, it has been clarified by other commentators like, Bālarāma Udāsīna, that the eyes *etc.* are the *karaṇa* of *pramā*. However, it is important to keep in mind that here, *karaṇa* is defined as '*yena kriyā kriyate tat karaṇam*', meaning that which is responsible for the occurrence of the action. Further, Bālarāma Udāsīna states that the *buddhivṛtti* acts both as the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa*. The reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* acts as the knower (*pramātā*) and the consciousness which has received the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on it, is then the witness of the *pramā* only (*pramāsākṣīmātra*).

Vācaspati Miśra and other philosophers, however, have not admitted two types of *pramā*. According to them, when the sense organs get associated with their specific objects, then the *tamoguṇa* diminishes (*abhibhava*) and the *sattvagūṇa* becomes extremely intense (*udbhava*). Such a state of the *buddhivṛtti* associated with the intense *sattvagūṇa* is called *adhyavasāya*. Thus, the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of the object constitutes the *pramāṇa*. When such *buddhivṛtti* receives the reflection of consciousness on it, then that *buddhivṛtti* gets imposed on the reflected consciousness, and that is the *pramā*. *Pramā* is due to *pramāṇa*. Thus, it is evident that the superimposed properties of the *buddhivṛtti* on the reflected consciousness is referred to as the *pramā*, and not simply the properties of the *buddhivṛtti* itself.

Pañcānana Tarkaratna, in his commentary (*tīkā*) entitled ‘*Pūrṇimā*’, has refuted the views of Vijñānabhikṣu with the help of various arguments. Of those, one argument seems to be particularly novel. He says that if we keep two mirrors facing one another, then each mirror would be reflected on the other simultaneously. Similarly, the clear (*svaccha*) *antaḥkaraṇa* and the pure (*svaccha*, *visuddha*) consciousness being in proximity to each other, would keep on producing unending series of mutual reflections. Hence, accepting Vijñānabhikṣu’s *anyonyapratibimbavāda* would compel us to admit the infinite series of mutual reflections which is clearly inadmissible. However, in this context Gaṅgeśopādhyāya states in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* that even if we have to admit the infinite series of mutual reflections, Vijñānabhikṣu’s position remains unhampered. This is because the said series of reflections do

not serve any of our purpose nor does its existence affect the thesis in any way. Hence, it is to be ignored.³⁹ However, it could be observed over here that the infinite series of mutual reflections do hamper the prime contention. That is what would be determined as the *pauruṣeyabodha*? Vijñānabhikṣu had admitted the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on the consciousness to be the *pauruṣeyabodha*. However, due to the multiple reflections of the *buddhivṛtti* on the consciousness that continues incessantly, and hence, neither one could be determined as the *pauruṣeyabodha*. If it is held that the first or the final reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on the consciousness would be regarded as the *pauruṣeyabodha*, even then it would be inconsistent as in a continuous stream of reflections it is never possible to identify the initial or the final reflection. Hence, the objection raised by Pañcānana Tarkaratna stands out to be a valid one as it clearly shows that the admission of Vijñānabhikṣu's theory leads to the non-determination of the *pauruṣeyabodha* forever.

On reaching the terminal part, let us compare the theory of mutual reflection (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*) from the perspective of modern physical science and that of the classical philosophical position. According to the laws of physics, the reflection of an object requires the help of light. The production of the reflection of an object occurs due to the deflection of the light waves from that object. According to Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy the transmission of light waves is due to the action-reaction between the reflector and the light waves themselves. For instance, a mirror acts as a reflector. When the light rays deflected from an object reach the surface of the mirror, the mirror acts

as the reflector, and the rays immediately reach the eyes of the perceiver. As a result the reflection of the object becomes perceptible on the mirror. However, in the context of our discussion of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* there is no question of any functionality of light. The pure consciousness or its reflection is received inside our body, where there is no light. So any theory of reflection in the context of explaining the relation between a cognition and the consciousness is rendered meaningless in the light of modern day science. In this context Madhusūdana Sarasvatī states that the *buddhivṛtti* delimits the *puruṣa* or the supra-sensory consciousness, and superimposes its own properties and attributes on it. Whatever is imposed on *puruṣa*, gets manifested. This was, however, in a way endorsed by Vijñānabhikṣu too in his *Pravacanabhāṣya* through the analogy of the mirage in a desert. Now leaving aside the theory of mutual reflection if we consider the view of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī along with the previously stated explanations of Vācaspati Miśra then we arrive at a comprehensive thesis on the issues of cognition and consciousness that could be acceptable by the scientific outlook too.

From the detailed analysis carried out so far on the method, possibility and the nature of cognition in Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is evident that the theories of reflectivity, be it as admitted by Vācaspati Miśra or by Vijñānabhikṣu, are nothing but representations of the cognitive process. However, they all emphasize somehow or the other on the fact that reflections of the *buddhivṛtti* should be received on the supra-sensory consciousness, and not on the reflected consciousness which acts as its representative. It is this

contention which poses the paradoxical difficulty in the entire discussion on cognition and consciousness. It exhibits the concern that *ekapratibimbavāda* does not look upon the *bimbapuruṣa* as the locus of any I-cognition, for all sorts of I-usages would be based on the mere reflection of the consciousness and would not pertain to *puruṣacaitanya*. This is because however closely the reflection might resemble the actual, yet it can never be the actual itself. Such has been admitted by Vācaspati Miśra too as we have found above. On the other hand, the admission of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* is not possible without considering a restricted sense of the functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) of *puruṣa* as held by Vijñānabhikṣu. In both the cases as stated and discussed above, we must keep in mind that the I-usages in the empirical realm are nothing but the modes of the ego, that is, the *abhimāna*. But the ego being a part of the insentient *antaḥkaraṇa*, its modes like the *abhimāna* require the contiguity of the luminous consciousness to be manifested. Thus, the reflection of consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* or the second-order reflection of the entire compound on the *puruṣa* again, it to be admitted to account for the I-usages. Thus, a meticulous analysis of the issues involved in case of cognitive usages in Sāṃkhya philosophy, as carried out above, finally proves that the views held by various philosophers regarding the nature and possibility of knowledge in the Sāṃkhya system are in consistence with the epistemological and metaphysical stance regarding the essence of *puruṣa*, as the perpetually and universally unaltered consciousness, as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, and hence, convincingly accounts for the I-usages in

terms of the reflected consciousness, be it one-sided or mutual, in a restricted sense as stated above.

On that note we now proceed towards the third part of the thesis which delves into the analysis of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The issues related to the said relation account for the creation of the world as well as for the liberation of the *puruṣa*. It is imperative to discuss and analyse such issues meticulously in order to understand the stance of the Sāṃkhya philosophical system as a doctrine of soteriology.

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tu citau buddhipratibimbaṃ kalpyata ityetāvanmātre cet tatrāśayo
varṇyeta// tadapyasat sūryādeḥ svapratibimbarūpasambandhena
jalāditatsthavastubhāsakatvādarśanāt//
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darśanādsamābhīcitau buddhipratibimba eva sarvārthibhānahetutayā
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sāmānyaviśeṣātmano 'arthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā vṛtti
pratyakṣam pramāṇam/ phalamaviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaścittavṛttibodhaḥ/
buddheḥ pratisamvedī puruṣa ityupariṣṭādūpapādayiṣyāmaḥ//', Vyāsa,
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tadvittidhārāvāhiviṣayaśatabhāramantharā
kācidvittirasmādaderutpadyamānānubhūyeta, na caivamiti cet/ na/
anuvyavasāyo viṣayamātra nirūpyo na tu tadviṣayaparamparānirūpyo
gauravāt/ tathāca jñānajñānatvena
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II ‘*vedyā na bhavatīti*’.

III ‘*aviralavitti-tadvittidhāreti*’.

PART III

CHAPTER 6

The Relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*

We know that the Sāṃkhya philosophy admits two fundamental principles, namely – the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. We have found out that the two principles referred to above are both eternal, ubiquitous yet of the opposite nature of each other. The *puruṣa* represents the embodied consciousness as well as the eternally free, unbound, pure consciousness. On the other hand the *prakṛti* is primordial matter, which is extremely subtle in nature, and can never be the object of perception. Rather it could only be known through inference. The *prakṛti*, through various stages and in a definite order, manifests itself as numerous other principles, as discussed in the introduction of the thesis. Those principles, namely, *prakṛti-vikṛti* and *kevalavikṛti*, evolve from subtle forms to gross forms and lead to the production of the world and its various components, including objects and the bodies of the beings. These principles in their final forms are perceptible. Further they constitute the matters of cognition and experiences (*bhoga*) too. However, from the discussions in our previous chapters we have seen that in case of cognition, enjoyment, agency *etc.* in the empirical realm, that is, in case of the embodied cognition, there appears to be a non-discriminatory apprehension between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. To be more precise, there appears to be non-apprehension of the distinction between the consciousness and the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that

is, that of the *buddhi*. This happens due to the reception of the reflection of the embodied consciousness on the *buddhi*, because of its predominantly *sāttvika* nature, which renders its functionality as a mirror. Due to such reflection of the consciousness on the intellect, and thus the manifestation of the modes of the intellect, there appears non-apprehension of the distinction between the consciousness or the reflected consciousness, and the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. Thus, whatever is there in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, seems to be there or to be related to that of the consciousness. These issues have been discussed in great detail in the preceding chapter, and hence, the repetition of such is not required here. However, the prime concern that arises from all the above notions is that how can the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, in spite of being two fundamentally opposing principles in essence, appear to be related to or to behave as one with each other. The present chapter focusses on the above issue and aims at explaining the notion of the relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers.

The *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* being two essentially contradictory principles it becomes a matter of philosophical concern that how at all the two principles could be related, and if so what would be the nature of that relation? The current chapter thus attempts at analysing the concept of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* in accordance with the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, but there are certain aspects in this connection which needs to be dealt with from a critical approach. The following discussion puts forward arguments that essentially constitute of those as advanced by the Sāṃkhya philosophers

themselves in order to establish the said relation. An interesting aspect of the methodology followed by the Sāṃkhya philosophers in establishing their philosophical stances is that, apart from their core argumentation by inferential method, they resort to the method of argumentation by analogy in most of the cases. This is perhaps due to their aim of making the theories involved in their *śāstra* more intelligible to the ordinary people, who are inclined to attain liberation from the three-fold sufferings, and are yet deluded by the prevalent or the readily available inauthentic, temporary and often contradictory methods of the freedom from sufferings, as propagated by the other *śāstras*. Thus, they provide various analogies from our practical life in order to have a greater outreach of their *śāstra* among the common people. In the above context of explaining the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* too, the Sāṃkhya philosophers provide numerous examples from daily life with an effort to explain the transcendental yet empirically apparent nature of the said relation more intelligible to us.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy *puruṣa* is conscious yet inactive, and the *prakṛti* is insentient but active. The *puruṣa* is attributed as eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), conscious (*buddha*), free (*mukta*), unchangeable (*kūṭastha*) and capable of not being transformed (*apariṇāmī*). Further in the nineteenth *kārikā* too it has been stated that the *puruṣa* is attributed with *sākṣitva*, *kaivalya*, *mādhyaṣtha*, *draṣṭṛtva* and *akartṛtva*. That is, the *puruṣa* is devoid of any form of actual bindings. It is never essentially related to any

thing as such. That is why it is a mere indifferent observer or a passive onlooker or things and events happening in the world.

The *prakṛti* too, on the other hand, is eternal, but it is capable of being transformed (*pariṇāmī*) and it is the primordial cause (*ādikāraṇa*) of the creation of the world (*jagat*). *Prakṛti* consists of three *guṇas* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. When the *prakṛti* is not in the state of creation, the three *guṇas* remain in the state of equilibrium, but each of the *guṇas* themselves keep on transforming into itself. This is referred to as *sarūpa pariṇāma*. That is, the *sattva* gets transformed into *sattva*, the *rajas* into *rajas* and the *tamas* into *tamas* itself. Thus, the *ādiprakṛti*, that is, even when the *prakṛti* is not in the mode of its manifestation, is still in its state of activity. That is, even the primordial matter, though not in a state of creation, yet remains in a continuous state of flux.

Now the question arises that how does the *mūlaprakṛti* get disturbed from its state of equilibrium? In Sāṃkhya philosophy, we find that due to the proximity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, the equilibrium of the *mūlaprakṛti* gets disturbed, and the creation of the world commences. This is referred to as the creative transformation (*virūpa pariṇāma*).

Here it is to be noted that though the concept of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* seems to present before us a puzzling situation, yet it is that very relation which acts as the basis of the entire Sāṃkhya system as a *mokṣavādī* school, that is, a philosophical system which essentially performs

an esoteric study on the concept of liberation. However, as in case of any other systems, the Sāṃkhya philosophy too is challenged with various objections and apprehensions from the opponents regarding their basic metaphysical and epistemological stances. It is evident from the elementary notion of Sāṃkhya philosophy, that *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are fundamentally different entities. So the natural question arises that how can there be any relation between two such entities at all? And if any relation is to be admitted, then what would be the nature of that relation? Further, and most significantly, what could be the significance of such a relation in the context of liberation?

In response to all the above apprehensions, we find that in the twentieth *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa portrays the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* as follows, - ‘*tasmāt tat saṃyogādacetanaṃ cetanāvādivalingam/ guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ bhavatyudāsīnaḥ*’¹

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, we know that though the *prakṛti* itself is subtle and independent, yet the manifested evolutes of *prakṛti* are dependent entities (*samhata* or *sambhūyakārī*), that is, they depend on each other for their manifestation or functionality. We already know that the *puruṣa* is the non-agent (*niṣkriya*). Then quite evidently the property of agency is being attributed to the *prakṛti*. However, we further know that for a thing to be an agent there must be some sort of sentient volition in it, which again quite naturally cannot be there in the *prakṛti*. Thus, to consider *prakṛti* as an independent agent of an action appears contradictory to our general notion of agency. We know that agency can only be the property of a conscious being

and thus, it is said that ‘*cetanaḥ ahaṁ karomi*’. An agent would first acquire the direct knowledge of an object and its material causes; then s/he would desire that and subsequently, s/he would have the volition to attain it. The statement which expresses the intention of the agent is, ‘*cetanaḥ ahaṁ cikīrṣan karomi*’². Here, the term ‘*cikīrṣan*’ means the ‘desire to act’. From this it is evident that, the co-existence of knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and volition (*prayatna*) in the same locus (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) constitutes the agency (*kartṛtva*) of that – ‘*upādānagocarāparokṣajñāna-cikīrṣā-kṛtimatvaṁ kartṛtvam*’³. Here Vācaspati Miśra points out that, the fact that the notion of agency is constituted of the co-existence of knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and volition (*prayatna*) in the same locus (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) and evidently in relation to consciousness, is known through experience. It is not a fact that is endorsed by the scriptures. That is, it *atāttvika*. Rather it is through our empirical usage that we claim that the clear and distinct knowledge of an object or event, the desire to act and the volition towards it, be it to attain (*īpsā*) it or to reject (*jihāsā*) it, together constitute the concept of agency. Hence, the above idea of agency needs to be re-evaluated in the context of the Sāṃkhya theory of creation.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers do not accept the above definition of agency. It is because of the fact that their basic metaphysical presupposition is that *puruṣa* is conscious, but it is inactive, and hence, it cannot be an agent. The *puruṣa* is devoid of any desire or volition. Accordingly, it can never be attributed with the property of agency, as that would lead to the hampering of

the essence of *puruṣa*. Further *prakṛti* is unconscious. It is essentially nothing but insentient matter. Though it has desire and volition in the form of the modes of the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*), yet it is devoid of knowledge. That is, though knowledge too is a mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, yet it cannot manifest or implement that knowledge on its own. So the Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that how can there be co-located-ness among the trio, namely, the knowledge, volition and the desire? Then we arrive at a crossroad, where we either have to admit volition in *puruṣa* or the independent implementation of knowledge by *prakṛti*. Otherwise it would not be possible to determine an agent of the vast creation called world (*jagat*). However, that is evidently an inadmissible position.

Now it may further be argued that if we admit that there is knowledge (*jñāna*) in *prakṛti*, that is, in any of its mode, insentient *prakṛti* is *jñānavatī*, then we would also be compelled to admit that there would be knowledge in all the evolutes of *prakṛti*. Thus, starting from the entity of greater dimension (*mahat*) to the five gross elements (*pañcabhūta*) would all have to be considered as consisting of knowledge (*jñānavān*), and most significantly, it would entail that they all are conscious. This again is clearly in contradiction to our natural cognition of the worldly matter. It is important to note here that the problem of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* of *jñāna*, *icchā* and *prayatna* arises in relation to consciousness because of the fact that in our daily life we find that beings, that is, embodied consciousness apparently manifests all the above properties. That is, the above attributes are found to be co-located in the

beings. Thus, due to our ignorance, that is, non-apprehension of the distinction between our bodily functions, which are material in nature, and the mere presence of the pure ubiquitous consciousness in our bodies, we erroneously consider the above functionalities to be either that of the *puruṣa* itself, or to be effective in relation to the consciousness only. Thus, we refer to the erroneous habitual usage of the attribution of agency to the *puruṣa* and not to the actual creative material principle, that is, the *prakṛti*.

Now to resolve the above issue, we find that in the twentieth *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa claims that the essence of agency is not constituted of the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* of volition (*kṛti* or *prayatna*) and consciousness (*caitanya*). Rather, the Sāṃkhya philosophers emphasise that the agency and the knowledge or consciousness never co-exist. In fact, they essentially reside in different loci. Agency and knowledge, as a mode of the intellect, is nothing but *prakṛti* in other terms of the matter, whereas consciousness is the *puruṣa* itself. Such a claim is endorsed by the term ‘*tasmāt*’ in the *kārikā*. Thus, usages like ‘I, being conscious and desirous to do, am doing’ (‘*cetanaḥ ahaṃ cikīrṣaṇ karomi*’) are erroneous because of the fact that there is non-apprehension of the distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. This could well be understood with reference to the discussion carried out on the cognition of I-usages in the fifth chapter.

To emphasise on the above, the Sāṃkhya philosophers reiterate the fact that *prakṛti* or *triguṇa* is insentient, and yet it is to be considered as the agent, whereas the *puruṣa*, in spite of being conscious, cannot be regarded as

the agent. The very idea of attributing *puruṣa* with agency is incorrect, because if *puruṣa* is to be admitted as the agent, then we would have to accept transformability (*pariṇāmitva* or *vikāritva*) of *puruṣa*, which is not at all an acceptable position in the Sāṃkhya philosophical system. Hence, it is to be admitted that knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*) and volition (*kṛti*) are the properties of *prakṛti* only, and accordingly the property of agency could only be attributed to the insentient yet creative *prakṛti*.

Again one might argue that only the presence of volition, or even if we consider knowledge and desire along with it, that does not lead to the idea of agency. Consciousness is mandatory in order to account for the agency of an action. Then how can unconscious *prakṛti* be the agent? In response, the Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that ‘*tat saṃyogat acetanaṃ cetanāvat iva*’. That is, the unconscious behaves like the conscious or the unconscious appears to be conscious, due to its relation or its proximity with *puruṣa*. And thus, the agency of the unconscious *prakṛti* is accounted for. Though they admit that knowledge or consciousness is a pre-condition of being an agent, but here, admitting agency of the *puruṣa* becomes paradoxical due to its essential inert, inactive nature. Hence, there being no other alternative, agency is to be attributed to the unconscious *prakṛti*. Thus, in the *kārikā* it is claimed that due to the proximity of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti*, the unconscious appears to be conscious, or behaves as the conscious. It is as if due to the reflection of the embodied consciousness on the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the intellect reflects the

properties of the consciousness, just like a mirror, and hence, appears to be itself conscious.

At this point another matter that needs to be elucidated is that we have found that according to the *kārikā*, due to the contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, the insentient matter or *triguṇa* appears to behave as the conscious. However, Vācaspati Miśra, in his *ītkā*, states that – ‘*liṅgam - mahadādisūkṣmaparyantaṁ vakṣyati*’.⁴ That is, Vācaspati Miśra refers to the *prakṛti* or the *triguṇa* as ‘*liṅga*’. That is, starting from the *mahattattva* to the subtle (*sūkṣma*) *pañcatanmātra*, the principles are being referred to as the *liṅga*. The principles, namely, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *manas*, *pañcajñānendriya*, *pañcakarmendriya* and *pañcatanmātra*, are together referred to as the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra* or *sūkṣmaśarīra*). At the beginning of creation individual subtle bodies are created for every being from the *prakṛti*. The subtle bodies are such that they can pervade any object on earth, including rocks and boulders. However, the most significant aspect is that the individual subtle bodies exist from the beginning of the creation till the end of that particular creation, or until the individual attains liberation. In certain other texts, *liṅgaśarīra* or *sūkṣmaśarīra* is considered to consist of seventeen constituent parts (*avayava*). Namely, *pañcajñānendriya* or *buddhendriya*, *pañcakarmendriya*, *pañcaprāṇa*, *manas* and *buddhi*. This is expressed as – ‘*buddhikarmendriya-prāṇapañcakairmanasā dhiyā/ śarīraṁ saptadaśabhiḥ sūkṣmaṁ talliṅgamucyate*’.⁵ Vācaspati Miśra, however, admits another *avayava*, that is, *ahamkāra* over and above the seventeen *avayavas* mentioned

above. However, he does not include *pañcaprāṇa* among the seventeen *avayavas*, instead he considers the *pañcatanmātra*. Thus, we find that there are some differences in view regarding the constituent factors of the *sūkṣmaśarīra*. However, that is not too relevant in the context of our current discussion, hence we would not delve into that further, but it is to be mentioned here that when the *sūkṣmaśarīra* enters the gross body (*sthūlaśarīra* or *bāhyaśarīra*), it is referred to as the birth of the individual. Issues regarding the birth, death *etc.* of *puruṣa* have already been discussed in the third chapter of the thesis, hence, we would not digress further. However, it is interesting to note here that when the *puruṣa* comes in contact with the *sūkṣmaśarīra*, the body is pervaded by consciousness, and hence, the idea of being emerges. The being then acts as the locus of the *mahat* or *buddhi*, *icchā* and *prayatna*. When the said complex comes in contact with the *puruṣa*, it appears to be conscious, that is, it seems to be *jñānavān*; accordingly, it appears to be the agent of an action. Though the intellect acts as the locus of the agency, yet it being essentially insentient in nature, attributing it as the agent might appear to be contradictory, as discussed earlier in the chapter. Thus, the reflection of the embodied consciousness is admitted on the *sattvapradhāna buddhi* in order to account for its property of agency. Further it could be reiterated that such reflection and accordingly, the sense of being the agent, occurs due to the contact between the *puruṣa* and the *buddhi*, that is, *prakṛti*.

Now the next pivotal issues that need to be dealt with are that what is meant by the ‘contact’ between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*? If the said contact

(*saṁyoga*) is supposed to indicate some kind of relation between the two, then what could be the nature of that relation? How at all the eternally free (*nityamukta*), unrelated (*asambaddha*), indifferent (*kūṭastha* or *udāsīna*) *puruṣa* be in the relation of contact with the *prakṛti*? Would it not lead to the hampering of the essential nature of *puruṣa*?

We know that *saṁyoga* is defined as the attainment of an object or some matter preceded by its non-attainment (*aprāptipūrvikā prāpti*). Accordingly, three kinds of *saṁyoga sambandha* are admitted. Namely, - *anyatarakarmajanya saṁyoga*, *ubhayakarmajanya saṁyoga* and *saṁyogajanya saṁyoga*. When the contact between the objects or entities occur due to the volition of either of the relata, it is called *anyatarakarmajanya saṁyoga*. For instance, when a bird sits on a branch of a tree, the contact between the bird and the branch of the tree is generated due to the activity of the bird. Thus, it is an instance of *anyatarakarmajanya saṁyoga*. Again when the contact between the objects or entities occur due to the volition of both the relata, it is called *ubhayakarmajanya saṁyoga*. For example, during the monsoon season, we often find that dark clouds appear from different directions towards each other, and then clash against each other causing lightning, thunderbolts and subsequent rains. The clashing of the clouds with each other coming forward from opposite directions is an instance of *ubhayakarmajanya saṁyoga*. Finally, when a contact or series of contacts are generated due to the preceding contact(s), it is called *saṁyogajanya saṁyoga*. For instance, when we hold a book with our hands, the contact between the

book and the hand is established. However, the hand being a part (*avayava*) of the whole body (*avayavī*), the contact of the book with the hand also entails the contact of the book with body, that is, *avayavīsamyogajanya avayavasamyoga*. Thus, it is an instance of *samyogajanya samyoga*. In Nyāya philosophy, this has been referred to as *paramparā sambandha*. Though *paramparā sambandha* cannot exactly be translated as *samyogajanya samyoga*, there are some more intricacies to it, yet there is an apparent similarity between the two notions, and thus, the reference. However, there are philosophical systems which do not admit the part-whole (*avayava-avayavī*) dichotomy. Accordingly, they deny the contact of the form, *samyogajanya samyoga*.

Now reverting back to the issue of the contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, let us analyse whether at all any of the above forms of contact is applicable in the present case or not. We know that the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are both ubiquitous (*vibhu*), so the two entities being ubiquitous or all-pervading, there cannot be non-attainment between the two. Hence, the question of the generation of contact between them cannot be caused by the activity of any of the relata. This is because the *puruṣa* being indifferent and inactive, cannot have any functionality towards the attainment of any sort of contact with the *prakṛti*. On the other hand, there being no essential non-attainment of the contact with the *puruṣa* on the part of the *prakṛti*, since, they both are ubiquitous, the *prakṛti* too cannot have any volition towards the establishment of such contact. Thus, there cannot be *anyatarakarmajanya*

saṁyoga between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Further the possibility of the generation of the contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* by the volition of both the principles is not possible either, because of the same reasons, as stated above. Thus, *ubhayakarmajanya saṁyoga* is not acceptable between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Furthermore, it is to be kept in mind that the Sāṁkhya philosophers do not admit the part-whole (*avayava-avayavī*) dichotomy. Thus, the admission of a contact generated due to other contact(s) is also not possible in this case. Thus, the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* cannot be a case of *saṁyogajanya saṁyoga* either.

At this juncture the question arises that, since the contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* does not pertain to any of the forms of contact known to us, then can we at all consider the term ‘*saṁyoga*’ in the literal sense of it? Also, the question persists that in what sense then has the term ‘*saṁyoga*’ been applied in the *kārikā* ‘*tasmāt tat saṁyogat*’? Is it at all an indicator of any form of relation? And if so, then what could be the nature of that relation? In this context, the Sāṁkhya philosophers put forward certain instances of contact relation from our empirical experiences in order to understand the probable nature of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*.

It might be enquired that is the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* like that of the fire and the heat? Now if the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* be a natural relation like that between the fire and the heat, then the *puruṣa* can never be liberated. We never find fire devoid of heat, so if the relation be such in the present case, then the *puruṣa* can never differentiate

between itself and the *prakṛti*, thus leading to the impossibility of liberation of *puruṣa*. Further it might be asked that is the relation in question like that between the eyes and colour? It is not like that either. This is because the eyes can perceive a color due to its own potency or power of vision, but we do not find any such potency in either the *puruṣa* or the *prakṛti* to establish such relation between them. Admitting any such potency would again lead to the question of non-liberation of *puruṣa*. Again, the question arises that is it like the relation between a fish and the water? If the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is to be described in the above manner, then we have to admit a subject-object relationship (*viśayaviśayibhāva*) between the two. The relation between a fish and the water is not that of a mere contact (*samyoga*). It is not the case that earlier the fish was unrelated to water and then later it came in contact with the water. Rather the fish always resides in the waterbody. So the subject-object relationship between a fish and the water cannot be considered either in explaining the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The subjectivity (*viśayitva*) of *puruṣa* is eternal and undifferentiated (*avyāvṛtta*), and the objectivity (*viśayatva*) of *prakṛti* is also such. Thus, admitting a subject-object relation between them would also lead to the non-liberation of *puruṣa*. Hence, none of the instances of contact discussed above could lead to the clarification of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*.

Thus, the question persists that what does the term ‘*samyoga*’ in case of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* stand for. In order to clarify,

Vācaspati Miśra here states that claims that the term ‘*saṁyoga*’ here has been used in a metaphorical sense. We are erroneously considering the primary sense of the term ‘*saṁyoga*’, that is, contact. However, that is not the intended sense at all. Rather term ‘*saṁyoga*’ here in the *kārikā*, that is, ‘*tat saṁyogaḥ*’ indicates ‘*tat sannidhānam*’.⁶ the term ‘*sannidhāna*’ means proximity or contiguity. When two objects or individuals or events, remain side by side, that is contiguous to one another, we consider the two to be in proximity to each other, and accordingly apparently related. For instance, the proximity between the bank of a river and the river water creates an apparent sense of related-ness between the two objects. Essentially the bank is nothing but a part of the land, whereas the water is a distinct element from it. But the two objects being in close contiguity to one another, we get the sense of the two things being related or to be in contact with one another. Though in times of floods *etc.* there could be actual contact between the bank of the river and the river water, yet the primary relation between the two is that of proximity. Similarly, at the empirical level the *puruṣa* being embodied by the materialistic body evolved out of the elements of *prakṛti*, there is the relation of proximity between the embodied consciousness and the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Further in the transcendental realm too the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, both being ubiquitous and eternal, are spatio-temporally forever contiguous, that is, in proximity to each other. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra’s explanation of the term ‘*saṁyoga*’ as *sannidhāna* holds true for both the phenomenal realm as well as the transcendental plane.

In the context of the above explanation, however, it might be argued that since both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are ubiquitous and eternal, then why does the *virūpa pariṇāma* of the *prakṛti* does not occur at all times? That is, how can we account for the repeated creation (*sṛiṣṭi*) and its destruction (*pralaya* or *mahāpralaya*) at regular intervals? It might be reasoned from the standpoint of the Sāṃkhya philosophers that the phenomena of creation and its respective destruction is due to the *adrṣṭa* of the beings constituting a particular creation. The primordial *prakṛti*, along with the association of the individual or respective *adrṣṭa* of beings, gets ready to be creative. Then the reflection of the ever contiguous *puruṣa* is received on the *prakṛti* which disturbs its equilibrium, and accordingly the *virūpa pariṇāma* commences. The same holds true for destruction of that particular creation as well. That is, the *adrṣṭa* of the beings determine the duration of the sustenance (*sthiti*) of that particular creation, and hence, its destruction.

Reverting back to the issue of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, we find that in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* it is stated that - ‘*asanga hi ayam puruṣaḥ*’⁷, that is, *puruṣa* is essentially indifferent and unrelated. Thus, any sort of reference to its contact with any other object or principle, fundamentally refers to their proximity only. For example, just as the *ākāśa* is in proximity to a jar, similarly for the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. As discussed above, due to the proximity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, the insentient *prakṛti* appears to be conscious, and the inactive *puruṣa* appears to be the agent of an action. Thus, the attribution of *puruṣa* as an agent and the apparent

sentience of *prakṛti* are nothing but mere illusions. It is simply due to the proximity (*sannidhāna*) of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* that their properties appear to be there in each other. Such appearance in turn, as we already know, is due to the non-apprehension of the distinction (*bhedāgraha*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Due to such superimpositions or apparent apprehensions, modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* appear to be there in the *puruṣa*, and accordingly, usages like, ‘*aham sukhi*’, ‘*aham duḥkhī*’, ‘*mayā kṛta*’ etc. occur. Such usages produce a sense of apparent related-ness to the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Hence, the *puruṣa* is conceived of as bound (*baddha*) or in the state of migration (*samsārī*) in the empirical realm. However, it is clear that essentially, the notions of agency, enjoyerhood, knowership etc. can never reside in the same locus as that of the consciousness. Hence, consciousness or *puruṣa* and the agent or the *triguṇa* are to be conceived of as clearly distinct from each other. It is merely an apparent usage in our phenomenal existence that we conceive of these two fundamentally distinct principles as attributed with the properties of each other simply because of their proximity. It occurs due to our ignorance, which is itself of the nature of the non-apprehension of the discriminatory cognition between the matter and the consciousness.

In the twenty first *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa further states that there is a sense of interdependence between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. From the twentieth *kārikā* we have found out that there is a relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, and that relation is of the nature of proximity. However, the question remains that how can there be any relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*

unless they both or either of them, depend on each other for some purpose? From our experiential point of view, the inactive consciousness is in direct contradiction with the agency of the insentient *prakṛti*. So the two realities cannot be related to each other unless they depend one each other for some purpose. Such interdependence between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* has been termed as ‘*apekṣā*’, which means ‘*sva-sva-kāryajanana-sahakāritva*’, that is, helping each other to achieve their respective ends. The *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* both depend on each other to attain the accomplishment of their purposes. Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* could be considered to be in the relation of the helper and the helped (*upakārya-upakāra-kabhāva*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa expresses that in his twenty first *kārikā*, in the following manner - ‘*puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya/ pangvandhavadubhayorapi saṃyogastatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*’⁸

The above *kārikā* states that the *pradhāna* or the *prakṛti* awaits to be perceived by the *puruṣa*. The *prakṛti* or the primordial cause (*ādikāraṇa*) of the creation possesses the three *guṇas*, and hence, is termed as *guṇamayī*. It is, thus, the producer of all the objects of desire or need which lead to the fulfilment of the purpose of the beings. It is further termed as *nikhilabhogyaprasavinī* and the *bhogyā*, meaning that which gives birth to all enjoyable entities, and that which is to be enjoyed respectively. However, the enjoyable entities cannot be considered to be so unless there is an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Hence the admission of the embodied *puruṣa* as the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) is inevitable. This has been discussed in detail in the second chapter of the

thesis in the context of the establishment of the existence of *puruṣa*. The property of being an enjoyer (*bhokṭṛtva*) of the *puruṣa* helps in the realization of the property of being enjoyed (*bhogyatva*) of the *prakṛti*. Thus, the *prakṛti* awaits its perception by the *puruṣa* in order to attain its fruitful end. Thus, though the *puruṣa* is of the opposite nature of *prakṛti*, yet the latter desires or waits to be related to the *puruṣa* for the realization of its own end.

At this point another pivotal issue comes up. That is, the *puruṣa* has no such need as the *prakṛti*, then why would it want to be related to the *prakṛti*? The need only on the part of the *prakṛti* would not propel the *puruṣa* to be related to it. It must possess a desire or need of its own as well, as that could only account for the mutual relationship between the two realities. In response to the above apprehension, we find that in the *kārikā*, it has been stated that - ‘*puruṣasya kaivalyārtham*’. This phrase explains, though metaphorically, why the *puruṣa* awaits or depends on the *prakṛti* as well. The *puruṣa* being essentially unrelated and indifferent, cannot really have any dependence on the *prakṛti*, yet it possesses some apparent dependence on the material principle in terms of the fulfilment of its purposes of migration and liberation, in order to account for the relation between the two. Thus, both await each other for the attainment of their respective ends.

Now Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary, clarifies why and how does the *puruṣa* await the *prakṛti* for the attainment of its ends in the state of migration, as well as that of liberation. This is expressed as follows – ‘*tathāhi bhogyena pradhānena sambhinnaḥ puruṣastadgatam duḥkhatrayam*

*svātmānyabhimānyamānaḥ kaivalyaṁ prārthayate*⁹. It means that the *puruṣa* awaits the *prakṛti* or the *pradhāna* for its own liberation. Liberation refers to the absolute cessation of the three kinds of sufferings, namely, - *ādhibhautika*, *ādhidāivika* and *ādhyātmika*. Liberation indicates such form of cessation of the sufferings that one does not have to go through those again, once they have been eradicated. The attainment of such cessation of sufferings is evidently the ultimate purpose of one's existence. The state of liberation is termed as *kaivalya* here, and the attainment of such a state, that is, liberation is the ultimate aim of *puruṣa*. It is interesting to note here that the Indian thinkers have coined many terms to denote liberation like *aparvarga*, *mukti*, *nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*, *kaivalya* etc. Each of the terms employed by the Indian thinkers in the different philosophical systems have got specific import. In the context of Sāṃkhya philosophy, we find that the term originates from the word '*kevala*', which refers to the liberation in the sense of 'non-related-ness' or 'isolation' arising out of the knowledge of discrimination (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Thus, the term '*kaivalya*' used to denote liberation in the Sāṃkhya system is perfectly consistent with the essential sense of isolation of *puruṣa*, as admitted in the Sāṃkhya metaphysics.

Now it may be further argued that *puruṣa* being eternally liberated (*nityamukta*), that is, the most desired liberation being its true essence and it being ever free from sufferings, why would it at all await *prakṛti* for its liberation again? The *puruṣa* is essentially of the opposite nature of *duḥkha*, and hence, ever bereft of any actual relation to the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*,

that is, with the *prakṛti*. Accordingly the *puruṣa* is forever free. Thus, the question remains that why and how come the *puruṣa* awaits the *prakṛti* for its liberation? In response, Vācaspati Miśra states that the *pradhāna* or the *prakṛti* serves as the object of need or desire to the *puruṣa*. From time unknown, the *puruṣa* is unaware of the distinction between itself and the *prakṛti*. Thus, due to such ignorance, the being considers the sufferings actually located in the *prakṛti* or the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be its own. The *puruṣa* is essentially free from all sufferings at all times, but due to its inability to distinguish between itself and the *pradhāna*, it appears to the being that the sufferings existing in *prakṛti* are its own. This happens because of the inherited or self-credited (*ābhimānika*) relation, due to which the embodied *puruṣa* or the being considers itself to be the sufferer, and accordingly, usages like ‘*aham duḥkhī*’ etc. occur. As long as such relation persists, the *puruṣa* is considered to be bound (*baddha* or *samsārī*). We know that the *puruṣa* is forever immutable, indifferent and unrelated. Hence, it is essentially devoid of all kinds of sufferings. It is only due to the inherited (*ābhimānika*) relation, that the *puruṣa* is apparently unaware of its distinction with the *prakṛti*, and hence remains bound by the three kinds of sufferings. However, due to such apparent bound state of the *puruṣa*, there appears the volition towards liberation from the said state. Thus, the *puruṣa* tries to attain liberation, and hence, seeks the help of the *pradhāna* in that course.

We know that an object which is already attained, itself acts as an impediment towards the desire for attaining that object. Thus, quite naturally

it could be argued that, the *puruṣa* being essentially of the ever-libearted nature, then why at all would it desire liberation again? This is because the very essence of the *puruṣa* as liberated, would prevent the *puruṣa* from having the volition towards liberation any further. Thus, the issue remains that how can the *puruṣa* await the *prakṛti* for its liberation.

From the standpoint of Sāṃkhya metaphysics, it could be argued that the being or the embodied *puruṣa* wants to achieve liberation from the imposed three kinds of sufferings (*trividha duḥkha*) which it experiences due to its apparent sense of oneness with the *prakṛti*. Due to the absence of the discriminatory cognition between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, the above sense of non-discrimination produces the sense of being bound, though apparently, on the part of the *puruṣa*. Thus, the desire for liberation, even from imposed bondages, is what the embodied *puruṣa* or the being tries to attain. This explains why and how the *puruṣa* in spite of being essentially free, possesses the desire for liberation, and such volition is clearly meaningful in the course of the realisation of the transcendental self, transgressing the phenomenal existence.

Further it is argued that even if the desire for liberation on the part of the *puruṣa* is meaningful, but why and how does it await *prakṛti* for the attainment of such? In response, Vācaspati Miśra states that - ‘*tacca sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti-nivandhanam*’¹⁰. The *puruṣa* tries to find the means of attaining liberation from the three-fold sufferings, and from our discussion so far, it is evident that the liberation could be achieved only by attaining the

discriminatory knowledge between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. In technical terms, it is referred to as the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*. The term ‘*sattva*’ refers to the *buddhi* and the term ‘*anyatākhyāti*’ means the knowledge of distinction. Hence, the said notion of *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* refers to the attainment of the distinctive cognition between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, which in turn acts as the instrument towards the attainment of *kaivalya* or liberation.

We know that the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are mutually exclusive principles. However, due to the non-ascertainment of the distinction between them, due to the inherited relation (*ābhimānika sambandha*) with the three types of sufferings located in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the embodied *puruṣa*, that is the being, considers the sufferings to be its own. With the attainment of the knowledge of distinction between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* (*anyatākhyāti*), the inherited relation gets destroyed. Consequently usages as ‘*aham duḥkḥī*’ etc. lose their import. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* is also known as *vivekakhyāti* or *tattvajñāna*.

We know that the *jñāna* or the *buddhi* is the evolute of the *antaḥkaraṇa* or the *mahattattva*. When the *mahattattva* becomes pure and potent through listening, concentration and contemplation (*śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*) over ages and through repeated births, then the *mahattattva* transforms into *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*. Thus, the *puruṣa*, being desirous of liberation, awaits such *mahattattva*, that is, the *prakṛti*, for its attainment of the highest *puruṣārtha*, namely, liberation. This clarifies how and why the *puruṣa* awaits

the *mahattattva* or the *prakṛti* for the attainment of liberation from its inherited apparent bondages.

The *mahattattva* is the first evolute of *prakṛti*. From that *mahattattva*, *vivekakhyāti* is produced, which instrumentally leads to the attainment of liberation or *kaivalya* on the part of the *baddhapuruṣa* encountered in the empirical realm. Thus, to acquire the *bhedajñāna* or the *anyatākhyāti*, it is essential for the *puruṣa* to depend on the *prakṛti* and its evolutes. Hence, it is evident that the *puruṣa* awaits *prakṛti*, which acts as its prime helper in the attainment of the highest *puruṣārtha*. Accordingly, it is natural that no one ignores such a helper, rather awaits it. Thus, Vācaspati mentions here, *puruṣa* depends on the *pradhāna* in order to attain its liberation. This is expressed in his commentary as - ‘*kaivalyārtham puruṣaḥ pradhānam apekṣate*’.¹¹

It may further be argued that, though we admit that the evolutes of the *prakṛti* act as instrumental in attaining the *kaivalya* of the *puruṣa*, but is *kaivalya* the only *puruṣārtha* for which the *puruṣa* awaits the *prakṛti*? Just as *kaivalya* is a *puruṣārtha*, similarly enjoyment (*bhoga*) is another *puruṣārtha*. The *puruṣa* awaits the *prakṛti* both for the liberation and the enjoyment (*bhoga*) as well. The relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is essential to account for the enjoyment or sufferings (*bhoga*) of beings.

Now it may be argued that the *puruṣa* being eternal, its enjoyment should also be eternal. Accordingly, the relation producing this enjoyment must also be eternal. On the other hand, the *prakṛti* too is eternal, and it

evolutes constitute the objects of enjoyment. It, thus, reveals itself to the *puruṣa* for its own purpose of attaining fulfillment. It is because of the Sāṃkhya thesis that the *prakṛti* being the *nikhilabhogyaprasavīni* as well as the *bhogyā*, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it attains its purposefulness by serving the purpose of the *puruṣa*. Hence, the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, apart from being the instrument towards liberation, acts as the cause of *bhoga* too in the realm of our empirical existence.

Here, however, one might argue that how can a relation, which is the cause of enjoyment, again be the cause of liberation of the *puruṣa*? In response to the above apprehension, Vācaspati Miśra says that there is a series of relations between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* get related to each other repeatedly. The relation which is instrumental for the enjoyment of the *puruṣa* is not the cause of its liberation. Enjoyment and liberation are fundamentally contradictory to each other. Thus, the same relation cannot act as the cause of two such essentially contradictory purposes. Hence, numerous relations are to be admitted for the attainment of the respective ends, both on the part of the *puruṣa* as well as that on the part of the *prakṛti*. Now one might say that the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* both being eternal and ubiquitous, how can they get related to each other repeatedly? If at all any relation is to be admitted between the two principles, then it has to be eternal, and in that case, there could be only one relation. No question of repeated relations from the spatio-temporal frame could be admitted in this context. However, in Sāṃkhya metaphysics, we find that though the *puruṣa* and the

prakṛti are eternally related, yet they get related to each other repeatedly for the fulfilment of the purposes of *bhoga* and *kaivalya*. This could be explained from the stance of *puruṣabahutvavāda*. Though both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are eternal, yet the Sāṃkhya philosophical system admits multiplicity of consciousness. Accordingly, the diversity of beings are explained, as have been done in the third chapter of the thesis. Now to account for the individual enjoyment and/or sufferings as well as the liberation of the respective beings, the *prakṛti* gets repeatedly related to the multiple consciousness. Thus, in spite of the fact that the primordial matter and the consciousness are both eternal, yet the admission of multiple relationships between the two principles in the phenomenal realm is perfectly consistent with the concerned philosophical standpoint. This explains that how one instance of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* could be considered as instrumental for *bhoga* of a particular being, whereas another such relation would act as the cause of the liberation for another being. Also for the same individual, at different points of time, that is, at the state of migration and eventually at the time of liberation after the attainment of *tattvajñāna*, the difference in the nature of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are to be considered. Hence, the admission of multiple relations between the two principles is consistently valid in the context of Sāṃkhya metaphysics.

At this juncture two more issues could further be raised. First, if the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* gets related to one another repeatedly, how can it be determined that which relation is the cause of enjoyment and which one is the

cause of liberation? Secondly, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, both being eternal and ubiquitous, they are never away from each other. Rather they are always in contiguity. So how can the question of the two realities being repeatedly related to one another arise at all? In this regard, the Sāṃkhya philosophers have remained silent. However, the probable responses from the stance of the Sāṃkhya metaphysics have already been provided above. It is important to note here, that two ubiquitous realities, can neither be away nor in proximity to one another, since the very technicality of the term ‘*vibhu*’ suggests that there cannot be any issue of spatial proximity or remoteness (*daiśika paratvāparatva*) in such cases, and also, both of them being eternal, there cannot be any question of temporal proximity or remoteness (*kālika paratvāparatva*) between them either. Hence, the issue of multiple relations between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* have to be explained from the notion of *puruṣabahutvavāda*.

However, regarding the former question raised above, the Sāṃkhya philosophers reply that the *prakṛti* reveals itself or gets transformed at every moment, since it is essentially forever in a state of flux. Hence, at each point of time, it is novel and different from its previous form. Thus, it could be claimed that the *puruṣa* gets related to a novel form of the *prakṛti* each time. Consequently, a series of relations between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are produced. Among those relations, some are the causes of the enjoyment, while the others are that of the liberation with respect to the individual beings.

Now Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in his *kārikā* puts forward another aspect of the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. It has already been discussed that there is a mutual relation of the helper and the helped between the two principles. To explicate this he provides an analogy from our ordinary life, which is expressed by the term ‘*pāṅgvandhavat*’¹² in the *kārikā*. The analogy talks of a lame person, that is, an individual unable to walk or to move on his own, and a blind person, that is, one who is unable to see. The lame person can see and the blind person can walk. Now they decide to help each other in reaching their desired destinations. Here, the lame person being able to see, may metaphorically be regarded as one who possesses knowledge (*jñānavān*) but is inactive (*niṣkriya*), whereas the blind person may be considered to be active (*kriyāśīla*) but devoid of knowledge (*jñānahīna*). If the blind person agrees to carry the lame person on his shoulders, and the lame person directs the blind one, then both of them can reach their desired destinations. Thus, they could depend on each other for the attainment of their respective purposes.

Here, quite evidently, the lame person represents the *puruṣa* and the blind person indicates the *prakṛti*. The *jñāna* refers to consciousness and activity refers to agency and transformability as well. Thus, by the above analogy Īśvarakṛṣṇa tries to uphold that just as the lame and the blind persons help each other to fulfill each other’s purpose, similarly, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* complement each other in attaining their own realizations.

However, certain objections come be raised here, which may show that the analogy is not very appropriate. First, it is to be noted that in the above analogy the lame and blind, both are conscious, whereas, in the context of our discussion on the mutual dependence between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, the *puruṣa* is conscious, but *prakṛti* is not. Secondly, the lame-ness and the blindness refer to certain physical disabilities of a conscious being, but the inactivity (*niṣkriyatva*) of *puruṣa* and the unconsciousness (*nirjñānatva*) of *prakṛti* do not express any such disability. Rather they are indicators of the essential absence of action in *puruṣa* and that of knowledge or consciousness in *prakṛti*. So the given analogy may not be considered to be a very appropriate one, but in spite of that it might be looked at as a crude analogy only, keeping in view the contradiction in terms of metaphor and entities or objects metaphorised (*drṣṭānta-dārṣṭāntika virodha*). For instance, when we compliment someone by saying, ‘*mukhachandraḥ*’, it means that one’s face is so beautiful that it resembles the glow of the moon on a full moon night. The moon, in reality, consists of many spots on its surface due to the faintly visible craters on it. However, when we compare someone’s beauty or glow with that of the moon, we do not consider the flawed appearance of the moon, rather the softness of its glow renders the meaningfulness to the intended metaphor. Furthermore it may be argued in favour of the Sāṃkhya philosophers that the charge of contradiction between the metaphor and the objects metaphorised (*drṣṭānta-dārṣṭāntika virodha*) does not hold on account of the fact that there can never be absolute similarity between the two objects which are being compared, rather only a partial one. When a face is metaphorised as moon, as stated

above, there is no identity between them. There is no affinity in terms of shape, size and other aspects of the moon, but only in terms of the glamour (*lāvanya*) between the moon and the face due to the respective glow and the freshness. If this point is kept in view, the metaphor between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and the blind and the lame man does not face any contradiction. Thus, it is to be kept in mind that in case of any sort of analogy, there would always be partial similarity and some instances of dissimilarity. That is why, precisely, these are cases of analogy, and not that of identity. Similarly, for the analogy provided by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in order to explain the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* as that of mutual dependence, there are instances of similarity with the lame and the blind person in the context of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, as well as instances of dissimilarities between them. In spite of that the analogy helps to explain the intended relation of mutual dependence between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* for the attainment of their respective ends. This is essentially the spirit of analogical argumentation, where the *drṣṭānta-dārṣṭāntika virodha* is not disregarded, yet the comparison helps to put forward the intended sense of the issue.

Now other analogies have also been given in this context. The potency of fire to burn is pre-existent in fire, but it can only be manifested when the fire comes in contact with inflammable objects, like, the branches of trees. Similarly, the *vivekakhyāti* is pre-existent in *puruṣa*, but the *puruṣa* becomes aware of it only after its relation or proximity with *prakṛti*, due to which it eventually attains the discriminatory cognition. Again it could be mentioned

that the fruits of a tree have the potency to satiate hunger, similarly, water has the potency to quench thirst, but their potentials can only be manifested in relation to an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Likewise, the actions of *prakṛti*, being instrumental to serve the purpose of *puruṣa* (*puruṣaprayojanasādhakatā*), can only be expressed due to its relation with the *puruṣa*. Hence, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* await each other or depend on each other, like the blind and the lame person, and the relation between them is aimed at their respective realizations.

In the context of the above analogies, it may be interesting to note notions of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as presented above, may appear to be something external or different from the worldly objects and individuals of our daily lives. However, that is not the moot point out here. Rather speaking from the point of Sāṃkhya metaphysics, it can be claimed that the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) referred to above is none but the *puruṣa*, and the fruits, water *etc.* are nothing but the evolutes of *prakṛti*, that is, the *prakṛti* itself. So the above analogies are not metaphors in the real sense, rather they are speaking of the two fundamental principles, that is, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, in finite terms, or in other words, from the point of view of our phenomenal existence.

As we approach towards the terminal part of our discussion, we revert back to a particular issue already discussed in order to emphasize on it. It has been asked that, since the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* has been established as the mutual helper and the helped, and accordingly, they await or depend on each other, then why is it necessary to admit the various evolutes

of *prakṛti*? Moreover, we have found that that the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is the cause of the realization of enjoyability (*bhogyatva*) of *prakṛti* and the liberation (*kaivalya*) of *puruṣa*. Then the natural question comes up that what constitutes the cause of the production of the *mahat* and the subsequent forms of it? In response to the above, we can cite Īśvarakṛṣṇa as he states in the *kārikā* – ‘*tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*’¹³. This implies that the said relation itself is the cause of the creation of *mahat etc.* The mere relation of proximity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, which is ever present, cannot act as the direct or the active cause of enjoyment or liberation. It can only be so through the creation or the manifestation of the evolutes of the *prakṛti*, namely, that of *mahat etc.* However, this does not mean that the same relation once acts as the cause of *mahat etc.* and then again that of enjoyment and liberation. It is not so. The relation of contiguity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* only helps in the production of *mahat etc.* which then leads to their enjoyment by the *puruṣa*, and eventually to the liberation of the self. The entire interpretation stated above is indicated by the phrase ‘*tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*’ in the *kārikā*. It is to be noted that the various evolutes of the *prakṛti* serve the purpose of the beings or the embodied *puruṣa* by fulfilling its needs and desires according to the various existential demands. Further the attainment of the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, that is, the distinctive cognition between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, also requires the assistance of the evolute of *prakṛti*, namely, the *sattvapradhāna buddhi*. It is only when the *puruṣa* perceives itself as distinct from the *buddhi* or the *antaḥkaraṇa*, then it attains the *vivekakhyāti* and continues to exist in its indifferent, immutable essential state. The

perception of *puruṣa* as itself distinct from the *sāttvika buddhi* will be discussed in detail in the following chapter of the thesis in accordance to the latter *Sāṃkhyakārikās*. Thus, we can claim that the manifestation of the evolutes of *prakṛti*, by virtue of *virūpa pariṇāma* occurring in the *prakṛti*, due to the contiguous relation between itself and the *puruṣa*, is an utmost necessity to account for the various facets of the Sāṃkhya epistemology and metaphysics, as have been discussed so far over the course of the various chapters and also in this chapter of the current research thesis.

Finally, in order to summarize the entire content of our discussion, carried out throughout the chapter, we may now reiterate certain points to put forward a clear portrayal of the main contention of the current chapter, that is, the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. We have found out that, enjoyment and/or sufferings (*bhoga*) and liberation (*kaivalya*) are the two ends of *puruṣa* (*puruṣārtha*). The relation of proximity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is admitted, but it cannot be the direct cause of the two *puruṣārthas*, and accordingly, the manifestation of the various evolutes of the *prakṛti* is necessary. Due to the transformation (*virūpa pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti*, the world is created starting from the production of the *mahat etc.* in definite order. This leads to the enjoyment of the objects by the *puruṣa*, but it is to be kept in mind that only those evolutes, like pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*), which are related to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, can be enjoyed. Now these principles being subsequently produced from the *mahat etc.*, the manifestation of each of the evolutes are significant and necessary. Hence, *mahat etc.* are necessary to

account for the *bhoga* of the *puruṣa*. Further, knowledge being a mode or evolute (*vṛtti*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and here, knowledge, specifically referring to the *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*, which can only be instrumental to *kaivalya*, is also nothing but dependent on the evolutes of the *prakṛti*. Hence, for the enjoyment as well as the liberation of *puruṣa*, the production of *mahat etc.* is an absolute necessity. Such manifestations, in turn, being dependent on the relation of proximity (*sannidhi*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, account for the admission of the apparent related-ness between the two fundamentally contradictory principles, that is, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Thus, we can convincingly claim that there is the relation of proximity or contiguity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, and hence, both the principles attain their respective realizations.

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13 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 21

CHAPTER 7

The Concepts of Bondage and Liberation in the Sāṃkhya System

In the preceding chapter we have found out that the relation of contiguity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* leads to the accomplishment of the *bhoga* and the *kaivalya* of *puruṣa*. In the process the assistance of the evolutes of the *prakṛti* is required, and hence their manifestation. In the course of our discussion throughout the thesis, we have found out that how the *puruṣa* conceives the modes of the *antaḥkāraṇa* to be its own, and accordingly the I-usages of the embodied consciousness have been accounted for, as we have discussed in our earlier chapters. However, the Sāṃkhya *śāstra* being essentially an esoteric study of liberation, the focal issue lies in the ascertainment of the nature and the possibility of liberation of *puruṣa* through the attainment of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the *prakṛti*. We know that the *puruṣa* is essentially and eternally free (*nityamukta*). Then quite evidently, the issue arises that how can we consider the possibility of liberation of the ever-liberated *puruṣa*? Further, how at all can the question of bondage arise in case of the unbound, immutable, unrelated *puruṣa*? Moreover, if at all any such bondages are to be admitted due to the apparent related-ness between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* due to their proximity, what could be the nature of such bondages? This has been expressed by Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary as follows – ‘*puruṣaścedaḡuṇo’apariṇāmī*,

*kathamasya mokṣaḥ? mucerbandhanaviśleṣārthatvāt,
savāsanakleśakarmāśayānāṅca bandhanasamākhyānām
puruṣe'apariṇāminyasambhavāt/ ataevāsyā na saṁsāraḥ
pretyabhāvāparanāmā'asti niṣkṛiyatvāt/ tasmāt 'puruṣavimokṣārtham' iti
riktaṁ vacaḥ'.¹ These pivotal issues and the related concerns regarding the
emancipation from such bondages are the moot points of discussion and
analysis in the present chapter. We now enter into the detailed critical analysis
and exposition of the issues stated above following the respective
Sāṁkhyakārikās. In this context various arguments from the position of the
Neo-Sāṁkhya tradition have also been put forward wherever those have been
found to be relevant.*

In the sixty-second *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa explicates the notion of the
bondage and that of the liberation in the context of the essentially unbound
puruṣa. The *kārikā* is as follows – ‘*tasmānna badhyate'addhā na mucyate
nā'api saṁsarati kaścit/ saṁsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā
prakṛtiḥ*’². Here the main contention is, that the *prakṛti* serves the purpose of
the enjoyment and the liberation of *puruṣa*, is not exactly an appropriate
manner of stating the essence of the Sāṁkhya *śāstra*. The term ‘*mokṣa*’ is only
applicable to those who are actually bound. The *puruṣa*, however, being
essentially unbound, immutable and devoid of the three *guṇas*, - the question
of its bondage and that of its volition towards liberation does not hold at all.
Thus, the notions of bondage and liberation in Sāṁkhya philosophy occupies
a unique character. In order to explicate the thesis that why at all the *puruṣa*

cannot be bound, Vācaspati Miśra states the nature of bondage as follows – ‘*savāsanakleśakarmāśayānām bandhanasamākhyānām*’³ etc. The term ‘*vāsanā*’ means *saṃskāra*. ‘*Kleśa*’ means *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *abhiniveśa*. ‘*Karma*’ refers to *dharma* and *adharma*. ‘*Āśaya*’ means the *citta*. When *kleśa*, *karma*, *āśaya* etc. are associated with the previous impressions (*saṃskāra*) then bondage (*bandhana*) takes place. Now the issue arises that if we consider the above sense of bondage, then the *puruṣa* can never be bound at all. The *puruṣa* being immutable, non-related etc. it cannot have any sort of association with *kleśa*, *karma*, *āśaya* or *saṃskāra*. Thus, the *puruṣa* never migrates nor is it ever bound. Migration (*samsāra*) is also understood as the cycle of birth, death and rebirth (*pretyabhāva*). The *puruṣa*, however, does not have any relation to birth or death. Thus, its question of migration does not occur. Now the question arises that the *puruṣa* being essentially non-related, indifferent, inactive, immutable, devoid of the *guṇas* etc. and accordingly being unbound and non-migratory, then the very tendency of *puruṣa* towards the attainment of liberation becomes meaningless. In apprehension of such objections from the opponents, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the sixty-second *kārikā* where he distinctly clarifies the notions of bondage, migration and liberation with respect to the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*.

The term ‘*addhā*’ in the *kārikā* means in actuality or in reality. That is, in actuality or in essence, ‘*na kaścit puruṣaḥ badhyate*’⁴ – that is, no *puruṣa* is bound in its true essence. So it does not migrate either. Consequently, it cannot have any possibility of attaining liberation. However, so far we have seen that

the *prakṛti* becomes creative in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Such a notion is only apparent from the phenomenal point of view, which is not essentially or theoretically valid. Rather the actual thesis is that the *puruṣa* being unbound and non-migratory, all such empirical phenomena are located in *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* evolving in various forms in relation to the different beings undergo migration, bondage and eventually liberation. Thus, in essence bondage, migration and liberation are all none but the modes of the *prakṛti* itself. Bondage is the result of the transformation of the three *guṇas*. Hence, that which is actually a mode of *prakṛti* appears to be there in the *puruṣa* due to the non-discrimination between the consciousness and the *buddhi* or *prakṛti*. So bondage *etc.* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*. However, such phenomenal bondage never touches or permeates the pure consciousness. It is merely a linguistic and cognitive misuse of the attributes of *prakṛti* to be that of the *puruṣa*, due to the non-apprehension of the discriminatory cognition between them.

This is further clarified by an analogy as follows – ‘*jayaparājayau bhṛtyagatāvapi svāminyupacaryete, tadāśrayeṇa bhṛtyānāstadbhāgitvāt, tatphalasya ca śokalābhādeḥ svāmini sambhavāt*’⁵. That is, in a battlefield it is the soldiers who actually experience the victory or the defeat, yet it is the king of the country who is attributed to be the victorious or the defeated one. The soldiers being in the relation of the server and the served with the ruler, though the result of the war actually belongs to them, yet it is imposed on or attributed to the ruler himself. Accordingly, the king enjoys the victory or

aggrieves the defeat. Similarly, in case of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, though migration, bondage and liberation are actually there in *prakṛti*, yet due to its proximity with *puruṣa* and due to the resulting non-apprehension of the discrimination between them, all that is there in *prakṛti* appears to be housed in the *puruṣa*. The cognition and other modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which act as the causes of bondage are used as attributes of the *puruṣa*. Hence, empirically *puruṣa* is referred to as bound or liberated. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary, states that – ‘*bhogāpavargoyaśca prakṛtigatayorapi vivekāgrahāt puruṣasambandha upapādita iti sarvaṁ puṣkalam*’⁶. The phrase ‘*sarvaṁ puṣkalam*’ means that whatever has been established that is consistent and there is no contradiction in it. Now referring to the original issue of impossibility of the liberation of *puruṣa* due to its essential inert, unrelated nature, it can be asserted that these issues are not actually contradictory to the philosophical system concerned; rather they strengthen the position through further clarification. The bondage, migration and liberation are not the attributes of *puruṣa*, rather they are imposed on the consciousness at the empirical level; and most strikingly, the *prakṛti* becomes creative to serve the purpose of such imposed tendencies of *puruṣa* at the phenomenal level. Thus, the concept of liberation of *puruṣa* here means that the liberation of the consciousness from the imposed bondages and the imposed migratory qualities or attributes, while the *prakṛti* attains fulfilment by serving the above.

Now the bondage, migration and liberation that are imposed or reflected on the consciousness, is considered to be owned by the *puruṣa*,

whereas in reality these are nothing but the modes of *prakṛti*. In this context, the opponents might argue that – ‘*prakṛtigatā bandhanasamsārāpavargāḥ puruṣeṣu upacaryante*’⁷. That is, though it is clear that the bondage *etc.* of the *prakṛti* is imposed on the *puruṣa*, yet the question arises that why or how the *prakṛti* experiences bondage *etc.*?

In response it is mentioned in the *kārikā* that – ‘*rūpaiḥ saptabhireva tu badhnātyātmānamātmanā prakṛtiḥ/ saiva ca puruṣārthamprati vimocayatyekarūpeṇa*’⁸. *Dharma*, *adharma*, *jñāna*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya* are the eight modes of *buddhi* or *mahattattva*. These modes act as instruments for the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* by controlling the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*). The eight modes of the *buddhi* include upward movement, downward motion, bondage *etc.* which are responsible for the enjoyment of *puruṣa*; then *vivekakhyāti* leads to the attainment of liberation. Thus, by serving the purpose of bondage and liberation of the *puruṣa*, the eight modes of *buddhi* attain fulfilment. The above *kārikā* states that among the eight modes of *buddhi*, apart from *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*, the other seven forms of the intellect, namely, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya* act as instruments towards the bondage and migration of the *prakṛti* itself. However, the *tattvajñāna* or the *vivekakhyāti* is distinct from the other seven modes of the *buddhi*, and hence, attributed as – ‘*ekarūpeṇa*’. On attainment of such distinctive cognition, the *prakṛti* eventually alleviates itself from both the bondage and the liberation, that is, relieves itself from serving the purpose of

puruṣa. Further, once the discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) is obtained, the *prakṛti* does not have the tendency of serving the purpose of *puruṣa* anymore. Thus, the bondage *etc.* of the *prakṛti* is due to *dharma*, *adharma etc.* It is because of the non-apprehension of the discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* that such bondage *etc.* are imposed on *puruṣa*. Furthermore, due to the production of the *vivekakhyāti*, *puruṣa* is relieved of the imposed bondages. Thus, by the seven modes of *buddhi*, *prakṛti* finds itself in bondage to fulfil the imposed experience of bondage of *puruṣa*. And on the other hand, with the help of *jñāna*, that is, discriminatory cognition, *prakṛti* leads the *puruṣa* towards liberation by destroying the cognition of the apparent non-discrimination between itself and *puruṣa*.

Here it is to be noted that the term '*prakṛti*' refers to *buddhi*. This is because the intellect (*buddhi*) being the first product of *prakṛti*, *dharma*, *adharma etc.* are all situated in *buddhi*. The sense of non-discrimination or oneness actually occurs between the *puruṣa* and the intellect. Thus, here the term '*prakṛti*' in the *kārikā* specifically refers to *buddhi*. Moreover, in Sāṃkhya philosophy, we do not differentiate between the cause and the effect in essence. Thus, it is perfectly consistent to refer to *buddhi* as *prakṛti*. Hence, it is established that theoretically there cannot be any bondage, migration or liberation of *puruṣa*. Rather all these are situated in and are modes of the *prakṛti*, that is, the *buddhi* itself.

Now one might ask that let us consider for argument's sake that the above form of the distinctive cognition is attained. But then how does that lead

to the attainment of liberation? In response the following *kārikā* has been put forward to clarify the above, as follows – ‘*evam tattvābhyāsānnā’asmi na me nā’ahamityapariśeṣam/ aviparyayādvīsuddham kaivalyamutpadyate jñānam/*’⁹. The term ‘*tattva*’ in the above *kārikā* is indicative of the prime contention of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The main thesis of Sāṃkhya *śāstra* is the ascertainment of the discriminatory cognition between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. However, the mere distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣaviveka*) cannot act as the means towards liberation. Hence, by the admission of implication (*lakṣaṇā*) in the term ‘*tattva*’ the intended meaning is to be understood. Here the term ‘*tattva*’ refers to ‘*tattvajñāna*’, that is, the cognition of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It is held that when such discriminatory cognition is attained, then pure cognitions like ‘I am conscious’, ‘I am not transmutable’, ‘I do not migrate’, ‘I am forever inactive’, ‘I do not possess agency of any action’, ‘I am not the possessor’, ‘I am not the agent’ *etc.* are produced which are indicative of the essential solitary or non-related nature of the *puruṣa* or consciousness. It is important to note here that the above cognitions are indubitable and free from error. However, it is to be kept in mind that the mere production of the above discriminatory cognition (*sattvānyatākhyāti*) between the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, would not situate it as an immediate and stable state of cognition. Rather the perfection of such cognition as the absolute means towards emancipation is to be achieved through practice. Further, if the practice is not performed with proper care and devotion, and if it only continues for a short while, then the purpose of liberation would not be served. Thus, even if the discriminatory cognition is

attained, it has to be practised and meditated upon with utmost devotion over ages and without any disruptions in-between. It is then that the cognition gets situated in its purest and most perfect form and hence, produces immediate perceptual cognition of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Thus, through practice one can truly attain the discriminatory cognition between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which is instrumental towards the ultimate liberation.

It has already been stated that the ‘*tattva*’ in case of *tattvajñāna*, as referred to above, indicates *prakṛtipuruṣavivekakhyāti*. The cognition of such form which thus arises through devoted practice over ages is pure (*viśuddha*). In order to emphasise on the fact that such cognition is pure, that is, veridical, the term ‘*aviparyayāt*’ has been included in the *kārikā*. It is due to fallacies (*viparyaya*) and uncertainties (*saṁśaya*) that a cognition becomes non-veridical. Hence, the inclusion of the term ‘*aviparyayāt*’ in the *kārikā* is extremely significant in order to emphasise the veracity or the authenticity of the *tattvajñāna*. *Tattvajñāna* is essentially free from fallacies and uncertainties, and that establishes its purity or veracity (*viśuddhi*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa, however, does not mention about *saṁśaya* in the *kārikā*, but Vācaspati Miśra clarifies the notion of the *viśuddhi* of the *tattvajñāna* by ruling out the possibility of *saṁśaya* too apart from *viparyaya*. He states that – ‘*niyatam aniyatatayā grhnan saṁśayo ’api viparyayah’*’.¹⁰ That is, though in the *kārikā* it has only been mentioned that *aviparyaya*, which stands for infallibility or authenticity, yet the same is to be understood as the indicator or certainty too. In clearer terms, the term ‘*aviparyaya*’ refers to both certainty and infallibility.

One might ask that how can the same term ‘*aviparyaya*’ refer to the absence of uncertainty? To clarify that Vācaspati Miśra states that – ‘*niyatam aniyatatayā*’. That is, though it is true that *viparyaya* stands for ‘*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka niścaya*’, yet the very phrase ‘*niyatam aniyatatayā*’ indicates that when an object is apprehended in a form or in a sense which does not pertain to it and there is no certainty regarding that apprehension either, then those cases represent the instances of dubious cognition. So if we interpret *viparyaya* as ‘*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka jñāna*’ instead of ‘*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka niścaya*’, then the cases of dubious cognitions too could be accounted for by the term ‘*viparyaya*’. Thus, here the term ‘*aviparyaya*’ in the *kārikā* could be considered to stand for *saṁśaya-viparyaya-śūnyatva*, that is, a cognition which is free from fallacies and uncertainties. *Tattvajñāna* being such that it represents the object of cognition as it is, and hence, it is devoid of any sort of errors or doubts. Accordingly, *tattvajñāna* is pure and veridical.

Now a question might be raised that in spite of attaining the perfect distinctive cognition by practising through ages, how could it be possible to eradicate the empirical migratory state (*saṁsāra*)? It is apprehended that false cognitions (*mithyājñāna*) produced out of illusory impressions (*mithyā saṁskāra*) are beginning-less (*anādi*) and infinite in number. Hence, the false impressions would continue to produce false cognitions and consequently, migratory states (*saṁsāra*), in an unending procession. Thus, as long as the flow of illusory cognitions would continue, the transmigration of beings would also be unimpeded. Now the illusory impressions are positive entities. We

know that if a positive entity is beginning-less, then it is devoid of destruction too. Now if the false cognitions arising out of beginning-less false impressions become indestructible, then even if the discriminatory cognition is produced, due to the prevalence of the illusory cognitions, transmigration will continue in its course. This would render the hard-earned discriminatory cognition to be inefficacious, and consequently, there would not be any volition towards its attainment. Emancipation is nothing but the eradication of transmigration forever. However, if the procession of transmigration due to false cognitions continue to exist, then the attainment of liberation would be impossible. In response to the above apprehension, Īśvarakṛṣṇa assures us that such a position never arises. This is because even though the illusory perception are beginning-less, yet when the pure and perfect discriminatory cognition, as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, is produced then the false perceptions are rendered powerless. The Sāṃkhya philosophical system does not admit *dhvaṃsābhāva*, that is, the absence of an object after its destruction. So it is not possible for them to admit the destruction of the illusory cognitions. However, with the production of the genuine isolatory cognition, the false impressions cannot produce illusory cognitions any further. Moreover, it is due to this reason that the absolute discriminatory cognition is held as solitary (*kevala*) cognition at this stage, as it is devoid of any relation to fallacies, uncertainties and falsities of cognition then.

At this point there might again be an apprehension that the false impressions being beginning-less, they are strongly deep-rooted. However, it

is to be kept in mind that the Sāṃkhya philosophers being *akhyātivādins*, do not admit falsity of cognitions, they only consider falsity of usages (*mithyāvyavahāra*). Now the discriminatory cognition attained through devoted practice over ages may be extremely strong or powerful, but it might not be deeply situated as it is produced through practice. To clarify it might be said that whereas the false impressions or illusory usages having their impact on beings are in a way innate, due to their beginning-less-ness, the attained *tattvajñāna* might not be that impactful on beings as it is learned through practise or is something which is acquired. Thus, the question arises that how or whether at all the discriminatory cognition would be able to eradicate the false impressions. The false impressions are infinite in number and the discriminatory cognition is one. So naturally the question arises that how will the *tattvajñāna* destroy the illusory perceptions and attain its solitary state. Vācaspati Miśra himself raises the above opposition and responds to it as follows – ‘*yadyapi anādiḥ viśayavāsanā*’¹¹ etc. That is, the state of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) is there from time unknown or in other words, it is beginning-less. It is impossible to determine from when did the consciousness start considering the pleasure, pain etc. as its own, which are actually there in the intellect or are modes of the intellect. The consideration of pleasure, pain, agency, enjoyer-ship etc. as one’s own is referred to by the term ‘*saṃskāra*’. However, it is never possible to determine the time period of such apparent sense of identification between the consciousness and the intellect. This being the root cause of transmigration, it is consequently, beginning-less. Further, the imposition or ascription of one’s property on another is called incongruity

(*viparyaya*). Though the ascription of the properties of *prakṛti* on *puruṣa* is incongruent and improper, yet such apparent imposition is to be admitted which leads to the notion of migration. Now such false ascriptions and illusory impressions are equivalent in Sāṃkhya system. Here the Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that though the false perceptions or impositions are beginning-less, yet the acquired discriminatory cognition is so powerful that it can eradicate those completely. This is because the discriminatory cognition is nothing but the purest and most perfect immediate perception of the essential nature of reality. Thus, it is potent enough to overpower the effects of the beginning-less imperfect cognitions. We know that if a cognition is infiltrated with fallacies, however, deep-rooted that notion might be, it is inevitably refutable (*bādhita*), and that is only a matter of time. A couple of instances would again help to explicate the matter more clearly. Say, there has been impermeable darkness in a cave for thousands of years at a stretch, yet if some day a person enters the cave with a lamp lit in her/his hand, immediately, the cave is lit up and the age-old darkness is eradicated. Similarly, the effect of the invincible *tattvajñāna* uproots the illusory impressions produced due to the endless stream of *mithyāsaṃskāra*. Further another instance could be stated as follows – a person standing in her/his balcony perceives the bank of a nearby river. However, due to the glitter of the bright sunlight, the sands on the bank of the river appears to be shimmery. Hence, the person cannot discern it to be the bank of the river, and considers it to be the river water itself. Now such a notion might continue for days and months together. However, if one day the person comes down to the river bank and perceives on one's own that

the shiny appearance is that of the sands of the bank of the river, and it is not the river itself, then immediately, the previously held wrong notion is eradicated. Thus, it is evident that whenever a cognition is inherently false, irrespective of its source or duration, it is bound to be refuted by the correct knowledge sooner or later. Accordingly, the impact of the *tattvajñāna* eradicates the erroneous cognitions or usages produced due to the innumerable age-old *mithyāsaṃskāra*.

We know that the intellect or cognition is essentially transparent in nature due to the predominance of *sattva guṇa* in it. The cognitions of the principles are results of the specialised actions of the intellect, that is, ‘*tattvavastupakṣapātohi dhiyām svabhāvaḥ*’.¹² If the actual principle becomes the subject matter of the cognition, then such cognition is never produced further. The illusory perceptions and the false impressions do not possess the actual principles as their subject matter, rather they acquire their contradictory properties, and hence, even if such cognitions are extremely deep-rooted, they cannot stand resilient before the perfect immediate perception of the actual principles and their reality. Thus, once the absolute discriminatory cognition is attained and is well-situated over practise, then one could eventually be freed from migration. Hence, it is clear that the above apprehension of the acquired absolute cognition not being able to eradicate the beginning-less illusory impressions, does not hold anymore and it is aptly clarified.

Illusory perceptions are also referred to as fallacious, contradictory, invalid cognitions *etc.* because such cognitions are deviant in nature

(*pracyutasvabhāva*). The reason for such deviations in cognition is the presence of fallacies. When a cognition is free from fallacies, it expresses the true nature of an object, that is, the object as it is. Once such correct cognition is produced which expresses the object or reality as it is, then it is bound to eradicate all sorts of false impressions. The above position is evidently admitted by the orthodox schools of philosophy, since they hold that the *vedavākyas*, be it unauthored (*apauruṣeya*) or created by *Īśvara*, are of the above unquestionably veridical nature. However, it is interesting to note here that the above view point is not only admitted by the orthodox schools of philosophy, rather it is also accepted by the externalists (*bāhyagāṇa*). Now in response to the question that why the fallacious cognitions cannot impede the correct cognition of reality, Dharmakīrti in his text *Pramāṇavārttika* mentions that — ‘*nirupadravabhūtārthasvabhāvasya viparyayaīḥ/ na bādhoyatnavattve’api buddhestatpakṣapātataḥ*’¹³. Here the term ‘*upadrava*’ indicates fallacies. It is due to fallacies that a cognition loses its veracity or authenticity. If a cognition is free from *upadrava*, that is, fallacies then it represents the object as it is or in its true essence. Once such pure cognition is produced, then the endless stream of age-old illusory impressions are ripped off their functionality. Accordingly, the pure cognition can never be refuted. The term ‘*buddhestatpakṣapātataḥ*’ as stated above, puts forward the above stand.

The cognition or the intellect is always capable of acquiring the actual nature of object. Its tendency is to express the object as it is. Thus, fallacies

cannot affect that potency of a cognition. To emphasise on this point Dharmakīrti has stated this view twice in his text, - once in the *pramāṇasiddhi prakaraṇa* and again in the *svārthānumāna prakaraṇa*. This establishes the fact that through utmost devotion and practice over ages, once the pure and perfect immediate perception of the reality is attained, none of the fallacies or false impressions could be functional anymore; they are removed forever. Then the false impressions too are rendered dysfunctional and cannot lead to the production of false cognitions or usages anymore. The discriminatory cognition thus produced, is essentially non-related to any fallacies *etc.*, and hence, it is never the case that the stream of the *tattvajñāna* and that of false cognitions continue parallel to each other. Rather once the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* is produced, only that cognition and its flow exist; this is why, the absolute cognition is referred to as solitary (*kevala*) cognition in the *kārikā* and moreover because of its non-related-ness to any sort of doubts or fallacies.

It is thus clear that the absolute discriminatory perception (*sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkārātmakajñāna*) is such that it pertains to the actual nature of the reality (*tattvaviṣayaka*), and is to be attained through devoted practice over ages and births. It is devoid of all sorts of fallacies, doubts *etc.* and hence, can never be refuted. Further it being of such pure nature, it leads to the eradication of the endless procession of the illusory impressions and its consequent erroneous usages. Thus, once such cognition is attained by an individual, one can never be affected by the illusory or erroneous perceptions

any further. The being then perceives the reality in its true essence. The actual nature of the discriminatory perception thus attained is expressed in the *kārikā* as ‘*nāsmi*’, ‘*na me*’ and ‘*nāham*’. The term ‘*nāsmi*’ stands for the essential inactive nature of the self. This further shows that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, activity could only be a property of the insentient. Let us now explain how such a position is being proved. The term ‘*asmi*’ literally (as an *avyaya*) stands for the self (*aham*). Again if the term ‘*asmi*’ is used as a verb, then it being related with the root ‘*as*’, indicates an action. Now to explain how the phrase ‘*na asmi*’ refers to inactivity of the self, Vācaspati Miśra refers to the grammarians and states that the root verbs like, *kr*, *bhū* and *as* stand for actions. Thus, the root ‘*as*’ as applied in case of ‘*na asmi*’ clearly indicates the absence of any activity. Hence, the above phrase is to be interpreted as that which prevents the admission of any sort of activity, - internal or external, in connection to the self.

In Sāṃkhya philosophy, we find that external activities like communicating, receiving *etc.* and internal activities like *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna*, *saṃkalpa* and *ālocana* are the functions of the *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, *manas* and *indriya* respectively. These transformations occurring inside the body are referred to as internal. Though Vācaspati Miśra has not clearly stated what is being referred to by the external activities, yet it could be held that the functions of the *karmendriya* could be considered as external. Now we know that these transformations are non-related to the self. However, agency cannot be accepted as devoid of all such relations. Thus, the self being devoid of all

such relations can never be considered to be the agent. Hence, the structure of such cognition is '*nāham*'. The phrase is to be completed as '*aham iti kartṛpadam*'¹⁴, because the term '*aham*' does not stand for the subject (*kartṛpada*). Thus, we have to reformulate it as – '*aham iti kartṛbodhakam padam*'. Now the term '*aham*' clearly stands for the subject or the agent (*kartṛbodhaka*), as is evident from our frequent usages. For instance, everyday parlances like, '*aham jānāmi*', '*aham juhomi*', '*aham dade*', meaning that 'I know', 'I perform sacrifices', 'I donate' respectively, represent the above sense of *aham* as the subject or the agent. It is thus evident that if the term '*aham*' stands for subject-hood or agency, then clearly '*nāham*' means the absence of agency. Further it follows that inactivity (*niṣkriyatva*) etc. being the markers of non-agency (*kartṛtvābhāva*), the phrase '*nāsmi*' prevents any sort of activity or functionality on the part of the self, and consequently the non-agency of the self is established.

According to the above notion of non-agency of the self discussed above, now the structure of the cognition that entails is of the form '*na me*'. The assertion '*na me*' indicates the non-related-ness and indifference (*nirlepatva* or *asaṅgitva*) of the self. However, it might be argued that in spite of being the non-agent, the self could be related to the pleasure, pain etc. of others. In such cases then though there is absence of agency, yet due to the presence of enjoyer-ship (*bhoktṛtva*), how would liberation be possible? It is because of such apprehension, it has been stated that the cognition of non-agency is not the ultimate; it should be followed by cognition of the form '*na*

me’ or ‘*matsambandhi na kiñcit*’. That is, ‘due to the absence of agency, nothing is related to me’ and ‘I am not related to anything’. Since, the sense of ownership is due to the sense of agency, then in absence of any sort of agency, one would be devoid of any sense of ownership too. An individual who has attained the *tattvajñāna* conceives of oneself as the non-agent. S/he does not consider the pleasure, pain *etc.* located in the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be one’s own any further. The being then realises oneself to be indifferent and isolated, that is, *asaṅga* and *nirlipta*. Thus, in the *kārikā* we find that ‘*nāsmi*’ stands for ‘I am inactive’, ‘*na me*’ means that ‘there is nothing which is related to me’ and ‘*nāham*’ states that ‘I am non-agent’.

Vācaspati Miśra, however, explains the above cognition in a different sequence because he holds that *puruṣa* initially considers itself as inactive. Then due to its inactivity realises its non- agency, and finally attains the cognition that due to its non-agency, it does not poses any ownership, that is, there is no object which is related to it, because only the agent can be the owner. He himself again provides another explanation to the above sequence in his commentary, as follows – ‘*athavā “nā’asmi” iti, “puruṣo’asmi, na prasavadharmā”/ aprasavadharmitvāccākartṛtvamāha – “nāham” iti/ akartṛtvācca na svāmitetyāha – “na me” iti*’.¹⁵ It may be argued that the cognition of the form ‘*nāsmi*’ does not only indicate inactivity on the part of the *puruṣa*, rather it denotes non-agency too. Thus, the subsequent cognition of the form ‘*nāham*’ becomes futile, as it is a mere repetition of the sense of non-agency of the *puruṣa*. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra reinterprets the terms

through a different sort of terminological analysis. Earlier the term ‘*nāsmi*’ has been considered as ‘*na + asmi*’, but Vācaspati Miśra analyses it as ‘*nā + asmi*’. The term ‘*nṛ*’ in the singular tense of the first case ending stands for ‘*nā*’. On attaining the *tattvajñāna* the self realises itself as ‘*nā asmi*’, that is, ‘*aham nā-puruṣaḥ*’.¹⁶ The phrase ‘*nāsmi*’ stands for ‘*puruṣaḥ asmi*’. That is, the cognition of the form, ‘I am *puruṣa*, but not creative’, arises. Here the intended meaning is that once the self realises itself as the *puruṣa*, then it immediately it realises itself as the indifferent, isolatory consciousness (*kūṭastha caitanya*) too. Further the cognitions of the form, ‘since I am the *puruṣa*, hence, I am neither immutable nor creative’, entails from the former realisation. The fact that an entity is immutable or non-creative entails the fact that it is a non-agent too. Thus, the following cognition ‘*nāham*’ establishes such. Furthermore, the realisation of the non-agency of the self leads to the consequent realisation of its non-relatedness (*sambandhaśūnyatā*) with anything as such, and accordingly, its sense of being the non-possessor (*asvāmitva*) arises. Thus, according to the above sequence, we find that the self on attaining the *tattvajñāna*, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*, realises itself as the inactive, non-agent, isolated consciousness. This is the fundamental essence of *puruṣa*, and accordingly, the realisation of such is nothing but the attainment of liberation.

In the above context, in the *Yogasūtra* we find that – ‘*tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe avasthānam*’.¹⁷ The term ‘*draṣṭu*’ refers to the immutable passive onlooker or seer within the being, that is the pure consciousness. According to

Patañjali, the realisation of the true essence of the core consciousness as distinct from the *citta* is the ultimate aim of our existence. It is then that we attain enlightenment, and consequently liberation. It is because of this reason that the *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra* is considered to be the pivotal cause of the liberation. According to Patañjali, each of our perceptions being veiled by the modes of the *citta*, we cannot attain the perfect cognition of the true nature of the consciousness in the course of our empirical existence. For instance, if we wear a glass with a spot on it, then whatever we perceive would be tainted with that spot. However, at the same time just as we need the pair of glasses for seeing the objects of the world, similarly, we need the assistance of the *citta* to perceive the *draṣṭu* in its true essence. Just as the spot on our glasses disturbs our vision of the empirical objects, the modes (*vyṛtti*) of the *citta* too distorts our perception of the *draṣṭu*, but in spite of that the assistance of the *cittavyṛtti* is necessary for the perception of the pure indifferent consciousness. In this regard, Patañjali puts forward a beautiful metaphor to explain the function of the *citta* in attaining the perfect cognition of the *draṣṭu*. He states that the *cittavyṛtti* is like the waves in the water of an ocean, whereas the *draṣṭu* is like the ocean-bed. Just as one has to move through the waves of the water in an ocean to reach the ocean bed and see the aquatic life underneath, similarly the being has to go through the various forms of the *cittavyṛtti* in order to eventually attain the clear and distinct perception of the core consciousness, that is, the *draṣṭu*.

Such form of the pure perception is held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers as *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*, and it is this form of realisation that lends instrumentality to the attainment of liberation on the part of the being. In Sāṃkhya philosophy this has been referred to as the direct perception of the discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* (*sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*). This ultimate cognition has been attributed with three qualifiers in the *kārikā* – ‘*viśuddham*’, ‘*kevalam*’ and ‘*apariśeṣam*’. The first two qualifiers have already been discussed. Now let us look at the third one. In order to bring out the significance of the third qualifier ‘*apariśeṣam*’, Vācaspati Miśra raises an objection, - ‘*nanu etāvatsu jñāteṣvapi kaścit kadācidajñāto viśayo ’asti, tadjñānam jantun bandhayiṣyati*’.¹⁸ That is, one might argue that even after attaining the cognition of almost all the objects by practising the ultimate cognition, there might be some object which remains unknown. So there might remain ignorance about at least one object, and until and unless all the objects are known and the respective ignorances are destroyed how could liberation be possible? In response to such possible objections, the term ‘*apariśeṣam*’ has been added as a mark of the ultimate cognition. It is held that once such absolute cognition is attained, nothing remains unknown. The root cause of all the products that constitute the world, - the *prakṛti*, and the one contradictory in essence to it, - the *puruṣa*, when known in their original essences and their absolute contradiction is perceived, everything that is there naturally falls under the purview of such overpowering cognition, and hence, nothing remains unknown, which could further create any sort of bondage. In this context, it has been mentioned in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* –

‘*tattvābhyāsānneti netīti tyāgādivivekasiddhiḥ*’¹⁹. In the commentary (*vṛtti*) to the said *sūtra*, Aniruddha states that – ‘*vivekaśca katham syādityatrāha – tattvābhyāsā/ aspaṣṭam/ śrutiśca “sa eṣa neti netyātmā’agrhyo nahi grhyate, aśīryo nahi śīryate”*’²⁰. Further in the commentary (*vṛttisāra*) to the above *vṛtti*, Vedānti Mahādeva states that – ‘*vivekaḥ katham syātyatrāha – tattvābhyāsāditi/ netinetīti tattvābhyāsāddehendriyādivailakṣaṇyainātmanaḥ punaḥ punaścintanāt tyāgāt samnyāsacca vivekasiddhiḥ vivekasākṣātkāraḥ/ tathā ca śrutiḥ - “athāta ādeśo neti netīti”*’²¹ “*tyāgenaike amṛtatvamānaśuḥ*”²² *iti ca*’.²³

Now it might be asked that, - ‘*kim punaḥ īdṛśena sāksātkāreṇa sidhyati?*’²⁴ That is, how does the absolute discriminatory cognition, eulogized so far, help to serve the purpose of the *puruṣa*? In response Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that – ‘*tena nivṛttaprasavāmarthavaśāt saptarūpavinivṛttāṃ/ prakṛtiṃ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavadavasthitaḥ svacchaḥ*’²⁵. The *triguṇātmikā prakṛti* is continually in the process of transformation (*niyata pariṇāmaśīlā*). It constitutes the very essence of the *prakṛti*. The transformation is of two types – *sarūpa pariṇāma* and *virūpa pariṇāma*. Here the term ‘*prasava*’ stands for *virūpa pariṇāma*. The transformation (*prasava*) of *prakṛti* serves the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* which finally leads to the *vivekasākṣātkāra*. From time immemorial, the *prakṛti* has evolved as the *mahat* etc. till the gross elements are produced in a definite sequence. These products help to serve the enjoyment of *puruṣa*. Now that *prakṛti* itself leads to the production of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the *puruṣa*

(*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*) when such cognition is meditated upon and practised with great care over ages. Thus, the *prakṛti* serves the purpose of liberation of *puruṣa*. The *prakṛti* does not have any more functionality other than these two, that is, serving the purpose of enjoyment (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*) of *puruṣa*. The term ‘*prasava*’ denotes the creativity (*kārya*) of *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* maintains its creativity over ages in the course of the evolutionary manifestation of the world, and thus serves the purpose of enjoyment of *puruṣa* from time immemorial. Now with the attainment of the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*, the *puruṣa* realises its freedom from any necessity of enjoyment, and continues to exist in its isolatory (*kevala*) essence. Thus, the *prakṛti* then helps in accomplishing the second purpose of the *puruṣa*, that is, its liberation. We know that the *prakṛti* has two major purposes, - one is to produce the evolutes in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment of *puruṣa*, and the other is to help in the production of *tattvajñāna* in order to help the *puruṣa* attain *vivekasākṣātkāra* that would eventually lead to its liberation. With the attainment of the *tattvasākṣātkāra* both the functions of the *prakṛti* are fulfilled. Thus, the *prakṛti* too is freed from its incessant functionalities. It then reverts to its primordial state, that is, its state of *sarūpa pariṇāma*, and does not become creative anymore, since its purposeful functions have been fulfilled, and accordingly there remains nothing for it to create any further.

It is to be noted that as long as the discriminatory cognition is not attained, the *prakṛti* does not cease to transform. The attainment of the

immediate perception which ceases the transformations of the *prakṛti* is of the form – ‘*tena tattvasākṣātkāreṇa prakṛtiḥ nivṛttaprasavā bhavati*’²⁶. The discriminatory cognition leads to the cessation of the seven modifications of *prakṛti*, namely, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya*. These seven transformations being prior to *tattvajñāna*, continue to be modified until and unless *tattvajñāna* is produced. However, with the production of the discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*), modifications of the *prakṛti* into the above seven forms cease. Thus, the ultimate cognition, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*, acts as the cause of cessation of the seven other transformations of *prakṛti*. This is precisely expressed by the term ‘*arthavaśāt*’ in the *kārikā*, that is, due to the power of the ultimate cognition the *prakṛti* ceases to transform into any other forms further.

Here an objection might be raised that among the above-mentioned seven forms of *prakṛti*, *vairāgya* acts as the cause of *tattvajñāna*. Hence, it is inappropriate to say that *vairāgya* acts as a cause of bondage or an impediment towards liberation. However, the *vairāgya* admitted by the Tauṣṭikas is considered as *atattvajñānapūrvaka*. The schools which admit either of the primordial *prakṛti*, *ahamkāra*, *indriya* or *mahābhūta* as the self (*ātman*) are referred to as the Tauṣṭikas. *Tattvajñāna* helps to destroy all that is against its nature, and hence, due to the eradication of the modes of *prakṛti* that are counter to *tattvajñāna* by the overpowering effect of the *tattvajñāna*, the *prakṛti* ceases to transform into *dharma* etc. Thus, owing to the cessation of the cause, the effect is no longer produced.

When the *puruṣa* attains *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, *prakṛti* no longer evolves as the *mahat etc.* and consequently, transformations into the form of *dharma etc.* also cease. It is at this moment, the inactive, pure *puruṣa* perceives the *prakṛti* in its almost primordial form as a mere witness or a detached observer. The term ‘*svaccha*’ in the *kārikā* significantly denotes the detached perception of *puruṣa*, which is free from all sorts of non-discriminatory cognition (*abhedābhimānaśūnya*). When we refer to the *puruṣa* as *svaccha*, it denotes the unrelated-ness of the *puruṣa* with the three *guṇas*. The term ‘*svaccha*’ means the non-relatedness of the *puruṣa* with those states of the *buddhi* which are permeated by the modes of the *raja* and the *tama guṇas*. Thus, at this moment the *puruṣa* perceives the *buddhi* in its essence, that is, in its predominantly *sāttvika* form. Accordingly, the *prakṛti* is perceived as devoid of all modes of transformation of the *raja* and *tama guṇa*, and hence, there does not remain any sense of non-discrimination between the *buddhi* and the *caitanya*. Thus, the *puruṣa* attains its essentially pure (*svaccha*) existence. However, it is interesting to note here that though the term ‘*svaccha*’ indicates the non-relation or the attainment of the discrimination between the consciousness and the intellect, yet there remains an identity of the *puruṣa* with the transformation of *sattva guṇa* for a momentary period (*manāk*). Most importantly, it is due to this non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sattvagūṇavṛtti* that the *puruṣa* can perceive the *prakṛti* as devoid of or free from its seven other modes of transformation. That is why, the ultimate cognition is called *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, that is, the final discriminatory cognition between the self and the *sattvagūṇavṛtti*. The term ‘*manāk*’ in the

statement ‘*manāḥ sambhedaḥ asti eva*’²⁷ has got two senses. That is, the sense of non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sāttvikībuddhi* is existent only for a very short while, and such non-discrimination does not give rise to any further *saṃskāra*. Thus, the said non-discriminatory state is characterized by the above two features. Such non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sāttvikī buddhi* is instrumental for the perception of the discrimination (*bhedasākṣātkāra*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Liberation is attained by *puruṣa* on attaining the discriminatory perception, and hence, the above non-discriminatory state dissolves, and does not give rise to any *saṃskāra* either.

In the following *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa further states that – ‘*dr̥ṣṭā mayetyupekṣaka eko dr̥ṣṭā’ ahamityuparamatyanyā/ sati saṃyoge’ api tayoh prayojanaṃ nāsti sargasya*’²⁸. In introducing the commentary to the above *kārikā*, Vācaspati Miśra shows some inconsistency in the previous contentions. In the previous *kārikā*, it has been mentioned that *prakṛti* is always in the state of transformation in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Once the *puruṣa* attains the discriminatory cognition, the *prakṛti* ceases to transform. However, it cannot be claimed that the *prakṛti* ceases to transform immediately on the attainment of the *tattvajñāna* by the *puruṣa*, that is, ‘*nivṛttaprasavām iti na mṛṣyāmahe*’.²⁹ If *vivekakhyāti* would have been the preventive towards the cause of transformation, then the above claim could have been accepted. However, in reality it is not so. *Vivekakhyāti* cannot act as an impediment towards the cause of transformation. This is because the cause of the evolution of *prakṛti* is the contact or the proximity

relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This has been discussed in detail in the sixth chapter of the thesis in the course of our discussion of the twenty first *kārikā*.

It is clear so far that the said contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, and the *vivekakhyāti* are not opposed to each other. Then naturally the question arises that the proximity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* being eternal, the cause of the transformation of *prakṛti* is also eternal, then how can the *prakṛti* cease to transform at all? Such transformation, further, is the natural potential of *prakṛti*, so it cannot be prevented by *vivekakhyāti*. Moreover, the relation of contact or proximity is there in both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Consequently, the enjoyer-ship of *puruṣa* and the enjoyable-ness of *prakṛti* are also retained, as these are the natural potentials of the consciousness and that of the matter respectively. Now even if the *tattvajñāna* is meditated upon and practised continuously with utmost sincerity, yet the properties of enjoyer-ship and that of enjoyable-ness can never be eradicated, as they are eternal in *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* respectively. So the relation between these capabilities being retained, there cannot be any reason for the *prakṛti* to cease transforming. Furthermore, if it is claimed that generating the objects of enjoyment and the ultimate discriminatory cognition being the two tasks of *prakṛti*, once these are accomplished, the *prakṛti* having no other purpose, ceases to evolve, even then that is not a very strong argument to establish the reason behind the cessation of the transformation of *prakṛti*. This is because there is no such claim that the task once performed by *prakṛti* could not be

repeated by itself again. The intended claim is that whatever has been accomplished once, similar instances could be accomplished time and again. Thus, the question remains that, since the relation between the natural potentials of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* remains intact, and that relation being considered as the instrumental cause of the evolution of *prakṛti*, why will there not be the production of other enjoyable commodities (*bhogāntara*) and even more strikingly, can it not produce other discriminatory cognitions (*bhedasākṣātkārāntara*) similar to the initial one?

To explicate it could further be stated that even on attainment of the *vivekakhyāti* and its foundation through devoted practice, the innate potency of *bhoktrtva* of *puruṣa* and that of the *bhogyatva* of the *prakṛti* cannot be denied. Moreover, both the principles being eternal, their potencies are eternal too. Hence, simply stating that since the purposes of fulfilling the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* have been accomplished by the *prakṛti*, the latter rests from its creativity, is not sufficient to explain the issue. It is true that fulfilling the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of the *puruṣa* are the two objectives of *prakṛti*, and nothing else, yet it does not sanction the fact that the *prakṛti* cannot perform the repetitive acts of creation in future. An action which has been performed once, can always be performed again, or at least actions similar to it. For instance, in our daily lives we find that after a pot has been produced, thousands of pots similar to it are repeatedly produced. Also, human beings after enjoying a particular piece of beauty or anything as such, enjoys things alike it repeatedly. Hence, there cannot be any definite sanction that the

creativity of the *prakṛti* cannot be staged again after the attainment of the *vivekakhyāti*. Since the innate potencies of enjoyership and being the enjoyable on the part of the consciousness and the matter respectively continue to exist, so by virtue of their relation of contiguity, it is only natural that the stream of *bhoga* and *bhedasākṣātkāra* would continue till eternity.

In response to the above stances and apprehensions, Īśvarakṛṣṇa maintains that ‘*dr̥ṣṭā mayā*’ etc. That *prakṛti* which has not yet produced *vivekakhyāti*, can produce enjoyable commodities again and again, and it is perfectly acceptable. However, once the *prakṛti* has produced *vivekakhyāti*, it can no longer produce the enjoyable commodities nor can it be in the state of migration experiencing the enjoyable commodities. Thus, as the non-discriminatory cognition acts as the cause of the enjoyment, in the absence of such cognition, there cannot be any reason to propel enjoyment. Just as in the absence of a seed, the sapling cannot be grown, similarly in the absence of non-discriminatory cognition, there cannot be any question of enjoyment. Enjoyable commodities like, sound etc. are essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, as these are nothing but the products of *prakṛti*. Due to the sense of non-discrimination with the *prakṛti*, the *puruṣa* considers these enjoyable commodities as its own objects of enjoyment, - ‘*īyam madarthā*’. Such enjoyer-ship continues due to the prevalent sense of non-discrimination, and as long as such cognition persists, the *prakṛti* continues to evolve as the enjoyable. Now as apprehended above, it is important to note over here that, the discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti* or *bhedasākṣātkāra*)

too could be generated time and again, if due to persisting sense of non-discrimination, the *puruṣa* considers the *prakṛti* as related to it or the *vivekakhyāti* thus generated to be of its own use or to be serving its own purpose. Then it is to be understood that the discriminatory cognition is not perfectly attained. However, in essence once *vivekakhyāti* is produced, all sorts of ignorance in the form of apparent non-discrimination *etc.* are eradicated. The self perceives the *prakṛti* as absolutely non-related to it, and hence, the tendency to experience the enjoyable commodities dissolve. The self, perceiving itself as absolutely distinct from the *prakṛti*, cannot consider the cognition of discrimination as its own either.

It is true that the enjoyable commodities and the discriminatory cognition, both are the products of *prakṛti*. However, that does not mean that the *prakṛti* would continue to produce them forever. The *prakṛti* becomes and remains creative as long as it serves the purpose (*puruṣārthas*) of *puruṣa*. The *puruṣārthas* in turn remain or are sought for, as long as there exists the sense of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). Once the *aviveka* is destroyed due to the discriminatory cognition, neither enjoyment nor liberation is considered to be an end (*puruṣārthas*). Thus, the *prakṛti* is no more induced to be creative. This has been expressed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the previous *kārikās* too, where he states that ‘*prayojanam nāsti sargasya*’. Here the term ‘*prayojana*’ indicates the volition of *prakṛti* to be creative. Enjoyment and liberation both constitute the purpose (*prayojana*). However, when the *puruṣa* attains *vivekakhyāti*, neither enjoyment nor liberation poses to be its end any more, and accordingly, the

prakṛti too does not have any volition to be creative, as it is no longer required. Attaining the cognition of the form, ‘I am perceiving the *prakṛti* as absolutely distinct from myself’, the *puruṣa* realises its essential indifferent (*udāsīna*) state of existence. This is further endorsed by the term ‘*eka*’ in the *kārikā* which stands for *puruṣa*. On the other hand, ‘*anyā*’, that is, the *prakṛti* ceases to be creative due to its transformation in the form, ‘I have been perceived by the spirit (*puruṣa*)’. Consequently, in spite of the existence of the contact or the relation of proximity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* no further creation takes place, due to the absence of the cause, that is, the sense of non-discrimination (*aviveka*).

In the *kārikā* ‘*tena nivṛttaprasavām*’, etc. it has been stated that the pure, inactive *puruṣa* perceives the *prakṛti* devoid of its seven modes of transformation (*saptarūparahitā*). However, the question arises that how does the *puruṣa* perceive the *prakṛti* at that time? This is because the *puruṣa* then has already attained its end by attaining the discriminatory cognition. Now one who attains such cognition and perceives itself as distinct from *prakṛti* and also perceives the *prakṛti* as absolutely distinct from itself, immediately attains absolute liberation. Further, when one is liberated that *puruṣa* is devoid of a body. So the question comes up that how can the *puruṣa* perceive the *prakṛti* without possessing a body. Perception is dependent on the sense organs, and thus, in turn, it requires a body. Liberated *puruṣas* are devoid of bodies. However, the *puruṣa* who has attained the *tattvajñāna* is not liberated yet, since there might be residual sufferings in the form of *prārabdha karma* which

have to be waned away through one's empirical existence and experiences, for it to be destroyed forever. This necessarily presupposes the sustenance of a body even in case of a *tattvajñānī*. However, once the *vivekakhyāti* is obtained, the indiscernibility between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is eradicated. Hence, the ignorance (*avidyā*) or the *aviveka* is destroyed. Creation takes place due to the contiguity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* associated with the *avidyā* and its subsequent illusory impressions. Now once the *vivekakhyāti* is obtained, the ignorance of the form of *aviveka* along with its subsequent illusory impressions are eradicated. Accordingly, neither creation, nor all that is created can exist. On that logic, the body too being an object created out of the material principle can no longer exist. We know that '*nimittāpāye naimittikasyāpi apāyah*', that is, the absence of the instrumental cause leads to the absence of the effect. That is, due to the eradication of the ignorance (*aviveka*), the objects created due to the assistance of the ignorance cannot exist either. So the absence of bodies in case of the liberated *puruṣas* continues to be an issue, and hence, the entire contention discussed so far comes to a question mark, as in neither of the cases, it is possible for the *puruṣa* to perceive the *prakṛti*.

In the above context it might be argued that '*tattvajñāne api na mucyate*'³⁰, that is, even after the attainment of *tattvajñāna*, *puruṣa* would not be completely liberated since, it has not yet experienced the results of all its previous actions. Though *tattvajñāna* acts as the instrumental and final cause of liberation, yet the existing results of actions (*prārabdha karmaphala*) act as

impediments towards liberation. Thus, an individual does not become liberated the moment after attaining *tattvajñāna*. Liberation is actually attained after the waning away of the results of the previous actions through experiences. The *tattvajñāna* cannot destroy all actions. So the natural question is that then how would the waning away of actions and their results be possible. Actions and their results could only be destroyed through sufferings and enjoyment, that is, through experiences (*bhoga*) only. Thus, even after attainment of *vivekajñāna*, if the results of previous actions await to be experienced, then one can attain liberation only after the destruction of those fruits of actions through experiences. In view of the above, the opponents might claim that the *tattvajñāna* then cannot be considered to be the instrument of liberation at all. It is mentioned in the *śāstras* that, ‘*nābhuktaṁ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭīśatairapi*’³¹. That is, even if one acquires thousands of bodies over repeated births, the fruits of the actions that are already in store cannot be destroyed, until and unless they are waned away through sufferings and enjoyment. Now if such a view is admitted, then it is to be accepted that ‘*tattvajñānam na mokṣasāadhanam*’³². Further such admission would lead to the falsification of the claim previously made by the Sāṃkhya philosophers that the distinctive cognition of the products of *prakṛti* (*vyakta*), primordial *prakṛti* (*avyakta*) and consciousness (*jñā*) act as the instrument of liberation.

An individual acquires the cognitions of *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā*, and with tremendous effort and practise also acquires the distinctive knowledge

between them. Even then, however, the person cannot attain liberation, since her/his previous actions and their results are still in store for the person to go through that and experience those. When all the stored actions (*karma*) and its results (*phala*) are waned away through experience, then only one can attain liberation. Now such a state-of-affairs reduces the idea of attainment of liberation to nothing but a utopia. The amount of actions and their impressions (*karmāśaya*) that have accumulated over ages, are impossible to be determined and eradicated. The term ‘*āśaya*’ means impressions (*samskāra*). The impressions acquired due to actions are *dharma* and *adharma*. It is also impossible to determine when those actions would yield their fruits. So if it is held that after the destruction of such insurmountable amount of actions and impressions only one can attain liberation, then the attainment of such end appears to be practically impossible. Moreover, which impression (*karmāśaya*) would fructify at what time, that is, whether in the present life or in the next life or in some other life after hundreds of years, there is no regulation to that. Thus, considering the above scenario, liberation not only seems to be an indefinitely far off end, rather it is reduced to a fiction. The individual would continue to perform actions and accordingly, there would not be any end to the impressions gathered due to the current actions along with the previously acquired ones. Hence, the stream of impressions being unending, liberation would never be attainable. An even more significant point is that there is no definite time-frame to determine which *karmāśaya* would produce the intended state of existence. Certain impressions might start bearing fruits from the current birth itself, whereas the other impressions might

start fruition from the next birth, while others may even remain dormant for ages at a stretch and then be ready to produce the intended results of the actions performed perhaps hundreds of births ago. Thus, a person would be undergoing numerous rebirths to experience the fruits of the previous actions and along with that continue to perform further actions which in turn would again produce the respective impressions. Thus, along with the heap of impressions previously acquired, enormous amount of impressions would continue to add up to those. Consequently, the waning away of the entire impressions would never be possible and the hard-earned discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*) would be rendered meaningless.

In response to the above criticisms, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the following *kārikā* - ‘*samyagjñānādhigamāt dharmādināmakāraṇaprāptaul tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāt cakrabhramivaddhṛtaśarīrah*’³³. He states that one must have a clear knowledge of the nature of *tattvajñāna* first, before proceeding to raise objections. If one actually realises the nature and the power of *tattvajñāna*, the objections raised would simply dissolve. It is true that there are innumerable actions and their impressions stored over ages, and there is no definite regulation regarding their fructification, yet the power of the discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*) is such that after its production it renders all the past impressions ineffective. They cannot further lead to fructification. Due to the strength of the ultimate cognition, the previous impressions are reduced to dysfunctional states just like a burnt seed which can never produce a sapling. The sense of non-discrimination or ignorance is

the root cause of the fructification of the impressions. However, with the production of the perfect cognition (*vivekakhyāti*), all sorts of ignorance are eradicated. Consequently, no new impressions are produced, the actions that are performed then are free from ignorance and hence, does not further add to the impressions, and accordingly, the previously acquired impressions of actions start to wane away. Due to the effect of *tattvajñāna*, the age-old impressions of actions are burnt out, which then lose their capacity to produce further impressions or to fructify into results. Thus, the tremendous power of the perfect knowledge renders all the impressions, generated due to ignorance, ineffective, however immense and deep-rooted they might be.

In the above context Vācaspati Miśra refers to the analogy of the burnt seed and explicates how the discriminatory cognition eradicates the beginning-less and unending stream of ignorant impressions. We know that seeds are sown on the ground after the ground is drenched by water. If the seed is intact, then on sowing it produces a sapling after some time. Now if the seed is burnt, then even sowing it on a fertile ground would not lead to the production of the sapling. Here the impressions (*karmāśaya*) are equivalent to the seeds. The intellect (*buddhi*) or the internal sense organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) as such is equivalent to the ground or the field. The *pañcakleśa* namely, *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa* are like the water that is used to drench the ground. The intellect becomes active in the presence of these five *kleśas*, which in turn help the impressions to fructify. Those five modes (*kleśa*) being intact in the intellect from time immemorial, the impressions have continued

to produce the fruits of enjoyment and sufferings in the intellect. However, when the *tattvajñāna* is produced, the intellect no longer remains active due to the eradication or burning down of the five *kleśas* by the perfect cognition. The intellect then exists as an infertile ground and the impressions can longer produce the fruits of actions leading to bondages of the individual.

Now in the first part of the *kārikā* it has been stated that due to the effect of the ultimate perfect cognition, the impressions no longer remain the causes of sufferings and enjoyment. The term '*karmāśaya*' stands for *dharmādharmā*. Such *karmāśaya* has been compared to the seeds. When the *tattvajñāna* reduces the *karmāśaya* to a state like that of a burnt seed, it can no longer lead to fructification. Again Vācaspati Miśra holds that the *tattvajñāna* makes the intellect turn into a barren ground by burning out the *pañcakleśa* and hence, the intellect being free from ignorance, *dharmādharmā* cannot fructify further. Apparently there seems to be an inconsistency in the above two explanations held by Vācaspati Miśra in the context of the analogy of the burnt seed. Initially, it has been mentioned that the impressions become ineffective like the burnt seed, and hence, cannot fructify anymore. Again it has been stated that the intellect is reduced to an infertile ground by the *tattvajñāna*, and hence, the impressions cannot fructify any further. Now if the first explanation is admitted, then it is to be understood that in spite of the presence of the fertile or active intellect due to the *pañcakleśa*, the impressions themselves being like the burnt seeds, cannot fructify anymore and if the second interpretation is considered, then it is to be noted that the impressions

in spite of remaining intact, cannot fructify. This is because the *tattvajñāna* turns the intellect into a dry land which is devoid of the *pañcakleśa* and hence, cannot remain active anymore. However, both the above positions have been admitted by Vācaspati Miśra himself. Thus, in order to remove the apparent inconsistency it could be said that we have to clearly understand the phenomenon of the impressions being reduced to a state like that of a burnt seed. The term ‘*dāha*’, which generally means burning, here refers to the act of eradication of all that is associated with ignorance. Thus, when it is referred to as burnt impressions *etc.*, it actually means that though the impressions are capable of fructification, yet due to the eradication of the associates of ignorance, which help in fructification, the impressions are rendered dysfunctional forever. Thus, the admission of the above interpretation of the analogy frees it from the apparent inconsistency referred to above. Hence, it can be claimed that due to the attainment of the perfect discriminatory cognition the impressions in the form of *dharmādharmā* lose their functionality and thus, the attainment of liberation of the knowledgeable individual (*tattvajñānī*) becomes possible.

In the present context, it is important to mention the views of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and the commentary (*vṛtti*) of Aniruddha on the *sūtra*. Vijñānabhikṣu states that – ‘*niyatakāraṇāt taducchittirdhvāntavat*’³⁴. Aniruddha states in his *vṛtti* to the above *sūtra* – ‘*bhavatvavivekāḍ bandhaḥ/ tathāpyavivekanāśārthaṁ dharmāṅgokaraṇāt tulyatvam/ anyathā sarvadā bandhaḥ syāt, ityat āha – niyata/*

anvayavyatirekābhyām yasya tat kāraṇabhavagatam tadvyabhicāre sarvato 'anāśvāsaḥ/ yathā dhvāntanāśāya prakāśaḥ, tathātrāpi vivekādavivekānāśaḥ/. Thus, they both hold that ignorance (*aviveka*) itself is the bondage, that is, sufferings. To eradicate such ignorance, *dharma* etc. have been referred to. Otherwise the bondage would have continued to exist forever. The destruction of ignorance and its consequent bondage is considered to be causally connected. Any sort of causal connection is established by the positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*). In the above case too, that is to be done. For example, just as the rays of light destroy the darkness immediately, *vivekajñāna* too annihilates the ignorance immediately on its production.

Further, in the next *Sāṃkhyasūtra* too, -
*'pradhānavivekādanāvivekasya taddhāne hānam/*³⁵, it has been mentioned that due to the non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* there arises the sense of bondage (*bandha*). If the ignorance (*aviveka*) is destroyed, then all sorts of bondage due to the ignorance would also be destroyed. Since, *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is the primordial cause, if the discriminatory cognition with that is attained, then the distinctive cognition with all other products of *prakṛti* will automatically be produced. This is because if there be no non-discrimination with the cause, then obviously there would not be any non-discrimination with its effects either. In the *vyṛtti* to the above *sūtra* Aniruddha states that – *'vivekānmuktirityuktam/ ghaṭapaṭādīnām viveko 'asmadādīnāmapyastīti sarvamuktiprasaṅga ityatrāha – pradhānā/*

*sarveṣāṃ mūlaṃ pradhānam, tasyāvivekādanyāvivekasya sambhavaḥ/
padārthānāmanyō 'anyaṃ bhavatvaviveko viveko vā, na tena bandhamokṣau,
kintu pradhānavivekāvivekābhyām/ atastaddhāne pradhānavivekahāne
sarvavivekahānam/'.*

Now an important thing is to be kept in mind that liberation is not attained immediately on attaining the *tattvajñāna*, because due to the remaining impressions of the *prārabdha karma*, that is, the fruits of actions which are already being experienced, the individual qualified with the *tattvajñāna* continues to exist with the given body. In the current context, it may be mentioned that there are three types of actions (*karma*) - *sañcita*, *kriyamāṇa* and *prārabdha*. The actions which have already been performed at time immemorial are termed as *sañcita karma*, meaning those which are in store or which have already been accumulated. The actions that are being performed now while experiencing the fruits of the *prārabdha karma*, are called *kriyamāṇa karma*, that is, actions which are in the act of being performed. However, if the current actions (*kriyamāṇa karma*) be something outstanding or something incredibly harmful, then its results might be experienced along with the results of the *prārabdha karma*; otherwise they are stored along with the other *sañcita karma*. Among the *sañcita karma* those actions which are ready to fructify are considered as *prārabdha karma* and to enjoy or suffer the results of those actions, the current body of the individual is created and acquired. Now with the attainment of the *tattvajñāna*, the *kriyamāṇa karma* are not produced. Though the knowledgeable individual

(*tattvajñānī*) continues to perform her/his own actions, yet those actions do not lead to the production of impressions or the consequent bondages anymore. This is because the actions of the *tattvajñānī* are no longer associated with the ignorance or its elements anymore. Thus, those activities are not really actions (*karma*) at all. More importantly, the previously accumulated actions (*anādi sañcita karma*) though capable of yielding results, will not do so ever again because the *tattvajñāna* have rendered all of them dysfunctional like a burnt seed. However, there is no way of avoiding the results of the *prārabdha karma* from being enjoyed or suffered. It is held that, ‘*prārabdha karmānām bhogād eva kṣayaḥ*’³⁶, that is, *prārabdha karma* or the action which have already started fruition, cannot be waned away other than by enjoying or suffering the fruits. Thus, the *tattvajñānīs* too have to maintain their bodies for a certain period until and unless all the fruits of their *prārabdha karma* are waned away through experience (*bhoga*).

The above notion has been explicated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the help of an analogy of the potter’s wheel, as stated in the *kārikā* as – ‘*tiṣṭhati saṁskāravaśāt cakrabhramivaddhṛtaśarīrah*’. A potter in order to create a jar turns the wheel with the help of a stick by means of her/his own volition and effort. This produces the spinning of the wheel, but even after the potter stops turning the wheel, it continues to spin for a while on its own due to the inertia of motion. Eventually when the inertia recedes, the spinning drops and finally the wheel stops. Similarly, in case of the *tattvajñānī*, due to the remnants of the impressions in the form of *dharmādharmā*, the fruits of the *prārabdha*

karma have to be experienced till their waning, with the help of the current body. Thus, even on attaining *tattvajñāna* the embodied self has to exist for a while till all the *prārabdha karma* are destroyed. This is because, once the actions have started their fruition, they cannot be stopped any more until they get completely spent up through experiences. Such contention is proved by the *Brahmasūtras* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The *Brahmasūtra*, ‘*bhoga tu itare kṣapayitvā atha sampadyate*’³⁷, states that all those *dharmādharmā* and the respective sufferings (*pāpa*) and enjoyment (*puṇya*) which have already started to fruition, can only be eradicated through experiences (*bhoga*) and then only the *tattvajñānī* can attain liberation. Again the *Chāndogyamantra* states that ‘*tasya tāvat eva ciraṁ yāvat na vimokṣye artha sampatsye*’³⁸. That is, the attainment of liberation for a *tattvajñānī* is only that much distant as much time as s/he requires to wane away her/his *prārabdha karmaphala*. When the impressions and fruitions of all such actions are destroyed, the individual is freed from the body and attains absolute liberation (*videhakaivalya*). The *sañcita* and *kriyamāṇa karma* of the individual qualified with absolute knowledge (*tattvajñānī*) have already been destroyed by the effect of the absolute discriminatory cognition, and the remaining *prārabdha karma* is spent up by the experiences (*bhoga*) of sufferings and enjoyment. Thus, all sorts of *karma* and its impressions being destroyed or spent up, there remains no necessity of the body, and hence, the absolute knower (*tattvajñānī*) is freed from the body too. However, during the period of maintaining the body and experiencing the fruits of the *prārabdha*, the absolute knower becomes capable of perceiving the *prakṛti* in its almost

primordial essence, that is, devoid of the modes of transformation, and thus the spirit or the consciousness exists as a mere detached witness. In this context Vedānti Mahādeva in his *vṛttisāra* of the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1/57 states that – ‘*nanu prakṛtipuruṣāviveka eva cet prakṛtisamyogadvārābandhahetuḥ, tayorviveka eva cenmokṣahetustarhi dehādyabhimānasattve’api mokṣaḥ syāt, sa ca śrutyādiviruddhastatrāha –pradhāneti/ puruṣe pradhānāvivekāt kāraṇādyo’anyāviveko buddhidehādyaviveko jāyate kāryāvivekasya kāryatayā anādikāraṇāvivekamūlakatvāt tasya pradhānāvivekahāne satyavaśyamityarthah/*’.³⁹

In order to clarify all sorts of objections and inconsistencies raised so far, and to conclude his contention of the entire Sāṃkhya *śāstra* in an organised manner, Īśvarakṛṣṇa asserts that - ‘*prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivṛtau/ aikāntikamātyantikamubhayam kaivalyamāpnoti*’⁴⁰. The apprehension was that if the absolute knower has to maintain his bodily existence in order to experience the remnants of the previous impressions then how would the individual attain absolute liberation? That is, *kadā tasya mokṣa bhaviṣyati*? One cannot be considered as liberated in the actual sense of the term, as long as the self is embodied. The final freedom from the body (*videhamukti*) is termed as absolute liberation. The absolute knower may be referred to as the *jīvanamukta*, as long as s/he maintains the body for the experience of the *prārabdha*.

Here the obvious question that comes up is that when will the absolute knower attain the absolute liberation. In response, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that

‘*prāpte śarārabhede*’ etc. in the *kārikā*. The impressions of the previously accumulated actions (*anādi sañcita karma*) which have not yet fructified in this birth, have all been rendered ineffective like a burnt seed due to the effect of the absolute discriminatory cognition. The actions which had started to fructify, that is the *prārabdha*, are being experienced, that is, suffered or enjoyed through. Hence, they all are being spent up. Once all of that is destroyed through experiences, the body attains distinction from that. That is, the body too gets destroyed. The body gets destroyed immediately after the moment the *prārabdha* is completely spent up. Thus, the two purposes of *prakṛti*, namely, enjoyment or suffering, that is, *bhoga* and discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) both are fulfilled. The distinctive cognition between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* has been attained and the residual experiences of *prārabdha* have been spent up, thus, there remains nothing else for the *prakṛti* to serve. Hence, it attains its fulfillment. All purposes being achieved, there remains no further volition in the *prakṛti* to serve the *puruṣa*. Thus, the *prakṛti* ceases to evolve, that is, it becomes *nivṛttaprasavā*. Consequently, the *puruṣa* attains the absolute (*aikāntika*) and irreversible (*ātyantika*) freedom (*kaivalya*) from the trifold sufferings. Also in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* - ‘*tatra prāptavivekasyānāvṛttiśrutiḥ*’⁴¹, it has been stated that due to the discriminatory cognition, inevitable and absolute cessation of sufferings is obtained. In the *vṛtti* of the above *sūtra* Aniruddha states that – ‘*puruṣārthatvaṃ darśayati – tatra/ tatra - prakṛtipuruṣayoḥ prāptavivekasya vivekajñānādanāvṛtti śrutiḥ “na sa punarāvarttate”*’⁴² iti/’.

Finally it may be stated that in *Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana* of Kṣemendra, we find that the Sāṃkhya philosophers are *abhāvamokṣavādins*. That is, liberation for them is not qualified by any other state of feelings like pleasure *etc.* The absolute cessation of sufferings is considered as liberation to the Sāṃkhya philosophers. There are some philosophical schools who consider liberation to be not only the cessation of sufferings, but the state of realisation (*upalabdhi*) of eternal pleasure (*nityasukha*). They are known as the *sukhamokṣavādins*. However, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the realisation of pleasure, be it eternal (*nitya*) or fleeting (*anitya*), the realisation (*upalabdhi*) itself is always non-eternal (*anitya*). Hence, liberation is not a state of realisation of eternal pleasure, rather it is the state of absolute cessation of the trifold sufferings. This has been expressed as – ‘*darśanaśaktirahitasya kriyāśaktimataḥ pradhānasyāpi puruṣeṇa saṃyogaḥ mokṣārtha puruṣasya bhinnatvena vyaktāvyaktapuruṣajñāne jāte pradhānasya mokṣo bhavati/ nityasukhopalabdhirmokṣa iti cedupalabdherapi nityānitya vivekagrastatvādasāram/ na ca nityasukhagocarasyāvidyādiyatkiñcidāvaraṇabhaṅga eva puruṣārthe/ vācyaḥ sukhānubhavasyaiva puruṣārthatvāccaitanyanityatvenāvaraṇasyāpi asambhavācca/ mokṣe paramānandaśrutismṛtayastu - mokṣaśāstraparibhāṣāmātrā/ duḥkhamevāsti na sukhaṃ yasmāt tadupalabhyate/ duḥkhārtasya pratīkāre sukhaṃsajñā vidhīyate// duḥkhaṃ kāmasukhāpekṣā sukhaṃduḥkhātyayaḥ smṛtaḥ/ ityādismṛtibhirduḥkhanivṛttireva sukhatvena paribhāṣitā/*’⁴³

After providing detailed analytic and critical expositions on the various aspects of Sāṃkhya philosophy, with respect to the study of consciousness and its related issues, throughout the course of our thesis, it is now imperative to delve into the discussions of the objections and arguments put forward by the Advaita Vedāntins, who are considered to be the severest critics of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition. The Advaitins have tried to refute the Sāṃkhya position from quite a few stances. Again the Sāṃkhya philosophers too have put forward a number of objections against the Advaita Vedānta thesis, and that is why they are considered as the main opponents (*pradhānamalla*) of the Advaita tradition. Thus, in the following fourth part of the thesis we put forward the eighth and the final chapter of the research work, where we engage into the study and a critical analysis of the debate between the Sāṃkhya and the Advaita Vedānta philosophers regarding moot issues on consciousness from various perspectives.

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- 29 Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 355
- 30 Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 358
- 31 Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 359

- 32 Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 359
- 33 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 67
- 34 *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1/56
- 35 *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1/57
- 36 Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 362
- 37 *Brahmasūtra* 4/1/19
- 38 *Chāndogyamantra* 6/14/2
- 39 Mahādeva, Vedāntin, 1973, *Vṛttisāra*, in *Sāṃkhyadarśanam*, ed. Janardan Shastri Pandeya, Varanasi: Bharata Manisha, p. 26
- 40 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 68
- 41 *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1/83
- 42 *Chāndogya* 8/15/1
- 43 Kṣemendra, 1920, *Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana* in *Sāṃkhyasaṃgraha*, ed. Vindhyesvariprasad Dvivedi, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office, p. 33

PART IV

CHAPTER 8

The Advaita Critique of the Sāṃkhya Theory of Consciousness

The Advaita Vedāntins are the severest critics of the Sāṃkhya system as they consider the Sāṃkhya philosophical system to be their main opponent (*pradhānamalla*). The Advaitins have tried to refute the Sāṃkhya position on various grounds. The Sāṃkhya philosophers too have put forward a number of objections against the Advaita Vedānta thesis, and that is why they are considered as the main opponents of the Advaita system. This is evident from the amount of effort employed by Śaṅkara to refute the Sāṃkhya position which is not observed in such proportions in case of refutation of the other philosophical schools. However, this is because many of the tenets regarding the nature of consciousness as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers are of immense significance. Moreover, both the Sāṃkhya philosophers and the Advaita Vedāntins admit *satkāryavāda* as their causal theory. That is why there are quite a few aspects where the views of the Sāṃkhya school are admitted by the Advaita Vedāntins too. For instance, both the systems admit the modification of the internal sense organ in the form of the object (*antaḥkaraṇaviśayākāravṛtti*). They admit that the sense organ reaches out to the external object and takes up its form, and accordingly, the internal sense organs undergo transformation through subsequent steps which lead to the production of cognition, as have been discussed earlier. Further both the

schools admit cognition and emotions like, pleasure, pain *etc.* as transformations (*pariṇāma*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Hence, it is very significant on the part of the Advaita Vedāntins to pay utmost attention to the Sāṃkhya views and establish their own distinctness from the Sāṃkhya school through detailed analysis and its refutations.

The primary refutation by the Advaita Vedāntins is about the nature of *puruṣa* as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. The Advaitins hold that if the nature of *puruṣa* essentially be eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), enlightened (*buddha*), free or unbound (*mukta*), as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, then it is not tenable to admit the plurality of consciousness (*puruṣabahutva*). This is because the kinds of distinctive properties that are being advanced to establish the multiplicity of *puruṣa*, are all fundamentally related to *prakṛti* only, and none of them could be considered in relation to consciousness. This is the first objection.

The second argument objects that if the nature of consciousness (*caitanya*) is such that it is completely devoid of any relation to *prakṛti* (*cetanānadhiṣṭhitajāda*) and is distinct from it (*svatantrapradhāna*), then such an essence of *puruṣa*, can never be responsible for any sort of creation. This is because any material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) which is not presided over by a sentient agent is not capable of production. Such arguments have been put forward in ‘*Smṛtipāda*’ and ‘*Tarkapāda*’ of *Brahmasūtra*, for instance, in the aphorism ‘*dṛśyate tu*’¹.

Further, the Advaita Vedāntins argue that if the *puruṣa* is essentially of the nature of *anubhaya*, that is, *na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ*, and moreover, if *akhyātivāda* is to be admitted, that is, if any cognition is essentially valid, and whatever illusion is apprehended occurs only in respect of usage, and not in respect of cognitions, then actually there cannot be any bondage in case of *puruṣa* at all.

This, however, has been admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers themselves in the sixty second *kārikā* as follows, - ‘*tasmānna badhyate’ addhā na mucyate nā’api saṃsarati kaścit/ saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ//*’. That is, the *puruṣa* being essentially unbound, immutable and devoid of the three *guṇas*, - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the question of its bondage and that of its volition towards liberation does not arise at all. The *puruṣa* being devoid of any relation to birth or death, any question of its migration does not occur at all, and accordingly, the propensity of *puruṣa* to attain liberation becomes meaningless. Thus, all sorts of phenomenal activities like, birth, death, migration and tendency to be liberated are not there in *puruṣa*, rather they all are located in the *prakṛti*. They are only imposed on the consciousness in case of empirical experiences. Hence, here the idea of liberation of *puruṣa* refers to its liberation from the imposed bondages, while the *prakṛti* attains fulfilment by serving the purpose of the *puruṣa*. The Advaitins, however, hold that the Sāṃkhya philosophers have not been able to resolve the issues satisfactorily related to bondage and liberation.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers, on the contrary, argue against the Advaita Vedāntins' theory regarding the genesis of the world, namely, *brahmakāraṇavāda*. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the world (*jagat*) and consciousness (*caitanya*) being intrinsically different or essentially opposed in nature, - *atyantavilakṣaṇasvabhāva*, the admission of the creation of the world from pure consciousness cannot be a tenable position. Hence, *brahmakāraṇavāda* cannot be an admissible position at all. This is expressed in the *sūtra* - 'na vilakṣaṇatvādasya tathātvamca śabdāt'².

The first section (*pāda*) of the second chapter (*adhyāya*) of *Brahmasūtra* is known as *Smṛtipāda*. The first verse (*adhikaraṇa*) of *Smṛtipāda* states that, - 'smṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅga iti cennānyasmṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅgāt'.³

The first *pāda* deals with the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga *smṛtis* which provide arguments against *Brahmakāraṇatāvāda*. So the main contention of this section is to establish the Advaita Vedānta thesis as veridical and free from all such objections.

According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the entire Sāṃkhya *smṛti* discusses the nature and the relation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. It does not discuss about *dharma* or Vedic rituals at any point. However, the *Vedas* or *śruti* establish both *Brahman* and *dharma*. So it is evident that the *Vedas* are of wider scope (*sāvakāśa*) and the Sāṃkhya *smṛti* is of a narrower scope (*niravakāśa*). Now using the Mīmāṃsā technique of *sāvakāśa*-

niravakāśanyāya, as discussed earlier, the Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that whenever there is a contradiction between two *sāvakāśa* and the *niravakāśa* theories, the *niravakāśa* theory turns out to be the stronger claim and consequently, the *sāvakāśa* theory has to be modified in conformity with the stronger *niravakāśa* thesis. Thus, the Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that the scriptures cannot be interpreted as establishing the thesis that *Brahman* is the material cause of the world. Vyāsa has refuted this objection of the Sāṃkhya philosophers in the first aphorism of *Smṛtipāda*.

The first volume of the *Brahmasūtra* states that the omnipotent, omniscient *Īśvara* is the cause of the production, existence and destruction of the world, just as the clay is the material cause of a pot or gold that of a necklace. *Īśvara*, however, not only is the material cause towards the production of the world, rather being the absolute controlling power of the entire existence, He is responsible for its sustenance (*sthiti*) too. Śaṅkara, in his exposition of *vivartavāda* initially states that just as a magician is responsible for the durability of the spell cast by him/her, similarly *Īśvara* bears the responsibility of the sustenance of the world produced from His own being and its dissolution into His own self or consciousness, just as the various life forms, namely, *svedaja*, *antaja*, *jarāyujā* and *udvijja*, eventually dissolve into the earth (*kṣiti* or *avanī*).

In the first chapter of the *Brahmasūtra*, with help of the statements of the *Upaniṣads*, it has been shown that how the different categories of life forms, as mentioned above, are nothing but forms of the self or consciousness.

They are not something distinct from the consciousness itself. Rather the schools which admit the production of the world from an insentient material principle like *pradhāna* (*pradhānakāraṇavādins*) are actually pertaining to a view that is counter to the *śruti*, that is, it is *aśābda* and hence, it is to be refuted.

Further, both Vyāsa and Śaṅkara have pointed out respectively in the first aphorism of the *Smṛtipāda* and in its commentary that if the scriptural statements following the Sāṃkhya school, then the validity of many *smṛti*-s like *Manusmṛti* which establish the theory of the evolution of the world from a conscious cause (*cetanakāraṇavāda*) will have to be denied and hence, it is not possible to accept the interpretation of the *Vedavākyas* in favour of the *pradhānakāraṇavādin* Sāṃkhya thesis.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers, however, consider their own thesis to be of narrower scope (*niravakāśa*) than the other *śāstras* like *Manusmṛti* and others, and hence, consider it to be a stronger position, following the Mīmāṃsā technique of *sāvakāśa-niravakāśanyāya*. Now it might be questioned that on what basis, the Sāṃkhya philosophers consider their theory to be *niravakāśa* and the *Manusmṛti* and others to be *sāvakāśa*. In response the Sāṃkhya philosophers state that the *śāstras* like *Manusmṛti* and others not only talk about *Brahmakāraṇavāda* or *cetanakāraṇavāda*, they carry out discussions on *dharma* too. For instance, dictates regarding when and how a particular caste (*varṇa*) is to carry out a certain ritual, or how the *Vedas* are to be studied, how marriages are to be carried out and the like. Moreover, in case of *Manusmṛti*,

definite prescriptions have been laid down regarding the various sorts of *puruṣārthas*. Also the specific (*viśeṣa*) and generic (*sādhāraṇa*) duties of the different castes (*varṇa*) and stations (*āśrama*) of an individual's life have been discussed by these *smṛtis*. The Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, however, does not address any issue related to *dharma*. Rather its sole concern is the attainment of that cognition which would lead to liberation. Thus, there being discussions on both *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and *dharma* in the *Manusmṛti*, and the discussion on *pradhānakāraṇavāda* only in the Sāṃkhya *smṛti*, it is evident that the Sāṃkhya *smṛti* is narrower in scope (*niravakāśa*) than *Manusmṛti* and other similar texts.

Furthermore, it has been argued that if *brahmakāraṇavāda* has already been established by *śruti*, then there is no need to further analyse and refute it with the help of other *smṛtiśāstras*. In reply to this argument the Sāṃkhya philosophers state that it is only the wise men (*prajña* or *vedajña*) who can discern the meaning of the *śruti* on their own, whereas the common people have to rely upon the words of wise men to understand the meaning of the *Vedas*. Manu and others being very learned, common people out of veneration for these learned authors might choose to follow the interpretation of the Vedic tenets as done by them. However, the Sāṃkhya philosophers point out that the *śruti* itself considers the words of the sages like, Kapila and others to be veridical as they have attained perfect veridical cognition (*ārṣajñāna* or *apratihatajñāna*). Hence, there is no scope for doubting or refuting the views expressed by Kapila in the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*. This is expressed in the following

statement from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, - ‘*rṣim prasūtaṁ kapilam yastamagre jñānairbibharti jāyamānaṁ ca paśyēt*’.⁴

Moreover, the Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that the veracity of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra* cannot be questioned since it establishes its thesis not only on the basis of the *vedavākyas*, but they are perceived by the great sage Kapila himself. Thus, the entire *śāstra* is not only *śrutimūlā* but it is *pratyakṣamūlā*, and hence, veridical. Here the opponents argue that the subject matters of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are extra-sensory (*atīndriya*). So it is not possible for any being to perceive or know such matters other than the *śruti*. In response the Sāṃkhya philosophers say that Kapila is the possessor of the final knowledge of reality (*siddha*), that is, the possessor of *ārṣajñāna* or *apratihatajñāna*, it is possible for him to attain immediate or perceptual cognition of extra-sensory matters too. However, the opponents here further argue that even the cognition of a *siddha* depends on the performance of *dharma*, which are again in turn dependent on the *Vedas* (*codanāvākyas*). Thus, the authority of Kapila who has attained his perfection (*siddhi*) by performing *dharma* as prescribed by the *Vedas* cannot override the authority of the *śruti* itself.

Furthermore, Kapila has not only admitted *pradhānakāraṇavāda* as opposed to *Brahmakāraṇavāda*, but has also admitted realistic dualism and plurality of self. Hence, it becomes questionable that how at all Kapila can be considered as a *siddha*, since all the above tenets are contradictory to the *Vedas*. So the *śrutivākya* as referred to, by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, to establish Kapila as the *siddha* and hence, his words as veridical, needs to be

interpreted in conformity with the main tenets propounded by the *Upaniṣads*. In this context, through much debate it is claimed that the verse from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, as cited above, do not refer to Kapila, the propounder of Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, at all. Rather the usage of the term ‘*kapila*’ in the scriptural statement “*ṛṣim prasūtam*” refers to Hiraṇyagarbha or Brahmā who created the universe.

Further Śaṃkara has shown that in the *Mahābhārata* as well the monist position has been advocated by referring to the theory of one, undivided self (*advaitatattva*). It has been asked in the *Mahābhārata* that ‘*vahavaḥ puruṣāḥ Brahman*’ and again, ‘*ekaḥ eva tu*’, that is, whether the self (*puruṣa*) is one or many. In response to such a dilemma, initially the views of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga have been put forward as, - ‘*vahavaḥ puruṣāḥ rājan sāmkyayoga vicārinām*’, and then it has been refuted as, - ‘*vahunām puruṣāṇām hi yathaikā yonirucyate/ tathā taṃ puruṣaṃ viśvamākhyāsyāmigūṇādhikam/*’. That is, just as the earth is considered to be the common ingredient of all forms of being and their bodies, similarly one *puruṣa*, qualified by the attributes like omniscience *etc.* has been admitted as the constituent of the entire existence, thus establishing the monist theory (*advaitatattva*) of consciousness.

Now to further endorse the first *sūtra* of the *Smṛtipāda* discussed so far, the second *sūtra* states that, - ‘*itareṣāṃ cānupalabdheḥ*’⁵. It is argued that the principles such as *mahat etc.* as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers as the first product of *pradhāna*, are neither admitted in the *Vedas* nor are they knowable to the common people. However, the gross elements (*pañcabhūta*)

and the sense organs (*indriya*) are referred to in the *Vedas* and hence, they may be discussed about in the *smṛtis*. However, principles like *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and *pañcatanmātra*, as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, not being approved by the *Vedas* and also not being the subject matter of ordinary cognition, are not acceptable at all.

Here the Sāṃkhya philosophers refer to the following verses from the *Kaṭhaśruti* to show that principles like *mahat etc.* have been admitted in the *Vedas*, - ‘*indriyebhyaḥ parā hyarthāḥ/ arthebhyasca param manaḥ/ manasastu parā buddhirbuddherātmā mahān paraḥ*’⁶; *mahataḥ paramavyaktamavyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ/ puruṣānna param kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ*’⁷.

Vyāsa in the aphorism ‘*ānumānikam*’ and Śaṃkara both have shown that though the term ‘*mahat*’ has been used in certain cases yet they do not stand for the first product of *pradhāna* as held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. Rather it denotes either the cosmic intellect (which in a way might be considered closest to the Sāṃkhya thesis) or Hiraṇyagarbha. It might still be argued that due to the absence of suitable proofs for the admission of certain principles like *mahat etc.* one cannot claim that the entire Sāṃkhya *śāstra* becomes non-veridical. In reply, Śaṃkara states that if the parts of the *smṛti* establishing *mahat etc.* as products of *pradhāna* become non-veridical, then the parts establishing *pradhānakāraṇavāda* also should be rejected.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers further argue that independent arguments can also be advocated to show that the Vedas do not establish *Brahmakāraṇavāda*.

The above mentioned Sāṃkhya objection is discussed in the fourth aphorism of the concerned *adhikaraṇa* and runs as follows, - ‘*na vilakṣaṇatvādasya tathātvam ca śabdāt*’. According to the opponents (here, Sāṃkhya philosophers), *Brahman* cannot be the cause of the world as the world is completely of a different nature from that of the *Brahman*, and such radical difference in the nature of the world and that of the *Brahman* is known from the scriptures. The Sāṃkhya philosophers put forward an inference to show the impossibility of *brahmakāraṇavāda*, - ‘*jagat na cetanaprakṛtikam vilakṣaṇatvāt yat yasmāt vilakṣaṇam, tat tasmāt na jāyate yathā go mahiṣaḥ*’⁸. In the said inference, *jagat* is the locus (*pakṣa*), the property of not being caused by *Brahman* (*Brahmaprakṛikatvābhāva*) is the probandum (*sādhya*) and the difference between the world and *Brahman* (*vilakṣaṇatva*) is the probans (*hetu*). The positive concomitance (*anvaya vyāpti*) is of the form, - ‘*yat yasmāt vilakṣaṇam, tat tasmāt na jāyate*’. However, it might be objected to that the above inference is fallacious due to the uncertainty of the presence of the probans in the locus and hence, is afflicted by the fallacy of *sādhyaśama* (according to the Classical Naiyāyikas) or *svarūpāsiddhi* (according to the Neo-Naiyāyikas). The Sāṃkhya philosophers, in response, state that the difference between the world and *Brahman* is mentioned in the *Vedas* itself and in favour of their position they cite the *śruti*, - ‘*vijñānam ca avijñānam*

ca'⁹, that is, that which is insentient can never be produced out of the sentient. The *Brahman* is pure consciousness, whereas the world is insentient and material in nature. Both the Sāṃkhya and the Advaita Vedānta schools pertain to the theory of *satkāryavāda* with regard to the nature of the causal connection. So they hold that the cause and the effect are of similar nature. Keeping that in mind the Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that the world and the *Brahman* being of radically different natures, the world cannot be the effect of the *Brahman*. Hence, *Brahmakāraṇavāda* cannot be an admissible position.

The proponents of *Brahmakāraṇavāda* now argue that *Brahman* has been admitted as the material and efficient cause of the world by *śruti* itself. So there cannot be any question of refuting it by another *pramāṇa*, namely, *anumāna*, since, compared to the *śruti* or *āgama*, any other *pramāṇa* is weaker in nature. Here the Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that when there is a contradiction between two *śrutivākyas*, another *śruti* is brought forward to resolve the issue. Similarly, when there is a controversy between a *pramāṇa* and the *śruti* itself, then again referring to the *sāvakāśa-niravakāśanyāya* we can try to resolve the matter. Any *pramāṇa*, here say, *anumāna* will be *niravakāśa* since, it can establish its intended object only in the way it does. However, the *śruti* being liable to be interpreted in various manners has to be considered as *sāvakāśa*. We know that whenever there is a conflict between a *sāvakāśapramāṇa* and a *niravakāśapramāṇa*, the *niravakāśa* one is considered to be the stronger among the two. Hence, in case of the above disagreement between the *śruti* and the *anumāna*, the latter is considered to be

the more powerful, and hence, the interpretation of the *śrutivākyas* as admitted by the Advaita Vedāntins is to be rejected.

It is further pointed out against the Sāṃkhya position that according to the *śruti*, - ‘*naiṣātarkeṇa matirāpaneyā/ prokta ’anyenaiva sujñānāya preṣṭha/ yām tvamāpaḥ satyadhṛtīrbatāsi/ tvādr̥ṇno bhūyānnaciketaḥ praṣṭā*’¹⁰, *Brahman* cannot be known or established through the method of argumentation (*tarka*). So it is not admissible to refute the Vedānta position on the basis of such *tarka*. In response to the above objection, the Sāṃkhya philosophers too cite the *śruti* in favour of their position as, – ‘*ātmā vā*’ are *draṣṭavya śrotavya mantavya nididhyāsitavya*’¹¹. That is, the self is to be perceived, heard about, thought over and contemplated on. Thus, an equally strong *śruti*, as provided by the Vedāntins, proves that the self is to be pondered over, that is, it is a matter of analysis and can be established in terms of logical reasoning.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers maintain that the conscious *Brahman* cannot be considered as the efficient and the material cause of the world as the world is of a completely different nature (*vilakṣaṇa*) than that of the *Brahman*. This is because the *Brahman* is conscious (*cetana*) and pure (*viśuddha*), whereas the world is unconscious (*acetana*) and impure (*aśuddha*). Due to such difference (*vilakṣaṇatva*) it is not possible to admit the causal relation, that is, *prakṛtīvikārabhāva* or *upādāna-upādeyabhāva* among the *Brahman* and the world. This is because in our empirical experience, too, we find that a gold ornament is made out of gold and not of clay, and similarly earthen pots

and pans are made out of clay and not of gold. This depicts that the effect shares the essence of the cause.

Now it might be questioned that why is it that the world is being considered as impure (*aśuddha*). In reply, it is stated that the world being contaminated by pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and delusion (*moha*), it is necessarily impure. The feelings of pleasure, pain *etc.* lead to the sense of attachment, hatred, frustration *etc.* and accordingly delusional senses of heaven (*svarga*) and hell (*naraka*) occur. Further, since the world is unconscious it undergoes transformation in the form of both the cause and the effect, like, the body (*śarīra*) and the sense organs (*indriya*) act as the causes of various effects.

Again it may be asked that can two conscious entities serve the purpose of each other, that is, can they be in the relation of the server and the served, just as the unconscious *pradhāna* is considered to serve the purpose of the conscious being or the *puruṣa*? In response Śaṅkara states that, - '*na hi sām्यe sati upakāryopakārahābhāvaḥ bhavati/ nahi pradīpau parasparasya upakurutaḥ*'¹². That is, whenever there is sameness between two entities, they cannot be in the relation of the server and the served with each other, just as a lamp cannot be responsible for the manifestation of another lamp. Here, however, the opponents might argue that two conscious individuals can be in the relation of the server and the served just as in case of a master and a servant. This has been refuted by stating that in such cases, it is not the self of the servant that is serving the master, rather the physical attributes of the servant

like his body, sense organs *etc.* are performing the tasks and hence, serving the purpose of his master. One consciousness cannot serve the purpose of another consciousness because consciousness does not admit of any betterment or degradation (*utkarṣa-apakarṣabhāvaśūnya* or *niratiśaya*), is devoid of any increase or decrease (*hrāsavṛddhirahita*) and is not an agent (*akartā*). By virtue of being a non-agent, conscious beings cannot complement one another. Thus, that which is the cause of an effect, or that which is conducive towards the production of an effect, is necessarily unconscious.

It may further be argued that the body and the sense organs being related to the self, due to superimposition (*adhyāsa*) they might appear to be conscious too. The Sāṃkhya philosophers clearly state that there is no evidence in favour of admitting the Advaita thesis that material objects like a piece of wood is conscious. So it is not appropriate to consider everything as conscious. Even in our ordinary experience the stark divide between the conscious and the insentient is evidently admitted. Hence, it is impossible to deny the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious entities. Accordingly, the creation of the unconscious world from the radically different conscious *Brahman* cannot be an admissible position at all. Moreover, both the Sāṃkhya philosophers and the Advaita Vedāntins being *satkāryavādins* hold that the cause and the effect are essentially the same. So if the world is produced out of the conscious *Brahman*, then the world itself and all its components, like a jar *etc.* must be conscious too. That is, however, evidently contradictory to our experience. In response, some advocates of

Brahmakāraṇavāda hold that just as in case of deep slumber (*susupti*), there is no manifestation of sentience even in conscious beings, similarly the piece of wood or the pot possesses no sign of sentience. Moreover, there is no contradiction in admitting that a conscious entity serves the purpose of another, just as the body and the sense organs serve the purpose of the self, or food products like, rice, meat *etc.* serve the purpose of the body by providing it nutrition. Hence, all these are instances of the relation of the server and the served (*upakāryopakārahāva*), in spite of all of them being essentially conscious.

Here the Sāṃkhya philosophers again question that if we consider all sorts of entities to be conscious, then how could it be possible to account for the conscious-unconscious dichotomy as known through experience. The Advaitins might argue that the above dichotomy is based on the manifestation of consciousness in certain beings and the absence of such manifestation in others. Such phenomena account for the distinction between the sentient and the insentient in case of ordinary experience. The Sāṃkhya philosophers, however, argue that the manifestation of consciousness in certain beings and its absence in others cannot appropriately account for the conscious-unconscious divide in the world; and even if for argument's sake, such a principle is admitted, yet the stark divide between the world and the *Brahman* in terms of the respective impurity and purity in them, can never be denied. That constitutes the prime factor of distinction (*vailakṣaṇya*) between the two and it is undeniable. Moreover, the *śruti* itself admits of the dual category of

existence, - the conscious (*vijñānasvarūpa* or *cetana*) and the insentient (*avijñānasvarūpa* or *acetana*) by virtue of the statement ‘*vijñānam ca avijñānam ca*’, which clearly indicates the conscious-unconscious dichotomy. Thus, the Sāṃkhya philosophers maintain that there cannot be any possibility of admitting the production of the world from the radically different (*atyantavilakṣaṇasvabhāva*) *Brahman*, and hence, *Brahmakāraṇavāda* is to be rejected.

The following *sūtra* put forward by the Advaita Vedāntins refutes the previous arguments provided by the Sāṃkhya philosophers against *Brahmakāraṇavāda*. It is as follows, - ‘*dṛśyate tu*’. The term ‘*tu*’ here is used to refute the opponent’s position. We have seen that according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers the insentient material world cannot be the product of the conscious *Brahman* due to their stark difference in nature. To this the Advaita Vedāntins react that such an objection is unfounded because we often find the production of insentient hairs, nails *etc.* from the body of a conscious being, and we also find the birth of conscious beings like a scorpion from unconscious cow dung. In both the cases it is true that the cause and the effect are of contradictory nature and these are known through our daily experiences. Hence, there is no inconsistency in admitting the production of the unconscious world from *Brahman* though they are of completely different nature.

One might object that the body of an individual is the cause of the growth of the hair and nails, and not the consciousness in the person

concerned, and also in the latter instance, the cow dung is the cause of the body of the scorpion but not the consciousness in it. However, even then it is to be admitted that there is difference in the nature of the cause and the effect, namely, the cow dung and the body of the scorpion respectively. This is because the body of the scorpion being insentient matter houses the consciousness of the scorpion in it, but the unconscious cow dung also being material in nature is devoid of any such feature in it. So even if we consider that a material object can only be produced from another material object, then also there is difference in their nature. Thus, the relation of cause and effect presupposes certain distinctions between the former and the latter; there cannot be absolute similarity between the two. In fact, if such would have been the case, there would not have been anything as the cause and the effect.

Further the Advaita Vedāntins argue that the inference provided by the Sāṃkhya philosophers to refute *Brahmakāraṇavāda* is itself fallacious. They claim that the probans *vilakṣaṇatva* is vitiated by the fallacy of *avyabhicāra*. Now *avyabhicāra* could be of two types, - *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. *Anvaya vyabhicāra* is traditionally defined as ‘*tadatirikta yāvatkāraṇasāmagrīsattve tatsattve tadasattvam*’ and *vyatireka vyabhicāra* is defined as ‘*tadatiriktayāvatkāraṇasāmagrīsattve tadasattve tatsattvam*’. The proponents of *Brahmakāraṇavāda* hold that the objection that the Sāṃkhya philosophers brought about regarding the impossibility of the production of an effect from a cause which is very different in nature from it, can be refuted by showing that the probans applied to prove such an inference is afflicted by both the

anvaya and *vyatireka vyabhicāra doṣa*. For instance, the genesis of unconscious hair, nails *etc.* from a conscious being is actually a case of *anvayavyabhicāra*. Again the genesis of a conscious scorpion from unconscious clay or dung is an instance of *vyatirekavyabhicāra*. Thus, Śaṁkara claims that the probans *vilakṣaṇatva* consists of the fallacy of *sādhāraṇa anaikāntika*. The Sāṁkhya philosophers might argue that ‘*vṛścikaḥ na gomayaprakṛtikaḥ gomayavilakṣaṇatvāt*’¹³, but Śaṁkara emphasises that the said probans commits the fallacy of *sādhāraṇa anaikāntika* or *savyabhicāra*, because though there is difference in nature (*vilakṣaṇatva*) between the cow dung and the scorpion, yet the cow dung (*gomayaprakṛtikatva*) is the cause of the scorpion. So the probans is present in cases where there is absence of the probandum. Hence, it is a case of *savyabhicāra*.

The Sāṁkhya philosophers, in response, claim that the unconscious hair, nails *etc.* are produced from the unconscious body of the sentient *puruṣa*, and similarly the unconscious body of the scorpion is produced from the insentient dung. These are all instances of the origination of an unconscious object from another unconscious thing. That is, there is no question of difference in nature (*vilakṣaṇatva*) between the cause and the effect. Hence, there is no counter-instance which can disprove the positive concomitance admitted by them.

The Vedāntins here further point out that even though if it is admitted that unconscious hair, nails *etc.* are produced from the unconscious body of

the sentient individual, yet certain unconscious objects acquire the apparent form of consciousness. However, that is not the case with all sorts of insentient objects. So there is a distinction (*vilakṣaṇatva*) between body, hair, nails *etc.* and objects like cow dung, clay *etc.* by virtue of the former being the parts of a living being (*prāṇī*) and hence possessing the property of *prāṇitva* in it and the latter being devoid of that. Among all the insentient objects only the bodies of living beings can apparently act as sentient by being the locus of life, enjoyment, sufferings *etc.* So it is to be admitted that the scorpion's body as the locus of its life is produced from the cow dung and the unconscious hairs, nails *etc.* are produced from the body of the living beings which is qualified with an apparent sentience (*prāṇitva*).

Here it is to be noted that an effect is the transformation of its cause. So, there are various differences in nature between the cause and the effect. Accordingly the material cause (*upādāna*) and the effect (*upādeya*) cannot be considered to be entirely similar to one another. Śaṅkara states that, - '*atyantasārūpye ca prakṛtīvikārabhāvaḥ eva pralīyeta*'.¹⁴ Here Śaṅkara questions the Sāṃkhya philosophers that while talking about the sameness in nature between the cause and the effect, do they admit complete sameness or partial similarity between the two? It is evident that there cannot be absolute similarity between the cause and the effect because then there would not be anything as the cause and the effect; because the cause and the effect are functionally different. For instance, if a pot is identical in nature to its material cause clay, then functions like bringing or storing water in a pot would not be

possible. Again if the second alternative is accepted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, that is, if they say that only partial similarity is sufficient enough between a cause and its effect, then it can easily be claimed that certain material properties of the *puruṣa* is entailed in the hair, nails *etc.* of the individual concerned and similarly some material characteristics of the cow dung is observed in the scorpion too. On that same note, it can thus be claimed that certain properties of *Brahman*, too, like existence (*sattā*) are evident in the world. Thus, the advocates of *Brahmakāraṇavāda* ask the *pradhānakāraṇavādins* that on what basis *Brahman* is said to be different from the world? Is it on the basis of some particular properties, or all properties? Or is it on the basis of the fact that there is a difference in nature between the world and the *Brahman* in respect of consciousness?

The *pradhānakāraṇavādin* Sāṃkhya philosophers cannot pertain to the view that there should be similarity between the cause and the effect in all respects because that would lead to the eradication of the relation of causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva* or *prakṛtīvikārabhāva*) altogether. The second alternative too cannot be admissible by the Sāṃkhya philosophers because it involves a fallacious inference. The inference is of the form – ‘*jagat na brahmaprakṛtikaṃ taddharmānanuvartanāt*’.¹⁵ The Advaita Vedāntins show that the above inference consists of the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi*. This is because the property of existence (*sattā*) is common between *Brahman* and the world. Now the probans *Brahmadharmānanuvartanattva* is absent both in

the locus *jagat* and in the parts of the world like, *ākāśa etc.* Hence, it is a case of *svarūpāsiddhi hetvābhāsa*.

Again if the third alternative is admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, then also the Advaita Vedāntins would show that it would be an instance of *anupasaṃhārī hetvābhāsa*. When there is an absence of both positive and negative instances of concomitance it is a case of *anupasaṃhārī hetvābhāsa*. The inference in question is as follows, - ‘*viyadādikāryam na brahmaprakṛtikam acetanatvāt*’¹⁶. According to the Advaita Vedāntins all objects are produced out of the *Brahman*, so there cannot be any object which is not of the same essence as that of the *Brahman*. Hence, no instance could be cited which is unconscious in nature, and consequently, the relation of concomitance (*vyāpti*) cannot be established.

Further the Sāṃkhya philosophers might argue that nescience (*avidyā*) is not a product of *Brahman* and is unconscious in nature. In reply the Advaita Vedāntins point out that in the above inference, again there would be the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi hetvābhāsa* as the probans would be qualified by an *upādhi* of the form beginningless-ness (*anāditva*). When an attribute is wider in scope than the probandum and narrower in scope than the probans, it is called *upādhi*. Any probans qualified by an *upādhi* (*sopādhika hetu*) is not fit for establishing a concomitance relation. Here, *anāditva* is the qualifier (*upādhi*) and *Brahmaprakṛtikatvābhāva* is the probandum (*sādhya*). The positive concomitance of the form ‘*yatra yatra Brahmaprakṛtikatvābhāvatva tatra tatra anāditva, yathā avidyā*’ can easily be established in *avidyā*.

However, the qualifier *anāditva* is narrower than the probans *acetanatva*; for instance, in case of a jar there is *acetanatva* but absence of *anāditva*. So the qualifier is narrower in scope than the probans, and hence, it is an *upādhi*.

Furthermore the three alternatives discussed so far are all inconsistent with the scriptures (*āgamaviruddha*) because that conscious *Brahman* is the material and the efficient cause of the world, - such interpretation of *śruti* has been elaborately established by the Advaita Vedāntins. Moreover, they state that *Brahman* being an established (*parniṣpanna* or *siddha*) entity, any sort of *pramāṇa* could be employed to know it, as held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, - such a position is not tenable at all. This is because *Brahman* is devoid of form, colour *etc.* So it can never be the object of perception (*pratyakṣa*). There being no ground (*hetu* or *liṅga*) in *Brahman*, it cannot be a matter of inference either. Thus, just like *dharma*, *Brahman* too is only knowable through *śruti* (*āgamamātrasamadhigamya*). Even if it is argued that the *śruti* itself encourages that apart from verbal testimony one must also contemplate on *Brahman*, to that Śaṅkara asserts that the intended meaning of such *śrutis* are that there cannot be any self-realisation (*ātmajñāna*) independent of the *śruti*. It is with the help of the *śruti* that the realisation of oneness between the self and the *Brahman* may be attained.

Earlier we have found that some philosophers of the Vedāntic tradition (*ekadeśī*) have tried to establish the entire world as sentient. However, the issue crept up regarding the interpretation of the *śruti* – ‘*vijñānam ca avijñānam ca*’. In response Śaṅkara states that the above *śruti* can be

interpreted as a denotation of the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) and non-manifestation (*anabhivyakti*) of consciousness. However, it is not possible for the Sāṃkhya philosophers to interpret it in that manner. This is because it has been mentioned in the *śruti* that *Brahman* Itself acquired the conscious and the unconscious forms, but the Sāṃkhya philosophers cannot admit that the unconscious *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* can ever be conscious. It is directly against their ontological dualistic stance. However, if for argument's sake it is held that just as the conscious *Brahman* expresses Itself as the unconscious, similarly the insentient *pradhāna* too can express itself as a conscious entity, even then such a position cannot be tenable because of the inadmissibility of the probans *vilakṣaṇatva* as a valid reason due to the various difficulties and fallacies discussed above. Hence, it is to be admitted that the conscious *Brahman* is the material and the efficient cause of the world, thus, establishing the Advaita Vedānta thesis of *Brahmakāraṇatā*.

REFERENCES

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- 15 *Bhāvadīpikā* on *Śāṃkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 2/1/6, in
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CONCLUSION

Like most of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, Sāṃkhya philosophy too is a philosophical school which aims at attaining liberation (*mokṣa*) as its ultimate end (*paramapuruṣārtha*). The most common definition of *puruṣārtha* as admitted by most of the schools of Indian philosophy is ‘*yena prayuktaḥ puruṣaḥ pravartate sa puruṣārthaḥ*’. According to this definition, that which motivates or compels an individual to perform tasks is to be considered as the goal of that individual (*puruṣārtha*). The most commonly admitted categorisation of these desired ends (*puruṣārthas*) classifies them into four kinds, namely, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Among these *dharma* and *artha* being the means (*upāya*) of attaining the primary ends, are considered to be secondary ends. On the other hand, *kāma* and *mokṣa* are not the means, rather ends-in-themselves (*upeya*). It is evident that both the *upāya* and the *upeya* would be the sought after goals of human lives in order to accomplish a meaningful living. Earned or acquired wealth is referred to as *artha*. In order to define *dharma*, the Mīmāṃsakas state that ‘*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhīṣṭasādhanaṭvaṃ dharmatvaṃ*’. The definition states that any means to a desired end (*iṣṭa*) which is not related to undesirable things (*aniṣṭa*) that are stronger than the desired end is called *dharma*. The Vedic rites and rituals being of the above nature are considered to be *dharma*. *Kāma* is defined as ‘*viṣayendriyasannikarṣajanitasukhaviśeṣaḥ kāmaḥ*’ –

according to which the pleasure produced due to the contact between the sense organ and the object is termed as *kāma*. The absolute and irreversible cessation of all forms of sufferings is called *mokṣa*. It involves such cessation of sufferings after which no further suffering occurs. Except for the Cārvākas and the Karmavādin Mīmāṃsakas, all the orthodox and the heterodox schools of Indian philosophy consider liberation to be the ultimate end of human life. According to the Cārvākas, *kāma* constitutes the ultimate end of human existence; whereas, the Karmavādin Mīmāṃsakas consider the attainment of heavenly pleasure (*svargaprāpti*) to be the ultimate goal of human actions. This has been as discussed in the introduction of the thesis.

Now one might ask that what could be the reason for considering *mokṣa* to be the ultimate end. Or, in other words, what constitutes the *paramatva* of *mokṣa*? In response, the orthodox schools state that the eternity (*nityatva*) of *mokṣa* constitutes its *paramatva*. According to the *Chāndogya śruti*, - ‘*na ca punarāvartate*’¹, one who has attained the absolute cessation of sufferings, that is, *mokṣa*, never goes through rebirth, and is forever released from the cycle of birth and death. However, among the other three *puruṣārthas*, *artha* is only a means of attaining some other desired end, and never an end-in-itself. The pleasure attained through the contact between the sense organs and the object is transient in nature. This holds true for the heavenly pleasures too attained through the practise of *dharma* in the form of Vedic sacrifices. However, there are debates concerning the eternity and non-

eternity of *svarga*, but we are refraining from the discussion of this issue because it is not relevant to the present context.

In the course of the entire thesis, we have seen that according to the Sāṃkhya system, it is only through the attainment of *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, we can attain liberation or the state of absolute cessation of sufferings. Every individual in this world experiences three kinds of sufferings – *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhāvika* and *ādhibhautika*, as discussed in detail in the introduction of the thesis. Human beings adopt various means of relief from the trifold sufferings. However, none of these methods can provide absolute emancipation from the sufferings. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, *vyaktāvyaktajñāvijñāna* is the only means to attaining such liberation. Here, as we know, *vyakta* stands for the gross evolutes of the *prakṛti*, *avyakta* refers to the primordial state of *prakṛti* or *mūlaprakṛti* and *jñā* indicates the *puruṣa*. It is held that the non-apprehension of the distinction between these three categories acts as the root cause of all our sufferings. Hence, the attainment of the discriminatory cognition between the *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and the evolutes of *prakṛti* is the only means to attain the absolute cessation of sufferings, that is, *niḥśreyasa*. Thus, in spite of the availability of the Vedic means and the empirical methods of alleviation of sufferings, those are not sanguin or are not potent enough to ensure the absolute cessation of sufferings. We often find that to get relief from some illness, we might take the appropriate medicine, or undergo surgery in many a cases, yet that does not guarantee that we would not be affected by the same illness or similar kinds of illnesses in future. Further, even the

performance of prescribed Vedic sacrifices, as held by the Karmavādin Mīmāṃsakas, in order to achieve certain desired ends, say, accumulation of wealth, destruction of enemies of a state, or increasing the territory of the land of a ruler, or sacrifices performed in prayer of rainfall to combat droughts *etc.* by carrying out sacrifices like the *vāyavīya homa*, *śyena yāga*, *aśvamedha yajña*, *kārīri yāga etc.* respectively are all efficacious means, yet they are not permanent measures of relief from the sufferings associated to the said desires. Moreover, according to the Vedic tradition, sacrifices like *śyena yāga* and the like are considered to be *abhicāra karma*. That is, actions which help to fulfil the purpose of the individual, but the acts themselves being associated with sin (*pratyavāya*) bring about more sufferings on the part of the performer of the sacrifices as a consequence along with the intended results. Furthermore, sacrifices are usually performed with the chanting of specified hymns (*mantra*) and also involve numerous steps (*aṅga yāga*) and ingredients (*dravya*) required for the accomplishment of the main sacrifice (*pradhāna yāga*). If the *mantras* are uttered incorrectly or the *aṅga yāga* are not carried out appropriately, then it not only leads to the non-attainment of the intended result, but may also bring about adverse effects, thus producing prolonged and intensified sufferings on the part of the performer of the sacrifice. Hence, it is evident that neither the empirical means nor the Vedic rituals can sanction the most sought after goal and the highest end of human life, that is, the attainment of the absolute cessation of sufferings. It is, thus, imperative to admit that the only means of attaining liberation is the realisation of the distinctive cognition

between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, that is, the attainment of *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, or in other words, *vyaktāvyaktajñāvijñāna*.

We know that the Sāṃkhya philosophy represents a dualist tradition in Indian philosophy as it admits both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as the fundamental realities. Further they admit twenty three principles as the evolutes of *prakṛti*, namely, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *manas*, *pañcajñānendriya*, *pañcakarmendriya*, *pañcatanmātra* and *pañcamahābhūta*. These have been discussed in detail and referred to as have been necessary respectively in the introduction and in the concerned chapters of the thesis.

Unlike the idealistic schools of philosophy, who do not admit the independent existence of the world apart from being an object of our knowledge, the Sāṃkhya philosophers consider the world as ontologically real (*sat*), that is, not merely as a matter of cognition. The *prakṛti* is the primordial cause of this creation, and it is real. However, the *prakṛti* itself is uncaused. If we consider a cause for the production of *prakṛti* as well, then there would be the fallacy of infinite regress. The state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṃas*, is called *prakṛti* or *mūlaprakṛti*. When there occurs disturbance in the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, creation of the world commences. Again after the final destruction (*mahāpralaya*), the *prakṛti* returns to its original state of equilibrium of the *guṇas*. Due to the fruition of the results of the respective action of the beings and their consequent *adṛṣṭa*, after a certain period there occurs some disturbance in the magnitude of the *guṇas*, and accordingly, a new creation starts. The order of creation is as

follows - *prakṛti* to *mahat*, *mahat* or *buddhitattva* to *ahaṁkāra*, *ahaṁkāra* to *pañcājñānendriya*, *pañcakarmendriya*, *manas* and *pañcatanmātra*, and finally *pañcatanmātra* to *pañcamahābhūta*. This is the sequence of production of the elements of the world, referred to as the *anulomakrama*. However, *pañcaprāṇa* is not a distinct category, rather it is a product of the combined effect of the *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra*. After the creation, the world exists (*stithi*), and then eventually the destruction starts. It is interesting to note that the destruction occurs exactly in the opposite sequence (*pratilomakrama*) of the manifestation of the evolutes of *prakṛti*, thus eventually attaining the state of equilibrium of the primordial *prakṛti*. Each effect gets dissolved in its preceding cause as follows –the *pañcamahābhūta* into the *pañcatanmātra*, *pañcatanmātra* into its cause *ahaṁkāra*, *ahaṁkāra* into *mahattattva* and finally *mahattattva* into *mūlaprakṛti*. The said cycle of creation and destruction continues to occur repeatedly after certain periods of lull in creation. According to the Sāṁkhya philosophy, in order to fulfil the needs of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*, the *prakṛti* becomes creative. Consequently, the *prakṛti* undergoes transformation and the world is created.

Further, according to Sāṁkhya philosophy, we know that the *puruṣa* is eternal, pure consciousness, immutable, indifferent, non-related and essentially free. It is devoid of the three *guṇas*, and is unrelated to pleasure, pain, merits, demerits *etc.* Thus, there is no actual relation between the *puruṣa* and the components of physical, vital and mental or emotional existence. Just as a crystal placed near a red hibiscus flower acquires the red colour of the

flower by virtue of reflection, similarly, the embodied consciousness or *puruṣa* being in proximity with the evolutes of the *prakṛti* like, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, pleasure, pain *etc.* is used as qualified by these evolutes, whereas in reality such usages (*vyavahāra*) are only superimposed. Hence, there is no actual relation between the *puruṣa* on the one hand and *dharma*, *adharma*, pleasure, pain *etc.* on the other. Fundamentally both belong to mutually exclusive categories, but their apparent related-ness is only a consequential perception of our non-discriminatory cognition between the two. We have seen that in case of a being there remains an actual relation between the intellect (*buddhi*) and the cognitions of pleasure, pain *etc.*, as emotions like, pleasure, pain *etc.* are nothing but transformations of the intellect (*buddhivṛtti*). The intellect is primarily constituted of clear, mirror-like *sattvaguna* and the pure consciousness gets reflected on it. Consequently, the components like pleasure, pain *etc.* which are there in the intellect appear to be there in the *puruṣa*. Accordingly, an apparent relation (*abhimāna*) is formed between the ego, the intellect and the consciousness, and usages like, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sad’ *etc.* occur. Eventually with the apprehension of the distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, all such apparent and imposed apprehensions of pleasure, pain, delusion *etc.* get dissolved. The *puruṣa* perceives itself as distinct from the *prakṛti* and thus, with the attainment of *vivekakhyāti*, eventually attains its ultimate end of liberation. Hence, the pure consciousness continues to exist in its own essence, devoid of any apparent apprehensions and consequently, free from all sorts of sufferings.

The nature of pure consciousness, how pure consciousness manifests itself through ordinary cognitions, the relation between the consciousness and the world, the way eventually the discriminatory cognition is attained and the pure consciousness exists in its own essentially liberated state, - all such issues have been addressed and analysed in detail in the relevant chapters of the thesis.

However, certain issues continue to perplex the mind of the critical thinker regarding the stances of the Sāṃkhya philosophy in relation to the creation of the world. The most subtle and ubiquitous *mūlaprakṛti* is considered to be the root cause of the entire creation. We know that the world consists of both sentient and insentient entities. Now even if we admit *prakṛti* to be the cause of the material world, but we encounter the impending difficulty of explaining the origination of conscious beings from unconscious *prakṛti*. It is precisely at this point that the Advaita Vedāntins refute the Sāṃkhya philosophers regarding their *prakṛtikāraṇatāvāda* and argue in favour of *Brahmakāraṇatāvāda*. The debate has been presented in the last chapter of the thesis.

Now the Sāṃkhya philosophers themselves admit that the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are essentially of contradictory nature. Hence, the admission of any sort of relationship between these two principles leads to further difficulties, which have been discussed earlier. Moreover, according to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka śruti*, - ‘*asaṅga hi ayam puruṣaḥ*’², we know that pure consciousness is essentially unrelated, and can never be actually related to anything. Hence, to

consider any relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* in the literal sense of the term, is an inadmissible position. However, to explain the creation and the function of the world, that is, to account for the experiences of knowledge, enjoyment, sufferings and agency of the beings in the empirical realm, the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit the relation of proximity (*sānnidhya*) between the two principles. This is referred to as the *puruṣa-prakṛti-vilakṣaṇasamyoga*. That is, the relation of reflectivity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is to be interpreted as only the relation of proximity between them. However, we know that both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are eternal principles. Hence, the relation between them should also be eternal. That further entails that the world, which is a consequence of the above relation, should also be eternal. This again, however, is an inadmissible position, because if we admit the world to be eternal, then its destruction (*pralaya*) would be impossible to account for. The Sāṃkhya philosophers too themselves admit *pralaya*. These issues and further concerns arising thereby from the admission of the relation of contiguity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, thus putting the possibility of liberation of beings in a questionable position, have been discussed and critically analysed in the sixth chapter of the thesis. Further it is also important to note that the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy cannot account for the fact that the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is sometimes there and sometimes not there. It is counter-intuitive to consider intermittent relations between two eternal principles. Any satisfactory response to the above could not be observed in the Sāṃkhya texts. However, some plausible responses have been

provided in conformity with the Sāṃkhya philosophical position in the context of the analysis of the above issue in the sixth chapter of the thesis.

According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers the cognitions about jar, cloth etc. being nothing but transformations of the internal sense organs (*cittavṛtti*), are essentially products of the *prakṛti*. So the question arises that how does the *vṛttijñāna* appear to be conscious, in spite of being a product of the insentient *prakṛti*? In response, the Sāṃkhya philosophers claim that such cognitive transformations being predominantly constituted of *sattvaguna*, are capable of receiving the reflection of consciousness. Such reflections produce an apparent sense of being the knower (*jñātṛtva*) and the Sāṃkhya philosophers refer to it as *puruṣāvbodha*. However, it is to be kept in mind that unlike other schools of Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not consider cognitive transformations to be located in the consciousness or self, rather in the *prakṛti* itself.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers explain the concepts of bondage and liberation of consciousness too based on the above principle of reflection. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its transformations are considered as apparent attributes (*upādhi*). This is because the transformations of the *antaḥkaraṇa* are imposed on the consciousness which gets reflected on the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself. However, attributions through reflection and the like are merely apparent and can affect the reflected consciousness (*pratibimbitacaitanya*) only, but can never be related to pure consciousness (*bimbacaitanya*). The actual consciousness remains pure and unaffected as

ever. However, due to non-apprehension of the distinction between the reflected consciousness and the pure consciousness, the attributes of the reflected consciousness are mistakenly used as that of the actual consciousness. That is why, the *bimbacaitanya* in spite of being eternally free (*nityamukta*), we often make usages of it as a bound one. However, it is to be noted here that the Sāṃkhya philosophers, being *akhyātivādins*, do not admit any false cognition, rather they claim that falsity occurs only in usages. So according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the *puruṣa* never cognises itself as bound, but is used as bound. Moreover, the *puruṣa* being essentially free, it can never undergo bondage and liberation in the literal sense of the terms. Thus, it is the *prakṛti* which undergoes transformation, experiences migration and eventually gets liberated. This has been discussed in detail in the seventh chapter of the thesis. Moreover, the thesis that these tendencies of *prakṛti* are aimed at fulfilling the apparent purposes of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*, is also not to be taken in its literal sense. These issues have been analysed in detail in the seventh chapter of the thesis. Various pertinent critical remarks in the above context as well as their responses from the Sāṃkhya philosophical school have been provided as far as practicable.

Further we have observed that the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit the plurality of consciousness. However, the arguments that have been provided in favour of the above position encounter lots of criticisms and refutations by the opponents. The regularity of the cycle of birth and death, the varying propensities of the sense organs *etc.* all being located in the *prakṛti*, cannot be

efficacious in establishing the plurality of consciousness (*puruṣabahutva*). Now delving into the method of ascertaining the plurality of consciousness, some Sāṃkhya philosophers claim that when the transformations of one *antaḥkaraṇa* is presented before a particular consciousness, the transformations of the other *antaḥkaraṇas* are not presented before that consciousness. Thus, owing to the specificity of the relationship between the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* and the *pratibimbitacaitanya*, the plurality of consciousness can be established.

Another very interesting aspect of the Sāṃkhya philosophy is that how it uses the term ‘*viparyaya*’ in the different *kārikās*. The term ‘*viparyaya*’ primarily refers to the absence of or the contradictory of. Accordingly, its inclusion in the respective *kārikās* helps to determine the distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* at the cosmic level as well as the distinction between the various individuals at the empirical level. From the eleventh, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth *kārikās*, we find that the term ‘*viparyaya*’ appears in various contexts and bears different connotations, though there is a subtle note of similarity as well in their varied usages. It is, thus, necessary to analyse that in what senses the term ‘*viparyaya*’ has been used on the different occasions in the respective *kārikās*.

In the seventeenth *kārikā*, - ‘*saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayādadhiṣṭhānāt/ puruṣo ’asti bhoktrbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteśca/*’³, as we have discussed earlier, the term ‘*triguṇādiviparyaya*’ signifies that which is of the contradictory nature of *prakṛti*. To be more

precise, it signifies an entity which is devoid of the attributes of *prakṛti* and its evolutes. Being of a compound nature (*saṁhata* or *saṁghātasvabhāva*) is the unique characteristic of the evolutes of *prakṛti* and that of the *prakṛti* itself. Thus, to establish the *puruṣa* as the conscious principle which is devoid of the above compound nature (*asaṁhata*), *triguṇādiviparyayatva* is mentioned in the *kārikā* as an identifying feature of *puruṣa* as opposed to *prakṛti*. However, it is to be noted here that the inference which establishes the existence of *puruṣa* as distinct from the evolutes of *prakṛti* (*saṁghātavyatirikta*) or as the ‘other’ (*para*), and as the one who receives the servitude of the material objects, is based on the negative concomitance ‘*yatra yatra saṁhatatvābhāva tatra tatra triguṇatvādyābhāva*’. Thus, the *puruṣa* is to be identified as a principle which is fundamentally of the opposite nature of *prakṛti*. This is clearly established by the qualifier *triguṇābhāvavattva* in the form of the probans *triguṇādiviparyayatva* in the *kārikā*. So it may be claimed that the term ‘*viparyaya*’ in the seventeenth *kārikā* establishes the distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* along with all its evolutes. It is referring to the fundamental divide between the two basic principles (*tattva*) as admitted in Sāṁkhya philosophy from a wider perspective, that is, from the cosmological frame, as had been done in the third *kārikā*, that is, ‘*mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛtivyāvṛtayaḥ sapta/ ṣoḍaśakastu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ*’⁴, while stating the different categories or principles of the concerned philosophical system.

Further in the eleventh *kārikā*, that is, - ‘*triguṇamaviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyamacetanam prasavadharmi/ vyaktam tathā pradhānam, tadviparītastathā ca pumān//*’⁵ and in the nineteenth *kārikā*, - ‘*tasmācca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvamasya puruṣasya/ kaivalyam mādhyasthyam draṣṭṛtvamakartṛbhāvaśca//*’⁶ too, we find that the phrases ‘*tadviparītastathā ca pumān*’ and ‘*tasmācca viparyāsāt*’ respectively. These terms on deeper analysis, as done earlier in the concerned chapters, reveal that the conscious principle, *puruṣa* and the material principle, *prakṛti* are radically different from each other in terms of their attributes and their identifying features. The eleventh *kārikā* states that how and why the *puruṣa* can ever act as the producer of the objects of the world nor can it be the object of knowledge. These issues have been discussed in great detail in the respective chapter of the thesis. Thus, it is clear that the *puruṣa* is essentially of the opposite nature of *prakṛti* and its evolutes. Again in the nineteenth *kārikā*, the phrase mentioned above, that is, ‘*tasmācca viparyāsāt*’ is employed to portray the essential nature of *puruṣa* as pure consciousness, who is eternally and essentially unbound (*asaṅga*, *kevala*) and is merely a detached observer (*sākṣī*). This too establishes the characteristic feature of *puruṣa* as radically opposed to that of *prakṛti*, and hence, the terms ‘*viparyaya*’, ‘*viparīta*’ or ‘*viparyāsa*’ in either of the cases. However, the interesting point is that in all the above instances the difference between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* along with all its evolutes have been stated and established from an over-arching fundamental transcendental plane yet remaining rooted to the phenomenal realm in case of argumentation.

Furthermore in the second half of the eighteenth *kārikā*, -
*‘jananamaraṇakaraṇānām pratinīyamādayugapat pravṛtteścal
puruṣabahutvaṁ siddham traiguṇyaviparyayāt caiva//’*⁷, we find the term
‘traiguṇyaviparyayāt’. While analysing the *kārikā* we find that instead of
signifying the distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, here the notion
of *viparyayatva* depicts a shift in the paradigm from the cosmological or the
transcendental to the lived-empirical, that is, in case of differentiating between
beings. Intriguingly enough, the term *‘traiguṇyaviparyaya’* here does not
stand for the basic distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, as have
usually been found in the earlier *kārikās*. Rather here it signifies the
stratification of beings in terms of the magnitude of the qualities, namely,
sattva, *rajas* and *tamas*, namely, in case of the individuals, or the categories
of beings of the world. This shift in the frame of perception, that is, from the
cosmological to the empirical, or from the cosmic to the individualistic plane,
introduces a more existentialist flavour to the concerns of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*,
as the different categories of beings, their tendencies, their potentials and their
characteristic features are taken into account and are explained in terms of the
magnitude of their constituent qualities, that is, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*,
present in them. This is ascertained by the inference, - *‘puruṣaḥ pratiśarīram
bhinnāḥ ayugapat pravṛttimattvāt’*⁸ which is further endorsed by the
admission of the principle of *‘pratiniyama’* in the *kārikā*. The said principle
of *‘pratipuruṣaṁ niyamaḥ vyavasthā’* takes care of the individual cases of
cognition, agency of actions, enjoyment of results of actions
(*karmaphalabhoga*) as well as individualistic experiences of pleasure, pain

and delusion related to contradictory phenomena like, birth, death *etc.* Thus, as we have already discussed, that here the term ‘*traiguṇyaviparyaya*’ is not to be considered in the literal sense of the term, but rather as signifying diversity by virtue of the sense *anyathātvā* or *vaicitra*. This accounts for the categorisation of beings, like, *deva*, *manuṣya* and *paśu* in the world, and in an implicit manner it also takes into consideration the individualistic differences among the beings of the same category, like the differences in individual human beings, be it from any perspective whatsoever, which precisely infuses the Sāṃkhya philosophical system with vivid existentialist concerns.

Thus, finally it could be stated that the term ‘*viparyaya*’ in the various contexts poses to be of immense significance considering the fact that it is being used to denote some sort of distinction among categories or the other, - be it among the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, or be it among the beings themselves. Such is the common thread that justifies the usage of the same word ‘*viparyaya*’ or its synonyms in the various *kārikās*. However, the distinctive part or the uniqueness of the usages of the term and its equivalent lies in the fact that in most of the *kārikās* the distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is portrayed from the cosmological plane, whereas in the eighteenth *kārikā*, the distinction runs deeper and is more incisive as it depicts the diversification among the beings themselves from the lived-empirical perspective.

An important methodological aspect of the Sāṃkhya philosophical system is that it uses numerous examples and analogies from our daily lives in

order to explicate various significant and critical issues involved in their theories. It may thus be claimed that the Sāṃkhya philosophers, apart from providing strong inferential arguments to establish various tenets of their philosophical theses, make frequent use of the method of argumentation by analogy in order to make the study of the *śāstra* more comprehensible to the eager learners. Thus, it is to be noted that the entire *śāstra* represents the idea of the matter and the consciousness, and that of the creation of the world in a subtle form of analogy where one may depict the *prakṛti* as the feminine principle and the *puruṣa* as the masculine one. That is why the creation of the world is also explained in terms of the above metaphor where the relation of contiguity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is considered to be instrumental for the creation. However, as students of Sāṃkhya philosophy we all know that such usages are merely metaphorical, and does not pertain to the reality in the actual senses of the terms. Also, various metaphors and analogical instances from our daily lives have been provided in the context of explaining the relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Thus, it is evident that the Sāṃkhya philosophers rely to quite an extent on the method of argumentation by analogy in order to establish their theses, and also to clarify their viewpoints regarding various critical and pertinent concerns. This method in fact makes the study of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra* more enjoyable as well as clearly intelligible. It is true that whenever we employ analogies to explicate our position, there remains a gap between the original tenet and the metaphorised one. However, keeping in mind the *drṣṭānta-dārṣṭāntika virodha*, if one engages into the study of the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, then the extremely esoteric study of soteriology

as discussed throughout the *śāstra*, becomes much more intelligible and enjoyable too. Thus, the use of analogies and metaphors in establishing the theories of Sāṃkhya philosophy occupy a significant position in the course of understanding the spirit of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Finally, we can state that the Advaita Vedāntins who pose to be the severest critics of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition advance some very crucial criticisms against the Sāṃkhya philosophical position. The Advaitins have tried to refute the Sāṃkhya position from quite a few perspectives. The primary refutation by the Advaita Vedāntins is about the nature of *puruṣa* as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. The Advaitins hold that if the nature of *puruṣa* essentially be eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), enlightened (*buddha*), free or unbound (*mukta*), as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, then it is not tenable to admit the plurality of consciousness (*puruṣabahutva*). This is because the kinds of distinctive properties that are being advanced to establish the multiplicity of *puruṣa*, are all fundamentally related to *prakṛti* only, and none of them pertains to pure consciousness. This is the first objection. The second argument objects that if the nature of consciousness (*caitanya*) is such that it is completely devoid of any relation to *prakṛti* (*cetanānadhiṣṭhitajaḍa*) and is distinct from it (*svatantrapradhāna*), then such an essence of *puruṣa*, can never be responsible for any sort of creation. This is because any material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) which is not presided over by a sentient agent is not capable of production. Such arguments have been put forward in the *Smṛtipāda* of the *Brahmasūtra* in the *sutra*, - ‘*dṛśyate tu*’⁹ and others. Such

objections along with other arguments have been discussed elaborately in the final chapter of the present thesis, and responses from the Sāṃkhya philosophical position have been provided as appropriately as possible.

In the context of the above mentioned issues, the present research work focuses mainly on classical Sāṃkhya tradition, but occasionally references have been made to the *Sāṃkhyapravacana sūtra* and *bhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu belonging to the neo-Sāṃkhya tradition. The differences between the two traditions have been highlighted and discussed as and when necessary. One such difference is highlighted while discussing the two opposite theories of *ekaikapratiḥimavāda* and *ananyapratiḥimavāda*. Further various issues, concerns and responses of criticisms which overlap with the Yoga school of philosophy regarding the nature of consciousness, non-apprehension of the distinction between the *citta* and the *caitanya*, cognitive methodologies and the like have been discussed in detail following the *Pātañjalayogasūtras* and their respective commentaries, in order to provide an exhaustive and comprehensive study of consciousness and its varied aspects as per the main contention of our research thesis.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Sāṃkhya system emphasises on the irreducible difference between the material and the conscious principles and the impossibility of the emergence of one from the other. In answer to the counterexamples offered by the Advaita Vedāntins, the Sāṃkhya philosophers would say that life and consciousness, even in its most rudimentary form, cannot arise from insentient matter. Even a bacteria or an insect is born out of

similar living organisms. Modern science, too, admits that no bacteria or living being comes into being in a sterilized environment. So, if the fundamental principles of *satkāryavāda* are to be retained, there cannot be any causal interaction between matter and consciousness. Thus, all causal transformations pertain to the domain of the material principle, thereby implying the Sāṃkhya thesis of *pradhānakāraṇavāda*.

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