

**What I am to Myself:
A Philosophical Analysis of Self-Awareness and Subjectivity**

**Synopsis of the
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Arts
at
Jadavpur University**

**By
Sanchayaita Sen**

**Under the Supervision of
Professor Madhucchanda Sen**

**Department of Philosophy
Jadavpur University
Kolkata, India**

2025

Synopsis

One of the central topics discussed throughout the history of philosophy has been the discussion of 'Self'. On a similar note, the notion of self-awareness also has always been a central topic of discussion and it is increasingly so. There are so many fundamental philosophical questions regarding the nature of self-awareness and its relation to the world. Self-awareness standardly refers to the knowledge of the self. In the ancient and traditional philosophical discourses, the problem of self was discussed with the aim of providing an ontological explanation of the self. In such discourses, at least two kinds of views were available. On one hand, there were philosophers who advocated that the self must be given a separate ontological status. According to this view, just like the other usual real entities residing in this universe, we need to admit the self as an ontological category. On the other hand, some philosophers denied this view and refused to admit the self as a substantive entity or as a distinctive ontological category. They had argued that all that really exists are conscious experiences, and to assume the existence of a substantive substratum that holds those experiences together is completely wrong. Some would claim that the required substratum of conscious experience is not some immaterial ontological entity. It is rather the physical body.

However, I have consistently planned and organized my approach throughout the process of writing this thesis in such a way that, before getting into the metaphysical/ontological discussion, we need to think about why the discussion of self seems so important to us in the first place. A little scrutiny in this regard has revealed that of all the phenomena with which we are

acquainted, the self is the most important one. The reason behind that is, we are not as confident about the experience of any other thing in the same way as we are confident about the experience of ourselves. We get to know about the self because there is a salient *sense of the self* that we all possess. We may deny some of the views regarding the ontological status of the self but we can never deny that we have a *sense of the self*. While we discuss self-awareness, it is also important to consider the notion of subjectivity. The reason behind that is, an individual's unique self-awareness gives rise to a particular kind of subjectivity. Hence, just as every experienced phenomenon demands a proper explanation in philosophical discourse, this unique sense of self and its subjectivity also demand a full explanation. Hence, my main research problem in this thesis revolves around finding out the nature of self-awareness and subjectivity. My thesis has aimed at providing an answer to a very basic yet shadowy question that is, how an individual is represented to herself?

Research Questions

1. What is self-awareness?
2. In how many ways self-awareness can be perceived and understood?
3. How is the awareness of the self constituted or built in us?
4. Are there different layers of self-awareness?
5. What is the nature of the pre-reflective layer of self-awareness?
6. What is the nature of the reflective layer of self-awareness?
7. What is *for-me-ness* in self-awareness?
8. How significant is the sense of *for-me-ness* in self-awareness?

9. What is the nature of the indexical 'I'?
10. What is the function of indexical 'I' while referring to self-awareness?
11. Can the indexical 'I' be used both in the sense of a subject and in the sense of an object?
12. What is it like to use the indexical 'I' in the sense of a subject?
13. What is it like to use the indexical 'I' in the sense of an object?
14. Which one between the subject use and the object use of indexical 'I' is more ubiquitous?
15. Does the meaning of indexical 'I' carry a sense of privacy?
16. What is the role of emotion in constituting self-awareness?
17. What is the nature of subjectivity?
18. What notion of subjectivity we can develop based on the idea of self-awareness we are discussing here?
19. How is the subjectivity of a subject constituted?
20. Does subjectivity imply privacy?

I have attempted to address all these questions throughout the thesis.

In order to explore the nature of self-awareness and subjectivity, I have freely adopted ideas discussed by many renowned philosophers belonging to analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and existentialist trends, throughout this whole thesis. Subsequently, the method I have adopted for this research is a qualitative method. So, I have mostly delved into theoretical analysis of the views of the mentioned philosophical trends in an attempt to find new ideas.

The thesis contains five main chapters along with an introductory and a conclusive chapter. The names of my chapters are given below maintaining their chronology:

- Introduction
- 1st An Overview of Different Accounts of Self-Awareness
- 2nd The Constitution of Self- Awareness
- 3rd Understanding the Indexical ‘I’
- 4th Role of Emotion in Constituting Self-Awareness
- 5th Subjectivity Reassessed
- Conclusion

The first chapter begins with an exploration of the various accounts of self that we encounter. It is named “**An Overview of Different Accounts of Self-Awareness**”. In this chapter, we discuss various possible ways of apprehending self-awareness. It has been upheld in the thesis that there may be at least four possible ways in which self-awareness can be understood. Firstly, we can consider the self as an ontological category, the awareness of which leads us to the path of liberation. This kind of self-knowledge is widely discussed in Indian philosophical traditions and other emancipatory discourses. Secondly, we can consider self-awareness to be merely the momentary awareness of our occurrent mental states. As if, self-awareness is nothing over and above the awareness of the occurrences in the mental sphere of an individual. Thirdly, we can have a theoretical knowledge of self to apprehend what sort of an entity it is. Fourthly, we can perceive self-awareness as a form of self-experience or self-hood. In this thesis, I am only concerned about exploring the essence of the fourth alternative

of self-awareness. This self-awareness is not momentary, nor does it confine itself to only the mental repertoire of an individual, nor is it an ontological category whose manifestation leads us to the path of *mokṣa*. This form of self-awareness is the awareness that builds my identity to myself. It also helps to qualify or characterize all my experiences as exclusively mine. We shall be talking about a form of self-awareness that makes a subject an 'I' to her own self, meaning, it appears as a continuous presence of self-hood qualified with the aspect of '*for-me-ness*'. Investigating this kind of self-awareness will help us understand how I am represented to myself, and when I say that I am self-aware, what is it that I experience? I have also presented some arguments to establish the necessity of accepting the notion of this particular kind of self-awareness that I am talking about. Here we discuss why accepting the 'for-me-ness' sense of 'I' is necessary. I believe that this unique sense of 'I' is a logical prerequisite for uniquely distinguishing my subjectivity for myself by myself. To deny the existence of this for-me-ness is to deny that we have a markedly different acquaintance with our own experiential life.

In the second chapter, we discuss how the awareness of the self is constituted and structured for a subject. The chapter has been named "**The Constitution of Self- Awareness**". While discussing the structural constitution of self-awareness, we also learn about the pre-reflective and reflective layers self-awareness. We correspondingly discuss that the experience of self-awareness may happen in two ways, namely, pre-reflectively and reflectively. However, in both these kinds of awareness, there is a co-existence of a constant-mindedness and an intervention of the other. A self-aware subject can be pre-reflectively aware or reflectively aware of her existence and self-experience but all those

experiences possess a *'for-me-ness'* and at the same time they are in some way or the other moulded by the other. Someone may ask, how is the intervention of the other possible in the pre-reflective layer? My answer to this question would be that the 'me' in any form of for-me-ness comes with the otherness from the 'other' built into it. So, any form of for-me-ness, be it pre-reflective or reflective, presupposes the recognition of the other. After that, we have also attempted to learn that the reflexivity of self-awareness sometimes plays a very important role in order to constitute a complete sense of 'I'. In the reflexive nature of self-awareness, my awareness is represented by myself to myself. Thus, it creates a sense of immediacy in the self-experience. So, a relation of identity is revealed in the reflexive essence of self-awareness. Here, we discuss how the reflexivity of self-awareness plays an important role in constituting the sense of 'I' to the subject herself. Furthermore, I have tried to demonstrate that along with these inter dimensions of pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness, the outward bodily and physical aspects of an individual also have significant contributions in constituting our self-awareness. Our body is the most important medium through which we experience the world and our world-embeddedness gets constructed. Hence, we must also accept that the self is embedded in the physical world with so many other subjects which also mould some layers of awareness of ourselves.

In the third chapter, we analyse the language we use to refer to self-awareness, focusing on the term "I." The chapter is named **“Understanding the Indexical ‘I’**”. In this chapter, we attempt to shed some light on the different aspects of the use of the indexical 'I'. I think that the discussion about the indexical 'I' has been important for my research because the use of the indexical 'I' exemplifies that an

individual is self-aware and she is referring to herself in and through this self-awareness. I have proposed here that 'I' may not be the proper name. It is not a substitute for a proper name. It definitely does not refer to some Cartesian ego, whose nature is always unrevealed. 'I' does not share the meaning of a proper name. It is neither a direct identity proposition where 'I' directly identifies itself with a proper name. It is rather a two-step process that involves two identity propositions. In the first step, we realize that 'I am something'. This step involves being self-conscious, self-ness, and being in conscious subjective mode of existence. In the second step, we equate this 'I' with a proper name. However, the usage of 'I' indexical does not necessarily require the second step (second identity proposition) to be accomplished. Even if the second step identity is missing, there can be a perfect and correct usage of 'I', only if the subject is self-conscious. According to me, the upshot here is that self-consciousness is the only necessary factor for using 'I'. Furthermore, I have disagreed with the radical standpoint that 'I' does not refer to anything. I have rather proposed that 'I' refers to this mode of being self-conscious or self-aware. It refers to self-ness. The referent of 'I' is not like the referents of other words in our language. The referent of 'I' is the subject's existential mode of being uniquely conscious about herself. Then I have proceeded to say that, there can be two ways of referring while using the indexical 'I'. One is the subject usage and the other is the object usage. The use in the sense of a subject is ubiquitous use and its referent is immune to error through misidentification whereas, the object usage is secondary and there can occur some sort of misidentification in referring to oneself. I have also endorsed the view that the subject usage of 'I' is a logical pre-requisite of the object usage of 'I'. However, the full development of the sense of 'I' emerges only when I see myself both as a subject and as an object and I also understand that I am an object to other

subjects, and the other subjects who are objects to me are also subjects to themselves in the same way that I am. This is given to our linguistic community as well. It comes under an intersubjective domain. Otherwise, the usage of 'I' would not have been possible. I have also suggested that maybe, both these uses of indexical 'I' are associated with some sort of descriptive content. Various ways of being aware of oneself may suggest some descriptive content associated with the indexical 'I'. I have taken a few examples. When I feel guilty or I am feeling ashamed of something, on the one hand, I am the experiencing subject of that feeling. On the other hand, I am also making myself an object of moral evaluation. I am evaluating my character or personality from a third-person perspective and judging my actions and hence I am feeling guilty or ashamed of something. However, when I am feeling intense pain in my teeth, I do not perceive myself as an agent or object of moral evaluation anymore. In this case, I am just a subject of experience to whom the experience of toothache is revealed immediately. Now, these two representational senses, namely, subject and object, may hold some sort of descriptive content of indexical 'I'. Nevertheless, embodying a description or not embodying it, correctly applying the description or not applying it does affect the referring ability of indexical 'I'. The moment 'I' is uttered, the reference is always essential, direct, and clear. After that, we proceed to learn that the shift of meaning or referent is possible in the case of indexical 'I' because the referent of 'I' is not an absolute fixed entity. The indexical 'I' rather has a common function or apparatus to play for every subject. I refer to my mode of being subject to myself while using 'I', another subject can use the same 'I' to refer to the mode of being another subject to herself. Now, if we say that the indexical 'I' is playing the same kind of functional tool for every subject then can we still accept that states of self-awareness are private in the way

Cartesian theory has taught us to believe? If the same thing happens to all of us, how can it still be private? I have attempted to answer this issue by saying that it is better not to claim that self-awareness is private. ‘Private’ is a very resilient quality to ascribe. It indicates a sense of ungraspability, as if we are never able to comprehend what it is for a subject to be a subject. However, that is not true in the practical world. We can actually empathize with another subject because we are also familiar with the experience of being a subject. So, being self-aware is not an insulated state that exists secretly inside the subject. Nevertheless, instead of accepting privacy, what we can say is that all the subjects have peculiar access to the constant-mindedness that we saliently feel. The scope of this peculiar access is very little according to me. It only applies to the core mindedness that a subject feels by virtue of being in subject mode. A subject does not have this peculiar access over her self-awareness or self-conception that is created through the intervention of the other. The self-awareness that gets shaped in us socially, culturally, and externally cannot be private, nor can it be exclusively and peculiarly available to me. It is available to me and it is also available to other subjects as well, through the ability of imagination, empathy, simulation, and inference.

In the fourth chapter, we discuss how emotion as a mental phenomenon is considered to be a very significant aspect of our mental repertoire. It has been named “**The Role of Emotion in Constituting Self-awareness**”. Here I have spoken about my firm conviction that emotional experiences have a great impact on the constitution of our self-awareness. In some cases, emotions also amplify our sense of the self. This chapter makes an attempt to demonstrate how the emotional states build up the self-awareness and the self-image of an individual. I

have claimed that there might be some distinction between the basic and non-basic emotions, from a biological and psychological perspective. However, I have advocated that self-awareness or self-understanding is enhanced by both kinds of emotions, be it basic or non-basic. The role of the non-basic, self-conscious, complex emotions in the constitution of self-awareness is very easy to determine because in these cases, the self-conscious emotions are manifested explicitly in the meaty layer of our self-awareness of an individual. This involves emotional concepts and complex cognitive evaluations that provide concrete information about the individual. On the contrary, the basic emotions are primitive, pre-reflective, implicit, non-verbal. However, the so-called basic emotions also shape a substratum of our self-consciousness. This emotional experience is equivalent to one's conscious existence. In an emotional encounter with the world, it is the state of emotion that constitutes the very mode in which an individual would apprehend the world around him. Interestingly, this primitively emotional conscious existence is tented with our self-awareness. Even if there is a basic emotion in an individual that is extremely devoid of any cognitive appraisal, so much so that it exists in a completely non-reflective or pre-reflective level; even then the state of emotion would have a certain function to do in shaping our self-awareness.

In the fifth chapter, we examine the concept of subjectivity through the lens of our understanding of self-awareness. The name of the fifth chapter is **“Subjectivity Reassessed”**. In this chapter, we directly address the issue regarding the essence of subjectivity. After exploring the nature of self-awareness, I have attempted to provide a tractable, account of subjectivity in my thesis. I have discussed that there is something it is like for a subject to go through

a conscious experience. I think, I imagine, I wish and thus I am a subject. I am the owner of my mental states that have a distinct subjective character. The main objective of this chapter is to understand the notion of peculiar subjectivity on the basis of our understanding of the nature of self-awareness as discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis. Usually, in the light of Cartesian philosophy, subjectivity is considered to be strictly private and is only accessible to the subject herself. I have proposed to change this perspective. I have tried to retain the notion of subjectivity without retaining the notion of privacy. I am perceiving the aspect of subjectivity and the aspect of privacy as two separate notions. I have suggested that the crux of subjectivity lies in the *for-me-ness* of every awareness an individual has. The *for-me-ness* builds the unique subjective aspect of every subject. I shall further clarify that I believe that the phenomenon of subjectivity arises from three apparatuses/constituents, namely, the body of the subject, the reflexivity of self-awareness, and the coexistence of *me-other* perspective of an individual. The *me-other* perspective refers to the ability of a subject to take upon both first-person and third-person perspectives at the same time. I, as a subject, get immediately aware of my own self-awareness and at the same time, I can also adopt a third-person perspective to see myself as *another* to another subject. This ability qualifies the subjectivity of an individual as unique. The self-intimating and self-manifesting nature that comes from the reflexivity of self-awareness makes it immediately, peculiarly, authoritatively, groundlessly, and non-inferentially presented to the subject herself. This indeed seems to be a very important aspect of subjectivity. Furthermore, the kind of self-awareness that I have been discussing so far also indicates bodily subjectivity to a great extent.

My primary intention in this thesis has been to discuss the nature of self-awareness. While discussing self-awareness, it seemed evident that we should also discuss the essence of subjectivity. I strongly believe that each one of us is presented to ourselves uniquely. My conviction is that the exclusivity of every individual lies in her unique self-awareness and the subjectivity that it ensues. What I mean by this is that despite being biologically similar entities, every human subject is uniquely experienced by herself in her self-awareness, which constitutes her subjectivity. My aim in this thesis has been to explore the exclusivity or uniqueness of the awareness of a subject when she experiences herself.

The thesis begins by exploring various possible perspectives on the notion of self-awareness. In this context, I argue that my focus is on exploring the unique way in which a subject represents herself to herself. Within this discussion, I emphasize the importance of the concept of "for-me-ness" in self-awareness. I then proceeded to discuss the structural constitution of self-awareness in a subject. After that, I examined the relationship between the indexical "I" and self-awareness, and I then explored how the indexicality of "I" contributes to the uniqueness of self-awareness. Thereafter, I explored the role of emotional mental states in shaping self-awareness. Subsequently, I tried to offer an understanding of how subjectivity is formed within an individual while being self-aware.

Bibliography

- Anscombe, G.E.M. 1975. The First Person. *Mind and Language*. Ed. Samuel D. Guttenplan. 45-65. Oxford University Press.
- Armstrong, D.M. 1968. *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Armstrong, D. 1981. What Is Consciousness? *The nature of consciousness*. Ed. Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, 721-728. MIT Press.
- Batson, C. D. 1987. "Prosocial motivation: Is It ever truly altruistic?" *Advances in experimental social psychology Vol. 20*, Ed. InL. Berkowitz, 65–122. New York: Academic Press.
- Baumeister, R.F. 1994., T.F. "Guilt: An interpersonal approach." *Psychological Bulletin, 115*, Stillwell, Ed. A.M ,& Heatherton 243–267. <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-2909.115.1.74>. [Accessed 23.08.2022]
- Bermudez, Jose Luis. 2016. *Understanding I: Language and Thought*. Oxford.
- Brentano, F. 1973. *Psychology From An Empirical Standpoint*. Ed. L.L. McAlister. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Bruner, J. 2002. *Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Campos, J.J. Foreword. 1995., *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. ed. J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer. ix–xi. New York: Guilford Press.
- Cassam, Quassim. 2011. The Embodied Self. *Oxford Handbook of the Self*, Ed. Shaun Gallagher. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Casteneda, Hector, N. 1989. "The Reflexivity of Self-Consciousness: Sameness/Identity, Data for Artificial Intelligence". *Philosophical Topics 17*. 27-58. University of Arkansas Press.

- Clark, D. M. 1986. "A cognitive model of panic." *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, 24. 461–470. [https://awspntest.apa.org/doi/10.1016/0005-7967\(86\)90011-2](https://awspntest.apa.org/doi/10.1016/0005-7967(86)90011-2) .[Accessed 27th September. 2023]
- Coseru, Christian. 2019. *Problem of the Self: Consciousness, Subjectivity, and the Other*. Ed. Manidipa Sen. 46–64. New Delhi, India: Aatar Books.
- Craig, A.D. 2002. How do you feel?, Interoception: The Sense of the physiological Condition of the body. *Nature Reviews Neuro Science* 3, 655-666. Nature Portfolio.
- Dainton, Barry. 2004. The Self and the Phenomenal. *The self*. Ed. G. Strawson. 1-25. Blackwell Publishing.
- Damasio, A. R. 1999. *The Feeling of What Happens*. San Diego. CA: Harcourt.
- Datta, Srilekha. 2005. "The Self and the Self-knowledge in Indian tradition", *Rabindra Bharati Journal of Philosophy*. Kolkata.
- Davidson, Donald. 2001. "The Myth of the Subjective". *Subjective, Intersubjective, objective*. 39-52. Claredon Press. Oxford.
- Dennett, D.C. 1991. *Consciousness Explained*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co.
- Descartes, Rene. 2010. Meditations on First Philosophy. I* (Trans: John Veitch). Ingram Short Title.
- Dokic, Jérôme, 2003, "The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action". *Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology*. Ed. Roessler & Eilan. 321–344. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Evans, Gareth .1982. *The Varieties of Reference*. Ed. John Henry McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Feiring, C., Taska, L. & Lewis, M. 2002 "Adjustment following sexual abuse discovery: The role of shame and attributional style." *Developmental Psychology* 38, 79–92. [Accessed 27th September. 2023]

- Flanagan, Owen, 1992, *Consciousness Reconsidered*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Frege, Gottlob, 1918, "Thought", *The Frege Reader* translated by Peter Geach and R.H. Stoothoff, Ed. Michael Beaney, 325–345. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Frege, Gottlob, 1956, "The Thought a Logical enquiry", 289-311. *Oxford Journals.*, Oxford University Press: Mind Association. [Accessed 18th December 2024]
- Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, 2008. *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive science*, Routledge.
- Garfield, J. L. 2016, 'Illusionism and Givenness', *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 23. 73-82. Imprint Academic.
- Goffman, E. 1955 "On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction." *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes*, 18. 213–231. William Alanson White psychiatric Foundation, Washington.
- Grünbaum, T & Zahavi 2013. Varieties of Self-Awareness. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry*. Ed. K.W.M Fulford. Oxford University Press.
- Harder, D.W. 1995. "Shame and guilt assessment and relationships of shame and guilt-proneness to psychopathology". *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. Ed. J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer, 368–392. New York: Guilford Press.
- Hume, David. 1748. *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. B Bebbington, 48, Booksellers' Row. London.
- Husserl, E, 1952. *Husserliana*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, Edmund .2001. *Logical Investigations I-II*. Translated by J.N. Findlay. London: Routledge.
- Husserl, E, 2001. *Logical Investigations*. Trans. J.N Findlay. London: Routledge.

- Kriegel, Uriah. 2002. Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness and Higher – Order Monitoring. *Dialogue XLI*. 517-540. Canadian Philosophical Association.
- Kriegel, Uriah. 2009, *Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kriegel, U. 2017, ‘The Three Circles of Consciousness’, Ed. M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero, *The Sense of Mineness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kripke, Saul. 1971. “Identity and Necessity,” *Identity and Individuation*, Ed. M.K. Muni.135–164. New York: New York University Press.
- Kripke, Saul .1980, *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kühle, Lana. 2017. The Subjectivity of Experiential Consciousness: It’s Real and It’s Bodily. *Mind and Matter* 15. 91-109. Imprint Academic.
- Lambie, J. A., & Marcel, A. J. 2002 “Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework”. *Psychological Review*, 109. 219–259. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.109.2.219. [Accessed 29th September. 2023]
- Lambie, John. 2009. “Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge”, *Emotion Review*. 272-280. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073909103596> [25th July. 2023]
- Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. 1998. “Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal conflicts: Guilt-prone people are better at perspective taking.” *Journal of Personality*, 66, 1–37. Wiley Blackwell.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. 1991. *Otherwise than being or Beyond Essence*. Kluwer, Academic Publishers Dordrecht.
- Lewis, H. B. 1971. *Shame and guilt in neurosis*. New York: International Universities Press.

- Marcel, Anthony. J. 2003. "The sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action". *Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology*. Ed. by Roessler and Eilan. 48-93. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Martin, M.G.F., 1995, "Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership", in *The body and the self*. Ed. Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan: 267–289. MIT Press.
- Merleau, Ponty, Maurice, 1945. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by Donald A. Landes. Paris: Editions Gallimard; reprinted New York: Routledge, 2012.
- Metzinger, Thomas. 2003. *Being No One*. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
- Mohanty, J.N., 2000, *The self and its other*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What it is like to be a Bat?". *The Philosophical Review: Volume 83*: 435-450. USA: Duke University Press.
- Nida-Rümelin, M. 2016, 'The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm', *Synthese*. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1121-1 [Accessed 2024]
- Nussbaum, Martha, 2003. "Martha Nussbaum". *What is an EMOTION?*, Ed. Robert C. Solomon, 271-283. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Ortony, A. & Turner, T. J. 1990. "What's basic about basic emotions?" *Psychological Review* 97, 315–331. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.97.3.315 [1st October. 2023]
- Perry, John. 1977. Frege on Demonstratives. *Philosophical Review* 86, 474-497. Duke University Press, Cornell University.
- Perry, John. 1979. The Problem of the Essential Indexical, *Noûs* 13/1, 3-21. Wiley Blackwell.
- Perry, John. 1999. Indexicals and Demonstratives., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, Ed. Bob Hale and Crispin Wright Blackwell, 586. Oxford.

- Piorkowska, Magda and Monika Wrobel. "Basic Emotions". 2017. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318447136_Basic_Emotions [1st October. 2023]
- Prinz, J. 2012, 'Waiting for the Self'. *Consciousness and the Self: New Essays*, Ed. J. Liu & J. Perry 123–149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Retzinger, S. M. 1987. Resentment and laughter: Video studies of the shame–rage spiral. *The Role of shame in symptom formation*. Ed. H. B. Lewis, 151–181. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Ricoeur, P. 1988. *Time and Narrative III*. Trans. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Rosenthal, D.M. 1990. A Theory of Consciousness. *Zif Technical Report 40*, Biefield, Germany.
- Rowlands, Mark. 2010. *The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Russell, B. 1910. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11*, 108-128. Oxford University Press.
- Russell, B. 1912. *Problems of Philosophy*. Oxford University Press.
- Sartre, J.P. 1956. *Being and Nothingness*. Trans. H.E Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Sartre, J. P. 1957. *The Transcendence of the Ego*. Trans. F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick. New York: Noonday Press.
- Sartre, J.P. 2003. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. H. E. Barnes. 127.London and New York: Routledge.
- Sartre, Jean Paul. 2012. *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*. Trans. Philip Mairet. South Asia: Routledge.

- Scheff, T.J. 1988. Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. *American Sociological Review* 53(3). 395–406. Sage Publications.
- Searle, J. R. 2005, ‘The Self as a Problem in Philosophy and Neurobiology’, *The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity* Ed.T. E. Feinberg & J. P. Keenan, 7–19. Oxford University Press.
- Sen, Madhucchanda. 2005. ‘The Self and the Other’. *Experiencing Self*. Ed. Lopamudra Chowdhury and Madhucchanda Sen. 29-42. Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Jadavpur University, in collaboration with Maha Bodhi Book Agency, Kolkata.
- Shoemaker, Sydney. S. 1968. Self-reference and Self-awareness. *Journal of Philosophy* 65. 555-567. Columbia University.
- Shoemaker, S, Sydney. 2001. Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. *Self-Reference and Self-Awareness*. Ed. Andrew Brook and Richard C. De Vidi.81-93. Carleton University, Ottawa.
- Stipek, D. 1995. The development of pride and shame in toddlers. *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. Ed. J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer, 237–252. New York: Guilford Press.
- Strawson, Galen. 1994. *Mental Reality* (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
- Strawson, G. 2000. The Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Self. Ed. D. Zahavi, *Exploring the Self*.39-54. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Strawson, Galen. 2005. Against Narrativity. *The Self*. Blackwell Publishing. Oxford.
- Strawson, Galen. 2009, *Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Strawson, Galen. 2011, ‘The Minimal Subject’, *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*. Ed. S. Gallagher. 253–278. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Strawson, Galen. 2017. *The Subject of Experience*. Oxford University Press.

- Tangney, J. P and Fischer, K. W. 1995. Ed. *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. 2002. *Shame and guilt*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. 2007. Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 58, 345–372. Annual Reviews: United States.
- Tracy, J. Robins, W. Tangey, J. 2007. *The Self Conscious Emotions*. The Guilford Press, New York.
- Tsakiris, Manos, 2011, “The Sense of Body Ownership”, *The Oxford handbook of Self*. Ed. Gallagher 180–203. Oxford University Press.
- W. du Toit, Cornel. 2019. The metaphysical self and the self in metaphysics and religion: Ambiguities of mind and reality. *HTS Theological Studies Vol 75*, No 1, page 1-9. AOSIS.
- Weiner, B. 1985. An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. *Psychological Review*, 92, 548–573. American Psychological Association.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'*. Ed. Rhush Rhees. Oxford, England: Harper & Row.
- Wright, Crispin, 1998, Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy. *Knowing Our Own Minds Essays in Self-knowledge*. Ed. Wright, Smith, & MacDonald. 102-122. Oxford University Press.
- Zahavi, D. 1999, *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Zahavi, D. 2000, ‘Self and Consciousness’. *Exploring the Self* . 55-74. Ed. D. Zahavi. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

- Zahavi, D. 2004, 'Back to Brentano?', *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11(10-11), 66–87. Imprint Academic.
- Zahavi, D. 2005, *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Zahavi, D. 2009, 'Is the self a social construct?', *Inquiry* 52/6, 551-573.
- Zahavi, D. 2011, 'The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications', *Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, & Indian Traditions*. Ed. Siderits, M., Thompson, Zahavi, D. 56-78. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zahavi, D. 2014, *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zahavi, Dan and Uriah Kriegel, 2015, "For-Me-Ness: What It Is and What It Is Not", *Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology*, Ed. Andreas Elpidorou, and Walter Hopp. 36–53. Oxford: Routledge.
- Zahavi. 2019. Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on for-Me-Ness and Mine ness, *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Ed. U. Kriegel. 635–653. Oxford University Press.
- Zahavi, D. 2020. We and I. *The Philosopher* 108/4. 19-24. United Kingdom.

Sanchayita Sen

09.01.2025

Madhusudanta

Professor
Department of Philosophy
Jadavpur University
Kolkata - 700 032