

**REMEMBERING 1962 WAR: TRUST DEFICIT AND WAR MEMORY IN SINO-  
INDIAN RELATIONS**

THESIS SUBMITTED TO JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY

FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (ARTS)

IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2024

BY

MAYURI BANERJEE

REG. NO. A00IR1101518

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

PROF. SHIBASHIS CHATTERJEE

PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY

KOLKATA

**CERTIFIED THAT THE THESIS ENTITLED**

**REMEMBERING 1962 WAR: TRUST DEFICIT AND WAR MEMORY IN SINO-  
INDIAN RELATIONS**

Submitted by me for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts at Jadavpur University is based upon my work carried out under the Supervision of

Prof. Shibashis Chatterjee (Professor, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University)

And that neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted before for any degree or diploma anywhere/elsewhere.

Countersigned by the

Supervisor:

Candidate:

Dated:

Dated:

## CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgement</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>Preface</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>Abstract</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
• <b>Statement of the Problem</b>	
• <b>Literature Review</b>	
• <b>Research Questions</b>	
• <b>Research Methodology</b>	
• <b>Theoretical Framework</b>	
• <b>Chapter Summary</b>	
<b>Chapter 1: From Brothers to Rivals: India's Memory Politics</b>	<b>23</b>
• <b>Introduction</b>	
• <b>Debates on India's China Policy 1949-1958</b>	
• <b>India's Foreign Policy Objectives and China</b>	
• <b>Dealing with China: Memory Diplomacy</b>	
• <b>Civilisational Friendship and Building Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai</b>	
• <b>Forming Memory Alliance: India-China Relations 1950-1958</b>	
• <b>Conclusion</b>	
<b>Chapter 2: Narrative Building and India-China Border War</b>	<b>48</b>
• <b>Introduction</b>	
• <b>India, Tibet, China, and Border</b>	
• <b>The Colonial Context: Tibet and Border</b>	
• <b>Ambiguous Approach Towards Tibet and Border Dispute</b>	
• <b>Rift in Sino-Indian Ties and the 1962 War</b>	
• <b>Reactions Abroad and Home</b>	
• <b>The War: Narratives, Representation and Propaganda</b>	
• <b>Conclusion</b>	
<b>Chapter 3: Decoding India's Memory and Memorialisation of 1962 War</b>	<b>82</b>
• <b>Introduction</b>	
• <b>Official Initiatives: Shaping India's Memory of 1962 conflict</b>	

- **Retrospection and Remembrance**
- **Two Anniversaries and Two Border Crises: Memory of the 1962 War**
- **Conclusion**

**Chapter 4: Remembering 1962: War Memory and India's Trust Deficit with China 107**

- **Introduction**
- **India's Distrust towards China**
- **Causes of India's Distrust towards China**
- **Memory and Remembrance of 1962 War and India's Distrust**
- **Reconciliation and Remembering Humiliation**
- **Conclusion**

**Conclusion 140**

**Bibliography 157**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Embarking on this journey of academic exploration has been an enriching experience, one that would not have been possible without the support, guidance, and inspiration from many remarkable individuals and institutions.

First and foremost, I extend my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Shibashis Chatterjee, whose unwavering support, insightful feedback, and encouragement propelled me forward at every stage of this research. His expertise and mentorship were instrumental in shaping the direction of this project. I am particularly grateful for his critical observations and timely interventions at crucial junctures, which ensured that the project stayed on course. But his impact went far beyond the academic; his steady encouragement was a lifeline during challenging moments. Without his unwavering guidance and inspiring presence, this dissertation would simply not exist. His mentorship has not only helped me develop as a researcher but, has also prepared me for life and bigger challenges.

I am also immensely grateful to the members of my dissertation committee, Professor Partha Pratim Basu and Professor Moinak Biswas, for their constructive criticism, scholarly insights, and invaluable suggestions that greatly enhanced the quality of this work.

My heartfelt appreciation goes to the archives, libraries, and institutions that provided me access to invaluable resources, without which this research would not have been possible. I am especially thankful to the library of Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) for providing me access to several important primary and secondary sources and to Ms. Hitakshi for her immense patience and help in locating these obscure resources.

I extend my sincere thanks to my East Asia Centre colleagues for their constant encouragement, especially to Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA for the many sessions of thought-provoking discussions on the border dispute, the 1962 war, and its memory. These discussions were greatly helpful in refining my own arguments.

I am immensely thankful to Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai and Dr. Jason Wahlang for their indispensable assistance in completing this project. Their professional and personal wisdom were a constant source of support in this journey. In times of difficulty, their unwavering encouragement, and reassurance were a source of immense strength and comfort.

Also, I am deeply grateful to Ms. Pritha Mukherjee, Dr. Mitul Islam and Mr. Karan Vora, for their friendship and support. Their presence and countless words of encouragement kept me grounded and motivated in this whirlwind journey of research, writing, and deadlines.

To my extended family, Mr. Gautam Bandopadhyay, Mrs. Nilima Banerjee, Mrs. Archana Chatterjee and Dr. Chaitali Banerjee, I extend my deepest gratitude. Their continuous understanding, encouragement and support were invaluable during this journey. I am grateful to my husband, Mr. Soutik Banerjee who gracefully endured the ordeal of being the life-partner of an academic and extended unwavering support in completion of this project.

Lastly, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents Mrs. Sabitri Banerjee and Mr. Rajat Banerjee, for their unfaltering support and sharing all my suffering, fears and happiness during the entire process. This accomplishment would not have been possible without their presence and constant encouragement. This dissertation is for my parents who have been the source of my happiness and strength.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB	:	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
BASIC	:	Brazil, South Africa, India, China
BDCA	:	Border Defence Cooperation Agreement
BJP	:	Bharatiya Janata Party
BPTA	:	Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement
BRI	:	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	:	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBMs	:	Confidence Building Measures
CCP	:	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	:	Central Intelligence Agency
COAS	:	Chief of Army Staff
CPEC	:	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPI	:	Communist Party of India
EAM	:	External Affairs Minister
FTA	:	Free Trade Agreement
G20	:	Group of 20
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
GOI	:	Government of India
HEU	:	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAF	:	Indian Air Force
IB	:	Intelligence Bureau
ICWA	:	Indian Council of World Affairs
INGCA	:	Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts
I&B	:	Information and Broadcasting
IOR	:	Indian Ocean Region
IPEF	:	Indo Pacific Economic Framework
IT	:	Information Technology
JeM	:	Jaish-e-Mohammed
JWG	:	Joint Working Group
JUD	:	Jamat-Ud-Dawa
LAC	:	Line of Actual Control
LDP	:	Liberal Democratic Party
LeT	:	Lashkar-e-Taiba
MEA	:	Ministry of External Affairs
MOD	:	Ministry of Defence
MOU	:	Memorandum of Understanding
NDA	:	National Democratic Alliance
NEFA	:	North-East Frontier Agency
NPT	:	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	:	National Security Advisor
NSG	:	Nuclear Security Group
OBOR	:	One Belt One Road
ORF	:	Observer Research Foundation
PLA	:	People's Liberation Army
PM	:	Prime Minister
POK	:	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
POW	:	Prisoners of War
PRC	:	People's Republic of China

PSP	:	Praja Socialist Party
QUAD	:	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
ROC	:	Republic of China
ROI	:	Republic of India
RSS	:	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC	:	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	:	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SLOC	:	Sea Lines of Communication
SSB	:	Shashastra Seema Bal
SSF	:	Special Frontier Force
SU	:	Soviet Union
TAR	:	Tibetan Autonomous Region
UK	:	United Kingdom
UN	:	United Nations
UNGA	:	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UPA	:	United Progressive Alliance
US	:	United States

## **PREFACE**

Our remembrance of past experiences greatly influence our understanding of the present and our vision of the future. This knowledge base, primarily referred to as memory, constitutes an important aspect of India-China relations. Generations of policymakers, politicians and other policy elites remember the 1962 war as a defining moment in India's history that changed the course of Indian foreign and defence policy. Sixty years after the war, as deadlock over border negotiations, competing geopolitical aspirations, conflicting regional interests and increasing power asymmetries persist, China is seen as a security threat by the Indian policy elites. Observers assert that India's psychological trauma from the 1962 war remains unresolved. The war memory of betrayal and humiliation embedded deep in the Indian policy elites' psyche works as a significant roadblock for re-shaping the interaction between the two rising Asian powers. This project explores the construction, dissemination, and impact of the memory narratives on India's political elites' beliefs and attitudes towards China. The project argues that the war memory is not value neutral and involves considerable socio-political engineering. Further, its dissemination and internalisation as part of strategic thinking significantly shape perceptions of trust and distrust in bilateral ties.

## **ABSTRACT**

The thesis titled ‘Remembering 1962 War: Trust Deficit and War Memory in Sino-Indian Relations’ investigates the influence of the war memory and remembrance of the 1962 Sino-Indian war on Indian policy elites’ distrust towards China. It focuses on Indian policy establishment’s intense distrust of Chinese intentions and examines how construction, dissemination and prominence of the war memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation within the Indian strategic community, perpetuates negative perceptions and suspicion towards China. The project employs a historical and analytical approach and covers the period from 1949 to 2022. The study advances in three phases. The first phase of the study extending from 1949 to 1962 delves into the foundational basis and construction of the memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation. The second phase of the study explores the state and the larger Indian strategic community’s role in popularising a simplistic account of the war through information control and selective dissemination. Using case studies, this phase also identifies the memory narrative that dominates Indian strategic community’s remembrance of the war. The final phase examines the long process of reconciliation and confidence building between the two countries and evaluates how Indian policy elites’ selective remembrance hinders attempts of reconciliation and often fuels distrust towards China. The project contributes to the field of International Relations by exploring the impact of the psychological dimension on inter-state relations. It highlights how along with material and structural factors, selective reconstruction and remembrance of events can perpetuate distrust and hinder cooperation between nations. The thesis also underscores the need for re-evaluating the memory narratives entrenched in Indian policy elites’ psyche and revising the remembrance of the war to foster positive ties with China.

## INTRODUCTION

The deepening trust deficit in bilateral ties, entrenched by the 1962 war, remains one of the foremost challenges in Sino-Indian relations. Mutual suspicion and lack of strategic and political confidence not only inhibit the prospect of robust Sino-Indian engagement but also provoke conflicts that threaten to upend the stability of bilateral ties. The process of normalisation initiated in 1976 was marked by a number of reverses, yet regular high-level official visits, government personnel exchanges, cultural exchanges, signing of confidence-building measures, and agreements relating to border, defence, and trade were continued to boost ‘mutual trust and understanding’.<sup>1</sup> However, all such well-meaning gestures and actions amounted to a formal rapprochement on the surface as distrust and perceptual bias continue to influence mutual judgement.<sup>2</sup> Policy experts and scholars point towards a wide range of issues like continuing border disputes, aspirations for Asian leadership, conflicting political systems, third-party alliances and threat perception as factors permeating trust deficit in bilateral ties.<sup>3</sup> Another aspect that is relatively less discussed but nonetheless widely acknowledged within the academia is the psychological cause of the trust deficit, that is, the memory of the 1962 war embedded in the Indian and Chinese national psyche, which acts as a major constraint in bridging the trust gap between the two countries. The existing literature on Sino-Indian relations does not elaborate on this aspect further or delve into questions like how India and China remember the 1962 war? how these memory narratives were shaped in the respective countries? what are the dominant narratives of remembrance and how the memory and remembrance of 1962 war permeate the trust deficit in bilateral ties.

---

<sup>1</sup> Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. “Imprisoned by History.” In *China and India: Cooperation Or Conflict?*, 9–44. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Smith, Jeff M. *Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century*. Lexington Books, 2013. Yun, Sun. “China’s Strategic Assessment of India.” *War on the Rocks*, March 25, 2020. Accessed on March 26, 2020. <http://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-india/>.

<sup>3</sup> Astarita, Claudia. “China and India: Rivals or Partners? An Analysis of the Background of the Interactions between the Two Major Emerging Asian Powers.” *Transition Studies Review* 14, no. 3 (December 2007): 545–61. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-007-0158-8>. Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng. “‘Chindia’ or Rivalry? Rising China, Rising India, and Contending Perspectives on India-China Relations.” *Asian Perspective* 35, no. 3 (2011): 437–69. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704764>.

This project aims to investigate these questions from the Indian perspective, with a particular focus on how India's policy elites' war memory shapes their distrust towards China. The cause of emphasis on India's policy elites' war memory is twofold. First, the existing scholarship on India-China ties highlights that the 1962 war memory is vivid within the Indian policy elites' psyche, compared to a relative absence of such vivid memory in Chinese elites' psyche. There is a general lack of widespread knowledge about the war within China. Conversely, the 1962 war remains deeply embedded in the consciousness of the Indian elite. Even six decades later, the causes and consequences of the conflict continue to be vigorously debated in New Delhi's policy circles, and it is argued that this persistent memory shapes India's security and strategic perceptions vis-à-vis China, potentially hindering efforts towards sustained cooperation between the two nations. The second reason the project delves into these questions is because mere knowledge about the presence of the 1962 war memory and its stated impact on bilateral ties does not advance in totality our understanding of the causal relation between war memory and India's distrust towards China. The psychological dimension of the trust deficit requires greater academic attention. A systematic enquiry into the psychological frames will help understand better the role of ideas and beliefs in shaping Sino-Indian relations. India's war memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation have persisted and transcended generations. Further, they have been accorded national prominence through monuments, days of commemoration or reiterations at public forums. Therefore, there exists a general assumption about their impact on constraining bilateral ties. However, there is lack of comprehensive analysis explaining the underlying dynamics that make war memory an influential variable in determining questions of trust and distrust in India. Therefore, it is imperative that questions pertaining to the source, content and relevance of war memory to India's distrust are explored in greater detail.

The project takes into consideration the national policy elites' memories of betrayal and humiliation. Since interactions and exchanges between the two countries continue to be heavily mediated by their respective state apparatuses thus, memory narratives emanating from outside the state hardly find space within the foreign policy conduct. Here, it is important to note that the national policy elites' memories are the dominant narratives in any country, forged according to the political exigencies of the state and are reflected in official and semi-official documents, public declarations, writings and

speeches, or sites of commemoration like museums and memorials. Drawing from various archival sources, commemorative works, policy documents, public statements, media reports and writings, and academic works relating to the war, along with interviews of concerned policy elites, the project intends to investigate the link between war memory and India's distrust towards China.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The project identifies the persistent and intensifying trust deficit between China and India as the primary area of concern, which needs to be addressed holistically if the two countries intend to build robust diplomatic ties. A brief account of the history of the evolution of Sino-Indian relations from 1976 normalisation till 2020 reveals that the trust-deficit between the two countries has intensified quite simultaneously with the expansion of their bi-lateral engagement than the other way round.

Within a decade of restoration of diplomatic contacts, the deep animosity between the two countries was demonstrated in the Sumdorong Chu crisis of 1986, which lasted till 1987, and although Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit helped ease the tense atmosphere, political and economic relations hardly registered remarkable improvement. In the 1990s, instances of growing institutional links between the militaries and the strategic communities of both countries and the signing of 1993 and 1996 land border agreements had renewed hopes for a Sino-Indian rapprochement, but the latent distrust between the two countries was revealed when barely a month after PLA chief of staff, General Fu Quanyou's visit to New Delhi in April 1998, the Indian defense minister George Fernandes publicly identified China as India's primary threat and post-Pokhran nuclear tests Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in a secret letter to US President Clinton cited Chinese threat and the persisting atmosphere of distrust between India and China as the primary causes of India's nuclear tests. China, in response, cancelled a scheduled Joint Working Group meeting for border negotiations, which did not resume until 2001. Comments by Brijesh Mishra, India's Principal Secretary and Indian President R.K. Narayanan that India did not view China as a threat, failed to assuage Chinese misgivings and in 1999 Beijing tested one of its Dongfeng missiles that were capable of reaching every corner of India.<sup>4</sup> Since neither country was keen to extend the political stalemate over the Pokhran tests, high-level reciprocal exchanges were resumed, and government officials from both countries

---

<sup>4</sup> Sidhu and Yuan, "China and India."

publicly assured that neither country viewed each other as threat. However, the 2000-2001 Indian defense annual report underscored Chinese incursions at the LAC and Chinese nuclear missiles placed in Tibet as major threats to Indian territorial integrity. Surprisingly, the same year, Zhu Bangzhao, then China's foreign ministry spokesperson declared that Beijing was paying close attention to the development and placement of India's medium-range Agni missiles. Moreover, even as the relationship appeared to gain momentum with high-level visits in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008, the signing of confidence-building measures and burgeoning trade; bi-lateral ties remained fraught. Both India and China moved rapidly to upgrade their border infrastructure and military capabilities along the disputed border on the sidelines of the Special Representative Talks and Joint Working Group meetings and resorted to diplomatic retaliation whereby China invited Kashmiri separatist leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq to Beijing at the same time when Dalai Lama was visiting Arunachal Pradesh.<sup>5</sup> Also, Indian hysteria over reports of the Chinese decision to build dams over the Yarlung Tsang Po River, New Delhi's moves to restrict Chinese investments over concerns of security and espionage and India and China's mutual criticism of the other's diplomatic and strategic endeavours as containment strategies<sup>6</sup> demonstrated the deep-seated distrust that had persisted and deepened over years. By 2010 when India and China were celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, the two countries apart from holding economic and security dialogues, defense, cultural and political exchanges, had also expanded their co-operation in groupings like BRICS, G-20, BASIC, and SCO and considering the change of leadership in China and India in 2012 and 2014 respectively, the 89 billion dollar trade and sixteen bi-lateral meetings between Xi-Jinping and Narendra Modi, caused optimism regarding a new phase of developmental partnership between China and India.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Bajpae, Chietigj. "China-India Relations: Regional Rivalry Takes the World Stage." *China Security* 6, no. 2 (2010): 3–20.

<sup>6</sup> Belanger, Jean Francois. "Balancing Strategies and the China-India Rivalry." In *The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era*, edited by T. V. Paul and Han Zhen, 95–116. Georgetown University Press, 2018.

<sup>7</sup> Panda, Jagannath P. *India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. The Hindu. "70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020]," March 31, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece>.

Nevertheless, these positive developments described only one side of the coin, as simultaneous events indicated that years of diplomatic exchanges, confidence building measures, economic and strategic links had amounted to a thin reconciliation as suspicion and distrust remained predominant in bilateral ties. For instance, amidst celebrating the Year of India-China Friendship and Co-operation in 2012, New Delhi also commemorated the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of 1962 war where distrust and threat perception of Chinese intentions emerged as the dominant sentiment.<sup>8</sup> This sentiment was matched by Chinese state media's Global Times' opinion pieces, which blamed India for the 1962 war and warned against misadventures in the future.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, when China declared the initiation of the OBOR project in 2013, many within the Indian strategic community responded with cynicism, dubbing the project as a Chinese attempt to subvert Indian territorial integrity and create a Sino-centric world order, and India has since, then boycotted OBOR meetings.<sup>10</sup> In 2014, reports of PLA's incursion during Xi Jinping's visit again flared the policy elites' suspicion of Chinese intent, leading Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to rhetorically warn that a little toothache could paralyse the entire body.<sup>11</sup> Bi-lateral relations were indeed paralysed during 2017 Doklam crisis when intense distrust brought the two countries to the brink of war.<sup>12</sup> Although efforts of recovery were made through informal summits between the two leaders in 2018 and 2019,<sup>13</sup> China's criticism of India's abrogation of article 370,<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> India Today. "India Pays Homage to Martyrs of 1962 Sino-India War for First Time," October 20, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-war-defence-minister-ak-antony-indian-air-force-119190-2012-10-19>. Parthasarathy, G. "Lessons from the 1962 Debacle." BusinessLine. The Hindu, October 24, 2012. <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/lessons-from-the-1962-debacle/article64598653.ece>.

<sup>9</sup> Liu, Zhongyi. "India Still Conserves Frontier Mentality over 1962 Border War with China." Global Times, December 13, 2012. Accessed on December 14, 2012. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/749877.shtml>. Hong, Yuan. "China Won, but Never Wanted, Sino-Indian War." Global Times, June 28, 2012. Accessed on June 30, 2012. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/717710.shtml>.

<sup>10</sup> Patil, Sameer. "OBOR and India's Security Concerns: Analysis." *Gateway House* (blog), May 19, 2015. <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/obor-and-indias-security-concerns-analysis/>.

<sup>11</sup> *The Times of India*. "Chinese Incursion in Ladakh: A Little Toothache Can Paralyze Entire Body, Modi Tells Xi Jinping." September 20, 2014. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinese-incursion-in-ladakh-a-little-toothache-can-paralyze-entire-body-modi-tells-xi-jinping/articleshow/42940337.cms>.

<sup>12</sup> Paul, T. V. "Explaining Conflict and Cooperation in China-India Rivalry." In *The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era*, edited by T.V. Paul, 3–26. Georgetown University Press, 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Ogden, Chris. "'Enhancing Strategic Mutual Trust': Decoding Bilateral Relations at the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit" China-India Brief #149. Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, November 14, 2019. Accessed on January 20, 2020. <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/center-publications/details/china-india-brief-149>.

New Delhi's criticism of China's handling of the Covid pandemic,<sup>15</sup> and the Galwan Valley crisis, which led to death of Indian and Chinese soldiers, have brought to fore the issue of trust-deficit as a prominent factor in Sino-Indian ties.

### Literature Review

The long history of Sino-Indian bilateral ties, the complexities involved and the multiple facets their relationship has assumed in contemporary times have produced a varied and rich literature on the Sino-Indian bi-lateral ties. The existing scholarship on Sino-Indian trust-deficit can be divided into three schools of thought: First are those who see the trust-deficit as a function of conflicting security, geostrategic and economic interests between India and China. Scholars like John W. Garver (2001),<sup>16</sup> Sinderpal Singh and Jing Dong Yuan (2003),<sup>17</sup> Chietigj Bajpae (2007),<sup>18</sup> David Scott (2008),<sup>19</sup> Jonathan Holslag, (2009)<sup>20</sup> David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee (2010),<sup>21</sup> and Mohan Malik, (2011)<sup>22</sup> belong to this school of thought. These works emphasise that while the 1962 war cemented mutual feelings of distrust, it was primarily the differences in their strategic cultures, diverse assessments of their respective security and geo-strategic environment and aspirations of revival of their global role that laid the initial foundation of distrust between the two countries. Over the years, these existing differences have been sharpened by the border dispute, Tibet, power imbalance, third party alliance, competition for resource, and geo-political influence. In the past one decade, more scholarly works have appeared, delving deeper to analyse the direct impact of these issues on Sino-Indian trustdeficit. Scholars like S. Konwer

---

<sup>14</sup> Haidar, Suhasini, and Ananth Krishnan. "India's Move on Article 370 Is 'Illegal and Invalid', Says China." *The Hindu*, August 5, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-article-370-abrogation-illegal-says-china/article32275663.ece>.

<sup>15</sup> Sharma, Unnati. "67% Indians Blame China for Covid-19, 50% Say Calling It 'Chinese Virus' Not Racist: Survey." *ThePrint*, April 6, 2020. <https://theprint.in/india/67-pc-indians-blame-china-for-covid-19-50-pc-say-calling-it-chinese-virus-not-racist-survey/396496/>.

<sup>16</sup> Garver, John W. *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. University of Washington Press, 2001.

<sup>17</sup> Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. *China and India: Cooperation Or Conflict?* Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Bajpae, Chietigj. "'The Panda and the Peacock.'" *China Security* 3, no. 4 (2007).

<sup>19</sup> Scott, David. "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century." *Asian Security* 4, no. 3 (September 23, 2008): 244–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850802306468>. Scott, David. "The Great Power 'Great Game' between India and China: 'The Logic of Geography.'" *Geopolitics* 13, no. 1 (February 15, 2008): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040701783243>.

<sup>20</sup> Holslag, Jonathan. "The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 6 (December 2009): 811–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390903189592>.

<sup>21</sup> Malone, David M., and Rohan Mukherjee. "India and China: Conflict and Cooperation." *Survival* 52, no. 1 (March 2010): 137–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396331003612513>.

<sup>22</sup> Malik, Mohan. *China and India: Great Power Rivals*. Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2011.

(2011),<sup>23</sup> Zhiqun Zhu (2011),<sup>24</sup> B.R. Deepak (2013),<sup>25</sup> Jagannath Panda (2017),<sup>26</sup> Zorawar Daulet Singh (2020),<sup>27</sup> Rajiv Narayanan and Qiu Yonghui (2020)<sup>28</sup> and Kanti Bajpai (2021),<sup>29</sup> among others, provide interesting insights in this regard. For instance, S. Konwer, Zhiqun Zhu, B R Deepak, Rahiv Narayanan and Qiu Yonghui observe that the unresolved border dispute, competing interests in the Indo-Pacific and resource competition have been major stumbling blocks in the bilateral ties. The delay in the resolution of the border dispute, mutual fears of encirclement and fears of resource denial have generated considerable hostility in bilateral ties. The complex interplay of unresolved territorial claims, reciprocal security interests, and resource competition have created a security dilemma, thereby fuelling distrust in the relations. Jagannath Panda in his work contends that in the era of globalisation, India-China relations are multilayered and polygonal in nature due to the multipolar world order. Therefore, the trust deficit in bilateral ties cuts through bilateral, sub-regional, regional cross-continental and global level. Reflecting on the nature of India-China interests and interactions on border disputes, military security, Asia and South Asia, Zorawar Daulet Singh concludes that there is mostly uncertainty and limited competition in these issues, which in turn sustain distrust in bilateral ties. Finally, Kanti Bajpai deliberating on why India and China are not friends and why bilateral ties suffers from trust deficit identified four Ps, that is, Perceptions (threat perception), Perimeters (border dispute), partnership (third-party ties) and power (military and economic power) as major reasons why India and China have not been able to bridge the trust gap. The major contribution of this school of thought is that by using notions of security dilemma, the balance of power, arms race and nuclear deterrence to analyse Sino-Indian relations, it draws attention to the fact that suspicion or distrust, which is a cognitive phenomenon, cannot be divorced from the material and structural realities within which India and

---

<sup>23</sup> Konwer, Shubhrajeev. "India-China Relations: Limited Cooperation and a Chequered Future." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 72, no. 1 (2011): 283–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761828>.

<sup>24</sup> Zhu, Zhiqun. "China-India Relations in the 21 St Century: A Critical Inquiry." *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 24, no. 1/2 (2011): 1–16. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41950508>.

<sup>25</sup> Deepak, B.R. "India and China: Contemporary Issues and Challenges." *Journal of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation* 7, no. 3–4 (December 2013): 110–32.

<sup>26</sup> Panda, *India-China Relations*.

<sup>27</sup> Singh, Zorawar Daulet. *Powershift: India-China Relations in a Multipolar World*. Pan Macmillan, 2020.

<sup>28</sup> Narayanan, Rajiv, and Prof Qiu Yonghui. *India and China: Building Strategic Trust*. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2020.

<sup>29</sup> Bajpai, Kanti. *India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends*. Juggernaut Publication India, 2021.

China operate; rather the material and structural dimensions tend to drive their competitive or conflictual interaction and in effect fuel mutual suspicion.

The second school of thought views the trust deficit as a product of negative perception cemented by the 1962 war. Studies by Steven F. Hoffman (2004),<sup>30</sup> Susan L. Shirk (2004),<sup>31</sup> Li Li (2009),<sup>32</sup> Lora Salman (2011),<sup>33</sup> and Tienze Fang (2014)<sup>34</sup> explore the perceptual aspects of the trust deficit. In this context, it is noteworthy that these studies observe that the negative perception is more intense in Indian policy elites' psyche than Chinese. The scholars depart from the trend of focusing on material and structural factors to analyse Sino-Indian distrust. While these elements undoubtedly play a role, these works demonstrate that a more nuanced picture of distrust in Sino-Indian relations emerges when perceptual factors are taken into consideration. Here, Steven F. Hoffman's survey of Indian perception is particularly informative as it captures a diverse range of perceptual narratives present within India's strategic thought. He concludes that within India's mainstream perspective a certain wariness and threat perception of Chinese intentions remains dominant. Indian policy elites' psyche, burdened with the legacy of the 1962 war, see China as long-term threat. Complementing Hoffman's survey is Shirk's study of Chinese perception, which contends that post-1962 war and the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991, China no longer viewed India as a serious political and military threat and has pushed for many reconciliatory measures. Shirk argues that Sino-Indian rivalry is largely one-sided owing to Indian threat perception and suspicion of China emanating from the experience of the 1962 war. This theme of asymmetrical threat perception is also reflected in the studies by Lora Salmaan and Tien-sze Fang, who argue that India's high threat perception of Beijing's material capabilities and China's dismissal of Indian concerns as 'victim mentality' as one of the root causes of Indian distrust vis-à-vis China. Although Beijing too harbours a certain degree of suspicion of India due to its close alliance with US, support for Dalai Lama and India's increasing military and

---

<sup>30</sup> Hoffman, Steven. "Perception and China Policy in India." In *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement*, edited by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, 33–74. Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>31</sup> Shirk, Susan L. "One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and Policies toward India." In *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement*, edited by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, 75–102. Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>32</sup> Li, Li. *Security Perception and China-India Relations*. KW Publishers, 2009.

<sup>33</sup> Saalman, Lora. "Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions." *Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 2 (2011): 169–94. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24385541>.

<sup>34</sup> Fang, Tien-sze. *Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

economic power, the distrust is much less pronounced than it is in India. The study by Li stands apart from the other four works in terms of its attention to security perception rather than threat perception. Li argues that Sino-Indian trust deficit is a consequence of conflicting security perceptions of the two countries shaped by their respective domestic and international circumstances. Sino-Indian bilateral ties suffered from intense trust-deficit as the Cold War and domestic conditions had exacerbated their sense of insecurity. Distrust and suspicion in bilateral ties were reduced with improvement in both international and domestic climate in the post-Cold War era. However, even though the two countries seek strategic partnership with each other, India's security perception vis-à-vis China on territorial and military security issues has remained negative, thereby sustaining an element of distrust in India's China policy.<sup>35</sup> Li contends that as perceptions construct relationships, the future direction of the Sino-Indian relationship will basically depend on the evolution of their respective security perceptions. Notably, departing from the 1962 point of reference, Tansen Sen takes a more holistic approach to analyse the trustdeficit in bilateral ties. He argues that there is a marked deficit in mutual trust and understanding, despite growth in trade and commerce because India and China have failed to create an adequate mechanisms to foster people-to-people contact and raise awareness and knowledge about each other. Also, lacking are institutions and qualified researchers who could contribute towards the formation of comprehensive and forward-looking policies towards each other.<sup>36</sup> Third are those scholars who see the trust deficit related to the identity narratives developed by India and China in the post-independence period. Drawing from the constructivist school of thought, works by Gitika Commuri (2010),<sup>37</sup> Priya Chacko (2011),<sup>38</sup> Manjari Miller Chatterjee (2013),<sup>39</sup> and Yang Lu (2016)<sup>40</sup> suggest we need looking into Indian and Chinese national identity narratives to understand the existing trust deficit. Central to their thesis is the argument that constructed narratives about

---

<sup>35</sup> Li, Li. "India's Security Concept and Its China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 2 (2008): 229–61. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615679>.

<sup>36</sup> Sen, Tansen. "The Trust Deficit in India–China Relations." In *Emerging China*, edited by Sudhir T Devare, Swaran Singh, and Reena Marwah, 295–306. Routledge India, 2012.

<sup>37</sup> Commuri, Gitika. *Indian Identity Narratives and the Politics of Security*. SAGE Publications, 2010.

<sup>38</sup> Chacko, Priya. *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*. Routledge, 2013.

<sup>39</sup> Miller, Manjari Chatterjee. *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*. Stanford University Press, 2013.

<sup>40</sup> Lu, Yang. *China-India Relations in the Contemporary World: Dynamics of National Identity and Interest*. Routledge, 2016.

‘Self’ and ‘Other’ have important implications for state behaviour, which, in extension, helps shape the perceptions about the trustworthiness of another actor. However, the significant point is that although each of these studies uses identity as the primary analytical variable, their outlook on how identity matters is considerably different. According to Gitika Commuri and Yang Lu, India and China’s ideas about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are rooted in their national ideologies and self-images as rising powers. These entrenched ideas about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ create perceptions of conflicting national interests, which in turn contributes to a general atmosphere of distrust, notwithstanding the cooperative measures undertaken by the two sides. Priya Chacko suggests that India initially pursued a policy of cultivating friendly relations with China. However, as the unresolved border dispute became increasingly intertwined with discourses of national honour, self-respect, and humiliation, it evolved into a potent symbol of national identity for both countries. The intertwining of the border issue with national identity consequently contributed to a developing trust deficit between India and China. Manjari Miller Chatterjee highlights the role of Post-Imperial ideology (PII) in fostering distrust between the two countries. The Post-Imperial Ideology drives the goals of maximising territorial sovereignty and status in nation-states. Post-independence India and China were engaged in a competitive pursuit of territorial sovereignty and status, which in turn fuelled the gradual rise of suspicion between the two countries.

To summarise, the existing literature deals with the question of distrust between India and China from three angles: The first is the role of structural and material factors in permeating distrust in Sino-Indian relations. Scholars observe that conflicting strategic cultures, geopolitical and geo-economic interests, and status competition have impinged on bilateral ties since the onset of diplomatic relations. The sense of estrangement flowing from these differences was reinforced by the unresolved border dispute in Tibet in the pre-1962 period and geopolitical competition in the region, power imbalance and third-party ties in the post-conflict period. Additionally, in the era of multipolar global order, the unresolved border dispute, power asymmetry, geostrategic competition, resource competition and third-party ties have acquired significance and momentum of their own. This, in turn, has made the distrust in bilateral ties layered, cutting through bilateral regional, sub-regional and global levels. The second angle is perception. One section of observers proffer that India’s experience

of the 1962 war cemented a threat perception in India's psyche. China, on the other hand, does not consider India much of a threat. Therefore, the distrust is more manifest on India's side. It is also opined that rather than threat perception, conflicting security perception between the two countries is the primary factor sustaining the sense of hostility and suspicion. Security perceptions are shaped by systemic external factors as well as domestic issues. Fluctuations in these two categories can impact the intensity of distrust in bilateral ties. Therefore, favourable international environment and the domestic situation can alleviate the trust deficit between the two countries. Finally, scholars also opine that negative perception and the consequent distrust in bilateral ties is also fostered by a lack of extensive people-to-people contacts and a pool of experts to formulate forward-looking policy towards each other. The third angle is the identity and trust deficit. Scholars contend that over the years, national ideologies and self-images entrenched a strong sense of 'Self' (superior self) and 'Other' (inferior other) in India and China. These perceptual lenses create an impression that the national values, interests and objectives are not compatible and essentially conflicting. Therefore, the perception of disharmony of fundamental values, interests and objectives sustains an atmosphere of distrust in bilateral ties. Further, post-1962 war the notions of honour, humiliation and self-respect that emerged during the war have also been woven into the self-identities of the two nations. Accordingly, leaders have been extremely cautious in their engagement and accommodation of the other, in order to limit threats to national honour. Finally, driven by PII (developed as a result of trauma experienced during colonialism), the two countries at one period of time competed for the maximisation of territorial sovereignty and status, which in turn fuelled hostility and trust. Since, the trauma of colonialism persists, the competition regarding the maximisation of sovereignty and status also remains, fostering distrust.

This dissertation intends to build on this existing work and advance the understanding of the trust deficit in Sino-Indian relations. The existing literature refers to the history of the 1962 war and its impact. However, history and memory are not the same, although, analytically, the two terms have been used interchangeably without making the necessary distinction. Studies demonstrate, that history denotes a simple past, containing factual information, and memory symbolises narratives about the past constructed through a process of remembering and forgetting. The two concepts are very different notions and to use them parallelly confounds more our understanding of

distrust in bi-lateral ties. Accordingly, the project attempts to address in a more systematic and focused way the impact of war memory in fuelling distrust in bilateral ties.

### **Research Questions**

As mentioned earlier, this research analyses the trust deficit from India's perspective and will explore how Indian policy elites' war memory impact their distrust towards China. The project identifies the following three core questions:

*How the memory narratives of the 1962 war were constructed and disseminated in the public arena?* Memories of betrayal and humiliation were not created in vacuum but were shaped by political intervention and socio-political circumstances in both domestic and international arena. This question will explore the foundational basis of the war memories of betrayal and humiliation by delving into the formative years of the India-China bilateral ties.

The second question *asks how the remembrance of the war has evolved in the six decades since the conflict and what is the dominant war memory discourse.* One of the primary reasons memory narratives are not analysed is because of their fluid character. Memory narratives can be subjected to continuous transformations, which often makes it difficult to test assumptions based on a mnemonic framework of analysis. However, mapping evolution of memory narratives and the dominant memory discourse is not only important to understand what the policy elites intend to remember but also more importantly, what they choose to forget. Most of the times state elites choose to remember of a self-glorifying and other-vilifying narrative, which casts the self in a positive image but fails to acknowledge the cognitive biases and errors in one's own decision making. Such one-sided approach impedes trust building process. This question will explore the whitewashed and sanitised narratives of the war that were generated in the post-conflict period through selective recalling.

*The final question tracked here is how war memories and its remembrance impact India's policy elites' distrust towards China.* This question investigates the correlation between war memory and trust deficit, essentially exploring the interplay between national perceptions of the past and state behaviour. By examining the conjunction between India's war memory and its China discourse, the research delves into how the

persistence of a sanitized and simplistic narrative of the 1962 Sino-Indian War contributes to the entrenchment of a distrustful attitude towards China.

### **Research Methodology**

The project, in general, will follow a qualitative method of research, and in accordance with the three questions listed above, the project will advance in three stages:

The project uses textual and discourse analysis to map the representation of the war in the national psyche. For the purpose of analysis, both primary and secondary sources were used. Primary sources, like official documents, policy reports, speeches, and audio-visual recordings, were used, and secondary sources like biographies, media interviews, newspaper reports, commentaries, and journal articles were used. The project also uses select case studies to analyse the shift in the remembrance of the war in the collective psyche. Finally, to analyse the impact of the collective memory on trust deficit, it uses the process tracing method. Using this method, the collective memories of the 1962 war are considered intervening factors in decision-making and their impact on Indian attitude towards China is evaluated by tracing how memory narratives were evoked in decision-making.

Primary and secondary materials have been sourced from the Nehru Memorial Library, the National Archives of India, the MP-IDS Library, the website of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and newspaper websites. In addition, online resources available through JSTOR, journal databases of Routledge, Sage and Project Muse are also used in this work.

The study proceeds in three phases: In the first phase, the project delves into analysing the construction of memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation. This phase employs a historical approach to analyse the evolution of India's memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation with regard to the war across two distinct time periods: First, the Formative Period (1949-1958) that focuses on the initial years following the establishment of diplomatic ties between India and China in 1949. The analysis will examine the early representations of the bilateral relationship in terms of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' where India and China were civilisational friends and partners in anti-colonial struggle.

This is followed by the second period called Escalation and Rupture (1959-1962): This period looks into the deterioration of India-China relations due to escalating tensions over the border dispute and the Tibetan issue. The project gives a brief overview of the complex situation, which developed in the late 1950s due to the evasive and ambiguous policies of both countries, and then moves to analyse how the previously dominant narratives of friendship and partnership were reinterpreted in light of these emerging conflicts. The focus will be on how the process of reinterpretation of the narratives of friendship and representation of the Chinese offensive as betrayal and humiliation excluded the complexities of the issues and errors in decision-making. Instead, we find that a simplistic, self-glorifying narrative was deliberately created that served as the template guiding India's understanding of China.

The second phase delves into the process of evolution of the memory narratives and remembrance of the war. It adopts a critical discourse analysis framework and a longitudinal research design to understand the state's intervention in shaping the remembrance of the war in its immediate aftermath, the onset of recalling of the war after Nehru's death in 1964, and finally, the dominant memory discourse that is present in the present century. The time frame of this phase extends from 1964 to 2022. Within this period, no clear distinction has been made. Instead, different timelines have been weaved together to demonstrate how the remembrance of the war has shifted from betrayal and humiliation in order to focus primarily on remembrance of the war as a national humiliation, political-military debacle caused by misplaced trust in China and lack of defence preparedness.

The third phase shifts the focus to investigating the long-term impact of the war memory on India's distrust towards China. It employs a process-tracing methodology to analyse the complex interplay between the persistence of a humiliation narrative and India's pursuit of reconciliation efforts with China since the 1962 war. To that end, this phase looks into five distinct time frames, that is, 1970-1976, 1980-1988, 1990-1998 and 2000-2013 and 2014 to 2020. These five distinct time frames represent five different phases of reconciliation with China, where Indian policy makers engaged in different confidence-building measures including expansion of trade, establishment of institutions and multilevel dialogues to foster confidence in bilateral ties. Looking into the memory discourses in each of these phases, the study analyses how the remembrance of the war became an intervening factor in hampering the reconciliation

process and entrenching a distrustful attitude towards China in India's strategic thinking.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **What is Collective Memory?**

Collective memory is an umbrella term used to denote the remembrance of very selective versions of past/historical events by individuals, communities, societies, and nations. Widely understood as a perception of the past, collective memory shapes stories which people and groups tell about themselves, linking past, present, and future in a simplified narrative. Collective memory keeps a highly selective version of the past alive in the present.<sup>41</sup> The concept of collective memory is intricately related to history. However, memory is not knowledge from history. Rather, it is knowledge about history, constructed through interaction amongst several actors/agents and continuous exclusion and inclusion of narratives.

The construction of collective memory is important. Collective memories do not originate on their own, but rather, they come into being through symbols, monuments, oral narratives, printed texts, public speeches, music, art, memorials, institutions, rituals and practices. These are also known as vectors, which preserve collective memories across generations.<sup>42</sup> A prominent example of the creation of collective memory and making it transgenerational is the memory of 9/11. In the US, although the number of victims of the 9/11 attacks was limited, the state created a collective memory of American victimisation whereby later generations or groups of people who do not have a first-hand experience of the incident feel aggrieved and victimised. The government erected memorials to communities which the victims belonged to and constructed a Flight 93 National Memorial in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, as part of the National Park System. The day 9/11 was declared as a Patriots Day and is commemorated every year, with the government encouraging citizens to remember by visiting these memorial sites.<sup>43</sup> Films and books produced in the aftermath of the event portrayed 9/11 as a day of national tragedy and an attack on larger American society and values. A Pew

---

<sup>41</sup> Bell, D. *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*. Springer, 2006.

<sup>42</sup> Finney, Patrick. "The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International History." *The International History Review* 36, no. 3 (2014): 443–72. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24703184>.

"September 11: A Day of Remembrance and Service - NPS Commemorations and Celebrations (U.S. National Park Service)." Accessed May 14, 2024. <https://www.nps.gov/subjects/npscelebrates/september-11.htm>.<sup>43</sup>

Research survey found that even twenty years, later the 9/11 is remembered as one of the most historic events in the nation's history. Also, the memory continues to shape American perception of issues of war, peace, security threats, citizen safety, and human rights.<sup>44</sup> This is very similar to the creation of the 1962 war memory in India. The 1962 conflict was a localised clash of arms between the two countries. Only three divisions were involved from our side and six from the Chinese side. Further, the war took place in a sparsely remote area and lasted for a month.<sup>45</sup> In effect, neither a large section of the army nor civilians were involved in fighting the Chinese. The government, although proclaimed emergence and ordered national mobilisation, both were short-lived to have any profound political-economic impact on the nation. Notably, at the outbreak of the war and in the aftermath period, the war was framed by the Indian government and sections of the Indian strategic community as an event of national victimisation by China. Through different vectors, including official texts, public speeches, statements, propaganda pamphlets, posters, documentaries, films, music, monuments and other structures, a memory complex of Indian victimhood was created. These vectors continue to sustain the war memory of betrayal and humiliation and a sense of victimisation by the Chinese amongst the larger Indian strategic community and the public who were not associated with the war.

There are several other examples of the construction of collective memories which persist through generations. The study of the anti-colonial struggles of different Asian countries reveals that the political elites, in a bid to reform their societies and sharpen the anti-colonial movement, constructed memories of the glorious past to establish their status vis-à-vis their colonisers and to boost national morale.

The second important aspect is the actors/agents who create and disseminate the memory. Besides the state machinery, which plays an active role in creating and circulating collective memories, party and institutional leaders, intellectuals, media personnel and several other non-state actors are involved in the process.<sup>46</sup> Avi Becker

---

<sup>44</sup> Doherty, Hannah Hartig and Carroll. "Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11." *Pew Research Center* (blog), September 2, 2021. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>.

<sup>45</sup> Athale (retired), Colonel Anil. "Exclusive: What Provoked the India-China War?" *Rediff.com*, October 16, 2012. <https://www.rediff.com/news/special/exclusive-what-provoked-indias-war-with-china/20121016.htm>.

<sup>46</sup> Confino, Alon. "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method." *The American Historical Review* 102, no. 5 (1997): 1386–1403. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2171069>. The socializing agents and privileged interpreters of memory regimes are politicians, journalists, religious and social

contends that powerful transnational organisations help “to transcend national traditions and construct regional, international, or “cosmopolitan” memory regimes.”<sup>47</sup> Further, the actors sometimes create competing memory narratives and contest them with vested interests and desire for power.

Here it is noteworthy, that dominance of particular memory as opposed to others reflects the power of the actor/s who create and disseminate the memory. Alon Confino, in his study on methods in memory studies, observes that the construction of memory through the process of invention and appropriation demonstrates the power dynamics within society which influences what the society will remember.<sup>48</sup> For instance, in the case of Japan, the war memory continues to be a ground for political contests, and attempts to interpret and re-interpret history result in considerable domestic tensions.<sup>49</sup> The political elite is divided about Japan’s imperial history and war-time responsibility, and especially Emperor Hirohito’s role. On one hand the liberal left argues that Japan should acknowledge its imperial past and accept wartime responsibility, crimes committed against humanity, and pay reparations. On the other hand, the dominant memory appears to be the one propagated by the conservative right-wing LDP who constitute the government. The LDP propagates the memory of Japanese military conquests as a glorious past of Japan’s pushback against Western colonialism and tends to portray accounts of wartime atrocities as negative propaganda by countries like China and Korea to exact political benefits from Japan. As Franziska Seraphim notes that this fragmented collective memory is the result of interest politics in Japan, which started whereby both sides placate the interests of specific social groups and propagate memory narratives to expand or strengthen respective political bases.<sup>50</sup> This applies to the international realm as well. Traditionally, powerful or victorious countries have been successful in imposing their version of memory

---

leaders, artists, teachers, intellectuals, and so on. There are also different subsets of the more general elite, such as academics, artists, politicians, and civil societal leaders, who operate in more specialized arenas and thus produce more specialized discourses.

<sup>47</sup> Becker, Avi. “Building Up a Memory: Austria, Switzerland, and Europe Face Holocaust.” In *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, edited by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, 67–120. Georgetown University Press, 2010.

<sup>48</sup> Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History.”

<sup>49</sup> Machida, Satoshi. “War Memories and Japanese Citizens’ Views toward the Self-Defense Forces.” *Contemporary Japan* 33, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 24–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/18692729.2020.1852369>.

<sup>50</sup> Seraphim, Franziska. *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005*. Brill, 2020.

narratives of events. Many scholars contend that post-Second World War the victorious allied powers primarily perpetrated a simplistic narrative of Germany and Japan being absolute aggressors.

With regard to the war memory of the 1962 conflict, the predominance of the state narratives of betrayal and humiliation reflects the hegemony the Indian state enjoyed in shaping the understanding of the conflict and the control the government continues to hold over the remembrance of the war. In the aftermath of the conflict, the state-sanctioned narrative marginalised other perspectives, that is, the experience of the individuals who witnessed the first national emergency, communities then residing in the border regions, and more importantly, Chinese families who were interned for two years after the war also exhibit the state power in sustaining the state-sanctioned understanding. The internment and subsequent deportation of a large number of Chinese-origin individuals, which significantly affected generations, remains one of the controversial occurrences during the war. However, it remains forgotten by the Indian strategic community and the wider public. This selective amnesia exhibits the hegemonic control of the state.

### **Collective Memory and International Relations**

Progress in research using collective memory and its various sub-themes has been slow primarily due to the fluidity of the concept, as it can often be redefined, reshaped and related to more than one branch of knowledge. Zheng Wang notes that every discipline has cited reasons for not attending to memory as a variable. Like in the field of history, the discipline's tradition of seeking scientific objectivity has been a major impediment in examining historical writing in relationship to the articulation of memory. In sociology and anthropology, research on memory was undermined in favour of topics allowing empirical research. The discipline of International Relations, too, has neglected the mnemonic field. Most mainstream International Relations scholars consider memory inconsequential to serious analysis. The dominant research frameworks of realism and liberalism attribute primacy to the rationality of actors and structures in the study of state behaviour and foreign policy analysis. As memory dwells in the realm of ideas and emotions, it can, at best, be applied to the study of domestic politics, where leaders use social narratives for political gains.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Wang, Zheng. *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. Columbia University Press, 2014.

Studies in collective memory in international relations emerged with the rise of the constructivist paradigm, that emphasised the role of identity, ideas, culture and values in foreign policy making and international affairs. As researchers delved into the constitution of these factors, it was seen that the ways states or political communities construct and remember the past have a great bearing on their identity, value systems, political cultures and decision-making, which, in turn, impacted inter-state relations, foreign policy, and issues of peace and conflict.<sup>52</sup> This led to the development of a new field of study of memory politics in international relations. The researchers sought to understand and theorise ways collective memories or memory narratives constructed and disseminated through generations impact foreign policy behaviour of states, are politically utilised for national security gains, and act as a determinant in international politics.

The nexus between collective memory, identity and foreign policy has been one of the primary focuses of research in the field of memory politics. Some of the earliest projects dealt with collective memory of the Second World War and Cold War in relation to national identity and foreign policy making in post-war Europe. Edited volumes like *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past, Memory*,<sup>53</sup> *Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*,<sup>54</sup> *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*<sup>55</sup> are some of the notable works in this context. Using case studies, they highlight how collective memories of victimisation by Nazi Germany were forged across Europe (including in countries that collaborated with the Nazis), which became part of the national identity discourse of many countries like France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, Austria, Norway, Russia. Further, during the Cold War, memory narratives were re-shaped according to the logic of communism and anti-communism, aggravating political divisions worldwide. More importantly, the memory of the Second World War and the

---

<sup>52</sup> Langenbacher, Eric, and Yossi Shain. "Introduction: Twenty-First Century Memories." In *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, edited by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, 1–12. Georgetown University Press, 2010. Budrytė, Dovilė. "Memory and World Politics." In *International Relations*, by Dovilė Budrytė. Oxford University Press, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0273>.

<sup>53</sup> Müller, Jan-Werner, ed. *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

<sup>54</sup> Bell, D. *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*. Springer, 2006.

<sup>55</sup> Lebow, Richard Ned, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu. *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*. Duke University Press, 2006.

trauma experienced during the Cold War continue to influence foreign policy positions, political identities, and cultures across the globe.

### **Collective Memory and Trust-Deficit**

The existing literature on collective memory does not explicitly deal with collective memory and distrust, although certain studies offer valuable insights that inform this project's dynamic exploration. First is a study by Jennier M. Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, published in 2009.<sup>56</sup> Lind, in her work, argues that how states remember and represent their past, especially atrocities inflicted on other states, signals their intention to other states. Using the examples of West Germany and France, she proffers three suggestions in this regard: first, that a country that deals with its history effectively sends a "costly signal." to other states. Second, interactions between countries are influenced by their identities. A state that repudiates its expansionist past indicates that its values have changed and, consequently, that it can be relied upon to act differently in the future. Finally, the way a country remembers its past can have emotional effects on observers in other countries. A failure to apologise can communicate a lack of respect, which triggers anger, which in turn fuels hostility between the countries. The major takeaway from Lind's study is that states' remembrance of the past or failure to acknowledge violence can trigger threat perception in other states. In effect, states not only assess other states' intent in the domain of military power but also the way a state addresses its past behaviour (Glaser, et al. 2009).<sup>57</sup> The second study is by Yinan He, who demonstrates in her work *The Search for Reconciliation Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*,<sup>58</sup> that divergent remembrance of historical events in the post-conflict period can affect state behaviour and impede the reconciliation process. Contrasting German-Polish relations with Sino-Japanese relations, He argues that in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, both Germany and Japan inflicted considerable injustices and trauma upon their neighbours. However, Germany and Poland achieved reasonably stable relations in the post-Cold War period. The reason is that successive German governments since the 1970s. They made serious efforts to confront their past and atone for the atrocities

---

<sup>56</sup> Lind, Jennifer. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Cornell University Press, 2011.

<sup>57</sup> Glaser, Charles L., Thomas U. Berger, and Mike M. Mochizuki. "Roundtable Discussion of Jennifer Lind's 'Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.'" Edited by Jennifer Lind. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 3 (2009): 337–68. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23418734>.

<sup>58</sup> He, Yinan. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

committed against Poland. The Polish government, too, accepted German apologies which in turn helped the Germans and Poles to develop a common understanding of the tragic past and reconcile. Conversely, Japan never intensely recognised its violent past nor offered any sincere apologies to China. Beijing, on its part, promoted a highly nationalistic historical narrative that emphasised China's victimisation by outside powers during the "century of humiliation." As a result, when the Cold War ended, Chinese and Japanese views of history remained far apart, thus impeding the reconciliation process. Yinan He concludes that while Germany and Poland achieved full reconciliation, Chinese and Japanese reconciliation remains shallow as both countries succeeded in controlling nationalist passions, and the history issue continues to be a major irritant in China-Japan relations.<sup>59</sup>

### **Chapter Summary**

This opening chapter, *From Brothers to Rivals: India's Memory Politics*, delves into the foundational elements that shaped the Indian strategic community's memory of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, as betrayal and humiliation. To that end, the chapter examines the formative years of India-China relations, specifically the period from 1949, when diplomatic ties were established, to 1958, when the border dispute emerged as a public issue with escalating tensions. The chapter argues that the simplistic framing of the conflict as a betrayal and humiliation rests upon a sanitised understanding of historical Sino-Indian relations. The chapter contrasts this dominant narrative with the earlier emphasis on a "2000-year civilisational friendship" and a "shared anti-colonial struggle" between the two nations and explains that at the outbreak of the war, the narratives of centuries of friendship and shared civilisational struggle were overturned to accuse China of violating trust and disrupting peaceful ties.

The second chapter, *India-China Border War and Narrative Building* delves deeper into the process of memory construction. It argues that the Indian government's war time propaganda campaign that sought to shape both domestic and international understanding of the conflict and its causes, played a major role in constructing the memory of the war in the aftermath of the conflict. This campaign strategically framed the war as a clear act of betrayal and national humiliation perpetrated by China, a stark

---

<sup>59</sup> Berger, Thomas. Review of *Review of The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*, by Yinan He. *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 4 (2010): 720–22. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25767110>.

betrayal of the previously emphasised "2000 years of civilisational friendship" and "shared anti-colonial struggle." In doing so, the chapter argues that New Delhi elided in the complexities of the pre-war bilateral situation and errors in its own-decision making that contributed to the conflict. Consequently, the government promulgated a simplistic narrative that promoted a sense of national victimisation at the hands of the Chinese over a nuanced understanding of the event.

The third chapter, *Decoding India's Memorialisation and Remembrance of 1962 War*, shifts its focus to the post-conflict period, investigating the evolution of India's remembrance of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, over the past six decades. It analyses how the memory of the war has been constructed and reconstructed within the Indian political and strategic space. The chapter notes that the process of recollection that began after Nehru's death in 1964 gradually shifted the focus of remembering from Chinese betrayal to humiliation to humiliation and military political debacle caused by Indian leadership's misplaced trust in China and consequent lack of defence preparedness.

The final chapter on *Remembering 1962: War Memory and India's Distrust towards China* argues that genuine reconciliation, characterised by the absence of violence, a lack of preparation for conflict, and smooth economic relations underpinned by a sense of shared interests, is a prerequisite for establishing trust in any post-conflict bilateral relationship. However, despite the restoration of ambassadorial-level ties following the 1962 war, India and China have fallen short of achieving genuine reconciliation, because India's remembrance of humiliation has remained intertwined with its efforts of reconciliation. The chapter contends, that remembering humiliation which enforced an image as an untrustworthy partner hindered the reconciliation process significantly and also sustained distrust in bilateral ties.

The objective of the thesis is to provide a better understanding of why India China bilateral ties remain mired in distrust despite decades of engagement and reconciliation efforts. The project demonstrates that the policy elites' remembrance of the war as national humiliation plays an important role in New Delhi's persistent distrust of China.

**CHAPTER - 1**  
**FROM BROTHERS TO RIVALS: INDIA'S MEMORY POLITICS**  
**INTRODUCTION**

The history of interaction between the ROI and the PRC is ambiguous and punctured with long phases of neglect and amnesia. Recent studies suggest that in the precolonial period, the kingdoms in India and the dynasties in China did not establish continuous and significant diplomatic and economic ties<sup>1</sup>. Although trade occurred through Central Asia, Nepal, and Tibet and between peninsular India and China's east coast, these contacts were part of the larger commercial circulation that was happening in South, South-east and West Asia. More importantly, it overwhelmingly involved actors and agents residing outside the geographical space of Indian and Chinese civilisation. The advent of colonial powers did facilitate greater commercial contacts and knowledge circulation between the two countries. However, ties were largely mediated through colonial policies, which restricted contact and understanding about each other.<sup>2</sup> Inspired by the ideals of Pan-Asianism, political figures and freedom fighters in both countries established contacts and expressed sympathy for each other's national struggles. Still, these exchanges relied largely on personal initiative and resources. It was only after their emergence as modern nation states that India and China established official diplomatic relations. However, post-independence, the narratives of '2000 years of civilisational friendship' and 'shared colonial struggle' became extremely popular in the political and diplomatic discourse of the two countries.<sup>3</sup> This narrative, which imparted a sense of deep bonding and friendship between India and China, defined the formative years of bilateral ties. Also, following the outbreak of the 1962 war, these narratives formed the basis of projecting China as betraying two millennia of friendship and humiliating a fellow post-colonial state. These narratives are central to India's remembrance of the 1962 war.

The chapter addresses the first question raised by this thesis, which is how the memory of the war as betrayal and humiliation by China was constructed by New Delhi. Looking into the formative years of India-China bilateral ties, the chapter delves into

---

<sup>1</sup>Wagner, Rudolf C. "China and India Pre-1939." In *Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations*, edited by Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho, and Manjari Miller Chatterjee, 35–62. Routledge, 2020.

<sup>2</sup> Sen, Tansen. "Introduction." In *India, China, and the World A Connected History*, 1–28. Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

<sup>3</sup> Sen, Tansen. "Pan-Asianism and Renewed Connections." In *India, China, and the World A Connected History*, 293–378. Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

the origin and dissemination of narratives of ‘2000 years of civilisational friendship’ and ‘shared anti-colonial struggles’ that formed the basis of war memory. At the inception of Sino-Indian bilateral ties these memory frames were popularised and deployed primarily by the Government of India (accepted by China) as a diplomatic strategy to deal with the new communist government of China. New Delhi propagated these memory frames to project a picture of peaceful bilateral ties, which could be used as a model for shaping bilateral ties in the post-colonial period. Notably, the memory frame of two thousand years of peaceful ties, cultural and spiritual connections and shared colonial struggle. It became the perceptual frame for interpreting and projecting Chinese attacks as betrayal and humiliation.

The chapter looks into the period from 1949 to 1958, that is, from the period of the emergence of the People’s Republic of China to the emergence of the border dispute publicly.

### **Debates on India’s China Policy 1949-1958**

The majority of the discussions regarding India’s management of bilateral ties with China in the formative years, that is, from 1949 to 1958, are critical of Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach to pursuing a friendly policy towards China. It is opined that Nehru and his close associates undermined the Chinese threat and took a very benign view of Chinese foreign policy behaviour.<sup>4</sup> Scholars and commentators observe that there were several instances of Chinese hostility, including Communist propaganda against Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress government as pseudo-imperialists. Still, the government of India during this period did not carefully assess the security threat emanating from China. Nehru’s early recognition of Communist China, ignoring the warnings of then Home Minister Shri Ballavbhai Patel, India’s silence during China’s occupation of Tibet, dismissal of China’s open criticism of Nehru’s refusal to seek powerful allies, and failure to adequately strengthen border defence indicate that the government was “unconcerned” about the Chinese threat.<sup>5</sup> Terming India’s policy

---

<sup>4</sup> Gopal, S. “The Formative Ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 11, no. 21 (1976): 787–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4364645>. Patil, Sameer Suryakant. “India’s China Policy in the 1950s: Threat Perceptions and Balances.” *South Asian Survey* 14, no. 2 (December 2007): 283–301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310701400206>. Akbar, M.J. “Is India Still Paying for Nehru’s China-Submissive Policy?” *Open The Magazine* (blog), June 26, 2020. <https://openthemagazine.com/cover-story/is-india-still-paying-for-nehrus-china-submissive-policy/>.

<sup>5</sup> Irani, Cushrow R. “India’s Foreign Policy—the Swatantra View.” *India Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1967): 16–20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45069178>. Sharma, B.M., and L.M. Choudhry. “Chinese Expansionism and India.” *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 3 (1968): 235–43. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41854278>. Seth, Nareshwar Dayal. “India’s Policy Towards China.” *The*

stance vis-à-vis China as pacifist, Claude Arpi contends that one of the major reasons for this was Nehru and his advisors' (K.M. Pannikar and V.K. Krishna Menon) fascination with China. While K.M. Pannikar was enamoured by the Chinese revolution and became a medium of Chinese propaganda, Nehru, in his high regard for Chinese friendship, became unwilling to grasp the Chinese mind. The Prime Minister and other Indian leaders let themselves be fooled by proclamations of 'Hindi-China Bhai-Bhai and chose to read the communist profession as the gospel of faith.<sup>6</sup> Bhasin argues on a similar line that during the independence struggle, Nehru exhibited almost a fatal attraction towards China, which continued after he became the Prime Minister. He not only welcomed the establishment of a Communist government in China as a harbinger of change in Asia but also appeared determined to protect the idea of civilisational friendship with China at any cost. Further, a section of policy advisors surrounding Nehru were also Sinophiles and occasionally resorted to justifying Beijing's hostile actions.<sup>7</sup> Ramachandra Guha notes in his study *Jawaharlal Nehru and China: A Study in Failure*, that post-1962 war, the analysis charging Nehru and his colleagues of naivety and political short-sightedness in formulating an unrealistic approach towards China became predominant.<sup>8</sup>

This phase is commonly considered the idealist phase. It is alleged that New Delhi evinced a sentimental attitude towards China. In this context, Nehru's statement that India had been "out of touch with reality" and was living in an "artificial atmosphere of our own creation" is often quoted.<sup>9</sup> Subsequently, over the decades, India has been seen to have moved towards a relatively pragmatic and realist policy towards China.

The counter-literature on this issue dismisses the proposition of sentimental approach and argues that Nehru's approach to maintaining friendly ties with China was driven a by number of considerations like Cold War politics, India's geopolitical setting and her

---

*Indian Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 2 (1968): 143–50. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41854262>. Rao, Amiya, and B. G. Rao. *Six Thousand Days: Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister*. Sterling Publishers, 1974. Roy, Nabarun. "The Anatomy of a Story Less Told: Nehru and the Balance of Power." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2016): 337–58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602153>. Bhasin, Avtar Singh. *Nehru, Tibet and China*. Gurugram, Haryana, India: Penguin/Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House, 2021.

<sup>6</sup> Claude, Arpi. *Tibet : The Last Months of a Free Nation India Tibet Relations (1947-1962)*. Vij, 2017.

<sup>7</sup> Bhasin, *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 61.

<sup>8</sup> Guha, Ramchandra. "Jawaharlal Nehru and China: A Study in Failure?" Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series . Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2011. <https://www.harvard-yenching.org/research/hyi-working-paper-series-ramachandra-guha/>.

<sup>9</sup> *Time*. "India: We Were Out of Touch with Reality." November 2, 1962. <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,874591-1,00.html>.

internal socio-economic and political conditions. Andrea Benvenuti, for instance claims that Nehru believed that aligning with bloc politics of the Cold War and alienating China would not bring the regional stability required for India's development and prosperity. Also, he was painfully aware of India's limited economic and military capabilities and the danger of internal communism. Therefore, he decided to pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence with China to create a sphere of peace in the region and in the process hoped to control the rising Communist tide in India.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, scholars like B.R. Nanda, and K. Subrahmanyam contend that Nehru was mindful of challenges emanating from China as early as 1950. Although he recognised the communist revolution and endeavoured to have friendly ties, Nehru had discerned a long-term threat posed by a strong centralised government on India's borders.<sup>11</sup> He had even warned K.M. Panikkar before the latter's travel to China about deep-seated conflicts underlying India-China relations.<sup>12</sup> However, he was also convinced that peaceful relations between India and China were required to balance Cold War politics. Therefore, he strongly resisted India becoming a bastion of anti-communism led by the US and also attempted to disarm Chinese suspicion about India's intent and decrease China's dependence on the Soviet Union. Further, India's geopolitical situation was sensitive. Post-independence India faced Pakistan as a hostile neighbour on its West, the Communists in power in China also appeared hostile to Nehru, the Soviet Union was indifferent, and the US was supporting Pakistan. In retrospect, Nehru worked to buy time from China while striving to bring economic development as a major bulwark against Chinese threat (Nanda, 1976, Subrahmanyam, 1976).<sup>13</sup> According to Nehru, the five years Plans were also Defence Plans to help India prepare against potential aggression from Pakistan and China.<sup>14</sup> In effect Nehru's friendly approach towards China was informed by a deep appreciation of India's national interests and the geopolitical trends of that time.

---

<sup>10</sup> Benvenuti, Andrea. "Constructing Peaceful Coexistence: Nehru's Approach to Regional Security and India's Rapprochement with Communist China in the Mid-1950s." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 91–117. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2020.1721063>.

<sup>11</sup> Nanda, B.R. "Introduction." In *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, edited by B.R. Nanda, 1–23. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976. Subrahmanyam, K. "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962." In *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, edited by B.R. Nanda, 103–29. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1976.

<sup>12</sup> Gopal, S., ed. "To K.M. Panikkar." In *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN) October 1950-February 1951*, 15:438–42. 2, Part 1. Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Nanda, "Introduction," 15. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962," 106.

<sup>14</sup> Nanda, "Introduction," 16.

The debate about India's approach towards China in the formative years has continued for decades. The basic contention has been whether Indian policy makers were idealists or realists in dealing with China. Both sides cite statements, actions, and events to support their argument. In one instance, the high-sounding public proclamations of civilisational friendship and Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai and New Delhi lobbying for UN recognition of China, despite Chinese aggression in Tibet and criticism of Nehru's policies exhibit a lack of practicality and grounding in reality. However, on the other hand Nehru's expression of apprehension and suspicion in private, occupation of Tawang following China's entry into Tibet, signing of treaties with the Himalayan states of Nepal and Bhutan, surveillance of socio-political events relating to China indicate an awareness and conscious effort to manage security threats from China.<sup>15</sup>

The common factor in the idealist and realist debate is that these discussions do not consider the role of narratives like 'two thousand years of civilisational ties' or 'spiritual or moral connect', 'shared colonial struggle' in shaping India's engagement with China. However, a purely idealist/realist perspective is unable to account for the nuances and the complexities that characterised the bilateral ties. Delving into these narratives and the way they shaped bilateral ties helps explain both the perceived idealist and realist components in India's China policy.

Further, the importance of the memory frames of civilisational friendship in India-China bilateral engagement arise for two reasons. First, due to their prominence in India's diplomatic discourse towards China. Post-independence the stories of 2000 years of civilisational exchange, moral and spiritual connect, shared colonial struggle were evoked quite frequently in India's diplomatic and political discourse to convey the

---

<sup>15</sup> In order to address these apparent contradictions a third genre of literature has emerged which sees India's foreign policy vis-à-vis China a complex mixture of realist and idealist components. Highlighting the inherent complexity in India-China relations it is argued that India's policy towards China in that period cannot be designated as purely idealist or realist. Sinologist Tansen Sen notes in this context that a "mixture of fascination, ambivalence, and suspicion, and not just the "bhai-bhai" catchphrase, defined the first decade of ROI-PRC interactions". Challenging the idealist-realist debate, Andrew Kennedy argues that India's China policy viewed within the broad framework of its foreign policy is a mix of both idealism and realism. While Nehru was idealistic in thinking that India's goodwill and China's intergration into the international system will moderate her foreign policy behaviour, realisation of India's core national interest added the realist edge to his policy. Others opine that India's China policy was pragmatic, conditioned by cross currents of idealist and realist ideas in Nehru's mind. Accordingly, India under Nehru's premiership did emphasised the role of values in conduct of foreign policy vis-à-vis China, at the same time New Delhi displayed flexibility to maximise India's power potential and protect her core interests. See, Mohan, Raja C. "Nehru's Realism." ORF, November 14, 2014. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/nehru-realism>. Kennedy, Andrew. *Nehru's Foreign Policy: Realism and Idealism Conjoined*. Edited by David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743538.013.7>.

sameness and solidarity between the two countries. In 1951 Jawaharlal Nehru in a broadcast from London stated that:

“ We, in India, have had 2,000 years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts, but when we hark back to that long past, something of the wisdom of that past also helps us to understand each other.”<sup>16</sup>

The same year, when Sunderlal visited China as leader of the Indian Goodwill Mission, in a press statement in Canton he highlighted the intimate ties between the two countries that extended over twenty centuries and urged the two countries to revive the relations on cultural, social, economic and political plane.<sup>17</sup>

Tansen Sen notes the prevalence of these ideas in 1950 India. He contends that the series of publications in India on the People’s Republic of China that appeared in early 1950 frequently emphasised historical connections and shared struggle against imperialism and advocated the establishment of the world of brotherhood.<sup>18</sup> This trend of referring to civilisational bonds and shared imperial struggle is also noted in Bondurant and Fischer’s study of Indian news media’s writings on China.<sup>19</sup>

The second reason is that a close look at Indian diplomacy in the 1950s demonstrate that memory narratives of past civilisational greatness were used to achieve New Delhi’s foreign policy objective of asserting India’s leadership in international affairs. For instance, in the wake of India’s independence in March 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru asserted in the Asian Relations Conference organised in New Delhi that India following its emergence as an independent nation shall play an important part in Asian affairs not only due to its geographical centrality but also due to India’s unique civilisational role as melting pot of various cultures.<sup>20</sup> Likewise in 1949, Sir Benegal N. Rao, Head of the Indian Delegation at the UN claimed in a speech at the UNGA that the gathering of 20 Asian heads of state in New Delhi to decide on the question of Indonesia’s

---

<sup>16</sup> Bhat, Sudhakar. “The Phase of Friendship.” In *India and China*, 9–19. New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1967.

<sup>17</sup> Sunderlal. *China Today: An Account of the Indian Goodwill Mission to China: September–October 1951*. 664–668, Hindustani Culture Society, 1952.

<sup>18</sup> Sen, Tansen. “The Geopolitical Disconnect.” In *India, China, and the World: A Connected History*, 379–469. Rowman and Littlefield, 2017.

<sup>19</sup> Fisher, Margaret W., and Joan V. Bondurant. *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*. Vol. 1. University of California: Berkley Institute of International Studies, 1956.

<sup>20</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Asia Finds Herself Again: Inaugural Speech at Asian Relations Conference.” In *Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: September 1946–May 1949*, 1:299–305. New Delhi: The Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1958

independence symbolised Indian centrality in Asian affairs. He emphasised that India plays an important part in forging Asian unity owing to India's rich civilisational heritage characterised by religio-cultural diversity.<sup>21</sup> Studies by Kate Sullivan and Manjari Miller Chatterjee detail how memory narratives of civilisational uniqueness and colonial victimisation were simultaneously incorporated into India's diplomatic discourse to assert leadership or justify their foreign policy positions respectively. Sullivan for instance notes that post-independence when India's diplomatic institutions were taking shape, Indian diplomats routinely invoked memories of civilisational and moral superiority to stake India's claim to seats at global high tables.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Chatterjee notes that the memory of colonial victimisation was used by India to claim international status and validate territorial gains vis-à-vis the other. The Indian leaders emphasised their past suffering and anti-imperialist credentials in a bid to forge solidarity and claim leadership of the newly-independent decolonised states. This resulted in significant competition and resentment between India and China. Further, the same historical memories were called on by both states during territorial negotiations to lay claim to the mantle of victimhood and emphasise that instead of making revisionist claims they were demanding territories that have been historically integral to their pre-colonial nation.<sup>23</sup>

Against this backdrop of the prominence of the slogans of civilisational friendship and Hindi-Chini Bhai and India's own diplomatic strategy of using memory narratives in diplomatic discourse, a deeper analysis is required to assess how these memory narratives later formed the basis of remembering the war.

### **India's Foreign Policy Objectives and China**

Before delving into India's memory it is important to discuss what were India's foreign policy objectives and how New Delhi perceived China's importance in relation to these objectives.

---

<sup>21</sup> Rau, Benegal N. "4th Session 222nd Plenary Meeting, 21st September, 1949 Speech by Sir Benegal N. Rau." Permanent Mission of India to the UN New York, n.d. Accessed on February 8, 2023. [pminewyork.gov.in](http://pminewyork.gov.in).

<sup>22</sup> Sullivan, Kate. "Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India's Moral Leadership Aspirations." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 37, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 640–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2014.939738>.

<sup>23</sup> Miller Chatterjee, Manjari. "PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations of 1960." In *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, 55–81. California: Stanford University Press, 2013.

Post-independence Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru enjoyed a high-degree of autonomy in the realm of foreign policy and profoundly shaped the contours of Indian foreign policy. Therefore, the chapter will primarily focus on Nehru's beliefs and strategies for management of India-China relations.

As manifested in Nehru's foreign policy thinking, three very important India's foreign policy objectives were: First maintaining an independent foreign policy, Second, shaping a peaceful external environment that is conducive to India's development and finally, elevating India's international status as a major power in international affairs.<sup>24</sup> The importance of decisional autonomy in foreign policy making as a foreign policy objective was highlighted by India's active resistance to involvement in Cold War bloc politics or binding military or political pacts. In his speech as the Head of the Interim National Government, Nehru informed about India's intent to guard against external influence on its policy making. He declared that India's foreign policy dictated "as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another."<sup>25</sup>

Then, in 1947, during a Constituent Assembly debate on the Objective Resolutions, he reiterated that "India, in so far as it has a foreign policy, has declared that it wants to remain independent and free of all these blocs and that it wants to co-operate on equal terms with all countries."<sup>26</sup> Echoing Nehru's sentiments, other Indian leaders too in that period emphasised the value of decisional autonomy. In 1953, India's then Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan, citing the US' previous stance of avoiding binding entanglements to preserve national interests declared in his United Nations Day Speech that "India does not believe that every nation should choose one side or the other..." and that the US should sympathise with the attitude as it herself had a long record of neutrality and non-involvement.<sup>27</sup> Again, in 1955, on the subject of India's participation in the Commonwealth, he conveyed that India prioritises decisional

---

<sup>24</sup> Appadorai, Angadipuram, and Mannaraswamighala Sreeranga Rajan. *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*. South Asian Publishers, 1985.

<sup>25</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "An Independent Sovereign Republic." In *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 4–10. India: The Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.

<sup>26</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "We Wish for Peace." In *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 10–12. India: The Publications Division: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.

<sup>27</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. "The United Nations Day, 24 October, 1953." In *Occasional Speeches and Writings October 1952-January 1956*, 3–11. India: The Publication Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.

autonomy and will not countenance any limitation in its decision-making flowing from participation in the Commonwealth.<sup>28</sup> The then-Indian leadership viewed the idea of foreign policy independence as a manifestation of India's political and territorial independence and a sustainable means to secure international support for economic development.<sup>29</sup> It was believed that any sacrifice of the capability to make one's own choices by aligning with a particular country or interests was not only inviting colonial domination through the back door but also losing the benefit of strategic flexibility to operate according to India's needs.<sup>30</sup>

The emphasis on framing a peaceful external security environment that is conducive to India's development was apparent in Nehru's approach towards security and great power politics. He considered that intense international tensions, especially in Asia, leading to large-scale conflict, would impinge on India's growth and development.<sup>31</sup> In a letter to Nobel Literature Laureate Pearl S. Buck on increasing international tension, Nehru expressed that a world disaster would be a disaster for India.<sup>32</sup> Further, he repeatedly underscored in his public statements that a global war would be detrimental not only to global progress and development but also to India's economic and political well-being. Delivering a speech at the ICWA, he declared that India at least needs fifteen years of peace to develop its resources.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, rejecting the traditional balance of power model, Nehru directed India's foreign policy towards taking measures not only to prevent war but also limit geopolitical manoeuvring of the great powers in Asia by promoting the region as zone of peace.<sup>34</sup> Referring to Nehru's active

---

<sup>28</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. "India and the Commonwealth: Speech on the Occasion of Sir Anthony Eden's Address to the Members of Parliament, 3 March, 1955." In *Occasional Speeches and Writings October 1952- January 1956*, 21–25. India: The Publication Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.

<sup>29</sup> Singh, Zorawar Daulet. "Introduction." In *Power and Diplomacy: India's Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, 1–34. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.

<sup>30</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru in one of the Constituent Assembly Speeches titled "We lead Ourselves" and delivered in 1948 had declared that "We want the help of other countries; we are going to have it and we are going to get it too in a large measure.... Even in accepting economic help, or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket." See. Nehru, Jawaharlal. "We Lead Ourselves." In *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 29–36. India: The Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.

<sup>31</sup> Singh, Zorawar Daulet. "Nehru's Role Conception." In *Power and Diplomacy: India's Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, 37–70. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.

<sup>32</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "To Pearl S. Buck." In *SWJN January 1948- April 1948*, 5:510–11. 2. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1987.

<sup>33</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "An Evolving Policy." In *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 42–49. New Delhi: The Publication Division: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.

<sup>34</sup> Arora, S. K. "The Area Of Peace." *The Australian Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1955): 57–63. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41416485>

diplomatic intervention in the Indo-China and Formosa crisis to reduce inter-bloc tensions Zorawer Daulet Singh notes that Nehru's proactive diplomacy or "peacemaker role" in Asian affairs was largely driven by his attempt to geopolitically stabilise Asia and counter Cold-war spillover in India's extended neighbourhood.<sup>35</sup>

The endeavours to elevate India's status as a major power were rooted in Nehru's conception of India as a civilisational state.<sup>36</sup> He considered that India, owing to its geographical location, natural resources, and trade, and cultural ties enjoyed great prominence before the advent of colonialism.<sup>37</sup> In his book *The Discovery of India*, Nehru expressing this thought states that:

"Thus, slowly, the long panorama of India's history unfolded itself before me, with its ups and downs, its triumphs and defeats. There seemed to me something unique about the continuity of a cultural tradition through five thousand years of history, of invasion and upheaval, a tradition which was widespread among the masses and powerfully influenced them....And this panorama of the past gradually merged into the unhappy present, when India, for all her past greatness and stability, was a slave country, an appendage of Britain...."<sup>38</sup>

Accordingly, he envisioned that India's foreign policy should be aimed at restoring the prominence she enjoyed before her colonisation by the Western powers. Here, it is noteworthy that Nehru was keenly aware of India's lack of economic and military strength, two crucial capabilities required to command international status. To remedy this lack of capabilities, Nehru first projected India as a major moral power and second strongly defended India's decisional autonomy.<sup>39</sup>

With regard to being a major moral power he introduced a strong moral tone in India's foreign policy conduct, projecting India as possessing indestructible moral power different from the economic or military powers at that point in time. He perceived that advocacy for world peace, decolonisation, and non-interference by appealing to the moral sense of the international players would help India command a leadership position, despite limited military and economic power. Scholars have termed this

---

<sup>35</sup> Singh, "Introduction," 27.

<sup>36</sup> Chatterjee, Shibashis, and Udayan Das. "India's Civilizational Arguments in South Asia: From Nehruvianism to *Hindutva*." *International Affairs* 99, no. 2 (March 6, 2023): 475–94. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iia020>.

<sup>37</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "The Quest." In *The Discovery of India*, 49–68. Calcutta: Signet Press, 1946.

<sup>38</sup> Nehru, "The Quest," 51–52.

<sup>39</sup> Singh, "Nehru's Role Conception," 58–60.

conduct as “moralpolitik.”<sup>40</sup> Besides promoting India as a moral force, Nehru also stringently defended maintaining an independent foreign policy. In this context, it is notable that the goal of attaining major power status was intricately related to the goal of maintaining independence in foreign policy decision-making. The endeavour to maintain decisional autonomy was also to tacitly create a major power status for India. It was considered that there was no independent foreign policy and no major power status.<sup>41</sup>

Owing to China’s geographical proximity to India, its vast size and population, and a huge reservoir of potential power, Nehru was convinced that an independent and friendly China had an important role to play in the realisation of India’s foreign policy objectives.<sup>42</sup> First, China’s foreign policy position with regard to Cold War politics would impact India’s strategic environment, and by extension, constrain New Delhi’s capability to implement a flexible foreign policy. It was perceived that a China relatively independent of Soviet influence would be a major bulwark against super-power intervention in Asian matters, which in turn would render New Delhi greater space to exercise policy options.<sup>43</sup> Second, China would also be a crucial stabilising factor in Asian security environment. A belligerent attitude of the new Chinese government towards its neighbours will not only disrupt the Asian security structure, but also without Chinese cooperation, it would be difficult to resolve the various geopolitical tensions and challenges in Asia.<sup>44</sup> Finally, friendly diplomatic ties with China would also enhance India’s status as a mature diplomatic actor capable of balancing between both communist and liberal democratic powers. Further, it would also allow India to assume a major role in acting as a bridge between the two camps.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Pardesi, Manjeet Singh. “Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives.” RSIS Working Papers. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), April 1, 2005. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/76-wp076-deducing-indias-gra/>.

<sup>41</sup> Paul, T.V., and Baldev Raj Nayar. “Nehru’s Grand Strategy.” In *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status*, 115–58. New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2014.

<sup>42</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “India’s Demand and England’s Answer.” In *SWJN July 1939-March 1940*, 10:273–82. 1. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1977.

<sup>43</sup> Singh, Zorawar Dault. “Cold War on India’s Doorstep, 1954.” In *Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, 99–142. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Dutt, Gargi. “India and China: A Reappraisal of Their Relations.” *India Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (1975): 1–10. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070194>.

<sup>45</sup> Nanda, B.R. “Nehru and Non-Alignment.” In *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Nehru perceived that maintaining a friendly approach towards China was necessary to enable New Delhi to exert a degree of influence on China's external foreign policy behaviour and thus safeguard India's foreign policy aims.<sup>46</sup> In the wake of the establishment of a communist government, he instructed the Foreign Secretary that the Indian ambassador should behave in a cooperative way with the new government and observed that "even from a narrow opportunist point of view, we cannot afford to be hostile in any way to new China".<sup>47</sup> Later, he argued that a hostile approach of the neighbouring countries towards China would be harmful to the neighbouring countries themselves and world peace.<sup>48</sup>

### **Dealing with China: Memory Diplomacy**

Considering India's strategic objectives Nehru adopted a policy of friendship vis-à-vis China. The approach remained the cornerstone of India's China policy from 1950-1958/59. The broad objectives of this policy were to project to the Chinese leadership a model of bilateral ties that could be followed in the contemporary period and shape India's impression as a friendly country in Chinese mind. In this context, the use of a selective version of bilateral history became an important diplomatic strategy. In the 1950s, Prime Minister Nehru promoted the memory of civilisational friendship, and anti-imperial struggle between the two countries and encouraged establishment of institutions and networks which could advance the memory frames of civilisational friendship. It is important to note that through the memory frame of civilisational friendship an informal alliance was promoted without Nehru and India's top leadership ardently subscribing to the same. With emergence of a strong centralised government in China, the Indian leadership developed considerable security concerns and deep suspicion of Chinese intentions. These apprehensions were repeatedly expressed to the Prime Minister in private correspondences and public debates on the Parliament floor.<sup>49</sup> Some of the major worries were whether the Communist government would aid

---

<sup>46</sup> Chakravarti, P.C. "India Faces China in Tibet." In *India's China Policy*, 45. USA: Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1962.

<sup>47</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "The Asian Situation: Note to the Foreign Secretary." In *SWJN, October 1948 - December 1948*, 8:329-31. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1989.

<sup>48</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "To Thakin Nu." In *SWJN, November 1949 - April 1950, Part.1*, 14:503-6. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1992.

<sup>49</sup> Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai. "Letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru" [claudearpi.net](https://www.claudearpi.net), November 7, 1950. [chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/P-18b-Patel-to-Nehru.pdf](https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/P-18b-Patel-to-Nehru.pdf). Jetly, Nancy. "The Initial Phase." In *India-China Relations, 1947-1977*, 10-34. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

communist insurgency in India or threaten the country's territorial integrity.<sup>50</sup> Nehru himself believed that China was an expansive power and deep-rooted conflicts of interest had persisted in bilateral ties since historical times. According to G.D. Deshingkar, who himself quotes India's first intelligence chief BN Mullick, Nehru had told Mullick in 1952 that China had "always been an aggressive country." He added that the "war between the two cultures was not over... and would go on for a long time."<sup>51</sup> However, the fact that diplomacy with memory narrative was continued is indicative that it was a diplomatic strategy rather than indicating real friendship towards China.

### **Civilisational Friendship and Building Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai**

The origin of the narrative of 'civilisational friendship' can be traced to the doctrine of Pan-Asianism that emerged in the early 1900s to resist Western hegemonism and colonialism. Pan-Asianism, as a collection of various ideas, and cultural, political and social movements, propagated a notion of natural unity between different Asian nations by virtue of historical contacts, cultural commonalities and shared values of peace and harmony.<sup>52</sup> The Pan-Asianists, overlooking the historical hierarchies, power contests and identity clashes imagined Asia as a homogenous space.<sup>53</sup> This all-encompassing idea of unity and fraternity not only tried to build a broad Asian identity mirroring the West but also mobilised anti-colonial solidarity amongst Asian countries.

Japan, China, and India emerged as important pillars in the Pan-Asian movement. During the anti-imperialist struggle period prominent thinkers in these countries preferred that a civilisational connection between China, India, and Japan existed before the arrival of the European colonial powers and efforts should be made to revive

---

<sup>50</sup> Jetly, "The Initial Phase," 21.

<sup>51</sup> Deshingkar, Giri. "The Nehru Year Revisited." In *Across the Himalayan Gap*, edited by Tan Chung and Ravni Thakur, 498–511. New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, Gyan Publishing House, 1998.

<sup>52</sup> Szpilman, Christopher W. A., and Sven Saaler. "Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present アジアの主体性・団結の理想としての汎アジア主義— 1850年から今日まで." *The Asia Pacific Journal, Japan Focus* 9, no. 7 (April 25, 2011): 1–30. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Pan-Asianism-as-an-Ideal-of-Asian-Identity-and-Szpilman-Saaler/1c651103d982c094c238dae65679c6464cfb225c>.

<sup>53</sup> Duara, Prasenjit. "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism." *Journal of World History* 12, no. 1 (2001): 99–130. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078879>. Stolte, Carolien, and Harald Fischer-Tiné. "Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905-1940)." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no. 1 (2012): 65–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428708>.

those contacts.<sup>54</sup> Whitewashing religious, cultural and racial differences an image of the Asian Brotherhood was projected.<sup>55</sup> Phrases like ‘Asia is One,’ (propagated by Okakura Tenshin), ‘fuche chunchi’ (relationship as close as that between lips and teeth), ‘Same Race Same Culture,’ ‘Greater Asianism’ emphasising affinity between India, China, and Japan and other Asian countries gained considerable traction. Also, organisations and secret societies like the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood, Ajia Gikai, Oriental People’s Oppressed Association, and Organisation of Asian Harmony were established by political leaders from India, China and Japan to facilitate more exchanges and to boost the image of Asian Brotherhood.<sup>56</sup> Chinese and Indian revolutionaries living in exile met in Japan. Indian revolutionaries living in exile in Paris also called for the establishment of a Pan-Asian Parliament in Paris.<sup>57</sup> Until the time Japan invaded China in 1930, the three countries formed a trilateral network of Pan-Asian movement. Revolutionaries and political leaders from India, China, and Japan corresponded with each other to enlist political, financial and logistical support from each other. In 1906, Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yat Sen met several Indian nationalists in Japan, like Bakratullah, Rash Behari Bose, Satindranath Sen, Vishnu Pingle, Lala Lajpat Rai, and M.N. Roy.<sup>58</sup>

The rhetoric of friendship and civilisational bond between China and India in the context of Pan-Asianism is important to note.<sup>59</sup> These narratives were often employed in public forums and bilateral exchanges. For instance, in 1921, Liang Qichao a

---

<sup>54</sup> Sen, Tansen, and Brian Tsui. “Introduction.” In *Beyond Pan-Asianism: Connecting China and India, 1840s-1960s*, edited by Tansen Sen and Brian Tsui, 1–25. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2021.

In 1907, Zhang Taiyan a Chinese scholar residing in Japan stated that the bond between India, China and Japan are like a folding fan, India is the paper, China is the bamboo frame and Japan is the pivot linking these two handles (Tsui and Sen). Also, following Japanese victory in Russo-Japanese war, Indian Independence Movement leader, Lala Lajpat Rai declared in public gathering that a fundamental unity exists between India, China and Japan and the unity cannot be destroyed by western influence.

<sup>55</sup> Keenleyside, T. A. “Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy.” *Pacific Affairs* 55, no. 2 (1982): 210–30. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2757594>.

<sup>56</sup> Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism.” Szpilman and Saaler, “Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present アジアの主体性・団結の理想としての汎アジア主義—1850年から今日まで.” Thampi, Madhavi. “Sectional President’s Address: The Discourse on Asia and Asianism in Early Twentieth Century China.” *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 72 (2011): 1017–28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44145713>. Nambiar, Devika. “‘Asia Is One’: Understanding the Rise and Fall of Pan-Asianism.” *INSIDE WESTMINSTER* (blog), March 22, 2023. <http://insidewestminster.co.uk/asia-is-one-understanding-the-rise-and-fall-of-pan-asianism/>.

<sup>57</sup> Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India.” Sen and Tsui, “Introduction.”

<sup>58</sup> Deepak, B.R. “India-China Relations 1905-1947: An Era of Anti-Imperialist Struggle.” Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1996. <http://hdl.handle.net/10603/17137>.

<sup>59</sup> Singh, Prashant Kumar. “Transforming India-Taiwan Relations: New Perspectives.” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Accessed May 9, 2024. [https://idsa.in/monograph/TransformingIndiaTaiwanRelations\\_pksingh](https://idsa.in/monograph/TransformingIndiaTaiwanRelations_pksingh).

Chinese politician in an article titled “Zhongguo Yindu zhi jiaotong” noted that “in the East, civilisation originated in China and India” and that India and China were like “older and younger brothers”.<sup>60</sup> While welcoming the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore in 1924, he declared that “Both in character and geography India and China are like twin brothers”. Tagore in his response marveled at the interaction between Indian and Chinese Buddhist scholars and contended that India and China should come nearer “for no political or commercial purpose, but the disinterested human love and for nothing else”.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, the joint statement issued in 1927 by the Indian and Chinese delegation at the World Congress of Oppressed Peoples stated that:

“For more than three thousand years the people of India and China were united by the most intimate cultural ties. From the days of Buddha [sic] to the end of the Mughal period and the beginning of British domination in India this friendly intercourse continued uninterrupted.” Later, the declaration emphasised that India and China “must now resume the ancient personal, cultural and political relations between the two peoples.”<sup>62</sup>

Later, in 1939, as China fought against Japan’s invasion, Jawaharlal Nehru, justifying his visit to China, wrote in the *National Herald* newspaper that:

“I chose to go because, while I hesitated, loving and comradely hands beckoned to me from China, and distant memories of ages past urged me to go. The long perspective of history rose up before me, the agonies and triumphs of India and China, and the troubles of today "folded their tents like the Arabs and as silently stole away.... The present will pass and merge into the future, and India will remain, and China will remain and the two will work together for their own good and the good of the world.”<sup>63</sup>

Similarly, Soong Mei-ling, the First Lady of the ROC, wrote to Nehru while returning from her visit to India in 1942 that:

“We shall leave nothing undone in assisting you to gain freedom and independence. Our hearts are drawn to you, and... the bond of affection between you and us has been

---

<sup>60</sup> Sen, “Pan-Asianism and Renewed Connections,” 299.

<sup>61</sup> Sen, “Pan-Asianism and Renewed Connections,” 299.

<sup>62</sup> Sen, “Pan-Asianism and Renewed Connections,” 304.

<sup>63</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “I Go to China.” In *SWJNS, July 1939 - March 1940*, 10:81–83. 1. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1977.

strengthened by our visit.... When you are discouraged and weary... remember that you are not alone in your struggle, for at all times we are with you in spirit .”<sup>64</sup>

The Cheena-Bhavana established in Viswa Bharati shortly before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria came to represent the institutional embodiment of India-China and intra-Asian friendship and fraternity.<sup>65</sup>

At the wake of Communist victory and establishment of PRC, India incorporated these sanitised narratives of civilisational friendship, Asian Brotherhood in its diplomatic discourse vis-à-vis China and moved to institutionalise them with the view to induce the new Communist leadership not to be hostile to India.<sup>66</sup>

Nehru and other Indian political elites tried to project an image of civilisational friendship and fraternity, without necessarily feeling that emotional attachment towards China and the new Communist regime.

### **Forming Memory Alliance: India-China Relations 1950-1958**

As the basis of serious engagement with the PRC historical reconstruction became the primary task. Drawing largely from the Pan-Asian solidarity discourse, Jawaharlal Nehru and a section of Indian leaders in 1950 incorporated a very mythologised and sanitised version of bilateral history in their public and diplomatic discourse vis-a-vis PRC. A memory narrative was widely propagated that not only did India and China share deep civilisational linkages extending for 2000 years, but the peaceful and intimate ties between the two civilisations were disrupted with the advent of colonialism. Further, both countries victimised by colonialism shared a history of anti-imperial struggle. Here, it is noteworthy that the Chinese Communist Party, who avowed to have made a complete break from the feudal past responded warmly to the proposal of 2000 years of deep civilisational linkages and shared anti-imperial struggle.<sup>67</sup> The two states by outwardly accepting the same interpretation of the past moved to form a “memory alliance”<sup>68</sup> The memory alliance captured in the phrase

---

<sup>64</sup> Pakula, Hannah. *The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the Birth of Modern China*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009.

<sup>65</sup> Sen, “Pan-Asianism and Renewed Connections,” 306–20.

<sup>66</sup> Nehru, “The Asian Situation: Note to the Foreign Secretary.”

<sup>67</sup> Fu, Zhengyuan. “Continuities of Chinese Political Tradition.” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 24, no. 3 (September 1991): 259–79. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592\(91\)90027-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(91)90027-4).

<sup>68</sup> McGlynn, Jade, and Jelena Đureinović. “The Alliance of Victory: Russo-Serbian Memory Diplomacy.” *Memory Studies* 16, no. 2 (April 2023): 227–42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980211073108>.

‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ was expected to act as the foundational basis of bi-lateral ties in the contemporary period.

In October 18, 1949, a few days after the proclamation of PRC, Nehru speaking at the Overseas Press Club, New York about the developments in Asia, stated that:

“With China, our contacts were not so intimate in recent centuries, but previously they were very intimate as you know, the principal religion in China originated in India.” Emphasising on the civilisational links, he stated that “vast numbers of Indians went to China and in one town alone, about ten thousand Indians had gone. They would have gone from India in connection probably with some missionary enterprise of Buddhism.” He went on to suggest that these peaceful civilisational ties were disrupted with the coming of the Britishers and will be revived in the post-independence period as “Old memories revive, and inevitably we think of each other’s problems, and there is the tendency to cooperate.”<sup>69</sup>

Thereafter, the same year, in an interview with the editor of an US newspaper David Lawrence regarding India’s interest in international recognition of Communist China, Nehru referring to civilisational ties as the basis of Sino-Indian bilateral relations, contended that “We have historical and almost immemorial ties of culture and friendship with China. For us, situated as we are and where we are, the friendship with China is desirable and natural.”<sup>70</sup>



Source: Twitter (X)

---

<sup>69</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Ferment in Asia.” In *SWJNS, August 1949-November 1949*, 13:320–27. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1992.

<sup>70</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Ideas for Peace.” In *SWJNS: October 1950 - February 1951*, 15, Part 2:373–78. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1993.

The image of fraternity was more forcefully conveyed when amidst speculations regarding Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Nehru, in a broadcast from London highlighting the ‘2000 years of friendship’ as the basis of mutual understanding between the two countries, sought to explain China’s approach towards the Korea War as a fellow colonial victim state. He stated that while assessing China’s actions “we have to remember the background of China – as of other Asian countries – the long period of struggle and frustration, the insolent treatment that they received from imperialist powers and the latter's refusal to deal with them on terms of equality.”<sup>71</sup>

The Chinese acceptance of and keenness towards promoting the memory narrative of civilisational linkages and shared anti-imperial struggle was demonstrated when in 1950, Mao Zedong, while accepting the credentials of the Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar (who was also the Indian Ambassador to the Republic of China) referred to “common traditions” and “common struggles” for independence.<sup>72</sup> Further, in early 1951, China proposed to send a cultural mission to India with leading non-political personalities.<sup>73</sup> Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai personally scrutinised the list of delegates to include names who had some knowledge of Indian culture, and the participants were provided a short course so that they could communicate appropriately with their Indian hosts.<sup>74</sup>

The 1951 exchange of unofficial cultural delegations by both countries was an important step towards advancing the memory alliance. Endorsing the same representation of bilateral history, the exchange of delegation was held as a revival of the ancient ties and strengthening of anti-imperial cooperation. The Chinese government, as hosts and guests stressed 2000 years of warm and friendly relations and expressed hope of India and China jointly maintaining world peace (imperialism being seen as the root cause of violence across the globe).<sup>75</sup> The Indian unofficial cultural delegation visiting China in its statement emphasised that the delegation visit would

---

<sup>71</sup> Bhat, “The Phase of Friendship,” 14.

<sup>72</sup> Panikkar, K.M. “Arrival in Communist Peking.” In *In Two Chinas Memoirs of a Diplomat*, 74–87. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955.

<sup>73</sup> Mangalagiri, Adhira. “The Culture of Cultural Diplomacy: China and India, 1947–1952.” *China and Asia* 3, no. 2 (February 4, 2022): 202–16. <https://doi.org/10.1163/2589465X-030205>.

<sup>74</sup> Yan, Jia. “Writing Friendship: The Fraternal Travelogue and China-India Cultural Diplomacy in the 1950s.” In *The Form of Ideology and the Ideology of Form*, edited by Francesca Orsini, Neelam Srivastava, and Laetitia Zecchini, 67–98. Open Book Publishers, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0254.02>.

<sup>75</sup> Fisher and Bondurant, *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*. “Exchange of Goodwill Missions between India and China. Visit of China Cultural Delegation Is India (1951) Correspondence with Indian Embassy.” National Archives of India, File No. 786-CJK/50, 1950.

“renew and strengthen the silken bonds of friendship that have existed before our countries well nigh for 2000 years” and assured India’s support to China’s anti-imperial struggle.<sup>76</sup>

Simultaneously, the establishment of Friendship Associations in both countries was another symbolic step towards formation of memory alliance. In India, India-China Friendship Association was set up in 1951 in Calcutta. Although not officially affiliated with the Government of India, it was encouraged by the state.<sup>77</sup> In 1955, India’s former ambassador to China, K M Panikkar, was elected Chairman of the National Executive of the India-China Friendship Association.<sup>78</sup>

The shared interpretation of the past was used, or in many ways, became a solid historical context, validating the development of close ties between the two socio-political and economically different systems. From 1951 to 1958, a series of exchanges and interactions were conducted between the two countries, and the memory frames of 2000 years of civilisational friendship and common struggle against imperialism featured prominently in these exchanges as well.<sup>79</sup> For instance, in 1955, the introduction of a published report by an Indian delegation on Agricultural planning in China stated that the picturesque countryside resembled the East coast of India and the Buddhist pagodas reminded of the great cultural bond that (has) existed between the two countries since very ancient times.

“The road lay through a picturesque countryside somewhat – like the east coast of India with large stretches of to a green paddy and jute fields interspersed with water-logged fens and chains of low hills. Brightly painted houses built in the traditional Chinese style nestled in ubiquitous bamboo groves and lent a local colour to the natural surroundings. A slight drizzle followed by a bright sun gave a silky texture to the landscape which reminded us of the beautiful Chinese paintings on silk that we had seen at exhibitions in Delhi. The Buddhist pagodas occasionally seen in the distance

---

<sup>76</sup> *China Today: An Account of the Indian Goodwill Mission to China: September—October 1951.*, 36–37, 376.

<sup>77</sup> “Interview To R. K. Karanjia, Editor, ‘Blitz’, Bombay, at Rawalpindi, September 7, 1972 – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,” September 7, 1972. <https://bhutto.org/index.php/interviews/interview-to-r-k-karanjia-editor-blitz-bomboy-at-rawalpindi-september-7-1972/>.

<sup>78</sup> “Organisation of India-China Friendship Association Suggestions by Sardar M. Panikkar.” External Affairs, National Archives of India, Progs.,Nos. 1(41)-FEA, 1955, 1955.

<sup>79</sup> Chakravarti, P.C. “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai.” In *India’s China Policy*, 58–74. USA: Indiana University Press Bloomington, 1962.

added to the picturesqueness of the scene and also reminded us of the great cultural bond that has existed between our two countries since very ancient times.”<sup>80</sup>

Likewise, in 1955 the All China Federation of Trade Union, in a congratulatory message for India-China Friendship Association Conference in Uttar Pradesh stated that the joint statements by Prime Ministers of both countries relating to peaceful co-existence and mutual visits would strengthen the friendly connections which have existed throughout history.<sup>81</sup>

Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in 1955 to meet Jawaharlal Nehru led to a series of comments and editorials which emphasised the aspect of traditional friendship, which went back to 2000 years. The Indian news media noted that historical contacts between India and China have been devoid of any conflict. Painting a positive image of both countries, the Indian news media noted that “traditional friendship” between India and China had grown out of the “community of ideals”....Both had always worked for spiritual ends, honoured the saint and the scholar and held acquisition of wealth and territorial aggrandizement as unworthy of pursuit”.<sup>82</sup>

The memory alliance helped advance a political discourse that India and China are natural allies. Not only the two countries faced common developmental problems in the modern era but also are linked together through civilisational and cultural relations, shared experience of colonial victimisation and anti-colonial struggle. However, the memory alliance did not denote any real connection between the two countries and had a huge performative aspect to it.

First, the claim of 2000 years of peaceful civilisational ties was an exaggerated account sourced from the Pan-Asian movement. Historical records indicate that cultural, political or economic contacts between ancient India and China were not direct and mediated by actors from other geographies and ethnic origins.<sup>83</sup> Also, the two countries peripherally existed in each other’s political and social consciousness, far from the

---

<sup>80</sup> Krishnappa, M.V, P.N Thapar, Tarlok Singh, R.J Kalamkar, and S.R Sen. *Report of the Indian Delegation to China of Agricultural Planning and Techniques*. Delhi, Manger of Publications, Government of India Press, 1956. <http://archive.org/details/dli.ministry.20755>.

<sup>81</sup> “Message of All China Federation of Trade Union , Peking for the First Conference of Indo China Friendship Association.” Digitized Private Papers, P.K. Malviya, National Archives of India, January 1, 1955.

<sup>82</sup> Fisher and Bondurant, *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*.

<sup>83</sup> Sen, Tansen. “Introduction.” In *India, China, and the World A Connected History*, 1–27. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

projected nature of deeply intertwined bilateral ties.<sup>84</sup> Further, the limited contact between these two geographies dried up with the spread of Islam in India and the decline of Buddhism in China, rather than being disrupted by the British.<sup>85</sup> Renowned historian Tan Chung notes that for a prolonged time India and China remained oblivious to each other's presence. The Chinese accounts of India from the 15<sup>th</sup> century demonstrate that Chinese information about India was in a state of ignorance and misinformation. Also, by the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of India being the Western Heaven had disappeared from Chinese vocabulary, Rather India, was identified as a country by the small Western Ocean to distinguish it from Atlantic and European states by the great Western Ocean.<sup>86</sup> More importantly, the notion of Buddhism being the culturally binding factor between the two countries is also debatable. Professor K.P. Gupta argues that the history of Buddhist interchange was extremely sanitised to portray an image of ever constructive and harmonious co-existence between two great nations. In actual practice, Buddhism in China took shape largely according to the prevalent socio-political system of the Chinese society and continuously competed for influence with Daoism and Confucianism. Buddhism, during its early phase of entry to China, was favoured primarily by Chinese elites, and later, as it percolated to the lower stratas, it drew heavily from local beliefs and systems to draw followers. At one point, Buddhism came under intense intellectual attack from Confucianists about being a religion of the barbarians, and Buddhist monasteries were destroyed and monks persecuted over corruption concerns. These negative details were left out of the narrative of cultural brotherhood.<sup>87</sup> Giri Deshingkar argues that “there were glaring asymmetries in the way India and China looked at each other, Perhaps as a result of Western scholarship.... westernised consciousness in India took such contacts to be between nations. Hence, the myth of India and China being Asian sister-countries a myth given currency not only by Nehru but many others....Until the early fifties, Chinese scholars had not produced a single work on India as a country. “India” entered

---

<sup>84</sup> Wagner, “China and India Pre-1939.”

<sup>85</sup> Wagner, “China and India Pre-1939,” 42–43.

<sup>86</sup> Chung ,Tan. “Changing Images of India: Through the Eyes of Chinese Culture.” In *Across the Himalayan Gap: A Chinese Quest for Understanding India*, edited by Chung Tan, Minqiu Zhang, and Ravni Thakur, 3–26. India International Centre, 2013.

<sup>87</sup> Gupta, Krishna Prakash. “The Making of China’s Image of India.” *China Report* 15, no. 2 (March 1979): 39–50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944557901500202>.

Chinese consciousness as the land from which soldiers of the British Indian Army came to loot and kill; it was from where opium came”.<sup>88</sup>

Second, the memory alliance also glossed over the impressions that the Chinese had formed when Indian and Chinese connections were revived as part of the colonial trading network. To the Chinese mind India had come to symbolise a failure, a negative example from which China should learn. This sentiment was apparent in the writings of Ma Jianzhong, Wu Guangpei and Kang Youwei, which appeared when China herself was coming under colonial subjugation. India’s internal discord, its enslavement to the Britishers, and its feudal and conservative society featured prominently in their works to highlight the lessons the Chinese should draw to avoid India’s tragic fate.<sup>89</sup> Later, as the British expanded their opium trade and transported Indian soldiers to suppress rebellions and impose colonial governance, India was perceived as accomplice of the imperialists. India as the source of opium trade and Chinese physical encounters with Indian policemen formed such a negative perception. The Indian traders related to the opium trade were seen as agents of the East India Company and the Indian policemen as ‘imperialism’s obedient dog’.<sup>90</sup> These impressions informed the Chinese view of India in the modern period and were visible in the Communist denunciation of Jawaharlal Nehru as “imperialism’s running dog” and “imperialist’s lackey.”<sup>91</sup> Finally, the memory alliance did not create any genuine friendship between the two countries and did not allay the fears the suspicion both sides had for each other.

During the height of the sentiment of the India-China brotherhood in 1953-1954, Ambassador N Raghavan reported to Nehru that that the senior Chinese leadership did not consider India a friend but useful due to her independent stance. Accordingly, the Chinese approach to India was ‘correct and friendly without being warm and cordial, and even references to the civilisational linkages and shared anti-imperial struggle were avoided except in unreported speeches at banquets to visiting dignitaries.’<sup>92</sup> As a matter

---

<sup>88</sup> Deshingkar, “The Nehru Year Revisited.”

<sup>89</sup> Lin, Chengjie. “Kang Youwei on India.” In *Across the Himalayan Gap: A Chinese Quest for Understanding India*, edited by Chung Tan, Minqiu Zhang, and Ravni Thakur, 39–48. New Delhi: India International Centre, 2013.

<sup>90</sup> Gupta, “The Making of China’s Image of India.” Mangalgiri, Adhira. “Slave of the Colonizer.” In *Beyond Pan-Asianism: Connecting China and India, 1840s–1960s*, edited by Tansen Sen and Brian Tsui, 29–66. India: Oxford University Press, 2020.

<sup>91</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. “Some Aspects of American Policy in China.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:136–40. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>92</sup> Rao, Nirupama. “Steep Descent.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

of fact, the Government of India too was not emotionally invested in the rhetoric of 2000 years of civilisational friendship. With the formation of the PRC, India's decision to recognise China was not influenced by the sentiment of brotherhood, but rather by cold diplomatic calculations. As highlighted by Nehru, the decision to recognise the PRC symbolised acknowledgment of a geopolitical reality and was not dependent on liking or disliking the government. Also, New Delhi became quite concerned about the adverse security and political consequences resulting from the emergence of a centralised communist government in China, especially after the declaration of its goal to 'liberate' Tibet from foreign influences in 1950.<sup>93</sup> Nehru denied Chinese request for movement of troops and supplies to Tibet through India, citing security concerns and instructed Panikkar that any concession in this regard should be retained as a "bargaining counter for overall settlements between China and us."<sup>94</sup> The impact on the status of the un-demarcated border and disputed territories was widely debated within government circles. In his private correspondences with Foreign Secretary, Chief Ministers and Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru expressed that India without being irrationally anxious should be vigilant of the security, military and political implications arising from the emergence of the Communist regime and their actions in Tibet.<sup>95</sup> Further, Nehru also sanctioned providing military and material aid to Tibet through the Indian mission in Lhasa and India moved quickly to take control of the strategic location of Tawang and signed treaties of friendship with Nepal and Sikkim.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, relations between the two countries became extremely strained over the Chinese moving into Tibet in 1950 and the Korean crisis. China saw India's policy approach as influenced by the US and the UK and aimed towards interfering in China's internal affairs while posing as the voice of Asia.<sup>97</sup> On the other hand Beijing's

---

<sup>93</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "Introduction." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, Vol. 1. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>94</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Cable to K M Panikkar." In *SWJN April 1952-July 1952*, 18:471-72. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1996.

<sup>95</sup> Das, Durga, ed. "Relations with China." In *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-1950*, 10:342-47. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1974. Parthasarathi, G., ed. In *Letters To Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Volume 2 1950-1952:237-54. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, Oxford University Press, 1996.. Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. "Note on the Meeting Held by the Prime Minister with Foreign Secretary, KM Panikkar, Political Officer on 30th December 1949 to Discuss 'Policy on Tibet.'" In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:217-18. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>96</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Note from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Defence, 16th January 1950." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:240-41. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>97</sup> Bhasin, *Nehru, Tibet and China*, chap. The Chinese Occupation of Tibet. Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Cable to N. Raghavan." In *SWJN October 1952-December 1952*, 20:449-50. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1997.

annexation of Tibet and rejection of Indian ceasefire proposals as the ‘parent of all evil’ at the UN was lamented by Indian policy makers. India felt that the Chinese dealt with India “unfairly” on both these issues, and in future dealings with China, India has to be careful.<sup>98</sup> In a cable to Indian Ambassador N. Raghavan in December 1952, Nehru instructed that while maintaining a friendly policy towards China, there should be no element of apology, and India should remain firm. He observed that “if we show weakness, advantage will be taken immediately....This applies to any development that might take place in reference to our frontier problems between Tibet and Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and the rest of India. In this regard, the entire frontier we have to maintain an attitude of firmness.”<sup>99</sup>

Official correspondences between India and China indicate that the status of Tibet and the undemarcated border continued to be a simmering issue. Especially in India, speculations remained deep on whether India faced military threats from China. Following the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, Nehru acknowledged in the Parliament that the Panchsheel Agreement was not a bulwark against aggression and that India cannot be fully certain of China’s continued goodwill.<sup>100</sup> Also, the phase of negotiation of the Panchsheel Agreement and the approaches of the Indian and Chinese governments also demonstrated the performative aspect of the memory alliance. Due to considerable uncertainty about each other’s attitude on the disputed border, both New Delhi and Beijing moved to consolidate their positions in the eastern and western sectors.

In the multilateral space, the two countries could be seen vying for diplomatic influence and leadership position. The Bandung Conference is considered one such instance. Both sides highlighted their anti-imperial suffering and struggle in a bid to build solidarity and gain prestige with the post-colonial states. According to Manjari Miller Chatterjee this led to building up of competition and resentment in the post-Bandung years which contributed to the hostile backdrop of 1960.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>98</sup> Parthasarathi, 237–54.

<sup>99</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Cable to N. Raghavan.” In *SWJN October 1952-December 1952*, 20:488–89. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1997.

<sup>100</sup> Rao, Nirupama. “Friends with Benefits.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>101</sup> Miller Chatterjee, Manjari. “PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations of 1960.” In *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, 55–81. California: Stanford University Press, 2013.

## **Conclusion**

As the divergences between the two countries over Tibet and the undemarcated boundary deepened, the memory alliance became difficult to sustain. In India, the organisations, networks, and circuits that forged the memory alliance and advanced the rhetoric of brotherhood lost public support and eventually dissolved. The India-China Friendship Association, which tried to isolate itself from the turmoils of the bilateral ties, faced considerable criticism, and in 1958, India's Home Ministry instructed its officials to suspend all ties with the India-China Friendship Association. The Association was dissolved at the outbreak of the 1962 war, and thereafter, for over a decade relations between the two countries froze.

The chapter deals with the formative years of India-China relations to understand the foundations of the war memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation. To that end, the chapter examines the construction and dissemination of narratives centering civilisational amity and shared anti-colonial struggle. The chapter argues that New Delhi, in an attempt to manage bilateral ties with the PRC, engaged in memory diplomacy and promoted a sanitised version of bilateral history largely drawn from the Pan-Asian movement. This sanitised version projected two countries as peacefully coexisting in a symbiotic relationship for centuries, which was disrupted by the advent of colonialism. However, the two countries came together again in a shared anti-colonial struggle. The sanitised narrative of the bilateral history further suggested that post-independence, it is only natural that the two countries would revive the harmonious friendly ties which existed for 2000 years. However, the narrative of civilisational friendship and shared anti-colonial struggle obscured the peripherality of bilateral ties in the pre-colonial period, the negative perception and lack of knowledge that existed on both sides vis-à-vis the other and the very different trajectories of their national independence struggle. Further, the enthusiasm around 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' (memory alliance) that encompassed the narratives of civilisational friendship and anti-colonial struggle did not translate into deep bond or friendship as both countries continued to harbour suspicion and distrust of each other over Tibet and the border issue. More importantly, at the outbreak of the 1962 war, these narratives became the perceptual lenses for assessing China's actions as betrayal and humiliation.

**CHAPTER - 2**  
**NARRATIVE BUILDING AND INDIA-CHINA BORDER WAR**  
**INTRODUCTION**

In the early 1950s, India attempted to forge a memory alliance with China using memory frames of civilisational brotherhood and anti-imperial struggle drawn from the Pan-Asian discourse. This policy came under extreme strain by 1958, as diplomatic and military tensions over events in Tibet and across the disputed border intensified and became prominent in bilateral ties. In India, Chinese actions with regard to Tibet, and rejection of the McMahon Line, and challenging India's border claims were branded as violation of the principles of Panchsheel and disregard for India's friendship. Nehru's China policy came under extreme criticism and the government was urged to maintain a firm approach towards China. The memory frames of civilisational brotherhood and shared anti-imperial struggle were sidelined, and the memory alliance was discarded.

From 1958 to 1962, India's relations with China suffered a steep descent, finally leading to war in October 1962. For India, the conflict of 1962 was an event of reset. Bilateral ties became openly hostile, suspicion and threat perception heightened, and diplomatic relations froze for a decade.

The chapter focuses on the emergence of the narratives of "Chinese betrayal" and "India's humiliation" in the aftermath of the 1962 war. These narratives were constructed to adapt to the new political and strategic needs of the Government of India, that is, to counter both national and international criticism of failure of India's balancing strategy vis-à-vis the Communist China and to justify a muscular turn of India's defence and security policy.

The chapter intends to provide a backdrop to the subsequent discussion on India's memory of the 1962 war. It first delves into elaborating on the difficult bilateral situation which developed in the latter half of the 1950s with regard to Tibet and the border dispute. Assessment of India's memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation against the complex backdrop of the 1962 war exhibits how simplified were the representation and memorialisation of the war and the related events. Second, the chapter discusses the propaganda campaign in India after the outbreak of the war representing the conflict as betrayal and humiliation. The narratives and representation

of the war promoted during 1962 tensions and in the immediate aftermath shaped Indian memorialisation in the later years.

### **India, Tibet, China, and Border**

Tibet and the border became irritants in India-China ties since the onset of diplomatic relations in 1947<sup>1</sup>. Central to the problem was ambiguity regarding Tibet's political status and acceptance of the McMahon Line.<sup>2</sup> During the Asian Relations Conference in India, a diplomatic controversy over Tibet erupted as the representatives of the Republic of China vigorously protested against the depiction of Tibet as a separate country on the world map and threatened to withdraw from the conference. Same year, the Nationalist government again protested against an Indian documentary showing Tibet to be a neighbouring territory and demanded its rectification. While during the conference the Chinese were placated by redrawing the map, the Government of India rejected demands for changes in the documentary. Diplomatic tensions sustained as the two governments diverged over relations with Tibet and the effectiveness of treaties signed during the colonial period. The Kuomintang government, anxious to assert its claim over Tibet, asked for revision of the old treaties signed with British India, conveyed its non-acceptance of the 1914 Simla Convention (by extension, the McMahon Line), and objected to the nature of India-Tibet relations. India, on its part, seeing itself as the successor state of British India, insisted on maintaining its special ties with Tibet and the validity of the Simla Treaty and its clauses.<sup>3</sup>

Both these issues became more contentious in the 1950s when the Communist government came to power and asserted itself militarily in Tibet. Although outwardly, India maintained a cordial approach, New Delhi became extremely apprehensive regarding Chinese military intervention in Tibet and the erosion of Tibetan autonomy. Further, the new geopolitical realities created by China's military occupation and the likely impact on the un-demarcated border created considerable discomfort in New Delhi. China, on the other hand, expressed deep suspicion of Indian sympathy for Dalai Lama and Tibetan autonomy and resented India's claims over Aksai China and

---

<sup>1</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "Fall of Kuomintang." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 16–32. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 1–15. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Bhasin, "Fall of Kuomintang," 22–28.

insistence on the McMahon Line being the formal border between India and China in NEFA.<sup>4</sup>

### **The Colonial Context: Tibet and Border**

Ambiguity regarding Tibet's political status and differences over border demarcation can be traced to the colonial period. Questions over Tibet's political status, the extent of Chinese control over Tibet, and the limits of territorial sovereignty repeatedly figured in the interactions between India, Tibet, and China over trade and security matters.

British faced the vexed case of Tibet's political status for the first time in the late 1770s when the East India Company attempted to establish trade ties with Lhasa. Feigning Chinese strict control on Tibetan affairs, the missions of George Bogle and Samuel Turner in 1774 and 1783, respectively, were returned by Tibetan officials and the Chinese Amban (an imperial agent installed by the Qings) on the pretext of a Manchu ban on entry of Moghuls, Indians, Pathans, and Britishers into Tibet.<sup>5</sup> However, George Bogle and Samuel Turner, in their accounts about Sino-Tibet relations, hinted towards a vague Chinese authority bordering on Tibetan autonomy. Bogle wrote in a letter in September 30, 1775 that "The Emperor of China is acknowledged [as] the sovereign of the country ... but the internal government of the country is committed entirely to natives ... the people of Thibet except at Lahasa, hardly feel the weight of a foreign yoke". Similarly, Samuel Turner in his accounts published in the 1800s pointed out that even when there is perceptible Chinese influence in Tibetan political proceedings, the Tibetans do not bend under the immediate authority of the Chinese court and the yoke of Manchu rule rests lightly on them. As such, the British could not make any conclusive decision could be made regarding Tibet's political status.<sup>6</sup>

More events followed, which underscored the problem of Tibet's political status and the question of Chinese control. For instance, in 1885, Lhasa turned to China for military and political intervention when Tibet got embroiled in a military conflict with

---

<sup>4</sup> Rao, Nirupama. "Fateful Decisions." In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 65–90. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Deepak, B. R. "The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region." In *India & China, 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, 1–28. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Anand, Dibyesh. "Strategic Hypocrisy: The British Imperial Scripting of Tibet's Geopolitical Identity." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 1 (2009): 227–52. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20619680>.

Great Britain over control of trans-Himalayan states of Sikkim and Bhutan. While China refrained from military assistance, the Chinese Amban was directed to negotiate on behalf of the Tibetans.<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, the Tibetans resisted Chinese Amban's instruction to withdraw from Sikkim and Bhutan until they were chased out by the British troops. Further, Lhasa refused to recognise the 1890 Anglo-Chinese convention (demarcating the Tibet-Sikkim border) that China negotiated and signed on its behalf.<sup>8</sup> Despite the Chinese failure to get Tibet to accept the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Sikkim, China continued to be the spokesperson for Tibet and negotiated the 1893 and 1908 Tibet Trade Regulations and the 1906 Beijing Convention on Tibet while the Dalai Lama was still in exile. In this context it is not clear to what extent the Tibetans cooperated with the Chinese and the British in fulfilling these treaty obligations. It is noteworthy that none of the treaties defined Tibet's political status and Tibet later refused to recognise both the treaties. Further, in 1912, Dalai Lama's position was reinstated who declared that Tibet-China relations were that of a patron and priest rather than subordination by the other.<sup>9</sup>

Here, it is also noteworthy that the British Government did not expressly make any efforts to determine Tibet's political status or define its relations with China. Instead, the ambiguity of Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan autonomy was maintained to suit British geopolitical interests in the Great Game with Russia. Both Tibet and China were seen as strategic buffers against Russia.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the provisions of autonomy and suzerainty were used to contain Russian advances. During the negotiation of Lhasa Convention in 1904, the British asserting Tibetan autonomy addressed the Tibetan government as a separate entity and demanded that no Tibetan territory be ceded, leased, or made accessible to any other foreign power without British consent. Further, no representatives or agents of any foreign power shall be admitted to Tibet. When the Chinese objected to these clauses, the British government while upholding Tibet's autonomy, signed a separate Beijing convention in 1906 recognising China's special rights in Tibet as a concession for Chinese assurance of denying Russian access to

---

<sup>7</sup> Deepak, "The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region," 21.

<sup>8</sup> Deepak, "The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region," 22.

<sup>9</sup> Gupta, K. "Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse: Its Origin and Significance." *Economic and Political Weekly* 13, no. 16 (1978): 696–702. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4366549>.

Deepak, B. R. "Making of Common Borders: Chinese Expansionism in the Himalayan Regions." In *India & China, 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, 32–60. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005. Bhasin, "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective," 7.

<sup>10</sup> Anand, "Strategic Hypocrisy."

Tibet.<sup>11</sup> As an additional safeguard against Russian expansion, the British also signed an Anglo-Russian convention in 1907 whereby both countries agreed to respect Tibet's territorial integrity, abstain from interference in internal administration and recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The term 'suzerainty' was not defined and the ambiguity regarding Tibet's political status persisted.<sup>12</sup>

However, later, China's increased influence in Tibet (especially Chinese military expeditions 1907-1911) worried the British administration in India that it would threaten India's North-East Frontier. In a note to the foreign office in London, the British administration in India conveyed to the London Office that "Tibet while nominally retaining her position as an Autonomous State under the suzerainty of China, should in reality be placed in a position of absolute dependence on the Indian Government and there should be set up an effective machinery for keeping out the Chinese on the one hand and the Russians on the other."<sup>13</sup> The Simla Convention, organised in 1914, was driven by this idea of securing the British India's position and limiting the Chinese role in Tibet.<sup>14</sup> However, the Simla Convention which brought into being the McMahon line to restrict Chinese control of Tibetan affairs, further complicated the questions of Tibet's political status. These were largely political arrangements made to suit their strategic needs and the ambiguity and uncertainty were maintained on purpose. Such arrangements turned out to be disastrous post-independence.

The Chinese attitude too towards Tibet and its control of Lhasa was inconsistent and bordering on opportunism. The Chinese court on most occasions remained satisfied with the recognition of its nominal authority and exerted influence on Tibetan affairs according to the politico-military capability of the reigning monarch and the power vacuum in Tibet.

Scholars suggest, that unlike Vietnam, Korea, and Champa, Tibet was not classified as a tributary state. Political, cultural and economic relations existed between Tibet and China; however, historical records don't indicate Dalai Lama performing kowtow ceremony as was the practice of representatives from tributary states. Further, China

---

<sup>11</sup> Deepak, "The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region," 25–28.

<sup>12</sup> Deepak, "The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region," 28–30.

<sup>13</sup> Bhasin, "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective," 8.

<sup>14</sup> Bhasin, "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective," 9–11.

also did not integrate Tibet as a province.<sup>15</sup> Chinese established a politico-administrative foothold in Tibet with the advent of the Qing dynasty in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. China began militarily intervening in Tibetan affairs, and for the first time, appointed an Amban after suppressing a civil strife in Tibet. Following the second Nepalese invasion of Tibet in 1791, Qing emperor Qianlong exerted more control and conducted many administrative reforms in Tibet. However, by the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century China's control over Tibet had drastically declined as the Qing dynasty was weakened by external aggressions and internal rebellions.<sup>16</sup> At this time, China was regarded as a nominal authority in Tibet. British officers in India continuously conveyed their doubts to the Home Government in London whether China was a proper authority to negotiate treaties with regard to Tibet as China was unable to secure Tibetan acceptance. The British Government, however, continued with recognition of the nominal authority to keep out the Russians.<sup>17</sup> An opportunity for China to re-assert its control arose with a power vacuum that was created in Tibet due to Younghusband's invasion in 1904. The Dalai Lama had fled to Mongolia. Also, the British and the Russians did not move to challenge Chinese 'suzerainty' over Tibet. Therefore, from 1904-1911, the Chinese implemented a number of measures to exhibit its absolute authority in Tibet. For instance, in 1907, during the negotiation of the Anglo-Chinese agreement, Chinese officials represented Tibet as subservient to China and denoted Britain as the foreign power in Tibet. Further, a Board of Mines was established in order to exploit Tibetan mines, and gold and a military school was established in Lhasa. Under the leadership of Zhao Erfeng, China militarily subjugated Tibet in 1910 and began to probe the Assam Hills. However, China's territorial consolidation in Tibet was frustrated by British attempts to prevent China from incorporating Tibet. More importantly, the 1911 Xinhai Revolution that led to the downfall of the Manchu dynasty also resulted in the expulsion of Chinese officials and troops from Tibet and the declaration of Tibetan independence.<sup>18</sup> The point of note is that despite the vanishing of Chinese authority in Tibet, the British or other powers did not recognise Tibet as an independent country.

---

<sup>15</sup> Deepak, "Making of Common Borders: Chinese Expansionism in the Himalayan Regions," 30–36.

<sup>16</sup> Deepak, "Making of Common Borders: Chinese Expansionism in the Himalayan Regions," 43–46.

<sup>17</sup> Bhasin, "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective," 2–3.

<sup>18</sup> Deepak, "Making of Common Borders: Chinese Expansionism in the Himalayan Regions," 47–60.

Crucial to determining Tibet's political status vis-à-vis India and China was demarcation of boundaries. Once again, the British initiatives to demarcate the Himalayan frontiers were guided primarily by her strategic competition with Russia. The urgency to delineate the boundary of the empire arose only when the Great Game intensified between them. Till then, the British administrators held no clear view of India's territorial limits along the massive Indo-Tibetan boundary. In 1846, the first attempt to fix a boundary line was launched due to threat perception from Russian explorers in Tibet. A Boundary Commission was established entrusted with the responsibility of determining the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet. Chinese authorities, too, were invited for joint demarcation. According to British accounts the Chinese never arrived, and the Boundary Commission unilaterally drew a line from the northern fringes of Pangong Lake to Spiti River, showing Khurnak Fort inside Tibet. China neither ratified the line nor repudiated it. The matter ended there.<sup>19</sup>

From the 1860s to the 1880s when Russia advanced into Central Asia most aggressively.<sup>20</sup> Great Britain again felt the need for demarcation of the northern borders to resist Russian advances. A survey officer, W. H. Johnson, was deputed. The young officer, in a bid to impress the Dogra ruler, produced expansive boundary claims stretching the Dogra state border to the Kunlun Mountains and including all of Aksai Chin within the Dogra state.<sup>21</sup> Since other British officials were sceptical about Johnson's claims, the boundary proposition died a natural death until it was revived in 1897 by the Director of the British military intelligence John Ardagh, who believed that implementation of the forward positions in Johnson's line would secure strategic leverage against Russia in an event Anglo-Russian confrontation. This boundary came to be known as the Ardagh-Johnson line, which later became the basis of India's claims to Aksai Chin. Here, it is noteworthy that between 1865 to 1897, the colonial administrators depicted different versions of the northern and north-eastern boundary of Kashmir, the line fluctuating according to the degree of perceived threat from Russia.<sup>22</sup> Also, China never acquiesced to or rejected explicitly any of the boundary propositions

---

<sup>19</sup> Deepak, "The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region," 6–7.

<sup>20</sup> Andreyev, Alexandre. "Indian Pundits and the Russian Exploration of Tibet: An Unknown Story of the Great Game Era." *Central Asiatic Journal* 45, no. 2 (2001): 163–80. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41928260>.

<sup>21</sup> Chakravarty, Ipsita. "How British Ambiguity about Frontier between India and China Paved Way for a Post-Colonial Conflict." Scroll.in, June 27, 2020. <https://scroll.in/article/965502/how-british-ambiguity-about-frontier-between-india-and-china-paved-way-for-a-post-colonial-conflict>.

<sup>22</sup> Palit, Maj Gen DK. "The High Frontiers." In *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*, 22–45. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991.

made during this period. Even the 1899 McCartney McDonald Line, which was the only formal boundary proposition ever presented to China, was never officially acknowledged by the Manchu dynasty.<sup>23</sup>

The British urgency to secure India's northern boundaries was lost with the removal of the threat of invasion due to the fall of the Tsarist Russia in 1914. Post-1945, a map published by Survey of India did imply claims to the Aksai China region, but the British military remained non-committal to that boundary. In effect, the British administration exercised such benign neglect that sometimes the McCartney-McDonald or the Ardagh-Johnson Line were treated as informal boundaries according to the administration's inclination. Therefore, when the British left in 1947, there was hardly any clear indication of the northern boundaries.<sup>24</sup> Major General D.K. Palit, who was Brigade Commander during the 1962 war, thus lamentingly wrote, that had the British suggested the newly formed Indian government follow the 1899 boundary proposition that left out the north-eastern Aksai Chin (through which the Chinese strategic road runs), the Nehru government would have certainly accepted the suggestion and consequently the whole confrontation with could have been avoided.<sup>25</sup>

A similar reticence was displayed by the colonial administrators in the eastern sector as well. For long, the British were content with occupying the Brahmaputra plains and did not extend their jurisdiction to the mountains, for these mountains were perceived to be of neither commercial nor strategic value. However, in order to delineate the limit of British responsibility, the foothills were divided into the Outer Line, representing the external territorial frontier of the British empire and the Inner Line, which was forbidden from entering without a permit. In the absence of any perceived threat from Russia or China, the vague demarcation continued.<sup>26</sup>

The British began consolidating India's eastern boundaries with Tibet in the 1900s, as the administration became alarmed about China's presence in Tibet and the vulnerability of India's North East Frontier. A military expedition under Francis Younghusband was sent to Lhasa to secure British India's diplomatic and economic

---

<sup>23</sup>Vengasseri, Ismail. "Aksai Chin Dispute." In *1962 Border War: Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes and Beyond*, 31–64. New Delhi: SAGE Publications India Pvt Limited, 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Chakravarty, "How British Ambiguity about Frontier between India and China Paved Way for a Post-Colonial Conflict."

<sup>25</sup> Palit, "The High Frontiers," 34–36.

<sup>26</sup> Chakravarty, "How British Ambiguity about Frontier between India and China Paved Way for a Post-Colonial Conflict."

rights, which in turn triggered Chinese threat perception and led China to send her own Military General Zhou Erh-feng to assert control over Lhasa. Britain, sensing potential threats from China's counter-moves, for the first time, ordered a series of exploration to determine the extent of tribal areas and to bring the area of Assam Himalaya (later called NEFA) under British jurisdiction. Although, the sudden collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 eased some pressure, the new republican government appeared equally assertive towards Tibet. This was when the British government began to contemplate a tripartite conference to determine issues of the eastern borders of Inner and Outer Tibet, Chinese degree of control in Inner Tibet, and the alignment of the Indo-Tibetan border. The tripartite conference which ultimately convened at Simla in October 1913, was fraught with controversies from the very beginning. For instance, the Chinese objected to Tibet's equal representation and were adamant about pushing Tibet's Inner Line as the Outer Boundary. After dragging negotiations, eventually, in March 1914, the Chinese representative reluctantly agreed to a line drawn by McMahon on the map that ran along the highest crest of the Assam Himalayas and included Tawang within British Indian territory.<sup>27</sup>

It remains to be stated that the Simla Conference in 1914 failed to resolve the issue of alignment of the Indo-Tibetan border, as the Chinese government never ratified the McMahon line, and also, since the Assam government was never informed about the Simla Conference proceedings, areas of Dhirang and Tawang claimed by the McMahon Line remained under Tibetan control. Later, in 1938, the Assam government attempted to occupy Tawang; however, it back-pedalled due to vehement protests from Lhasa and even during the Second World War in 1945, the British government, to repel Japanese invasion, sent out posts only to Walong and Dhirang, mysteriously excluding Tawang. China, too mired in her violent freedom struggle against Japan and civil war between Kuomintang and Communist forces, paid scant attention to the Indo-Tibetan border alignment.<sup>28</sup>

Both British India and China saw Tibet as an international frontier zone where their interests, and activities converged, overlapped, or clashed with each other. The British positioned Tibet as an extended frontier of defence of its vast empire, and China saw Tibet as the strategic backdoor that could be used to threaten the Chinese heartland

---

<sup>27</sup> Deepak, "Making of Common Borders: Chinese Expansionism in the Himalayan Regions," 56–57.

<sup>28</sup> Palit, "The High Frontiers," 38–44.

Driven by frontier defence policy, both powers sought to exercise political and military control of Tibet. However, they succeeded in implementing varied levels of control due to the changing balance of power, geopolitical considerations, and internal capabilities. This in turn led to continued uncertainty in the political status of Tibet, which also spilled over into the border demarcation.

The uncertainty of status and the un-demarcated border in itself were problematic issues. Post-independence, the complexity deepened due to policy decisions on both sides with regard to Tibet and the border dispute.

### **Ambiguous Approach Towards Tibet and Border Dispute**

The failure of both the Republic of India and the PRC to judiciously address the complex history of Tibet and the border did significant damage to the bilateral ties. Here, it is noteworthy that both sides were aware of the colonial legacy and policy position of the other. For instance, Nehru and his close associates managing India's China policy were aware of imperial and the ROC's claims on Tibet and non-acceptance of the 1914 Simla Convention and the McMahon Line. The secret correspondences within the Government as early as 1950 record concerns over the PLA militarily asserting its position in Tibet and de-stabilising the Indo-Tibet border.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, China too was aware of the cultural, linguistic, economic, religious, and political links between India and Tibet and India's sensitivities in Tibet. Further, the CCP had also noted India's declaration of the McMahon Line as an Indian frontier long before they disputed Indian claims.<sup>30</sup>

Notwithstanding this consciousness, none of the parties opted to openly discuss and address the entanglements and unresolved issues left by imperial policies. Instead, the uncertainty and the ambiguity were seen as an opportunity to fortify their own positions in Tibet and along the border.

New Delhi, although it did not openly challenge China's claims in Tibet, it chose not to discuss Tibet's political status with China to avoid lending credence to China's claims in Tibet and opening discussions on the Indo-Tibetan border. Indicating India's intention, the Indian Foreign Secretary KPS Menon informed the US that the Government of India did not intend to raise the question of Tibet's political status with

---

<sup>29</sup> Bhasin, "The Tibet Conundrum," 67–68.

<sup>30</sup> Dai, Chaowu. "From 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' to 'International Class Struggle against Nehru: China's India Policy and the Frontier Dispute, 1950-62.'" In *The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives*, edited by Amit R. Das Gupta and Lorenz M. Lüthi. Abingdon Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2017.

China.<sup>31</sup> Later, on the eve of the Communist takeover of Tibet, India, in order to limit Chinese presence in Tibet, decided to promote Tibet's autonomy within the vague framework of Chinese suzerainty. The Government of India, in 1950, conveyed to the Indian Embassy in Nanking that India adhered to the policy of Tibetan independence subject to the suzerainty of China. New Delhi also clarified that the "Government of India's willingness to recognise Chinese suzerainty is dependent on Chinese government's willingness to give formal recognition to Tibetan autonomy."<sup>32</sup> Later a note titled "Prime Minister on the policy towards Tibet" instructed that the Indian Mission in Lhasa "should maintain and continue friendly relations with the Tibetan Government and give them such aid as we have been giving them.... We should be very careful in taking any measure which might be considered a challenge to Chinese Communist Government."<sup>33</sup>

Simultaneously, the government remained strongly averse to any negotiation on the border and decided to strengthen military and administrative presence along the border.<sup>34</sup> Although there were doubts and debates within the Government about the merits of raising the border question, especially before the commencement of negotiation of the Panchsheel Treaty with China, it was ultimately decided that India would not directly raise the border question since the Prime Minister had already declared India's position in the Parliament. Further, if the issue is raised from the Chinese side, New Delhi would simply tell that there is nothing to discuss except for minor modifications, which can be considered after the boundary has been recognised by the Chinese.<sup>35</sup> As a matter of fact, up until 1960 India did not recognise that the border was disputed and insisted that the issue was non-negotiable. Correspondingly, Nehru issued orders to strengthen Indian defence and administrative position on the border.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "The Tibet Conundrum." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 61–80. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>32</sup> "Foreign Dept. File No.7/2/NEF/48 Secret." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:97. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>33</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. "Note by the Prime Minister on the Policy towards Tibet." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:121. 2018. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, n.d.

<sup>34</sup> Rao, "Fateful Decisions," 83–86.

<sup>35</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "India-China Agreement on Tibet." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 133–56. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>36</sup> Bhasin, *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 206–7.

China, on its part, utilising the situation that Tibet's independence was never internationally recognised sought to ignore Indian sensitivities and coerced Tibet into the Chinese fold. No sooner than Tibet had started reaching out to various countries, including India, for support of its independence, the PLA entered Lhasa as part of its liberation campaign. The CCP explained the military campaign as the liberation of Tibet from imperial and reactionary influences dispatched the PLA to Lhasa, and forced the Tibetan delegation to sign a 17-Point Agreement whereby Tibet was denoted as an integral part of the Chinese motherland.<sup>37</sup>

With regard to the disputed border, the Chinese in the early 1950s remained silent to Indian declarations about the McMahon Line and consolidation of its position in the Western sector. Party officials were instructed not to raise boundary questions with the Indian officials as China's military and administrative position in Tibet was considered weak.<sup>38</sup> Before 1954, the Chinese leadership insisted that it intended to settle only those matters related to Tibet which were ripe for settlement. The border issue will be raised only when China is well prepared. At the same time, China also resisted India's request for revision of the official maps and moved rapidly to build the Aksai Chin Road, which would facilitate easy access to Tibet.<sup>39</sup> It was only after India officially objected to Chinese construction of the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway in the Aksai Chin region that Zhou Enlai, in 1958, informed Nehru that there was no mutually recognised border between the two countries and that China did not accept the McMahon Line. Although he added that the two countries could reach a friendly settlement regarding the same.<sup>40</sup>

### **Rift in Sino-Indian Ties and the 1962 War**

The major drawback of the ambiguous and the evasive policies of the two countries with regard to Tibet and the boundary issue was that they deepened the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion and immensely strained bilateral ties when the differences came to the fore.

---

<sup>37</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "The Chinese Occupation of Tibet." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 81–113. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>38</sup> Dai, "From 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' to 'International Class Struggle against Nehru: China's India Policy and the Frontier Dispute, 1950-62,'" 70–71.

<sup>39</sup> Rao, "Steep Descent," 144–45.

<sup>40</sup> Rao, Nirupama. "Borderlines." In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 260–85. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

News of China's coercive policies and military action in Tibet in 1950, contrary to assurances of peaceful settlement, greatly perturbed India. A large section of the Indian public and the political leadership, expressing shock and regret, voiced negative views about China. It was argued that China had deceived India by professions of friendship and peaceful intent.<sup>41</sup> Further, Chinese actions signalled to India that China harboured an expansionist mindset and posed a potential threat to India's borders. Within the Indian parliament, members urged the government to resist the Chinese invasion of Tibet with full force, revise its China policy and undertake strengthening of India's defence forces.<sup>42</sup> Then Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wrote to Nehru, informing the latter about his views of 'Chinese irredentism and imperialism' and apprehensions about Chinese designs regarding the McMahon Line.<sup>43</sup> Nehru, who avoided any kind of fear-mongering vis-à-vis China, expressed that China's military operations hurt India and that it was an act of discourtesy.<sup>44</sup> He observed that Chinese aggression in Tibet "raises new frontier problems for us. We cannot be happy to have a strong centralised and communist Government in control of Tibetan border in India...". Referring to press reports about implication of China's occupation of Tibet on India's borders, he added that China's "wrong and foolish" invasion of Tibet necessitated that India become more frontier conscious and "guard the mountain passes, which lead to the country" without getting hysterical about it.<sup>45</sup> Despite expressing concerns about the Chinese threat from certain sections of Congress and non-Congress opposition, the Government refrained from proactive intervention in the Chinese occupation of Tibet. New Delhi continued promoting the memory frames of civilisational brotherhood and shared anti-imperial struggle through various cultural political networks.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Jetly, "The Initial Phase," 16–27. Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Letter of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to C. Rajagopalachari." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:415–16. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>42</sup> Jetly, "The Initial Phase," 20–25.

<sup>43</sup> Patel, "Letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru."

<sup>44</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Extract from the Note by Prime Minister on Policy towards East and South Asia." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:452–53. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>45</sup> Parthasarathi, 262–72.

<sup>46</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Note by the Prime Minister Setting the Policy Regarding China and Tibet." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:458–63. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

Distrust and suspicion of the Chinese were prominent. New Delhi quickly moved to establish a Border Defence Committee in 1951 under the chairmanship of Major General Himmatsinghji. The committee was assigned the responsibility to make recommendations regarding strengthening of border defence and external intelligence by the IB.<sup>47</sup> India also signed a protectorate treaty with Sikkim in December 1950 and occupied Tawang in 1951.<sup>48</sup> Scholars suggest that China's occupation of Tibet heightened India's concern with frontier security.<sup>49</sup> A consensus emerged within the Indian politico-military leadership that China had to be dealt with in a friendly but firm manner and that the McMahon Line needed to be vindicated.<sup>50</sup>

China, too, did not take India's response to the Tibet crisis kindly. The CCP resented India's involvement and saw its concerns and interests as unwarranted interference in China's domestic affairs and exercise of sovereign rights. Internal reports citing India's actions like increasing import tariffs from Tibet and banning rice exports from Sikkim to Tibet, emphasised that India had inherited the British legacy and held similar imperial designs in Tibet. The occupation of Tawang in 1951 and India's declaration of the McMahon Line as India's border were also reported to the Central leadership with comments that India intended to impose its boundary claims on China.<sup>51</sup> The Chinese government deeply suspicious of India's intent moved to consolidate its hold on Tibet.

The episode caused great distress between the two governments. New Delhi termed China's actions as deplorable, aggressive and disrupting world peace<sup>52</sup> and Beijing

---

<sup>47</sup> Gupta, Karunakar. "Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier I—1947-1954." *Economic and Political Weekly* 9, no. 18 (1974): 721–26. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41497054>.

<sup>48</sup> Malik, Preet Mohan Singh, and Constantino Xavier. "Sikkim and the Geostrategic Lessons from Himalayan History." *CSEP* (blog), March 24, 2022. <https://csep.org/blog/sikkim-and-the-geostrategic-lessons-from-himalayan-history/>. Dutta, Sujit. "Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunachal." *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 4 (July 18, 2008): 549–81. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802215562>.

<sup>49</sup> Rose, Leo E. "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship." *Pacific Affairs* 42, no. 1 (1969): 32–46. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2754861>.

<sup>50</sup> Rao, "Fateful Decisions."

<sup>51</sup> Deepak, B. R. "India and the People's Republic of China 1949-1959: A Decade of Mistrust and Diplomatic Manoeuvrability." In *India & China, 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, 131–35. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005. Dai, "From 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' to 'International Class Struggle against Nehru: China's India Policy and the Frontier Dispute, 1950-62,'" 70.

<sup>52</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. "Note of the Government of the Republic of India on the Question of Tibet Delivered by the Indian Ambassador in Peking 28 October, 1950." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 372–73. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

accused New Delhi of being influenced by foreign elements hostile to China and obstructing the peaceful unification of Tibet with the motherland.<sup>53</sup>

Although eventually, the two countries normalised relations owing to respective political and strategic imperatives, China's actions in Tibet and India's interest continued to be a thorn in bilateral ties. The two countries anxiously followed each others' movements in Tibet. Several issues like the functioning of the Dalai Lama's close associates in Kalimpong, India's continued cultural association with Tibet and large-scale public sympathy for the Tibetan cause annoyed the Chinese and suspected New Delhi of malevolence.<sup>54</sup> The Indian Government on the other hand became extremely aggrieved by the news of the harrassment of Indian personnel at the hands of the PLA and Chinese atrocities and violation of the 17-Point Agreement.<sup>55</sup> The 1954 Panchsheel Treaty which was meant to be a non-aggression pact, failed to contain the tensions regarding Tibet, later compounded by the differences over the boundary issue.

During the negotiation of the Panchsheel Treaty, both countries declined to include boundary talks in the agenda. It is noteworthy, that almost immediately after its signing of the treaty, stirrings began at the border. Indian and Chinese patrols encountered each other in different spots like Bara Hoti, Niti Pass, Nilang, and Tunjun La, and the two countries started making diplomatic protests against each other. Soon the encounters devolved into clashes.<sup>56</sup>

The Indian administration was aware of how successive Chinese governments never accepted the McMahon Line.<sup>57</sup> Yet, instances like Chinese silence, Zhou Enlai's assurance to Nehru and Panikkar about there being no disputes between India and China, China's acceptance of the McMahon Line in Myanmar and its own internal troubles had led New Delhi to consider that Beijing was unlikely to contest India's claims. In this context, the appearance of Chinese patrols in the middle and the eastern sector and continued representation of India's claimed territories inside China, were seen as opportunistic manoeuvring by the Chinese and annoyed Indian policy

---

<sup>53</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. "Reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on 30 October, 1950, to the Memorandum and Note of the Indian Government on the Question of Tibet." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 374–75. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

<sup>54</sup> Rao, Nirupama. "Buddha Jayanti: An Anniversary Remembered." In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 239–46. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>55</sup> Rao, "Steep Descent," 137. Rao, "Buddha Jayanti: An Anniversary Remembered," 258.

<sup>56</sup> Rao, "Borderlines," 265–66.

<sup>57</sup> Bhasin, "Fall of Kuomintang," 24. Bhasin, "India-China Agreement on Tibet," 137.

makers.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, China, too, had noted Indian assertions about the McMahon Line, withdrawal of old maps, strengthening of border posts, and continued cultural and political association with Tibet. A view had crystallised in Beijing that the Indian Government despite proclaiming to uphold anti-imperialism, wanted to continue British India's imperial and expansionist policies regarding Tibet and the boundary.<sup>59</sup>

For four years that is from 1954-1958, these perceptions continued to induce tensions in bilateral ties, even when friendly proclamations of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' and civilisational friendship were made. For instance, barely six-weeks after conclusion of the Panchsheel Agreement (April 29, 1954) in July 1954, the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs accusing that Indian troops had crossed the Niti Pass and intruded into the Bara Hoti area of the Tibet Region of China.<sup>60</sup> On another occasion, Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru during his visit to China in 1956, raised the issue of the boundary with Zhou Enlai, contending that the boundary drawn in the maps was not correct. Zhou responded by stating that the "Sino-Indian boundary problem is an issue left over by history....Once the conditions are ripe, we would produce new maps in accordance with the outcomes of the negotiations".<sup>61</sup> Similarly, during Zhou En Lai's visit to India the same year and in 1957, the issue of the McMahon Line was also discussed between Zhou and the Indian leadership in a vague manner, with both parties agreeing to resolve the issues on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. However, contrary to New Delhi's position, Zhou suggested that a new boundary will have to be demarcated and contended that it was necessary to maintain peace and tranquillity before the demarcation. The border dispute came to the fore in public view in 1958, when China published the news of completion of the road, just one year after Zhou's visit to India.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "India-Tibet Frontier." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 186–247. Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>59</sup> Dai, Chaowu. "China's Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962." *Asian Perspective* 43, no. 3 (2019): 435–57. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0022>.

<sup>60</sup> Deepak, "India and the People's Republic of China 1949-1959: A Decade of Mistrust and Diplomatic Manoeuvrability," 161.

<sup>61</sup> Deepak, "India and the People's Republic of China 1949-1959: A Decade of Mistrust and Diplomatic Manoeuvrability," 162–63.

<sup>62</sup> Deepak, "India and the People's Republic of China 1949-1959: A Decade of Mistrust and Diplomatic Manoeuvrability," 166–68.

A coolness in bilateral ties had set in by 1958. In 1958, Jawaharlal Nehru warned his foreign officials that ‘China was arrogant, devious, hypocritical and thoroughly unreliable.’<sup>63</sup> The publication of Chinese maps showing large parts of NEFA as Chinese territories evoked public sentiment, with the press and the Parliament urging the Government to take a firmer stand on the border.<sup>64</sup> The public discovery of the Aksai Chin road in 1958, news of Tibet uprising, Chinese probes of border and exchange of fire between Indian and Chinese troops enraged Indian public opinion. Chinese actions were deemed humiliating for they were seen as challenging India’s traditional borders, and thus, its statehood. Further, it was also feared that Chinese movements and incidents were precursors to a major attack on India.<sup>65</sup> Certain ministers from the Congress Party and the Opposition expressed doubts about the wisdom of recognising China’s sovereignty over Tibet and urged the government to take stringent measures to resist Chinese aggression at the border and called for military action by the Indian Government to evict occupying Chinese forces. Dr. Ram Subhag Singh from Congress benches demanded, that “If we are not succeeding in ousting that force...in sending our troops or reinforcements by road, it is our inherent right to bombard that territory.”<sup>66</sup> The misgivings had intensified in China, too, especially due to reports that Tibetan rebels were working in conjunction with the CIA and Kuomintang agents in Kalimpong. India’s non-negotiatory stance on the McMahon Line, despite Zhou Enlai’s proposal for negotiation, antagonised the Chinese more.<sup>67</sup>

The downward spiral in the situation in India continued from 1959 to 1962. The outbreak of the Tibetan revolt, reports of Chinese rejection of the McMahon Line, control of the disputed territories, and violent skirmishes with Indian soldiers generated bitter reactions in India. China was termed as a totalitarian and expansionist power that betrayed Indian friendship and posed an intense security threat to India’s territorial integrity. Reflecting this opinion, Indian newspapers contended that China’s entire claim on Tibet is based on “past conquests” and maps drawn by “Kuomintang

---

<sup>63</sup> Rao, “Borderlines,” 279.

<sup>64</sup> Jetly, Nancy. “The Initial Phase.” In *India-China Relations, 1947-1977*, 10–34. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

<sup>65</sup> Jetly, Nancy. “Tension on the Border 1959-1960.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 79–81. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

<sup>66</sup> Jetly, “Tension on the Border 1959-1960,” 95.

<sup>67</sup> Rao, “Buddha Jayanti: An Anniversary Remembered,” 256. Rao, Nirupama. “The Unravelling.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 306–9. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

imperialists.”<sup>68</sup> Further, in disregard of Indian friendship the Chinese had “stabbed India while smiling.” Indian President Rajendra Prasad, in a public speech, called Chinese actions a “breach of faith” after the support India provided to its cause.<sup>69</sup> In the course of Parliament debates, many members like Braj Raj Singh, P.K. Deo, Barua and Vajpayee referred to China’s encroachments on the Indian border as a grave threat to India’s security and challenge to India’s territorial integrity.<sup>70</sup>

During this period a strong anti-negotiation stance on the border dispute developed in the public arena. In 1960, Jana Sangh launched a campaign to mobilise public opinion against Zhou-Nehru talks. It argued that “we cannot allow Mr. Nehru to meet Zhou and sign a treaty of surrender.”<sup>71</sup> Any talks of negotiation without Chinese evacuation from India claimed territories were interpreted as appeasement and submission to Chinese aggression.<sup>72</sup>

A threat perception consolidated even within the Government that the Chinese could be attempting to coerce India into accepting Chinese claims through military and political manipulation. The threat perception was so entrenched that in 1960, the government moved to destroy old maps showing India’s borders as undefined as these maps were perceived could be used as adverse evidence against India.<sup>73</sup> The Home Ministry too at the same time issued a prohibitory order on buying or selling books from China dealing with the boundary question or expressing remotest doubts about India’s borders.<sup>74</sup>

Further, demands heightened for the use of force to deal with the Chinese. Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay, an influential leader of the Jana Sangh in the 1960s, declared that China should be given a deadline to vacate Indian territory, and then the Government must resort to military measures to forcibly push back the Chinese.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, P.K.Deo of the Swatantra Party suggesting that the government adopt military

---

<sup>68</sup> Jetly, Nancy. “Tension on the Border 1959-1960.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 79–81. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

<sup>69</sup> Parliament Digital Library. “Rajendra Prasad Address To Parliament: 8 February 1960,” n.d. [https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4029/1/prasad\\_08\\_02\\_1960.pdf](https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4029/1/prasad_08_02_1960.pdf).

<sup>70</sup> Jetly, “Tension on the Border 1959-1960.”

<sup>71</sup> *Indian Express*. “Anti Nehru-Chou Meeting Campaign Launched.” March 4, 1960.

<sup>72</sup> “Fifteenth Session Lok Sabha Debates (Second Series, No.15).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, December 7, 1961.

<sup>73</sup> Nayar, Kuldip. “A Diary.” In *Between the Lines*, 174. 1969: Konark Publishers, 2014.

<sup>74</sup> *New Age*. “P.P.H Statement.” June 5, 1961.

<sup>75</sup> Upadhyaya, Pandit Deendayal. “An Alternative China Policy.” Deendayal Sansar, January 11, 1960. <https://deendayalupadhyay.org/policy.html>.

measures declaring that “I think it is high time that the entire job should be entrusted to our gallant jawans and they should be asked to push out the Chinese intruders from the Indian soil and give them a destructive blow”.<sup>76</sup> During Zhou En Lai’s visit to India in 1960 even when Nehru and some of his colleagues were inclined to reach a settled negotiation with China, he refrained from the same for the fear of public and political reaction.<sup>77</sup>

Amidst rising resentment against China, certain sections of the Indian strategic community, while agreeing with the general sentiment of resisting Chinese coercion, warned against fear psychosis and war-mongering. The CPI in 1959, issued a press statement stating that:

“Under the Panch Shila India and China are under mutual obligations to respect each other’s territorial integrity. Unfortunately, however, a greater part of the northern border of our country has not been clearly demarcated. Moreover, the absence of any formal agreement between free India and People’s Republic of China in this matter is liable to give rise to confusion and misunderstanding. The recent incidents involving the border patrols of India and China have taken place in this background. The Secretariat of the National Council of the Communist Party of India fervently hopes that immediate steps will be taken by both the governments concerned to settle all controversies with regard to the border issue by mutual discussion. It further believes that there is no outstanding between our two countries which cannot be settled through friendly negotiations. Enemies of freedom and peace are exploiting these unfortunate occurrences to embitter the friendly relations between our two great countries”<sup>78</sup>. The CPI also contended that members of non-communist Opposition like the Swatantra Party and the Praja Socialist Party were advancing American interests and trying to use the border dispute for their own political gains.<sup>79</sup> Whereas, Nehru’s proposal of negotiation was reasonable and aimed at avoidance of war. Later, The Prime Minister himself argued that “We cannot take adventurist action which may land use in greater military or other difficulties”<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup> Jetly, Nancy. “The Widening Chasm, 1960-1962.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 146. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

<sup>77</sup> Upadhyaya, Pandit Deendayal. “Jana Sangh’s Call For Anti-Appeasement Week Reaction To Nehru’s Invitation To Chou.” Deendayal Sansar, February 29, 1960. <https://deendayalupadhyay.org/chou.html>.

<sup>78</sup> *New Age*. “CPI Statement on India-China Relations.” September 6, 1959.

<sup>79</sup> Ghosh, Ajoy. “National Council Reviews Work, Plans Future Tasks.” *New Age*, February 7, 1961.

<sup>80</sup> “Fifteenth Session Lok Sabha Debates ( Second Series No.7).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 28, 1961.

However, the majoritarian sentiment remained adverse to any reconciliatory stance on the border, especially with more news of Chinese incursion and death of Indian soldiers. It was opined that Chinese use of force on the border should be met by force, especially when the honour of the motherland was in question. Therefore, both to appease public opinion and to stem the advance of the Chinese claim line, the 'forward policy' was conceived in 1961.<sup>81</sup> Later, China claimed India's 'forward policy as one of the major reasons for the 1962 attack.

In China, India's objection to the Aksai Chin road, the outbreak of the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, and India granting political asylum to the Dalai Lama, hardened China's attitude towards the boundary issue. The Tibetan revolt was seen to have been instigated by Tibetan revisionists with the help of a section of Indian national bourgeoisie, encouraged by Nehru's government.<sup>82</sup> The Indian Government was also seen as provoking the border problem with China. The talks of using military force, sending more military deployments, and demanding withdrawal from Aksai-Chin to gain an upperhand, especially when Beijing was embroiled in Tibet. India's implementation of the Forward Policy in 1961 evoked a forceful reaction in China. Beijing considered that by using the Tibet conundrum, India intended to realise its territorial claims by force. In 1962, as India's manoeuvres along the border increased, Mao directed the PLA a more stricter presence across the border and prepared for a long-term armed coexistence.<sup>83</sup>

The period 1959-1962 could be termed as the phase of unravelling in the bilateral ties. The external impression of cordial and friendly ties waned away and was completely demolished with the Longju and Kongka Pass incidents in 1959. Diplomatic exchanges became antagonistic. Distrust and threat perception, on the other hand, became acute.<sup>84</sup> Against this backdrop the two meetings between the Indian and Chinese Prime Ministers and the meeting of the officials of the GoI and PRC in 1960 proved to be futile. The discussions where both sides accused the other of violation of the Panchsheel Agreement and of being expansionist and imperialistic revealed the wide difference in position of the two sides. New Delhi insisted that India's borders in the Aksai Chin region were defined by usages and customs while the frontier in the NEFA

---

<sup>81</sup> Jetly, "The Widening Chasm, 1960-1962," 149.

<sup>82</sup> Renmin, Ribao. "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy." *Peking Review*, May 12, 1959.

<sup>83</sup> Dai, "China's Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950-1962," 451.

<sup>84</sup> Rao, "The Unravelling," 286-313.

region followed the watershed principle, which is the standard international principle for demarcating borders. Further, past Chinese governments knew about the existence of the McMahon Line and never questioned it, amounting to tacit acquiescence.<sup>85</sup> China on its part rejected India's claims and argued that,

“[As] for the alignment claimed by the Indian side, it does not at all present any so called traditional customary line; it has neither been confirmed by history nor sanctioned by any treaty or agreement but is a line planned out by the British imperialists for the purpose of implementing its policy of aggression and expansion against China's Sinkiang and Tibet and which only appeared for the first time in 1954 on official Indian maps as its territorial claim”.<sup>86</sup>

The Chinese, for their part, argue that the border between the two countries has never been formally demarcated and that the McMahon line was an imperial imposition on weak China. Hence, India's proposal was unacceptable.<sup>87</sup>

The bilateral talks broke down at the end of 1960, with two powers rapidly militarising the border in the following two years. In 1961, India implemented the Forward Policy, which involved setting up of military posts, near its claim line and forward patrolling. China reciprocated India's moves by bringing in tanks and armoured vehicles, setting up military posts and conducting intense patrolling. Apparently, both powers aimed to halt the perceived encroachment by the other. India, on its part, believed that a strong and firm military positioning at the border would deter the Chinese from advancing and subsequently lead them to withdraw.<sup>88</sup> China, on the other hand, strategised that the best anti-encroachment policy was to strengthen China's front line of defence and launch a limited struggle to push back the Indian troops.<sup>89</sup> Correspondingly, sharp protest notes containing warnings and hostile media campaigns continued which dampened the political climate for negotiation or accommodation in both countries.

---

<sup>85</sup> Miller Chatterjee, Manjari. “PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations of 1960.” In *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, 55–81. California: Stanford University Press, 2013.

<sup>86</sup> Miller Chatterjee, “PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations of 1960,” 74.

<sup>87</sup> Miller Chatterjee, “PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations of 1960,” 56. Bhasin, Avtar Singh. “Nehru-Zhou Summit, April 1960.” In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 260. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>88</sup> Rao, Nirupama. “The Decline.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 391–98. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>89</sup> Dai, “China's Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962,” 451.

Finally, the Chinese launched a massive attack on 20<sup>th</sup> October 1962. The conflict continued till 21<sup>st</sup> November 1962, when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire. At the end of the war, the Indian Army was completely routed, the political leadership appeared to be shattered, and India's strategic vulnerability vis-à-vis China lay exposed.

The bilateral context from 1950 to 1962 points towards a gradual shift from moderate uncertainty and suspicion to intense distrust and threat perception. The web of domestic politics, post-colonial nationalism, ideological moorings, and conflicting interpretation of history created a complex scenario whereby both countries remained constrained to accommodate each other's perspective. Compounding this factor was the repeated failure of the two countries to come together and address the colonial legacy that surrounded Tibet and the border.

### **Reactions Abroad and Home**

With the onset of the border conflict with China, the Indian leadership faced extreme distress on political, diplomatic and military front. The Chinese offensive and India's military defeat triggered massive criticism of the Government of India's China policy and the wider approach of Panchsheel and non-alignment. At the same time, India continued to face military pressure from China. In the immediate aftermath of the declaration of a Chinese ceasefire, the Indian leaders seriously considered another attack by China possible.<sup>90</sup>

Sections of international and national audiences, who had been doubtful about the Chinese intention and the success of Nehru's policy approach, opined that this eventuality was caused by Nehru's policy of neutrality and failure to recognise the Chinese threat. Observers and commentators in the West exhibited the view that Chinese aggression was a vindication of Western fears against the communist bloc, and India's suffering was caused by her naïve approach to communism and refusal to understand the realities of power politics.<sup>91</sup> The American Magazine *Time* in an article opined, that:

---

<sup>90</sup> Pradhan, R. D. "Unveiling: Any More Secrets." In *Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65*, 172–73. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1998.

<sup>91</sup> Gupta, Sisir. "The United States' Reaction." *International Studies* 5, no. 1–2 (January 1963): 56–63. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088176300500106>.

“India is still a long way from giving up its passion for neutrality. But the country is now angrily fighting off the kind of attack that, when suffered by others in the past, Indians always tried to talk away with smug moral platitudes. At least some of the country's illusions about peace, war and Communism are beginning to fade”.<sup>92</sup>

Nehru's non-alignment policy was described as impractical and dangerous, especially in the context of the Cold War.<sup>93</sup>

English dailies in America and Western Europe accused Nehru of lacking realism and strategic foresight. For instance, *The Christian Science Monitor* opined, that

“If Mr. Nehru had been a realist, if he had accepted the offer of Pakistan President Ayub two years ago to form a common defence of the area against Peking, if some adjustment of the mutual conflict over Kashmir had been found and the troops of both sides released from their common frontier, the present Chinese attack might not have occurred.”<sup>94</sup>

Similarly, the German newspaper *Welt am Sonntag* remarked that that the West before supporting India, should draw lessons from the conflict about how freedom can be lost due to the naiveté of statesmen. Some expressed doubts over the future of India's role in international politics as India's military defeat had led to India losing in the game of power to China with its weaknesses and vulnerabilities exposed.<sup>95</sup>

At home, members of the Parliament expressed regret over India's “indiscriminate and excessive reliance on the professions of peace by the People's Republic of China during the last decade” and deplored “the utter inadequacy” of “arrangements and preparations for the defence and safety of our northern frontiers.”<sup>96</sup> Then President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, charged the government with “credulity and negligence”. The leadership was declared to be dreaming for years over the “terrific crisis.”<sup>97</sup> Further, it

---

<sup>92</sup> *Time*. “India: Fading Illusions.” November 9, 1962.

<https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,829317,00.html>.

<sup>93</sup> Mookerjee, Girija K. “Chinese Invasion: The West European View.” *International Studies* 5, no. 1–2 (January 1963): 90–95. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088176300500112>.

<sup>94</sup> Gupta, “The United States' Reaction,” 58.

<sup>95</sup> Mookerjee, “Chinese Invasion,” 94.

<sup>96</sup> Jetly, Nancy. “Invasion and Ceasefire.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 172–86. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

<sup>97</sup> Parthasarathy, G. “Lessons from the 1962 Debacle.” *BusinessLine*. The Hindu, October 24, 2012. <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/lessons-from-the-1962-debacle/article64598653.ece>. “Lok Sabha Debates, Third Session” Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 8, 1962.

was proposed that the government apologise to the nation for the defence unpreparedness, publicly acknowledge the mistakes made and reorient its foreign policy with greater vigilance against China.<sup>98</sup> Critiquing the government's initial reluctance towards war mobilisation, the leader of the Swatantra Party, Prof. N.C. Ranga, sarcastically commented at the government that "I am glad that although wise counsels on our side have failed, the Chinese have brought these things home to our Prime Minister, and he has been obliged to agree with the President in declaring this national emergency and taking the necessary steps in that direction." He also urged whether India should constitute a separate wartime leadership as is the practice in Britain.<sup>99</sup> Demands were also made to appoint a new Defence Minister as V.K. Menon was reproached for his role in India's lack of defence preparedness. It was opined that the Minister had purposefully rendered the military weak by hampering defence modernisation.<sup>100</sup> The Indian media linking the Indian military's defeat with India's Tibet policy, argued that the British policy of dealing with China was more realistic and that New Delhi "virtually conniving" to the Chinese occupation in Tibet lost India both political and military advantages.<sup>101</sup> Further, criticising the Government's policy line of Panchsheel and non-alignment, the media argued that that Panchsheel belonged to the dunghill of history and questioned whether neutrality could be maintained in the face of Chinese aggression.<sup>102</sup> Subsequently, in 1963, the opposition also issues a call for a no-confidence motion against the government.<sup>103</sup>

Implicit in these criticisms and censure was the loss of India's status at the international level and Nehru's loss of prestige both nationally and internationally. With the end of war in 1962 and the Indian Army's military defeat, New Delhi was seen to have lost its claim to leadership of the Third World/Global South. The military reverses lowered the prestige India had accumulated through its forceful diplomacy and Jawaharlal Nehru,

---

<sup>98</sup> "Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No. 4)." Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 12, 1962. "Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.9)." Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 19, 1962. Jetly, "Invasion and Ceasefire," 178.

<sup>99</sup> "Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.1)," 155.

<sup>100</sup> Khera, Sucha Singh. "Defence Ministers of Independent India." In *India's Defence Problem*, 76–77. Orient Longmans, 1968.

<sup>101</sup> *The Indian Express*. "Our Northern Neighbours." October 23, 1962.

<sup>102</sup> *The Indian Express*. "A National Government?" October 24, 1962.

<sup>103</sup> *The Indian Express*. "In Shadow of 1962 War Debacle, When Nehru Faced a No-Trust Vote," August 6, 2023. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/in-1962-war-shadow-when-nehru-faced-no-trust-vote-8878631/>.

who had been building his image as an advocate of peace and coexistence was humiliated diplomatically.<sup>104</sup>

On the ground, as the PLA demolished India's forward posts and forced the Indian army to retreat in NEFA and Ladakh, the military leadership collapsed. The higher authority issuing orders from Army Headquarters had little idea of the ground realities, and many hasty and rash orders were issued on the basis of assumptions.<sup>105</sup> Soon, a shortage of advanced and proper ammunition appeared. Consequently, confusion and panic spread. In the Western sector, the Indian posts were rapidly overrun by the Chinese, and the army suffered huge loss of lives due to a lack of ammunition and logistic support.<sup>106</sup> Reportedly, in the Western sector, the IV Indian Division posted at NEFA near the Sela- Bomdila, dissolved without a fight due to a lack of planning and leadership at the divisional and corps level.<sup>107</sup> There was severe disconnect in the military chain of command that cast B.M. Kaul, P.N. Thapar and L.P. Sen in very poor light. The government, alarmed by Chinese advances and anticipating a full-scale invasion established voluntary centres to enlist and recruit young men to fight and established a National Defence Fund, urging Indian citizens to donate to the country's war efforts. Further exposing weakness in the Indian defence preparedness in the face of Chinese onslaught, Nehru not only appealed to the US for an urgent supply of military equipment but also for the participation of American personnel for defence of the Indian heartland.<sup>108</sup> According to a very conservative official account published in 1996, the Indian Army faced 2616 casualties and out of these only 875 were attributed to enemy action. However, a more distressing fact was that the Chinese refused to

---

<sup>104</sup> Rajan, M. S. "India and World Politics in the Post-Nehru Era." *International Journal* 24, no. 1 (1968): 138–58. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40199979>. Lüthi, Lorenz. "Sino-Indian Relations, 1954-1962." *Eurasia Border Review* 3, no. Special Issue (2012): 93–119. <https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/50965>. Chauhan, Rishika. "Differences Not Disputes India's View of the Border after 1962." In *Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations*, edited by Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, 180–95. UK: Routledge, 2020.

<sup>105</sup> Dalvi, J. P. "Faulty Higher Direction of War." In *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War Of 1962*, 441–42. New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1969.

<sup>106</sup> Sandhu, P. J. S., Vinay Shankar, and G. G. Dwivedi. *1962: A View from the Other Side of the Hill*. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.

<sup>107</sup> Subrahmanyam, K. "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962." In *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, edited by B.R Nanda, 103–29. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1976.

<sup>108</sup> Hoffmann, Steven A. "Decisions of War, Diplomacy and Politics." In *India and the China Crisis*, 207. London: University of California Press, 1990.

return the bodies of the Indian soldiers who died in service beyond the Chinese 1960 claim line.<sup>109</sup>

As has been mentioned earlier, during the period 1958-1962, the memory alliance of civilisational friendship was discarded. Instead, China was accused of destroying the 2000 years of friendship by attacking India.<sup>110</sup> In the months leading to the war members of Parliament and the Press advocated that Chinese actions in Tibet and claims on the border exhibited their disregard for Indian friendship and goodwill.

### **The War: Narratives, Representation and Propaganda**

With the outbreak of the war in 1962, both India and China engaged in extensive propaganda that intended to create a controlled understanding of the conflict at home and export the same perspective abroad.<sup>111</sup>

In India, Government citing Chinese propaganda activities about the war within China and abroad instructed the Ministers and officials of the State Information Bureau to apply similar techniques and publicise India's account of the war to the domestic and international audience in a way that cast India in a positive light.<sup>112</sup> Also, Government officials were instructed to mobilise the press and bring them in "tune" with the government. Additionally, Government bodies requested prominent writers to contribute articles on Chinese aggression in the print media.<sup>113</sup>

The Indian political leadership projected the conflict as unprovoked aggression by China against India<sup>114</sup> and an event of great betrayal and humiliation. This narrative was publicised across the country through parliamentary debates, public

---

<sup>109</sup> Singh, Sushant. "A Border Move That Will Only Bolster China." *The Hindu*, February 3, 2022, sec. Lead. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-border-move-that-will-only-bolster-china/article38372591.ece>.

<sup>110</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "To Heads of Government 26/27 October 1962." In *SWJN October 1962-November 1962*, 79:627–28. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

<sup>111</sup> Chervin, Reed. "'Cartographic Aggression': Media Politics, Propaganda, and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22, no. 3 (2020): 225–47. <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/6/article/762896>.

<sup>112</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. "To State Information Ministers' Conference." In *SWJN October 1962-November 1962*, 79:93–119. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

<sup>113</sup> "From Ramnath Goenka to Mahavir Tyagi." In *SWJN, October 1962-November 1962*, 79:829–30. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

<sup>114</sup> Between 4 and 5 November National Development Council met in New Delhi. The agenda for discussion was Chinese offensive. At the end of the meeting a resolution was adopted stating that "Fifteen years ago we won freedom. Today the freedom is being threatened. The Chinese invasion is a turning point in the history of our motherland". See, Karnik, V.B. "Chinese Invasion and After." In *Chinese Invasion: Background and Sequel*, edited by V.B. Karnik, 212. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1969.

demonstrations, resolutions, press commentaries, media reports, officially sanctioned publications, and more.

Nehru, in a national address on 22 October 1962, delivered hours after the first Chinese attack, declared that India's efforts for peaceful resolution had been in vain as China endeavoured on unabashed aggression against India. He stated that:

“perhaps there are not many instances in the history where one country, that is India, has gone out of her way to be friendly and cooperative with the Chinese Government and people and plead their cause in the Councils of the world, and then for the Chinese Government to return evil for good and even to the extent of committing aggression and invade our sacred land”<sup>115</sup>.

Nehru's speech portraying India as the victim of Chinese aggression and deceit was reported widely. Major newspapers like the Indian Express, The Hindu, The Times of India published the whole or excerpts of the speech.

As the clash between the two armies continued, the narratives of betrayal, unprovoked aggression and humiliation were propagated more forcefully. In the Parliamentary deliberations, although the Opposition and members of the ruling party criticised the Government for lack of defence preparedness, the widespread consensus was forged through a resolution called “Proclamation of Emergency and Aggression by China that “in spite of uniform gestures of friendship and goodwill by Indians,” the People's Government of China “betrayed” the goodwill and friendship and the principles of Panchsheel. It was repeatedly argued that Chinese “invasion” was “shocking” and that while India championed the cause of peace and freedom everywhere, she herself became the victim of Chinese aggression.<sup>116</sup> Members of the Parliament claimed that while the Indians were saying Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai, the Chinese stabbed India in the back.” Nobody, has ever tried to invade us in this manner coming across the Himalayas from where nobody ever dared to come and unprovoked at that”. Further, China should be branded as an aggressor in the UN and UN aid should be taken to repulse Chinese aggression.<sup>117</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Menace to Freedom: Text of Broadcast to the Nation October 22, 1962.” In *Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression*, 1–4. New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1963.

<sup>116</sup> “Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.9).”

<sup>117</sup> “Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.1),” 135, 179.

Discussing Chinese motivation in launching the offensive, it was asserted that the attack was pre-mediated and intended to humiliate India to surrender and diminish her position amongst the neighbouring countries. The PLA's development of border infrastructure, setting up of military posts, transportation and training of troops in high altitudes were held as evidence of Chinese planning. Here, Indians were the helpless victim of Chinese aggression as India was neither accustomed to such "invasion" from the North nor did it expect such action from China.<sup>118</sup> The use of large-scale force against a small number of Indian troops was assessed to have been intended to humiliate India in front of the whole world and particularly Asia. As a counter to the Chinese "humiliation" of India, a section of Indian leaders demanded strengthening of defence alliance with countries who were opposed to Chinese expansionism.<sup>119</sup>

The narrative of humiliation gained further traction when the Chinese declared a ceasefire and offered to negotiate. Sections within Indian political community who urged the government to reject China's offer for talks opined that the Chinese declaration of ceasefire and terms of negotiation were humiliations imposed on a self-respecting nation. It was observed that China having proved its military superiority sought to humiliate India more by offering a unilateral ceasefire and resumption of diplomatic talks.<sup>120</sup>

In the wider public arena too the narratives of Chinese unprovoked aggression, betrayal, and humiliation were circulated. China was branded as an invader/aggressor and treacherous neighbour (who betrayed India's trust) bent on expansionism and compelling India to surrender to Chinese demands. Several protest rallies and public meetings were held across the country carrying slogans of "down with aggression" and "Hindi-Chini Hai Hai."

---


<sup>118</sup> "Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.1)," 211.

<sup>119</sup> "Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.1)."

<sup>120</sup> Varma, Shanti Prasad. "Ceasefire and After." In *Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations*, 174. Julunder: Sterling Publishers, 1965.



ngma\_del-ngma-16779-10446\_01\_h



*Protest Rally during Chinese Aggression, Photograph by Kulwant Roy:*

*Source: Indian Culture, Government of India*



Marching on: Students in Madurai protest the Chinese aggression in 1962 | Photo Credit: APPAR

Various organisations ranging from school bodies to professional, commercial, cultural and religious associations to larger organisations passed resolutions denouncing China as an aggressor and treacherous. For instance, Goa Shetkari Parishad passed a resolution expressing deep regret over “brutal aggression committed by the Chinese forces...It is a flagrant betrayal of trust and confidence reposed by our government and the Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru...in the Chinese Government. Likewise, Assam Sahitya Sabha, making donation to the National Defence Fund, termed China’s attack as a “great act of treachery” perpetrated against peaceful Indians. Another association, the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity passed a resolution (circulated to Asian and African countries) blaming China for engaging in pre-mediated aggression vis-à-vis India’s peaceful stance and termed the offer of negotiation as humiliating. Here it is noteworthy that Chinese Overseas Associations in Kolkata and Bombay also passed resolutions in November 1962 pledging unqualified support for the Government of India, condemning Chinese actions as unprovoked aggression by Chinese communists.<sup>121</sup>

Prominent members of Indian civil society noted that China wilfully misled India through its professions of friendship and evading questions on the border until it was militarily prepared to stake its claim. Further, China is a “ruthless enemy, armed to the teeth, whom, in our infatuation, we wooed and courted ceaselessly these last many years, has now unbarred its fangs and has launched a full-scale offensive against our

---

<sup>121</sup> “File No. 4(1)/62: Miscellaneous-Message from Different Bodies, Individuals Etc. on Chinese Aggression.” Ministry Of External Affairs, National Archives of India, 1962.

motherland” to militarily achieve its border claims.<sup>122</sup> The legendary editor of Times of India N J Nanporia suggesting Chinese duplicity remarked that the 1962 war for the Chinese was “yet a border skirmish in which the purpose of Chinese military activity is to " chastise " the Indian forces and compel them to behave in the spirit of Sino-Indian friendship.” He claimed that Beijing’s offer to negotiate is another form of aggression and part of China’s overall manoeuvre to pressurise India into accepting Chinese claims.<sup>123</sup> Concurrently, Indian national newspapers like The Times of India, Hindu, Indian Express and Statesman held China responsible for the border conflict and condemned China as the aggressor. Emphasising Chinese imperialistic motives to settle the border dispute by force, the newspapers projected China as a truculent and expansionist neighbour. China’s declaration of ceasefire and offer for negotiation were termed as insincere, since China had already violated the promises made under the Panchsheel Agreement.<sup>124</sup>

The Publication Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs also published a number of pamphlets like “Chinese Betrayal of India,”<sup>125</sup> “Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression,”<sup>126</sup> “India-China Border Problem,”<sup>127</sup> “Leading Events in India-China Relations,”<sup>128</sup> “World Press on Chinese Aggression”<sup>129</sup> to disseminate India’s version of the bilateral conflict at home and abroad. Posters depicting Chinese aggression, Indian victimisation, and patriotism were also commissioned.

---

<sup>122</sup> Limaye, Madhu. “The Sino-Indian War: The Road to Victory.” In *The Sino-Indian War: Its Historical and International Background*, 3–11, 1962.

<sup>123</sup> Nanporia, N.J. “How Firm Is Firmness.” In *The Sino-Indian Dispute*, 25–28. Times of India, 1963.

<sup>124</sup> Basu, Partha Pratim. *The Press and Foreign Policy in India*. Lancer’s Books, 2003.

<sup>125</sup> *China’s Betrayal of India: Background to the Invasion*. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1962.

<sup>126</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. *Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1963.

<sup>127</sup> *India-China Border Problem*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962.

<sup>128</sup> *Leading Events in India-China Relations, 1947-1962*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962.

<sup>129</sup> *World Press on Chinese Aggression*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1963.



With regard to the external audience, Nehru wrote to the Heads of State and eminent international personalities across the world, arguing that India had consistently adhered to tolerance and peaceful measures in the face of Chinese aggression. The Chinese, on the other hand, “have paid back evil for good,” as friendship with China had been India’s basic policy since her independence. He highlighted that India’s military measures were a response to years of Chinese aggressions as no self-respecting country, including India, could sacrifice her freedom and submit to aggression “whatever may be the consequence” .<sup>130</sup> Indian officials and diplomats communicating with external observers were sent similar briefings to convey that China committed unprovoked aggression in return for India’s constant friendship. Therefore, India was committed to resisting Chinese aggression on its own soil. Furthermore, Indian embassies in Western countries published and disseminated the Indian account of the 1962 conflict in the local language to give wider coverage to Indian version of events.

131

---

<sup>130</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “To Heads of Government 26/27 October 1962.” In *SWJN October 1962-November 1962*, 79:627–28. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

<sup>131</sup> “File No. 4(1)/62: Miscellaneous-Message from Different Bodies, Individuals Etc. on Chinese Aggression.” Ministry Of External Affairs, National Archives of India, 1962.



**Source: Invisible Histories “Coping with Defeat”**

**These images are copies from the Arunachal Department of Information and Public Relations (photograph collections for 1962, M 2625-2628).**

### **Conclusion**

The period leading to the 1962 war that is from 1958-1962, saw a rapid deterioration of bilateral relations. The political and diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries became extremely tense. The underlying tensions regarding the status of Tibet and the border dispute came to the fore and intensified distrust and misperception of each other. Both accused the other of expansionism and violating the principles of Panchsheel. The events in Tibet, skirmishes at the border and heightened domestic nationalism further deepened the cracks. Soon, the differences and disagreements magnified, turning into flashpoints. However, central to these occurrences was the failure of both countries to seriously acknowledge and address the complexities left

behind by imperialism. Instead, India and China ignored their imperial records and histories of expansionism and moved to consolidate and maintain the privileges or strategic advantages derived from the imperial policies of their predecessors. This, in turn, resulted in a series of silent manoeuvring against each other with China quietly consolidating its hold in the Western Sector and India's position in the Eastern sector. The evasive and unilateral policies made the resolution of Tibet and the border issue more complex as it induced mis-interpretations on both sides. By the time the two issues popped out in the open and severely strained bilateral ties, the governments on both sides were constrained by domestic political exigencies and ideological/historical perspectives. The conflicting views on Tibet and competing claims on the border drove the two countries into a collision course.

For India, the unravelling of the bilateral ties led to significant consequences on the domestic and international front. The outbreak of the war in 1962 and the Indian Army's dismal performance heightened domestic and international censure of the government's approach towards China and the lack of defence unpreparedness. Both India's international stature and Nehru's political reputation took a hit, political factionalism heightened threatening rupture of the country's socio-political fabric, and the country became extremely demoralised. Therefore, more as a mitigation strategy to address the multiple concerns, the Government undertook a massive propaganda campaign that painted India as a victim of unprovoked Chinese aggression. The war was portrayed as event of betrayal and humiliation, urging Indian citizens to unite against the treacherous enemy and resist aggression. Further, the narrative of Chinese betrayal and aggression fit well within the West's Cold War narrative of the threat of communist expansionism securing India's moral and material support from the West. In the later period these narratives shaped India's memorialisation of the war.

## CHAPTER - 3

### DECODING INDIA'S MEMORY AND MEMORIALISATION OF 1962 WAR

#### INTRODUCTION

Amidst the 1962 war, The Indian state produced a rather simplistic self-glorifying and other-vilifying narrative of the conflict and the related events to rally domestic and international public support for the Government. The narrative framed the war as a case of unprovoked Chinese aggression against peace-loving India. The nation was projected as a victim of Chinese betrayal and deeply humiliated despite its heroic resistance. Focusing on national innocence and Chinese perfidy, the propaganda narrative elided the intricate context of the war and assessment of the rationale behind India's political and military actions. Officially sanctioned narratives carried four major themes that is, the superiority of India's claims in the border dispute, Chinese misleading of the Indian leadership about their intention, the betrayal of 2000 years of friendship and India's goodwill and bravery and self-sacrifice of the Indian soldiers. The state also maintained a degree of control on alternative views. For instance, publications from China were banned, especially ones discussing Tibet and the border issue. The government also moved to scrutinise publications and views expressed by Indian and foreign authors which questioned Indian arguments and claims. Further, news of reverses was downplayed to prevent large scale panic. In the post-war period the Government limited the range and focus of investigation into causes of Indian Army's defeat and access of documents relating to the conflict, thus giving greater prominence to the state authorised account of the war.

The official narrative building exercise was important in shaping collective remembrance as well. This chapter first dives into India's collective memory of the 1962 war. Drawing from variety of official and non-official, political and cultural resources related to the war it explores the memory narratives which emerged after 1962. The chapter then focuses on four events that occurred in the second and the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to underscore the memory regime which persists in the national psyche.

#### **Official Initiatives: Shaping India's Memory of 1962 conflict**

Ideas like China launching unprovoked aggression on India, Chinese actions as a betrayal of India's friendship and trust, and the war as a testament to the bravery of

Indian soldiers, which were narrated during the war, were integrated into the memory regime. The narratives became institutionalised in public recollection through official writings, speeches, government reports, statements, commemorative structures, films and other mediums. The government undertook many initiatives in shaping public recollection of the 1962 war along these lines.

As noted previously, Indian political and military planners were severely criticised for their failure to foresee the attack and the Indian Army's defeat. Questions were also raised about the credibility of the armed forces, following news of soldiers' retreat in NEFA without putting up a fight.<sup>1</sup> The sense of demoralisation, disillusionment with Chinese actions, and lack of confidence in the Government, which could jeopardise the electoral prospects were pervasive.<sup>2</sup> In view of these factors, the Government of India, immediately after the conflict, intervened hugely to shape the collective memory of the 1962 war. The aim was to reduce the scope of responsibility of the government, alleviate the sense of humiliation from defeat, induce a sense of moral superiority and cast the nation and the government in a positive light.

The government, in order to shape popular understanding, restricted public access to classified information which could trigger a larger debate about the war. Documents related to policy-making during that period and investigative reports on the conflict were classified on the pretext of national security. Majority of the documents continue to remain so except a fraction of them, which were made available in the early 2000s. Therefore, for long, official pronouncements and selective range of documents/publications by the MEA and Ministry of I&B, which offered a white-washed and self-glorifying account of the 1962 war, were the primary materials available for public reference. For instance, a few months after the cessation of hostilities the Ministry of External Affairs funded ICWA journal included official pamphlets like "China's Betrayal of India", "Chinese Aggression in maps- Nine maps with an introduction and explanatory notes" and "World Press on Chinese Aggression", used during the propaganda campaign, as academic sources on India-China relations.<sup>3</sup> Notably, more

---

<sup>1</sup> Pradhan, R. D. "The NEFA Debacle: Enquiry and Report." In *Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65*, 132–60. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1999.

<sup>2</sup> Singh, "A Border Move That Will Only Bolster China."

<sup>3</sup> Devi, A. Chaya. "Indian Books of the Quarter." *India Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1963): 94–104. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45068279>. Devi, A. Chaya. "Indian Books of the Quarter." *India Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1963): 412–25. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070524>

than a decade after the 1962 war, these official pamphlets continued to be marked as scholarly materials for research in India-China relations.<sup>4</sup>

Concurrently, the state narrative was publicised by policy elites. Government leaders in public writings and pronouncements continued to emphasise Chinese aggression and perfidy. The Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1963, claimed that the Chinese attack across the Himalayas felt like a “wanton betrayal of India’s friendship”.<sup>5</sup> Same year the Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon who was publicly censured for Indian Army’s defeat published a book “*India and the Chinese Invasion*”, reiterating the official narrative:

“In spite of all the goodwill and services, both in friendship and international solidarity, that China received from our country and our people and in spite of our good neighbourly policy, this neighbour of ours has betrayed us. China has not only betrayed us, but she has also betrayed the cause of world peace and the progress of the peoples of Asia and of mankind”.<sup>6</sup>

Further, in a public speech to the nation on the Republic Day 1963, President S. Radhakrishnan highlighted China’s unprovoked and sudden aggression against India as a cause of the Indian Army’s defeat declared that:

“In pursuance of this policy we did our best to establish cordial relations with our neighbour, China. Even as we were attempting to resolve our border differences through peaceful negotiations and proposing a conference for that purpose, China, in violation of the principles to which both our countries have subscribed, decided to change the boundary by resort to arms. The large-scale attack on our frontiers took us by surprise. On account of our traditional adherence to the methods of peace and the habits engendered by it, we were psychologically unprepared for meeting this sudden aggression. Owing to the difficult terrain and numerical superiority of the Chinese, we suffered military reverses.”<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> “Selected Books and Articles on India-China Relations 1949-79.” *China Report* 15, no. 2 (March 1979): 119–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944557901500210>.

<sup>5</sup> Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Changing India.” *Foreign Affairs*, April 1, 1963. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1963-04-01/changing-india>.

<sup>6</sup> Menon Krishna, V.K. *India and the Chinese Invasion*. Bombay: Contemporary Publishers, 1963.

<sup>7</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. “A Year of Regeneration.” In *President Radhakrishnan’s Speeches and Writings (May 1962-May 1964)*, 86. Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965.

The government's annual reports about defence and external affairs also carried the official sanctioned record of events. In government reports of the MEA and MOD, the chronicling of events leading to the 1962 war conveyed an impression of continuous Chinese aggression in the face of Indian attempts for negotiation and peaceful resolution.<sup>8</sup> The 1962-63 MEA Annual Report, excluding references to Indian forward patrols and military posts in the eastern and the western sectors of the border, stated that since early 1962, the Chinese had started aggressive probing along the India-China border and rejected India's offers of withdrawal and joint use of the Aksai-Chin road to avoid military clashes. Blaming China for destroying all hopes for peacefully resolving the border dispute, the report claimed that while notes were being exchanged for discussions, the Chinese suddenly launched an offensive against Indian territory.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the 1962-63 Ministry of Defence report stated that the Chinese conducted unprovoked aggression against India across the Himalayas, which was hitherto considered peaceful and devoid of danger.<sup>10</sup>

The government also facilitated the publication of a compiled edition containing reprints of official speeches, statements and articles by the Prime Minister, President, politicians and other government officials. The compiled edition was dedicated to "the Indian soldiers who laid their lives heroically for the defence and glory of our motherland" on the Sino-Indian and was based on themes of "Chinese invasion" "treachery", "expansionism" "India's heroic resistance".<sup>11</sup> Claiming that the expansionist trait was not only limited to the Communist government but also extended to the common Chinese people, the editorial chapter claimed that China was out for a holocaust in Asia and that "China found Chiang Kai-shek too sluggard and unfit for her imperial designs and kicked him and his henchmen out of China. China wanted a real master who could satisfy her traditional hunger. This she found in Mao Tse-tung and his communist regalia".<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> "Annual Report of The Ministry of External Affairs for 1962-63 ." New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, January 1, 1962.

<sup>9</sup> "Annual Report of The Ministry of External Affairs for 1962-63," 27.

<sup>10</sup> "Annual Report 1962-1963." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> Rana, Satya Paul, ed. *Our Northern Borders: India-China Border Dispute*. Book Times Company, 1963.

<sup>12</sup> Rana, Satya Paul. "Winds of Chinese Expansionism." In *Our Northern Borders: India-China Border Dispute*, edited by Satya Paul Rana, 1-18. New Delhi: Book Times Company, 1963.

Besides literary documentation, the Government also encouraged audio visual and cultural documentation showcasing Chinese betrayal and India's heroic resistance. In 1963, the Government organised an exhibition *A Nation Prepares* marking one-year of Chinese attack.<sup>13</sup> The theme of the exhibition was Chinese 'treacherous attack on India'. Further, at the outbreak of the war, the government, to advance its propaganda campaign had instructed the Films Division to produce two films a week covering the themes of Chinese betrayal, duplicity and the nation's heroic resistance.<sup>14</sup> Post-1962 conflict, similar films like *The Chinese Threat, It Happened on a Saturday, The Great Betrayal, Shadow Across the East* among others continued to be produced till 1968.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, two movies *Rattha Thilakam* and *Haqeeqat* were released in 1963 and 1964 respectively. Notably, the movies focused on the battles in the Ladakh sector, where the Indian Army divisions reportedly inflicted significant losses on the Chinese side, rather than the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) where Indian military losses were considered disgraceful.<sup>16</sup> The movies produced captivating stories of battle hardships endured by Indian soldiers and fight-till-death spirits showcased in the face of tragic defeat. Highlighting their teamwork, comradeship and unwavering resolve to defend India's territorial integrity, the Indian soldiers were portrayed as valiant freedom fighters embracing martyrdom. Whereas the Chinese army was shown as the treacherous enemy engaging in brutality, mental games and deception by chanting "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" while attacking with superior force.<sup>17</sup> The films became widely popular and the Hindi language film *Haqeeqat* won the Film Award for the Best Feature Film in 1965.<sup>18</sup> Further, patriotic songs like *Ae Mere Watan Ke Logon* and *Ab Tumhare Hawale Watan Sathiyon* and poem collections like *Parshuram ki Pratiksha*

<sup>13</sup> Films Division. "Catalogue, Archives." <https://filmsdivision.org/film-catalogue.html>, n.d.

<sup>14</sup> Ray, Sandeep. "Frenemies on Film: Rescreening the Sino-Indian War of 1962." *Positions* 31, no. 4 (November 1, 2023): 769–801. <https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-10714259>.

<sup>15</sup> "Catalogue, Archives."

<sup>16</sup> *The Hindu*. "Rattha Thilakam (1963)." October 17, 2015, sec. Columns. <https://www.thehindu.com/features/cinema/cinema-columns/rattha-thilakam-1963/article7774391.ece>. The movie *Haqeeqat* was made with assistance from the Government of India. See. Unnithan, Sandeep. "China's 'Haqeeqat': A Stark Documentary on the 1962 War." *India Today*, October 19, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/1962-indo-china-war-50th-anniversary/story/chinas-haqeeqat-a-stark-documentary-on-the-1962-war-119161-2012-10-18>.

<sup>17</sup> Swami, Yogita. "Courage and Valour of Indian Army In Hindi War Movies: Study of Patriotism and Popularity in Post 1962 Era." Manipal University, 2021. <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/339625>.

<sup>18</sup> "12th National Film Awards." Directorate of Film Festivals, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, September 14, 2011. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Film\\_Award\\_for\\_Second\\_Best\\_Feature\\_Film#cite\\_note-12thaward-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Film_Award_for_Second_Best_Feature_Film#cite_note-12thaward-8).

were composed by eminent authors and aired on then *Akashvani* to convey India's victimhood and heroism of Indian Army. Along with cultural memorialisation, the Government erected commemorative structures. Here, too, the focus was on the Ladakh sector, rather than NEFA. In 1963, the Government erected a war memorial in the Ladakh, Chusul.<sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile, in 1963, when the State was shaping public memory of the war, the investigative commission constituting of Lt. General T.B. Henderson and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat also submitted its report about the Indian Army's operation during the conflict by July 1963. The report was speculated to be an objective analysis of events in NEFA and Ladakh and was critical of the political-military leadership. However, the Government classified the report, citing public interest and security concerns. Former Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, who was also Private Secretary to Y.B. Chavan, claimed in his book *Debacle to Revival: Y B Chavan as Defence Minister 1962-1965* that the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report was a "hot potato" and the government remained extremely careful in preventing any possible leak. So much so that the report was shown only to five individuals including the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and the President.<sup>20</sup>

Given the huge anti-China sentiment across the country, the notion of Chinese perfidy and unprovoked aggression was not challenged, however, debates intensified in the press critiques and the Parliamentary opposition about the role of the civilian and military leadership in India's defeat. Questions were raised regarding the planning and execution of the 'forward policy', identifying the 'Guilty Men' responsible for military reverses and acceptability of the Colombo Proposals. The Government's decision to not publicise the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report were seen as attempts to shield the guilty.<sup>21</sup> The charges of, 'betrayal' by the Government, of weak China policy and negligence of defence were reiterated by Opposition members. This criticism came

---

<sup>19</sup> The Wire. "Factcheck: Was the Landmark at Rezang La Dismantled as Part of Disengagement With China?". <https://thewire.in/politics/factcheck-was-the-landmark-at-rezang-la-dismantled-as-part-of-disengagement-with-china>.

<sup>20</sup> Pradhan, "Debacle to Revival," 140.

Prem Shankar Jha claimed in an article written in his blog in 2014 that that secrecy regarding the report continues to be maintained at a level that when author of the book "India's China War" published a part of the report, the website was blocked by the Government of India. Jha, Prem Shankar. "The Real Truth about the 1962 China-India War." Accessed May 12, 2024.

<https://www.premshankarjha.com/2014/04/14/indias-most-fateful-election/>.

<sup>21</sup> Jetly, Nancy. "Colombo Proposals and After." In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 220–23. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

largely from members of Swatantra, Jana Sangh, Socialist Party, PSP. For instance, H.V.Kamath, member of PSP accused Nehru of kowtowing to the Chinese and almost handing the country over from “white imperialism to yellow imperialism”.<sup>22</sup> H M Patel who had been India’s defence secretary in 1952-53 and was a member of the Jana Sangh during the conflict remarked in a public address in 1963 that India remaining silent on China’s occupation of Tibet “exchanged a friendly, peaceful and peace-loving Tibet for an expansionist, powerful and unscrupulous China as its neighbour. Further, Nehru’s hopes for a peaceful settlement with China kept the military unprepared for a conflict.”<sup>23</sup> Similarly, Ram Manohar Lohia a member of the Socialist Party, claimed that India followed a “foolish” policy towards China primarily because of Nehru’s beliefs and actions contrary to the lessons derived from history. He accused that by unhedged acceptance of Communist China, the Indian Government was guilty of crime.<sup>24</sup> Members of the Parliament renewed charges of Krishna Menon and Jawaharlal Nehru’s political interference in military decisions leading to defence weakness and military defeat.<sup>25</sup> The opinion which perceived the government’s handling of China and India’s defence also became part of the collective remembrance.

### **Retrospection and Remembrance**

Nehru’s death in 1964, the primary architect of India’s China policy and the country’s resuscitation from the sense of humiliation following the Indian Army’s decisive victory in the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 created a politically relaxed atmosphere to enable more extensive discussion on the 1962 war in a retrospective manner. Accounts and explanations of events and policies leading to the war and India’s defeat were published by individuals directly related to the policy making or were informed observers. While none of the works challenged the thesis of Chinese treachery and aggression against India, they blamed either the government or the higher military leadership in different degrees for the 1962 war and the cause of India’s military defeat. B.M. Kaul, in his memoir *The Untold Story* published in 1967, recalled that since Independence, the country’s defence needs and border infrastructure was widely ignored owing to the political beliefs of the leadership and inter-ministerial

---

<sup>22</sup> Jetly, “India China Relations, 1947-1977,” 216.

<sup>23</sup> Patel, H.M. *The Defence of India: R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture*. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics & Economics, Asia Publishing House, 1963.

<sup>24</sup> Lohia, Rammanohar. “Some Aspect’s of India’s China Policy.” In *India, China, and Northern Frontiers*, 225–44. New Delhi: Navahind, 1963.

<sup>25</sup> Jetly, “India China Relations, 1947-1977,” 219.

disagreement over defence expenditure.<sup>26</sup> While China treacherously attacked India, the political leadership swayed by the Opposition issued militarily untenable instructions, including the implementation of Forward Policy, often ignoring the warnings of the military officials (which was supported by Intelligence Bureau). This, in turn, led the poorly armed Indian soldiers with poor intelligence information from IB on a path of humiliation against China.<sup>27</sup> Given Kaul's previous political links and contribution in the decision-making the book was considered an authoritative resource and became a best-seller that year. Contrary to Kaul's versions were the books published by Cabinet Secretary S.S. Khera "India's Defence Problem"(1968) and Cabinet Secretary P.V.R. Rao's "Defence without a Drift" (1970). Both these books, while defending the civilian leadership, were critical of the army and held the military establishment responsible for failing to assess military intelligence and undertake requisite action.<sup>28</sup> Representing the views of observers outside the government, D R Mankekar, a veteran journalist in 1962 argued in his book, "The Guilty Men of 1962 War" (1968) that from Independence till 1962 was an era of 'Great Illusion'. The political leadership was guilty of misjudgement and complacency and misleading the nation to war. However, the military leadership was equally guilty for failing to provide frank counsel to the civilian leadership and undertaking swift action. Therefore, when the war came India was neither psychologically nor militarily prepared for the war.<sup>29</sup> Providing a more specific account of the battle at the NEFA, Brig. J.P. Dalvi, then Commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade in NEFA in 1962 and a PoW, wrote in his book 'The Himalayan Blunder' (1969) that the political leadership's decision to involve the Indian Army in border defence without additional resources made the bad situation worse. Further, the government overlooked signs of the possibility of armed retaliation by the Chinese to Indian manoeuvres and ignored the military's forewarning against the Chinese threats. He opined that political and military high command led the country to "ignominy" through political indecision, faulty military planning and imposing war on an unprepared and under-resourced Army.<sup>30</sup> Corroborating some of Dalvi's contentions, Kuldip Nayar who was Press

---

<sup>26</sup> Kaul, Brij Mohan. *The Untold Story*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1967.

<sup>27</sup> Kaul, *The Untold Story*, 480–81.

<sup>28</sup> Cohen, Stephen P. "India's China War and After: A Review Article." Edited by G. S. Bhargava, B. V. Karnik, B. M. Kaul, S. S. Khera, and P. V. R. Rao. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 30, no. 4 (1971): 847–57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2052995>.

<sup>29</sup> Mankekar, D. R. *The Guilty Men of 1962*. Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968.

<sup>30</sup> Dalvi, J. P. *Himalayan Blunder (The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962)*. Thacker & Comp., 1969.

Officer in India's Home Ministry in 1962, opined in his book *Between The Lines* that the political leader's instruction to the military to aggressively confront the Chinese across the disputed border without adequate resources and military preparation set them on a course destined for adverse outcome. Nayar also hinted that large scale dissonance in the Government regarding dealing with the Chinese on the border dispute and mis-assessment about Chinese seriousness to attack while implementing the Forward Policy were responsible for India's plight.<sup>31</sup> Probably, as a counter to these narratives blaming the Government's handling of the border dispute with China, B.N. Mullik published "The Chinese Betrayal: My Years with Nehru" which reasserted the official narrative<sup>32</sup>. Citing instances of friendly gesture, Mullick claimed that despite India's friendly policy towards China, "China conveniently forgot all that India had done for her and did not shrink from stabbing Pandit Nehru in the back, and tried her best to denigrate his position internationally".

In the subsequent years, more bureaucrats, military officials who had been associated with policy-making and the conflict or were close observers published their accounts, which highlighted the errors in political and military decision-making that led to national humiliation. Some of the notable works which came to be regarded as important for their insider perspective were Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt's "With Nehru in Foreign Office" (1977),<sup>33</sup> Division Commander in NEFA during the 1962 conflict, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad's "Fall of Towang" (1981),<sup>34</sup> Indian Charge de Affairs, P.K. Banerjee's *My Peking Memoirs of Chinese Invasion of India* (1990),<sup>35</sup> Director of Military Operations during 1962 war, D.K. Palit's *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis* (1991).<sup>36</sup>

These accounts, while making important revelations provided rich insights into the slants in political-military decision making, the beliefs of the leaders, domestic political imperatives and the complex bilateral environment that developed in the period pre-

---

<sup>31</sup> Nayar, Kuldip. *Between The Lines*. Hind Pocket Books, 1969.

<sup>32</sup> Mullik, B. N. *The Chinese Betrayal; My Years with Nehru*. Allied Publishers, 1971.

The author acknowledges in the preface that the encouragement for writing the book came from Y.B. Chavan, who replaced V.K. Krishna Menon. Mullik informs that the Chavan was concerned at some unjust and uninformed criticisms that were being levelled at the Government's handling of the security and defence matters during Nehru's premiership.

<sup>33</sup> Dutt, Subimal. *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*. Minerva Associates, 1977.

<sup>34</sup> Prasad, Niranjan. *The Fall of Towang, 1962*. Palit & Palit, 1981.

<sup>35</sup> Banerjee, Purnendu Kumar. *My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India*. Clarion Books, 1990.

<sup>36</sup> Palit, D. K. *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*. London : New York: Hurst ; St. Martin's Press, 1991.

dating the outbreak of the war. This, in turn, raises serious questions about whether the understanding and memory of the war could be confined to simplistic narratives propagated by the state.

By the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, two memory narratives had become entrenched in public psyche; the war as Chinese betrayal and the war as a debacle caused by political and military leadership failure. The official history published in 1992 by the Indian Defence Ministry recognised these two perceptual lenses. The official historical record on the one hand enumerated on the supposed political and military failures like underestimation of the Chinese threat, neglect of national defence requirements, civilian interference in military affairs and the army's failure to forcefully convey the ground reality to the civilian leadership, on the other it reaffirmed the notion that the 'origin of the Sino-Indian conflict lay in Chinese expansionism' which was advanced 'under cover' of friendly proclamation.<sup>37</sup>

It is noteworthy in this context that in order to boost the morale of the soldiers and mobilise support of the border population who had felt abandoned by the Army, especially in NEFA, the narrative of valour and self-sacrifice of the Indian soldiers began to be recalled at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The commemoration of military bravery was localised in the NEFA and the Ladakh sector. In 1999, a Tawang memorial was inaugurated by the then Eastern Army Commander Lt. Gen. HRS Kalkat.<sup>38</sup> Subsequently, more war memorials were constructed in the early 2000s. Amongst these, the Jaswantgarh memorial, commemorating rifleman Jaswant Singh Rawat, is especially famous as the memorial has attained the status of a holy site and 'Jaswant baba' is considered to be still protecting Arunachal Pradesh from the Chinese<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Sinha, P.B, and A A Athale. "History of the Conflict with China, 1962." History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992.

<sup>38</sup> Vinayak, G. "Special Series: 40 Years after the Sino-Indian 1962 War." Rediffmail. Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/29chin.htm#:~:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the,there%20is%20no%20such%20shortcoming.>

<sup>39</sup> Anand, Dibyesh. "Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory ." *Journal of Defence Studies* 6, no. 4 (2012): 229–48.

## **Two Anniversaries and Two Border Crises: Memory of the 1962 War**

Four particular events are important in this regard which underscore the complex memory regime which has evolved with regard to the 1962 war. The events are two anniversaries, which were commemorated in 2012 and 2022 respectively and the two border stand-offs in 2017 and 2022 when the 1962 war was recalled.

### **Two Anniversaries**

The 1962 war was commemorated at a national scale for the first time at its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2012. Then Defence Minister A K Antony and the Defence Chiefs from the Army, Navy and Air visited the Amar Jyoti Jawan, memorial to pay homage to the soldiers who died in the 1962 conflict. The defence minister in his press briefing, refuting the possibility of military reverses claimed that:

“I would like to assure the nation that India of today is not the India of 1962. Over the years, successive governments learning lessons from the past strengthened our capabilities and modernised our armed forces... we are confident armed forces will be able to protect the border in event of any threat.”<sup>40</sup>

The official commemoration was accompanied by collective recollection of the conflict, its causes, reasons for Indian Army’s failure and the lessons drawn. Majority of the discussions while maintaining the narrative of Indian victimisation by China, recalled the political and military failures, the national humiliation suffered and the sacrifice of Indian soldiers.

An eminent Indian policy expert writing in *India Today* recalled the “humiliating defeat” of the 1962 war and observed that the conflict led to the end of the Nehru period. Elaborating on the causes of the war, he opined that “1962 war was a consequence of Mao's need to reassert his control over the party after the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and to score off the Soviet Union.” Further, while there is the possibility of another 1962-like conflict due to Chinese assertiveness, given India’s present intelligence capabilities the element of surprise will not be there.<sup>41</sup> English

---

<sup>40</sup> India Today. “India Pays Homage to Martyrs of 1962 Sino-India War for First Time,” October 20, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-war-defence-minister-ak-antony-indian-air-force-119190-2012-10-19>.

<sup>41</sup> Joshi, Manoj. “India-China Relations after 50 Years of Sino-India War.” *India Today*, October 14, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/manoj-joshi/story/india-china-relations-after-50-years-of-sino-indian-war-118613-2012-10-13>.

news daily *Times of India* noted that ‘India needs to revisit the humiliation and admit to major blunders committed at every level, not least at the very top’.<sup>42</sup>

Certain eminent personalities also shared their memories. Recalling, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s warning to Nehru in 1950 about threat from China, B.G. Verghese, a veteran journalist who had reported from NEFA during 1962 recounted that lack of proper understanding of China, military unpreparedness and faulty strategic planning and finally political mis-handling of the border dispute characterised the pre-conflict period.<sup>43</sup> A former ambassador to China, K.S. Bajpai, argued that China made a fool of India as there was a lack of careful judgement and appropriate action on the part of the Indian political and military leadership.<sup>44</sup> Some of the commentators also opined India’s failure to use the Air Force to bomb Chinese supply lines as one of the major reasons for the worst defeat.<sup>45</sup>

Interestingly contradicting the blame of deliberate neglect, Indian journalist and retired Colonel Ajay Shukla contended that India’s “restraint and sensitivity and reluctance to use military force in establishing administration across the North East Frontier Agency -- as Arunachal was then called -- certainly won over locals to the idea of India, but it also contained within it the seeds of the 1962 defeat”.<sup>46</sup> Reaffirming this perspective and hailing Hindi language as a uniting factor in Arunachal Pradesh, a commentator opined that “Writers and historians say India lost the 1962 Sino-Indian war to the invading Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the erstwhile NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh, but not many people are aware that despite the defeat, Indian nationalism in the form of Hindi won a long-drawn war of language crisis in the state”.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Times of India. “India Needs to Revisit 1962 Humiliation for Catharsis.” Accessed May 12, 2024. [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-needs-to-revisit-1962-humiliation-for-catharsis/articleshow\\_new/16746349.cms](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-needs-to-revisit-1962-humiliation-for-catharsis/articleshow_new/16746349.cms).

<sup>43</sup> Verghese, B.G. “Fifty Years after 1962.” *Asian Conversations*, 2013. <https://www.asianconversations.com/IndiaChinaWar.php>.

<sup>44</sup> IANS. “‘Few Lessons Learnt from 1962 War.’” *Deccan Herald*. Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://www.deccanherald.com/india/few-lessons-learnt-1962-war-2366482>.

<sup>45</sup> Patabhraman, Lieutenant General S. “Fifty Years After the 1962 Debacle.” *USI CXLI*, no. 590 (December 2012). <https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/fifty-years-after-the-1962-debacle.html>. Phadke, Ramesh. “The Two Myths of 1962.” *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*. Accessed May 12, 2024.

[https://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheTwoMythsof1962\\_RameshPhadke\\_301012](https://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheTwoMythsof1962_RameshPhadke_301012).

<sup>46</sup> Shukla, Ajai. “India Was Whipped in 1962 War, but Won the Peace.” *Rediff*. Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-was-whipped-in-1962-war-but-won-the-peace/20121016.htm>.

<sup>47</sup> Sunil, Oinam. “India Lost War with China but Won Arunachal’s Heart.” *The Times of India*, November 1, 2012. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-lost-war-with-China-but-won-Arunachals-heart/articleshow/17039530.cms>.

However, lamenting that defeats leave a deeper imprint than victories, another commentator noted that Indians are so overwhelmed by defeat and debacle that the military feats demonstrated in the Rezang la battle by Charlie Company of 13 Kumaon regiment.<sup>48</sup> Writing on similar lines scholars and commentators urged that the country should not forget the battle of Rezang la.<sup>49</sup> Mohan Guruswamy, an eminent policy analyst observed that ‘in those dark days of 1962, Chusul became a matter of national honour’.<sup>50</sup> Reaffirming this perspective then Times of India bureau chief remarked that the war is remembered in Bomdila as an instance where the soldiers and the locals fought together against the Chinese invasion.<sup>51</sup>

During the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the focus remained primarily on recalling the failure in decision-making and national humiliation. A small section of the public opinion drifted towards recalling the betrayal and even a smaller section challenged the state narrative.

The next anniversary that is the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1962 conflict came when India and China were embroiled in a border standoff following armed skirmishes and death of 20 Indian soldiers in Ladakh 2020.<sup>52</sup> Political sensitivities remained high in India due to both bloodshed and because Galwan had been a point of confrontation during the 1962 war. A huge contingent of Indian soldiers remained deployed at forward positions and India’s external affairs’ minister S. Jaishankar claimed in press briefing that relations with China would not be normal without disengagement.<sup>53</sup> Here it is noteworthy, that unlike 2012, the collective commemoration centred around the

---

<sup>48</sup> Gupta, Shekhar. “1962, a Different Story.” ThePrint, October 20, 2012. <https://theprint.in/sg-national-interest/national-interest-1962-a-different-story/544059/>.

<sup>49</sup> Gupta, Shekhar. “Nobody Believed We Had Killed so Many Chinese at Rezang La.” The Indian Express, October 30, 2012. <https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/nobody-believed-we-had-killed-so-many-chinese-at-rezang-la-our-commander-called-me-crazy-and-warned-that-i-could-be-court-martialled/>. Bajwa, Mandeep Singh. “The Battle of Rezang La.” Hindustan Times, November 27, 2012. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/chandigarh/the-battle-of-rezang-la/story-yIbVEheR2d5S9Xe1bSfKYI.html>. Kumar, Anil. “Rezang La Stands Out.” Indian Defence Review, November 12, 2012. <https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/rezang-la-stands-out/>.

<sup>50</sup> Guruswamy, Mohan. “Don’t Forget the Heroes of Rezang La.” The Hindu, November 19, 2012. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Don%E2%80%99t-forget-the-heroes-of-Rezang-La/article12513562.ece>.

<sup>51</sup> Sunil, Oinam. “Bomdila’s Tales of War & Bravery.” The Times of India, November 13, 2012. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/bomdilas-theses-of-war-bravery/articleshow/17204212.cms>.

<sup>52</sup> Haider, Suhasini, Ananth Krishnan, and Dinakar Peri. “Indian Army Says 20 Soldiers Killed in Clash with Chinese Troops in the Galwan Area.” The Hindu, June 16, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-says-20-soldiers-killed-in-clash-with-chinese-troops-in-the-galwan-area/article61668218.ece>.

<sup>53</sup> Al Jazeera. “India Says Ties with China Can’t Be Normal with Border Tension.” <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/china-fm-india-surprise-trip-first-since-2020-border-clashes>.

narrative of soldier's bravery Indian soldiers and Army's resistance to Chinese attack in 1962 war. The official remembrance emphasised the heroism and valour of the Indian soldiers in fighting the Chinese rather than the Chinese victimisation of India. The Indian Army, instead of marking 20 October (which was commemorated in 2012), that is the day of the launch of the Chinese attack, commemorated the Battle of Walong in Arunachal Pradesh on 16 November and Battle of Rezang la in Ladakh on 18 November.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, a wreath-laying ceremony was conducted at the memorial of a declared war-hero, Major Shaitan Singh, involving General Commanding Officers from Southern Command and Konark Corps and high-level state officials.<sup>55</sup> The Indian government television channel, The Sansad TV, produced a television programme arguing that it was the Indian Army who taught China many 'lessons' and inflicted unforgettable scars on the PLA.<sup>56</sup> The MOD in a revamped Gallantry Awards website, published an account of the Rezang la war narrating the Indian Army's struggle against PLA under Maj. Shaitan Singh's leadership. The official claimed that the "The valour of the Charlie Company not only successfully stopped China's advance, but it also resulted in the Chushul airport being saved, thereby preventing a possible Chinese occupation of the entire Ladakh region in 1962".<sup>57</sup> In a symbolic gesture, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also visited Arunachal Pradesh in November, two days after the commemoration of the Battle of Walong and inaugurated a hydroelectric project in Kameng which was overrun by the Chinese in 1962.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Singh, Mayank. "On 1962 War Anniversary, India Fortifies Defence on LAC." The New Indian Express, November 21, 2022. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/Nov/21/on-1962-war-anniversary-india-fortifies-defence-on-lac-2520472.html>. UNI. "Indian Army Commemorates 60th Year of 'Battle of Walong.'" <http://www.uniindia.com/news/east/indian-army-commemorates-60th-year-of-battle-of-walong/2844061.html>. <http://www.uniindia.com/news/east/indian-army-commemorates-60th-year-of-battle-of-walong/2844061.html>.

<sup>55</sup> The Times of India. "Indian Army Pays Tribute to Hero of Rezang La Major Shaitan Singh," November 20, 2022. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jodhpur/indian-army-pays-tribute-to-hero-of-rezang-la-major-shaitan-singh/articleshow/95633213.cms>.

<sup>56</sup> Twitter X. "Sansad TV Heroes of 1962," July 14, 2022. [https://twitter.com/sansad\\_tv/status/1547445788833464321](https://twitter.com/sansad_tv/status/1547445788833464321).

<sup>57</sup> Gallantry Awards, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. "Battle of Rezang La," n.d. <https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/>.

<sup>58</sup> "PM to Visit Arunachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh on 19th November." [https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news\\_updates/pm-to-visit-arunachal-pradesh-and-uttar-pradesh-on-19th-november/](https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-to-visit-arunachal-pradesh-and-uttar-pradesh-on-19th-november/).



Source: Twitter [https://twitter.com/sansad\\_tv/status/1547445788833464321](https://twitter.com/sansad_tv/status/1547445788833464321)

The other discussions in the public domain followed similar line, that is, focussing on stories of resistance by the Indian Army. In the news media, the Times of India published a story on Havildar Shere Thapa of Indian Army who was claimed to have single-handedly delayed waves of assault of Chinese Army during the 1962 war.<sup>59</sup> The regional news daily *Arunachal Times* launched a series titled ‘Unsung Heroes of the 1962 war’ by a retired Group Captain of the Armed Forces accounting stories of foot soldiers fighting against the PLA to educate the readers about the ‘fierce battles’ fought by Indian soldiers to defend Indian territory.<sup>60</sup> The Print produced a short documentary featuring the memorial site of the Walong Battle. The documentary describing the battle as one of the ‘fiercest counter-attacks’ by the Indian soldiers, sought to project to the viewers a superior military acumen of the Indian army who were defeated due to greater man and fire-power of the Chinese.<sup>61</sup> In this context, a digital news platform *Wion*, highlighting India’s increased military prowess than the 1962 war, commented

<sup>59</sup> The Times of India. “60 Years on, Hero of 1962 War yet to Get Centre’s Recognition,” November 14, 2022. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/itanagar/60-years-on-hero-of-1962-war-yet-to-get-centres-recognition/articleshow/95499104.cms>.

<sup>60</sup> Pao, M. Panging. “Heroes of 1962 War in Arunachal: Havildar Govind Kamble .” *The Arunachal Times*, September 25, 2022. <https://arunachaltimes.in/index.php/2022/09/25/heroes-of-1962-war-in-arunachal-havildar-govind-kamble/>.

<sup>61</sup> ThePrint. *Remembering 1962 India-China War—60 Years of Battle of Walong*, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPtynctPWc>.

that although the war left a deep scar in India's military and political class, it is "no more an easy cakewalk now, and China knows this well".<sup>62</sup>

The 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary also saw increased demands for official commemoration. Lamenting the lack of larger ceremonial commemoration by the government of the 1962 war in the national capital, one commentator argued that 'defeat in the war cannot obliterate the valour and sacrifices of Indian soldiers in the face of heavy odds'. It was opined that in memory of the soldiers died fighting in the 1962 war, the government should organise a 'remembrance day'.<sup>63</sup> Another commentator noted that it is a myth that IAF was not used at all. Pointing towards supply and evacuation efforts of the IAF between two conflict zones, the commentator argued that the IAF had become the lifeline for supporting the posts which had been established under Forward Policy. Accordingly, the contribution of the IAF should be duly recognised.<sup>64</sup>

There were also calls for declassification of the archives, especially the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report. C Uday Bhaskar, Director of Society for Policy Studies and a retired military officer, argued that a total recall amounting to more public access to Henderson Brooks and Bhagat report is required to avoid old mistakes.<sup>65</sup>

However, contradicting the spirit of military heroism, some recalled the leadership failure and military defeat in 1962 war and urged the government to learn 'right lessons' from the 1962 war in terms of strengthening its defence preparedness and politico-military decision-making to manage Chinese aggression on the border.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Shrivastava, Anuj. "60 Years of India-China War: It Won't Be a Cakewalk for the Aggressor Again." WION, October 20, 2022. <https://www.wionews.com/world/60-years-of-1962-indo-china-war-it-wont-be-a-cakewalk-for-the-aggressor-again-527115>.

<sup>63</sup> Banerjee, Ajay. "Why No Official Remembrance of 1962." The Tribune, November 27, 2022. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/features/why-no-official-remembrance-of-1962-455165>.

<sup>64</sup> Bahadur, Manmohan. "It's a Myth IAF Wasn't Used in 1962 War. Helicopter and Transport Fleets Were Deeply Involved." ThePrint, October 23, 2022. <https://theprint.in/opinion/its-a-myth-iaf-wasnt-used-in-1962-war-helicopter-and-transport-fleets-were-deeply-involved/1179119/>.

<sup>65</sup> Bhaskar, Uday C. "Total Recall Needed to Avoid Same Old Mistakes." The Tribune, October 20, 2022. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/total-recall-needed-to-avoid-same-old-mistakes-443545>.

<sup>66</sup> Singh, Sushant. "Ladakh Shows That Modi Government Has Learnt the Wrong Lessons from the 1962 War." Scroll.in, October 20, 2022. <https://scroll.in/article/1035458/ladakh-shows-that-modi-government-has-learnt-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-1962-war>. Bhattacharyya, Abhijit. "1962 to 2022: No Lessons Learnt on Tackling China." Deccan Chronicle, December 16, 2022. <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/opinion/columnists/151222/abhijit-bhattacharyya-1962-to-2022-no-lessons-learnt-on-tackling-ch.html>.

## Two Border Crises

Two intense border stand-offs occurred in the second and the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century which witnessed large-scale recalling of the 1962 war.

The first border standoff occurred in 2017 when Indian troops crossed over into Bhutan and obstructed Chinese construction of the road at Doklam Valley situated at the India-Bhutan-China trijunction. The origin of the dispute lay in conflicting interpretation of the alignment of the Doklam Valley. China claimed sovereignty over Doklam Valley which, as per Indian media reports, is legally disputed between China and Bhutan. India, on the other hand, citing a 2012 agreement signed about the determination of the alignment of the trijunction contented that the road building as unilateral change of status-quo. Thus ensued a 70-day long border stand-off between the Indian and Chinese armies.<sup>67</sup>

The recall in India was triggered by the Chinese alluding to the 1962 war. The Chinese state media, Global Times, published an editorial titled “India will suffer worse losses than in 1962 if it incites border clash” and asserted that New Delhi needed to be taught “a bitter lesson” for trespassing into Chinese territory.<sup>68</sup> Further, then Chinese defence ministry spokesperson Col. Wu Qian implicitly referring to the 1962 war stated that the Indian Army should learn historical lessons and stop clamouring for war with China.<sup>69</sup> Responding to the Chinese comments, then Defence Minister Arun Jaitley asserted that India was capable of giving a befitting reply as “the situation in 1962 was different, the India of today is different” and then army-chief Bipin Rawat affirmed that Indian military was capable of fighting two-front war with China and Pakistan.<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>67</sup> Mitra, Devirupa. “China Disputes Indian Version of 2012 Understanding on Border Tri-Junction.” *The Wire*, August 30, 2017. <https://thewire.in/uncategorised/china-disputes-indian-version-2012-understanding-border-tri-junction>. Joseph, Josy. “What Is the Doklam Issue All About?” *The Hindu*, January 27, 2018, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-the-doklam-issue-all-about/article22536937.ece>.

<sup>68</sup> Global Times. “India Will Suffer Worse Losses than 1962 If It Incites Border Clash - Global Times,” July 4, 2017. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201707/1054925.shtml>.

<sup>69</sup> Joseph, Josy, and Atul Aneja. “Rawat in Sikkim as China Demands Troop Withdrawal.” *The Hindu*, June 29, 2017. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sikkim-standoff-china-asks-army-chief-to-stop-clamouring-for-war/article19180321.ece>.

<sup>70</sup> Singh, Rahul. “Army Chief Warns of Two-Front War with China, Pakistan: Is IAF Fighting Fit?” *Hindustan Times*, September 7, 2017. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-chief-gen-bipin-rawat-s-warning-of-two-front-war-with-china-pakistan-is-indian-air-force-fighting-fit/story-qVzPciHhNm6oDHfFliiCoN.html>. Financial Express. “Arun Jaitley Response to China Warning: India of 2017 Different from That of 1962,” June 30, 2017. <https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/arun-jaitley-response-to-china-warning-india-of-2017-different-from-that-of-1962/742933/>.

A significant aspect of the Doklam standoff was drawing analogies between the 1962 war and the Doklam crisis in 2017. This, in turn, sets the context of remembrance. An eminent policy expert contended that repeated threats and reminder of the 1962 war implied that China intended to wage war against India. Arguing that in the backdrop of similar international setting (Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 and North Korea in 2017) New Delhi should be vigilant as “China’s bullet-less aggression can rapidly turn into a full-fledged, 1962-style invasion”.<sup>71</sup> Additionally, a section of scholars opined that “that the crisis comes at a time when China is facing economic hardships at home similar to what it faced in 1962 and international insecurity (Chinese insecurity in the current scenario given Donald Trump’s ascendance to power, South China Sea dispute and hostile neighbourhood) similar to insecurities in faced in 1962 like increasing international isolation by both Russia and the US. Thus, another attack by China cannot be completely ruled out.”<sup>72</sup> In another instance, referring to the Chinese claim and building of infrastructure in Aksai Chin in the 1950s, it was argued that it has always been China’s strategy to target a territory, start building heavy infrastructure, project historical claims and then issue threats of withdrawal”.<sup>73</sup> The Chinese were argued to have opted for “suitable timing” for publicizing the conflict, drawing analogy with Chinese timing of attack in 1962. One commentator contended that Chinese timing of publicizing the impasse could not have been coincidental since China in 1962 had attacked when Nehru was in Colombo for the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference. Likewise, China publicized the deadlock in Doklam when Modi was in the US. Another commentator sought to identify Chinese intentions of 1962 with 2017, contending that China through Doklam, intends humiliate India for not participating in OBOR as it had had done when India was actively promoting non-alignment and hosting Dalai Lama.

The collective remembrance in India drifted towards recalling the humiliation India faced during the 1962 war in different ways. Certain sections of public opinion demanded that India avenge the defeat and humiliation of the 1962 war. A former diplomat argued that if an eventuality of India-China war arises then India should be

---

<sup>71</sup> Chellaney, Brahma. “China Wants War with India, Make No Mistake.” Daily O, August 16, 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/china-war-xi-jinping-doklam-18991>.

<sup>72</sup> Pathak, Sriparna. “Doklam Stand-off in Juxtapose to 1962: An Assessment.” *IndraStra Global* 7 (2017): 1–3. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5202805>.

<sup>73</sup> Sajjanhar, Ashok. “The Doklam Standoff - Should India Project Its Stand More Vigorously?” *Indian Defence Review*, August 13, 2017. <https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-doklam-standoff-should-india-project-its-stand-more-vigorously/>.

prepared to avenge the defeat and “reclaim some of the prestige and credibility that it lost on that occasion”.<sup>74</sup> Similarly, in a letter to a news medium, some of the readers demanded that India should think beyond action on the borders and strategize in economic and military terms “keeping in mind that this could be our chance to make up for the humiliation of 1962”.<sup>75</sup> Urging the government to stand firm on Doklam some commentators argued that the “myth of Chinese invincibility is a tale that belongs to an era gone by... India need not be overtly nervous about China’s jingoistic sabre rattling”. Further, “a military clash between two nuclear Asian giants will not be a replay of 1962.”<sup>76</sup>

However, a section of press and public warned against escalation in view of the uncertain outcome. An Indian Express editorial argued that while territorial problems are mainly of Chinese making, New Delhi should tread carefully as there is little to gain from escalation and much to lose.<sup>77</sup> Further, commentators pointed out that India while preparing for a war should avoid one as average Indians have been living with humiliated hearts since 1962 a possible repetition of this defeat would be unpardonable.<sup>78</sup>

Suggesting that the memory of humiliation could be a psychological vulnerability, it was also opined that China’s reminder of the 1962 war was a classic case of China employing psychological warfare against India to compel New Delhi to back down.<sup>79</sup> Clearly, China through its aggressive posturing, is seeking to take advantage of India’s

---

<sup>74</sup> Sajjanhar, “The Doklam Standoff - Should India Project Its Stand More Vigorously?”

<sup>75</sup> Scroll. “Readers’ Comments: If War Breaks out with China, India Must Not Lose the Chance to Make up for 1962.” Scroll.in, August 20, 2017. <https://scroll.in/article/847863/readers-comments-if-war-breaks-out-with-china-india-must-not-lose-the-chance-to-make-up-for-1962>.

<sup>76</sup> Masih, Archana. “China Standoff: ‘The Indian Army Should Stand Firm.’” Rediff, July 18, 2017. <https://www.rediff.com/news/special/china-standoff-the-indian-army-should-stand-firm/20170718.htm>. Gumaste, Vivek. “Why 2017 Is Not 1962.” Rediff, August 8, 2017. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-2017-is-not-1962/20170808.htm>.

<sup>77</sup> The Indian Express. “Face-off in Doklam,” July 1, 2017. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/kailash-mansarovar-pilgrims-face-off-in-doklam-4729849/>.

<sup>78</sup> Singh, Mayank. “Doklam Disengagement: Is the Dragon Crouching to Strike?” The Times of India, August 31, 2017. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/doklam-disengagement-is-the-dragon-crouching-to-strike/>. Kumar, Rajeesh. “Will the Doklam Standoff Lead to a Second India-China War?” The Diplomat, July 18, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/will-the-doklam-standoff-lead-to-a-second-india-china-war/>.

<sup>79</sup> Karnad, Bharat. “Eyeballing in Doklam or Free Pass to China?” *Security Wise* (blog), July 5, 2017. July 6, 2017. <https://bharatkarnad.com/2017/07/05/free-pass-to-china/>.

psychological vulnerability.<sup>80</sup> A former military personnel elaborated that the psychological warfare of playing upon Indian sensitivities of ‘1962 debacle’ is conducted to instil doubts in the public sphere and dilute India’s muscular approach.<sup>81</sup> Notably, the disengagement between the armies was hailed as a victory of India’s forceful diplomacy and resuscitation from the memory of 1962 war. One observer noted that “In many ways, 1962 remains a sore point in India's collective memory... India had, so far, found it impossible to break out of the redolent prison...It is here that Doka La may initiate a tectonic change in India's collective psyche. That we stared down a nation much stronger than ourselves adds to confidence, that we did it against China even more so”.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, another observer opined that under Modi’s leadership in handling of the Doklam crisis, the ghost of 1962 was ‘exorcised’ which had been repeatedly used by China to intimidate India.<sup>83</sup>

Three years later, India and China were again embroiled in an intense military stand-off at the Galwan Valley in May-June 2020. According to media reports scuffles had been taking place between the two armies in the months preceding the clash over patrolling points and setting of infrastructure. The fighting in June was triggered by a disagreement between Indian and Chinese soldiers over the establishment of tents and observation towers. There are different versions of who attacked first and the official sources in India and China accused each other of breaching the LAC. Following the clashes, which led to the death of soldiers on both sides, the diplomatic and military posturing between the two countries became more intense. Thousands of troops, armoured vehicles and military equipment were deployed by India and China in

---

<sup>80</sup> Sarathy, VRP. “Twice-Decorated Army War Veteran Decodes Doklam Standoff.” Daily O, August 17, 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/doklam-standoff-india-china-ties-bhutan-1962-war-cag-indian-army-sikkim-pakistan-19015>.

<sup>81</sup> Bahadur, Manmohan. “We Are Not in 1962 and We Are Militarily Strong, but India Can’t Afford a Piecemeal Approach to Doklam Style Events.” The Times of India, July 7, 2017. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/we-are-not-in-1962-and-we-are-militarily-strong-but-india-cant-afford-a-piecemeal-approach-to-doklam-style-events/>.

<sup>82</sup> Talukdar, Sreemoy. “Beyond Doka La: India Finally Breaks Free of China’s 1962 Prison; This May Change Asia’s Power Matrix.” Firstpost, August 31, 2017. <https://www.firstpost.com/india/beyond-doka-la-india-finally-breaks-free-of-chinas-1962-prison-this-may-change-asias-power-matrix-3991425.html>.

<sup>83</sup> Singh, Ajay. “With Doklam, Modi Has Exorcised the Ghost of 1962.” Governance Now, August 29, 2017. <https://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/with-doklam-modi-has-exorcised-the-ghost-of-1962>.

forward positions. Three years have passed, the two countries have not disengaged fully.<sup>84</sup>

One of the major factors that appeared to trigger the recalling of the conflict was the fact that Galwan Valley was a flashpoint too during the 1962 war. Various news media outlets and policy commentators recounted the skirmishes which had occurred in the Galwan Valley in 1959 and that the Galwan Valley post was one of the first posts to be outrun by the Chinese troops. The Indian Express re-published its archives from 1962 to exhibit the tensions which unfolded in the Galwan Valley region before the outbreak of the war.<sup>85</sup>



The recalling of the war was accompanied by drawing of analogies between the pre-conflict period of 1962 and the Galwan valley clash. Certain observers noted that the pattern of Chinese incursion into Galwan and the Modi leadership's statements about resisting China are similar to that of 1962.<sup>86</sup> Also, the Chinese can be expected to return with bigger forces to attack Indian positions as had happened during the 1962 war.<sup>87</sup> Another commentator noted that the rhetoric and exchanges between India and China in

<sup>84</sup> Kumar, Ankit. "Exclusive: Satellite Images Show Galwan Standoff Intensifying." India Today, June 24, 2020.

<https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/exclusive-satellite-images-show-galwan-standoff-intensifying-1692325-2020-06-24>.

<sup>85</sup> Indian Express. "Explained: In Archives, Reminder of Galwan in 1962 before the Echo in 2020," July 11, 2020.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20200711022836/https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-lac-border-dispute-galwan-valley-clashes-6498462/>.

<sup>86</sup> *Indo-China Standoff: 1962 like Situation or a Short Kargil like Conflict, Where Are We Headed For?* The Economic Times, 2020. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFDTTVYEz\\_Q](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFDTTVYEz_Q).

<sup>87</sup> Krishnaswamy, Srinivasapuram. "Chinese Threat Is Unlikely to Go Away. India Needs Big Plans for LAC to Save Its Land." ThePrint, July 12, 2020. <https://theprint.in/opinion/chinese-threat-is-unlikely-to-go-away-india-needs-big-plans-for-lac-to-save-its-land/459105/>.

the months before the 1962 war were almost identical to the exchanges between India and China in 2020.<sup>88</sup> These discussions also led to speculations whether the tensions would lead to 1962 like conflict.

During the tense stand-off and negotiations, the memory of betrayal and humiliation was both recalled. The Chief Minister of Uttarakhand expressed to the media that the way China attacked Indian soldiers in Galwan was a repeat of the 1962 war and China again betrayed us by attacking when peace dialogues were in process.<sup>89</sup> Similarly, a former Commander of the Indian Army's Northern Command argued that the clash was not a skirmish "but a premeditated, treacherous and deceitful assault by the PLA on an unsuspecting Patrol of 16 Bihar, monitoring the staging back of the PLA to their side of the LAC".<sup>90</sup> Another army personnel warned that while China has stabbed India in the back again (first time was in 1962) it might persist in the near future.<sup>91</sup> Alluding to Chinese betrayal of Nehru in 1962, few commentators observed that India has always erred in analysis of Chinese intent and that Modi also learnt the same lesson as Nehru learned in 1962 that "There can be no appeasement of China in service of the naïve belief that China would not put its strategic interests first".<sup>92</sup> Referring to the death of Colonel Santosh Babu, a retired veteran claimed that a commanding officer being clubbed to death was deeply humiliating for the Indian Army.<sup>93</sup> Accordingly, the government was urged by a section of the public opinion to give a "befitting reply" "hold ground" to "Chinese bullying" meant to humiliate India. A retired colonel argued

---

<sup>88</sup> Patranobis, Sutirtho. "Ladakh Sector's Galwan Valley and Its History in Sino-India Relations." *Hindustan Times*, May 20, 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/when-india-and-china-clashed-in-ladakh-s-galwan-valley-weeks-before-1962-war/story-kjcsT7ILMvbizOriFuI7L.html>.

<sup>89</sup> The Indian Express. "China Betrayed Us, Repeated 1962: Uttarakhand CM," June 18, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/china-betrayed-us-repeated-1962-uttarakhand-cm-trivendra-singh-rawat-6464036/>.

<sup>90</sup> Parnaik, K. T. "The Galwan Syndrome." *The Times of India*, June 29, 2020. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/the-galwan-syndrome/>.

<sup>91</sup> Katoch, Prakash. "Don't Ever Trust China." *Indian Defence Review* (blog), June 26, 2020. <https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/dont-ever-trust-china/>.

<sup>92</sup> Bhaskar, Uday C. "From 1962 to 2020, India's China Error." *Hindustan Times*, October 19, 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/from-1962-to-2020-india-s-china-error-analysis/story-2x1ACo1KvSJUSEz6zjTC7H.html>. Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. "Why India Needs to Draw the Line With China: The Geopolitics of the Sino-Indian Skirmish." *The Diplomat*, June 23, 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/why-india-needs-to-draw-the-line-with-china-the-geopolitics-of-the-sino-indian-skirmish/>.

<sup>93</sup> Siddiqui, Imran Ahmed. "Veterans Demand Answers." *The Telegraph Online*, June 20, 2020. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/india-china-clash-veterans-demand-answers/cid/1782231>.

that “China has been a bully in the region. It is time that India takes a bold stand and hold its ground. They cannot browbeat us and we need to show them that”.<sup>94</sup>

### **Conclusion: Remembering and forgetting the 1962 war**

This chapter finds several key aspects to India’s collective memories centred on the traumatic experience of the humiliating defeat in the 1962 War. First, the fabled narrative of civilisation friendship and ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ was used to emphasise Chinese unethical behaviour. In this context, it needs to be noted that hardly any significant friendship existed between the two countries. The contacts between Indian and Chinese empires were not extensive and the phase of interaction between Indian and Tibetan/Chinese Buddhist scholars was brief and did not pervade into significant people to people and cultural contacts. The economic contacts too did not originate in India or China, but were part of large economic connections between South, South East, East Asia and European Powers. Therefore, for a prolonged period of time both India and China were not aware of each other to form a deep understanding. The concept of ‘civilisation friendship’ was a memory frame and ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ was a political line evoked for political ends. While the Indian policy elites were aware of the fabrication as they discussed in private about the conflict and competition underlying the bilateral ties and the expansionist nature of the Chinese empires, in public, this narrative was used to convey more forcefully Chinese transgression.

Second, the memory building highlighted Chinese duplicity regarding raising the border dispute and rejection of the McMahon Line at a later stage and silently building the road through Aksai Chin. It is true that the Chinese while being aware of India’s position on the border and McMahon Line went for consolidating their hold on Tibet before objecting to India’s stance. The Chinese leadership either remained evasive or postponed discussion on these issues in both formal and informal meetings. However, the fact also remains that during this period Chinese actions were mirrored by New Delhi. India had always been aware of the Tibetan and Chinese rejection of McMahon Line and the lack of a ‘defined’ boundary between the two countries. The Tibetans in 1938 had expressed ignorance of the 1914 Simla Convention and immediately after India’s independence had demanded return of the territories along the McMahon Line

---

<sup>94</sup> Jha, Prashant. “China Sees Itself as a Superpower, Can’t Be Trusted: Veterans of 1962.” The Times of India, June 18, 2020. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-sees-itself-as-a-superpower-cant-be-trusted-veterans-of-1962/printarticle/76438335.cms>.

and beyond.<sup>95</sup> The Republic of China too towards the end of its regime had sought a treaty with India to regulate commercial relations between India and China that would contain the provision of redefinition of the boundaries between the two countries. This demand was then rejected by New Delhi.<sup>96</sup> Further, India herself was reluctant to open the border and the McMahon issue for discussion with the Chinese fearing demand for revision. Before commencement of the 1954 negotiations, it was decided that if the Chinese raised the border issue, Indian envoys would immediately break off the talks and if the Chinese remained silent that would be taken as their acceptance of the existing border alignment.<sup>97</sup> Some of the other important aspects were also conveniently sidelined. First, that the McMahon Line was not discussed between British India, Tibet and China during the 1914 Simla Convention but was decided separately between British India and Tibet without Chinese knowledge. There are conflicting accounts on whether the Qing government knew about the McMahon Line and the outcome of the Simla Conference, however, it is documented that the Chinese did not agree to the Article 9 of the Simla Convention stating the boundaries between Tibet-China and India-Tibet and due to Chinese refusal to sign the Agreement the British Foreign Office considered the conference abortive.<sup>98</sup> Second, India's maps since independence till 1955 showed the western sector (Aksai Chin) as 'Undefined' and northern border was shown as McMahon Line. Later, when new maps were issued to show absolute demarcation of the Indian territory, New Delhi without waiting for survey results endorsed the line most favourable to India.<sup>99</sup> Finally, the building of road should not have come as a surprise as the IB since 1952 was reporting that the Chinese were building a jeep track from Yarkand to Tibet via Aksai Chin and in 1955 an Indian Trade Agent in Gartok, Laxman Singh Jangpangi had sent a detailed report to the Ministry of External Affairs about the same.<sup>100</sup>

Third, the bandaging over past and obsession over humiliation also induced nation-wide amnesia regarding the bitter and anti-negotiatory stance which had developed within and outside the government along with calls for military action against China. In

---

<sup>95</sup> Gupta, Sonika. "Frontiers in Flux: Indo-Tibetan Border: 1946–1948." *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 77, no. 1 (March 2021): 42–58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928420983095>.

<sup>96</sup> Rao, Nirupama. "Top of the World." In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 26–64. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2022.

<sup>97</sup> Following the signing of the 1954 Agreement, the press perception was that with the signing of this Agreement, India had secured Chinese affirmation of the McMahon Line. Chinese silence was construed in the public sphere as Chinese acceptance of McMahon Line. See, the chapter "India-China Agreement on Tibet" in "Nehru Tibet and China", by A.S. Bhasin

<sup>98</sup> Gupta, Karunakar. "Distortions in the History of Sino-Indian Frontiers." *Economic and Political Weekly* 15, no. 30 (1980): 1265–70. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4368898>.

<sup>99</sup> Bhasin, "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective."

<sup>100</sup> Rao, "Borderlines," 271.

the early 1959, Indian public opinion was inflamed with the events in Tibet. Demonstrations were staged outside the Chinese embassy in New Delhi and protest marches and processions were held in many cities across major cities. The Opposition pressured the government to hold discussion sessions to condemn Chinese actions and urge the government to reconsider India-China friendship. Prominent Indian leaders like J.P. Narayan, Acharya Kriplani, Hem Barua made demands to the Government to sponsor Tibet's case in the United Nations. Former Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee then a young leader in Jana Sangh urged the government to militarily intervene on behalf of Tibet. Similarly on the publication of the news of Tibetan highway, the Government was urged to take "immediate and effective steps to make the Chinese withdraw". Evoking the notion of national honour certain section argued that although the Government is wedded to the peaceful methods, however, it ought to defend every inch of territory even if it involved use of force. However, some of the suggestions to the government were more blunt calling for involving the army in defence of the borders and bombardment of areas to "throw the Chinese out". The news of the clashes and death of Indian soldiers increased clamours for revenge and military action against China. Any conciliatory approach by the Government was termed as "appeasement". Some of Nehru's close political advisors in the Cabinet and the military remained strongly disposed against talks with the Chinese. Reportedly, during the Nehru-Zhou talks in 1960, the former was under tremendous pressure from his Cabinet members to not concede to any Chinese demands.<sup>101</sup> A CIA report on India-China border dispute noted that in the period between 1961-1962, Nehru was pressurised by the Opposition, Press and by the members of his own party to take steps to "recover" territory from China. Indian Army leaders, discounting possibility of major Chinese retaliation pressed Nehru for an unbending attitude and authority to push back the Chinese.<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Jetly, "Tension on the Border 1959-1960."

<sup>102</sup> "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section III 1961-62." CIA, May 2007.

**CHAPTER - 4**  
**REMEMBERING 1962: WAR MEMORY AND INDIA'S TRUST DEFICIT**  
**WITH CHINA**  
**INTRODUCTION**

In the past seven decades since the 1962 conflict the memory of national humiliation has emerged dominant in the collective psyche of the Indian strategic community. Although China is occasionally accused of violating the Panchsheel and two millennia of friendship, references to the Indian Army's defeat, the political leadership's powerlessness, the debacle in NEFA and national humiliation dominate the remembrance discourse on the war within the Indian strategic community. This trend has figured prominently in memoirs and observer accounts, scholarly and political debates and Indian news media discussions associated with the war. The Indian strategic community rather than reflecting deeply on Chinese betrayal, has more intensely recalled the politico-military humiliation faced by the country. Elaborating on how Indian political and defence structures failed to resist Chinese aggression against India, the remembrance has focused on military reverses faced in NEFA and Ladakh and the consequent national embarrassment.<sup>1</sup>

Comparatively, recalling of betrayal has been occasional and associated largely with Nehru. The official propaganda about the war and Nehru's own statements though projected the war as a Chinese betrayal later Indian accounts and scholarly works on the war that emerged across five decades since 1962 challenged this narrative as they highlighted sufficient availability of information and awareness about Chinese threat within the Indian policy-making. Therefore, instead of the entire political and military leadership, only Nehru is understood or said to have been betrayed by China<sup>2</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> Further, citing the scale of Chinese attack, military preparedness and Beijing's statements about "teaching India a lesson", it is contended that the Chinese launched a pre-mediated attack to humiliate India and diminish New Delhi's position within the Afro-Asian community.

<sup>2</sup>Chellaney, Brahma. "India, the Lamb State." Rediff, June 2, 2004.

<https://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/02spec1.htm>. Rana, Kishan S. "Scarred by War, Nehru Destroyed Message from Zhou." Rediff, October 22, 2012.

<https://www.rediff.com/news/column/scarred-by-war-nehru-destroyed-message-from-zhou/20121022.htm>. Chaubey, Santosh. "When China's Mao Zedong Wanted to Crush Jawaharlal Nehru Alleging Indian Interference in Tibet." India Today, August 5, 2017.

<https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-mao-zedong-jawaharlal-nehru-india-tibet-nikita-khrushchev-doklam-standoff-1028190-2017-08-05>.

Recalling Nehru's legacy during his 40<sup>th</sup> death anniversary, Brahma Chellaney recounted that Nehru felt so betrayed by the Chinese attack that he admitted "living in a fool's paradise". Further, the shock Nehru received due to the attack hastened his death. Senior diplomat Kishan S Rana, writing during the 50<sup>th</sup>

Given the prominence of the humiliation narrative in Indian memorialisation, the chapter analyses what is the impact of remembering humiliation on India's trust-deficit vis-à-vis China. The attempt to analyse India's mistrust towards China through the mnemonic lens does not discredit the more material and tangible sources of mistrust in bilateral ties. On the contrary, this analysis strives to understand how ideas amplify or complement the effect of material and tangible sources.

The chapter addresses the question of why, despite years of engagement and confidence building measures in the post-1962 period, India continues to harbour distrust towards China and what is the role of memory in this regard. The chapter is divided into three sections: it first provides an overview of India's distrust of China. The section discusses various instances where Indian policymakers and leaders have expressed their distrust of China and have demonstrated it through policies and actions. The second section delves into the sources or the material factors considered to be the cause of India's distrust towards China. This section elaborates on how the unresolved border dispute, growing geopolitical ambitions between the two countries, military-economic power asymmetry and third-party ties induce India's suspicion towards China. Finally, the chapter looks into what is the role of remembering humiliation in sustaining India's distrust towards China.

### **India's Distrust towards China**

As has been discussed in the previous chapters, India's leadership had begun expressing distrust towards China since the 1950s. As discussed in the previous chapters, many instances like Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's famous letter to Nehru in 1949 warning about Chinese expansionism, Nehru's discussions with Congress Chief Ministers, senior diplomats and military officers regarding need of maintaining a firm attitude with the Chinese, India's signing of treaty of friendship with Nepal in 1950 on the eve of Chinese occupation of Tibet and annexation of Tawang in 1951 reflected the considerable distrust of the Chinese. India's mistrust heightened and became more explicit and public in 1958 when the border dispute came to the fore. In the press and Parliament, China was argued to have stabbed India in the back by raising the border

---

anniversary of the war argued that the 'scars of 1962 war ran deep for Nehru' so much so that Chinese efforts to engage India in a political dialogue in Nehru's lifetime failed (Rana 2012). On another occasion of the 2017 Doklam crisis, a commentator recalling the 1962 war wrote in *India Today* that "It is consensus in India that China backstabbed first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in spite of his friendly stand that believed the Indian and the Chinese were brothers (Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai)."

issue after the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement. New Delhi constituted the Border Roads Organisation in 1960 to secure India's borders and build infrastructure in remote areas for military use, Nehru instructed his diplomats to China to not trust the Chinese leadership and undertook a more assertive stance towards border patrolling, eventually leading to the implementation of Forward Policy. After the 1962 war, India publicly declared that trust towards China had been completely eroded. PM Nehru, in an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, four months after the war, stated that "China's behaviour toward us has shown such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behaviour that it has shaken severely our confidence in her good faith. We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with profoundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions".<sup>3</sup>

Over the years, as the two countries moved towards normalisation of bilateral ties, New Delhi's deep distrust of China remained a constant factor. Here, it is noteworthy that distrust and suspicion are mutual. China, too, harbours considerable suspicion about New Delhi's motives and intentions and managing distrust in bilateral ties is counted as one of the significant challenges. However, the chapter will focus primarily on India's trust-deficit towards China.

In the immediate aftermath of the cessation of 1962 hostilities, the threat perception of another Chinese attack was widespread. As R.D. Pradhan, then Personal Secretary to Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan records that it was widely suspected that China would launch another attack and that the truce was temporary.<sup>4</sup> Besides discussions in the Parliament and at the Press, then Defence Minister Chavan himself assumed that the Chinese offer to withdraw was a tactical move and Beijing would resume hostilities once snows melted and the mountain pass reopened.<sup>5</sup> The government accelerated the pace of defence modernisation, procurement of modern weapons, the size of the army was expanded from 5,50,000 to 8,25,000, a special frontier force was created in 1963 to carry out covert operations across the border, the defence budget was expanded from 2 percent to 4.5 percent between 1963-1964.<sup>6</sup> China's test of the nuclear bomb in 1963

---

<sup>3</sup> Nehru, "Changing India."

<sup>4</sup> Pradhan, "Debate to Revival." Chinese rejection of the Colombo Proposals was seen as evidence of Chinese malevolence.

<sup>5</sup> Pradhan, "Debate to Revival," 25.

<sup>6</sup> Subrahmanyam, K. "Indian Defence Expenditure in Global Perspective." *Economic and Political Weekly* 8, no. 26 (1973): 1155–58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4362796>. Dutta, Amrita Nayak. "All about Special Frontier Force, the Secretive Indian Unit in News after Ladakh Clash." ThePrint,

triggered widespread debate within the country about increased threat and the government was urged to develop nuclear weapons capability for China could resort to nuclear blackmail against India.<sup>7</sup> New Delhi, accordingly, in 1967, refused to sign the NPT, treaty citing “security threat” from China.<sup>8</sup> India moved closer to the SU to counter-balance the threat perceived from China. In October 1970, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reportedly expressed to her British counterpart Edward Heath about India’s perception of China’s threat<sup>9</sup> and in 1971, India and Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship agreeing to “consult each other” if either came under attack.<sup>10</sup>

Post-1976 restoration of diplomatic ties, New Delhi endeavoured to improve bilateral relations with China for strategic and economic reasons, however, element of suspicion remained. In 1976, as ambassadorial level diplomatic ties were being restored, the Government of India charged Beijing with a raging propaganda war against India.<sup>11</sup> Further, in 1978, the All-India Dr. Kotnis Memorial Committee invited the Head of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Wang Ping-nan. Wang Ping-nan, accompanied by then Chinese Ambassador to India Chen Zhaoyuan, were given access to meet India’s then Prime Minister Morarji Desai and then Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. While the two Indian leaders held discussions regarding India’s desire to develop bilateral ties, the Chinese visitors were also informed about enduring scepticism in India regarding friendly ties with China.<sup>12</sup>

---

September 6, 2020. <https://theprint.in/defence/all-about-special-frontier-force-the-secretive-indian-unit-in-news-after-ladakh-clash/496660/>. Chinoy, Sujan. “Indian Armed Forces.” *Yojana: A Development Monthly*, 2022.

<sup>7</sup> Bhabha, Homi. “Letter, Homi Bhabha to Jawaharlal Nehru,” August 2, 1963. Wilson Centre Digital Archive.

<sup>8</sup> “Memorandum of Conversation from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence: Meeting Between Secretary of Defence and Mr. L K Jha,” April 25, 1967. The National Security Archives. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/>.

<sup>9</sup> Kalyanraman, S. “India Response to China Threat from 1949.” In *India’s Great Power Politics: Managing China’s Rise*, 49–74. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2021.

<sup>10</sup> Mastny, Vojtech. “The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 3 (2010): 50–90. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26923380>.

<sup>11</sup> Borders, William. “India to Send Ambassador To China, First in 15 Years.” *The New York Times*, April 16, 1976, sec. Archives. <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/04/16/archives/india-to-send-ambassador-to-china-first-in-15-years-joyous.html>.

<sup>12</sup> “Record of Discussion That PM and FM Had with Wang Ping-Nan, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in March 1978.” Ministry of External Affairs, 1978. National Archives of India.

Also, in the 1980's when India-China ties were considered advancing towards rapprochement with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit in 1981 and the launch of India-China official level talks on the border, Defence Minister K C Pant and Foreign Minister N D Tiwari's visit to China in 1985 and finally Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988,<sup>13</sup> New Delhi was closely monitoring Chinese patrols and intrusions into Ladakh, Chinese assistance to Indian insurgents in the North East, undertook military exercise "Chequerboard" to respond to Chinese intrusions and continued India's development of nuclear power capability.<sup>14</sup>

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1988 was although undertaken to ease the tense atmosphere political and economic relations hardly registered remarkable improvement. In the 1990s instances of growing institutional links between the militaries and the strategic communities of both countries, and signing of the 1993 BPTA and 1996 CBMs in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas were seen as signs of trust-building with China, but the latent distrust within India's leadership was revealed when barely a month after PLA chief of staff, General Fu Quanyou's visit to New Delhi in April 1998, Indian defence minister George Fernandes publicly identified China as India's primary threat and post-Pokhran nuclear tests Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in a secret letter to US President Clinton cited Chinese threat and the persisting atmosphere of distrust between India and China as the primary causes of India's nuclear tests. China, in response, cancelled a scheduled JWG meeting for border negotiations, which did not resume until 2001.<sup>15</sup>

Since neither country was keen to extend the political stalemate over the Pokhran tests, high-level reciprocal exchanges were resumed and government officials from both countries publicly assured that neither country viewed each other as a threat. The relationship appeared to gain momentum with high-level visits in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, signing of confidence building measures and burgeoning trade<sup>16</sup>. However,

---

<sup>13</sup> Ganguly, Sumit. "The Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1989: A View from New Delhi." *Asian Survey* 29, no. 12 (December 1, 1989): 1123-35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644760>.

<sup>14</sup> "Reports in Chinese Intrusion in 1981." Ministry of Home Affairs, 1987. National Archives of India.

<sup>15</sup> Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. "Imprisoned by History." In *China and India: Cooperation Or Conflict?*, 9-44. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> "India-China Bilateral Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, n.d. [www.mea.gov.in](http://www.mea.gov.in). "Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation." Ministry of External Affairs, April 11, 2005. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/6567/Report+of+the+IndiaChina+Joint+Study+Group+on+Comprehensive+Trade+and+Economic+Cooperation>.

reflecting long-standing suspicion India's defence annual reports continued to underscore Chinese threat to India's security in terms of incursions across the LAC, Chinese nuclear missiles in Tibet, Chinese military modernisation, increase in the defence budget, infrastructure building near India-China border and China-Pakistan ties (MOD Annual Report 2002-2003, MOD Annual Report 2003-2004, MOD Annual Report 2004-2005, MOD Annual Report 2005-2006, MOD Annual Report 2006-2007, MoD Annual Report 2007-2008).<sup>17</sup> Further, the China discourse within India also reflected India's distrust. Despite being inclined towards diplomatic and economic engagement with China, Indian policy makers remained wary of Chinese engagement in India's periphery. In 2003, then Defence Minister George Fernandes noted that: "there is a perception here in India and among other informed external interlocutors that some actions ascribed to China are not in conformity with the degree of responsibility and rectitude that is associated with a major power. China has perhaps encouraged or endorsed a revisionist agenda on the Indian periphery and this causes deep anxiety — more so when this heightens state-sponsored terrorism".<sup>18</sup> Similarly, then Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, in a speech in 2003, called on China to show greater sensitivity to India's security concerns<sup>19</sup> and in 2004, then Foreign Secretary recommended to the Government to urgently build infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh to counter China's increasing presence across the LAC.<sup>20</sup> Few years later, in 2007, India's NSA, in a media briefing, expressed discontent at China supplying arms to Sri Lanka, suggesting security implications for India.<sup>21</sup> Next year, in 2008, Pranab Mukherjee, in a public speech mentioned China as India's most pressing and immediate

---

India-China trade which was as low as US\$ 2.92 billion in 2000 reached US\$ 41.85 billion in 2008, making China the largest trading partner of goods with India, replacing the US. (See. *Ministry of External Affairs, India-China Relations*)

<sup>17</sup> "Annual Report 2002-2003." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2003. "Annual Report 2003-2004." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2004. "Annual Report 2004-2005." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2005. "Annual Report 2005-2006." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2006. "Annual Report 2006-2007." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2007. "Annual Report 2007-2008." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Dutta, Sujan. "George Does a Chinese 'Pirouette.'" The Telegraph Online, January 29, 2003. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/george-does-a-chinese-pirouette/cid/844086>.

<sup>19</sup> Malik, Mohan. "India-China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete." Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, October 2004. [https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus\\_articles/how-soft-power-work/](https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus_articles/how-soft-power-work/).

<sup>20</sup> Shukla, Saurabh. "India Makes Concessions on Tibet to China, Beijing Shows No Signs of Reciprocating." India Today, October 17, 2005. <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/diplomacy/story/20051017-india-makes-concessions-on-tibet-to-china-beijing-shows-no-signs-of-reciprocating-786807-2005-10-16>.

<sup>21</sup> Tamil Guardian. "India Opposes Sri Lanka Buying Arms from China, Pakistan," June 5, 2007. <https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/india-opposes-sri-lanka-buying-arms-china-pakistan>.

security concern and claimed that India is faced with a new China which seeks to further her interests more aggressively than in the past.<sup>22</sup> Thereafter, in 2009, even when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the India-ASEAN Summit, Singh expressed concerns that China for reasons unknown was getting increasingly assertive in India's neighbourhood.<sup>23</sup> Responding to Chinese moves, India deployed additional troops and sophisticated SU-30 combat fighters along the LAC in the Ladakh sector.<sup>24</sup>

In this context, it is noteworthy that a study of the Indian strategic community's perception of China by Dr. Steven Hoffman indicated that a large section of the mainstream Indian view perceived China as a strategic threat and only differed in time-scale, that is, short term or long-term.<sup>25</sup> It is noteworthy that a decade later, a survey of the Indian strategic community conducted by Dhruva Jaishankar in 2019 indicated that more than half of India's strategic elites considered China as India's most significant external challenge and only a minority considered China to be an important partner in global issues.<sup>26</sup>

Around this period, it was also advocated by a section of the Indian strategic community that China was trying to contain India's rise by aiding Pakistan's military and maintaining military pressure at the border and encircling India by forging deep economic and military ties with India's neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives.<sup>27</sup> This was opined to be a deceptive strategy as it not only allows China to contain India's rise as a peer competitor by compelling New Delhi to allocate more resources (which could have been used elsewhere) to its defence

---

<sup>22</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. *India's Foreign Relations-2008 Documents*. New Delhi: Public Diplomacy Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2009.

<sup>23</sup> India Today. "There Is Certain Amount of Assertiveness by China: PM," November 24, 2009. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/americas/story/there-is-certain-amount-of-assertiveness-by-china-pm-61515-2009-11-23>.

<sup>24</sup> Zhu, Zhiqun. "China-India Relations in the 21 St Century: A Critical Inquiry." *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 24, no. 1/2 (2011): 1–16. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41950508>.

<sup>25</sup> Frankel, Francine R., and Harry Harding, eds. *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement*. Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>26</sup> Jaishankar, Dhruva. "Survey of India's Strategic Community." Centre for Social and Economic Progress, March 1, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/introduction-survey-of-indias-strategic-community/>.

<sup>27</sup> Malik, Mohan. "Eyeing the Dragon: India's China Debate." Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003.

and maintenance of its predominance in the region but also strategically encircle India with pro-Beijing regimes.<sup>28</sup>

Moving into the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the hope that an increase in bilateral trade, undertaking confidence building measures and de-linking of the border dispute with other aspects of the bilateral relations will improve mutual understanding and confidence did not materialise.<sup>29</sup> On New Delhi's part, India moved to rapidly upgrade its border infrastructure and military capabilities along the disputed border on the sidelines of the Special Representative Talks and Joint Working Group meetings.<sup>30</sup> The 2010 Defence Ministry annual report noted an increase in border infrastructure building in the TAR informed about India's alertness to the security implications of India's modernisation.<sup>31</sup> Further, in 2010, even when both countries celebrated the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, bilateral ties remained strained over China's support to Pakistan on Kashmir and sell of nuclear plants to Islamabad, the question of sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh and the perception of containment and insensitivity to India's concerns.<sup>32</sup> New Delhi also voiced concerns about the increasing imbalance in trade.<sup>33</sup> Outside the government, the RSS, an influential pressure group, at its annual meeting in 2011, passed two resolutions calling for expanding Indian military and diplomatic clout to counter Chinese influence in the neighbourhood, reclaim the territory lost during the 1962 war and boycott Chinese goods to stop their influx into Indian markets.<sup>34</sup> Although the resolution did not have wide policy implications, but it demonstrated intense acrimony in the Indian strategic community at both governmental and non-governmental levels.

---

<sup>28</sup> Tellis, Ashley. "The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know." In *China and India in Asia*, edited by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding. Columbia University Press, 2004.

<sup>29</sup> Sen, Tansen. "The Trust Deficit in India-China Relations." In *Emerging China*, edited by Sudhir T Devare, Swaran Singh, and Reena Marwah, 295–306. Routledge India, 2012.

<sup>30</sup> Bajpae, Chietigi. "China-India Relations: Regional Rivalry Takes the World Stage." *China Security* 6, no. 2 (2010): 3–20.

In August 2009, the Indian government alarmed by reports of intrusion of Chinese soldiers, helicopters and fighter jets into Indian territory in August, called urgent meeting for assessment of the situation. See. NDTV.com. "India, China Relations Complex: Shashi Tharoor," September 6, 2009. <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-china-relations-complex-shashi-tharoor-401546>.

<sup>31</sup> "Annual Report 2009-2010." New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2010.

<sup>32</sup> Bhasin, Avtar Singh, ed. *India's Foreign Relations-2010 Documents*. New Delhi: Geetika Publishers in Cooperation with Public Diplomacy Division Ministry of External Affairs, 2011.

<sup>33</sup> Bhattacharya, Abanti. "Sixty Years of India-China Relations." *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 5 (August 27, 2010): 678–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2010.501583>.

<sup>34</sup> "ABKM 2011: Need for Comprehensive Strategic Initiative for National Security." RSS, 2011. <https://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx>. "ABPS 2011: Defeat Chinese Designs against Our National Interests and Security." RSS, 2011. <https://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx>. Zhu, "China-India Relations in the 21 St Century."

In the 2010s India and China also expanded their cooperation to platforms like BRICS, G-20, BASIC, and SCO and considering the change of leadership in China and India in 2012 and 2014 respectively, the 89 billion dollar trade and sixteen bi-lateral meetings between Xi-Jinping and Narendra Modi, there had emerged an optimism regarding a new phase of developmental partnership between China and India.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless these positive developments described only one side of the coin, as simultaneous events indicated that years of diplomatic exchanges, confidence building measures, economic and strategic links had amounted to a thin reconciliation and suspicion and distrust remained predominant in bilateral ties. For instance, amidst celebrating the Year of India-China Friendship and Co-operation in 2012, New Delhi also commemorated the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1962 war where distrust and threat perception of Chinese intentions emerged as the dominant sentiment.<sup>36</sup> Then Defence Minister A K Antony, responding to the possibility of a threat from China, claimed that the defeat of the 1962 war would not be repeated as successive countries learnt their lesson and that India was vigorously strengthening its capabilities to meet any armed challenge.<sup>37</sup> Simultaneously, then primary national Opposition party BJP claimed in a public gathering that India's borders were still open and insecure and while New Delhi and Beijing can work for peace at the global level, China continues to pose a security threat along the disputed border.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, when China declared the initiation of the OBOR later changed to BRI project in 2013, many within the Indian strategic community responded with cynicism, dubbing the project as a Chinese attempt to subvert Indian territorial integrity with CPEC (passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir) and create

---

<sup>35</sup> Panda, Jagannath P. *India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. The Hindu. "70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020]," March 31, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece>.

<sup>36</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. "China and India." Accessed May 13, 2024. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq\\_665435/2675\\_665437/2711\\_663426/#:~:text=The%20year%202012%20is%20declared,Conference%20on%20Sustainable%20Development%20respectively.](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2711_663426/#:~:text=The%20year%202012%20is%20declared,Conference%20on%20Sustainable%20Development%20respectively.) *The Economic Times*. "Nation Pays Homage to Martyrs of 1962 War for First Time." October 20, 2012. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/nation-pays-homage-to-martyrs-of-1962-war-for-first-time/articleshow/16888227.cms?from=mdr>. Parthasarathy, "Lessons from the 1962 Debacle."

<sup>37</sup> "Nation Pays Homage to Martyrs of 1962 War for First Time."

<sup>38</sup> India Today. "Commemorating 50th Anniversary of India-China War," October 18, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/photo/bjp-chief-nitin-gadkari-commemorating-50th-anniversary-of-india-china-war-shahid-shradhanjali-yatra-368472-2012-10-18>.

a Sino-centric world order and India has since then boycotted OBOR meetings.<sup>39</sup> Studies on the Indian response to BRI contended that the Chinese infrastructure and connectivity projects with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan heightened suspicions about China's strategic encirclement of India within Indian strategic community.<sup>40</sup> The Chinese capital and technology driven land and maritime projects were argued as strategy to increase Chinese military presence around India and gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean.<sup>41</sup>

The reports of PLA incursion in 2013 and 2014 before Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang's visit and during Xi Jinping's visit to India, respectively, again flared Indian distrust. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 conveyed to Xi that a small toothache could paralyze the whole body.<sup>42</sup> Later, in 2016 and 2017, China's opposition to India's NSG membership and designation of JeM as a terrorist organisation was perceived within India as evidence of Beijing's denial to accept India as a nuclear power and contain its rise.<sup>43</sup> Combined with the Doklam crisis in the same year, India's perception of Chinese intentions became more negative.<sup>44</sup> Although efforts of recovery were made through informal summits between the two leaders in 2018 and 2019, however, China's criticism of India's abrogation of Article 370 and Galwan Valley crisis in 2020, bilateral ties received a serious setback.<sup>45</sup> In India, the death of 20 Indian soldiers due to the Chinese attack was perceived as a violation of the

---

<sup>39</sup> Patil, Sameer. "OBOR and India's Security Concerns: Analysis." *Gateway House* (blog), May 19, 2015. <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/obor-and-indias-security-concerns-analysis/>.

<sup>40</sup> Sharma, Mala. "India's Approach to China's Belt and Road Initiative—Opportunities and Concerns." *The Chinese Journal of Global Governance* 5, no. 2 (October 14, 2019): 136–52. <https://doi.org/10.1163/23525207-12340041>.

<sup>41</sup> Blanco Pitlo, Lucio, and Amruta Karambelkar. "India's Perception and Response to China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative: Views From Indian Mainstream Media." *Asian Politics & Policy* 7, no. 4 (October 2015): 667–71. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12214>.

<sup>42</sup> *The Times of India*. "Chinese Incursion in Ladakh: A Little Toothache Can Paralyze Entire Body, Modi Tells Xi Jinping." September 20, 2014. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinese-incursion-in-ladakh-a-little-toothache-can-paralyze-entire-body-modi-tells-xi-jinping/articleshow/42940337.cms>.

<sup>43</sup> Kanwal, Gurmeet. "China's Insecurity Leads to India's NSG Bid Being Blocked Again." *The Quint*, June 28, 2017. <https://www.thequint.com/opinion/china-blocks-india-nsg-bid-again>.

<sup>44</sup> Ganguly, Sumit. "India and China: On a Collision Course?" *Pacific Affairs* 91, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 231–44. <https://doi.org/10.5509/2018912231>.

<sup>45</sup> Haider, Suhasini, Ananth Krishnan, and Dinakar Peri. "Indian Army Says 20 Soldiers Killed in Clash with Chinese Troops in the Galwan Area." *The Hindu*, June 16, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-says-20-soldiers-killed-in-clash-with-chinese-troops-in-the-galwan-area/article61668218.ece>.

BDCA signed in 2013 and again evidence that China cannot be trusted.<sup>46</sup> External Affairs Minister Jaishankar claimed that the violence at the border had left India-China ties “profoundly disturbed”<sup>47</sup> while Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and NSA Chief Ajit Doval observed that the Galwan incident eroded India’s strategic trust towards China.<sup>48</sup>

### **Causes of India’s Distrust towards China: Post-1962 war normalisation of diplomatic ties**

The existing scholarship on India-China relations identifies four primary reasons for India’s Distrust towards China.

#### **Un-resolved Border Dispute**

The unresolved border dispute is considered one of the major causes for the persisting distrust within India’s policy elites.<sup>49</sup> Pre-1962 war, the border was a considerable source of insecurity for Indian policy-makers as China was perceived as prone to large revisionist claims. In the period leading to the conflict, China’s non-recognition of the McMahon line, multiple claim lines<sup>50</sup> and the Chinese offensive entrenched in Indian leaderships’ psyche suspicions that China was bent on revising the entire border according to its own claims and was likely to use force to settle the border dispute in its favour. Post-1962 war, the border skirmishes of 1967 and 1987 reinforced these beliefs. While New Delhi began to engage with Beijing on the border dispute since 1989/90, leading to the establishment of a JWG mechanism for negotiations and signing of CBMs in 1993, 1996, 2003 and 2005, trust and confidence with regard to the border

---

<sup>46</sup> Samanta, Pranab Dhal. “Chinese Action Violates 1993, 1996, and 2013 Border Agreements.” *The Economic Times*, June 18, 2020. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-action-violates-1993-1996-and-2013-border-agreements/articleshow/76405795.cms?from=mdr>.

<sup>47</sup> Roy, Subhjit. “Galwan Clashes Left India’s Relationship with China ‘Profoundly Disturbed’ : Jaishankar.” *The Indian Express* (blog), October 17, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/galwan-clashes-left-indias-relationship-with-china-profoundly-disturbed-jaishankar-6757940/>.

<sup>48</sup> Pradhan, S. D. “Indian NSA Underlines the Erosion of Strategic Trust While China Weaponizes Its Narrative.” *The Times of India*, July 30, 2023. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/indian-nsa-underlines-the-erosion-of-strategic-trust-while-china-weaponizes-its-narrative/>. Singh, Rahul. “Rajnath Singh Takes Hard Line on LAC Row, Says It Has Eroded India-China Ties.” *Hindustan Times*, April 27, 2023. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indias-defence-minister-raises-border-issue-with-china-s-general-li-shangfu-stresses-on-peaceful-resolution-indiachinaborder-ladakhstandoff-101682606924880.html>.

<sup>49</sup> Balazs, Daniel. “Wars, Fought and Unfought : China and the Sino Indian Border Dispute.” National Technological University, 2021.

<sup>50</sup> K. Subrahmanyam, Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Defence in 1962, observes that the Chinese put forward two claim lines during the period 1959-1961, with the second claim line claiming more areas than the first. See ‘Nehru and India-China Conflict of 1962’ in B.R. Nanda ed. *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, Radiant Publishers, 1976.

dispute has been elusive.<sup>51</sup> On India's part two of the primary issues in this regard have been regular Chinese intrusions (sometimes leading to stand-off) over the years and rapid infrastructure building. The *Times of India* reported in 2014, quoting the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, that between 2010 and 2014, there had been a total of 1,612 intrusions from the Chinese side due to differences in perception of the LAC.<sup>52</sup> Due to the undemarcated border, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of intrusion every time, however, sometimes these incidents escalate to military stand-offs requiring diplomatic intervention, like in 2012, 2013, 2014 and then recently in 2020. Combined with these intrusions, China also rapidly modernised dual-use infrastructure in Tibet, extending till the Indian borders and continues to do so. According to certain reports, the total road network in Tibet constituted 1,20,000 km in 2022. Reportedly, under its current 14<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan (2021-2025), China intends to invest another USD 29.3 billion in transportation infrastructure projects and one of these projects involves laying down railway lines to operate bullet trains in Tibet connected to the Chinese mainland and close to Arunachal Pradesh.<sup>53</sup> Further, China has been planning to build a second national highway, G695, in the Aksai Chin region, which will bring it closer to a number of disputed spots (the first one being the G219, built in the 1950s) by 2035.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, over five years, China has been constructing "well-off" villages, settling populations along the LAC, including Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.<sup>55</sup>

New Delhi remains wary of Chinese intrusions and infrastructural development activities. These activities are viewed as 'salami slicing' strategy to buttress its cartographical claims.<sup>56</sup> India's policy observers contend that these actions are part of Beijing's design of territorial aggrandizement as they aim to cut off the Indian

---

<sup>51</sup> Panda, *India-China Relations*, 38–47.

<sup>52</sup> Jain, Bharti. "No Chinese Intrusion since 2010, Only 'transgressions': Govt." *The Times of India*, August 20, 2014. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-chinese-intrusion-since-2010-only-transgressions-govt/articleshow/40457901.cms>.

<sup>53</sup> Business Today. "China to Invest \$30 Billion for Infra Development in Tibet over next 5 Years," March 9, 2021. <https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/world/story/china-to-invest-30-billion-for-infra-development-in-tibet-over-next-5-years-290330-2021-03-09>. Singh, Vivek. "China's Infrastructure Development Along The Line Of Actual Control (LAC) and Implications for India." CENJOWS, January 29, 2024.

<sup>54</sup> Krishnan, Ananth. "China Plans Another Highway in Aksai Chin." *The Hindu*, July 20, 2022. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-plans-another-aksai-chin-highway/article65663018.ece>.

<sup>55</sup> Dutta, Amrita Nayak. "Explained: China's 'Xiaokang' Border Defence Villages along the LAC, Now Being Occupied." *The Indian Express* (blog), February 15, 2024. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-xiaokang-border-defence-villages-lac-9163202/>.

<sup>56</sup> Chellaney, Brahma. "China's Himalayan Salami Tactics." Project Syndicate, March 9, 2021. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/xi-jinping-salami-tactics-himalayas-south-china-sea-by-brahma-chellaney-2021-03>.

military's access to the disputed areas and present New Delhi with a fait accompli.<sup>57</sup> Reflecting this perspective, Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury, Congress leader in Lok Sabha, opined in a newspaper op-ed, published post the death of twenty Indian soldiers, that through incursions and infrastructure building, China wants to settle the border dispute in its own terms as it had done with other powers.<sup>58</sup> Expressing a similar view, an Indian Press media, *Deccan Herald*, published a report on a study of Chinese incursions into the Indian territory, arguing that these incursions were strategic movements to gain permanent control of disputed areas.<sup>59</sup> On another occasion, in a public briefing, then COAS Bipin Rawat alluding to Chinese intent of changing the status quo, observed that through small stealth military operations against neighbouring countries, China intends to make massive territorial gains over time.<sup>60</sup> In view of these actions, India's policy establishment also believes that Chinese actions near the disputed border are aimed at keeping India off its balance by provoking disturbances in the border sectors.<sup>61</sup> Sections of the Indian strategic community further opine that China is not seriously interested in settling the border dispute (as it had rejected India's suggestion of exchange of maps for every sector) and the border infrastructure in Tibet is primarily aimed at India to maintain a psychological and strategic pressure on New Delhi to prevent India's rise as a peer competitor in Asia.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> Pradhan, S. D. "Chinese Intent behind the Intrusion into the Indian Territory." *The Times of India*, April 26, 2013. Accessed June 6, 2017. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/chinese-intent-behind-the-intrusion-into-the-indian-territory/>.

<sup>58</sup> Chowdhury, Adhir Ranjan. "Chinese Intrusion in Ladakh Has Created a Challenge That Must Be Met." *The Indian Express* (blog), June 17, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/resolve-and-prudence-india-china-border-dispute-galwan-valley-ladakh-6462309/>.

<sup>59</sup> Ray, Kalyan. "Chinese Incursions into India Strategically Planned: Study." *Deccan Herald*, November 11, 2022. <https://www.deccanherald.com/india/chinese-incursions-into-india-strategically-planned-study-1161264.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Dutta, Prabhash K. "What Is China's Salami Slicing Tactic That Army Chief Bipin Rawat Talked About?" *India Today*, September 7, 2017. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/doklam-china-salami-slicing-army-chief-general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07>.

<sup>61</sup> Aiyengar, SRR. "A Perspective on India-China Relations." *Claws Journal*, 2010, 9–21. Ramchandran, Sudha. "Manoj Joshi on Why China Wants Its Border With India to Remain Unsettled," October 25, 2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/manoj-joshi-on-why-china-wants-its-border-with-india-to-remain-unsettled/>. Menon, Lt General Prakash. "At LAC, China Is Not Settling 'disputed' Borders. It's Containing India." *The Print*, August 29, 2023. <https://theprint.in/opinion/at-lac-china-is-not-settling-disputed-borders-its-containing-india/1735155/>.

<sup>62</sup>

## China's rise and widening power asymmetry between India and China

In the 1950s, when India and China had emerged as new republics, India's military and economic capabilities were better than China. In the 1950s India's per capita income was 40 percent higher than China and India's GNP was 49.5 percent higher than the latter.<sup>63</sup> Further, the Indian military was also qualitatively better than the Chinese PLA, as the former inherited a disciplined fighting force with vast combat experience, having fought in the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and First and Second World Wars (1914-1919, 1939-1945), compared to the Chinese PLA which was a peasant army trained primarily in guerilla tactics.<sup>64</sup> Seven decades later, the situation is reversed. According to current GDP levels, India is a lower-middle income country (\$1,136-4,465 range) and China is an upper-middle income country (4,466-13,845).<sup>65</sup> Also, China's GDP is currently six times that of India; China's 18.3 trillion USD to India's 3.39 trillion USD.<sup>66</sup> Similarly, Beijing at present commands the largest standing army in the world and, since 2015, has implemented military modernisation at an accelerated pace, achieving high-levels of integration among its land, air and naval forces, nuclear force modernisation and technological upgrade in military operations.<sup>67</sup> Comparatively, India is considered to be lagging behind both in military capabilities and military modernisation vis-à-vis China. While New Delhi has been pursuing policies for defence modernisation, jointness, theaterisation and technological integration, it will take some time for India to achieve relative parity in military balance with China.<sup>68</sup> Scholars opine that there is significant power disparity in terms of military and

---

<sup>63</sup> Zhou, Wen. "Comparing the Economic Growth of China and India: Current Situation, Problems, and Prospects." *World Review of Political Economy* 5, no. 4 (2014): 455–71. <https://doi.org/10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.5.4.0455>.

<sup>64</sup> Li, Xiaobing. *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*. University Press of Kentucky, 2007. Ganguly, Rajat. "India's Military: Evolution, Modernisation and Transformation." *India Quarterly* 71, no. 3 (2015): 187–205. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072753>.

<sup>65</sup> Damodaran, Harish. "On Road to Viksit Bharat, India Should Target per Capita, Not Aggregate, GDP. Here's Why." *The Indian Express* (blog), April 1, 2024. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-economics/viksit-bharat-india-gdp-per-capita-china-comparison-economy-growth-9245440/>.

<sup>66</sup> Garg, Subhash Chandra. "India's GDP Gap with US, China Is Widening Alarmingly." *Deccan Herald*, July 4, 2023. <https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/india-s-gdp-gap-with-us-china-is-widening-alarmingly-1233747.html>.

<sup>67</sup> Rajagopalan, Rajeshwari Pillai. "An Indian Perspective on China's Military Modernization." *The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)*, January 6, 2022. <https://www.nbr.org/publication/an-indian-perspective-on-chinas-military-modernization/>. Schrag, Jacque. "How Is China Modernizing Its Nuclear Forces?" *ChinaPower Project* (blog), December 10, 2019. <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/>.

<sup>68</sup> Pant, Harsh. "The India-China Military Matrix and Their Modernisation Trajectories." *ORF Expert Speak*, June 27, 2020. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-india-china-military-matrix-and-their-modernisation-trajectories-68631>.

economic capacity between the two countries and these asymmetries are in favour of China. Moreover, increasing power disparity in terms of GDP and military expenditures indicates that China is ahead of India in terms of building a more sophisticated military.<sup>69</sup>

The increase in China's economic and military power, along with the expansion of its diplomatic clout, has been noted by observation the West as China's rise, who have also questioned whether this rise will be peaceful.<sup>70</sup> India being one of China's immediate neighbours and also sharing an un-demarcated and disputed border, have viewed the latter's rise with caution. While India's policy establishment acknowledges China's economic and military rise, it is essentially seen as a challenge that could adversely impact India's political and security interests. Indian policy elites perceive that with the widening of the power gap between India and China due to China's increasing military, economic and diplomatic clout, Beijing will be more assertive and coercive towards New Delhi on issues like border disputes, regional and international geopolitics and less sensitive to India's concerns on Kashmir, north-east and relations with Pakistan.<sup>71</sup> In this context, Jasjit Singh, one of India's foremost military strategists, who was also awarded one of India's highest civilian awards *Padma Bhushan*, observed in a commentary in 2005 that :

“With it is the rise of China's military power which would provide it with expanding options to apply force, discriminately or massively, in pursuit of its political and strategic goals”. Alluding to the border dispute with India he comments that “Here it may be useful to note that if China uses military power in accordance with its 20-year doctrine of fighting (and winning) local border wars, it is much more likely to pursue a limited war for goals like "teaching lessons", etc.”<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Colley, Christopher K., and Prashant Hosur Suhas. “India–China and Their War-Making Capacities.” *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (April 2021): 33–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797021993962>.

<sup>70</sup> Kristof, Nicholas D. “The Rise of China.” *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 1993. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/rise-china>. Buzan, Barry. “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, no. 1 (2010): 5–36. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615778>.

<sup>71</sup> Pant, Harsh V., ed. *The Rise of China: Implications for India*. Foundation Books, 2012.

<sup>72</sup> Singh, Jasjit. “The Shifting Balance of Military Power in Asia.” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 1, no. 3 (2006): 8–16. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340572>.

Similarly, another prominent military strategist Brahma Chellaney commented in 2008, citing instances of PLA's demolition of unmanned Indian forward posts at the Tibet-Bhutan-Sikkim- Tri junction, showcasing nuclear capable submarine and strategic moves around India, that challenges for Indian diplomacy are likely to increase in the future as China had already begun muscle-flexing around India in its early stages of its rise as a major power.<sup>73</sup>

Over the years the perspective that China's rise and the consequent power asymmetry between the two will have adverse implication for India has been reiterated by the higher leadership on different occasions, demonstrating its prominence in Indian mind. For instance, in 2012 Deepak Kapoor, a former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, referring to instances like Beijing's increasing assertiveness in dealing with nations in its periphery, growing presence in POK and providing aid to anti- Indian insurgents, cyber-attacks against India's sensitive information infrastructure and finally increased presence in the IOR, warned that such actions would intensify with increase in Chinese capabilities.<sup>74</sup> Same year, the *Indian Express* reported that then Defence Minister A.K. Antony referring to China's economic and military rise as challenge had cautioned the top commanders of the three armed forces to be watchful against Beijing's coercive policies in the region.<sup>75</sup> Expressing similar views, Former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon opined in 2016 that China's rise would make India's external geopolitical environment complex and lead to an extended period of political and security instability in Asia and the Pacific. He further noted that "An assertive China is unlikely to seek an early settlement of the boundary issue no matter how reasonable India may be....On the other hand, China's other priorities have made Pakistan even more crucial to China's purposes – religious extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang, overland access to the Indian Ocean, keeping India in check, a window on Western arms technology, the Chinese commitment and presence in POK, etc".<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> Brahma Chellaney. "China Adds Muscle to Its Foreign Policy." *Stagecraft and Statecraft* (blog), January 6, 2008. <https://chellaney.net/2008/01/06/china-adds-muscle-to-its-foreign-policy/>.

<sup>74</sup> Kapoor, Deepak. "Changing Global Security Environment with Specific Reference to Our Region and Its Impact on the Indian Army." *Journal of Defence Studies* 2, no. 2 (2008): 1–18.

<sup>75</sup> The Indian Express. "China's Rise Poses Challenge: Antony," April 25, 2012. <https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/china-s-rise-poses-challenge-antony/>.

<sup>76</sup> Menon, Shivshankar. "What China's Rise Means for India." *The Wire*, January 4, 2016. <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/what-chinas-rise-means-for-india>.

Following the Doklam crisis in 2017 and the Galwan Valley crisis in 2020, deliberations have intensified within the Indian strategic community on China's ascent and the power asymmetry in Beijing's favour. Indian policy observers note that New Delhi had severely undermined the implications of China's rise and the power imbalance.<sup>77</sup> It is being opined that a surge in Chinese capabilities will not only pose a military threat to India's borders, especially in view of India's military inadequacies but also to New Delhi's political centrality in South Asia and geopolitical space beyond the region as Beijing will draw smaller countries deeper into its sphere of influence. In this context, it is noteworthy that besides concerns about sharpening tensions at the border and India's shrinking geopolitical space, Indian policy elites are also wary that China could use its newly developed capabilities to reshape the global order and attempt to bring about a "Chinese Century".<sup>78</sup>

### **China's forays into South Asia**

During the Nehru's period, India did not pronounce a clear policy towards South Asia, however, in New Delhi's worldview, the security of the South Asian region was seen central to India's security.<sup>79</sup> Further, by virtue of its size, economic potential and political, cultural and economic linkages with the smaller countries of South Asia, India saw itself as the primary manager of the political and security affairs of South Asia.<sup>80</sup> However, in order to avoid triggering the threat perception of the neighbours, India maintained a low-profile humanitarian approach, devoid of forceful interference. India's policy towards South Asia became pronounced during Indira Gandhi's period.<sup>81</sup> Emboldened by Pakistan's dismemberment, India formulated the Indira Doctrine whereby New Delhi declared itself to be the primary arbitrator in regional conflicts rather than outside powers (China, US, Russia, or other Western powers) and

---

<sup>77</sup> Mohan, Raja C. "Mind the Power Gap." *The Indian Express* (blog), August 2, 2017. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-china-standoff-mind-the-power-gap-4777926/>. Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "The Political Consequences of China's Rise." ORF, January 5, 2018. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/political-consequences-china-rise>. Mohan, Raja C. "Explained Ideas: Why China's Rise Could Spell the End of the Asian Century." *The Indian Express* (blog), July 7, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-xi-jinping-asian-century-india-border-dispute-6493584/>.

<sup>78</sup> Mohan, "Mind the Power Gap.", Rajagopalan, "The Political Consequences of China's Rise." Mohan, "Explained Ideas."

<sup>79</sup> Ghosh, Partha S. "Region without Regionalism: Cooperation in South Asia." *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 32 (2016): 114–21. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44004705>.

<sup>80</sup> Bhasin, Madhavi. "India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?" *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 3, no. 4 (2008): 72–88. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340757>.

<sup>81</sup> Garver, John W. "Sino-Indian Relations: The Protracted Contest." In *In Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, 3–31. University of Washington Press, 2001.

international organisations<sup>82</sup> This doctrine paved the way for India's military intervention in Sri Lanka (1971 and 1987) and Maldives (1988). Devin T. Hagerty notes in this context that from 1983-1990, India's policy towards South Asia was driven by attempts to deny external influence in the region, primarily from the US and China (even at the cost of regional stability). This resulted in widespread discontent amongst India's smaller neighbours who perceived India as the hegemon<sup>83</sup> In order to make India's pre-eminence more acceptable in the region and limit counter-balancing against India, then, Prime Minister I.K. Gujral formulated the Gujral Doctrine in 1997. The doctrine highlighted that India would deal with its neighbours on the basis of non-reciprocity, whereas New Delhi would undertake more responsibility and expect less from its neighbours. The UPA government led by Manmohan Singh that came to power in 2004 applied the Gujral Doctrine to reorient India's foreign policy to increase economic relations and diplomatic partnerships with neighbouring countries, including Pakistan.<sup>84</sup> A decade later, when BJP led NDA came to power, Narendra Modi articulated the "Neighbourhood First Policy" to alleviate regional threats about India's hegemony. The government declared itself committed to developing "mutually beneficial, people-oriented, regional frameworks for stability and prosperity". New Delhi's engagement with the neighbouring countries was declared would be based on a "consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented approach, which focuses on delivering benefits like greater connectivity, improved infrastructure, stronger development cooperation in various sectors area, security and broader people-to-people contacts".<sup>85</sup> Over the years, India's policies towards South Asia have demonstrated that New Delhi views the region both as a sphere of insecurity and opportunity.<sup>86</sup> Due to factors like cultural similarities, economic linkages and porous land borders that facilitate rapid spillover of instability, South Asia remains one of the primary sources

---

<sup>82</sup> Wagner, Christian. "From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India's South Asia Policy." *South Asia Institute Department of Political Science University of Heidelberg*, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, 2005. <https://doi.org/10.11588/HEIDOK.00005436>. Mazumdar, Arijit. "India's South Asia Policy in the Twenty-First Century: New Approach, Old Strategy." *Contemporary Politics* 18, no. 3 (September 2012): 286–302. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2012.702973>.

<sup>83</sup> Hagerty, Devin T. "India's Regional Security Doctrine." *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (1991): 351–63. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645389>.

<sup>84</sup> Wagner, "From Hard Power to Soft Power?"

<sup>85</sup> "QUESTION NO.3692 NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST POLICY." Accessed May 13, 2024. <https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/31673/QUESTION+NO3692+NEIGHBOURHOOD+FIRST+POLICY>.

<sup>86</sup> Malik, J. Mohan. "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations." *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 13, no. 1 (February 2001): 73–90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13239100120036054>.

of threat for New Delhi. At the same time, Indian policy makers also see the region as a springboard for India to play a larger role in a multipolar international system. Accordingly, there is a dominant consciousness in New Delhi that India needs to maintain a strong political and military foothold in the smaller neighbouring countries to quell threats to India's national security emanating from these countries as well as project itself as a responsible major power by being the primary responder to regional security and stability issues.<sup>87</sup> Since South Asia is one of the most important regions for India's foreign policy objectives, New Delhi remains wary of external interference by major powers, including China.

China's forays into South Asia have been a point of concern for Indian policymakers since the pre-1962 period. As the CCP came to power in China in 1949, Nehru moved to sign treaties of friendship with the smaller Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan (1949) and Nepal (1950) with a view to limiting diplomatic ties between these countries and China. Also, Nehru began to closely guide Myanmar on its China policy. Post-1962 conflict, New Delhi as it retreated from its international outlook, focused more on consolidating its position in South Asia and excluding Chinese influence. However, India's pivot to South Asia triggered the big power versus small power syndrome, and China's interference became more welcoming.<sup>88</sup> China too on its part considered South Asia as its strategic backyard and post 1962 saw its status as a stronger military power as an opportunity to intensify its engagement with South Asian countries. Therefore, since 1963, beginning with Pakistan, China developed close politico-military relations with South Asian governments neighbouring India on the principles of peaceful coexistence.<sup>89</sup> By the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, 90 percent of China's military exports were coming to South Asia and all of India's neighbours received their military arsenal from China.<sup>90</sup> At about the same period China also initiated bilateral trade and extended developmental aid to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar through economic investments and strategic infrastructure building. Over the years China has increased its military and strategic footprint in South Asia with frequent

---

<sup>87</sup> Tanham, George. "Indian Strategic Culture." *The Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 129–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609209550082>. Mazumdar, Arijit. *Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia*. Routledge, 2014.

<sup>88</sup> Paranjpe, Shrikant. "Organizing Ideas for the Development of Order in South Asia." In *India and South Asia Since 1971*, 1–25. Radiant Publishers, 1985.

<sup>89</sup> Garver, John W. "China and South Asia." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 519 (1992): 67–85. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1046754>. Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations."

<sup>90</sup> Malik, "Eyeing the Dragon: India's China Debate."

high-profile visits to South Asian countries, launching of economic corridors and crucial infrastructure building projects like ports, highways, power plants as part of BRI and continuing transfer of submarines, fighter jets, frigates and other conventional arms.<sup>91</sup>

For the Indian strategic community, China's inroads into South Asia are motivated largely by an anti-India agenda. A common perception is that Beijing's engagement with South Asia is intended to contain India's rise as a peer competitor to challenge China's status in the Asia-Pacific. To that end, China has been arming India's neighbours including Pakistan and is deepening its presence in South Asia to complicate India's strategic environment and hamper its rise.<sup>92</sup> Another perspective is that China sees South Asia as integral to reviving its status as the Middle Kingdom. Therefore, the commercial penetration is largely aimed at transforming the small South Asian countries as strategic bases through chequebook diplomacy. It is opined that China is extending a system of economic patronage to South Asia, where Pakistan, Maldives Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly becoming client states and in turn will serve China's continental ambitions as well as expanding its influence over the key geostrategic maritime space of Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.<sup>93</sup> Finally, there is also fear within Indian strategic community is that due to India's lesser economic and defence capabilities than China and its poor record in delivering, China will gradually replace India as a dominant power altogether. Smaller neighbours will not only use the China card to resist India's influence also the governments could be more amenable to Chinese policies and abide by Chinese decisions.<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Loc, Tran My Hai. "India's Security Threats from Chinese Military Funding and Economic Development in South Asia." *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional* 25, no. 2 November 25, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v25i2.1289>. Singh, Ridipt. "China's Arms Exports in South Asia." CESCUBE, December 10, 2022. <https://www.cescube.com/vp-china-s-arms-exports-in-south-asia#:~:text=China%20has%20sold%20a%20total,to%20its%20close%20military%20connections>.

<sup>92</sup> Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations." Kumar, Sanjeev. "China's South Asia Policy in the 'New Era.'" *India Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (2019): 137–54. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48509416>.

<sup>93</sup> Narayanan, Rajiv. "Strategic Competition and Cooperation in South Asia: An Indian Perspective on the Chinese Outreach in the Region." In *India-China Building Strategic Trust*, edited by Rajiv Narayanan and Qiu Yonghui, 255–66. New Delhi: Vij Books, 2020.

<sup>94</sup> Narayanan, "Strategic Competition and Cooperation in South Asia: An Indian Perspective on the Chinese Outreach in the Region."

## China-Pakistan ties

China's "all-weather" friendship with Pakistan is considered the most important factor in inducing India's distrust towards China. Beijing and Islamabad advanced bilateral ties in the post-1962 period at a remarkable pace. In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a boundary agreement whereby Islamabad surrendered thousands of square miles of territory. Further, during the India-Pakistan war in 1965, Beijing threatened to open a second front and during the 1971 Bangladesh war, China extended diplomatic support to Pakistan and vehemently criticised India at the UN for its intervention in the war.<sup>95</sup> As the outcome of the 1971 war shifted the balance of power in Asia in favour of India, China increased military and financial aid to Islamabad and also transferred nuclear weapons technology to strengthen Pakistan against future Indian onslaught. During that period, Beijing, cancelled Pakistan's debt of 110 million dollars and deferred repayment of 1970 interest-free loans by 20 years. Mid-1970s, Beijing helped Pakistan set up tank and fighter aircraft factories and also provided various levels of nuclear and missile related assistance, including centrifuge equipment, warhead designs, HEU, components of various missile systems and technical expertise.<sup>96</sup> Notwithstanding, improved relations with India in the 1980s, China continued to render robust diplomatic, military and financial support to Pakistan. With regard to Kashmir, Beijing ensured Pakistan of its continued support for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute according to the UN resolutions.<sup>97</sup> Further, top military commanders from both countries held regular dialogue to enhance military cooperation and the Chinese weapons systems became the backbone of Pakistan's military.<sup>98</sup> One of the most noteworthy developments of this period was that, in,1986, China and Pakistan signed an agreement to exchange civil nuclear technology.<sup>99</sup> Beijing also provided financial and technical assistance to Islamabad to achieve defence self-sufficiency and monetary support to set up heavy machinery industry, fertiliser plants, thermal power plants and

---

<sup>95</sup> Choudhury, Ishfaq Ilahi. "Liberation War 1971: Geo-Political Fallout." Daily Star, December 16, 2009. <https://archive.thedailystar.net/supplements/2009/december/victorydayspecial/page09.htm>.

<sup>96</sup> Fazal-ur-Rahman. "Pakistan's Relations with China." *Strategic Studies* 19/20 (1998): 55–89. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45182307>. NTI. "Pakistan Nuclear Overview," November 5, 2019. <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-nuclear/>.

<sup>97</sup> Garver, John W. "Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente." *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 323–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2152324>.

<sup>98</sup> Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. "Review of Sino-Pakistan Relations (1981-85)." *Pakistan Horizon* 39, no. 1 (1986): 92–106. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393754>.

<sup>99</sup> Khalid, Asma. "China-Pakistan Nuclear Energy Cooperation: History and Key Debates." *South Asian Voices*, February 12, 2020. <https://southasianvoices.org/china-pakistan-nuclear-energy-cooperation/>.

develop road and railway infrastructure.<sup>100</sup> The momentum of bilateral ties sustained through the 1990s as Sino-Pakistan relations burgeoned in areas of economic, trade, defence cooperation.<sup>101</sup> Beijing also encouraged Islamabad to conduct nuclear tests following India's nuclear tests in 1998. Moving to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, both countries deepened their bilateral ties through regular presidential and prime ministerial visits to each other, signing of FTAs, joint military exercises, more people to people and business contacts. One of the major milestones in bilateral ties was the inauguration of the CPEC project in July 2013, signed to connect China's Xinjiang region with the Gwadar port of Pakistan.<sup>102</sup>

On the international level too, China and Pakistan exhibited diplomatic solidarity by supporting each other for membership in international organisations like SCO and SAARC, respectively, in 2006.<sup>103</sup> Beijing also provided unwavering support to Pakistan at the UN on the issue of terrorism.<sup>104</sup> China repeatedly resisted, at times through vetoes, New Delhi's attempts to hold Islamabad accountable for attacks by Pakistan-based terrorists. For instance, Beijing blocked India's bid to get JuD, the political arm of LeT designated as a terrorist organisation until the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks and also placed a technical hold to block UNSC sanctions on LeT in 2010. In 2015, again China blocked India's request to question Pakistan over releasing one of the main planners of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.<sup>105</sup> Very recently, China in both 2022 and 2023, blocked India's attempts to get certain individuals from LeT designated as terrorists and sanctioned.

In view of Indian policy elites, China-Pakistan ties are based on an anti-India agenda and commonality of interest to hamper India's rise because as India-China relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, Sino-Pakistan relations improved dramatically. Further,

---

<sup>100</sup> Sherwani, "Review of Sino-Pakistan Relations (1981-85)."

<sup>101</sup> Allauddin, Hongsong Liu, and Raja Qaiser Ahmed. "The Changing Dynamics and New Developments of China-Pakistan Relations." *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (March 2020): 73–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419901195>.

<sup>102</sup> Azeemi, Haris Raqeeb. "55 Years of Pakistan-China Relationship." *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007): 109–24. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41500066>. Syed Muhammad, Prof. Dr. Sayeda Daud, Prof. Dr. Farooq Aziz. "China- Pakistan Economic Relations: A Review of First Two Decades of 21st Century." *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (December 29, 2020). <https://doi.org/10.52337/pjia.v3i2.82>.

<sup>103</sup> Zhao, Jing, Zhao Li, and Yaling Guo. "The Development of China-Pakistan Diplomatic Relations." *Pacific International Journal* 6, no. 1 (2023): 34–39. <https://relss.com/index.php/pij>.

<sup>104</sup> Panda, Ankit. "Why China Snubbed India on a Pakistan-Based Terrorist at the UN," June 25, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-china-snubbed-india-on-a-pakistan-based-terrorist-at-the-un/>.

<sup>105</sup> Roggio, Bill. "UN Declares Jamaat-Ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group ." *FDD's Long War Journal*, December 11, 2008. [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un\\_declares\\_jamaatud.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un_declares_jamaatud.php).

the primary elements of the relationship have been close military and economic cooperation, which the strategic community believes aimed to prop Pakistan as a counter to India's dominant position in South Asia or worse, jointly pose a threat to India's security and territorial integrity. It is also believed that China intends to use its influence with Pakistan to keep India tied down to South Asia so that it is unable to play a larger role in the region and beyond.<sup>106</sup>

### **Memory and Remembrance of 1962 War and India's Distrust**

According to the existing literature by Indian scholars, the politico, military, and economic confidence building measures which India and China undertook following the restoration of diplomatic ties in 1976 failed to bridge India's trust-gap towards China. Distrust of Chinese intentions remain entrenched in Indian policy elites' psyche despite years of high-level bilateral talks on the border dispute, signing of confidence building measures and border agreements on the management of the disputed boundary, cooperation on several multilateral platforms like BRICS, SCO, G20 among others and more importantly thriving economic relations. Indian scholars contend that largely developments with regard to the unresolved border dispute, widening power asymmetry, China's increasing presence in South Asia and deepening ties with Pakistan are responsible.

The element of distrust was present in Indian policy elites' psyche even before the 1962 conflict and similar issues like the unresolved border dispute, China's military presence near the disputed border, blooming diplomatic ties between China and Pakistan and expanding Chinese presence in South Asia evoked India's suspicion. Although the border conflict was triggered by a different set of events, the point of note is that the issues inducing distrust were not addressed. It was only after the 1976 normalisation of bilateral ties and especially after Rajiv Gandhi's visit, that India and China took steps to manage the trust deficit. Fifteen rounds of JWG Meetings were held to resolve the border dispute, and in 2003 Special Representatives were appointed who met twenty-three times to negotiate a framework for the settlement of the border dispute and maintenance of peace and tranquillity at the border.<sup>107</sup> Two years later, in 2005, Track-II level informal dialogues were launched where representatives from the Indian side

---

<sup>106</sup> Bambale, Gautam, and Tanvi Madan. "How India Sees China's Ties with Pakistan and Bhutan." Brookings, November 1, 2023. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-india-sees-chinas-ties-with-pakistan-and-bhutan/>.

<sup>107</sup> "India-China Bilateral Relations." Ministry of External Affairs, May 12, 2023. [www.mea.gov.in](http://www.mea.gov.in).

conveyed New Delhi's apprehensions about increasing infrastructure building near the disputed border, Chinese military modernisation, CPEC and China's politico-military presence in South Asia.<sup>108</sup> In the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century more channels of communication were opened, leading to the formation of fifty dialogue mechanisms at various levels to discuss issues relating to bilateral political, economic, cultural, people-to-people, consular matters as well as dialogues on regional and global issues.<sup>109</sup> The CCP and major political parties of India, including the Congress and BJP exchanged friendly delegation visits to promote trust and mutual understanding. Indian and Chinese leaders met each other numerous times on the sidelines of BRICS, SCO and G20 summits. Reportedly, PM Narendra Modi met Xi Jinping sixteen times between 2014-2020 and held two-informal in-person summits for the exchange of in-depth views on issues of mutual concern.<sup>110</sup>

In effect, India and China post normalisation of their bilateral ties became more interlinked through various political, economic and diplomatic channels. The fact that the Indian policy establishment still harbours a distrust of China needs to be assessed going beyond the tangible factors to see how psychological factors like memory affect the interpretation of India's intent of China.

### **Reconciliation and Remembering Humiliation**

India's distrust towards China in the post-1962 period can also be characterised as a state of shallow reconciliation with the latter, whereby instead of absolute lack of trust (which would denote non-reconciliation and non-existence of diplomatic ties), New Delhi's trust level is low (denoting shallow reconciliation) as demonstrated by remote preparations for war, cautious cooperation, occasional politicisation of the border dispute limited economic engagement and estrangement and suspicion even as New Delhi engages with China on multiple issues on a regular basis.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>108</sup> Bhonsale, Mihir. "Understanding Sino-Indian Border Issues: An Analysis of Incidents Reported in the Indian Media." ORF Occasional Paper. New Delhi: ORF, February 2018. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-sino-indian-border-issues-an-analysis-of-incidents-reported-in-the-indian-media>.

<sup>109</sup> Embassy of India, Beijing. "India-China Political Relations," January 30, 2023. [https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing\\_pages/MjM](https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing_pages/MjM).

<sup>110</sup> The Hindu. "70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020]," March 31, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece>.

<sup>111</sup> He, Yinan. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

In this context, remembering the war as a humiliation and debacle has played an important role. India and China began the process of diplomatic normalisation and reconciliation since the late 1960s. The two countries did not achieve deep reconciliation due to various internal and external factors. On India's part, one of the major reasons was that Indian policy elites' memorialisation of the war as a humiliation, blaming the civilian leadership and the military for credulity and failure to perceive and prepare for the China threat, coincided with the normalisation and reconciliation efforts that began in the late 1960s. Ever since, New Delhi, on the one hand, has tried to advance bilateral ties and reconcile with China, on the other, back at home, Indian policy elites have simultaneously recalled Chinese aggression, humiliation India faced in 1962, cautioning that China should not be allowed to humiliate India again.

During the first phase of reconciliation, which began in the late 1960s and ended with restoration of ambassadorial level ties in 1976, diplomatic and political overtures for reviving bilateral ties were shadowed by extensive remembering of the war as humiliation. For instance, in 1969, as PM Indira Gandhi called for resolving the political stalemate with China and sent Brajesh Mishra to Beijing as Indian Charge de Affairs,<sup>112</sup> J.P. Dalvi took a POW during the 1962 war, recalled in his book *The Himalayan Blunder (The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962)* published at the same, that the nation and the Army found themselves in the predicament due to the political leadership's failure to anticipate the war with China. He noted that the biggest lesson of the 1962 war was that military power determined the status of a nation rather than "flimsy notion of fellowship with ex-colonial countries" and called on the leaders never to be credulous and negligent.<sup>113</sup> PVR Rao, who was Defence Secretary back in 1962 in his work *Defence Without Drift*, published in 1970, described Chinese actions during the war as aggressive and expansionist and recalled that India's 1962 defeat was a 'debacle' that may have been avoided with realistic China policy and defence preparedness.<sup>114</sup> Reflecting on the lessons of the 1962 war, he noted that events leading to the debacle emphasised the need for a carefully considered defence policy to ensure

---

<sup>112</sup> Mishra, Brajesh, and Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. "The 'Mao's Smile' Revisited: Sino-Indian Relations During an Important Period." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 1, no. 4 (2006): 109–18. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340597>.

<sup>113</sup> Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder (The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962)*, 3, 482, 488.

<sup>114</sup> Rao, P.V.R. *Defence Without Drift*. Popular Prakashan, 1970.

that the independence of the country was not jeopardised.<sup>115</sup> At the same time within the state apparatus in Lok Sabha, in the course of the debate on the Ministry of Defence's request for grants, Indian leaders like George Fernandes (who later became the defence minister in 1998) and Nath Pai, recalling the military defeat faced in 1962 and suggesting the possibility of future conflict, urged the government to prepare for war with China and adopt a realistic foreign policy to assess Chinese threat.<sup>116</sup> Further, again on the year of restoration of ambassadorial ties in 1976, sections of leaders in the Parliament on the issue of the development of bilateral ties with Beijing, referring to Chinese aggression and India's humiliation in 1962, demanded that the government take back possession of the occupied territories and restore Indian "dignity" (indicating India's humiliation during the 1962 war).<sup>117</sup>

In the second phase of reconciliation, which began in the 1980s and concluded with the historic visit of PM Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, a similar trend continued. In December 1981, as India and China renewed the talks on border, then Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao rejected China's proposal of 'package deal' as it reinforced India's humiliation.<sup>118</sup> Then again in the late mid-1980s, when two countries were negotiating the meeting of PM Rajiv Gandhi and Chinese premier Zhao Zhiyang, triggered by the India-China military stand-off Suidong Chu in 1986, the spectre of another humiliation was raised in Parliament debates. Referring to the 1962 war, certain Indian Parliamentarians proposed that "we need to be much vigilant so that China may repeat the history of 1962, for this purpose, it is necessary that we must have strong military power".<sup>119</sup>

The third phase of reconciliation was launched in the early 1990s with Li Peng reciprocating Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit in 1991 and closed with India's nuclear tests in 1998.<sup>120</sup> New Delhi moved to fast-track bilateral ties with China, signing two important confidence building agreements; Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (1993) and Agreement of

---

<sup>115</sup> Rao, *Defence Without Drift*, 17.

<sup>116</sup> Jetly, Nancy. "Continuing Stalemate 1969-1977." In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 259-63. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

<sup>117</sup> Jetly, "India China Relations, 1947-1977," 290.

<sup>118</sup> Ganguly, "The Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1989."

<sup>119</sup> "Eighth Session Lok Sabha Debates (Vol. 24, Issue No. 4)." Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 27, 1987.

<sup>120</sup> Chacko, Arun. "Chinese Premier Li Peng's India Trip Renews Ties." *India Today*, December 31, 1991. <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/diplomacy/story/19911231-chinese-premier-li-pengs-india-trip-renews-ties-815250-1991-12-30>.

Confidence Building Measures in the Military field along the LAC with China (1996).<sup>121</sup> However, it is noteworthy that as negotiations on the 1993 Agreement were going on in 1991-1992, the MOD published the Official History of the 1962 war. Arguing Chinese expansionism as the root cause, the authors of the report observed that the defeat was a “big blow to India’s prestige”, caused primarily by the failure of the policy leaders to timely perceive the threat from China and prepare India’s defences accordingly.<sup>122</sup> It is noteworthy, that the report suggested that India had adopted a realistic policy and has been preparing for future conflict to avoid another debacle.<sup>123</sup> Incidentally, during the same period, the memoir of Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit (who was also interviewed for the Brooks Bhagat report and the official history) *War in High Himalaya: Indian Army in Crisis* also released, reflecting that owing to the political leadership’s conviction about the unlikelihood of war between India and China and the consequent defence unpreparedness, Indian Army faced a debacle in 1962. He called for better civil-military integration in strategic decision-making for avoiding future disasters.<sup>124</sup> The year India and China signed the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement in 1993, intense debates ensued in the Parliament over India’s national security vis-à-vis China, the government was urged to appreciate the threat from China and prepare the Indian Army in order to avoid another military defeat like 1962.<sup>125</sup> Three years later, in 1996, when India signed the Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures, the Indian strategic community continued recalling Chinese aggression in 1962 and India’s military defeat to argue about the threat China posed to India’s security and the necessity of defence preparedness.<sup>126</sup> In 1998, as debates ensued following the Pokhran tests, a section of Indian pro-nuclear power politicians in the Parliament, recalling India’s military defeat and referring to the war as

---

<sup>121</sup> United Nations Peacemaker. “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas .” Accessed May 14, 2024. <https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindia-borderagreement93>. United Nations Peacemaker. “Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas .” Accessed May 14, 2024. <https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindiaconfidenceagreement96>.

<sup>122</sup> Sinha and Athale, “History of the Conflict with China, 1962.”

<sup>123</sup> Sinha and Athale, “History of the Conflict with China, 1962,” 426.

<sup>124</sup> Palit, *War in High Himalaya*, 422.

<sup>125</sup> “Sixth Session Tenth Lok Sabha Debates (Vol. 21, Issue No.3).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, April 27, 1993.

<sup>126</sup> Chellaney, Brahma. “The Dragon’s Chicanery behind the Smile.” *The Pioneer*, October 23, 1996. Ganguly, Sumit. “Future Uncertain: Indian Security Policy Approaches the Millenium.” *Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 1 (1997): 221–38. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357481>. Singh, L.P. “Learning the Lessons of History.” In *Securing India’s Future in the New Millennium*, edited by Brahma Chellaney, 1–20. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1999.

“ignominy” suggested that New Delhi should develop nuclear power as India cannot afford to be vulnerable to another 1962 like situation.<sup>127</sup>

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the fourth phase of reconciliation began in 2000 after bilateral ties were strained following India’s 1998 nuclear tests and continued till 2013 when the first border stand-off in 27 years occurred at Despang plains.<sup>128</sup> From 2000-2013, India and China signed three-confidence building measures; Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (2005); Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (2012) and Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013) and also launched Special Representative Talks for political resolution of the border dispute in 2003.<sup>129</sup> Further, bilateral trade increased at an exponential rate during this period; the volume of bilateral trade stood at USD 13.6 billion reached USD 61.7 billion by 2010 and reached USD 73.9 billion in 2011.<sup>130</sup> The two countries also exchanged high-level visits like Indian President K R Narayanan visit to China in 2000 on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of India-China ties and Zhu Rongji’s visit in 2002. Then PM Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit in 2003 led to the signing of The Declaration on the Principles and Comprehensive Cooperation in China-India Relations. More high-level official visits followed in the second-half of the decade with PM Manmohan Singh’s and the President Prathibha Patil’s visit to China in 2008 and 2010 respectively. In 2012, the two countries also celebrated “Year of India-China Friendship and Cooperation” and in 2013, PM Manmohan Singh met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 5<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit in Durban.<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>127</sup> “Twelfth Lok Sabha Debates Second Session (Vol. 2, Issue No. 3).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, May 29, 1998.

<sup>128</sup> Sawant, Gaurav C. “India Is No Pushover, We Are Not Scared of China: Salman Khurshid.” India Today, April 26, 2013. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/neighbours/story/china-india-china-incursion-indo-china-border-160085-2013-04-25>.

<sup>129</sup> Joshi, Manoj. “Indo-China Row Signals Breakdown of Confidence Building Measures.” ORF, June 8, 2020. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-china-row-signals-breakdown-of-confidence-building-measures-67469>.

<sup>130</sup> “Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation.” India Today. “India-China Trade Hits All Time High of USD 73.9 Billion in 2011,” January 29, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/business/world/story/india-china-trade-hits-all-time-high-of-usd-739-billion-in-2011-91292-2012-01-28>.

<sup>131</sup> The Hindu. “70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020],” March 31, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece>.

However, parallel to New Delhi's efforts at reconciliation and confidence building exercises the policy establishment continued recalling and referring to the 1962 humiliation in the domestic discourse on China. For instance, in 2002, following Zhu Rongji's meeting with PM Atal Behari Vajpayee and Indian Foreign Ministers' 5-day trip to China, an Indian news media outlet, *Rediffmail* commemorating the 40th anniversary of the war published a series of articles by retired Indian diplomats, military officers and policy observers.<sup>132</sup> Most of the opinion pieces, besides discussing the factors that led China to attack, recalled Chinese aggression against India, India's "crushing defeat",<sup>133</sup> reversals in NEFA civilians fleeing Tezpur,<sup>134</sup> lack of defence preparedness<sup>135</sup> and neglect of the country's defence needs by the civilian leadership,<sup>136</sup> advised caution on part of the government vis-à-vis China. Further, in 2012, the government besides celebrating the Year of India-China Friendship and Cooperation, commemorated the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1962 war, claiming that the humiliation of 1962 will not be repeated.<sup>137</sup> Also, during the period 2000-2013, as India and China were signing CBMs and advancing economic ties, further commemorative and insider accounts of the 1962 war were published like *The Diplomat's Diary* (T.N. Kaul, 2000), *A Clash of Political Cultures* (Amb. Sudarshan Bhutani, 2004), *Negotiating for India* (M J Desai 2006), *My China Diary* (K. Natwar Singh 2009), *I was Prisoner of War in China* (Lt. Col. K.N. Bakshi 2011), *Unknown and Unsung: Indian Air Force in Sino-Indian War* (2013), *Recollection of Se la and Bomdi la Debacle in 1962* (Maj. Gen. Jaidev Singh Dutta 2013). These accounts proffering their version of lack of defence planning and resources and Indian political and military leadership's failure to anticipate the attack reiterated suggestions of a more realistic China policy. Additionally, contrary to Indian President A.P. J. Abdul Kalam's statement in 2006 that the wound of 1962 had healed and that India and China aimed to come together<sup>138</sup>, the

<sup>132</sup> Rediff.com. "Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict," 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/indochin.htm>.

<sup>133</sup> Parsanis, R V. "Lest We Forget." Rediff.com, November 26, 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/27chin.htm>.

<sup>134</sup> Banerjee, P. "Fleeing Tezpur (Special Series: 40 Years after the Sino-Indian 1962 War)." Rediff.com, November 11, 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/11chin.htm>.

<sup>135</sup> Tewari, K K. "A PoW in Tibet (Special Series: 40 Years after the Sino-Indian 1962 War)." Rediff.com, November 5, 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/06chin.htm>.

<sup>136</sup> Sawant, Chittaranjan. "Ill-Armed, Ill-Clad, Ill-Trained (Special Series: 40 Years after the India-China War)." Rediff.com, October 22, 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/22chin.htm>.

<sup>137</sup> The Indian Express. "India of 2012 Is Not India of 1962: Antony," October 18, 2012. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/latest-news/india-of-2012-is-not-india-of-1962-antony/>.

<sup>138</sup> Bhattacharya, Pallab . "Wound of 1962 Has Healed: Kalam." Rediff.com, February 3, 2006. <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/kalam/20060203.htm>.

larger Indian strategic community, policy experts and former practitioners speculated whether there would be another attack by China in the near future. Accordingly, the government was urged to modernise India's defences and deal strongly with China because 1962 national humiliation was suffered due to the absence of a hard-nosed approach vis-à-vis China.<sup>139</sup> During the 2013 stand-off at Deshang, even as the government tried to downplay the event, the Opposition claimed that China's incursion into Indian territory in 2013 was as humiliating as the Chinese attack and occupation of land in 1962 and called on the government to "immediately drive out the Chinese".<sup>140</sup> The last and final phase of reconciliation began in 2014, however, ended with the Galwan Valley crisis in 2020, which led to the death of twenty Indian soldiers. Bilateral ties remained quite tense in this phase of reconciliation due to three border stand-offs in 2014, 2017 and 2020 and humiliation remained a constant theme in the discussions regarding India-China relations. Although the two countries sought to build trust and confidence with Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to India, informal summits between Xi and Modi in 2018 and 2019 to hold candid, in-depth discussions, sections of Indian policy elites suggesting that China could be trying to humiliate India again, urged the government to respond strongly.<sup>141</sup> For instance, in 2016, both the Indian President and Prime Minister visited China in May and September, respectively, to hold talks with Xi. Notably, on the 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Indian independence, the Film Directorate of India, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence re-screened the

---

<sup>139</sup> Raman, B. "India Finally Stands up to China." Rediff.com, June 22, 2007. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/raman/20070622.htm>. Krishnaswami, Sridhar. "Nehru Taken for a Ride by Chinese: CIA" Rediff.com, June 29, 2007. <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/cia/20070629.htm>. Gumaste, Vivek. "India and China: It Was a Stab from the Front." Rediff.com, August 25, 2009. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-a-stab-from-the-front/20090825.htm>. Sreenivasan, T. P. "India-China Relations Worse than in 1962!" Rediff.com, December 21, 2010. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-india-china-relations-worse-than-in-1962/20101221.htm>. Athale, A. A. "Can China and Pakistan Launch a Kargil-like Foray?" Rediff.com, October 12, 2011. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-can-china-and-pakistan-launch-a-kargil-like-foray/20111012.htm>. Taylor, John. "The Chinese Army Is Not Unpredictable like the Pakistan Army." Rediff.com, March 2, 2012. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-the-chinese-army-is-not-unpredictable-like-pakistan-army/20120302.htm>. Hariharan, R. "India-China Stand-off: Sun Tzu in Action." Rediff.com, May 3, 2013. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-india-china-stand-off-sun-tzu-in-action/20130503.htm>.

<sup>140</sup> "Fifteenth Lok Sabha Debates (Thirteenth Session, Vol.33, Issue No.26)." Lok Sabha Secretariat, April 29, 2013.

<sup>141</sup> Mohan, Geeta. "Modi-Xi Meet: India, China to Issue Separate Statements Today." India Today, October 12, 2019. <https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/modi-xi-meet-india-china-to-issue-separate-statements-today-1608513-2019-10-11>.

war movie *Haqeeqat*.<sup>142</sup> Thereafter, in 2017, as discussed in the previous chapter, during the Doklam crisis, a section of Indian commentators called on the government to avenge the defeat of the 1962 war. Further, in 2020, when negotiations for military disengagement were going on at the political, military and diplomatic levels, the Indian strategic community equated the Galwan clash and the death of twenty Indian soldiers as betrayal and humiliation faced during the 1962 war.

In the post-1962 period, the phenomenon of remembering humiliation while trying to reconcile, normalised the culture of harbouring a certain degree of distrust and suspicion in Indian policy elites' attitude towards China. The memory of humiliation with emphasis on the lack of pragmatic policy and negligence of defence needs as the cause of the debacle also suggests that China cannot be trusted as any political and military vulnerability can tempt Beijing to humiliate India again or reduce her status through calculated aggression, therefore, India cannot let its guard down vis-à-vis China even when cooperating on various issues. As discussed in the previous chapter 4 these notions are integral to Indian policy elites remembering of the war. On that account, while Indian leaders due to changing geostrategic and geoeconomic circumstances realised the unsustainability of adversarial relations with China and moved to generate trust and confidence in various phases to conduct bilateral ties, the simultaneous recalling of Chinese aggression, sustained fears about Chinese intentions and fuelled concerns that perceived loss of status vis-à-vis China could impact electoral fortunes. Thus, the state of shallow reconciliation or distrust, where we see a puzzling mix of partnership and distrust at the same time. Thereby, we see New Delhi engaging with Beijing across cultural, political, economic, and institutional issues, leading to many instances of meaningful cooperation, like a joint revival of Nalanda University in India in 2013<sup>143</sup>; IGNCAs and CNAs signing MOUs to jointly preserve and safeguard intangible cultural heritage in 2019;<sup>144</sup> exchange of political delegations in 2003, 2014, 2019 to enhance understanding of each other's political systems; Chinese investments in Indian startup, building institutions like BRICS, SCO, AIIB as alternative to west-led

---

<sup>142</sup> Dey, Swati. "This Festival Showed India's Freedom Movement Through Films." *Youth Ki Awaaz*, September 3, 2016. <https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2016/09/independence-day-film-festival/>.

<sup>143</sup> Embassy of India, Beijing. "Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Nalanda University." Accessed on May 14, 2024. [https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing\\_listview/ODQ1](https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing_listview/ODQ1).

<sup>144</sup> "Programme of Cultural Exchange Between the Government of India and The People's Republic of China For the Years 2019-2023." Ministry of Culture, Government of India, 2019.

multilateral institutions.<sup>145</sup> On the other side we also witness, MEA and the MOD carefully observing Chinese activities in South Asia and at the border; the government building infrastructure, increasing defence imports and undertaking defence modernisation to be able to conduct two-pronged conflict in view of China's increasing military capabilities, New Delhi rejecting 5G technology and restricting Chinese investments in critical and sensitive sectors and repeatedly assuring the public of the government's resolve to fend-off Chinese attack on occasions of border skirmishes.<sup>146</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The chapter addresses the final question raised by the thesis, that is why India's distrust towards China prevails and what is the role of memory and remembrance of the war in perpetrating the distrust. The chapter highlights that over the years New Delhi while deepening and diversifying its engagement with China have expressed its distrust of Chinese intentions and motives through public statements, writings and has demonstrated the same through defence modernisation, development of infrastructure near India-China border, undertaking measures to limit Chinese influence in the region and forging closer partnerships with other major powers like the US and Russia. The existing literature suggests four major reasons that the unresolved border dispute, increasing power asymmetry, Chinese influence in South Asia and Pakistan-China friendship as four major reasons for India's persistent distrust. However, the puzzle remains that India and China are now more connected than in the pre-1962 period through trade, institutional and organisational links, dialogue mechanisms, people to people exchanges. This, in turn, has opened channels of frequent and regular communication of concerns and modes of resolution of differences at various levels of government, military, business and civil society. However, India's distrust of China is far from removed. While the complexity of the geostrategic, economic and power asymmetries is too intense to be resolved through dialogue and discussions, it is also imperative to look into psychological factors of memory and remembrance that shape perceptions and attitudes which determine how the more tangible and perceptible factors evoking distrust will be managed.

---

<sup>145</sup> "70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020]."

<sup>146</sup> Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. "PSUs, Govt Bodies Sensitised to Chinese Investment, Tech." *The Economic Times*, June 7, 2023. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/psus-govt-bodies-sensitised-to-chinese-investment-tech/articleshow/100802613.cms?from=mdr>.

Delving into the memory and remembrance of Indian policy elites, the chapter notes that the remembrance of humiliation has been concurrent with India's attempts of reconciliation with China. Looking into different phases of reconciliation, that is from 1969-1976, 1980s to 1988, 1990 to 1998, 2000 to 2013 and 2014-2020, the chapter demonstrates that while New Delhi, on one hand, has strived to restore friendly relations with China at different times, the policy establishment back home has simultaneously recalled the war, Chinese aggression and evoked the memory of humiliation, cautioning the government to be vigilant against China and prepare for potential conflict to avoid repetition of 1962 like situation. In the long-run this, in turn, has normalised in the Indian political psyche the trend of harbouring distrust and suspicion of China as a pragmatic and realistic approach, seeing it as a departure from the idealism and romanticisation of China in the Nehru era, considered the primary cause of national weakness and debacle in 1962.

## CONCLUSION

India-China ties in the immediate aftermath of the clashes at Galwan Valley in June 2020, became extremely tense and confrontational. On the Indian side, the IAF airlifted over 68000 soldiers, 330 infantry combat vehicles, 90 tanks, several artillery guns and radar systems to Eastern Ladakh. Further, Su-30MKI and Jaguar jets were deployed for round-the-clock surveillance and intelligence gathering and several squadrons of combat aircraft were put in offensive posture.<sup>1</sup> According to media reports, China also ramped up its military presence along the border, increased training exercises and combat drills for commanders, officers and soldiers and mobilised more weapons to forward positions.<sup>2</sup> Reportedly, tensions between India and China extended through 2021 and 2022, even as diplomatic, political and military talks continued. Indian Army Chief General Manoj Pande informed in early January 2024 that the situation along the border with China in the Ladakh sector is stable but sensitive.<sup>3</sup> Members of the Indian strategic community contend that the incident of bloodshed and the rapid military mobilisation at the border is a watershed moment in India-China relations as it reset bilateral ties to function within a framework of antagonistic co-existence for the near future.<sup>4</sup>

At the official level, Indian leaders have expressed their concern about the future of the bilateral ties by repeatedly stating that the Galwan Valley crisis eroded India's trust on China. One year after the clashes, India's EAM S. Jaishankar declared in an international conference that "After 45 years, you've actually had bloodshed on the

---

<sup>1</sup> Bhuyan, Manash Pratim. "IAF Airlifted over 68,000 Soldiers to Eastern Ladakh Following Galwan Valley Clashes in 2020." *The Times of India*, August 14, 2023. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/iaf-airlifted-over-68000-soldiers-to-eastern-ladakh-following-galwan-valley-clashes-in-2020/articleshow/102700244.cms>. Pubby, Manu. "After Galwan, IAF's Airlift Led to Quick Deployment in Ladakh." *The Economic Times*, August 13, 2023. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iaf-airlifted-over-68000-soldiers-to-eastern-ladakh-following-galwan-valley-clashes/articleshow/102696655.cms?from=mdr>.

<sup>2</sup> Chan, Minnie. "PLA Got Ready to Fight after Gunfire Exchange with Indian Troops, Sources Say." *South China Morning Post*, September 16, 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3101663/china-india-border-dispute-pla-raised-combat-readiness-after>.

<sup>3</sup> Peri, Dinakar. "India, China Tensions Continued through 2021 and 2022, New Details Reveal." *The Hindu*, January 16, 2024. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-tensions-continued-through-2021-and-2022-new-details-reveal/article67746294.ece>.

<sup>4</sup> Set, Shounak, and Harsh V. Pant. "The Himalayan Barrier: India-China Relations since Galwan." *China Review* 23, no. 1 (2023): 135–59. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48717991>. Pathak, Sriparna, and Objā Borah Hazarika. "Reasons and Reactions to the Galwan Clash: An Indian Perspective." *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 9, no. 2 (2022): 83–101. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48684190>. Gokhale, Vijay. "The Road From Galwan." *The Road from Galwan: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30024.9>. Roy, "Galwan Clashes Left India's Relationship with China 'Profoundly Disturbed.'"

border.... And that's had a huge impact on public opinion and on political opinion... really the impact of trust and confidence in India where China and their relationship is concerned...because that has been profoundly disturbed".<sup>5</sup> Similarly, during Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's meeting with his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu in April 2023, he conveyed to the Chinese leadership the Indian perspective that violations at the LAC "eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations".<sup>6</sup> Same year, India's NSA Ajit Doval, in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, informed that the Galwan Valley crisis "eroded strategic trust and public and political basis of the relationship".<sup>7</sup>

Lack of sufficient trust or trust-deficit has been a long-standing issue in Sino-Indian relations. During the formative years of the bilateral ties, that is, in the 1950s, the two countries exhibited distrust towards each other even when they publicly sloganeered Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai and talked about civilisational friendship. India's first Prime Minister Nehru, remained apprehensive about China's motives with regard to Tibet, the un-demarcated border and the CCP supporting communist movements in India and the neighbouring countries of Nepal and Myanmar. Accordingly, New Delhi intervened to limit China's control on Tibet, moved to occupy Tawang in 1950, signed a treaty of friendship with Nepal and Bhutan, coordinated with Myanmar on its China policy, kept a close watch on the activities of the Indian communists and Chinese embassy in India and more importantly adopted a policy of friendship to abate threats from China.<sup>8</sup> Beijing, on its part, saw Nehru and other Indian political leaders as lackies of the US imperialism and suspected that India intended to follow imperialist policies of turning Tibet into a buffer zone between India and China and impose the McMahon Line. Thereby, China while maintaining cordial ties with India, proceeded to consolidate its position in Tibet and study the boundary question without raising it with New Delhi.<sup>9</sup> It is noteworthy that during this period, none of the countries talked about the trust-deficit

---

<sup>5</sup> Roy, "Galwan Clashes Left India's Relationship with China 'Profoundly Disturbed'."

<sup>6</sup> Singh, "Rajnath Singh Takes Hard Line on LAC Row, Says It Has Eroded India-China Ties."

<sup>7</sup> Laskar, Rezaul H. "LAC Situation Has 'Eroded Strategic Trust', NSA Doval Tells Chinese Counterpart Wang." Hindustan Times, July 25, 2023. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/lac-situation-has-eroded-strategic-trust-nsa-doval-tells-chinese-counterpart-wang-101690263141315.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Sen, Tansen. "Introduction." In *India, China, and the World A Connected History*, 1–27. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

<sup>9</sup> Dai, "China's Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962." Gokhale, Vijay. "A Historical Evaluation of China's India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations," December 13, 2022. <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/3336738/a-historical-evaluation-of-chinas-india-policy/4135558/>.

in bilateral ties instead, they strived to maintain an image of mutual understanding and Asian brotherhood to the international audience.

Following the 1962 conflict, the distrust in Sino-Indian relations became pronounced and overtly expressed by the two sides. Leaders on both sides time and again acknowledged the lack of strategic and political trust and called for building mutual trust and confidence to sustain bilateral ties. Over the years, various measures including de-linking of the border dispute from other aspects of the bilateral ties, establishment of a JWG, signing of Agreements on maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border regions and cooperation in border defence, appointment of Special Representatives, organisation of multi-level dialogues, establishment of a hotline between ground commanders along the LAC, among others have been undertaken to develop mutual trust and understanding between the two parties. However, the trust-deficit has widened, rendering bilateral ties fragile.

Scholars and policy commentators highlight certain factors like the unresolved border dispute, geopolitical competition in South and South-east Asia, third party ties and threat perceptions that work on both sides to evoke mutual distrust and suspicion. For instance, Beijing views New Delhi's insistence on sector-by-sector negotiation and settlement of disputes according to demographic settlement as intended to exact concessions from Beijing without making reciprocal meaningful concessions in the western sector. Further, China also perceives that India's suggestions of demarcating the LAC across the border are aimed to expand the area of dispute.<sup>10</sup> On the Indian side, New Delhi perceives that China is not interested in resolving the border dispute in order to maintain strategic pressure on India. Furthermore, with aggressive infrastructure building, Beijing intends to enforce a status quo on India.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, on the other issues of geopolitical competition in South and South-east Asia and third-party ties (China-Pakistan and India-US), both sides attribute policy of containment as the driving force for engagement. New Delhi believes China's engagement with South Asian countries especially Pakistan is aimed towards encircling India and containing

---

<sup>10</sup> Bajpai, Kanti. *India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends*. Juggernaut Publication India, 2021. Lin, Minwang. "China's Stance on the Sino-Indian Border Issue and Roadmap for a Resolution." In *India and China: Building Strategic Trust*, edited by Rajiv Narayanan and Prof. Qiu Yonghui, 75–88. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2020.

<sup>11</sup> Aiyengar, "A Perspective on India-China Relations." Ramchandran, "Manoj Joshi on Why China Wants Its Border With India to Remain Unsettled." Menon, "At LAC, China Is Not Settling 'disputed' Borders. It's Containing India."

its rise while China contends that India's Look East/Act East Policy, cooperation with the US on QUAD and IPEF is focused on propagating 'China threat theory' and containing China's rise.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, while New Delhi harbours apprehension that the increasing power gap will make China more coercive towards India, Beijing fears that with the rapid expansion of the Indian Navy, New Delhi will dominate the Indian Ocean and pose a threat to the SLOCs crucial for China.<sup>13</sup>

In New Delhi's case, the legacy or the memories of the 1962 war are considered as an additional factor in enduring India's distrust towards China. Observers contend that while Beijing downplays the conflict, in India, memories of the 1962 war are vivid. In this context, Tien-sze Fang notes that the memory of the 1962 war remains a factor solely in India's perception and its evocation within the Indian strategic intellectual space contributes to shaping India's distrust towards China.<sup>14</sup> Amit R. Dasgupta and Lorenz Luthi too contend that most Chinese do not know about the 'Self-Defence/Couter-Attack war' and there is almost a complete lack of the war's influence on China's domestic and foreign policy compared to India where the conflict remains a sensitive issue and shapes India's attitude towards China.<sup>15</sup> Emphasising the prominence of the memory of the war in the domestic political setting, Indian scholars argue that the 1962 war left a "deep scar" on the national psyche, which India continues to carry.<sup>16</sup> The border war, although it lasted for 42 days, permanently scarred the psyche of Indian bureaucratic, military and political leadership and the national

---

<sup>12</sup> Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations." Kumar, "China's South Asia Policy in the 'New Era.'" Ghoshal, Baladas. "China's Perception of 'Look East Policy' and Its Implications ." New Delhi: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2013. <https://www.idsa.in/monograph/ChinasPerceptionofLookEastPolicyandItsImplications>. Gan, Nectar. "Analysis: China Is Alarmed by the Quad. But Its Threats Are Driving the Group Closer Together." CNN, May 23, 2022. <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/china/quad-summit-china-threat-analysis-intl-hnk-mic/index.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Pardesi, Manjeet S. "Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India." *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 4 (June 23, 2010): 562–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0970016100380276>. Pant, *The Rise of China*.

<sup>14</sup> Singh, Prashant Kumar. "Book Review: Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India–China Relations by Tien-Sze Fang. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 266, INR 795." *Journal of Defence Studies* 9, no. 4 (December 2015): 145–50.

<sup>15</sup> Gupta, Amit Das, and Lorenz M. Luthi, eds. "Introduction." In *The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

<sup>16</sup> Singh, Swaran. "India–China Relations: Perception, Problems, Potential." *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 2008): 83–98. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500106>.

Rana, "Scarred by War, Nehru Destroyed Message from Zhou." Chakravorty, Pk. "Sino-Indian War of 1962." *Indian Historical Review* 44, no. 2 (December 2017): 285–312. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0376983617726649>.

humiliation continues to haunt India's national consciousness.<sup>17</sup> It is opined that the "scar of the 1962 war runs through India's heart.... and injured national psyche is not easy to repair".<sup>18</sup> Further, this 'scar' has injected pessimism and has reduced confidence in bilateral relationship.<sup>19</sup>

Despite widespread recognition of the prominence of the 1962 war memory in the Indian national elite psyche and its influence in perpetrating New Delhi's distrust towards China, very few research publications have appeared on this aspect. Studies on India's memory of the 1962 war have been cursory, limited to analysing what India remembers in terms of betrayal and humiliation. In 2012, Dibyesh Anand argued in an article that in India, the war is recalled primarily as a betrayal; one blaming the Chinese expansionism and the other PM Nehru for his naïve idealism and trusting the Chinese. He observes that these betrayal narratives are based on the assumption of the legitimacy of Indian claims, the unexpected Chinese aggression and lastly, the failure of Indian political leadership.<sup>20</sup> Contradicting Anand's view, in 2017, Jabin T. Jacob, in a survey of remembrance of the war on its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2012 argued that India's remembrance of the war is layered and consists of several themes like lessons of the 1962 war, reasons for political and military failure and understanding of China.<sup>21</sup> Same year, Devesh Kapur, commenting on the use of memories by Asian countries to advance their respective regional agenda, observes that India, rankled by the memory of the humiliation of the 1962 war, had itself inflicted humiliation on Pakistan in 1971, which is celebrated in India as 'Vijay Diwas'. As a hierarchy of humiliation persist in Asia, the humiliation inflicted on one's own country is considered vitally important than that inflicted on the other country.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Jacob, Jabin T. "The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute: Sub-National Units as Ice-Breakers." *Eurasia Border Review* 2, no. 1 (2011): 35–45. <https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/50850>. Ahlawat, Dalbir, and Lindsay Hughes. "India–China Stand-off in Doklam: Aligning Realism with National Characteristics." *The Round Table* 107, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 613–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2018.1530376>. Rao, Nirupama. "Introduction." In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

<sup>18</sup> Dutta, Sujit. "Scars of 1962." *The Hindu*, October 27, 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Bhattacharya, "Sixty Years of India–China Relations."

<sup>20</sup> Anand, Dibyesh. "Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory ." *Journal of Defence Studies* 6, no. 4 (2012): 229–48.

<sup>21</sup> Gupta and Luthi, "The Sino-Indian War of 1962," chap. Remembering 1952 in India, 50 years on. 233-252.

<sup>22</sup> Kapur, Devesh. "Asia's Hierarchies of Humiliation." Project Syndicate, July 12, 2017 <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asia-hierarchies-of-humiliation-by-devesh-kapur-2017-07>.

The point of note is that these writings provide a generalised understanding of the war memory and do not delve in-depth into very important questions like; how the war memories of betrayal and humiliation were constructed? how the war memories were propagated across generations and, most importantly, how the 1962 war memory and its remembrance sustain India's policy elites' distrust towards China. The thesis addresses this research gap and undertakes a rigorous study of the war memory and its role in sustaining Indian policy elites' distrust towards China. Here, a point of note is that the study focuses on war memories of Indian policy elites or the Indian strategic community consisting of political leaders from ruling/opposition parties, bureaucrats, career diplomats, military personnel, public intellectuals, commentators in the media, scholars at the universities and think-tanks. The project identifies three core questions; first, how the memory narratives of the 1962 war were constructed and disseminated in the public arena? Second, how the remembrance of the war has evolved in the six decades since the war and what is the dominant war memory discourse and finally how war memories impact India's policy elites' distrust towards China?

In order to answer these questions, the study proceeds in three phases. The first phase delves into exploring and analysing the construction of the 1962 war memory. The first two chapters that is, *From Brothers to Rivals: India's Memory Politics* and *India-China Border War and Narrative Building* are part of the first phase of the study. Memories represent a sanitised and selective version of history or historical events. The process by which these selective versions are formed and embedded in the national psyche is influenced by several factors like political context, interest of policy elites, distribution of power within society and deliberate acts of inclusion and exclusion of events. Similarly, India's policy elites' war memories of betrayal and humiliation too crystallised within a particular political context and were influenced by the goals and objectives of the political leadership, the power dynamics in the 1960s and selective exclusion and narrative building. The first two chapters of this thesis deals with these issues.

The first chapter, *From Brothers to Rivals: India's Memory Politics* traces the basis of the formation of the war memories of betrayal and humiliation. To that end, the chapter looks into the formative years of the bilateral ties, that is, from 1949 (establishment of diplomatic ties between India and China) to 1958 (emergence of the border dispute and tensions along the border publicly). The narratives of betrayal and humiliation project

the 1962 war as a time of Indian victimisation. According to this portrayal, India was wronged by China and suffered military humiliation due to misplaced trust in the Chinese leadership and neglect of the country's defence and security needs, thinking that the Chinese would not initiate an attack. This chapter notes that this simplistic representation of the conflict as betrayal and humiliation was itself based on sanitised memory narratives of history of Sino-Indian bilateral ties, that is, '2000 years of civilisational friendship' and 'shared anti-colonial struggle'. At the time of India's independence in 1947, the international system was fractured owing to Cold War tensions between the US and the SU. The international system was divided into two camps, that is, liberal democracies and communists, the two powers vigorously competed in different geographical spaces, especially in Asia and Africa (where newly independent countries were emerging) to carve out spheres of influence. Then Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru saw this as inimical to India's core national priorities of maintaining foreign policy independence, achieving economic development and elevating India's position as a leading actor at the global stage. In order to achieve these policy objectives, New Delhi rejected Cold War alliance systems; Indian policy leaders like Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Rajendra Prasad, along with PM Nehru, repeatedly emphasised India's commitment to independent decision-making in domestic and foreign policy issues. Second, New Delhi strove to shape a peaceful external environment conducive to India's economic development. To this end, India attempted to geopolitically stabilise Asia and limit the spill-over of Cold War tensions by diplomatically intervening in the Indo-China and Formosa crisis. Finally, India moved to play a proactive role in international diplomacy to mitigate Cold War tensions. As Nehru was keenly aware of India's lack of military and economic capabilities, two important prerequisites to command a major power role, he emphasised India's civilisational heritage, anti-colonial credentials and non-violent independence movement to project moral superiority as the basis of India's demand for leadership position.

Owing to China's geographical proximity to India, size and potential to play a crucial role in international politics, Nehru perceived China to be an important player vis-à-vis India's strategic interests. First, China's foreign policy position with regard to Cold War politics was thought would impact India's external strategic environment. Second, China was seen as a stabilising factor in the Asian security environment and finally,

friendly diplomatic ties with China were expected to enable India to play a greater role at the international level as a bridge between communist and liberal democratic camps. Therefore, maintaining cordial diplomatic ties with China became a cornerstone of India's foreign policy.

In this regard, New Delhi, besides, extending friendly gestures like early recognition of the PRC, supporting China's membership in the UN or extending diplomatic support to the Chinese leadership during the Korean crisis, also propagated memory frames of '2000 years of civilisational friendship' and 'shared anti-colonial struggle' in its diplomatic discourse vis-à-vis China. This was done to shape India's image as a friendly country in the Chinese mind and present to the Chinese leadership a model of peaceful and friendly ties that could be replicated in the post-independence period. Indian policy elites, in their public pronouncements called for 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai', referring to 2000 years of peaceful ties between the two countries through cultural and economic linkages and shared colonial victimisation and anti-colonial struggle. It is noteworthy, that the advent of colonialism was alleged to be the cause of disruption of the peaceful ties.

The government also expended considerable political capital to institutionalise this narrative of the history of bilateral ties through repeated public proclamations, facilitating friendly exchanges and setting up "India-China Friendship Associations". In effect, these memory narratives were drawn from the Pan-Asian movement that promoted an idea of unity and fraternity between Asian powers against the colonial powers by virtue of historical contacts, cultural commonalities and shared cultural values. The Pan-Asian movement had glossed over dissimilarities, hierarchies and instances of violent exchanges between Asian countries to project an image of Asian brotherhood. Likewise, the narratives of civilisational friendship and shared anti-colonial struggle eluded the uneasy details of the marginal nature of economic and cultural contact between Indian and Chinese kingdoms much before the arrival of colonial powers, persecution of Buddhists in China during the Tang and Song dynasties, perception of the common Chinese of Indian opium traders and Sikh soldiers as collaborators of the British which continued even after independence and the starkly different trajectories of their independence struggles. More importantly, the exaggerated accounts of friendship and the networks to reinforce the same did not lead to any real emotional involvement in the bilateral ties. In the 1950s, notwithstanding

the slogans of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' tensions between the two countries were brewing over Tibet, the border dispute and for the leadership of the third-world countries. Also, Indian leaders, including Nehru, expressed in private their apprehensions about Chinese expansionism, PLA's presence in Tibet and its implication on the un demarcated border and the possibility of conflict between the two countries. Further, Nehru himself cautioned Indian diplomats to deal with China firmly as any show of weakness would lead to exploitation by Beijing.

The key takeaways of the chapter are that India in order to advance friendly ties with China propagated a sanitised version of bi-lateral history in the form of '2000 years of civilisational friendship' and 'shared anti-colonial struggle'. However, neither the historical ties were deep, nor relations became close and friendly during the formative years. Second, trust-deficit was latent in bilateral ties since the onset of diplomatic relations. The memory narratives merely fostered a superficial sense of understanding of China (primarily in India). In effect, the lack of real understanding of China in the Indian policy elites left issues of concern like Tibet and the border dispute unattended, despite New Delhi being aware of the divergences in views.

Moving to the second chapter, *India-China Border War and Narrative Building*, the project delves deeper into the memory building process. It argues that the propaganda campaign that was launched by the Indian government in the wake of the 1962 war to shape the nations and the external audience's understanding of the conflict and its causes, strategically placed the war as betrayal and humiliation perpetrated by China in disregard of 2000 years of civilisational friendship and shared anti-colonial struggle. In the process, New Delhi elided the complex bilateral situation that led to the war and promulgated a simplistic self-glorifying narrative.

During the early 1950s, notwithstanding the calls for 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai', the establishment of India-China Friendship Associations and exchange of friendly visits, signs of diplomatic strain appeared in bilateral ties over Tibet and the disputed border. New Delhi, although outwardly remained dismissive of any threat being posed to India due to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, did not take PLA's military intervention lightly. In 1950, the Indian government, in a protest note to Beijing, termed the Chinese invasion of Tibet 'deplorable' and privately extended limited diplomatic and military assistance to the Tibetans to resist the PLA. Post-1950 occupation, Nehru also tried to

leverage Indo-Tibetan trade to reduce the PLA's presence in Tibet and continued to provide diplomatic assistance to the Dalai Lama to limit Chinese dominance. With regard to the disputed border, New Delhi remained displeased with Chinese maps' representation of Indian territories on the Chinese side and ordered the strengthening of Indian civil and military presence along the border. Beijing, too on, its part, resented India's sympathy for Dalai Lama and Tibetan autonomy and alleged that India's perceptions were being influenced by foreign elements hostile to China. On the border issue, the CCP leadership concluded that India's position on the border dispute and McMahon Line was a continuance of the British policy of expansionism.

One of the primary reasons for the tensions was that both India and China failed to timely address the complexities introduced into these issues by their colonial and imperial predecessors respectively. The two countries, despite being aware of each other's position on Tibet and the border dispute, adopted an evasive approach that increased the complexity and ambiguity. Archival records reveal that New Delhi was aware of the subsequent Chinese government's claim over Tibet and rejection of the McMahon Line. Beijing, too, had noted India's occupation of Tawang and proclamations about the McMahon Line. However, for a prolonged period, India and China avoided direct talks on the political status of Tibet and the McMahon Line until the border dispute surfaced openly. Furthermore, during the negotiation of the Panchsheel Treaty in 1955, both countries expressly instructed their respective negotiators not to discuss the border dispute or the McMahon Line.

The year 1958 marked a turning point in bilateral ties. Tensions deepened over differing interpretations of the border's location leading to perceived intrusions. Chinese concerns regarding the activities of the Dalai Lama's supporters in Kalimpong and India's objection to Chinese maps added to the friction. The unravelling of bilateral ties continued from 1959-1962. Reports of Chinese excesses in Tibet, Chinese construction of highway in Aksai Chin and border clashes inflamed public opinion in India, pressurising New Delhi to adopt a hard-line stance towards China. Similarly, criticism of CCP's policies in Tibet and calls for military action against China by a section of Indian political leaders and public intellectuals, outbreak of armed resistance in Tibet in 1959, India's granting of asylum to Dalai Lama in 1960 deeply angered Beijing. Subsequently, the sense of animosity between both countries heightened, diplomatic protest notes became sharper against each other with accusations of

transgression and expansionism, talks between Zhou Enlai and Nehru and the political officers in 1960 failed owing to intense distrust between the two countries, forward patrolling by the PLA and the Indian Army caused frequent clashes.

The outbreak of conflict in October 1962 and the Indian army's military reverses resulted in severe criticism of Nehru's China policy at both the national and international level. In Parliament and the press, the government was accused of credulity and neglect of India's security needs. Serious doubts were expressed regarding the Indian Army's capability to protect India's territorial integrity and security and the government faced a no-confidence motion in 1963. Suggestions were also floated about constituting a separate wartime leadership as then government led by Nehru was perceived as incapable of conducting wartime operations. International observers held the conflict as vindication of the West's fear against communism and described Nehru's non-alignment approach as impractical and dangerous.

In an attempt to manage public discourse surrounding the conflict and to cultivate a favourable perception of the government and the army, New Delhi launched a massive propaganda campaign, whereby the Chinese attack was projected as betrayal and humiliation and the Indian Army as brave soldiers defending India's territorial integrity. Immediately following China's attack in 1962, the State Information Bureau was instructed to publicise India's account and mobilise the press to align it with the government's position. Thereafter, Nehru's national speech of 22 October denouncing China for unabashed aggression against India and appreciating the Army's courage was reprinted by national dailies like the Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Times of India to disseminate the government's viewpoint. In order to further solidify this perspective in the national psyche, the narrative of betrayal and humiliation by China and the sacrifice of the Indian Army was disseminated across the country through public speeches, demonstrations, resolutions, posters, commentaries in the press and official documentaries. Official publications like 'China's Betrayal of India: Background to the Invasion' and official documentaries like *The Chinese Threat* and *United We Stand* emphasising Chinese duplicity and Indian resilience were also circulated. Indian officials and diplomats in foreign missions were asked to convey to the international audience that China had committed unprovoked aggression in return for India's constant friendship and India intended to resist it with full force.

The chapter yields two key insights regarding the construction of the war memory surrounding the 1962 war. First, the pre-existing narratives of a 2,000-year civilizational friendship and shared anti-colonial struggle formed the foundation for portraying the Chinese offensive as a betrayal and humiliation. The narratives of civilisational friendship and shared anti-colonial struggle were given a sense of historical footing and it was opined that the Chinese, in disregard of these factors wrongfully launched military action against India, disrupting centuries of peaceful ties. Second, while constructing the narrative of unprovoked Chinese aggression and duplicity juxtaposed against Indian innocence, the state also excluded several intricate details like the lack of clear policy of the British predecessors regarding the status of Tibet and rejection of the McMahon line by both Lhasa and Beijing, India's knowledge about the Aksai Chin road since 1952, and suggestions by certain parliamentarians and army officials to initiate military action against China. Consequently, the national psyche internalised a simplistic victim-glorifying and other-vilifying narrative overlooking the spatial, temporal and perceptual complexities which led to the outbreak of the war.

The second phase of the thesis, in the form of the third chapter, *Decoding India's Memorialisation and Remembrance of 1962 War*, shifts its focus to the post-conflict period, investigating the evolution of the war's remembrance over the past six decades. This phase also analyses the dominant memory discourse surrounding the Sino-Indian War within the Indian strategic community.

It is noteworthy that the state intervened hugely to shape public remembrance of the 1962 war immediately after the cessation of hostilities in November 1962. For instance, public records and the Henderson Brooks Bhagat Report, potentially contradicting the government narrative, were classified. However, selective information contained in government pamphlets about the war was disseminated as scholarly references. Further, the policy elites, including PM Nehru, used political messaging to maintain a certain understanding of the war by reiterating narratives of betrayal and humiliation by China through public speeches, writings and other official documents. Further, literature from China, especially dealing with Tibet and the border dispute was banned. Also, the government sanctioned cultural productions for mass circulation like war films, documentaries, music and other literary works, showcasing Indian military bravery at the face of Chinese perfidy and ruthlessness.

However, parallel to the government's efforts of memorialising the war as an event of betrayal and humiliation, calls intensified within sections of the Indian strategic community to identify internal actors responsible for military reverses. A counter-discourse emerged, which, although it did not challenge the narrative of Chinese perfidy, but saw the war as a debacle caused by political and military leadership's naivete, failure to assess military threat from China and prepare India's defences accordingly.

Recalling and retrospection about the war began a few years after Nehru's death. The demise of the primary architect of India's foreign policy and the Indian Army's resuscitation in 1965 created the space for revisiting the past. Beginning from the 1967 publication of B M Kaul's (considered one of the architect's India's military response) *The Untold Story*, till the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, several political, military and civilian leaders who were closely associated with the war or had an insider perspective published their accounts.<sup>23</sup>

Besides these retrospective analyses, the Sino-Indian War also remained a persistent topic of public discourse. References to the conflict were woven into public discussions, parliamentary debates, and writings on India-China relations. Notably, certain recurring themes in these retrospective works, writings and discussions were military reverses, mistakes in tactical and strategic decision-making and an accompanying sense of humiliation. Inadequate defence preparedness was seen as the cause of military reverses and related consequences and this failure was attributed by some to Indian leadership's misplaced trust in Chinese pronouncements and uncritical acceptance of Beijing's assurances. However, some analysts argued that the military and the intelligence had failed to prepare as well as strongly convey the threat from China to the political leadership. In this regard, some of these works, highlighting

---

<sup>23</sup> Some of the major works were, Cabinet Secretary S.S. Khera *India's Defence Problem* (1968) and Defence Secretary P.V.R. Rao's *Defence without a Drift* (1970), veteran journalist, D R Mankekar's *The Guilty Men of 1962 War* (1968), Commander of the 7th Brigade in NEFA in 1962 and a PoW, J.P. Dalvi's *The Himalayan Blunder* (1969), Press Officer to Home Minister in 1962, Kuldip Nayar's *Between the Lines* (1969), Intelligence Bureau Director, B N Mullik's *My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal* (1970), Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt's *With Nehru in Foreign Office*, (1977), *Division Commander in NEFA during 1962 conflict*, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad's *Fall of Towang* (1981), Indian Charge de Affairs to China after the outbreak of the 1962 war, P.K. Banerjee's *My Peking Memoirs of Chinese Invasion of India* (1990), Director of Military Operations during 1962 war, D.K. Palit's *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis* (1991), former Prime Minister P .V. Narasimha Rao's *The Insider* (1997), personal secretary to Defence Minister in 1962, R D Pradhan's, *Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65* (1999) a close confidante of Nehru T.N. Kaul's, *A Diplomat's Diary* (2000).

instances like China's rejection of the McMahon Line after signing of the Panchsheel Treaty in 1955, gradual infrastructure building and mobilisation of troops in Tibet and the launch of a two-pronged attack in 1962, opined that Indian leaders were unable to match the clever and hard-headed approach that China took with regard to India-China relations. It is noteworthy, that while this body of literature held the government and military accountable for their actions, it did not fundamentally challenge the narratives of Chinese duplicity. Instead, it attributed the national humiliation to political naiveté, specifically a misplaced trust in China and a failure to adopt a more realistic foreign policy approach towards that nation.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Indian strategic community's recollection of the war has persistently centred around the theme of national humiliation and debacle, perceived to have been caused due to Indian political-military leadership's failure to appreciate and timely respond to the security threat posed by China. During the commemoration of the 50<sup>th</sup> and the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1962 war in 2012 and 2022 respectively and the 2017 Doklam and the 2020 Galwan Valley crisis, when recalling the 1962 war surged surrounding these events, a large section of Indian commentators recalled India's lack of understanding of Chinese intent, Indian Army's military weakness vis-à-vis the PLA, the national humiliation suffered due to military reverses in NEFA, India's loss of prestige amongst third world countries and opportunity for New Delhi to avenge the 1962 defeat. The government, too, without explicitly referencing the humiliation, asserted that successive Indian governments had learnt lessons from the 1962 war, and a similar outcome would not be repeated. While certain observers reflected on the Chinese betrayal of Nehru's friendship, its continued tendency to do so and the Indian Army's valour despite lacking logistical support, the national elite psyche remained preoccupied with the narratives of the 1962 war as humiliation and debacle.

The chapter demonstrates that by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the memory frames of civilizational friendship and anti-colonial struggle are replaced by memory narratives of betrayal and humiliation. This transformation occurred largely due to state propaganda campaigns and the government's attempts to shape remembrance of the war. These state-sanctioned representations are entrenched in the elite psyche and have not been challenged even sixty years after the war. Second, it is also noteworthy that while memories of betrayal and humiliation co-exist, the memory of the war as an event of debacle and national humiliation has been more dominant in the elite psyche, probably

due to the power gap between the two countries. This dominant narrative of humiliation, while blames the Indian leadership for misplaced trust and faulty assessment of Chinese intentions, it also implicitly enforces that the Chinese are not trustworthy and New Delhi needs to be constantly vigilant against Beijing.

The final part of the thesis addresses the question of how memory and remembrance of the war as humiliation and debacle impacts India's distrust towards China.

The fourth chapter, *Remembering 1962: War Memory and India's Distrust towards China* notes that in order to build trust in bilateral ties in post-conflict situation the two countries have to genuinely reconcile, where there is no expectation of violence and preparation for conflict and economic relations are smooth with shared feeling of harmony in interests.

In that context, post 1962 conflict, despite the restoration of ambassadorial level ties, India and China fell short of achieving genuine reconciliation, thus hindering the establishment of trust. For instance, the Indian policy establishment continues to harbour concern about another 1962-like or larger armed conflict with China in the long-term.<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, India's defence modernisation has been geared primarily to meet the eventuality of a Chinese attack or two-front war with Pakistan and China. New Delhi raised special divisions like SSF and Brahmastra (XVII) for mountain warfare and created SSB to conduct guerilla warfare against PLA in the event of another Chinese attack across the border. Further, India also advanced its missile defence capabilities, adding a nuclear component to it to reduce military vulnerability vis-à-vis China. With regard to smooth economic relations, while trade volume between the two countries have increased significantly to cross 130 billion, it remains a contentious political issue. Indian commentators and policy observers time and again call for import curbs or ban on Chinese goods, citing increasing trade-deficit between the countries. The government, too, is extremely wary of Chinese technology like 5G and investments in sensitive sectors like banking, IT, infrastructure building among others. Furthermore, New Delhi remains suspicious and wary of Chinese presence in India's neighbourhood and sees China's diplomatic-military support to Pakistan as aimed to counter India's rise.

---

<sup>24</sup> Very recently, following the Galwan Valley clashes in 2024, India's Chief of Army Staff expressed that transgressions along the border can escalate to conflict.

Despite years of efforts towards reconciliation, factors like the unresolved border dispute, geostrategic competition, threat perception and third-party ties have impeded the process and intensified distrust in the Indian elite psyche. However, an additional and often overlooked challenge has been that India's attempts at reconciliation have always been shadowed by its memory and remembrance of the war as a humiliation. Meaning, New Delhi on one hand has tried to advance bilateral ties and reconcile with China, on the other, back at home, Indian policy elites have simultaneously recalled Chinese aggression, humiliation India faced in 1962, cautioning that India should not let its guard down vis-à-vis China despite talks of cooperation. For instance, during the first phase of reconciliation from 1969-1976, a number of first-hand accounts of the 1962 war were published, which termed China as an expansionist power and recalling the humiliation, urged the government to ensure that India's security and defence is not compromised again. At the same time, the Indian political opposition, too, speculating the possibility of future conflict, urged the government to prepare for war in order to avoid 1962-like humiliation. Similarly, in the 1980s, despite the Rajiv Gandhi government intensifying the reconciliation efforts, then Foreign Minister P V Narasimha Rao rejected China's package deal, citing that the arrangement did not address Indian humiliation. Further, evoking the spectre of humiliation during the Sumdorong Chu crisis in 1986, Indian policy elites urged the government to remain vigilant. In the 1990s when negotiations for Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control were ongoing, India's Ministry of Defence published the official history of the 1962 conflict, stating that the war was caused due to Chinese expansionism and assured that India was making necessary preparations to avoid another debacle in future conflict. Notably, in 1998, two years after signing of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in Military, the Indian policy establishment justified India's nuclear states citing the 1962 war and the prevailing atmosphere of distrust between the two countries.

Moving on to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, from 2000-2013, amidst high-level delegation exchanges, increasing bilateral trade, signing agreements on confidence building measures and border defence and celebration of the India-China Year of Friendship, a number of commemorative works by former government officials and military personnel appeared lamenting New Delhi's lack of understanding of the Chinese leadership and failure to anticipate the attack. The Indian strategic community also

commemorated the 40<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1962 war in 2002 and 2012, reiterating suggestions of military preparedness and vigilance against China to avoid national humiliation. Furthermore, in 2013, as India signed BDCA with China, the government also established the XVII Brahmastra Corps as a quick-reaction and counter-offensive force against China across LAC. Finally, from 2014-2020, even as the two countries held informal summits in 2018 and 2019, established hotline between military commanders, New Delhi sanctioned several projects to modernise infrastructure in the ecologically fragile border regions, citing military defeat during the 1962 war. Further, India's Foreign Ministry directed its foreign missions to carefully watch Chinese activities while improving ties and imposed multiple restrictions on Chinese business and investment in India, citing national security threats.

The phenomenon of remembering humiliation that makes China untrustworthy while trying to reconcile has normalised the culture of distrust as a pragmatic policy approach as opposed to the perceived romanticisation of the Nehru period. The Indian strategic community accepts that while complete estrangement between the two countries is not practical and both countries will have to take measures to manage differences, humiliation seems entrenched in the Indian psyche, primarily due to the cycle of remembrance that India cannot let its guard down vis-à-vis China as political military vulnerability could tempt Beijing to humiliate India again.

This thesis has looked into the trust-deficit in India-China bilateral ties from India's perspective and has attempted to analyse the role of memory and remembrance of the 1962 war in sustaining New Delhi's distrust towards China. However, it is noteworthy that the distrust is mutual. Beijing, too, remains wary of India's military modernisation, engagement with South east and East Asia and deepening of political and military ties with the US. It acknowledges the need to undertake research to explore how Chinese memories of the 1962 war affect Beijing's distrust towards Indian leadership.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### **Primary Sources**

- “Annual Report 2002-2003.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2003.
- “Annual Report of The Ministry of External Affairs for 1962-63.” New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, January 1, 1962.
- “ABKM 2011: Need for Comprehensive Strategic Initiative for National Security.” RSS, 2011. <https://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx>.
- “ABPS 2011: Defeat Chinese Designs against Our National Interests and Security.” RSS, 2011. <https://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx>.
- “Annual Report 1962-1963.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1963.
- “Annual Report 2003-2004.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2004.
- “Annual Report 2004-2005.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2005.
- “Annual Report 2005-2006.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2006.
- “Annual Report 2006-2007.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2007.
- “Annual Report 2007-2008.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2008.
- “Annual Report 2009-2010.” New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2010.
- China’s Betrayal of India: Background to the Invasion.* Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1962.
- “Eighth Session Lok Sabha Debates (Vol. 24, Issue No. 4).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 27, 1987.
- Embassy of India, Beijing. “India-China Political Relations,” January 30, 2023. [https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing\\_pages/MjM,](https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing_pages/MjM,)
- Embassy of India, Beijing. “Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Nalanda University.” Accessed May 14, 2024. [https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing\\_listview/ODQ1](https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibeijing_listview/ODQ1).
- “Exchange of Goodwill Missions between India and China. Visit of China Cultural

- Delegation Is India (1951) Correspondence with Indian Embassy.” National Archives of India, File No. 786-CJK/50, 1950.
- “Fifteenth Lok Sabha Debates (Thirteenth Session, Vol.33, Issue No.26).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, April 29, 2013.
- “Fifteenth Session Lok Sabha Debates ( Second Series No.7).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 28, 1961.
- “Fifteenth Session Lok Sabha Debates (Second Series, No.15).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, December 7, 1961.
- “File No. 4(1)/62: Miscellaneous-Message from Different Bodies, Individuals Etc. on Chinese Aggression.” Ministry Of External Affairs, National Archives of India, 1962.
- Films Division. “Catalogue, Archives.” <https://filmsdivision.org/film-catalogue.html>, n.d.
- “India-China Bilateral Relations.” Ministry of External Affairs , May 12, 2023. [www.mea.gov.in](http://www.mea.gov.in).
- “India-China Bilateral Relations.” Ministry of External Affairs, n.d. [www.mea.gov.in](http://www.mea.gov.in).
- India-China Border Problem*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962.
- Leading Events in India-China Relations, 1947-1962*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962.
- “Menace to Freedom: Text of Broadcast to the Nation October 22, 1962.” In *Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression*, 1–4. New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1963.
- “Message of All China Federation of Trade Union , Peking for the First Conference of Indo China Friendship Association.” Digitized Private Papers, P.K. Malviya, National Archives of India, January 1, 1955.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China. “China and India.” Accessed May 13, 2024. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq\\_665435/2675\\_665437/2711\\_663426/#:~:text=The%20year%202012%20is%20declared,Conference%20on%20Sustainable%20Development%20respectively](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2711_663426/#:~:text=The%20year%202012%20is%20declared,Conference%20on%20Sustainable%20Development%20respectively).
- New Age*. “CPI Statement on India-China Relations.” September 6, 1959.
- New Age*. “P.P.H Statement.” June 5, 1961.
- “Organisation of India-China Friendship Association Suggestions by Sardar M.

- Panikkar.” External Affairs, National Archives of India, Progs.,Nos. 1(41)-FEA, 1955, 1955.
- Parliament Digital Library. “Rajendra Prasad Address To Parliament: 8 February 1960,” n.d. [https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4029/1/prasad\\_08\\_02\\_1960.pdf](https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4029/1/prasad_08_02_1960.pdf).
- Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1963.
- “QUESTION NO.3692 NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST POLICY.” Accessed May 13, 2024. <https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/31673/QUESTION+NO3692+NEIGHBOURHOOD+FIRST+POLICY>
- Rau, Benegal N. “4th Session 222nd Plenary Meeting, 21st September, 1949 Speech by Sir Benegal N. Rau.” Permanent Mission of India to the UN New York, n.d. [pminewyork.gov.in](http://pminewyork.gov.in).
- Renmin, Ribao. “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy.” *Peking Review*, May 12, 1959.
- “Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation.” Ministry of External Affairs, April 11, 2005. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6567/Report+of+the+IndiaChina+Joint+Study+Group+on+Comprehensive+Trade+and+Economic+Cooperation>.
- “Reports in Chinese Intrusion in 1981.” Ministry of Home Affairs, 1987. National Archives of India.
- “Record of Discussion That PM and FM Had with Wang Ping-Nan, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in March 1978.” Ministry of External Affairs, 1978. National Archives of India.
- “Sixth Session Tenth Lok Sabha Debates (Vol. 21, Issue No.3).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, April 27, 1993.
- “Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.1).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 8, 1962.
- “Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No. 4).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 12, 1962.
- “Third Session Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series, No.9).” Lok Sabha Secretariat, November 19, 1962.
- “Twelfth Lok Sabha Debates Second Session (Vol. 2, Issue No. 3).” Lok Sabha

Secretariat, May 29, 1998.

“The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section III 1961-62.” CIA, May 2007

*World Press on Chinese Aggression*. External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1963.

### Secondary Sources

Krishnappa, M.V, P.N Thapar, Tarlok Singh, R.J Kalamkar, and S.R Sen. *Report of the Indian Delegation to China of Agricultural Planning and Techniques*. Delhi, Manger of Publications, Government of India Press, 1956.

<http://archive.org/details/dli.ministry.20755>.

“12th National Film Awards.” Directorate of Film Festivals, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, September 14, 2011.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Film\\_Award\\_for\\_Second\\_Best\\_Feature\\_Film#cite\\_note-12thaward-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Film_Award_for_Second_Best_Feature_Film#cite_note-12thaward-8).

Ahlawat, Dalbir, and Lindsay Hughes. “India–China Stand-off in Doklam: Aligning Realism with National Characteristics.” *The Round Table* 107, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 613–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2018.1530376>.

Aiyengar, SRR. “A Perspective on India-China Relations.” *Claws Journal*, 2010, 9–21.

Akbar, M.J. “Is India Still Paying for Nehru’s China-Submissive Policy?” *Open The Magazine* (blog), June 26, 2020. <https://openthemagazine.com/cover-story/is-india-still-paying-for-nehrus-china-submissive-policy/>.

Al Jazeera. “India Says Ties with China Can’t Be Normal with Border Tension.” Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/china-fm-india-surprise-trip-first-since-2020-border-clashes>.

Allauddin, Hongsong Liu, and Raja Qaiser Ahmed. “The Changing Dynamics and New Developments of China–Pakistan Relations.” *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (March 2020): 73–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419901195>.

Anand, Dibyesh. “Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory .” *Journal of Defence Studies* 6, no. 4 (2012): 229–48.

———. “Strategic Hypocrisy: The British Imperial Scripting of Tibet’s Geopolitical Identity.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 1 (2009): 227–52. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20619680>.

Andreyev, Alexandre. “Indian Pundits and the Russian Exploration of Tibet: An

Unknown Story of the Great Game Era.” *Central Asiatic Journal* 45, no. 2 (2001): 163–80. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41928260>.

Appadorai, Angadipuram, and Mannaraswamighala Sreeranga Rajan. *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*. South Asian Publishers, 1985.

Arora, S. K. “The Area Of Peace.” *The Australian Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1955): 57–63. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41416485>.

Astarita, Claudia. “China and India: Rivals or Partners? An Analysis of the Background of the Interactions between the Two Major Emerging Asian Powers.” *Transition Studies Review* 14, no. 3 (December 2007): 545–61. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-007-0158-8>.

Athale, A. A. “Can China and Pakistan Launch a Kargil-like Foray?” Rediff.com, October 12, 2011. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-can-china-and-pakistan-launch-a-kargil-like-foray/20111012.htm>.

Athale (retd), Colonel Anil. “Exclusive: What Provoked the India-China War?” Rediff.com, October 16, 2012. <https://www.rediff.com/news/special/exclusive-what-provoked-indias-war-with-china/20121016.htm>.

Azeemi, Haris Raqeeb. “55 Years of Pakistan-China Relationship.” *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007): 109–24. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41500066>.

Bahadur , Manmohan. “It’s a Myth IAF Wasn’t Used in 1962 War. Helicopter and Transport Fleets Were Deeply Involved.” ThePrint, October 23, 2022. <https://theprint.in/opinion/its-a-myth-iaf-wasnt-used-in-1962-war-helicopter-and-transport-fleets-were-deeply-involved/1179119/>.

Bahadur, Manmohan. “We Are Not in 1962 and We Are Militarily Strong, but India Can’t Afford a Piecemeal Approach to Doklam Style Events.” The Times of India, July 7, 2017. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/we-are-not-in-1962-and-we-are-militarily-strong-but-india-cant-afford-a-piecemeal-approach-to-doklam-style-events/>.

Bajpae, Chietigj. “China-India Relations: Regional Rivalry Takes the World Stage.” *China Security* 6, no. 2 (2010): 3–20.

———. “The Panda and the Peacock.” *China Security* 3, no. 4 (2007).

Bajpai, Kanti. *India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends*. Juggernaut Publication India, 2021.

Bajwa, Mandeep Singh. “The Battle of Rezang La.” Hindustan Times, November 27, 2012. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/chandigarh/the-battle-of-rezang-la/story->

yIbVEheR2d5S9Xe1bSfKYI.html.

Balazs, Daniel. "Wars, Fought and Unfought : China and the Sino Indian Border Dispute." National Technological University, 2021.

Bambawale, Gautam, and Tanvi Madan. "How India Sees China's Ties with Pakistan and Bhutan." Brookings, November 1, 2023. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-india-sees-chinas-ties-with-pakistan-and-bhutan>.

Banerjee, Ajay. "Why No Official Remembrance of 1962." The Tribune, November 27, 2022. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/features/why-no-official-remembrance-of-1962-455165>.

Banerjee, P. "Fleeing Tezpur (Special Series: 40 Years after the Sino-Indian 1962 War)." Rediffmail, November 11, 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/11chin.htm>.

Banerjee, Purnendu Kumar. *My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India*. Clarion Books, 1990.

Basu, Partha Pratim. *The Press and Foreign Policy in India*. Lancer's Books, 2003.

Becker, Avi. "Building Up a Memory: Austria, Switzerland, and Europe Face Holocaust." In *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, edited by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, 67–120. Georgetown University Press, 2010.

Belanger, Jean Francois. "Balancing Strategies and the China-India Rivalry." In *The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era*, edited by T. V. Paul and Han Zhen, 95–116. Georgetown University Press, 2018.

Bell, D. *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*. Springer, 2006.

Benvenuti, Andrea. "Constructing Peaceful Coexistence: Nehru's Approach to Regional Security and India's Rapprochement with Communist China in the Mid-1950s." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 91–117. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2020.1721063>.

Berger, Thomas. Review of *Review of The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*, by Yinan He. *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 4 (2010): 720–22. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25767110>.

Bhabha, Homi. "Letter, Homi Bhabha to Jawaharlal Nehru," August 2, 1963. Wilson Centre Digital Archive.

Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "Introduction." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A*

*Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, Vol. 1. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs Geetika Publishers, 2018.

Bhasin, Avtar Singh. "Fall of Kuomintang." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 16–32. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. "India, Tibet and China—A Historical Perspective." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 1–15. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. "India-China Agreement on Tibet." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 133–56. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———, ed. *India's Foreign Relations-2008 Documents*. New Delhi: Public Diplomacy Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2009.

———, ed. *India's Foreign Relations-2010 Documents*. New Delhi: Geetika Publishers in Cooperation with Public Diplomacy Division Ministry of External Affairs, 2011.

———. "India-Tibet Frontier." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 186–247. Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. *Nehru, Tibet and China*. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. "Nehru-Zhou Summit, April 1960." In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 260. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———, ed. "Note by the Prime Minister on the Policy towards Tibet." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:121. 2018. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, n.d.

———, ed. "Note of the Government of the Republic of India on the Question of Tibet Delivered by the Indian Ambassador in Peking 28 October, 1950." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 372–73. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

———, ed. "Note on the Meeting Held by the Prime Minister with Foreign Secretary, KM Panikkar, Political Officer on 30th December 1949 to Discuss 'Policy on Tibet.'" In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:217–18. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

———, ed. "Reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on 30 October, 1950, to the Memorandum and Note of the Indian Government on the Question of Tibet." In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 374–75. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika

Publishers, 2018.

———, ed. “Some Aspects of American Policy in China.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:136–40. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

———. “The Chinese Occupation of Tibet.” In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 81–113. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. “The Tibet Conundrum.” In *Nehru, Tibet and China*, 61–80. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

“Foreign Dept. File No.7/2/NEF/48 Secret.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, 1:97. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.

Bhasin, Madhavi. “India’s Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 3, no. 4 (2008): 72–88.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340757>.

Bhaskar, Uday C. “From 1962 to 2020, India’s China Error .” *Hindustan Times*, October 19, 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/from-1962-to-2020-india-s-china-error-analysis/story-2x1ACo1KvSJUSEz6zjTC7H.html>.

———. “Total Recall Needed to Avoid Same Old Mistakes.” *The Tribune*, October 20, 2022. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/total-recall-needed-to-avoid-same-old-mistakes-443545>.

Bhat, Sudhakar. “The Phase of Friendship.” In *India and China*, 9–19. New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1967.

Bhattacharya, Abanti. “Sixty Years of India–China Relations.” *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 5 (August 27, 2010): 678–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2010.501583>.

———. “Sixty Years of India–China Relations.” *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 5 (August 27, 2010): 678–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2010.501583>.

Bhattacharya, Pallab . “Wound of 1962 Has Healed: Kalam.” *Rediff.com*, February 3, 2006. <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/kalam/20060203.htm>.

Bhattacharyya, Abhijit. “1962 to 2022: No Lessons Learnt on Tackling China.” *Deccan Chronicle*, December 16, 2022.

<https://www.deccanchronicle.com/opinion/columnists/151222/abhijit-bhattacharyya-1962-to-2022-no-lessons-learnt-on-tackling-ch.html>.

Bhonsale, Mihir. “Understanding Sino-Indian Border Issues: An Analysis of Incidents Reported in the Indian Media.” *ORF Occasional Paper*. New Delhi: ORF, February

2018. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-sino-indian-border-issues-an-analysis-of-incidents-reported-in-the-indian-media>.

Bhuyan, Manash Pratim. “IAF Airlifted over 68,000 Soldiers to Eastern Ladakh Following Galwan Valley Clashes in 2020.” *The Times of India*, August 14, 2023. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/iaf-airlifted-over-68000-soldiers-to-eastern-ladakh-following-galwan-valley-clashes-in-2020/articleshow/102700244.cms>.

Blanco Pitlo, Lucio, and Amruta Karambelkar. “India’s Perception and Response to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: Views From Indian Mainstream Media.” *Asian Politics & Policy* 7, no. 4 (October 2015): 667–71. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12214>.

Borders, William. “India to Send Ambassador To China, First in 15 Years.” *The New York Times*, April 16, 1976, sec. Archives. <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/04/16/archives/india-to-send-ambassador-to-china-first-in-15-years-joyous.html>.

Brahma Chellaney. “China Adds Muscle to Its Foreign Policy.” *Stagecraft and Statecraft* (blog), January 6, 2008. <https://chellaney.net/2008/01/06/china-adds-muscle-to-its-foreign-policy/>.

Budrytė, Dovilė. “Memory and World Politics.” In *International Relations*, by Dovilė Budrytė. Oxford University Press, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0273>.

Business Today. “China to Invest \$30 Billion for Infra Development in Tibet over next 5 Years,” March 9, 2021. <https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/world/story/china-to-invest-30-billion-for-infra-development-in-tibet-over-next-5-years-290330-2021-03-09>.

Buzan, Barry. “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, no. 1 (2010): 5–36. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615778>.

Chacko, Arun. “Chinese Premier Li Peng’s India Trip Renews Ties.” *India Today*, December 31, 1991. <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/diplomacy/story/19911231-chinese-premier-li-pengs-india-trip-renews-ties-815250-1991-12-30>.

Chacko, Priya. *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*. Routledge, 2013.

Chakravarti, P.C. “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai.” In *India’s China Policy*, 58–74. USA: Indiana University Press Bloomington, 1962.

———. “India Faces China in Tibet.” In *India’s China Policy*, 45. USA: Indiana

University Press, Bloomington, 1962.

Chakravarty, Ipsita. “How British Ambiguity about Frontier between India and China Paved Way for a Post-Colonial Conflict.” *Scroll.in*, June 27, 2020.

<https://scroll.in/article/965502/how-british-ambiguity-about-frontier-between-india-and-china-paved-way-for-a-post-colonial-conflict>.

Chakravorty, Pk. “Sino-Indian War of 1962.” *Indian Historical Review* 44, no. 2 (December 2017): 285–312. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0376983617726649>.

Chan, Minnie. “PLA Got Ready to Fight after Gunfire Exchange with Indian Troops, Sources Say.” *South China Morning Post*, September 16, 2020.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3101663/china-india-border-dispute-pla-raised-combat-readiness-after>.

Chatterjee, Shibashis, and Udayan Das. “India’s Civilizational Arguments in South Asia: From Nehruvianism to *Hindutva*.” *International Affairs* 99, no. 2 (March 6, 2023): 475–94. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad020>.

Chaubey, Santosh. “When China’s Mao Zedong Wanted to Crush Jawaharlal Nehru Alleging Indian Interference in Tibet.” *India Today*, August 5, 2017.

<https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-mao-zedong-jawaharlal-nehru-india-tibet-nikita-khrushchev-doklam-standoff-1028190-2017-08-05>.

Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. “PSUs, Govt Bodies Sensitised to Chinese Investment, Tech.” *The Economic Times*, June 7, 2023.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/psus-govt-bodies-sensitised-to-chinese-investment-tech/articleshow/100802613.cms?from=mdr>.

Chauhan, Rishika. “Differences Not Disputes India’s View of the Border after 1962.” In *Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations*, edited by Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, 180–95. UK: Routledge, 2020.

Chellaney, Brahma. “China Wants War with India, Make No Mistake.” *Daily O*, August 16, 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/china-war-xi-jinping-doklam-18991>.

———. “China’s Himalayan Salami Tactics.” *Project Syndicate*, March 9, 2021. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/xi-jinping-salami-tactics-himalayas-south-china-sea-by-brahma-chellaney-2021-03>.

———. “India, the Lamb State.” *Rediff*, June 2, 2004. <https://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/02spec1.htm>.

———. “The Dragon’s Chicanery behind the Smile.” *The Pioneer*, October 23, 1996.

Chervin, Reed. “‘Cartographic Aggression’: Media Politics, Propaganda, and the Sino-

Indian Border Dispute.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22, no. 3 (2020): 225–47.  
<https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/6/article/762896>.

Chinoy, Sujan. “Indian Armed Forces.” *Yojana: A Development Monthly*, 2022.

Choudhury, Ishfaq Ilahi. “Liberation War 1971: Geo-Political Fallout.” *Daily Star*, December 16, 2009.  
<https://archive.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2009/december/victorydayspecial/page09.htm>.

Chowdhury, Adhir Ranjan. “Chinese Intrusion in Ladakh Has Created a Challenge That Must Be Met.” *The Indian Express* (blog), June 17, 2020.  
<https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/resolve-and-prudence-india-china-border-dispute-galwan-valley-ladakh-6462309/>.

Chung, Tan. “Changing Images of India: Through the Eyes of Chinese Culture.” In *Across the Himalayan Gap: A Chinese Quest for Understanding India*, edited by Chung Tan, Minqiu Zhang, and Ravni Thakur, 3–26. India International Centre, 2013.

Claude, Arpi. *Tibet : The Last Months of a Free Nation India Tibet Relations (1947-1962)*. Vij, 2017.

Cohen, Stephen P. “India’s China War and After: A Review Article.” Edited by G. S. Bhargava, B. V. Karnik, B. M. Kaul, S. S. Khera, and P. V. R. Rao. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 30, no. 4 (1971): 847–57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2052995>.

Colley, Christopher K., and Prashant Hosur Suhas. “India–China and Their War-Making Capacities.” *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (April 2021): 33–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797021993962>.

Commuri, Gitika. *Indian Identity Narratives and the Politics of Security*. SAGE Publications, 2010.

Confino, Alon. “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method.” *The American Historical Review* 102, no. 5 (1997): 1386–1403.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2171069>.

Dai, Chaowu. “China’s Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962.” *Asian Perspective* 43, no. 3 (2019): 435–57. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0022>.

———. “From ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ to ‘International Class Struggle against Nehru: China’s India Policy and the Frontier Dispute, 1950-62.’” In *The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives*, edited by Amit R. Das Gupta and Lorenz M. Lüthi. Abingdon Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2017.

Dalvi, J. P. “Faulty Higher Direction of War.” In *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-*

- Raiser to the Sino-Indian War Of 1962*, 441–42. New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1969.
- . *Himalayan Blunder (The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962)*. Thacker & Comp., 1969.
- Damodaran, Harish. “On Road to Viksit Bharat, India Should Target per Capita, Not Aggregate, GDP. Here’s Why.” *The Indian Express* (blog), April 1, 2024. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-economics/viksit-bharat-india-gdp-per-capita-china-comparison-economy-growth-9245440/>.
- Das, Durga, ed. “Relations with China.” In *Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945-1950*, 10:342–47. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1974.
- Deepak, B. R. “India and the People’s Republic of China 1949-1959: A Decade of Mistrust and Diplomatic Manoeuvrability.” In *India & China, 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, 131–35. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005.
- . “Making of Common Borders: Chinese Expansionism in the Himalayan Regions.” In *India & China, 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, 32–60. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005.
- . “The Making of Common Borders: British Expansionism in the Himalayan Region.” In *India & China, 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, 1–28. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005.
- Deepak, B.R. “India and China: Contemporary Issues and Challenges.” *Journal of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation* 7, no. 3–4 (December 2013): 110–32.
- . “India-China Relations 1905-1947: An Era of Anti-Imperialist Struggle.” Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1996. <http://hdl.handle.net/10603/17137>.
- Deshingkar, Giri. “The Nehru Year Revisited.” In *Across the Himalayan Gap*, edited by Tan Chung and Ravni Thakur, 498–511. New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, Gyan Publishing House, 1998.
- Devi, A. Chaya. “Indian Books of the Quarter.” *India Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1963): 94–104. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45068279>.
- . “Indian Books of the Quarter.” *India Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1963): 412–25. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070524>.
- Dey, Swati. “This Festival Showed India’s Freedom Movement Through Films.” Youth Ki Awaaz, September 3, 2016. <https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2016/09/independence-day-film-festival/>.
- Doherty, Hannah Hartig and Carroll. “Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11.” *Pew Research Center* (blog), September 2, 2021.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>.

Duara, Prasenjit. "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism." *Journal of World History* 12, no. 1 (2001): 99–130. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078879>.

Dutt, Gargi. "India and China: A Reappraisal of Their Relations." *India Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (1975): 1–10. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070194>.

Dutt, Subimal. *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*. Minerva Associates, 1977.

Dutta, Amrita Nayak. "All about Special Frontier Force, the Secretive Indian Unit in News after Ladakh Clash." ThePrint, September 6, 2020. <https://theprint.in/defence/all-about-special-frontier-force-the-secretive-indian-unit-in-news-after-ladakh-clash/496660/>.

———. "Explained: China's 'Xiaokang' Border Defence Villages along the LAC, Now Being Occupied." *The Indian Express* (blog), February 15, 2024. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-xiaokang-border-defence-villages-lac-9163202/>.

Dutta, Prabhask K. "What Is China's Salami Slicing Tactic That Army Chief Bipin Rawat Talked About?" India Today, September 7, 2017. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/doklam-china-salami-slicing-army-chief-general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07>.

Dutta, Sujan. "George Does a Chinese 'Pirouette.'" The Telegraph Online, January 29, 2003. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/george-does-a-chinese-pirouette/cid/844086>.

Dutta, Sujit. "Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunachal." *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 4 (July 18, 2008): 549–81. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802215562>.

———. "Scars of 1962." *The Hindu*, October 27, 2002.

Fang, Tien-sze. *Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Fazal-ur-Rahman. "Pakistan's Relations with China." *Strategic Studies* 19/20 (1998): 55–89. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45182307>.

Financial Express. "Arun Jaitley Response to China Warning: India of 2017 Different from That of 1962," June 30, 2017. <https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/arun-jaitley-response-to-china-warning-india-of-2017-different-from-that-of-1962/742933/>.

Finney, Patrick. "The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International History." *The International History Review* 36, no. 3 (2014): 443–72.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24703184>.

Fisher, Margaret W., and Joan V. Bondurant. *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*. Vol. 1. University of California: Berkley Institute of International Studies, 1956.

Frankel, Francine R., and Harry Harding, eds. *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement*. Oxford University Press, 2004.

“From Ramnath Goenka to Mahavir Tyagi.” In *SWJN, October 1962-November 1962*, 79:829–30. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

Fu, Zhengyuan. “Continuities of Chinese Political Tradition.” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 24, no. 3 (September 1991): 259–79. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592\(91\)90027-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(91)90027-4).

Gallantry Awards, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. “Battle of Rezang La,” n.d. <https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/>.

Gan, Nectar. “Analysis: China Is Alarmed by the Quad. But Its Threats Are Driving the Group Closer Together.” CNN, May 23, 2022.

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/china/quad-summit-china-threat-analysis-intl-hnk-mic/index.html>.

Ganguly, Rajat. “India’s Military: Evolution, Modernisation and Transformation.” *India Quarterly* 71, no. 3 (2015): 187–205. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072753>.

Ganguly, Šumit. “Future Uncertain: Indian Security Policy Approaches the Millenium.” *Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 1 (1997): 221–38.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357481>.

Ganguly, Sumit. “India and China: On a Collision Course?” *Pacific Affairs* 91, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 231–44. <https://doi.org/10.5509/2018912231>.

———. “The Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1989: A View from New Delhi.” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 12 (December 1, 1989): 1123–35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644760>.

Garg, Subhash Chandra. “India’s GDP Gap with US, China Is Widening Alarmingly.” Deccan Herald, July 4, 2023. <https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/india-s-gdp-gap-with-us-china-is-widening-alarmingly-1233747.html>.

Garver, John W. “China and South Asia.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 519 (1992): 67–85. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1046754>.

———. *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. University of Washington Press, 2001.

———. “Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente.” *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 323–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2152324>.

- . “Sino-Indian Relations: The Protracted Contest.” In *In Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, 3–31. University of Washington Press, 2001.
- Ghosh, Ajoy. “National Council Reviews Work, Plans Future Tasks.” *New Age*, February 7, 1961.
- Ghosh, Partha S. “Region without Regionalism: Cooperation in South Asia.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 32 (2016): 114–21.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/44004705>.
- Ghoshal, Baladas. “China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications .” New Delhi: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2013.  
<https://www.idsa.in/monograph/ChinasPerceptionofLookEastPolicyandItsImplications>.
- Glaser, Charles L., Thomas U. Berger, and Mike M. Mochizuki. “Roundtable Discussion of Jennifer Lind’s ‘Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.’” Edited by Jennifer Lind. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 3 (2009): 337–68.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/23418734>.
- Global Times. “India Will Suffer Worse Losses than 1962 If It Incites Border Clash ,” July 4, 2017. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201707/1054925.shtml>.
- Gokhale, Vijay. “A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations,” December 13, 2022. <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/3336738/a-historical-evaluation-of-chinas-india-policy/4135558/>.
- . “The Road From Galwan.” *The Road from Galwan: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30024.9>.
- Gopal, S. “The Formative Ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 11, no. 21 (1976): 787–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4364645>.
- , ed. “To K.M. Panikkar.” In *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN) October 1950-February 1951*, 15:438–42. 2, Part 1. Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1993.
- Guha, Ramchandra. “Jawaharlal Nehru and China: A Study in Failure?” Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series . Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2011.  
<https://www.harvard-yenching.org/research/hyi-working-paper-series-ramachandra-guha/>.
- Gumaste, Vivek. “India and China: It Was a Stab from the Front.” Rediff.com, August 25, 2009. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-a-stab-from-the-front/20090825.htm>.

- . “Why 2017 Is Not 1962.” Rediff, August 8, 2017.  
<https://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-2017-is-not-1962/20170808.htm>.
- Gupta, Amit Das, and Lorenz M. Luthi, eds. “Introduction.” In *The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.
- Gupta, Karunakar. “Distortions in the History of Sino-Indian Frontiers.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 15, no. 30 (1980): 1265–70. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4368898>.
- . “Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier I—1947-1954.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 9, no. 18 (1974): 721–26. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41497054>.
- . “Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse: Its Origin and Significance.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 13, no. 16 (1978): 696–702.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4366549>.
- Gupta, Krishna Prakash. “The Making of China’s Image of India.” *China Report* 15, no. 2 (March 1979): 39–50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944557901500202>.
- Gupta, Shekhar. “1962, a Different Story.” ThePrint, October 20, 2012.  
<https://theprint.in/sg-national-interest/national-interest-1962-a-different-story/544059/>.
- . “Nobody Believed We Had Killed so Many Chinese at Rezang La.” The Indian Express, October 30, 2012. <https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/nobody-believed-we-had-killed-so-many-chinese-at-rezang-la-our-commander-called-me-crazy-and-warned-that-i-could-be-court-martialled/>.
- Gupta, Sisir. “The United States’ Reaction.” *International Studies* 5, no. 1–2 (January 1963): 56–63. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088176300500106>.
- Gupta, Sonika. “Frontiers in Flux: Indo-Tibetan Border: 1946–1948.” *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 77, no. 1 (March 2021): 42–58.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928420983095>.
- Guruswamy, Mohan. “Don’t Forget the Heroes of Rezang La.” The Hindu, November 19, 2012. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Don%E2%80%99t-forget-the-heroes-of-Rezang-La/article12513562.ece>.
- Hagerty, Devin T. “India’s Regional Security Doctrine.” *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (1991): 351–63. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645389>.
- Haidar, Suhasini, and Ananth Krishnan. “India’s Move on Article 370 Is ‘Illegal and Invalid’, Says China.” *The Hindu*, August 5, 2020.  
<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-article-370-abrogation-illegal-says-china/article32275663.ece>.
- Haider, Suhasini, Ananth Krishnan, and Dinakar Peri. “Indian Army Says 20 Soldiers

Killed in Clash with Chinese Troops in the Galwan Area.” *The Hindu*, June 16, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-says-20-soldiers-killed-in-clash-with-chinese-troops-in-the-galwan-area/article61668218.ece>.

Hariharan, R. “India-China Stand-off: Sun Tzu in Action.” *Rediff.com*, May 3, 2013. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-india-china-stand-off-sun-tzu-in-action/20130503.htm>.

He, Yanan. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

———. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Hoffman, Steven. “Perception and China Policy in India.” In *The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement*, edited by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, 33–74. Oxford University Press, 2004.

Hoffman, Steven A. “Decisions of War, Diplomacy and Politics.” In *India and the China Crisis*, 207. London: University of California Press, 1990.

Holslag, Jonathan. “The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 6 (December 2009): 811–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390903189592>.

Hong, Yuan. “China Won, but Never Wanted, Sino-Indian War.” *Global Times*, June 28, 2012. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/717710.shtml>.

IANS. “Few Lessons Learnt from 1962 War.” *Deccan Herald*. Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://www.deccanherald.com/india/few-lessons-learnt-1962-war-2366482>.

India Today. “Commemorating 50th Anniversary of India-China War,” October 18, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/photo/bjp-chief-nitin-gadkari-commemorating-50th-anniversary-of-india-china-war-shahid-shradhanjali-yatra-368472-2012-10-18>.

India Today. “India Pays Homage to Martyrs of 1962 Sino-India War for First Time,” October 20, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-war-defence-minister-ak-antony-indian-air-force-119190-2012-10-19>.

India Today. “India-China Trade Hits All Time High of USD 73.9 Billion in 2011,” January 29, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/business/world/story/india-china-trade-hits-all-time-high-of-usd-739-billion-in-2011-91292-2012-01-28>.

India Today. “India-China War of 1962: How It Started and What Happened Later,” November 21, 2016. <https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/india-china-war-of-1962-839077-2016-11-21>.

India Today. "There Is Certain Amount of Assertiveness by China: PM," November 24, 2009. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/americas/story/there-is-certain-amount-of-assertiveness-by-china-pm-61515-2009-11-23>.

India Today. "When China's Mao Zedong Wanted to Crush Jawaharlal Nehru Alleging Indian Interference in Tibet," August 5, 2017. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-mao-zedong-jawaharlal-nehru-india-tibet-nikita-khrushchev-doklam-standoff-1028190-2017-08-05>.

Indian Express. "Explained: In Archives, Reminder of Galwan in 1962 before the Echo in 2020," July 11, 2020. <https://web.archive.org/web/20200711022836/https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-lac-border-dispute-galwan-valley-clashes-6498462/>.

*Indo-China Standoff: 1962 like Situation or a Short Kargil like Conflict, Where Are We Headed For?* The Economic Times, 2020. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFDTTVYEz\\_Q](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFDTTVYEz_Q).

"Interview To R. K. Karanjia, Editor, 'Blitz', Bombay, at Rawalpindi, September 7, 1972 – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto," September 7, 1972. <https://bhutto.org/index.php/interviews/interview-to-r-k-karanjia-editor-blitz-bombay-at-rawalpindi-september-7-1972/>.

Irani, Cushrow R. "India's Foreign Policy—the Swatantra View." *India Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1967): 16–20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45069178>.

Jacob, Jabin T. "The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute : Sub-National Units as Ice-Breakers." *Eurasia Border Review* 2, no. 1 (2011): 35–45. <https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/50850>.

Jain, Bharti. "No Chinese Intrusion since 2010, Only 'transgressions': Govt." *The Times of India*, August 20, 2014. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-chinese-intrusion-since-2010-only-transgressions-govt/articleshow/40457901.cms>.

Jaishankar, Dhruva. "Survey of India's Strategic Community." Centre for Social and Economic Progress, March 1, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/introduction-survey-of-indias-strategic-community/>.

Jetly, Nancy. "Colombo Proposals and After." In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 220–23. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

———. "Continuing Stalemate 1969-1977." In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 259–63. New Delhi:

Radiant Publishers, 1979.

———. “Invasion and Ceasefire.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 172–86. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

———. “Tension on the Border 1959-1960.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 79–81. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

———. “The Initial Phase.” In *India-China Relations, 1947-1977*, 10–34. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

———. “The Widening Chasm, 1960-1962.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 146. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979.

———. “The Years of Panchsheel 1954-1959.” In *India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy*, 49–54. Radiant Publishers, 1979.

Jha, Prashant. “China Sees Itself as a Superpower, Can’t Be Trusted: Veterans of 1962.” *The Times of India*, June 18, 2020.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-sees-itself-as-a-superpower-cant-be-trusted-veterans-of-1962/printarticle/76438335.cms>.

Jha, Prem Shankar. “The Real Truth about the 1962 China-India War .” Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://www.premshankarjha.com/2014/04/14/indias-most-fateful-election/>.

Joseph, Josy. “What Is the Doklam Issue All About?” *The Hindu*, January 27, 2018, sec. India. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-the-doklam-issue-all-about/article22536937.ece>.

Joseph, Josy, and Atul Aneja. “Rawat in Sikkim as China Demands Troop Withdrawal.” *The Hindu*, June 29, 2017.

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sikkim-standoff-china-asks-army-chief-to-stop-clamouring-for-war/article19180321.ece>.

Joshi, Manoj. “India-China Relations after 50 Years of Sino-India War.” *India Today*, October 14, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/manoj-joshi/story/india-china-relations-after-50-years-of-sino-indian-war-118613-2012-10-13>.

———. “Indo-China Row Signals Breakdown of Confidence Building Measures.” ORF, June 8, 2020. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-china-row-signals-breakdown-of-confidence-building-measures-67469>.

Kalyanraman, S. "India Response to China Threat from 1949." In *India's Great Power Politics: Managing China's Rise*, 49–74. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2021.

Kanwal, Gurmeet. "China's Insecurity Leads to India's NSG Bid Being Blocked Again." *The Quint*, June 28, 2017. <https://www.thequint.com/opinion/china-blocks-india-nsg-bid-again>.

Kapoor, Deepak. "Changing Global Security Environment with Specific Reference to Our Region and Its Impact on the Indian Army." *Journal of Defence Studies* 2, no. 2 (2008): 1–18.

Kapur, Devesh. "Asia's Hierarchies of Humiliation | by Devesh Kapur." Project Syndicate, July 12, 2017. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asia-hierarchies-of-humiliation-by-devesh-kapur-2017-07>.

Karnad, Bharat. "Eyeballing in Doklam or Free Pass to China?" *Security Wise* (blog), July 5, 2017. <https://bharatkarnad.com/2017/07/05/free-pass-to-china/>.

Karnik, V.B. "Chinese Invasion and After." In *Chinese Invasion: Background and Sequel*, edited by V.B. Karnik, 212. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1969.

Katoch, Prakash. "Don't Ever Trust China." *Indian Defence Review* (blog), June 26, 2020. <https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/dont-ever-trust-china/>.

Kaul, Brij Mohan. *The Untold Story*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1967.

Keenleyside, T. A. "Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy." *Pacific Affairs* 55, no. 2 (1982): 210–30. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2757594>.

Kennedy, Andrew. *Nehru's Foreign Policy: Realism and Idealism Conjoined*. Edited by David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743538.013.7>.

Khalid, Asma. "China-Pakistan Nuclear Energy Cooperation: History and Key Debates." *South Asian Voices*, February 12, 2020. <https://southasianvoices.org/china-pakistan-nuclear-energy-cooperation/>.

Khera, Sucha Singh. "Defence Ministers of Independent India." In *India's Defence Problem*, 76–77. Orient Longmans, 1968.

Konwer, Shubhrajee. "India-China Relations: Limited Cooperation and a Chequered Future." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 72, no. 1 (2011): 283–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761828>.

Krishnan, Ananth. "China Plans Another Highway in Aksai Chin." *The Hindu*, July 20, 2022. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-plans-another-aksai-chin->

highway/article65663018.ece.

Krishnaswami, Sridhar. "Nehru Taken for a Ride by Chinese: CIA." Rediff.com, June 29, 2007. <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/cia/20070629.htm>.

Krishnaswamy, Srinivasapuram. "Chinese Threat Is Unlikely to Go Away. India Needs Big Plans for LAC to Save Its Land." ThePrint, July 12, 2020.

<https://theprint.in/opinion/chinese-threat-is-unlikely-to-go-away-india-needs-big-plans-for-lac-to-save-its-land/459105/>.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "The Rise of China." *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 1993.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/rise-china>.

Kumar, Anil. "Rezang La Stands Out." Indian Defence Review, November 12, 2012.

<https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/rezang-la-stands-out/>.

Kumar, Ankit. "Exclusive: Satellite Images Show Galwan Standoff Intensifying." India Today, June 24, 2020. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/exclusive-satellite-images-show-galwan-standoff-intensifying-1692325-2020-06-24>.

Kumar, Rajeesh. "Will the Doklam Standoff Lead to a Second India-China War?" The Diplomat, July 18, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/will-the-doklam-standoff-lead-to-a-second-india-china-war/>.

Kumar, Sanjeev. "China's South Asia Policy in the 'New Era.'" *India Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (2019): 137–54. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48509416>.

Langenbacher, Eric, and Yossi Shain. "Introduction: Twenty-First Century Memories." In *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, edited by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, 1–12. Georgetown University Press, 2010.

Laskar, Rezaul H. "LAC Situation Has 'Eroded Strategic Trust', NSA Doval Tells Chinese Counterpart Wang." Hindustan Times, July 25, 2023.

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/lac-situation-has-eroded-strategic-trust-nsa-doval-tells-chinese-counterpart-wang-101690263141315.html>.

Lebow, Richard Ned, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu. *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*. Duke University Press, 2006.

Li, Li. "India's Security Concept and Its China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 2 (2008): 229–61.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615679>.

———. *Security Perception and China-India Relations*. KW Publishers, 2009.

Li, Xiaobing. *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*. University Press of Kentucky, 2007.

- Limaye, Madhu. "The Sino-Indian War: The Road to Victory." In *The Sino-Indian War: Its Historical and International Background*, 3–11, 1962.
- Lin, Chengjie. "Kang Youwei on India." In *Across the Himalayan Gap: A Chinese Quest for Understanding India*, edited by Chung Tan, Minqiu Zhang, and Ravni Thakur, 39–48. New Delhi: India International Centre, 2013.
- Lin, Minwang. "China's Stance on the Sino-Indian Border Issue and Roadmap for a Resolution." In *India and China: Building Strategic Trust*, edited by Rajiv Narayanan and Prof. Qiu Yonghui, 75–88. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2020.
- Lind, Jennifer. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Cornell University Press, 2011.
- Liu, Zhongyi. "India Still Conserves Frontier Mentality over 1962 Border War with China." *Global Times*, December 13, 2012.  
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/749877.shtml>.
- Loc, Tran My Hai. "India's Security Threats from Chinese Military Funding and Economic Development in South Asia." *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional* 25, no. 2 (November 25, 2023). <https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v25i2.1289>.
- Lohia, Rammanohar. "Some Aspect's of India's China Policy." In *India, China, and Northern Frontiers*, 225–44. New Delhi: Navahind, 1963.
- Lu, Yang. *China-India Relations in the Contemporary World: Dynamics of National Identity and Interest*. Routledge, 2016.
- Lüthi, Lorenz. "Sino-Indian Relations, 1954-1962." *Eurasia Border Review* 3, no. Special Issue (2012): 93–119.  
<https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/50965>.
- Machida, Satoshi. "War Memories and Japanese Citizens' Views toward the Self-Defense Forces." *Contemporary Japan* 33, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 24–40.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/18692729.2020.1852369>.
- Malik, J. Mohan. "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations." *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 13, no. 1 (February 2001): 73–90.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13239100120036054>.
- Malik, Mohan. *China and India: Great Power Rivals*. Boulder, CO: FirstForumPress, 2011.
- . "Eyeing the Dragon: India's China Debate." Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003.
- . "India-China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete." Honolulu: Asia-

Pacific Center for Security Studies, October 2004.  
[https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus\\_articles/how-soft-power-work/](https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus_articles/how-soft-power-work/).

Malik, Preet Mohan Singh, and Constantino Xavier. “Sikkim and the Geostrategic Lessons from Himalayan History.” *CSEP* (blog), March 24, 2022.  
<https://csep.org/blog/sikkim-and-the-geostrategic-lessons-from-himalayan-history/>.

Malone, David M., and Rohan Mukherjee. “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation.” *Survival* 52, no. 1 (March 2010): 137–58.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00396331003612513>.

Mangalagiri, Adhira. “The Culture of Cultural Diplomacy: China and India, 1947–1952.” *China and Asia* 3, no. 2 (February 4, 2022): 202–16.  
<https://doi.org/10.1163/2589465X-030205>.

Mangalagiri, Adhira. “Slave of the Colonizer.” In *Beyond Pan-Asianism: Connecting China and India, 1840s–1960s*, edited by Tansen Sen and Brian Tsui, 29–66. India: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Mankekar, D. R. *The Guilty Men of 1962*. Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968.

Masih, Archana. “China Standoff: ‘The Indian Army Should Stand Firm.’” Rediff, July 18, 2017. <https://www.rediff.com/news/special/china-standoff-the-indian-army-should-stand-firm/20170718.htm>.

Mastny, Vojtech. “The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 3 (2010): 50–90. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26923380>.

Mazumdar, Arijit. *Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia*. Routledge, 2014.

———. “India’s South Asia Policy in the Twenty-First Century: New Approach, Old Strategy.” *Contemporary Politics* 18, no. 3 (September 2012): 286–302.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2012.702973>.

McGlynn, Jade, and Jelena Đureinović. “The Alliance of Victory: Russo-Serbian Memory Diplomacy.” *Memory Studies* 16, no. 2 (April 2023): 227–42.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980211073108>.

“Memorandum of Conversation from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense: Meeting Between Secretary of Defence and Mr. L K Jha,” April 25, 1967. The National Security Archives. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/>.

Menon Krishna, V.K. *India and the Chinese Invasion*. Bombay: Contemporary Publishers, 1963.

Menon, Lt General Prakash. “At LAC, China Is Not Settling ‘disputed’ Borders. It’s

Containing India.” ThePrint, August 29, 2023. <https://theprint.in/opinion/at-lac-china-is-not-settling-disputed-borders-its-containing-india/1735155/>.

———. “At LAC, China Is Not Settling ‘disputed’ Borders. It’s Containing India.” ThePrint, August 29, 2023. <https://theprint.in/opinion/at-lac-china-is-not-settling-disputed-borders-its-containing-india/1735155/>.

Menon, Shivshankar. “What China’s Rise Means for India.” The Wire, January 4, 2016. <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/what-chinas-rise-means-for-india>.

Miller Chatterjee, Manjari. “PII and the Sino-Indian Border Negotiations of 1960.” In *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, 55–81. California: Stanford University Press, 2013.

Miller, Manjari Chatterjee. *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*. Stanford University Press, 2013.

Mishra, Brajesh, and Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. “The ‘Mao’s Smile’ Revisited: Sino-Indian Relations During an Important Period.” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 1, no. 4 (2006): 109–18. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340597>.

Mitra, Devirupa. “China Disputes Indian Version of 2012 Understanding on Border Tri-Junction.” The Wire, August 30, 2017. <https://thewire.in/uncategorised/china-disputes-indian-version-2012-understanding-border-tri-junction>.

Mohan, Geeta. “Modi-Xi Meet: India, China to Issue Separate Statements Today.” India Today, October 12, 2019. <https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/modi-xi-meet-india-china-to-issue-separate-statements-today-1608513-2019-10-11>.

Mohan, Raja C. “Explained Ideas: Why China’s Rise Could Spell the End of the Asian Century.” *The Indian Express* (blog), July 7, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-xi-jinping-asian-century-india-border-dispute-6493584/>.

———. “Nehru’s Realism.” ORF, November 14, 2014. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/nehru-realism>.

Mohan, Raja C. . “Mind the Power Gap.” *The Indian Express* (blog), August 2, 2017. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-china-standoff-mind-the-power-gap-4777926/>.

Mookerjee, Girija K. “Chinese Invasion: The West European View.” *International Studies* 5, no. 1–2 (January 1963): 90–95. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088176300500112>.

Müller, Jan-Werner, ed. *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the*

*Presence of the Past*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Mullik, B. N. *The Chinese Betrayal; My Years with Nehru*. Allied Publishers, 1971.

Nambiar, Devika. “‘Asia Is One’: Understanding the Rise and Fall of Pan-Asianism.” *INSIDE WESTMINSTER* (blog), March 22, 2023. <http://insidewestminster.co.uk/asia-is-one-understanding-the-rise-and-fall-of-pan-asianism/>.

Nanda, B.R. “Nehru and Non-Alignment.” In *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Nanda, B.R. “Introduction.” In *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, edited by B.R. Nanda, 1–23. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976.

Nanporia, N.J. “How Firm Is Firmness.” In *The Sino-Indian Dispute*, 25–28. Times of India, 1963.

Narayanan, Rajiv. “Strategic Competition and Cooperation in South Asia: An Indian Perspective on the Chinese Outreach in the Region.” In *India-China Building Strategic Trust*, edited by Rajiv Narayanan and Qiu Yonghui, 255–66. New Delhi: Vij Books, 2020.

Narayanan, Rajiv, and Prof Qiu Yonghui. *India and China: Building Strategic Trust*. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2020.

Nayar, Kuldip. “A Diary.” In *Between the Lines*, 174. Hind Pocket Books, 1969.

———. *Between The Lines*. Hind Pocket Books, 1969.

NDTV.com. “India, China Relations Complex: Shashi Tharoor,” September 6, 2009. <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-china-relations-complex-shashi-tharoor-401546>.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. “An Evolving Policy.” In *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 42–49. New Delhi: The Publication Division: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.

———. “An Independent Sovereign Republic.” In *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 4–10. India: The Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.

———. “Asia Finds Herself Again: Inaugural Speech at Asian Relations Conference.” In *Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: September 1946-May 1949*, 1:299–305. New Delhi: The Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1958.

———. “Cable to K M Panikkar.” In *SWJN April 1952-July 1952*, 18:471–72. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1996.

- . “Cable to N. Raghavan.” In *SWJN October 1952-December 1952*, 20:449–50. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1997.
- . “Cable to N. Raghavan.” In *SWJN October 1952-December 1952*, 20:488–89. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1997.
- . “Changing India.” *Foreign Affairs*, April 1, 1963.  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1963-04-01/changing-india>.
- . “Extract from the Note by Prime Minister on Policy towards East and South Asia.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:452–53. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.
- . “Ferment in Asia.” In *SWJN, August 1949-November 1949*, 13:320–27. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1992.
- . “I Go to China.” In *SWJN, July 1939 - March 1940*, 10:81–83. 1. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1977.
- . “Ideas for Peace.” In *SWJN, October 1950 - February 1951*, 15, Part 2:373–78. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1993.
- . “India’s Demand and England’s Answer.” In *SWJN, July 1939-March 1940*, 10:273–82. 1. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1977.
- . “Letter of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to C. Rajagopalachari.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:415–16. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.
- . “Note by the Prime Minister Setting the Policy Regarding China and Tibet.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:458–63. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.
- . “Note from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Defence, 16th January 1950.” In *India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study*, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, 1:240–41. New Delhi: Policy Planning Division Ministry of External Affairs, Geetika Publishers, 2018.
- . “The Asian Situation: Note to the Foreign Secretary.” In *SWJN, October 1948 - December 1948*, 8:329–31. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1989.
- . “The Quest.” In *The Discovery of India*, 49–68. Calcutta: Signet Press, 1946.
- . “To Heads of Government 26/27 October 1962.” In *SWJN October 1962-*

*November 1962*, 79:627–28. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

———. “To Pearl S. Buck.” In *SWJN, January 1948- April 1948*, 5:510–11. 2. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1987.

———. “To State Information Ministers’ Conference.” In *SWJN October 1962- November 1962*, 79:93–119. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 2018.

———. “To Thakin Nu.” In *SWJN, November 1949 - April 1950, Part.1*, 14:503–6. 2. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund, 1992.

———. “We Lead Ourselves.” In *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 29–36. India: The Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.

———. “We Wish for Peace.” In *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, 10–12. India: The Publications Division: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.

NTI. “Pakistan Nuclear Overview,” November 5, 2019. <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-nuclear/>.

Ogden , Chris. “‘Enhancing Strategic Mutual Trust’: Decoding Bilateral Relations at the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit .” *China-India Brief #149* . Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, November 14, 2019. <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/center-publications/details/china-india-brief-149>.

Pakula, Hannah. *The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the Birth of Modern China*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009.

Palit, D. K. *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*. London : New York: Hurst ; St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

Palit, Maj Gen DK. “The High Frontiers.” In *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*, 22–45. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991.

Panda, Ankit. “Why China Snubbed India on a Pakistan-Based Terrorist at the UN,” June 25, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-china-snubbed-india-on-a-pakistan-based-terrorist-at-the-un/>.

Panda, Jagannath P. *India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

Panikkar, K.M. “Arrival in Communist Peking.” In *In Two Chinas Memoirs of a Diplomat*, 74–87. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955.

Pant, Harsh. “The India-China Military Matrix and Their Modernisation Trajectories.”

ORF Expert Speak, June 27, 2020. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-india-china-military-matrix-and-their-modernisation-trajectories-68631>.

Pant, Harsh V., ed. *The Rise of China: Implications for India*. Foundation Books, 2012.

Pao, M. Panging. “Heroes of 1962 War in Arunachal: Havildar Govind Kamble .” *The Arunachal Times*, September 25, 2022. <https://arunachaltimes.in/index.php/2022/09/25/heroes-of-1962-war-in-arunachal-havildar-govind-kamble/>.

Paranjpe, Shrikant. “Organizing Ideas for the Development of Order in South Asia.” In *India and South Asia Since 1971*, 1–25. Radiant Publishers, 1985.

Pardesi, Manjeet S. “Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India.” *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 4 (June 23, 2010): 562–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161003802760>.

Pardesi, Manjeet Singh. “Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives.” RSIS Working Papers. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), April 1, 2005. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/76-wp076-deducing-indias-gra/>.

Parnaik, K. T. “The Galwan Syndrome.” *The Times of India*, June 29, 2020. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/the-galwan-syndrome/>.

Parsanis, R V. “Lest We Forget .” Rediffmail, November 26, 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/27chin.htm>.

Parthasarathi, G., ed. In *Letters To Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Volume 2 1950-1952:237–54. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, Oxford University Press, 1996.

Parthasarathy, G. “Lessons from the 1962 Debacle.” BusinessLine. *The Hindu*, October 24, 2012. <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/lessons-from-the-1962-debacle/article64598653.ece>.

Parthasarthy, G. “Lessons from the 1962 Debacle.” BusinessLine, October 24, 2012. <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/lessons-from-the-1962-debacle/article64598653.ece>.

Patabhraman, Lieutenant General S. “Fifty Years After the 1962 Debacle.” *USI CXLI*, no. 590 (December 2012). <https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/fifty-years-after-the-1962-debacle.html>.

Patel, H.M. *The Defence of India: R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture*. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics & Economics, Asia Publishing House, 1963.

Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai. "Letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ." [claudearpi.net](https://www.claudearpi.net), November 7, 1950. [chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/P-18b-Patel-to-Nehru.pdf](https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/P-18b-Patel-to-Nehru.pdf).

Pathak, Sriparna. "Doklam Stand-off in Juxtapose to 1962: An Assessment." *IndraStra Global* 7 (2017): 1–3. [https://doi.org/https:// doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5202805](https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5202805).

Pathak, Sriparna, and Objha Borah Hazarika. "Reasons and Reactions to the Galwan Clash: An Indian Perspective." *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 9, no. 2 (2022): 83–101. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48684190>.

Patil, Sameer. "OBOR and India's Security Concerns: Analysis." *Gateway House* (blog), May 19, 2015. <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/obor-and-indias-security-concerns-analysis/>.

Patil, Sameer Suryakant. "India's China Policy in the 1950s: Threat Perceptions and Balances." *South Asian Survey* 14, no. 2 (December 2007): 283–301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310701400206>.

Patranobis, Sutirtho. "Ladakh Sector's Galwan Valley and Its History in Sino-India Relations." *Hindustan Times*, May 20, 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/when-india-and-china-clashed-in-ladakh-s-galwan-valley-weeks-before-1962-war/story-kjcsT7ILMvbizrOriFuI7L.html>.

Paul, T. V. "Explaining Conflict and Cooperation in China-India Rivalry." In *The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era*, edited by T.V. Paul, 3–26. Georgetown University Press, 2018.

Paul, T.V., and Baldev Raj Nayar. "Nehru's Grand Strategy." In *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status*, 115–58. New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2014.

Peri, Dinakar. "India, China Tensions Continued through 2021 and 2022, New Details Reveal." *The Hindu*, January 16, 2024. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-tensions-continued-through-2021-and-2022-new-details-reveal/article67746294.ece>.

Phadke, Ramesh. "The Two Myths of 1962 ." Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Accessed May 12, 2024. [https://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheTwoMythsof1962\\_RameshPhadke\\_301012](https://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheTwoMythsof1962_RameshPhadke_301012).

Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. "Why India Needs to Draw the Line With China: The Geopolitics of the Sino-Indian Skirmish." *The Diplomat*, June 23, 2020.

<https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/why-india-needs-to-draw-the-line-with-china-the-geopolitics-of-the-sino-indian-skirmish/>.

“PM to Visit Arunachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh on 19th November.” Accessed May 12, 2024. [https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news\\_updates/pm-to-visit-arunachal-pradesh-and-uttar-pradesh-on-19th-november/](https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-to-visit-arunachal-pradesh-and-uttar-pradesh-on-19th-november/).

Pradhan, R. D. “The NEFA Debacle: Enquiry and Report.” In *Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65*, 132–60. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1999.

———. “Unveiling: Any More Secrets.” In *Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65*, 172–73. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1998.

Pradhan, S. D. “Chinese Intent behind the Intrusion into the Indian Territory.” *The Times of India*, April 26, 2013.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/chinese-intent-behind-the-intrusion-into-the-indian-territory/>.

———. “Indian NSA Underlines the Erosion of Strategic Trust While China Weaponizes Its Narrative.” *The Times of India*, July 30, 2023.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/indian-nsa-underlines-the-erosion-of-strategic-trust-while-china-weaponizes-its-narrative/>.

Prasad, Niranjana. *The Fall of Towang, 1962*. Palit & Palit, 1981.

“Programme of Cultural Exchange Between the Government of India and The People’s Republic of China For the Years 2019-2023.” Ministry of Culture, Government of India, 2019.

Pubby, Manu. “After Galwan, IAF’s Airlift Led to Quick Deployment in Ladakh.” *The Economic Times*, August 13, 2023.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iaf-airlifted-over-68000-soldiers-to-eastern-ladakh-following-galwan-valley-clashes/articleshow/102696655.cms?from=mdr>.

Radhakrishnan, S. “A Year of Regeneration.” In *President Radhakrishnan’s Speeches and Writings (May 1962-May 1964)*, 86. Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965.

Radhakrishnan, S. “India and the Commonwealth: Speech on the Occasion of Sir Anthony Eden’s Address to the Members of Parliament, 3 March, 1955.” In *Occasional Speeches and Writings October 1952- January 1956*, 21–25. India: The Publication Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.

Radhakrishnan, S. “The United Nations Day, 24 October, 1953.” In *Occasional*

*Speeches and Writings October 1952-January 1956*, 3–11. India: The Publication Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh. “The Political Consequences of China’s Rise.” ORF, January 5, 2018. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/political-consequences-china-rise>.

Rajagopalan, Rajeshwari Pillai. “An Indian Perspective on China’s Military Modernization .” The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), January 6, 2022. <https://www.nbr.org/publication/an-indian-perspective-on-chinas-military-modernization/>.

Rajan, M. S. “India and World Politics in the Post-Nehru Era.” *International Journal* 24, no. 1 (1968): 138–58. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40199979>.

Raman, B. “India Finally Stands up to China.” Rediff.com, June 22, 2007. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/raman/20070622.htm>.

Ramchandran, Sudha. “Manoj Joshi on Why China Wants Its Border With India to Remain Unsettled,” October 25, 2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/manoj-joshi-on-why-china-wants-its-border-with-india-to-remain-unsettled/>.

Rana, Kishan S. “Scarred by War, Nehru Destroyed Message from Zhou.” Rediff, October 22, 2012. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/scarred-by-war-nehru-destroyed-message-from-zhou/20121022.htm>.

Rana, Satya Paul, ed. *Our Northern Borders: India-China Border Dispute*. Book Times Company, 1963.

———. “Winds of Chinese Expansionism.” In *Our Northern Borders: India-China Border Dispute*, edited by Satya Paul Rana, 1–18. New Delhi: Book Times Company, 1963.

Rao, Amiya, and B. G. Rao. *Six Thousand Days: Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister*. Sterling Publishers, 1974.

Rao, Nirupama. “Borderlines.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 260–85. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. “Buddha Jayanti: An Anniversary Remembered.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 239–46. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. “Fateful Decisions.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 65–90. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

———. “Friends with Benefits.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 158–86. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.

- . “Introduction.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.
- . “Steep Descent.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 134–57. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.
- . “The Decline.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 391–98. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.
- . “The Unravelling.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 306–9. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2021.
- . “Top of the World.” In *The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-1962*, 26–64. New Delhi: Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2022.
- Rao, P.V.R. *Defence Without Drift*. Popular Prakashan, 1970.
- Ray, Kalyan. “Chinese Incursions into India Strategically Planned: Study.” *Deccan Herald*, November 11, 2022. <https://www.deccanherald.com/india/chinese-incursions-into-india-strategically-planned-study-1161264.html>.
- Ray, Sandeep. “Frenemies on Film: Rescreening the Sino-Indian War of 1962.” *Positions* 31, no. 4 (November 1, 2023): 769–801. <https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-10714259>.
- Rediffmail. “Remembering a War : The 1962 India-China Conflict,” 2002. <https://m.rediff.com/news/indochin.htm>.
- Roggio, Bill. “UN Declares Jamaat-Ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group .” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, December 11, 2008. [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un\\_declares\\_jamaatud.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un_declares_jamaatud.php).
- Rose, Leo E. “India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship.” *Pacific Affairs* 42, no. 1 (1969): 32–46. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2754861>.
- Roy, Nabarun. “The Anatomy of a Story Less Told: Nehru and the Balance of Power.” *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2016): 337–58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602153>.
- Roy, Subhjit. “Galwan Clashes Left India’s Relationship with China ‘Profoundly Disturbed’: Jaishankar.” *The Indian Express* (blog), October 17, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/galwan-clashes-left-indias-relationship-with-china-profoundly-disturbed-jaishankar-6757940/>.
- Saalman, Lora. “Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions.” *Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 2 (2011): 169–94. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24385541>.

Sajjanhar, Ashok. "The Doklam Standoff - Should India Project Its Stand More Vigorously?" *Indian Defence Review*, August 13, 2017.  
<https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-doklam-standoff-should-india-project-its-stand-more-vigorously/>.

Samanta, Pranab Dhal. "Chinese Action Violates 1993, 1996, and 2013 Border Agreements." *The Economic Times*, June 18, 2020.  
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-action-violates-1993-1996-and-2013-border-agreements/articleshow/76405795.cms?from=mdr>.

Sandhu, P. J. S., Vinay Shankar, and G. G. Dwivedi. *1962: A View from the Other Side of the Hill*. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.

Sarathy, VRP. "Twice-Decorated Army War Veteran Decodes Doklam Standoff." *Daily O*, August 17, 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/doklam-standoff-india-china-ties-bhutan-1962-war-cag-indian-army-sikkim-pakistan-19015>.

Sawant, Chittaranjan. "Ill-Armed, Ill-Clad, Ill-Trained (Special Series: 40 Years after the India-China War)." *Rediff.com*, October 22, 2002.  
<https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/22chin.htm>.

Sawant, Gaurav C. "India Is No Pushover, We Are Not Scared of China: Salman Khurshid." *India Today*, April 26, 2013.  
<https://www.indiatoday.in/world/neighbours/story/china-india-china-incursion-into-china-border-160085-2013-04-25>.

Schrag, Jacque. "How Is China Modernizing Its Nuclear Forces?" *ChinaPower Project* (blog), December 10, 2019. <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/>.

Scott, David. "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century." *Asian Security* 4, no. 3 (September 23, 2008): 244–70.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850802306468>.

———. "The Great Power 'Great Game' between India and China: 'The Logic of Geography.'" *Geopolitics* 13, no. 1 (February 15, 2008): 1–26.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040701783243>.

Scroll. "Readers' Comments: If War Breaks out with China, India Must Not Lose the Chance to Make up for 1962." *Scroll.in*, August 20, 2017.  
<https://scroll.in/article/847863/readers-comments-if-war-breaks-out-with-china-india-must-not-lose-the-chance-to-make-up-for-1962>.

"Selected Books and Articles on India-China Relations 1949-79." *China Report* 15, no. 2 (March 1979): 119–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000944557901500210>.

- Sen, Tansen. "Introduction." In *India, China, and the World A Connected History*, 1–27. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- . "Pan-Asianism and Renewed Connections." In *India, China, and the World A Connected History*, 293–378. Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- . "The Geopolitical Disconnect." In *India, China, and the World: A Connected History*, 379–469. Rowman and Littlefield, 2017.
- . "The Trust Deficit in India–China Relations." In *Emerging China*, edited by Sudhir T Devare, Swaran Singh, and Reena Marwah, 295–306. Routledge India, 2012.
- Sen, Tansen, and Brian Tsui. "Introduction." In *Beyond Pan-Asianism: Connecting China and India, 1840s-1960s*, edited by Tansen Sen and Brian Tsui, 1–25. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2021.
- "September 11: A Day of Remembrance and Service - NPS Commemorations and Celebrations (U.S. National Park Service)." Accessed May 14, 2024.  
<https://www.nps.gov/subjects/npscelebrates/september-11.htm>.
- Seraphim, Franziska. *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005*. Brill, 2020.
- Set, Shounak, and Harsh V. Pant. "The Himalayan Barrier: India-China Relations since Galwan." *China Review* 23, no. 1 (2023): 135–59.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48717991>.
- Seth, Nareshwar Dayal. "India's Policy Towards China." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 2 (1968): 143–50. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41854262>.
- Sharma, B.M., and L.M. Choudhry. "Chinese Expansionism and India." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 3 (1968): 235–43.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41854278>.
- Sharma, Mala. "India's Approach to China's Belt and Road Initiative—Opportunities and Concerns." *The Chinese Journal of Global Governance* 5, no. 2 (October 14, 2019): 136–52. <https://doi.org/10.1163/23525207-12340041>.
- Sharma, Unnati. "67% Indians Blame China for Covid-19, 50% Say Calling It 'Chinese Virus' Not Racist: Survey." ThePrint, April 6, 2020. <https://theprint.in/india/67-pc-indians-blame-china-for-covid-19-50-pc-say-calling-it-chinese-virus-not-racist-survey/396496/>.
- Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. "Review of Sino-Pakistan Relations (1981-85)." *Pakistan Horizon* 39, no. 1 (1986): 92–106. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393754>.
- Shirk, Susan L. "One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and Policies toward India." In

*The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement*, edited by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, 75–102. Oxford University Press, 2004.

Shrivastava, Anuj. “60 Years of India-China War: It Won’t Be a Cakewalk for the Aggressor Again.” WION, October 20, 2022. <https://www.wionews.com/world/60-years-of-1962-indo-china-war-it-wont-be-a-cakewalk-for-the-aggressor-again-527115>.

Shukla, Ajai. “India Was Whipped in 1962 War, but Won the Peace.” Rediff. Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-was-whipped-in-1962-war-but-won-the-peace/20121016.htm>.

Shukla, Saurabh. “India Makes Concessions on Tibet to China, Beijing Shows No Signs of Reciprocating.” India Today, October 17, 2005.

<https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/diplomacy/story/20051017-india-makes-concessions-on-tibet-to-china-beijing-shows-no-signs-of-reciprocating-786807-2005-10-16>.

Siddiqui, Imran Ahmed. “Veterans Demand Answers.” The Telegraph Online, June 20, 2020. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/india-china-clash-veterans-demand-answers/cid/1782231>.

Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. *China and India: Cooperation Or Conflict?* Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

———. “Imprisoned by History.” In *China and India: Cooperation Or Conflict?*, 9–44. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003.

Singh, Ajay. “With Doklam, Modi Has Exorcised the Ghost of 1962.” Governance Now, August 29, 2017. <https://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/with-doklam-modi-has-exorcised-the-ghost-of-1962>.

Singh, Jasjit. “The Shifting Balance of Military Power in Asia.” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 1, no. 3 (2006): 8–16. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340572>.

Singh, L.P. “Learning the Lessons of History.” In *Securing India’s Future in the New Millennium*, edited by Brahma Chellaney, 1–20. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1999.

Singh, Mayank. “Doklam Disengagement: Is the Dragon Crouching to Strike?” The Times of India, August 31, 2017.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/doklam-disengagement-is-the-dragon-crouching-to-strike/>.

———. “On 1962 War Anniversary, India Fortifies Defence on LAC.” The New Indian Express, November 21, 2022.

<https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/Nov/21/on-1962-war-anniversary->

india-fortifies-defence-on-lac-2520472.html.

Singh, Prashant Kumar. "Book Review: Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India–China Relations by Tien-Sze Fang, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 266, INR 795." *Journal of Defence Studies* 9, no. 4 (December 2015): 145–50.

———. "Transforming India-Taiwan Relations : New Perspectives ." Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Accessed May 9, 2024. [https://idsa.in/monograph/TransformingIndiaTaiwanRelations\\_pksingh](https://idsa.in/monograph/TransformingIndiaTaiwanRelations_pksingh).

Singh, Rahul. "Army Chief Warns of Two-Front War with China, Pakistan: Is IAF Fighting Fit?" *Hindustan Times*, September 7, 2017.

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-chief-gen-bipin-rawat-s-warning-of-two-front-war-with-china-pakistan-is-indian-air-force-fighting-fit/story-qVzpCiHhNm6oDHfFlilCoN.html>.

———. "Rajnath Singh Takes Hard Line on LAC Row, Says It Has Eroded India-China Ties." *Hindustan Times*, April 27, 2023. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indias-defence-minister-raises-border-issue-with-china-s-general-li-shangfu-stresses-on-peaceful-resolution-indiachinaborder-ladakhstandoff-101682606924880.html>.

Singh, Ridipt. "China's Arms Exports in South Asia." CESCUBE, December 10, 2022. <https://www.cescube.com/vp-china-s-arms-exports-in-south-asia#:~:text=China%20has%20sold%20a%20total,to%20its%20close%20military%20connections>.

Singh, Sushant. "A Border Move That Will Only Bolster China." *The Hindu*, February 3, 2022, sec. Lead. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-border-move-that-will-only-bolster-china/article38372591.ece>.

———. "Ladakh Shows That Modi Government Has Learnt the Wrong Lessons from the 1962 War." *Scroll.in*, October 20, 2022. <https://scroll.in/article/1035458/ladakh-shows-that-modi-government-has-learnt-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-1962-war>.

Singh, Swaran. "India–China Relations: Perception, Problems, Potential." *South Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 2008): 83–98. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500106>.

Singh, Vivek. "China's Infrastructure Development Along The Line Of Actual Control (LAC) and Implications for India." *CENJOWS*, January 29, 2024.

Singh, Zorawar Daulet. "Cold War on India's Doorstep, 1954." In *Power and Diplomacy: India's Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, 99–142. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.

- . “Introduction.” In *Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, 1–34. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- . “Nehru’s Role Conception.” In *Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies During the Cold War*, 37–70. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- . *Powershift: India-China Relations in a Multipolar World*. Pan Macmillan, 2020.
- Sinha, P.B, and A A Athale. “History of the Conflict with China, 1962.” History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992.
- Smith, Jeff M. *Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century*. Lexington Books, 2013.
- Sreenivasan, T. P. “India-China Relations Worse than in 1962!” Rediff.com, December 21, 2010. <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-india-china-relations-worse-than-in-1962/20101221.htm>.
- Stolte, Carolien, and Harald Fischer-Tiné. “Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905-1940).” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no. 1 (2012): 65–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428708>.
- Subrahmanyam, K. “Indian Defence Expenditure in Global Perspective.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 8, no. 26 (1973): 1155–58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4362796>.
- . “Indian Security: The Absence of Conceptual Evolution.” *India International Centre Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1996): 79–100. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23003561>.
- Subrahmanyam, K. “Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962.” In *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, edited by B.R Nanda, 103–29. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1976.
- Sullivan, Kate. “Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India’s Moral Leadership Aspirations.” *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 37, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 640–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2014.939738>.
- Sunderlal. *China Today: An Account of the Indian Goodwill Mission to China: September—October 1951*. Hindustani Culture Society, 1952.
- Sunil, Oinam. “Bomdila’s Tales of War & Bravery.” *The Times of India*, November 13, 2012. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/bomdilas-tales-of-war-bravery/articleshow/17204212.cms>.
- . “India Lost War with China but Won Arunachal’s Heart.” *The Times of India*, November 1, 2012. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-lost-war-with-China-but-won-Arunachals-heart/articleshow/17039530.cms>.

Swami, Yogita. "Courage and Valour of Indian Army In Hindi War Movies: Study of Patriotism and Popularity in Post 1962 Era." Manipal University, 2021.  
<https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/339625>.

Syed Muhammad ,Prof. Dr. Sayeda Daud, Prof. Dr. Farooq Aziz. "China- Pakistan Economic Relations: A Review of First Two Decades of 21st Century." *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (December 29, 2020).  
<https://doi.org/10.52337/pjia.v3i2.82>.

Szpilman, Christopher W. A., and Sven Saaler. "Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present アジアの主体性・団結の理想としての汎アジア主義— 1850年から今日まで." *The Asia Pacific Journal, Japan Focus* 9, no. 7 (April 25, 2011): 1–30. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Pan-Asianism-as-an-Ideal-of-Asian-Identity-and-Szpilman-Saaler/1c651103d982c094c238dae65679c6464cfb225c>.

Talukdar, Sreemoy. "Beyond Doka La: India Finally Breaks Free of China's 1962 Prison; This May Change Asia's Power Matrix." Firstpost, August 31, 2017.  
<https://www.firstpost.com/india/beyond-doka-la-india-finally-breaks-free-of-chinas-1962-prison-this-may-change-asias-power-matrix-3991425.html>.

Tamil Guardian. "India Opposes Sri Lanka Buying Arms from China, Pakistan ," June 5, 2007. <https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/india-opposes-sri-lanka-buying-arms-china-pakistan>.

Tanham, George. "Indian Strategic Culture." *The Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 129–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609209550082>.

Taylor, John. "The Chinese Army Is Not Unpredictable like the Pakistan Army." Rediff.com, March 2, 2012. <https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-the-chinese-army-is-not-unpredictable-like-pakistan-army/20120302.htm>.

Tellis, Ashley. "The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know." In *China and India in Asia*, edited by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding. Columbia University Press, 2004.

Tewari, K K. "A POW in Tibet (Special Series: 40 Years after the Sino-Indian 1962 War)." Rediff.com, November 5, 2002.  
<https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/06chin.htm>.

Thampi, Madhavi. "Sectional President's Address: The Discourse on Asia and Asianism in Early Twentieth Century China." *Proceedings of the Indian History*

*Congress* 72 (2011): 1017–28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44145713>.

The Economic Times. *Indo-China Standoff: 1962 like Situation or a Short Kargil like Conflict, Where Are We Headed For?*, 2020.

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFDTTVYEz\\_Q](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFDTTVYEz_Q).

The Economic Times. “Nation Pays Homage to Martyrs of 1962 War for First Time.” October 20, 2012. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/nation-pays-homage-to-martyrs-of-1962-war-for-first-time/articleshow/16888227.cms?from=mdr>.

The Hindu. “70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020],” March 31, 2020. <https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece>.

The Hindu. “Rattha Thilakam (1963).” October 17, 2015, sec. Columns. <https://www.thehindu.com/features/cinema/cinema-columns/rattha-thilakam-1963/article7774391.ece>.

The Indian Express. “A National Government?” October 24, 1962.

The Indian Express. “Anti Nehru-Chou Meeting Campaign Launched.” March 4, 1960.

The Indian Express. “China Betrayed Us, Repeated 1962: Uttarakhand CM,” June 18, 2020. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/china-betrayed-us-repeated-1962-uttarakhand-cm-trivendra-singh-rawat-6464036/>.

The Indian Express. “China’s Rise Poses Challenge: Antony,” April 25, 2012. <https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/china-s-rise-poses-challenge-antony/>.

The Indian Express. “Face-off in Doklam,” July 1, 2017. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/kailash-mansarovar-pilgrims-face-off-in-doklam-4729849/>.

The Indian Express. “In Shadow of 1962 War Debacle, When Nehru Faced a No-Trust Vote,” August 6, 2023. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/in-1962-war-shadow-when-nehru-faced-no-trust-vote-8878631/>.

The Indian Express. “India of 2012 Is Not India of 1962: Antony,” October 18, 2012. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/latest-news/india-of-2012-is-not-india-of-1962-antony/>.

The Indian Express. “Our Northern Neighbours.” October 23, 1962.

.

The Times of India. “60 Years on, Hero of 1962 War yet to Get Centre’s Recognition,”

November 14, 2022. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/itanagar/60-years-on-hero-of-1962-war-yet-to-get-centres-recognition/articleshow/95499104.cms>.

*The Times of India*. “Chinese Incursion in Ladakh: A Little Toothache Can Paralyze Entire Body, Modi Tells Xi Jinping.” September 20, 2014. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinese-incursion-in-ladakh-a-little-toothache-can-paralyze-entire-body-modi-tells-xi-jinping/articleshow/42940337.cms>.

The Times of India. “Indian Army Pays Tribute to Hero of Rezang La Major Shaitan Singh,” November 20, 2022. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jodhpur/indian-army-pays-tribute-to-hero-of-rezang-la-major-shaitan-singh/articleshow/95633213.cms>.

The Wire. “Factcheck: Was the Landmark at Rezang La Dismantled as Part of Disengagement With China?” Accessed May 12, 2024. <https://thewire.in/politics/factcheck-was-the-landmark-at-rezang-la-dismantled-as-part-of-disengagement-with-china>.

ThePrint. *Remembering 1962 India-China War—60 Years of Battle of Walong*, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPtyncltPWc>.

*Time*. “India: Fading Illusions.” November 9, 1962. <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,829317,00.html>.

*Time*. “India: We Were Out of Touch with Reality.” November 2, 1962. <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,874591-1,00.html>.

Times of India. “India Needs to Revisit 1962 Humiliation for Catharsis .” Accessed May 12, 2024. [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-needs-to-revisit-1962-humiliation-for-catharsis/articleshow\\_new/16746349.cms](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-needs-to-revisit-1962-humiliation-for-catharsis/articleshow_new/16746349.cms).

Twitter X. “Sansad TV Heroes of 1962,” July 14, 2022. [https://twitter.com/sansad\\_tv/status/1547445788833464321](https://twitter.com/sansad_tv/status/1547445788833464321).

UNI. “Indian Army Commemorates 60th Year of ‘Battle of Walong.’” <http://www.uniindia.com/news/east/indian-army-commemorates-60th-year-of-battle-of-walong/2844061.html>. Accessed May 12, 2024.

<http://www.uniindia.com/news/east/indian-army-commemorates-60th-year-of-battle-of-walong/2844061.html>.

United Nations Peacemaker. “Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas .” Accessed May 14, 2024. <https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindiaconfidenceagreement96>.

United Nations Peacemaker. “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility

along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas .” Accessed May 14, 2024. <https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindia-borderagreement93>.

Unnithan, Sandeep. “China’s ‘Haqeeqat’: A Stark Documentary on the 1962 War.” *India Today*, October 19, 2012. <https://www.indiatoday.in/1962-indo-china-war-50th-anniversary/story/chinas-haqeeqat-a-stark-documentary-on-the-1962-war-119161-2012-10-18>.

Upadhyaya, Pandit Deendayal. “An Alternative China Policy.” *Deendayal Sansar*, January 11, 1960. <https://deendayalupadhyay.org/policy.html>.

———. “Jana Sangh’s Call For Anti-Appeasement Week Reaction To Nehru’s Invitation To Chou.” *Deendayal Sansar*, February 29, 1960. <https://deendayalupadhyay.org/chou.html>.

Varma, Shanti Prasad. “Ceasefire and After.” In *Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations*, 174. Julunder: Sterling Publishers, 1965.

Vengasserri, Ismail. “Aksai Chin Dispute.” In *1962 Border War: Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes and Beyond*, 31–64. New Delhi: SAGE Publications India Pvt Limited, 2021.

Verghese, B.G. “Fifty Years after 1962.” *Asian Conversations*, 2013. <https://www.asianconversations.com/IndiaChinaWar.php>.

Vinayak, G. “Special Series: 40 Years after the Sino-Indian 1962 War.” *Rediffmail*. Accessed May 12, 2024.

<https://m.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/29chin.htm#:~:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the,there%20is%20no%20such%20shortcoming>.

Wagner, Christian. “From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India’s South Asia Policy.” *South Asia Institute Department of Political Science University of Heidelberg*, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics , 2005. <https://doi.org/10.11588/HEIDOK.00005436>.

Wagner, Rudolf C. “China and India Pre-1939.” In *Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations*, edited by Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho, and Manjari Miller Chatterjee, 35–62. Routledge, 2020.

Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng. “‘Chindia’ or Rivalry? Rising China, Rising India, and Contending Perspectives on India-China Relations.” *Asian Perspective* 35, no. 3 (2011): 437–69. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704764>.

Wang, Zheng. *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. Columbia University Press, 2014.

Yan, Jia. “Writing Friendship: The Fraternal Travelogue and China-India Cultural

Diplomacy in the 1950s.” In *The Form of Ideology and the Ideology of Form*, edited by Francesca Orsini, Neelam Srivastava, and Laetitia Zecchini, 67–98. Open Book Publishers, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0254.02>.

Yun, Sun. “China’s Strategic Assessment of India.” *War on the Rocks*, March 25, 2020. <http://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-india/>.

Zhao, Jing, Zhao Li , and Yaling Guo. “The Development of China-Pakistan Diplomatic Relations.” *Pacific International Journal* 6, no. 1 (2023): 34–39. <https://rclss.com/index.php/pij>.

Zhou, Wen. “Comparing the Economic Growth of China and India: Current Situation, Problems, and Prospects.” *World Review of Political Economy* 5, no. 4 (2014): 455–71. <https://doi.org/10.13169/worrevipoliecon.5.4.0455>.

Zhu, Zhiquan. “China-India Relations in the 21 St Century: A Critical Inquiry.” *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 24, no. 1/2 (2011): 1–16. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41950508>.